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China’s Aircraft Carriers and Southeast Asia: Testing Coercive Naval Diplomacy?

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By Shang-su Wu 

Introduction

Since the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its second aircraft carrier, the possibility of utilizing these capital ships for coercive diplomacy is becoming more real. In China’s surrounding areas, Southeast Asia would be most suitable for “carrier diplomacy” regarding the proximity, the relatively weak defenses of the regional countries, and the major territorial disputes in the South China Sea. However, Southeast Asian countries, with their military modernizations and geopolitical circumstances, would not be merely hopeless either.

Chinese Carrier Group Capabilities

The main challenges coming from China’s aircraft carrier fleet come in the form of airpower and multi-domain survivability. The former refers to the shipboard J-15 fighters, but the number would be slightly lower than the maximal capacity of 24 and 32, respectively, for the Liaoning and Shandong, with several retained for self-defense.1 The matter of multi-domain survivability is derived from the major surface combatants escorting the aircraft carrier, particularly Type 055 cruisers, and how they could deny anti-ship threats, namely submarines, other surface ships, and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).2 As such, the kinetic countermeasures of Southeast Asian countries can be measured to an extent in whether their airpower or air defense capability can contest the J-15 fleet, and whether their sea denial capability can considerably threaten the carrier group itself.

Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong berthed at a naval port in Sanya in December 2019. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn, photo by Feng Kaixuan)

The Philippines

Geostrategically, the four Southeast Asian claimants bordering the South China Sea along with Indonesia would be the most likely targets for naval coercion due to their conflicting interests with China. Among them, the Philippines with its relative lack of anti-ship missiles and robust air defenses would be an ideal target, if the United States does not effectively support its ally.3 Although Manila recapitalized some of its fighter fleet from 2015 with a dozen Korean FA-50s and will introduce another dozen in the future, they are quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, inferior to the Chinese shipboard J-15 fighters.4 Although its two newly delivered frigates are armed with Korean C-STAR ASCMs, the platforms could be large targets for PLAN anti-ship firepower, and their subsonic anti-ship missiles may not penetrate the layered defenses of the Chinese aircraft carrier group.5 The only game-changer would be the upcoming BrahMos supersonic ASCMs arriving from India because their superior speed may allow for the penetration of carrier group air defenses.6 The BrahMos missiles will nevertheless be constrained with their limited numbers and over-the-horizon targeting capabilities of the Philippines, and where their kill chain could be preemptively attacked by the PLAN with precision-guided munitions or sabotage.

Brunei

Brunei has only four corvettes equipped with the French MM-40 ASCM, and without any fighters, would also be militarily suitable for coercion, but its geographic environment may not be suitable for naval coercion.7 Located between Malaysian territories, a Chinese naval deployment aimed at the kingdom will also draw close scrutiny from Malaysia and even Indonesia on the other side of Borneo. Based on their support for Southeast Asian regionalism and the rather neutral positions in the international community, it is unlikely for either Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta to welcome any coercion in their neighborhood. Unless Beijing is planning to take on or infuriate several countries simaultaneously, trying to coerce Brunei and other nearby Southeast Asian nations would be diplomatically unwise.

Malaysia

In the face of the Chinese aircraft carrier group, Malaysia is certainly inferior. Kuala Lumpur has purchased several modern fighters which would be equivalent to J-15s, but the MiG-29 squadrons are on their way to obsolescence and the serviceable numbers of other fighters are uncertain for the limited procurements of eight F-18Ds and 18 Su-30MKKs and the associated maintenance challenges.8 Malaysia also falls short in area air defense systems, as most surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are portable for only point defense.9 Hence, the Chinese J-15s could likely achieve regional air superiority.

