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Deglobalization Will Change the Mission of Naval Forces

The following article is adapted from a report for the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, International Studies, Will Technological Convergence Reverse Globalization?

By T. X. Hammes

Since the end of World War II, the United States has consistently supported greater global integration. U.S. leaders saw this as the route to both prosperity and security. After the shock of Korea, the United States consistently forward deployed its armed forces to support this policy. The following decades of increasing global trade seem to validate this strategy. However from 2011 to 2014, manufacturing trade as a percentage of GDP actually flattened and then declined from 2011 to 2014. Services and financial flows followed the same pattern. In its 2016 report, Mackenzie Global Institute reported, “After 20 years of rapid growth, traditional flows of goods, services, and finance have declined relative to GDP.”

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Figure 11

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Figure 3 Hammes

Many analysts contend these are short term trends and soon trade will resume growing. In contrast, this article will argue that the convergence of new technologies is dramatically changing how we make things, what we make, and where we make them. These technologies plus trends in energy production, agriculture, politics, and internet governance will result in the localization of manufacturing, services, energy, and food production. This shift will significantly change the international security environment and in particular the role of the U.S. naval forces.

How We Make Things

The cost advantages derived from the combination of robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing is driving production to automated factories. According to Boston Consulting Group, about 10 percent of all manufacturing is currently automated, but this will rise to 25 percent by 2025. This is only the very front end of the shift of labor to automation. A Price Waterhouse Cooper survey showed 94 percent of CEOs who had robots say the robots increased productivity.

Even as robots are changing traditional manufacturing, 3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing, is creating entirely new ways to manufacture a rapidly expanding range of products – from medical devices to aircraft parts to buildings. In April 2016, Carbon3D released the first commercial version of a machine that prints 100 times faster than its predecessors.

Commercial firms are exploiting these advances. United Parcel Service established a fully-automated facility with 100 3D printers to manufacture one-off parts or mass produce thousands of the same part. “UPS can see a major change coming. The concept is simple, local production of a vast number of components will hit the international shipping market hard.”

In fact, Price Waterhouse Cooper surveyed over 100 industrial manufacturers and reported that fifty-two percent of the CEOs surveyed expect 3D printing to be used for high volume production in the next 3-5 years. 

What We Will Make

3D printing will have two other major impacts — mass customization and design for purpose. Rather than stocking the wide variety of parts in the spectrum of colors and finishes they use, a range of industries are looking to maintain only digital files and print on demand. More revolutionary, designers can now design an object to optimally fulfill its purpose rather than to meet manufacturing limitations. General Electric replaced jet engine fuel nozzles made from 18 smaller parts with a single, lighter, stronger, longer lasting, and cheaper 3D printed part.

3D printing can also increase the strength of a product through honeycomb construction, like that of bird bones. Very difficult to make with traditional manufacturing, 3D printing can make them with relative ease. Further, 3D printing can create gradient alloys which expand the material properties of the product. 3D printing can actually improve the performance of existing materials. 3D printed ceramics can have 10 times the compressive strength of commercially available ceramics, tolerate higher temperatures, and be printed in complex lattices, further increasing the strength to weight ratio.

Where We Make Things

The combination of robotics, artificial intelligence, and 3D printing means “on-shoring,” returning manufacturing to the home market, is increasing rapidly. In 2015 survey of CEOs, Boston Consulting Group noted

            –a 17 percent increase in the number that report they are actively reshoring now, which is 2.5 times the number actively reshoring in 2012.

            –31 percent would put new capacity to serve the U.S. in the U.S. versus 20 percent who would choose China.  A reversal from 2 years ago when China was favored 30 percent to 20 percent.

            –71 percent believe that advanced manufacturing technologies will improve the economics of localized production.

The trends noted in Boston Consulting Group’s survey are reflected in the reversal of manufacturing job trends over the past two decades. The United States lost manufacturing jobs every year from 1998 to 2009 — a total of 8 million jobs. But in the last six years, it regained about 1 million of them.

Co-location reduces shipping and inventory costs. It also allows closer interaction between design and manufacturing which speeds the design, test, build, employ, and improve cycle. General Electric just finished building an Advanced Manufacturing Works right next to a large manufacturing plant to both take advantage of proximity and learn more about how to maximize that benefit.

Hal Sirkin, an analyst with Boston Consulting, predicts “you’re going to see more localization rather than more scale… I can put up a plant, change the software and manufacture all sorts of things, not in the hundreds of millions but runs of five million or ten million.” The bottom line is that more and more products will be produced locally, which will steadily reduce the need for international trade in manufactured goods.

Service Industries Are Coming Home Too

Service industries are following suit as artificial intelligence takes over more high order tasks. Pairing AI with humans has resulted in lower costs (fewer humans) and higher customer satisfaction for United Services Automobile Association’s call center.

Nor is artificial intelligence limited to routine call center tasks. This year the Georgia Institute of Technology employed a software program named “Jill Watson” as a teaching assistant for an online course without telling the students. All of the students rated Ms. Watson as a very effective teaching assistant. None guessed she wasn’t human. Baker & Hostetler, a law firm, announced it has hired her ‘brother,’ Ross, also based on Watson, as a lawyer for its bankruptcy practice.

Artificial intelligence is already handling tasks formerly assigned to associate lawyers, new accountants, new reporters, new radiologists, and many other specialties. In short, non-routine tasks – whether manual or cognitive – will still be done by humans while routine tasks – even cognitive ones – will be done by machines.  And this is not a new phenomenon, computer technology has been eating jobs since 1990. 

Figure 4 Hammes

With labor costs much less of an issue, better communications links, better infrastructure, more attractive business conditions, and effective intellectual properly enforcement, services are returning to developed nations. The few, more complex questions that require human operators are better handled by native language speakers intimately familiar with the culture. 

Only the First Step?

The changes in manufacturing and services may be only the first step in de-globalization. Electric/hybrid vehicles, alternative energy technologies, and increased energy efficiency are reducing the global movement of coal and oil. While starting from a small base, renewable energy — wind, solar, thermal — is growing very rapidly.  In 2014, 58.5 percent of all new additions to global power systems were renewables. In 2015, 68 percent of the new capacity installed in the United States was renewable. As vehicle fuel efficiency, hybrids, and all-electric vehicles improve, Wood Mackenzie suggests that U.S. gasoline demand could fall from 9.3 million barrels/day to 6.5 million barrels/day by 2035. Fracking, alternative energy, and new efficiencies have already dramatically reduced the U.S. need for imported energy. If other nations can make similar advances in these areas, it will slow and then reduce the global trade in gas and oil.

Agriculture is another area that has seen increased global trade over the last few decades. High value fruits, vegetables, and flowers move from nations with favorable growing conditions to those without. However, indoor farming has begun to undercut this trade by providing locally produced, fresher, organic products. Depending on the product, such farms can produce 11-15 crop cycles per year. A facility in Tokyo produces 30,000 heads of lettuce per day and plans a second plant to produce 500,000 head of lettuce daily within 5 years. Now that the concept has been proven, Japanese firms are putting 211 unused factories into food production.

The industry is not restricted to Japan. A firm in the United States is planning to establish 75 indoor factory farms. Similar urban farms are being built across Europe and Russia. These indoor farms do not require herbicides or pesticides, use 97 percent less water, waste 50 percent less food, use 40 percent less power, reduce fertilizer use, reduce shipping costs, and are not subject to weather irregularities. Scaled-up, these processes will seriously reduce the market for long-range shipping of high value agricultural products. Japanese firms are even experimenting with growing rice in a number of their facilities. 

All of the factors listed above are being reinforced by social pressures to “buy local” to reduce the environmental impact of production. Local production both creates jobs near the consumer and dramatically reduces transportation energy and packaging waste. Indoor farming can almost eliminate the environmental impact of farming on land and waterways.   

A further driver of global fragmentation is the effort by authoritarian governments to segment the internet.  Initially considered an impossible goal, China has steadily improved its ability to control what people can access inside its territory. Totalitarian nations have decided the costs of connectivity exceed the benefits of globalization. Restricted access to the internet will inevitably reduce these nations’ participation in the global economy.

Cumulative Effects

The key question is how much will the sum of shifts in manufacturing, automation of services, localization of power, and food production reduce globalization. Localizing production will dramatically reduce traffic in components and finished manufactured products thus disrupting established trade patterns. Currently we ship raw materials to one country. It puts together the sub-assemblies, packs them, and ships them to another country for assembly. There they complete the assembly and packaging, then ship the packaged product onward to the consuming country. With the emergence of 3D manufacturing, we will ship smaller quantities of raw materials to a point near the consumer, produce them, and then ship them short distances for consumption. Thus reducing international trade. The localization of energy production and return of high value agriculture to developed nations will further reduce global trade.

