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A Deckplate Review: How the Submarine Force can Reach its Warfighting Potential, Pt. 1

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By LT Jeff Vandenengel, USN

Bottom Line Up Front

The submarine force is highly capable but not near its full warfighting potential. Several factors limit submariners’ ability to prepare for safe deployments during peace and combat-effective operations during war. These factors include:

  1. Massive time obligations
  2. Limited training resources
  3. Extensive deployment administrative burdens

This two-part article outlines options to address these problems and thus enable submarine officers and crews to better prepare for the job only they can perform: at-sea operations and combat.

Introduction

Training for at-sea operations and combat has always been a primary concern in the U.S. Navy, and today those missions are more important and more difficult than they have been for decades. The recent fatal mishaps involving USS Fitzgerald, USS John S. McCain, and ARA San Juan, along with potential adversaries’ rapid technological advances, underscore the importance of training in the naval profession.

Warfighting training and preparations are especially crucial in the submarine force, which the Navy will rely on heavily in war. Today’s force of just fifty-three fast attack (SSN) and four guided-missile (SSGN) platforms are accomplishing vital missions during peacetime and will play a disproportionately important role in wartime.1 That outsized role will be accomplished by submarine wardrooms comprising less than two percent of all active duty naval officers and by crews comprising approximately three percent of all active duty sailors.2 With so much riding on so few, the submarine fleet must ensure its officers and crews are trained and ready to employ the warships the Navy has worked so hard to build and maintain.

Unfortunately, massive time obligations, limited training resources, and extensive deployment administrative burdens are severely impairing submariners’ ability to conduct effective training. As a result, the submarine force is not near its full warfighting potential, despite incredible technology, excellent material readiness, and the best people the country has to offer. Fortunately, there are numerous personnel and administrative solutions that would significantly improve each boat’s warfighting ability.

The Navy recently completed two excellent analyses of recent fleet mishaps: the Comprehensive Review3 and Strategic Readiness Review.4 These meticulous, constructive products closely analyzed the fleet’s problems to make substantive recommendations. To complement those high-level studies, this bottom-up “deckplate review” is submitted as an analysis of the Navy’s challenges from the viewpoint of an operational warship, with recommendations that would enable that ship to operate more safely and effectively.

It is important to note that the author and his fellow officers made these recommendations with a limited frame of reference and without complete knowledge of the Navy’s status with regards to personnel, budgets, training facilities, equipment, certification processes, logistics, and legal requirements. However, as the end users of all those lines of effort, it seems this feedback should be worth some measure of consideration.

The Navy and submarine force’s leadership have wisely instructed the fleet to focus on warfighting above all else. This paper details recommendations that would enable operational warships to meet that commander’s intent. Part One focuses on time constraints affecting the submarine fleet’s ability to focus on training. Part Two focuses on other problems that arise once submariners find time to train, both in their homeports and while deployed.

Factor 1: Time Constraints

“The ships, aircraft, and men and women of the Navy are finite resources. Those who man our ships are limited in the amount of time they have to perform equipment maintenance and build their warfighting skills…The core and primary competence of sailors must be mastery of naval warfighting skills.”– ADM Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.), and the Hon. Michael Bayer Secretary of the Navy Strategic Readiness Review5

The single largest factor limiting submarine warfighting training is officer and crew time. With numerous demands on their time, submariners are too often prevented from focusing on the job only they can do —tactically employ their warship — because they must accomplish tasks that supporting commands can assist with or perform more effectively.

The wardroom is the best example of a submarine training group limited in its ability to prepare because of time constraints. As the only group to span the nuclear and non-nuclear worlds, the officers have numerous responsibilities that occupy almost the entirety of their workweek. Assuming an eleven-hour workday in port, officers spend an estimated 28 percent of their time standing duty, 30 percent of their time completing administrative and miscellaneous tasks (meetings, monitors, planning, etc.), and 14 percent of their time fulfilling divisional and collateral duties, leaving 28 percent of their time to complete training and qualifications.6 However, this time encompasses a vast array of training topics and requirements which span the tactical, nuclear, divisional, and maintenance areas, in addition to simulators and qualification interviews for junior personnel. This in-port time allocation is summarized in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Submarine Officer Inport Time Allocation

What results is a strapped wardroom running from event to event, regularly working into the night and on the weekends to catch up. Despite carefully planned schedules, it is rare for all officers to attend all mandatory events because of overlapping demands. Even when an officer finds him or herself with free time, it is often in small blocks and rarely coincides with the rest of the wardroom, limiting the training he or she can effectively accomplish.

When the Navy assigns an officer to a task, part of that decision is based on the importance of the task and a lack of faith that someone else — a Chief Petty Officer (CPO) or non-ship’s force individual — could execute it properly. These many tasks help the ship improve its combat potential, either through improving its material condition, finding and fixing deficiencies, or developing the crew. While the importance of these tasks is not up for debate, the ability for someone besides an officer to accomplish them is debatable in every single instance except one: combat. No other group on a submarine has the training, holistic ship knowledge, access to information, and experience to fight the ship. However, when the vast majority of officers’ time is accounted for, the unintended consequence is that there are fewer opportunities for concentrated training on the numerous important warfighting topics that only they can perform. With so much information to teach officers and so little time to do it, most warfighting training is stuck at the basic level.

Fortunately, three categories of officer and crew time — in-port watch-standing, divisional and collateral duties, and administrative responsibilities — have opportunities for improvement that would allow for more focus on the fourth category of training and qualifications.

In-Port Duty

Standing duty, both as the Ship’s Duty Officer (SDO) and Engineering Duty Officer (EDO), undoubtedly improves the ship’s material condition and warfighting readiness. However, with a limited number of qualified officer watchstanders available, each officer must stand on average more than one duty day per workweek. Swamped with work controls, maintenance execution, inspections, and administration, there is little hope of study or training on those days. The amount of time spent on watch in port increases when ships use work control production officers or enter shiftwork, periods that can last days or weeks at a time. Throughout the author’s recent four-month dry-docking maintenance availability, an average of 29 percent of available qualified officers were on watch at any one time.7

The challenge is to reduce the time officers stand duty, allowing them to conduct more effective training together, without causing a reduction in the maintenance execution, security, or professionalism onboard. To meet those requirements, some basic ground rules were used when developing these options. There should always be at least one ship’s force unrestricted line officer onboard, either as SDO or EDO. There cannot be a reduction in watchstanding ability, as both SDO and EDO are challenging positions pivotal to fixing the ship and getting it back out to sea. Additionally, the use of duty alternatives should only occur during the day when needed to support training, with the wardroom resuming its normal duty roles at night to minimize the effect on supporting commands and individuals. Ship’s force would still stand most of the watches during the workweek and all of the watches outside normal working hours.

Engineering Duty Officer

For EDO alternatives, the submarine force could train and qualify Limited Duty Officers (LDOs), officers from the Engineering Duty community, submarine junior officers (JOs) on shore duty, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) civilian Shift Test Engineers (STEs), or nuclear-trained CPOs. Most of these options are already being executed in different parts of the submarine fleet.

LDOs, with their years of nuclear training and experience, are already standing duty on pre-commissioning submarines. Similarly, members of the Engineering Duty community are already heavily involved in maintenance planning and execution onboard ships, with many of their officers laterally transferring from the submarine community. Another easy option would be to use submarine JOs on their shore duty as “duty augment officers.” Submarine JOs are already standing 24-hour watches on their shore duty, such as Shift Engineers at the Nuclear Power Training Units (NTPU) or as duty officers on pre-commissioning units, and so it is likely that many would be interested in being “duty augment officers” where they are only required to stand duty on weekdays during normal working hours. Alternatively, submarine JOs who have transferred to the Reserve Component (RC) could also be activated to perform this function.

In addition to using different officers for EDO, the submarine force could employ the highly trained STEs of NAVSEA’s Nuclear Engineering and Planning Department.8 During major availabilities, these dedicated civilians, with more than two years of nuclear training and an in-depth knowledge of the engineering plant, work with the EDO to complete numerous complex evolutions. The EDO and STE literally stand next to each other throughout the entire day, giving orders that they must both concur on before executing. The submarine force should authorize STEs to relieve as EDO in order to not duplicate supervision, allow the STE to lead the complex engineering evolutions that he or she knows best, and allow the submarine line officer more time to focus on the warfighting task that only he or she can execute.