Kuala Lumpur has better potential in sea denial. The two French/Spanish Scorpene-class submarines are equipped with sub-launched French SM-39 Exocet ASCMs and Italian Black Shark torpedoes, and the F-18D and Su-30MKM aircraft are respectively armed with American AGM-84A Harpoons and Russian Kh-31A ASCMs, along with a range of surface vessels being platforms for MM-40 ASCMs.10 The submarine base bordering the South China Sea in Sabah would be convenient for deploying assets, and the combined platforms fielding ASCMs offer tactical potential for multi-axis salvo attacks which may overwhelm the PLAN’s layered defenses for its aircraft carrier.11 However, the uncertain serviceability and the challenge of joint operations between Malaysian naval vessels and air force fighters could inhibit options. A gambit between the Malaysian submarines and the Chinese aircraft carrier group is also unpredictable. The PLAN has improved its capability for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) for Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers which feature towed sonar arrays and new Z-18F ASW helicopters featuring larger capacity than the Z-9Cs helos.12 Due to the flotilla of only two submarines, there may be only one Malaysian submarine available, but the familiar operational environment and sub-launched ASCM offer advantages.

Indonesia

Despite not being a claimant in the South China Sea, the maritime disputes around the Natuna Islands make Indonesia a potential target for China to coercively deploy an aircraft carrier group.13 Jakarta’s airpower of 11 F-16A/Bs, 24 F-16C/Ds, five Su-27SK/SKMs, 11 SU-30MK/MK2 fighters, in addition to the likely deal of F-16Vs, would be more than the shipboard Chinese J-15s. But Indonesia’s logistical challenges, as reflected by frequent accidents, may undermine quantitative superiority.14

Indonesia’s sea denial is composed of five German and Korean Type-209 submarines armed with Black Shark torpedoes, and numerous surface platforms fielding various ASCMs, including MM-40s, Russian 3M55s, and Chinese C-705s and C-802s.15 Since a Chinese aircraft carrier group would likely not get too proximate to the archipelago in a tense situation (let alone pass through it) these Indonesian platforms may not be able conduct littoral ambushes using island cover. But they can operate in open seas. Jakarta may further face another challenge from a lack of military infrastructure nationwide, as Beijing may choose a location to pressure other than the Natuna Islands in the widely stretched archipelago, such as a future location near the new capital in East Kalimantan.16 However, Indonesia’s sizeable and expanding submarine fleet may constitute an independent and formidable underwater force for deterrence.17

SOUTH CHINA SEA (May 21, 2018) Indonesian Navy frigate KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata (FFG-331) prepares to receive fuel from the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO-204) during an underway replenishment in the South China Sea. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

Vietnam

Vietnam is a mixed case for China to apply pressure via aircraft carrier. The adjacency allows the PLA and PLAN Air Forces to project airpower to almost the whole of Vietnam from various airbases in Guangxi, Hainan island, and even artificial islands in the South China Sea.18 As such, a Chinese aircraft carrier with its airpower could put additional pressure on Vietnam, but it may also be more exposed to the latter’s firepower.

Hanoi has procured a collection of Russian sea denial weapon systems, such as P-800 supersonic ASCMs onshore, six project-636 submarines with 3M-54 ASCMs, 53-65KEs, and TEST-71 torpedoes, P-15s and 3M24E ASCMs from several frigates and fast attack craft, in addition to airborne Kh-31A ASCMs launched by Su-30 MK2 aircraft.19 Those assets and munitions could put a Chinese aircraft carrier in a dilemma: too close to be exposed to attack and a significant risk of damaging or losing their national pride, or too far so that shipboard J-15s can hardly contribute much beyond land-based Chinese airpower. The risk of losing these icons of national pride may make Beijing cautious in aggressively deploying its aircraft carriers against Hanoi.

Cambodia

Beyond these five Southeast Asian countries, the rest represent distinct scenarios. Without ASCMs, fighters, or other considerable sea denial capabilities, Cambodia would be a militarily attractive target for naval coercion.20 The location in the Gulf of Thailand away from the South China Sea, nevertheless, suggests the low geopolitical value of Cambodia to sea lines of communication (SLOCs). At the two ends of the entrance to the Gulf of Thailand are Vietnam and Thailand, and sending an aircraft carrier group into the gulf would affect relations with these states more than with Cambodia. Finally, Phnom Penh’s friendship with Beijing, especially the former’s dependence on the latter’s investment, would make it the least likely nation in the region for the PLAN to coerce compared to the economic pressures available.