Other factors are slowing globalization. First, protectionism is growing. Since 2008, more than 3,500 protectionist measures and administrative requirements have been instituted globally. As technology eliminates jobs, the political pressure for protectionism will rise. Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton both oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Its Atlantic counterpart, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is still being negotiated but faces growing political opposition on both sides of the Atlantic. Brexit probably has killed it.

American policy makers and economists still believe global trade is essential. But according to a recent Pew poll, only 17 percent of Americans thought it leads to higher wages, only 20 percent believed it created new jobs. 

Implications for National Security

Since 1945, the United States has pursued globalization for both economic and security reasons. Today, the economic premise of globalization is being challenged by a wide range of political actors. Thus, whichever party wins the next election will likely encourage each of the trends discussed in this paper with tax breaks, trade policy, and administrative actions. The cumulative effect will be to discourage and undermine the case for globalization while potentially strengthening the U.S.-Canada-Mexico trading bloc. Similar pressures may drive nations across the globe to regional trade blocks.

In turn, if globalization no longer has major economic benefits for the United States, then employing U.S. power in an effort to maintain global security will be seen purely as a cost. This will create a very different domestic environment for the practice of U.S. foreign policy. Deglobalization will reduce the American people’s interest in propping up global stability at exactly the time the widespread dissemination of smart, cheap weapons will significantly increase the costs of doing so. Faced with growing social and infrastructure needs, Americans may no longer be willing to underwrite international security with their blood and treasure.

Turning isolationist would reverse over 60 years of American foreign and security policy and radically alter the international security picture. Europeans, already struggling with the implications of Brexit, will have to determine which threat – mass migration or Russian expansion – is the greater one and how they will reach agreement on allocation of security resources. 

Asian nations will also face a very different environment. American presence in Asia has been seen as the major provider of stability and peace for the region. Given China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea, the biggest question for Asian nations will be how to prevent Chinese domination. In a region with no history of military security alliances, the challenges will be extensive. Some Asian states have the capability to rapidly develop nuclear weapons and may choose to do so to provide nuclear deterrence. 

Role of Seaborne Trade in a Regionalized World

Deglobalization will take a decade or two and while it will result in major decreases in international trade, it will not eliminate it entirely. From the U.S. point of view, the import of raw materials and the export of bulk energy, food, and manufactured goods will remain economically important. However, maritime strategists should understand the relatively low percentage of U.S. GDP this represents. In 2014, the United States exported over $1.5 trillion of its $18 trillion GDP. Canada and Mexico accounted for about 35 percent of the total, with most of it shipped overland. The other 65 percent was broadly distributed globally. While 75 percent of those exports by weight were seaborne only 33 percent of exports by value were. This means just under 2 percent of the GDP of the United States was exported by sea and just over 3 percent by air. While mariners faithfully repeat the mantra that 90% of U.S. goods travel by sea, we fail to see the relatively low value to our economy. Thus sustaining support for a global Navy in times of reduced budgets and isolationist sentiment will be a real challenge. Nor will the fact that we import $2.2 trillion per year be a useful argument if isolationist tendencies continue to dominate the political sphere.

So What For The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps

A couple of decades may seem adequate time to prepare if isolationism does come about. It is in fact a very short time for the Department of the Navy. Most of the procurement budgets for the next two decades are effectively obligated to existing and planned programs such as the Ford class, the F-35, and the SSBN replacement. Thus the services must think through how their roles and missions may change in such a future.

Maintaining nuclear deterrence will remain the highest defense priority. However, the combined cost of replacing the triad may force the United States to reconsider whether it needs all three legs. The Navy must be prepared to articulate why the submarine leg of the triad remains important – and deal with the concerns about increasing transparency of the oceans.

In an isolationist America, the next highest priority is likely to be defense of the hemisphere or at least the North American trading block (U.S.-Canada-Mexico). This will require an integrated air, sea, and sub-surface defense of the territory and waters of the region. It will also include protection of undersea fiber optic networks. 

A secondary mission will remain the protection of U.S. trade. Even with these increases in manufacturing and energy exports, U.S. exports will likely remain well less than 10 percent of our national economy. Further, these exports will be focused on developed nations in Asia and Europe perhaps reducing the need for naval forces in other regions. Thus the current emphasis on intensive and extensive engagement with navies around the world will be significantly reduced. However, as always, naval forces will often be the force of choice for protection of U.S. facilities or evacuation of U.S. citizens overseas and this will require forward deployed forces.

In an isolationist future, America will not conduct major land campaigns overseas unless absolutely forced to by strategic need. If America chooses to do so, Navy and Marine forces may be the force of choice for initial deployment. The continuance of the small, smart and many revolution means naval forces will have to rethink how they fight. As Professor and retired U.S. Navy Captain Robert C. Rubel noted in 2013,

“Given the increasing sophistication of defenses and the growing expensiveness (and thus smaller numbers) of traditional strike platforms, such as tactical aircraft, the answer to this problem will increasingly involve new kinds of missiles and other unmanned systems. If the Navy, along with the other services, can evolve to a predominantly missile-based, aggression-disruption posture, U.S. influence may be manifested in the inability of unwillingness of dissatisfied power to try to overturn the international order, either regionally or globally, via military means.”

Thus rather than projecting power to dissuade, enemy naval forces might turn to disrupting the opponent’s ability to project power. The convergence of technologies – artificial intelligence, robotics, 3D manufacturing, and drones – will provide thousands of autonomous weapons able to reach out hundreds of miles and even a few that will range thousands of miles. In short, A2/AD will become much more effective and powerful. Fortunately, it can work both ways; strategic geography heavily favors the United States in any contest with China.

A new, old mission may also evolve – Marine Defense Battalions. Developed prior to WWII, they were formed to rapidly establish anti-air and coastal artillery on critical islands. With the exponential increase in range of drones, ASCMs, cruise and ballistic missiles as well as self-deploying sea mines, such forces could create sea denial areas reaching hundreds of miles into the surrounding waters or close maritime chokepoints. These units could be employed in the first island chain to force the Chinese to fight hard if they want to exit the South or East China Seas. Further, they can be used as models for partner and allied nations that wish to build a relatively inexpensive A2/AD capability to raise the cost to China if it attempts to bully them.

Summary

Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum writes, “The speed of the current breakthroughs has no historical precedent. When compared with previous industrial revolutions, the Fourth is evolving at an exponential rather than a linear pace. Moreover, it is disrupting almost every industry in every country. And the breadth and depth of these changes herald the transformation of entire systems of production, management, and governance.”

The 4th Industrial Revolution will unfold over the next couple of decades, bringing amazing advances in manufacturing and services. There is no doubt the global economy will change in many ways. Manufacturing, services, energy, and agriculture all seem to be moving to localized production. The net effect is slowing and may be reversing globalization. Obviously, this is not a certainty but it is a strong possibility supported by technical, social, and political trends. If this is happening, the basic assumptions undergirding sixty years of post-World War II prosperity and security will change too. Thus the fundamental assumptions about the role of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps must also change. As part of their continuing efforts to understand the future, the services must add this possible future and explore what it means.

Dr. T. X. Hammes is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the U. S. National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. government. An extended version of this article is available here

Endnotes

1. World Bank, “Trade ( percent of GDP), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS/countries/1W-CN-US?display=graph, accessed Mar 29, 2016.

2. World Bank, “Merchandise trade ( percent of GDP), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries?display=graph, accessed Mar 29, 2016. 

3. Matthieu Bussiere, Julia Schmidt, Natacha Valla,  International Financial Flows in the New Normal: Key Patterns (and Why We Should Care), CEPII, Mar 2016, p.5,  http://www.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/pb/2016/pb2016-10.pdf, accessed May 26, 2016.

4. Maximiliano Dvorkin, “Job Involving Routine Tasks Aren’t Growing,” St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2016/january/jobs-involving-routine-tasks-arent-growing, accessed May 25, 2016.

Featured Image: Mariners aboard MSC-chartered cargo ships MV BBC Seattle and MV Marstan conduct cargo operations in Talamone Bay, Italy. (U.S. Navy photo by Matthew Sweeney)

China’s Reactions to the Arbitration Ruling Will Lead It Into Battles It Won’t Win, Part I

The following is a two-part series on China’s possible reactions to the Arbitration Ruling in its dispute with the Philippines. In Part I, the military implications of China’s recent and possible future actions are analyzed. Part II will look at the likely outcome of China using economic and legal leverage to register its displeasure with the ruling.  