The final option for EDO alternatives are nuclear-trained CPOs. This is also a proven model, as CPOs are already successfully standing EDO at the NPTUs. However, with a limited number of nuclear-trained CPOs on board SSNs and SSGNs, there are not enough of them available to support their watch bill plus the EDO position without changing their manning.

None of these options—LDOs, Engineering Duty community officers, shore duty JOs, STEs, or CPOs—would be attached to the ship. Rather, they would work from squadrons and be shared amongst the boats, ready to relieve as EDO during the day as needed, granting the ship’s force officers much-needed time to conduct training. This way, just a few augment options could serve an entire squadron, assisting whichever boats are in port.

Ship’s Duty Officer

There are also numerous options to augment SDOs, with the right controls in place. Currently, SDOs must be qualified Surfaced Officer of the Deck (OOD) so that they are ready to get the ship underway in the event of an emergency. However, there are many days that it would be impossible for the ship to get underway in any reasonable amount of time, such as when in drydock or during major engineering maintenance evolutions, negating the need to keep an OOD continuously onboard. If the submarine fleet relaxes this requirement as a function of the ship’s readiness condition, then there are alternatives to making the ship’s force officers always stand SDO. Additionally, augmenting SDO instead of EDO has the added benefit of avoiding the extensive although necessary certification and administration associated with standing watch on a naval nuclear power plant.

Shore duty JOs would be an attractive option for SDO just as it is for EDO. Some of these officers could be from the Naval Reserve, serving a year of obligated service before retirement. If the ship is not going underway and there is a line officer standing EDO, then Supply Officers should qualify and stand SDO to ease the duty rotation, as they are already doing on surface ships. Finally, CPOs could qualify SDO to temporarily relieve during the workday. This option is more attractive for SDO than EDO because of the larger number of non-nuclear vs nuclear CPOs available to flex to watch-bill burdens.

Enlisted Duty

Enlisted duty also stands in the way of better tactical training. Sonar, Fire Control, Torpedo, Navigation, and Radio Divisions would all greatly benefit from more in-port time to focus on their advanced skillsets. However, when they are manning a three- or four-section duty rotation, it becomes very difficult to free a majority of the division for any extended period while also completing necessary maintenance.

Most in-port watches require ship’s force sailors due to the level of knowledge required, but topside security watches could easily be outsourced to supporting commands. These watches are vital to protecting the ship, but do not require extensive training or certification. This off-hull support could come from Masters at Arms, Naval Reservists, or sailors on their shore duty attached to squadrons, again ready to support whatever boats are in port. Just as with officer support, ship’s force sailors would still stand the majority of the watches, but would receive assistance from these augment alternatives. Reservists have already assisted with SSGN security watches while overseas, and this model should be expanded to SSNs in their homeports during normal working hours.

Making Tough Choices About In-Port Duty

There are numerous options for standing SDO and EDO: ship’s force officers, LDOs, Engineering Duty community officers, augment shore duty JOs, NAVSEA STEs, and CPOs. However, only the ship’s officers can stand OOD, Contact Manager, and Engineering Officer of the Watch at sea and in battle. Similarly, there are numerous options for standing enlisted security watches in port, but only the submarine’s sailors can stand Fire Control Technician of the Watch, Torpedo Room Watch, and Passive Broadband Operator underway. Shifting a small portion of the in-port duty burden to these alternatives would free up desperately needed time for the ship’s officers and sailors to focus on the jobs that only they can perform. 

Collateral Duties

Common themes when the Navy assigns collateral duties to submariners:

  1. Smart, hard-working submariners will put in the time and energy to tackle the challenge
  2. Those submariners will be completing their collateral duties at a steep opportunity cost: preparing for at-sea operations and combat
  3. In many cases, supporting commands can accomplish those collateral duties more effectively and efficiently

When submariners are not on watch, they have an array of collateral duties that again occupy their time and inhibit an at-sea focus. Responsibilities such as Quality Assurance Officer (QAO), Scuba Diving Officer, Radiation Health Officer, and Cryptologic Security Manager all make the submarine a more capable warship. However, significant parts of these jobs can be more effectively completed by specialized supporting commands, freeing submariners to focus on their primary functions.

The many shore commands and organizations that task submarines each rightfully strive to execute their respective programs. Most designate a ship’s force officer to be responsible for those programs knowing that it will maximize their chances of administrative success. Many of these programs are not individually overwhelming, and so the external commands apply moderate pressure to ensure the officers properly execute them. However, the cumulative effect of these various commands’ dictated programs is a culture in which submarine officers are constantly pulled in all directions except training for safe and combat-effective operations at sea.

To the junior sailors and officers on the deckplates, the Navy’s decisions to implement many new programs or requirements can seem to be made in a vacuum and without consideration of the reality of shipboard life. Each task is a good idea by itself, but crammed into already full workdays they rob those sailors and officers of time to focus on what matters.

Lots of good ideas with lots of unintended consequences are improving the submarine force’s collateral duties while distracting it from its primary function.

When everything is important—Audit and Surveillance Programs, Radiation Health Programs, Full Speed Ahead Training, Lessons Learned messages—nothing is important, including warfighting.

Procedure Development and Quality Assurance

Properly researched and written maintenance procedures are key to the ship’s material condition. While most of these are provided to the fleet, there are still numerous maintenance evolutions that have no provided procedure. This forces sailors and officers to research, write, review, and approve their own procedures, typically as Formal Work Packages (FWPs) or Controlled Work Packages (CWPs).9 This is a challenging process that requires numerous technical manuals, access to parts research, and a significant amount of time to do an adequate review. During a maintenance period, petty officers, divisional CPOs, division officers, department heads, and at times even the commanding officer (CO) must write, review, or approve several of these each week, with much of this effort duplicated on each boat in a class. Incorrect FWPs and CWPs can lead to critiques, rework, lost underway days, personnel injury, equipment damage, or loss of the ship in extreme cases.

Many of these maintenance packages are reviewed by the QAO, a JO who has attended a two-week school. Because that JO is dedicated to his submarine’s success, he will devote significant time and energy to properly execute the QA program. He will dig into the technical manuals, carefully review the Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM), and conduct thorough parts research to ensure the work is done correctly and the ship can safely get to sea. Despite his intelligence and diligence, his lack of experience and time will prevent him from ever being as proficient in Quality Assurance (QA) as the people running the squadrons’ and regional maintenance centers’ QA offices. These administrators are typically retired CPOs and LDOs working full time on QA, able to draw on their expertise to produce quality products without the distractions of submarine life.

To both alleviate a time demand on the QAO and numerous other submariners and to ensure they execute maintenance correctly the first time, more procedures should be written and approved off the ship. These could be standardized as Reactor Plant Manual (RPM) procedures and Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRCs) or provided as FWPs and CWPs. This will reduce the duplication of administration across boats, improve the quality of procedures, and allow the ships to focus on their execution. This will not work for all procedures, as many will still have to be tailored to a ship’s unique conditions or equipment.

The newly developed Automated Work Package Generator (AWPG) is a great start to combating this problem. Retired QA experts research and write CWPs and periodically provide them to the fleet for use. However, boats are not allowed to simply use these quality packages, but must still complete the full review process. Additionally, the AWPG only covers a small fraction of all the procedures submarines must write on their own.

Maintenance and engineering organizations off the ship are better at writing and approving technical procedures than submariners are. Submariners are better at employing their warships at sea. To produce a submarine fleet that is both in better material condition and more effectively trained for sea, the submarine fleet should transfer as many procedure writing responsibilities from the boats to supporting commands as possible.

Scuba Diving

SSN’s Scuba Diving Divisions perform important functions including hull inspections, component cleanings, and serving as rescue swimmers. They are also another example of a program that makes the ship more capable but at a cost.

To meet the required number of personnel in Dive Division, submarines must send an officer and several sailors to Dive School. During this six-week period they are lost to the ship and completely unable to train on their primary warfighting duty. When they return, they must perform all the required maintenance, training, dives, and inspections in addition to their normal duties.