Thailand

Thailand’s coastlines, either on the Gulf or the Indian Ocean, may not be suitable for the Chinese aircraft carrier group to operate in. As previously mentioned, the Gulf is rather irrelevant to China’s maritime interest in the SLOCs, and the force presence near the Thai coastline on the Indian Ocean is too remote to Bangkok. As for air defense, the two Swedish Saab-340 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft would help fighter fleets of 11 JAS-39C/D and 53 F-16A/B fighters, together with some older but upgraded F-5E/F fighters, contest the Chinese J-15s.

Bangkok also maintains a range of platforms fielding ASCMs in the air and surface, such as Swedish RBS-15F from the JAS-39 fighters, RGM-84s and C-802s from different frigates and corvettes, in addition to its DTI-1G artillery rockets which could also conduct sea denial missions, particularly at the entrance of the Gulf.21 Furthermore, an imminent S-26T submarine from China with C-708 ASCMs and Yu-7 torpedoes would strengthen Thailand’s deterrence as well.22

Thailand’s diverse anti-ship firepower in the Gulf may lend itself to deterrence against PLAN carrier groups because of multi-directional threats that could be made real with rather short warning times. If Beijing chooses to deploy the aircraft carrier out of the Gulf, the coercive pressure placed on Bangkok would be lower due to distance and shift toward other nations.

Singapore 

Surrounded by Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore would also be geopolitically unsuitable for targeted naval coercion, and the disruption of the Singapore Strait will create consequences going far beyond the region. Militarily, the city-state’s fighter fleets of 60 F-16C/Ds and 40 F-15SGs backed by four G-550 AEW aircraft are stronger than the J-15s from either the Liaoning, Shandong, or even both combined. Singapore has also invested in sea denial capabilities, comprised of four ex-Swedish submarines, two Sjoormen and two Västergötland with air-independent propulsion, the RGM-84 and AGM-84 from surface vessels, and Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft, AGM-158s from fighters, plus HIMARS guided rockets onshore.23 The four submarines will soon be replaced with four, more modern Type-218s from Germany.24 Although PLAN major surface combatants could intercept subsonic Harpoon missiles, the Singaporean fighters supported by four A-330 aerial refueling aircraft could pose a formidable threat to the J-15 squadrons and contest coercion or outright attack.

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 24, 2012) The Republic of Singapore frigate RSS Formidable (68) is alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) for a photo exercise during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eva-Marie Ramsaran/Released)

Myanmar

The long bilateral borders and the endless isurgency present a range of alternatives for China to sending an aircraft carrier group to coerce Myanmar, not to mention their economic ties. If Beijing still chooses the naval option, Naypyidaw is not completely inferior. Although Myanmar only has the sea denial capability of subsonic Chinese ASCMs on surface vessels which could likely not penetrate the PLAN’s layered defenses, its fleet of 32 MiG-29B/SM fighters along with 30+ inferior J-7s and some JF-17s, plus several Russian S-125, 2K12, and Chinese KS-1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, could make for a match with the J-15s.25 Geostrategically, a Chinese aircraft carrier group sailing into the Indian Ocean would also alarm India, and the Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command can facilitate Indian military deployments near Myanmar.26 The PLAN would not operate freely in the Andaman Sea.

Conclusion

In terms of military and geostrategy alone, Beijing already faces some constraints and countervailing forces on applying coercive aircraft carrier diplomacy to Southeast Asia. The most appropriate target would be the Philippines, followed by Malaysia and Indonesia, due to their territorial disputes with China and their relatively inferior military capabilities, but they still have some means to deter a PLAN aircraft carrier group. These aircraft carriers do indeed contribute to Beijing’s image of a rising military superpower, but their operational applications may not be as overwhelming as the propaganda describes.