By Mark E. Rosen

The Arbitration Panel’s ruling against China on July 12 was a stinging blow to China’s international prestige. China advanced a narrative that it had historic rights to nearly the entirety of the South China Sea (SCS), and that it could prevent states like the Philippines and Vietnam from fishing in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and drilling for oil near their coasts. China also maintained, through its actions, the right to engage in island building and fishing practices which caused severe damage to the marine environment. Since these activities occurred inside of its Nine Dashed Line Claim (9DL), China felt justified in these “internal matters” and told its neighbors in almost evangelical terms that the SCS is their patrimony and that no country or international body has a right to mess in their domestic affairs. On all these counts, the Tribunal disagreed and issued a strong rebuke of China’s activities.  

The few positive signs that China is receptive to peaceful resolution and has moved past the ruling have been overtaken by a number of very disturbing trends which, regardless of which path China ultimately takes, puts it on a collision course with Japan, the United States, or even a much broader group of states. Unless something dramatic emerges as a result of the secret conclave in Beidaihe, the negative developments seem to overwhelmingly demonstrate that China’s gaze is only focused on settling scores with the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines, because these states are responsible for its legal embarrassment and loss of face within ASEAN.  

China’s Negative Reactions to the Ruling

Immediately after the ruling, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a detailed repudiation of the ruling on July 12; declaring that the ruling was “null and void,” “has no binding force,” and that “China neither accepts nor recognizes it.” It also stated that the Philippine’s actions in filing the action were “unilateral” and a “violation of international law,” because the Philippines deviated from its legal commitment in the 2002 ASEAN Declaration of Conduct (DOC) to resolve differences via negotiations. China, in the same breath, reaffirmed its commitment to international law and to peace and stability in the South China Sea. Two days later, the Chinese state media declared the permanent court of arbitration a “puppet” of external forces and that “China will take all necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.” Since then, the following developments have taken place:

  • On July 13, China sent civilian aircraft to two new airports on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef. This action was taken in spite of the Tribunal’s ruling that Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation and part of the Philippine continental shelf, and Subi Reef is a low tide elevation and part of the territorial sea of Itu Aba. In both cases, low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated by China.  
  • On July 13, China’s vice foreign minister asserted, “If our security is being threatened, of course we have the right to demarcate a [air defense identification] zone.”  
  • On July 15, China posted images of its recent overflight of the highly contested Scarborough Shoal by nuclear capable H-6K bombers (and escorts) and announced that such patrols would be a “Regular Practice.”  This announcement came the same day as the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson was visiting his Chinese counterpart, Adm. Wu Shengli.   
  • On July 18, Press reports cited Adm. Wu Shengli as warning the U.S. CNO that future U.S. freedom of navigation operations “will only backfire” and that Beijing will complete its planned land reclamation and reef reclamation and has made “sufficient preparations” to deal with any sovereignty infringements.    
  • On July 19, China’s vice minister of commerce Gao Yan told reporters that trade relations between China and the Philippines were “mutually beneficial,” and added that the government did not endorse calls within China to boycott Philippine products. There were also reports of Chinese activities smashing iPhones and massing protests in front of KFC restaurants in several cities.  
  • On July 24, ASEAN failed to achieve consensus to issue a statement on the Tribunal decision after China’s ally, Cambodia, broke away from a consensus document that was being proposed by the Philippines, Vietnam, and others.
  • On July 25, the United States, Australia, and Japan held a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and issued a statement expressing “their strong support for the rule of law and called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral Tribunal’s Award of July 12 in the Philippines-China arbitration, which is final and legally binding on both parties.” The ministers also expressed opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo including future land reclamation activities.    
  • On July 27, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the Trilateral statement and charged that the statement was not constructive and was “fanning the flames.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang also charged that the U.S., Australia, and Japan have been adopting double standards towards international law which they adopt when it “fits their needs.”   
  • On July 28, The Chinese Defense Ministry announced plans to hold a joint military exercise with Russia in the SCS in September; the first such bilateral exercise in that body of water.   
  • On August 1, China held a significant live fire drill in the East China Sea (ECS) that included the firing of “dozens” of missiles and torpedoes. (AP, Aug 2, 2016).  There were also reports that six PRC coast guard vessels and over 200 fishing vessels swarmed in the vicinity of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  
  • On August 2, Japan’s Ministry of Defense published a white paper describing China’s position on the SCS an object of “deep concern.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called Japan’s paper “full of malice,” “lousy clichés,” and “irresponsible” and a smokescreen to obscure Japan’s expansionist arms policies. This exchange of statements was then followed by North Korea’s firing of a ballistic missile into Japan’s EEZ on August 3.  When the UN Security Council sought to condemn North Korea’s actions, China “curtailed” the Security Council’s actions.
  • On August 2, China’s Supreme People’s Court clarified China’s 2014 Fishing Regulation to the effect that those that engage in illegal activities inside of the waters claimed by China will be arrested and tried as criminals. This decision settled past differences of opinion as to whether China’s EEZ and Territorial Seas empowered Chinese officials to pursue criminal liability for those involved in illegal hunting or fishing in China’s jurisdictional seas. The practical import is that fishing within the 9DL area will be met with vessel seizure and imprisonment.  
  • On August 2, Malaysia joined Indonesia in announcing that they would sink any foreign ships that are fishing in their claimed waters. This statement was a veiled threat to China that had allowed its “fishing militia” to fish in waters claimed by both countries.  
  • On August 6, China sent bombers and fighter jets on patrol in the vicinity of “Scarborough Shoals.” China announced that these flights would be a “regular practice” to “normalize South China Sea combat patrols” to safeguard its sovereignty interests. 

Converging Flash Points

Much like current U.S. presidential campaign antics, it is hard to imagine what is likely to happen next in the high stakes poker game being played out in Asian waters. Taking into account what has happened to date and where China believes that it has leverage, there are three possible ways in which China might lash out: military, economic, and legal.   

Possible Military Moves by China: The Senkakus

The statements by China’s Chief of the Naval Staff and its military activity near the Senkakus suggest that China is employing tactics of intimidation to get Japan to back away from its recent statements over the Tribunal’s decision. It may also be the case that the presence of swarming vessels in and around the Senkakus and the North Korean missile shot (presumably with tacit PRC approval) suggest that China is trying to goad Japan to militarily respond or back off its claims.   

The Senkakus have always been the powder keg of Asia because it features the two leading powers in Asia: one ascending and one arguably in decline both competing on the world stage. Both are rivals for dominance over a tiny scrap of land and associated maritime space which, given the implications for access to fisheries and oil and gas, is not irrational. This is somewhat ironic because the Tribunal decision in China v. the Philippines takes away much of the incentive for the two states to fight over these rocks since they would be enclaved within the continental shelf of one of the two states; most likely Japan. In that case, the rocks themselves and the surrounding territorial sea have much less value that the large continental shelf projections of each country and aren’t worth fighting over. (See, Fixing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Problem Once and For All ).      

It is somewhat curious that China is lashing out at Japan, given that the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue has been rather quiet until recently and the SCS is China’s current problem. Regardless, China would do well to revisit its strategic objectives, especially since the United States declared in April of 2014 that Japan is the lawful administrator of the islands and are within the scope of Article 5 of the 1961 Mutual Defense Treaty. The reaffirmation of solidarity between U.S., Australia, and Japan in the July 25 Trilateral declaration likely provides Tokyo the fortitude it needs to militarily respond if China continues to operate provocatively near the Senkakus.   

Another important point in this calculus is Japanese President Shinzo Abe. Abe stated in 2015 that Japan is a “maritime state” and can “only ensure its own peace and security by actively engaging in efforts to make the entire world a more peaceful and secure place.” Japan’s record 2016 military budget of roughly $42 billion is further evidence of that goal. Japan has a combatant fleet of 131 vessels,  including 3 aircraft carriers, 43 destroyers, and 17 submarines using frontline U.S. tactics and systems. China has substantially more hulls and submarines, but most naval analysts interviewed by the author cite the excellent Japanese submarine force as a likely game changer.

Izumo
Japan’s Izumo-class helicopter destroyer. (AFP)

More important is the will to fight. Japan, as noted, has been greatly increasing its military spending even though its economy has been in the doldrums. According to the OECD, output growth has been slowed by a drop in demand from China and other Asian countries and by sluggish private consumption. This indicates that if Japan is pushed to the point that it must militarily respond, it has three valid reasons for using instant and overwhelming force now. First, Japan’s economy is too fragile to become involved in a protracted war with China. It would need to win fast and win big to reestablish economic dominance within Asia. If China is not dealt a mortal blow and forced to capitulate, it will use its economic leverage to coerce states to suspend trading with Japan. Japan’s trading economy cannot easily weather a suspension of its trade relations – even if the U.S. and Australia remain in their corner. Second, Japan cannot win a military war of attrition with China: it suffers from a lack of hulls, aircraft, personnel, and production capacity.