POLARIS POINT, Guam (April 7, 2011) Navy Diver 3rd Class Kyle Fox, of the submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS 40), assists Hospital Corpsman 3rd Class Jason Kantorik with an air hose check before a dive. Frank Cable maintains and supports submarines and surface vessels deployed in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David R. Krigbaum/Released)

The Supplemental Preliminary Inquiry on USS Fitzgerald’s June 2017 collision contained numerous examples of astonishing courage exhibited by the crew as they struggled to save their ship. It also contained a statement likely surprising to many submariners: Fitzgerald and surface ships “have no dive equipment aboard, nor do they have trained and qualified divers.”10 If surface warships and SSBNs are not required to man Dive Divisions, then the rest of the submarine fleet, with smaller crews and less space for gear stowage, should follow their example.

All SSN homeports have specialized divers that perform all the boats’ advanced maintenance and inspections, and these could be used to accomplish the dives currently being done by ship’s force. These specialized divers are highly trained, well equipped, and dive as their primary responsibility, making them a more proficient and safer alternative than submariners fulfilling a collateral duty. When pulling in for deployment port calls, most US Navy ports again have divers that could perform required inspections or maintenance. Additionally, flyaway teams could support boats when in foreign ports without U.S. Navy diver presence, a model the surface fleet is already employing. In war, port calls would all likely be at U.S. Navy ports, negating the need for those flyaway teams. Boats at sea could employ Search and Rescue (SAR) swimmers as surface ships already do, ready to respond in case of a man overboard. Transforming the ship’s divers into SAR swimmers would greatly cut down on the time lost to school, administration, maintenance, and inspections.

Just like QAOs, Scuba Diving Officers are going to work tenaciously to lead a safe and effective program. However, with their schedule so packed, the time they spend focusing on Dive Division is time they do not spend studying the Nautical Rules of the Road, how to safely proceed to periscope depth, or how to recover the reactor in the event of a scram at sea. Finally, just as with QA, there are supporting organizations off the boat that will always be better at the task because of their experience, specialized equipment, and singular focus.

Miscellaneous

There are numerous other collateral duties that follow a similar theme of being important to the submarine, but more effectively performed by someone not aboard that submarine. The Navigation and Operations Officer, as the security officer, initiates Secret security clearances for everyone onboard when it comes time for their renewal. However, squadron Special Security Officers (SSO) could easily take on this task and free the Navigator to focus on the safe planning and operation of his ship. SSOs already initiate Top Secret clearances for submariners, as well as all Secret clearances when the boat is out of contact on deployment. SSOs should continue that support when boats pull back in.

The Radiation Health Program, led by the executive officer (XO), helps ensure the crew’s long-term health by tracking their radiation exposure. However, the administratively burdensome program detracts from the XO’s ability to fulfill his primary duty of Training Officer. To refocus XOs—and prepare them to be the next Dick O’Kane under the next Mush Morton—much of the Radiation Health programs should be outsourced to squadron Undersea Medical Officers or squadron Independent Duty Corpsmen. These specialists are better suited to yield a quality product, allowing the XOs to focus on crew training. At sea, XOs would still be responsible for the Radiation Health program, but in port they would be relieved of these duties.

Maintaining proper inventories and controls of cryptologic keys are an obviously vital task for the submarine and the entire fleet. Because it is a painstaking process that the fleet is obviously concerned with, a CPO and JO are tasked with leading the program with a great deal of oversight from the CO. However, there are options to shift the administration off the boats by making them simple end-users, significantly cutting down on the time and paperwork associated with the program. The Navy should fully implement this proposal to free a CPO and JO from yet another task and, more importantly, give the CO more time to focus on what only he can accomplish.

Other tasks such as the Safety Program, Ship Systems Manual (SSM) page updates, gauge calibration, and painting could all be partially outsourced to a combination of shore duty sailors, reservists, specialized supporting teams, or civilians. Each task is small, but when sailors are sleeping at work for duty every third or fourth day, accomplishing incredible amounts of maintenance, and pushing to accomplish numerous qualifications and training sessions, every little bit helps.

Conclusion

“In many cases, our biggest challenges and opportunities for improvement are at [the junior officer and chief] scale of the command. By virtue of piling on meaningless collateral duties and programs that contribute little to operational and warfighting excellence, we have confused these leaders, making it hard for them to see through the chaff and to prioritize the personal and professional development of their people.”-  ADM John M. Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations Message on Navy-Wide Operational Pause11

None of these tasks — maintenance procedure development, scuba diving, radiation health, security investigation initiation, cryptologic security management— are by themselves a huge burden on the ship. Together, they are a constant pull on submarine officers and crews, minimizing the time they can devote to what truly matters — warfighting.

The submarine force can continue to use ship’s force officers to stand SDO and EDO, to demand they write and review numerous FWPs and CWPs each week, and to expect them to execute numerous collateral duties. That would be the simplest option because it is how the undersea fleet has operated for decades and because it is the safest choice for when the submarine is in port. However, the unintended consequence is that once the submarine returns to sea, its officers and crew will be less safe and tactically adept than they could be if they were given the time to properly prepare.

Part Two of this article will focus on other problems that arise once submariners find time to train, both in their homeports and while deployed. 

LT Vandenengel is the Weapons Officer on USS Alexandria (SSN 757). He developed this paper with a working group of submarine officers. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the Department of Defense. You can reach him at [email protected].

Endnotes

1.“Fleet Size,” Naval Vessel Register, last modified April 9, 2018, accessed April 15, 2018, http://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRships/fleetsize.html.

2. “Navy Demographics,” U.S. Navy Fact File, last modified September 29, 2017, accessed October 1, 2017, www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146. Assuming 53 SSN crews and 8 SSGN crews of 16 officers and 140 sailors each.

3. Admiral Philip S. Davidson, USN. “Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents.” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Fleet Forces Command, October 26, 2017).

4. The Honorable Michael Bayer and Admiral Gary Roughead, USN (Ret.). “Strategic Readiness Review.” (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Navy, December 3, 2017).

5. Ibid, 78-79.

6. Assumes each officer stands six duty days per month, equating to 1.4 duty days per five-day work week. “Administrative and Miscellaneous Responsibilities” include monitors, audits, meetings, planning sessions, miscellaneous requirements (such as flag visits or one-time training sessions), a thirty-minute lunch, and 2.5 hours of unaccounted for time weekly.

7. Estimating twelve qualified watch officers, with two unavailable due to the Prospective Nuclear Engineer Officer (PNEO) course. Various engineering evolutions and testing periods required additional watches such as night-shift EDOs and SDOs, Senior Supervisory Watches, and production officers.

8. “Nuclear Engineering and Planning Department, Code 2300,” Naval Sea Systems Command, accessed November 25, 2017, http://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Shipyards/Norfolk/Department-Links/C2300-Nuclear-Engineering-and-Planning-Department/.

9. Executive Director SUBMEPP, “Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual,” Revision C Change 5. (Portsmouth, NH.: Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Department of the Navy, 11 August 2016), Part I Volume V Chapter 2.

10. “Supplemental Preliminary Inquiry and Line of Duty Determination Regarding Injuries and the Deaths of Seven Sailors Aboard USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) On or About 17 June 2017.” (Yokosuka, Japan: Commander, Carrier Strike Group FIVE, 2017), 16.

11. Admiral John M. Richardson, USN. “CNO Richardson Message on Navy Operational Pause,” USNI News, October 6, 2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/10/06/cno-richardson-message-navy-operational-pause.

Featured Image: DIEGO GARCIA (Sept. 8, 2011) Sonar Technician (Submarine) 2nd Class Jeff Wiesmaier, left, Chief Fire Control Technician Johnathan Taylor, Missile Technician 2nd Class David Laymon, MachinistÕs Mate 1st Class Cody Henry and MachinistÕs Mate 3rd Class Christopher Smith secure the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Dallas (SSN 700) in Diego Garcia. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chris Williamson/Released)

Events

CFAR 2018: And The Winners Are…

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On 15 May CIMSEC will host the fourth annual CIMSEC Forum for Authors and Readers (CFAR), an event for our readers and the public to engage our contributors on their work and topics of interest.  Thanks to the generous support of CNA we are pleased to offer a professional conference on a range of maritime security issues.

The evening will provide a chance to engage your favorite CIMSEC contributors on their work over the preceding year, hear their thoughts on how their pieces have held up, and explore predictions for the coming year. Following last year’s success, CNA speakers will again participate in the proceedings.

Congratulations to the Winners and Speakers:

CIMSEC Category:
“The U.S. Coast Guard in the South China Sea: Strategy or Folly?”
By Michael D. Armour

“Three Hard Questions for U.S. Maritime Strategy in A Digital Age”
By Frank Goertner

“The Battle of Locust Point: An Oral History of the First Autonomous Combat Engagement”
By David Strachan

“Fighting for the Seafloor: From Lawfare to Warfare”
By Kyle Cregge

CNA Category:
“NATO Maritime Strategy for a New Era: “These Aren’t the SLOCs You’re Looking For”
By Steve Wills

“Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security”
By Mark Rosen and Cara Thuringer

How were the speakers be chosen?  All CIMSEC readers were welcome to submit nominations for articles with the only criteria that the article nominated must have appeared on the site on or after 15 April, 2017.  After nominations closed, CIMSEC members voted and the top vote-getters received invites to speak at CFAR.  Not yet a member?  Consider joining CIMSEC for free!

Event Details:
Date: May 15th 
5:00pm-6:00pm: Pre-Event Reception (Details upon RSVPing)
6:00pm-6:15pm: Welcome
6:15pm-8:00pm: Author Discussions and Q+As
Location: CNA, 3003 Washington Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22201 

Indo-Asia-Pacific

A Sign of the Times: China’s Recent Actions and the Undermining of Global Rules, Pt. 2

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By Tuan N. Pham

Last month, CIMSEC published an article titled “A Sign of the Times: China’s Recent Actions and the Undermining of Global Rules, Part 1” highlighting three troubling developments that oblige the United States to further encourage and also challenge China to become a more responsible global stakeholder that contributes positively to the international system. The article noted Beijing trying to convince others to accept the self-aggrandizing and self-serving term of “near-arctic state”; to fulfill its nationalistic promise to the Chinese people and reclaim the disputed and contested South China Sea (SCS) from ancient times; and to expand its “sharp power” activities across the globe.

A month later, these undertakings continue to mature and advance apace. China considers legislation seemingly to protect the environment in Antarctica, but really to safeguard its growing interests in the southernmost continent. Beijing takes more active measures to reassert its sovereignty and preserve its territorial integrity in the SCS. China restructures its public diplomacy (and influence operations) apparatus to better convey Beijing’s strategic message and to better shape public opinion abroad.     

Left unchallenged and unhindered, Beijing may become even more emboldened and determined to expand its global power and influence and accelerate the pace of its deliberate march toward regional preeminence and ultimately global preeminence. If so, Washington would be prudent to consider that it is much easier to slow or stop a large boulder rolling down a steep hill near the top than wait until it gains speed and momentum near the bottom.

Antarctic Legislation

A leading Chinese international maritime law expert recently called for exigent legislation to promote and safeguard China’s increasing activities and growing interests in Antarctica, particularly as they relate to scientific research, tourism, and environmental protection. China spends more than any other Antarctic state on infrastructure such as bases and icebreakers. Beijing maintains three bases (Great Wall, Zhongshan, and Kunlun) on the southernmost continent. Chinese polar research icebreakers make annual scientific research expeditions and periodic re-supply trips to those bases. And last year, the number of Chinese tourists to Antarctica grew to 5,300 from just 100 13 years ago. Altogether, the expanding presence, operations, and activities are embraced by Beijing as ways and means to build the necessary physical fundamentals for China’s evolving Antarctic resource and governance rights.

The legislative clarion call is not new. Beijing has been deliberately and incrementally paving the way for Antarctic legislation with government-sponsored studies dating back to the 1990s. A draft law has been listed on the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’ (NPC) legislative agenda since last year, while the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) – the principal governmental body overseeing Antarctic issues – has drafted departmental rules to regulate Chinese activities on the continent since 2007. The latest of these rules – Environmental Protection Regulation on Activities in Antarctica – was issued last February. Contained therein, Beijing benevolently asserts that “with these rules, the SOA has been organizing activities in the southernmost continent in strict accordance with the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic Treaty, which provides comprehensive protection for the Antarctic environment.” In other words, a law with specific criminal and civil liabilities is urgently needed to keep visitors from unlawful actions, which may damage the fragile Antarctic eco-system.

Beijing’s actions in Antarctica should be linked and taken in context with other actions in the Arctic. For years, China has pushed to be designated a member of the Arctic Council, whose membership is restricted to nations bordering the Arctic. In 2013, Beijing finally gained observer status, and continues to seek membership to the very exclusive and potentially lucrative club.

On January 26, Beijing followed up last year’s policy paper “Vision for Maritime Cooperation Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” that outlined its ambitious plan to advance its developing global sea corridors (blue economic passages connected to the greater Belt and Road network) – with its first white paper on the Arctic. The white paper boldly proclaimed China’s strategic intent to actively partake in Arctic activities as a “near-Arctic state.”Activities include but are not limited to the development of Arctic shipping routes (Polar Silk Road); exploration for and exploitation of oil, gas, mineral, and other natural resources; utilization and conservation of fisheries; and promotion of Arctic tourism. Of note, there is no legal or international definition of “near-Arctic state.” China is the sole originator of the term. Beijing is clearly attempting to inject itself into the substance of Arctic dialogue and convince others to accept the self-aggrandizing and self-serving term.      

On March 17, Beijing announced the building of its first polar expedition cruise ship, as China looks to extend the BRI into the Arctic through shipping lanes opened up by global warming. Beijing and Helsinki have agreed to build a double-acting polar research vessel equipped with icebreaking capabilities, usable while the vessel is moving forward and backward. The new vessel is expected to be built in the Shanghai Shipyard later this year.

Greenland is actively courting Chinese investors to help expand three extant airports, raising concerns in Copenhagen. Chinese interest in Greenland comes after Beijing in late January laid out its strategic plan to establish the Polar Silk Road by developing shipping lanes and promoting infrastructure in the Arctic.

Working with Moscow, Beijing is now exporting liquefied natural gas using the Northern Sea Route through Arctic waters and has stepped up monitoring of oceanographic conditions in the Far North from Svalbard, a Norwegian island that is open to international scientific research.

Reasserting Sovereignty in the South “China” Sea

On March 23, USS Mustin (DDG-89) purportedly conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) during which it reportedly passed within 12nm of Mischief Reef – one of seven occupied geographic features in the Spratly archipelago that China has transformed into a large military outpost in a bid to dominate the contested surrounding waters. If so, this may have been the second U.S. FONOP of the year and the sixth U.S. naval operation in the last 10 months to challenge Beijing’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) responded the next day with mostly the same recycled talking points from past U.S. FONOPs, but with some noteworthy additions (bolded below) and in a noticeably more assertive and harsher tone:

“The United States has violated the Chinese law and relevant international law, infringed upon China’s sovereignty, undermined peace, security, and order of the relevant waters, and put in jeopardy the facilities and personnel on the Chinese islands, and thus constitutes a serious political and military provocation. China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Qundao (Spratly Islands) and its adjacent waters. China always respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS all countries are entitled to under international law, but firmly opposes any country or person undermining the sovereignty and security of littoral countries under the pretext of ‘freedom of navigation and overflight. At present, the situation in the SCS has been improving thanks to the concerted efforts of China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states. Under such circumstance, the United States, who deliberately stirs up troubles and creates tension in the SCS to disrupt peace and stability there, is running against the will of regional countries who aspire for stability, cooperation, and development, and thus unpopular at all. The Chinese side strongly urges the U.S. side to immediately stop provocative operations that violate China’s sovereignty and threaten China’s security and faithfully respect the regional countries’ concerted efforts to uphold peace and stability in the SCS. The Chinese side will continue to take all necessary measures to defend its national sovereignty and security and safeguard peace and stability in the SCS.”

The notable extras were remarks characterizing the United States as an uninvited and destabilizing interloper to the region and ASEAN interests; and statements warning Washington that FONOPs and the increased naval presence in the SCS may no longer be tolerated as evidenced by assertive language more forceful than in the past – “take all necessary measures to defend its national sovereignty and security” vice the previous softer language of “take necessary measures to firmly safeguard its sovereignty.” The new language and tone is in step with President Xi Jinping’s recent policy remarks on sovereignty and territorial integrity at the 13th NPC – “The Chinese people and the Chinese nation have a shared conviction: not one single inch of our land will be or can be seceded from China.”    