Like Israel did in the 1967  six-day attack on Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Japan would feel compelled to use its current qualitative advantages to deliver a massive blow to Chinese maritime and air forces to dissuade Beijing from further military incursions in the ECS. In a few years, the military edge could shift to China because of its massive building plans. Third, Japanese domestic politics today would likely support a massive strike. This starts with Japan’s new self-defense law which entered into force in March of 2016 and allows Japan to engage in limited coalition warfare. Also, a 2012 Public Opinion Poll by the Cabinet Office shows a nose-dive in Japanese attitudes towards China. According to a 2013 paper by Stimson Center Analyst Yuki Tatsumi Chinese economic ascendancy has been a source of friction as has been the influx of Chinese citizens into Japan as members of the workforce or as tourists. People complain of the increases in crime by Chinese living and working in Japan and bad manners. Finally, the Japanese public is extremely well read and are likely becoming unnerved and physically threatened by the constant scrambling of Japanese fighters (200 times alone in April – June) to intercept Chinese aircraft, ballistic missile tests by China’s “Puppet” in Pyongyang, and live fire exercises in the Senkakus.       

China needs to ask itself what it is trying to achieve in the ECS. If its intent is to beat Tokyo into submission or lure it into a limited and protracted war of attrition to undermine public support for Abe, it seems very unlikely that Tokyo will take the bait. However, if its intent is to successfully provoke a full-scale military attack, they are likely to be very disappointed, particularly since U.S. forces will be present to backstop the protection of Japan’s homeland. They may also be gravely miscalculating that Japan will only respond to Beijing’s move in a piecemeal  fashion. Japan has an excellent and professional Navy – especially its submarine force – and could deliver a knock-out punch to much of China’s maritime forces.   

Possible Military Moves by China: An Actual or De Facto South China Sea ADIZ  

Until the combat patrols on August 6 near Scarborough Shoal, Beijing’s recent attention seemed focused on the East China Sea. However, while Chinese threats to establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS seemed to have died down, the possibility cannot be reasonably excluded. The question then becomes: does an ADIZ advance China’s campaign to assert its sovereignty in the South China Sea? If China concludes that an ADIZ will send the correct signal that it has sovereignty claims in the SCS, the next concerns are the likely responses and whether or not they can succeed.

The United States was the first country to establish an ADIZ during the height of the Cold War as a way of providing notice to Soviet flights entering the zone near the United States that the United States reserved the right to undertake a radio challenge or dispatch fighter aircraft to ascertain the incoming flights course and intentions if it was not flying on a predetermined flight plan. The United States now has four ADIZs in operation:  the U.S. ADIZ (Continental U.S.); Alaska ADIZ, Guam ADIZ, and Hawaii ADIZ. Upwards of 20 other countries have established these zones adjacent to their coastlines. These zones do not seek to restrict freedoms of navigation or overflight; their sole purpose is to ascertain a particular flights intention to reassure the coastal state that no surprise attack is being launched. When China established its ADIZ in late 2013 over the contested Senkaku islands, it was diplomatically protested because it was overbroad and inappropriate to defend an uninhabited rock as a sort of occupation measure. China’s ECS ADIZ was also criticized for including civil aircraft flying on established flight plans.

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China’s ECS ADIZ declared in November 2013. (Wire Agencies, BBC, Yonhap News)

ADIZs have no explicit foundation in UNCLOS or other international instruments, yet they are regarded as customary and lawful when used for the limited purpose of identifying aircraft near a country’s coastline, not to deny such aircraft their lawful rights of overflight. For this reason, the United States and other countries protested the Chinese ADIZ, since it was established to “control and react to aircraft entering the zone” and warned that aircraft flying in the ECS Zone “must comply” with the requirements to provide detailed identification data and “comply with the instructions” of the zone controller.  

The same legal issues in China’s ECS zone would apply in a SCS Zone. Depending on how it was actually constituted, it would certainly be provocative because it is not associated mainland protection but rather protection of mostly uninhabited rocks and islets from surprise attack. As it relates to military aircraft lawfully operating in the SCS, there is a fear that China will seek to limit military flights to corridors that they can instrument and hold at risk with missiles. There are also the impacts of a large SCS ADIZ and the impact on civil aviation. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the South China Sea is a “Main Truck” for all traffic on “all routes” and there are concerns that added reporting and routing by Chinese civil authorities will impede international air traffic.

The last possibility is that China, through deeds and action, will establish a de facto ADIZ as an adjunct of its promised combat air patrols. It might simply declare that all aircraft flying in the SCS have to provide flight information to Chinese Military authorities or risk interception or being shot down.

In the last analysis, if China were to establish an actual or de facto ADIZ encompassing the SCS and used the same sort of rules as its ECS ADIZ, the United States will almost certainly protest the action and fly combat aircraft into those portions of the ADIZ which are illegitimate. Australia and France are two other states that are also unlikely to stand idly by if a SCS ADIZ is established because of Australia’s longstanding commitment to UNCLOS, order at sea, and also because of the verbal barrage which it received from China following the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue statement. Also, this support from Australia is consistent with the U.S./Australia Security Treaty of 1952 in which security guarantees are triggered by an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties.” Finally, France announced at the Shangri-La Dialogue Forum in June that it would, on its own right, conduct “regular and visible” patrols in the South China Sea. This is logical, because France frequently operates in those waters in conjunction with the protection of its vast South Pacific Territories. The French defense minister has also urged the EU to also join in these patrols to reinforce “a rules-based maritime order.” Great Britain, Vietnam, and India are other countries voicing public support for the ruling and could conceivably contribute to a “FON Coalition.”  

If China goes forward with an ADIZ, it is very reasonable to expect that the United States, France, Australia and even Japan will mount FON-like operations to protest with the zone’s establishment. If these operations are “regular and visible” as suggested by France, China would need to ask itself whether or not it is is achieving its political objectives when foreign aircraft can operate with impunity in their new ADIZ. Also, if China continues to engage in persistent combat patrols around Scarborough Shoal, then a declaration that the United States that regards Scarborough to be within the scope of the “metropolitan territory” of the Philippines under Article V of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is both possible and a fresh challenge to Beijing that would cause it embarrassment.         

China puts itself greatly at risk if it moves forward with an ADIZ or something resembling it given the widespread international support for the Tribunal Ruling, abhorrence with China’s behavior towards its neighbors, and general concern that China’s bad behavior be deterred. Now that the U.S. has bed down rights in five bases in the Philippines adjacent to the South China Sea, it has gained a significant military advantage in being able to operate fixed wing combat aircraft from land locations to conduct its own FON operations or combat patrols that don’t put a carrier at risk. China’s ADIZ gamble might have paid off if only the United States were involved so that it could “declare victory” in a future contacts with U.S. ships or aircraft such as the EP3 incident. However, given the threat dynamic and the potential to trigger alliance support from Australia and France, China will hopefully conclude that it will be biting off more than it can chew by going down the ADIZ path or, as noted above, further provoking Japan in the East China Sea.   

A maritime and international lawyer, Mark E. Rosen is the SVP and General Counsel of CNA and holds an adjunct faculty appointment at George Washington School of Law. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of CNA or any of its sponsors.   

Featured Image:Japanese submarine Oyashio arrives at the former U.S. naval base in Subic bay. (AFP)

After Distributed Lethality – Unmanned Netted Lethality

Distributed Lethality Topic Week

By Javier Gonzalez

Distributed lethality was introduced to the fleet in January 2015 as a response to the development of very capable anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and sensors specifically designed to deny access to a contested area. The main goal is to complicate the environment for our adversaries by increasing surface-force lethality—particularly with our offensive weapons—and transform the concept of operations for surface action groups (SAGs), thus shifting the enemy’s focus from capital ships to every ship in the fleet. Rear Admiral Fanta said it best: “If it floats, it fights.” The real challenge is to accomplish this with no major funding increase, no increase in the number of ships, and no major technology introductions. The Navy has successfully implemented this concept by repurposing existing technology and actively pursuing long-range anti-ship weapons for every platform. An illustrative example of the results of these efforts is the current initiative to once again repurpose Tomahawk missiles, currently used for land strikes, as anti-ship missiles. The next step in the evolution of distributed lethality will be to deploy similar force packages and introduce new technology. The introduction of  Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) technology is the kind of technological advancement that enhances distributed lethality. NIFC-CA combines multiple kill chains into a single kill web agnostic of sensors or platforms. In the near future, hunter-killer SAGs will deploy with these very capable networks and bring powerful and credible capability into the A2/AD environment

The first hunter-killer SAG deployed earlier this year. It was comprised of three destroyers and a command element. This recent SAG mirrors the World War II “wolf pack” concept—not just a disaggregated group of destroyers in theater under a different fleet commander, but a group of ships sailing together with an embarked command element. The embarked command element is key because, coupled with the concept of “mission command,” it allows the hunter-killer SAG the autonomy required to fully realize effects in a command and control denied environment.