The first add-on was intended for the other ASEAN members, shaping and influencing the ongoing negotiations of the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the management of contested claims in the strategic waterway. Beijing will undoubtedly try to insert favorable language into the CoC, like excluding non-ASEAN states from the SCS and regulating military activities in the SCS. The latter is consistent with Chinese comments made at the 54th Munich Security Conference – “the problem now is that some countries unilaterally and wrongly interpreted the freedom of navigation of UNCLOS as the freedom of military operations, which is not the principle set by the UNCLOS.” The second add-on was meant for Washington, signaling Beijing’s intent to increasingly challenge greater American naval presence and operations in their perceived home waters.

Chinese media largely echoed the MFA’s rhetoric, and further asserted that Washington had deliberately timed the FONOP to challenge Beijing on the same day China decided to hit back at America’s punitive tariffs. The destabilizing FONOP was a calculated gesture and part of a U.S. combined economic and military pressure campaign against China.

In a press conference “five days after” the MFA press conference, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MND) curiously did not adopt the MFA’s more assertive rhetoric and instead kept to its previous talking points on U.S. FONOPs. The relatively subdued narrative and tone suggest a possible change of tack from Beijing’s initial public diplomacy approach, but the coming months will tell if that is truly the case:

“The spokesperson of the MND has released a statement lately to emphasize China’s principles and positions in response to the U.S. Navy ship’s entering the neighboring waters of relevant islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Qundao (Spratly Islands). China has indisputable sovereignty over relevant islands and their adjacent waters in the SCS. China always respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS all countries are entitled to under International Law, but firmly opposes any act of showing-off forces, aggravating regional tensions, threatening and undermining other countries’ sovereignty and security interests. The Chinese military will strengthen its defense capability according to the degree of the threat to its sovereignty and security, firmly safeguard national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, and firmly safeguard regional peace and stability.” (Chinese Defense Ministry Press Conference, March 29)

Following the FONOP, China announced and carried out combat exercises in the disputed waters to include a large-scale show-of-force demonstration; and then stated that it may conduct similar monthly combat drills in the future. Beijing characterized these combat drills as routine, part of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) annual training plan to hone combat capability, and not aimed at any specific country or target (interestingly mimicking U.S. talking points):

“The live-force naval exercise conducted by the PLAN in the SCS is the measure to implement the important instruction of President Xi at the opening ceremony of the new year training session of the PLA and encourage the combat-oriented training of the PLA naval troops. It is a routine arrangement in accordance with the annual training program of the PLAN. The purpose of the training is to test and enhance the training level of the PLAN, and promote the capabilities of the troops to win wars. It is not targeted at any specific country or target.” (Chinese Defense Ministry Press Conference, March 29)

Chinese naval warships fire missiles during a live-fire military drill on August 7, 2017. (China Stringer Network/Reuters)

On April 2, the Global Times (subsidiary of the People’s Liberation Army’s Daily) published an article expounding various motives for the naval maneuvers. The cited reasons were more expansive and somewhat inconsistent with those provided at the Chinese Defense Ministry’s press conference three days before:

“First, China needs to safeguard its national interests in the region and the routine exercises are in line with China’s defensive military policy. Second, they are related to the changing international situation as some countries have made moves that strategically target China. The guided missile destroyer USS Mustin recently entered the waters around China’s islands and reefs in the SCS. The United States, Japan, Australia, and India are promoting cooperation through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue; and the United Kingdom was reportedly considering sending a warship to conduct FONOPs in the SCS in 2018. And it is also partly because of the changing Taiwan situation as the U.S. President Trump has recently signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law, allowing senior-level official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. This goes against the one-China policy. These shifts are vital and relevant to China’s security. Beijing needs to make some practical preparations to confront the changes in the international situation. Third, with China’s military strength growing, we need more large drills to test and improve military combat ability. This is the normal action of any country that wants to develop its military power.” 

On April 12, Xi personally attended a naval review in the SCS, one of the largest of its kind in China since its founding in 1949. He viewed 48 vessels, 76 aircraft, and more than 10,000 service personnel to include the aircraft carrier Liaoning. Xi made a speech after the review, reaffirming Beijing’s aspiration to have a strong navy and pledging to speed up PLAN modernization…“A mighty navy is an important pillar of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” On April 17, the PLA Daily elaborated on Xi’s statements five days before. Xi has resolutely set Beijing on an unyielding course for achieving the Chinese Dream, thus making it imperative for China to have a strong and modern navy. This is because having a capable navy doesn’t simply protect one’s shores, but also to protect one’s interests beyond those shores. 90 percent of the world’s trade is still carried through the maritime domain, and it is, by far, the most cost-effective way to transport goods and raw materials around the globe. This is why Xi reviewed the PLAN in the SCS on April 12.

It will be interesting to see how Beijing further responds in the next few months, a period with the most favorable weather conditions for reclamation and infrastructure building operations in the SCS. Besides the naval maneuvers, China claims to have deploy additional troops and set up territorial defense equipment; and justifies the opportunistic deployment as Beijing having every right to deploy necessary military equipment on its military outposts in the Spratly archipelago:

“The Nansha Islands are China’s territory. It is the natural right of a sovereign state for China to station troops and deploy necessary territory defense facilities on the relevant islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands. It is conducive to safeguarding the state’s sovereignty and security, ensuring the freedom and security of navigation channels in the SCS, and maintaining regional peace and stability. It is not directed against any country. China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development, pursue a national defense policy that is defensive in nature and a military strategy of active defense.”

It will also be telling to see how Beijing reacts to other related regional developments – French Navy frigate Vendémiaire “allegedly” conducted a FONOP in the SCS (some would say that it was not a FONOP, but just a transit); Hanoi welcomed a U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier for a port visit; Jakarta lobbies other Southeast Asian countries to carry out maritime patrols in the disputed waters; Canberra increases its maritime presence and considers conducting FONOPs in the strategic waterway; Manila plans to include again Japan and Australia into its annual bilateral exercise with the United States (Balikatan); SCS claimant states continue to buy more naval arms (Kuala Lumpur will equip its new littoral combat ships with advanced naval strike missiles from Norway and Jakarta will buy three modern submarines from South Korea); and Tokyo tries to link the Mekong and ASEAN into a broader Indo-Pacific Strategy, allied with India, United States, and Australia. When China does decide to react, it will do so bilaterally and quietly like it dealt with Vietnam (intimidated Hanoi to halt its oil drilling project off its southeast coast and called Hanoi to settle maritime disputes through talks and to jointly exploit the contested waters), Philippines (encouraged Manila to jointly explore for oil and gas in the disputed waters), and Brunei (brokered an unspoken arrangement whereby Bandar Seri Begawan remains silent on the SCS issue in order to secure Chinese investment); and surreptitiously like when Chinese cyberspace hackers supposedly attacked corporate firms linked to the SCS.

The wildcard will be Singapore, who assumed the ASEAN chairmanship last January. Singapore’s fair and balanced approach and predisposition toward global rules and norms may moderate (and possibly even check) Beijing within ASEAN in 2018. Chinese leaders may have anticipated this unwelcome prospect and are taking proactive steps to mitigate. On March 8, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told visiting Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong that China will work with ASEAN: “China is willing to bring benefits to surrounding countries through its own development and build a community of both shared interest and shared destiny with countries in the ASEAN countries.” On April 12, Beijing launched a joint laboratory program with ASEAN to promote and enhance technological innovation, as part of the greater BRI’s efforts to build a community with a shared future for China and ASEAN. The joint program was organized by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology, Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the ASEAN Secretariat.                      

Coming Sharp Power Offensive

China recently restructured its state media to better control domestic content and create a bigger public diplomacy (propaganda) machine to better convey Beijing’s strategic message and to better shape public opinion abroad. Both objectives align with Xi’s goals of ensuring that the domestic and international audiences hear the messages that he wants them to hear, see the images that he wants them to see, and believe the narratives that he wants them to believe. In his eyes, all messages are political and thus subject to state and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control.

In mid-March, Beijing announced the Beijing announced the merger of three national radio and television entities – China Central Television, China Radio International, and China National Radio – to create a single Voice of China (VoC) to “guide hot social issues, strengthen and improve public opinion, push multimedia integration, strengthen international communication, and tell good China stories.” The VoC will employ 15,000 employees across dozens of bureaus around the globe, producing media programs in more than 60 languages to provide a reassuring and benevolent image of China, one that blunts any concern about Beijing’s growing power and influence in the world. 

The VoC will complement similar “sharp power” activities by the Confucian Institutes and United Front (UF). The former is a network of more than 1500 teaching centers established in over 140 countries that provides Chinese language and culture lessons to more than 1.5 million students from around the world. The latter is a CCP organization designed to build broad-based domestic and international political coalitions to achieve party’s objectives, advance the party’s political agenda, counter political foes, and help realize broader geo-economic ambitions such as the BRI. The UF will reportedly take over the functions of the State Council Overseas Office, National Ethnic Affairs Commission, and State Administration for Religious Affairs to exercise tighter control over religion and ethnic issues and to further carry out its efforts on exercising influence overseas. Altogether, these influence organs are intended to promote the Chinese political agenda and explain Chinese ideas and values, and in a way that wins the country supporters abroad.

On February 17, Xi issued a directive to cultivate greater support amongst the estimated 60 million-strong Chinese diaspora. He called for “closely uniting” with overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Dream, and underscored that “to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must work together with our sons and daughters at home and abroad…it is an important task for the party and the state to unite the vast number of overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese and their families in the country and play their positive role in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

The new influence campaign has apparently begun in earnest with a March 22 Xinhua article titled “Overseas Chinese Confident China’s new Leadership Will Lead to National Rejuvenation.” The following is a sampling of endorsements of newly re-elected Xi (President and Chairman of the Central Military Commission) from the worldwide Chinese diaspora:

  • “The new leadership will lead China to greater prosperity and called on Chinese in Canada to work as a bridge in bilateral non-governmental exchanges.” (Wang Dianqi, Head of the Joint Committee of Chinese Associations in Canada)
  • “Chinese in France will help boost China-France exchanges, contributing to the implementation of the BRI proposed by Xi and the notion of building a community with a shared future for mankind.” (Wu Wuhua, Honorary Chair of the Chaozhou Guild Hall in France)
  • “Urge the Chinese in Peru to help boost exchanges and mutual trust between their host country and China.” (Liang Shun, Head of the Central Association of Chinese in Peru).
  • “Xi would be able to lead the Chinese to national rejuvenation, and bring overseas Chinese more benefits and pride.” (Zhou Ying, Head of the Federation of Chinese Associations in Cyprus)
  • “For overseas Chinese, the development of China, most importantly, makes them more respected, and second, brings them new business opportunities.” (Fang Tianxing, Head of the Federation of Chinese Associations in Malaysia)

Conclusion

The United States made progress last year calling out wayward and untoward Chinese behavior, pushing back on Chinese unilateralism and assertiveness, strengthening regional alliances and partnerships, increasing regional presence, reasserting regional influence, and most importantly, incrementally reversing years of ill-advised accommodation. But there is much more Washington can and should do. If not, passivity and acquiescence undermine the new U.S. National Security Strategy, reinforce Beijing’s growing belief that Washington is a declining power, and may further embolden China – a self-perceived rising power – to execute unchallenged and unhindered its strategic roadmap (grand strategy) for national rejuvenation (Chinese Dream). Hence, the new strategy, calling for America to embrace the strategic great power competition with China and plan and act accordingly, is a step in the right direction, for decline is a deliberate choice, not an imposed reality. 

Tuan Pham serves on the executive committee of the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies and is widely published in national security affairs and international relations. The views expressed therein are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government.

Featured Image: Nine Dragon Wall in the Forbidden City in Beijing, China. (Wikimedia Commons)

History

The Forgotten Texas Navy: Heroes from the Gulf of Mexico

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By LT Jason Lancaster, USN

 “It is no exaggeration to say that without the Texas Navy there probably would have been no Lone Star State, and possibly, the state of Texas would still be a part of Mexico.”

 – Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr.

Texan Independence and the First Texas Navy

Despite their integral part in the creation, defense, and maintenance of the Republic of Texas, today, the Texas Navy is a footnote in modern history. Mexican invasions that never happened and gunboat diplomacy criticized so heavily by President Houston destroyed the reputation of the Navy and erased their history from public memory.

In 1835, Texas’ population was small, rural, and dispersed across a vast territorial expanse. There was no industrial base to speak of; Texas imported everything by sea. Galveston Island, on the upper coast, was the most important city and port in Texas, followed by Velasco on the Brazos River, and Indianola on Matagorda Bay. Texas exported timber and cotton but imported everything else. To lose the ports would mean the destruction of the republic and the death knell of the Anglo-Texan dream.   

With the start of the Texas Revolution, Texans formed a provisional government and declared independence on March 2nd, 1836. Despite a provisional government primarily composed of farmers, ranchers, frontiersmen, and lawyers, some of the government’s first acts issued Letters of Marques to ship owners and laid the foundations for a navy. Officials debated how generous to make the terms for privateers, but viewed privateering as a temporary measure to protect the lifeline to New Orleans and fight the Mexican Navy while the provisional government created a regular navy.

With privateers guarding the coast, the hunt for ships began and eventually four ships were found. The flagship of the new navy was the 18-gun brig Independence, a former U.S. Revenue Cutter. The other ships were the Invincible, an eight-gun Baltimore slave ship, the Brutus, a 10-gun schooner, and the six-gun schooner Liberty, a former Texas privateer.1 The squadron quickly cleared the Gulf of Mexican ships. Following the major Texan defeats at the Alamo and Goliad, the navy shielded the Texan coast from invasion and prevented the Mexicans from using the Texan coast for resupply, forcing Mexican logistics to come overland from Matamoros and Laredo instead of landing supplies and men at Copano Bay in southern Texas.

The Texas Navy of the revolution was short lived. Texas won independence at the battle of San Jacinto. The Texas army captured Mexican President, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana and forced him to recognize Texas’ independence and withdrawal Mexican soldiers from Texas at the Treaty of Velasco. Despite the treaty, the two nations continued to spar at sea. In 1837, a numerically superior Mexican fleet attacked the Texas ships near Galveston Bay. The Mexican fleet captured the Independence, while the Brutus ran aground on a sandbar in Galveston Harbor and broke up in a storm. The Texas Navy was gone. Under President Sam Houston, there was no drive to procure replacements. Without a navy, the eight ships of the Mexican Navy were free to harass commerce and cut Texas off from New Orleans commerce. Fortunately for Texas, a diplomatic row between France and Mexico over the treatment of French citizens’ pastry shops resulted in France sending a large fleet to protect its interests. The French captured the Mexican navy and demolished the fortress at Vera Cruz. The Mexican naval threat had been eliminated… at least temporarily.

Republic of Texas Politics

From the beginning of Anglo settlement in Texas, there had been a faction desiring annexation into the United States. Annexation was a highly popular idea in revolutionary and republican Texas. However, there was a second party that believed Texas should be independent. This faction believed that Texas could be the greatest power on the North American continent, and should expand to the Pacific Ocean. American immigrants such as Mirabeau Lamar carried Manifest Destiny to Texas and dreamt that Texas could rival the United States in power.

In Texas, presidents could not serve consecutive terms, so after President Houston’s first term expired December 1, 1838, Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar became president of the Republic of Texas. President Lamar’s vision for Texas was as expansive and glorious as his name would suggest. He believed in Texas’ own manifest destiny. Lamar’s policies as president reflected his belief in the republic. He sent military and trade expeditions to conquer Santa Fe and gain control of the overland trade routes to California, rebuilt the navy, and created alliances with rebelling Mexican provinces.

The Texas Navy was reborn. New warships were constructed in Baltimore, Maryland. Instead of enterprising merchant sailors, Texas searched for talented young American naval officers bored by slow promotion and the dull existence of the peacetime navy. Texas found Lieutenant Edwin Ward Moore to command the squadron with the title of Commodore and the rank of Post Captain.  

Former President and now Congressman Houston ridiculed these policies and accused Lamar of entangling Texas in foreign disputes irrelevant to the republic. Congressman Houston did not think Lamar should squander money on expansionist schemes, but save money and wait until the United States annexed Texas.