While there is no argument that distributed lethality is a sound short-term strategy, the enemy has a vote and will adjust. The real challenge for the Navy then is to continue finding ways to innovate and rapidly incorporate new technologies such as unmanned systems to ensure that distributed lethality does not yield to distributed attrition. The best way to prevent distributed attrition is to fully integrate unmanned technologies into the fleet to ultimately transform distributed lethality into a new concept, hereby referred to as Unmanned Netted Lethality. 

Evolving Distributed Lethality

In the near future, a hunter-killer SAG will bring a more powerful and lethal force package into the fight with the partial integration of unmanned systems. A near-future force package could include a NIFC-CA capable DDG with an MH-60R detachment, littoral combat ships with scan eagle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and an anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel (ACTUV)- DARPA’s latest unmanned vessel built with a sensor package optimized to track submarines. These new capabilities bring  unprecedented flexibility to  warfighters, and commanders in theater will have additional options to tailor adaptive force packages based on the perceived threat or mission.

The next step in the evolution of distributed lethality will be to add more advanced weapons to every ship—from energy weapons to the rail gun—and fully incorporate unmanned systems into  future force packages. The ultimate vision is hunter-killer SAGs comprised of unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, and UAVs under the command of a single manned ship. These unmanned platforms will create a massive constellation of sensors and weapons that will transform every ship in the Navy into a lethal, flexible, and fully distributed force to reckon with—the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept.

It is evident that the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept relies on the aggressive development and integration of unmanned, and eventually fully autonomous, systems into the fleet..  Controlled autonomy is fundamental for the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept to be effective.  While autonomy brings many benefits, there are concerns as well—unintended loss of control, compromise by adversaries, accountability, liability, and trust, to name a few. The solution to mitigate these concerns is to manage the level of autonomy with a manned ship as an extension of the commanding officer’s combat system. Employing various levels of autonomy control, from completely manual to completely autonomous, gives the power to the decision makers to set the level of autonomy based on the prevailing circumstance and allows unmanned system utilization in any environment.   

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SOUTH CHINA SEA (Feb. 19, 2015) – Sailors assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, Detachment 2, prepare an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned autonomous helicopter for flight operations aboard the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Conor Minto) 

The mission will drive the level of autonomy. For instance, 20 years from now, during the first Unmanned Netted Lethality hunter-killer SAG deployment and while transiting in safe waters, the command ship will control the operations of an unmanned vessel until it is in restricted waters. Then, the commanding officer will change the level of autonomy into a cooperative mode in which the unmanned systems quickly create a constellation of passive and active sensors to increase overall maritime awareness. Once a crisis transitions into combat operations, the commanding officer will place the unmanned systems into a fully autonomous status with two primary missions: sense and destroy  enemy forces while protecting the manned ship by creating a lethal cluster around it. This layered approach to autonomy increases overall trust in unmanned systems in a responsible and palatable way for decision makers who are unquestionably accountable for the performance of these unmanned systems.

Cooperative independence is also an important feature, in which unmanned systems will perform complex tasks, both individually and in groups under the supervision of a commanding officer. Not one unmanned system should rely on another; if a system is destroyed or is taken off-line, each system should be able to continue with the mission independently but cooperatively with remaining systems.

Without a doubt and due in great part to the proliferation of unmanned systems, interoperability remains the hardest challenge to overcome. The bottom line is that these systems need to be developed with common and open software architecture to minimize interoperability challenges and maximize employment opportunities. The need to convey these requirements early in the acquisition process is fundamental so that new unmanned systems are designed with three primary characteristics: controlled autonomy, cooperative but independent functionality, and complete interoperability.

A Roadmap to Guide Change

Distributed lethality’s initial charter was to increase performance with no technology leaps, significant funding increase, or number of ship increases while having immediate to near-future effects. In the short term, this goal is achievable. However, in the near to long-term future, the Navy should continue to follow former General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch’s advice “Change before you have to.” The Unmanned Netted Lethality concept provides the Navy with a vision and a roadmap to guide the evolution of distributed lethality into the future. Incorporating unmanned systems into an Unmanned Netted Lethality concept will transform every manned ship in the Navy into a force package with a credible conflict changing capability.

Commander Javier Gonzalez is a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and a career Surface Warfare Officer. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of John Hopkins University or the Department of the Navy.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Feb. 6, 2012) Scan Eagle, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), sits on the flight deck after a successful test aboard the Whidbey Island-class amphibious dock-landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) during a certification exercise (CERTEX).  (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Lauren G. Randall/ Released)

Riding A New Wave of Professionalization and Militarization: Sansha City’s Maritime Militia

By Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson

On 21 July 2013, several dozen Sansha City “residents” stood before the city government building and swore oaths during an inspection by Mayor Xiao Jie (肖杰) and his military counterpart Garrison Commander Cai Xihong (蔡喜宏). Clad in militia uniforms and toting Type-56 assault rifles, the Sansha Maritime Militia was officially established to uphold Chinese interests throughout the Paracels and beyond. According to the Garrison Commander, Sansha City’s Maritime Militia are given five major missions in China’s struggle for maritime rights protection: regular declarations of sovereignty, conducting reconnaissance and patrols, cooperating with maritime law enforcement, participating in marine rescue, and supporting combat operations. They also repel foreign fishing vessels, safeguard islands and reefs, and provide disaster relief for civilians living there. Such missions represent important, evolving roles for the militia as China seeks to reinforce its claims to the South China Sea. Sansha’s Maritime Militia is on the frontlines of this effort given the municipality’s responsibility for administering all Chinese-claimed features in the South China Sea.

We previously examined in depth the maritime militia forces of Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen (Parts One and Two). No examination of the maritime militia of Hainan Province would be complete, however, without scrutinizing the Sansha Maritime Militia. As China’s newest, southernmost municipality, Sansha City is a critical node in China’s South China Sea strategy. Given its responsibility to administer all of China’s claimed features within the nine-dashed line by Beijing, Sansha lies at the apex of Chinese civilian presence in the South China Sea and efforts to exercise administrative control over China’s claimed waters. To better grasp the range of tools China uses to achieve such control, deeper understanding of Sansha’s Maritime Militia is necessary. 

Most importantly, recent organizational developments concerning the Sansha Maritime Militia demonstrate a new professionalization and militarization of China’s elite maritime militia forces. Indicators of increased professionalization include hiring recently separated veterans, standardization and enhancement of training, and in some cases lack of clear fishing responsibilities in return for payment of salaries. Key indicators of increased militarization include preparations to make small arms rapidly available to deploying units according to mission requirements, construction of new bases, deployment for non-commercial purposes, and introduction of new classes of vessels with dedicated weapons and ammunition storage rooms, reinforced hulls, and water cannons.

Significantly, the Sansha Maritime Militia is being created from scratch using personnel that receive extremely generous guaranteed salaries—seemingly independent of any fishing or marine industrial activity on their part, a dedicated arrangement that we have not seen elsewhere. This represents a significant departure from what we have described previously regarding the maritime militias at Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen. These militias were formed and evolved over years if not decades, drawing upon the community’s resident skills and resources. The majority of such militia members engaged in fundamentally civilian economic activities with occasional additional purposes assigned through a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chain of command, including military law enforcement-style activities. While these three elite militias remain important to Chinese “rights protection” activities, Sansha City’s new, purpose-built militia may in the future be even more so.

With logistics and maintenance facilities, as well as family housing, Woody Island has been transformed into something akin to a regional hub base. Other facilities in the Paracels offer the Sansha Maritime Militia sites to deploy for rotational operations. The Sansha Maritime Militia’s organizational structure is increasingly military-like. It is formally organized and operated in a joint, three-layer structure that incorporates China’s three major sea forces, with maritime militia forces on the front line, Coast Guard forces on the second line, and China’s naval and military forces as a third line backstop. Finally, the Sansha Maritime Militia may have front-line responsibilities in the Spratlys in addition to its responsibilities in the Paracels. Alternatively, it may serve as a model for the development of another new leading militia specific to that area, much as the Sansha Maritime Militia seems to have drawn inspiration in part from the Tanmen Maritime Militia. Sansha City Mayor Xiao, who led a delegation to inspect the Tanmen Maritime Militia on 15 November 2013, is in fact a former Party Chief of Qionghai City—the county level city that administers Tanmen Township. He served there from May 2000 to July 2002, which placed him in a position of responsibility for the development of the Tanmen Maritime Militia. This experience likely gave him some degree of familiarity with the dynamics of local militia building, skills that may later have assisted him during the buildup of the Sansha Maritime Militia.