One of Lamar’s most controversial policies included interference with Mexican domestic politics. In the 1840s, Mexico possessed two major political philosophies: the Centralists, who favored a strong central government typically led by dictators such as General Santa Anna, and the Federalists, typically found in the extremities of Mexico on the Yucatan Peninsula and on the border with Texas. These states felt threatened by the strong central government. Their livelihoods were based primarily on commerce with foreign countries and any threat to international commerce threatened their livelihoods. The Centralists placed high tariffs on imported goods to support Mexican industrialization. The high tariffs affected the merchants in the Yucatan provinces and along the Rio Grande, who frequently rebelled against the Central Government. Both regions proclaimed themselves republics, the Republic of the Rio Grande centered on the now Texas city of Laredo, while the Republic of the Yucatan comprised the provinces of Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, and Quintana Roo. Both of the new republics asked for Texan support but only one republic was successful. President Lamar went on to conclude treaties of friendship with the Yucatecos. The Yucatecos offered to pay for the Texas Navy if it was employed on the Yucatan Coast. The only aid for the Republic of the Rio Grande was an unofficial army of filibusters formed in Texas, in support of the fledgling republic.

Lithograph in Huber, 1856. (Wikimedia Commons)

While serving as a Texas Congressman in between presidential terms Houston opposed almost everything that Lamar had done, and Houston’s political following constituted its own political party. Under his leadership, the congress disbanded the army and ignored issuing commissions for naval officers. For three years, the navy sailed without any official documents stating their legitimacy.2

President Lamar’s expansionist mindset was not without precedent. In the middle President Houston’s first term in July 1837, the Texas Navy under the command of Captain Thompson claimed the island of Cozumel, in the words of Captain Thompson, the “star spangled banner [referring to the Texas flag] was raised to a height of forty-five feet with acclamations both from inhabitants and our little patriotic band.”3 In addition to the island of Cozumel, the navy took possession of the Arcas Islands, a small island chain in the Gulf of Mexico. The Arcas islands proved a valuable halfway point between Galveston, the Yucatan, and Vera Cruz.  Only 250 miles separated them from Vera Cruz, while it was 623 miles from Galveston to Vera Cruz, or 789 miles from New Orleans.4 The Texans used these uninhabited islands as a rendezvous, recreational area, and supply base. The central position of the Arcas Islands allowed the Texans an easier time of blockading ports and intercepting Mexico’s commerce.

The Texas Navy used this advanced position to interdict Mexican trade and the navy seized British and American merchantmen carrying weapons and military supplies to Mexico. Often times these countries ignored their own pasts and demanded compensation from the fledgling republic. Similarly to how during the Napoleonic Wars the Royal Navy captured neutral ships with cargos bound to France, the Texas Navy was defending Texas from similar Mexican aggression and could therefore intercept neutral ships. Several times the Texas Navy captured vessels like the U.S. brig Pocket bound to Mexico with weapons and gunpowder hidden in barrels of flour. Houston cited occurrences such as these as examples of Texas Navy lawlessness and a  primary reason for the dissolution of the navy.

President Lamar sent expeditions to Santa Fe and other places claimed by Texas and Mexico. The Santa Fe expedition’s goal was to bring the city of Santa Fe under the jurisdiction of Texas. Santa Fe was a valuable trading center in the southwest. This expedition crossed several hundred miles of unexplored terrain to reach Santa Fe, but they lost all of their supplies, and were forced to surrender to the Mexican garrison of a village outside Santa Fe after encountering inhabitants resistant to the idea of becoming Texan. The prisoners were marched to Mexico City. The Santa Fe expedition, along with several others, taxed the resources of the republic. Arms, food, and accoutrements cost money and Texas could not raise the funds to pay for it because the government lacked the power of direct taxation. It was incredibly difficult to raise the means to make Manifest Destiny a reality. Instead of money, soldiers were paid in land bounties. The financial cost of empire proved to be the downfall of the Republic of Texas.

Recognition

The last act of President Jackson recognized Texas independence. However, this did not guarantee protection. On September 25, 1839, France became the first European power to recognize Texas signing a “Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce” with France. Trade did not guarantee protection. From 1836 until the annexation process began in 1844, Texans had to maintain their Independence by force. A navy is an expensive tool. But, when properly used, and properly supported, is well worth the investment. According to Captain A.T. Mahan, the “influence of the government should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy, which, if not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to keep clear the approaches to its own.”5 The close proximity of the Texas coast to the Mexican coast, combined with the relative poverty of both national governments, allowed two small naval forces to operate in the Gulf. Both navies combined never equaled more than fifteen men of war. Often times, they could never put more than two or three to sea at one time. The Texas Navy’s primary mission was to protect the independence of Texas, done through the blockading of the main Atlantic ports of Mexico.

The blockades strangled the commerce of Mexico, and forced British diplomatic recognition of Texas, followed quickly by Belgium and Holland. In 1840, the Mexicans were still recovering from the French assault in 1838. They had no navy to defend their shores from the Texans; however, they quickly and desperately searched for one. The Mexicans sought complete dominance over the western Gulf, and ordered two new steam ships of war. In addition to these, they found, armed, and commissioned several sailings ships.  

Mexican shipbuilding projects frightened Galvestonians. The Texas Navy was ill-used by President Houston. His hesitancy to spend money on maintenance, pay, and supplies caused the ships’ material condition to deteriorate and the crews to go unpaid. Her officers received pay only three times in as many years.

Mexico postured threateningly toward conquest of the Yucatan and then Texas, causing hysteria in Texas, and the hysteria increased because the navy was stuck in New Orleans without money to recruit crews, pay its debts, or maintain the ships. The navy did not even need Texan taxes, just President Houston’s support for the Yucatecos, who had been subsidizing the fleet for two years. Commodore Moore had operated continuously on the Mexican coast, blockading enemy ports, extracting ransom money from them, and disrupting trade with Europe. Houston simply had to allow subsidies to continue, as well as make periodic expenditures toward the upkeep of the navy in dry dock and refitting.

President Houston’s Militia Navy   

On the few occasions Houston desired the navy’s use, his orders for them were entirely improper for both the size and nature of the fleet vis-à-vis the opposing force. Houston’s experiences as a soldier led him to believe the best way to protect Galveston was to have the navy moored in port as a fleet-in-being. Following Houston’s orders meant the navy could be blockaded in Galveston by a superior force and rendered useless, similar to what had happened to the Brutus and the Invincible in the first navy during Houston’s last presidency.

There was a great debate on the measures necessary to protect the republic. President Houston had great experience with the use of militias on land, and believed that a naval militia would be an inexpensive and viable option for the fledgling republic. President Houston favored militias on land and sea to save money. However, a naval militia cannot accomplish the same objectives as a standing naval force commensurate with protecting Texas commerce. Sea control is the goal of a navy. The Texas Navy’s mission was to protect Texas’ international commerce, while disrupting the Mexican commerce by interdicting trade, and destroying or defeating the enemy’s fleet.

The use of militia ships proved to be complete and utter folly. The Englishman William Bollaert served as a volunteer “waister” aboard the steamer Lafitte, one of three militia ships operating out of Galveston. President Houston sent the militia squadron to interdict a rumored Mexican invasion fleet. The cruise was a complete fiasco, with the ships luckily failing in their mission to intercept the enemy force. The Lafitte did capture one small prize, but poor discipline and lack of naval training proved the ineffectiveness of a militia fleet. Mahan said that the best way for a fleet to protect a port was “drawing the enemy forces away from shores through offensive action on the high seas or forcing them to concentrate against a powerful if inferior force.”6 President Houston repeatedly defied common sense naval strategy; luckily, his defiance did not cost the life of the Republic.

President Houston and the Navy    

President Houston’s handling of naval affairs is incredibly controversial. Why was President Houston so belligerent toward his own navy? There are perceived reasons for Houston’s antipathy. The first Secretary of the Navy, Robert Potter proposed dismissing Sam Houston from his post as commander-in-chief after the battle of San Jacinto. Secretary Potter had opposed his appointment to the post to begin with.7 In addition to these actions in the wake of San Jacinto, Houston’s great victory, Secretary Potter had ordered the first Texas navy on a cruise forbidden by Houston, and then joined the cruise himself. Perhaps a part of the answer is that Secretary Potter’s actions had caused Houston to associate the navy with his disgust for Secretary Potter. When Houston was a member of the Texas Senate, he led his large faction in opposition to all large financial projects, including the navy.