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Sansha Maritime Militia conducting a nighttime inspection of a vessel whose crew was deemed guilty of “rights infringement and illegal fishing.” (National Defense)

The Sansha municipality and a divisional-level PLA garrison were created on 24 July 2012. This involved reorganizing what were previously small “Paracels Militia” (西沙民兵) platoons established by the Paracels Working Committee into the new Sansha Maritime Militia. Lu Le, a Paracels Militia member since 2003, proclaimed that the reorganization catalyzed considerable change, including greater intensity and specialization in training. The scattered fishing communities that live permanently and semi-permanently in the Paracels often hail from different areas, raising challenges for maritime militia organization. The fishermen were not steadily present on the islands and returned to disparate cities along China coasts. To preserve cohesion among the maritime militia and among the residents on the islands, the Sansha City government provides fishermen with stipends and other material support to encourage sustained habitation there. In early 2016 Mayor Xiao stated that the Sansha City government spends ten million RMB (approx. $1.5 million USD) annually to support fishermen transitioning to more permanent livelihoods on the islands in response to deteriorating fish stocks and declining incomes. The government pays stipends to people living on the islands in amounts varying by their island of residence. For example, each person living in the Crescent Group earns 45 RMB ($6.79 USD) per person a day, providing they stay on the islands for 180 days of the year. Those residing on Mischief Reef for 150 days of the year earn 80 RMB ($12.07 USD) per day. Various government-provided benefits foster a more permanent population and generate a relatively stable community from which ranks of the maritime militia can be drawn.  

Efforts to populate the islands have benefited the maritime militia. The force was relatively small when Sansha City was established, with only two maritime militia companies—each responsible for protecting a portion of the islands and reefs in the Paracels. Expanding mission requirements led to an expanded force. Now there are six maritime militia companies with more than 1,800 personnel and 100 fishing vessels. Sansha fishermen have also joined a “law enforcement coordinating team” composed of 30 personnel and five boats. Between its inception and June 2015, the Sansha Maritime Militia conducted 228 missions to report information, expel foreign fishing vessels, prevent foreigners from landing on the islands, and conduct rights protection and stability maintenance.

According to Garrison Commander Cai Xihong, Sansha City’s civilian and military leaders and the maritime militia were recognized for their role in what they refer to as the “Zhongjiannan Security Operation” (中建南安保行动). Chinese maritime forces conducted these maneuvers south of Triton Island when China’s HYSY-981 oil rig was placed in the Zhongjiannan Basin in May 2014. The Sansha City and Garrison leadership established a sea command post and sent a command and coordination group to the China Coast Guard’s “forward command post at sea” (海上前线指挥所) to coordinate efforts among the maritime militia and other task forces operating in the “theater” (战区). While confrontation erupted around HYSY-981, Sansha’s Maritime Militia forces were also engaged in protecting other areas of the Paracels from encroachment by foreign fishing vessels. In support of this “security operation,” militia members reportedly confiscated short-wave radios and binoculars from detained foreign fishing vessels.

As has been observed in other operations involving China’s maritime militia, the former Guangzhou Military Region issued mobilization orders to local commands in Hainan Province which in turn mobilized maritime militia units from various localities to participate in this security operation. Sansha City’s close proximity to the site of the Chinese operation around HYSY-981 suggests the reason why the theater command required Sansha City to commit Maritime Militia resources to the joint effort. While coordination occurred and the Sansha Maritime Militia reportedly completed its portion of the operation, it remains unclear exactly what tasks Sansha’s Maritime Militia performed.

Assembling a New Fleet

While stationing militia units on the islands and reefs and using the militia units to patrol around them remain priorities, efforts are underway to establish a state-owned maritime militia fishing fleet that can work in more distant waters at the behest of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Accordingly, the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company (三沙市渔业发展有限公司) was established in February 2015. Authoritative sources demonstrate that this company is explicitly meant to serve as a maritime militia organization to “develop maritime rights protection capabilities” for Sansha City.

According to an article in the June issue of National Defense magazine, the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company will organize its vessels into maritime militia units as follows. “The fisheries company will form a flotilla (支队), subsidiaries will set up squadrons (大队), production [groups] will set up companies (中队), and individual vessels will be squads (区队).” (The characters of each unit-level are included because of inconsistent translation of Chinese terminology for units.) The fisheries company will also establish its own People’s Armed Forces Department (PAFD), primarily responsible for managing the “steel-hulled militia fishing vessels.” This fisheries company is different from more commercially oriented fishing enterprises that apply to enter the maritime militia. An online job recruitment posting for this company notes that hiring military veterans is a priority for all positions on board each vessel and offers substantial salaries. Paying a salary represents a departure from the widespread practice by which income is paid as a share of the vessel’s catch plus fuel supplements and performance bonuses. This departure suggests two things. First, that China is professionalizing some units of the maritime militia. And second, that the parent companies may essentially be front organizations, rather than primarily commercial enterprises.

Under this new rubric, ‘patriotism’ pays well for Sansha militiamen. For example, the position of crewmen (水手) advertises an annual salary of 90,000 RMB ($13,494 USD). This compares very favorably to the average annual net income of a Hainanese fishermen, which stands at only 13,081 RMB ($1,961 USD) according to China’s 2014 Fisheries Yearbook. The same posting advertises an annual salary of 170,000 RMB ($25,489 USD) for captains, which is highly competitive by Chinese standards and provides far greater purchasing power than the same salary in the United States or another Western economy. Each advertisement also offers insurance, retirement, medical, unemployment and living benefits for every position, referred to as “five social insurance and one housing fund” (五险一金) according to the standards of similar enterprises under Hainan’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. Regular maritime militiamen are typically compensated by local governments for income lost due to service or training, and incentivized with preferential treatment, Party membership, subsidies and potential pensions; but do not receive a salary. Thus, compensation for regular maritime militia units does not match the compensation of a salaried position aboard these new vessels. Furthermore, when juxtaposed with the salary of a second lieutenant (Platoon Leader) in the PLA Ground Force of around 36,000 RMB ($5,413 USD) as reported by the People’s Daily, the relatively high salaries advertised by the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company indicate that China is devoting tremendous resources to hire professional maritime militia personnel.

As reform of the PLA forces the retirement or separation of 300,000 of its personnel, positions in the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company offer continued service, a competitive salary, and robust social welfare benefits, seemingly without relation to any catch performance. The career trajectories of two individuals who are current Sansha Maritime Militia members—Xu Zhuang (许状) and Liu Jianqiang (刘坚强)—serve as useful examples. Xu served in Fisheries Law Enforcement starting in 1994, but applied to join the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company in 2014. He won the position of captain within the newly forming militia fleet. When Xu led a trip to the Spratlys in November 2013, he reported a foreign fishing vessel approaching one of the PRC features and assisted maritime law enforcement forces in expelling the vessel. Liu served in a PLA Army vessel transport unit until he was demobilized three years ago. He has since joined the ranks of the Sansha Maritime Militia. 

Although construction has not yet started, one proposal submitted to the Hainan Provincial Government in early 2015 reveals a great deal about plans to build up this state-owned militia fishing fleet. The proposal involves development of a new port to act as a strategic rear area for Sansha City, specifically to act as a logistics base for the 84 militia fishing vessels allocated to Sansha City by Hainan Provincial authorities. According to the proposal, ten of these vessels were delivered in 2015, with 70 more expected to be delivered in 2016. Concerned about the fragile environment of Woody Island and the inability of Hainan’s other fishing ports to support this large militia fleet, the proposal makes a case for the appropriation of 20 sq. km of coastal land in Wenchang City’s Puqian Township on Hainan Island’s northern coast, to be designated as a strategic rear area for Sansha City. Hainan Governor Liu Cigui, deputy governor Mao Chaofeng (head of the leading small group overseeing the project) and Sansha City Mayor Xiao Jie have all verified that this project is receiving “special preferential policies.” Currently in the planning phase, the project is also included in the 2016 Hainan Provincial Government Work Report. That the project is included in these reports indicates high political support for the project’s construction as part of a larger plan to develop the Mulan Bay area. The port facility will likely be equipped to support the operations of the Sansha Maritime Militia fleet, with specifics yet to be determined.