(Sloop-of-war Austin, Republic of Texas Navy, in the Battle of Campeche.
Painting, San Jacinto Museum of History)

In 1842, Houston sent three naval commissioners to New Orleans where the fleet had been stuck for lack of funds, to order the fleet to return to Galveston, and for Moore to relinquish command to the next senior officer. Moore, alerted by Yucateco friends of the eminent fall of Campeche, persuaded Commissioner Morgan to allow him to engage the Mexican fleet and attempt to relieve Campeche, lest the Mexicans invade Galveston next. Commissioner Morgan concurred, and they proceeded to Campeche. Houston was outraged. He declared Moore a pirate, and asked the “naval powers of Christendom” to “seize… and bring them into the port of Galveston.”8  Another example of Houston’s continued anti-Moore stance comes from a speech he made after annexation in the United States Senate where spoke, “that miserable Commodore Moore… who would fall by his own poison, or be strangled by his own venom…  He, like a bloated maggot, can only live in his own corruption.”9 The Writings of Sam Houston, volume VI; contain a 32-page harangue of Moore’s actions as commodore. Houston successfully prevented Commodore Moore and the other Texas Naval Officers from receiving commissions in the United States Navy after Annexation. Houston won his feud, killing all memorials to the navy as well as pensions and land bounties to her sailors.

The Battle of Campeche

In 1843, before Moore was declared a pirate, he set sail to do battle with a greatly superior foe. The Mexican fleet consisted of two modern steam ships of war, officered and manned by Britons. In addition to these two steamers, the Mexicans kept four or five sailing ships blockading Campeche. Moore headed for Campeche with his two ships the Austin and the Wharton. After a long and brutal siege, the citizens of Campeche were preparing to capitulate, when in the distance they spied the Texan ships. They broke off negotiations with the Centralists, and cheered the approaching ships. The newly arrived Texans had a difficult task to accomplish. Outnumbered three to one, they sailed out of Campeche to meet the adversary. The Mexican ships refused to engage the Texans and continually withdrew in the face of the Texans, fighting a running battle with them.

The Campeche Campaign, 1843, Meed, pg 2. (Texas State Historical Association, Austin)

Eventually, the Texans were compelled to break off their actions in defense of their allies in Campeche and return to Galveston, not by enemy action, but betrayal at home. President Houston had declared his own Navy to be pirates and outlaws. Commodore Moore received a copy of Houston’s piracy declaration in Campeche, and was forced to return to Galveston. Moore had no desire to risk his men and ships to the consequences of piracy charges if captured by the Mexicans. Despite President Houston’s declaration of the navy as pirates, Commodore Moore’s squadron returned as heroes, the sheriff refused to arrest him; balls were thrown in honor of him and his officers.

Annexation

There were unconfirmed reports that President Jackson had sent his young protégé Sam Houston to Texas to bring her into the Union. Houston denied these reports, and proof has never surfaced. However, he used every trick in the book to encourage the United States to annex the state. He engaged in talks with European powers Britain and France, frequently conversing with European attaches such as Captain Charles Elliot R.N., and the Frenchmen, Viscount Craymayel and Dubois de Saligny. Viscount Craymayel believed all of the peace talks with Mexico completely futile. Moreover, he asserted that the only way “for Texas to escape from her precarious position would be… annexation, which has always been the desire of the population.”10 Craymayel also accused the United States of using Texas to drain Mexican resources to prevent them becoming a rival on the continent.

With annexation efforts decided in Washington D.C., instead of in Texas, Houston attempted annexation through another tack. He spent time with the British Charge d’Affaires in Texas, Captain Elliot, RN. At times, he hinted at emancipation, although never ever specifically saying such a thing. When word of this arrived in America, the newspapers went berserk claiming Britain was trying to defeat them from “within” 11 Sam Houston’s coy discussions with Britain helped persuade the United States to annex Texas. Houston explained his often-confusing diplomatic initiatives thusly “just as a woman with two suitors might use coquetry to prompt the interest of the one she favored, you must excuse me for using the same means to annex Texas to Uncle Sam.”12 The people loved Sam Houston’s explanation for his actions; the people loved, and still love Sam Houston. When it came time to vote for or against annexation, the people voted overwhelmingly for annexation. In the election on October 13, 1845, there were 4,254 votes for annexation with 267 votes against annexation. 

Conclusion

Today we often remember the heroes who fell at the Alamo, the men who were massacred at Goliad, and the men who charged the Mexican lines at San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. Save for a county named after Moore in the Texas panhandle, an entire pantheon of naval heroes has largely been ignored. If one goes to Galveston, there are no statues of Commodore Moore, but one sees memorials to Heros of the republic who fought at San Jacinto and a monument to Confederate Heroes. On the streets, no mention of the Texas Navy, no Moore Avenue runs adjacent to the Strand. The Texas Navy is largely forgotten, erased from memory by a vindictive president.

LT Jason Lancaster is a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer. He is currently the Weapons Officer aboard USS STOUT (DDG 55). He holds a Masters degree in History from the University of Tulsa. His views are his alone and do not represent the stance of any U.S. government department or agency.

Bibliography

1.) Hill, Jim Dan, The Texas Navy, in Forgotten Battles and Shirtsleeve Diplomacy, 
University of Chicago Press, 1937; reprint, State House Press, Austin, Texas, 1987, 224p.

2.) Wells, Commander Tom Henderson, USN, retired, Commodore Moore & The Texas Navy, University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1960, second printing 1988, 218p.

3.) Douglas, Claude L, Thunder on the Gulf, or, The Story of the Texas Navy, Old Army Press, Fort Collins, CO, 1973. 

4.) Francaviglia, Richard V., From Sail to Steam, Four Centuries of Texas Maritime 
 History 1500-1900, University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1998, 324p. Company, 1936; reprint, Old Army Press, 1973, 128p.

5.) Meed, Douglas V., the Fighting Texas Navy, Republic of Texas Press, 2001, 250p.

6.) Devereaux, Linda Ericson, the Texas Navy, Ericson Books, Nacogdoches, Texas, 1983.

7.) Barker, Eugene, The Writings of Sam Houston, volumes I-VIII Pemberton Press, 1970.

8.) Barker, Nancy Nichols, The French Legation in Texas, volumes I-II Texas State Historical Association, 1973.

9.) Campbell, Randolph B, Sam Houston and the Southwest, Harper-Collins College Publishers, 1993.

10.) Sumida, Tetsuro Jon, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: the Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C. 1997.

11.) Mahan, A.T., the Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, Dover Publications, NY, 1987.

12.) Maberry, Robert Jr., Texas Flags, Texas A&M Press, College Station, 2001.

13.) Gulick, Charles Adams, Jr., the Papers of Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar, volumes II-VI, AMS Press New York, 1972.

14.) Hollon, Eugene, W. William Bollaert’s Texas, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1956. The Campeche Campaign, 1843, Meed, pg 2. (Texas State Historical Association, Austin) 

Texas Gulf Coastline, Francaviglia, Richard V., From Sail to Steam, Four Centuries of Texas Maritime History 1500-1900, pg 2. (Jeffery G Paine and Robert A. Morton, Shoreline and Vegetation-Line Movement: Texas Gulf Coast 197241882)

Endnotes

[1] Douglas, Thunder on the Gulf,  pg 17

[2] Jim Dan Hill, The Texas Navy,  pg 119

[3] Hill, pg 84

[4] Commander Tom Henderson Wells, Commodore Moore and the Texas Navy, pg 32

[5] John Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command, 1997

[6] Sumida, pg 48

[7] Campbell, 71

[8] Wells, pg 159

[9] Douglas V. Meed, The Fighting Texas Navy, pg 227 

[11] Nancy Barker, The French Legation in Texas, Volume II, pg 489

[12] Randolph Campbell, Sam Houston, pg 112-113

Featured Image: On a street in London, England at 4 St James’s Street sits the building which at one time served as the site of the Embassy of Texas. From 1842 until 1845, when Texas became a state, this is where the Republic of Texas did business in England and across from St. James Palace. (Photo by Luke Spencer)