Until the new port is built, the militia fleet remains based out of the various fishing ports of Hainan. For example, the Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor that opened 1 August 2016 provides ample mooring for some of the Sansha Maritime Militia. The link embedded here contains aerial footage of the fleet moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor.

18 June 2016: Newly-built fishing vessels for Sansha City moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor. Note the exterior hull reinforcements and mast-mounted water cannons. Image source: Hainan Government
18 June 2016: Newly-built fishing vessels for Sansha City moored at Yazhou Central Fishing Harbor. Note the exterior hull reinforcements and mast-mounted water cannons. (Hainan Government)
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Map depicting locations mentioned in this article. Source of original baseline image:  Sansha City Government.

In keeping with his position as local Party-State leader, Mayor Xiao Jie appears to be spearheading development of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. In October 2015, Xiao hosted a forum with prominent private fishing companies from Hainan and other provinces to foster cooperation and learn from their experience. One of the six key points Xiao made was to strengthen cooperation in maritime rights protection. In demonstrating his leadership role, Xiao inspected the company in early July 2016. Reflecting the PLA practice of having political instructors of company-sized units also serve as company Party branch secretaries, political instructor Zhang Jun (one of the company Party branch secretaries) pledged to resolutely execute the guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Central Party while working in the South China Sea. With six of the company’s Party branch secretaries in his meeting room, Xiao emphasized the fishing company’s responsibility to protect China’s maritime rights and interests. This structure of six Party branch secretaries corresponds to the six company-sized units of maritime militia reported by Garrison Commander Cai in June 2015, further indicating that the Sansha Fisheries Development Company is a dedicated, professional maritime militia organization.

28 June 2016: Sansha City Mayor Xiao holds a meeting with Party Secretaries of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. Image source: Sansha City Government
28 June 2016: Sansha City Mayor Xiao holds a meeting with Party Secretaries of the Sansha City Fisheries Development Company. (Sansha City Government)

Photos of newly-built Chinese fishing vessels with hull designators “Qiongsanshayu” (琼三沙渔), indicating that they are fishing vessels belonging to Sansha City, have recently received attention on Chinese Internet websites. They look quite different from the average Chinese fishing vessel, bearing comparatively robust hull designs with additional rub strakes (“rub-rails”) welded onto the hull’s steel plating aft of the bow. Such pronounced rub strakes are generally uncommon on Chinese fishing vessel hulls and appear to be added to mitigate damage from potential collisions. These vessels also possess mast-mounted water cannons. Both features could facilitate more aggressive close-in tactics, such as shouldering, ramming, and spraying. For instance, Captain Lu Wei of Sansha City’s Comprehensive Law Enforcement Ship No. 2 complained in May 2015 of difficulties in pursuing foreign fishing vessels as they are no longer permitted to board and inspect them. His only resort is to issue verbal warnings and to use the ship’s water cannon, which, due to the limited agility of his larger ship, is unable to stay on target. Luckily for Lu and his colleagues, Sansha Maritime Militia units are equipped to fill this gap in “maritime rights protection.” They are able to continuously harass foreign vessels with water cannons thanks to their tighter turning radii and shallower draughts, allowing them to sustain such harassment even when foreign vessels seek refuge in the shallows surrounding disputed features. Demonstrating additional official demand for maritime militia vessel capabilities, Hainan Provincial Military District Commander Zhang Jian wrote in the October 2015 edition of National Defense that priorities for fishing vessels in the maritime militia will be based on larger displacement steel-hulled boats that can reach higher speeds and can sustain collisions (抗冲撞). Existing Chinese fishing vessels already clearly outclassed Vietnamese fishing vessels when they clashed near the HYSY-981 oil rig in May 2014. The features of these new vessels can further ensure that neighboring states’ fishing fleets are repelled successfully in future confrontations.   

One of the shipyards constructing Sansha’s Maritime Militia fleet is a subsidiary of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. Chongqing Chuandong Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd. (重庆川东重工船舶有限公司), located in Sichuan Province far up the Yangzi River, has constructed a large number of Sansha City’s new fleet of fishing vessels. Several navigational warnings issued by China’s Maritime Safety Administration indicated that the twelve hulls listed below left the shipyard and were towed down stream between 16 December 2015 and 3 February 2016, a span of less than two months.

Sansha City Fishing Vessels Departing Chuandong Shipyard

 

Hull Classification

 

Date of Departure
Qiongsanshayu 00209

Qiongsanshayu 00210

 

16 December 2015
Qiongsanshayu 00113

Qiongsanshayu 00115

Qiongsanshayu 00118

 

31 December 2015
Qiongsanshayu 00116

Qiongsanshayu 00119

 

20 January 2016
Qiongsanshayu 00120

Qiongsanshayu 00121

 

22 January 2016
Qiongsanshayu 00122

Qiongsanshayu 00114

Qiongsanshayu 00117

 

1 February 2016
21 December 2015: Fuling Maritime Safety Department posted photos of Qiongsanshayu 00209 and Qiongsanshayu 00210 leaving the Chuandong Shipyard. Additional vessels can be seen under construction in the yard. Image source: Fuling Government
21 December 2015: Fuling Maritime Safety Department posted photos of Qiongsanshayu 00209 and Qiongsanshayu 00210 leaving the Chuandong Shipyard. Additional vessels can be seen under construction in the yard. (Fuling Government)

At least two additional shipyards launched vessels for Sansha City from Guangdong Province—the Huangpu Wenchong Shipyard (中船黄埔文冲船舶有限公司) in Guangzhou and the Xijiang Shipyard (中船西江造船有限公司) in Liuzhou. Both are subsidiaries of China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The two vessels produced by the Wenchong Shipyard, a well-known builder of surface warships for the PLA Navy (PLAN), are the first fishing vessels ever to be produced there. At this rate of production, many if not most of Sansha City’s 84 new fishing vessels will be delivered by the end of 2016. Although an accurate appraisal of the total number of vessels already delivered is difficult, AIS reports from Marine Traffic dating to December 2015 show reported positions of 29 vessels with the name “Qiongsanshayu.”

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On 14 July 2016, the Sansha City Maritime Safety Administration held its first “Sea-Air Three Dimensional’ Joint Rescue Exercise” in waters north of Woody Island. The newly-built militia fishing vessels “Qiongsanshayu 00111” and “Qiongsanshayu 00310” can be seen participating directly in the firefighting and rescue exercise. (Dagong Bao)

The shipbuilding technology service company Guangzhou Taicheng Shipbuilding Industry Co. Ltd. (广州市泰诚船舶工业有限公司) provided interior furnishing for the vessels produced at the Xijiang and Wenchong Shipyards. The page displaying its furnishing work for a vessel produced by the Xijiang Shipyard describes a “weapons and equipment room” (武备室) and “ammunition store” (弹药库) on the main deck of the vessel. Additionally, the image below appeared in a June 2015 feature article on Sansha City in National Defense showing Sansha Maritime Militia members loading crates labeled “light weapons” (轻武器) onto one of the newly delivered fishing vessels. While China’s Maritime Militia is ostensibly an unarmed force, it is apparent that, at a minimum, preparations are underway to arm at least some of its vessels.

Sansha Maritime Militia participate in exercises to load materials on their vessels. 32-kg crates labeled “light weapons” are shown being loaded with cranes. The exercises were also featured on the Guangzhou Military Region Website in September 2015. Image source: National Defense
Sansha Maritime Militia participate in exercises to load materials on their vessels. 32-kg crates labeled “light weapons” are shown being loaded with cranes. The exercises were also featured on the Guangzhou Military Region Website in September 2015. (National Defense)

A new fleet of vessels is only as effective as its crew. Operating on the front-lines of disputed maritime claims, Sansha’s Maritime Militia will need enhanced training and discipline to conduct its assigned missions. Garrison Commander Cai explains that personnel receive training collectively and in smaller groups while stationed on islands, covering topics such political education, reconnaissance, rescue, “assisting in rights protection” and “shooting at sea.” Sansha Garrison Chief of Staff Li Zhaofeng told reporters in January 2016 that Sansha Maritime Militiamen were sent to a training base in Northern Hainan to receive military training. According to Li, they must pass evaluations in subjects on navigation, communications, fishing practices, and legal regulations before they are allowed to sea. Such efforts will be necessary for the maritime militia units to be effective enough to integrate with PLAN and CCG vessels to execute joint defense of China’s maritime claims.

Building a Militia Network to Defend Outposts

An important priority after Sansha City was established was to form the civil-military institutional structures for Party leadership and national defense building in the South China Sea. Institutions established by Sansha City include its National Defense Mobilization Committee (国防动员委员会), Ocean Defense Committee (海防委员会), Military Facility Security Committee (军事设施保护委员会), and a Double-Support Work Leading Small Group (双拥工作领导小组). A routine of military affairs meetings (议军会) also began. “Double Support,” short for “support the army and give preferential treatment to military families, and support the government and cherish the people” (拥军优属拥政爱民), is a policy based on a reciprocal civil-military relationship whereby military and local civilian work units reinforce each other. For example, military units can assist in local construction projects while local governments help facilitate military exercises. These arrangements help ensure Party control over the military in Sansha City, facilitate Party-State-Military cooperation in military-related construction efforts throughout Chinese-occupied features in the South China Sea, and foster valuable synergies between PLA forces and the civilian population. Present at many of these meetings, Sansha City Mayor Xiao Jie is fulfilling his responsibility as First Party Secretary of the PLA Garrison’s Party Committee. He must work alongside Garrison Commander Cai Xihong and Political Commissar Liao Chaoyi (廖朝) to ensure that local military work and construction of the reserves is included in the city’s overall planning, which prominently features matters related to Sansha’s Maritime Militia. There may be no other city in present-day China where the military and civilian populations are so closely linked. Sansha has a high troop-to-civilian ratio stemming from the city’s extremely small population. Not surprisingly, the resources of the central government and military are critical to Sansha City’s development. These dynamics won Sansha City the title of “National Double-Support Model City”—an award for municipalities that provide exceptional support for the military—received by Mayor Xiao in Beijing on 29 July 2016.

An important role for militia units based in China’s border and coastal regions is the participation in military-police-civilian joint defense (军警民联防), a concept included in three of China’s recent Defense White Papers (2013, 2010, 2006). Joint military-police-civilian defense applies Mao Zedong’s People’s War concept to the peacetime security of border and coastal regions through combined use of the PLA, local security or law enforcement forces, and the militia. Sansha City organizes its border and coastal defense in the form of joint defense involving the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia. Such efforts aim to improve coordination between the military and local forces to create three lines of operation for maritime rights protection—a “first line of militia, a second line of administrative law enforcement, supported by a third line of the military.” Manning a first line to advance China’s objectives while limiting escalation, maritime militia forces can confront foreign vessels under support provided by China’s Navy and Coast Guard. Employment of this three-tiered structure of force demonstrates an official institutionalized approach to integrating China’s three sea forces. This concept is the subject of ongoing discussion in the PLA and is already put into practice by such localities as Sansha City. Given the concept’s evolving status, it is unclear how successful it would be if executed as envisioned as a full spectrum of operations. One particular weakness may be command and control in real time in a contested environment.

Essential to managing the maritime militia, PAFDs were reportedly established on several South China Sea islands in January 2015, each of which reports to the Sansha City Garrison. Proliferating in step with the expansion of PRC grass roots governance structures, they are located on three Paracels features: Woody Island (永兴岛), Tree Island (赵述岛), and Drummond Island (晋卿岛). Further south in the Spratlys, a PAFD was established at Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁). Subordinate to China’s Provincial Military Command system, PAFDs are the local PLA organs established in military sub-districts, counties, cities, districts, townships, and enterprises that are responsible for local PLA recruitment and registration work, supporting demobilized troops, and organizing and training the militia. The scant population inhabiting Woody Island and other PRC-occupied features means these PAFDs must be primarily engaged in militia and defense mobilization-related work, rather than conducting the PLA’s grassroots work with the masses. Operational command of the militia belongs to Sansha City Garrison, while the PAFDs are responsible for the regular command and training of Sansha’s Maritime Militia. Additional PAFDs may be established in the future on other PRC-occupied Spratly features. Mischief Reef, for instance, hosts a maritime militia “flag-raising squad,” indicating that elements of the Sansha Maritime Militia are already stationed there.

Sansha City has devoted considerable resources to bolstering its joint defense infrastructure on the islands and reefs in the Paracels. According to Mayor Xiao, Sansha has invested over 40 million RMB ($6 million USD) to construct a joint defense command center, officially beginning construction on 25 July 2015. It provides joint command, training, management and “combat readiness materials storage” (战备物资存储) functions. The project supports information sharing and provides the facilities for the unified organization of maritime law enforcement. Some personnel of the Sansha Maritime Militia are receiving training on how to man this joint defense command center, as depicted below. The exact extent to which command and control is exercised over forces in the South China Sea from this center remains unclear.

23 January 2015: Sansha Government Website features its maritime militia operating workstations of the “Naval, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia Joint Defense System.” Image source: Sansha City Government
23 January 2015: Sansha Government Website features its maritime militia operating workstations of the “Naval, Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia Joint Defense System.” (Sansha City Government)

Local militiamen are assigned the important task of manning militia outposts (民兵哨所) established in border and coastal areas around the country. From these outposts, militia units conduct patrols and defensive missions, and monitor the surrounding areas. Such outposts help secure China’s remote regions and act as eyes and ears for the PLA. On the edge of China’s contemporary frontier, Sansha City’s military authorities are also building militia outposts to secure PRC-controlled islands and reef areas. On 24 July 2015, Sansha City built its first “informatized ocean defense militia outpost” (信息化海防民兵哨所). It is manned around the clock by the maritime militia stationed on Tree Island. This militia outpost supplies data to the joint defense command center on Woody Island and is supported by growing communications infrastructure throughout PRC-occupied islands in the South China Sea. The outpost also reportedly tracks targets in the surrounding seas using AIS, marine radar, and video surveillance. These outposts are built within multi-purpose buildings that also house the PAFDs. Sansha’s civilian and military authorities plan to construct more militia outposts to “upgrade capabilities in maritime rights protection, administrative control of sea areas, and emergency response and rescue.” Drummond Island has also completed its militia outpost and PAFD building and has been approved as a future logistics base. In short, these military functions are being performed by organized professional units often dressed as civilians.

Recent Image of Tree Island and construction of its militia outpost (large red building) and pier. Image source: Chinese Internet Bulletin Board System (BBS)
Recent image of Tree Island and construction of its militia outpost (large red building) and pier. (Chinese Internet Bulletin Board System (BBS)
28 July 2016: Drummond Island finishes construction of its PAFD and militia outpost multipurpose building. Image source: Macao Daily
28 July 2016: Drummond Island finishes construction of its PAFD and militia outpost multipurpose building. (Macao Daily)

Documentation of Sansha Maritime Militia activities and infrastructure in the Paracels Island Group is relatively clear. Chinese open sources reveal much less about related activities in the Spratlys, especially on or around the features China built up since 2014. The PRC has stated clearly that these outposts will support China’s fishing industry, but has not acknowledged the existence of China’s Maritime Militia within this context.

Conclusion: The One to Watch

As this dynamic unfolds, the Sansha Maritime Militia and its newly assembled fleet of dedicated vessels is the most important unit to watch. By decree, it is responsible for patrolling and defending China-claimed features in the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal, and the Spratlys. In future incidents involving the maritime militia in the South China Sea, the Sansha Maritime Militia will likely be the ‘go-to’ unit that Chinese authorities will entrust to enforce claims and confront foreign vessels. Sansha City is making great strides to construct a maritime militia capable of manning and defending PRC-occupied features and venturing into the surrounding seas to uphold China’s maritime claims backed up by the PLAN and China Coast Guard. 

In preparing to fulfill these sweeping responsibilities, the Sansha City Militia is even more militarized in structure, forces, and character than its elite counterparts in Sanya, Danzhou, and Tanmen.

This elite, professional unit is formally integrated into a joint operational structure incorporating all three of China’s major sea forces: the maritime militia, Coast Guard, and Navy. Within this layered conglomerate, Sansha’s Maritime Militia is charged with operating at the front lines and engaging foreign vessels directly, ideally achieving Beijing’s objectives without the other two forces needing to intervene. To this end, it is being professionalized and militarized to an unprecedented degree.

This series covering Hainan Province’s Maritime Militia explores key local units in-depth, exposing much of the details of this inadequately understood tool China uses to uphold and further its maritime claims. The next and final article will examine Hainan’s development of the maritime militia at the provincial military district level, and provide insight into the future course and trajectory of China’s Maritime Militia.

Conor Kennedy is a research assistant in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA at the Johns Hopkins University – Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a Professor of Strategy in, and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board. He is an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and an expert contributor to the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time Report. In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional Security Education Program scholar aboard USS Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). He received his Ph.D. from Princeton University. Erickson blogs at www.andrewerickson.com and www.chinasignpost.com. The views expressed here are Erickson’s alone and do not represent the policies or estimates of the U.S. Navy or any other organization of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: Two to three different classes of these fishing vessels are in production, although their functional differences remain unclear. The vessel depicted above is produced in fewer numbers and with a significantly different design, suggesting a functional specialization. Image source: Twitter.