It must be noted that all Southeast Asian countries carefully handle their relations with China and strenuously work to prevent any occasion for the latter to pursue military options. However, if the strong choose to do as they please, the weak will not merely suffer what they must.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

References

1. Sebastien Roblin, “Here’s Everything We Know About China’s Domestically Built Shandong Aircraft Carrier,” the National Interest, 27 FEBRUARY 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/heres-everything-we-know-about-chinas-domestically-built-shandong-aircraft-carrier-127607

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2020 (London: IISS, 2020), 262.

3. IISS, Military Balance 2020, 305.

4. Francis Wakefield, “PH to acquire 12 more FA-50 light fighter jets,” Manila Bulletin, 9 JUNE 2018, https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/06/07/ph-to-acquire-12-more-fa-50-light-fighter-jets/

5. Martin Manaranche, “Future Philippine Navy Frigate BRP ‘Jose Rizal’ Sails Home for Commissioning,” Naval News, 18 MAY 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/05/future-philippine-navy-frigate-brp-jose-rizal-sails-home-for-commissioning/

6. Masao Dahlgren, “Philippines to Order BrahMos Missile,” Missile Threat, 20 DECEMBER 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/philippines-to-order-brahmos-missile/

7. IISS, Military Balance 2020, 256-257.

8. IISS, 293; “Malaysia air force says low maintenance rate of fighter jets partly due to lack of operating funds,” the Strait Times, 3 AUGUST 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-air-force-says-low-maintenance-rate-of-fighter-jets-partly-due-to-lack-of

9. IISS, 292-293

10. IISS, 293.

11. IISS, 293; “Malaysia Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 16 OCTOBER 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/malaysia-submarine-capabilities/

12. IISS, 236; “Z-18 Medium transport helicopter,” Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/helicopters/z18.htm

13. Fransiska Nangoy, Wilda Asmarini, Stanley Widianto, and Gabriel Crossley, “Indonesia’s president visits island in waters disputed by China,” Reuters, 8 JANUARY 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea-idUSKBN1Z710N

14. Yulius Yoma, “C-130 crashes in Indonesia, 6th similar accident in 2016,” Aerotime, 20 DECEMBER 2016, https://www.aerotime.aero/yulius.yoma/16039-c-130-crashes-in-indonesia-6th-similar-accident-in-2016; IISS, 278; “F-16 Indonesia,” Lockheed Martin, 2020, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-16/f-16-indonesia.html; Heru Andriyanto and Yeremia Sukoyo, “Indonesia’s Defense Modernization Gains Momentum After Two Air Crashes in Nine Days,” Jakarta Globe, 15 JUNE 2020, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesias-defense-modernization-gains-momentum-after-two-air-crashes-in-nine-days

15. IISS, 277; “Indonesia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, 17 OCTOBER 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/indonesia-submarine-capabilities/

16. Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, “’Indonesia’s new capital city will be very special,’ Tony Blair says,” the Jakarta Post, 29 FEBRUARY 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/29/indonesias-new-capital-city-will-be-very-special-tony-blair-says.html; Evan Laksmana, “The military and strategic implications of Indonesia’s new capital,” the Strategist, 6 NOVEMBER 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-military-and-strategic-implications-of-indonesias-new-capital/; Beritasatu, “Indonesia Set to Have Four New Military Bases,” Jakarta Globe, 5 OCTOBER 2019, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-set-to-have-four-new-military-bases/

17. “Indonesia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI.

18. Ben Werner, “New Air Bases, Baby Cabbage Key to Chinese Long-Term Claims in South China Sea,” USNI News, 3 JUNE 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/03/new-air-bases-baby-cabbage-key-to-chinese-long-term-claims-on-south-china-sea

19. IISS, 319-320.

20. IISS, 258.

21. IISS, 315-316.

22. SIPRI.

23. IISS, 307-308.

24. Lim Min Zhang, “Invincible, first of Singapore’s biggest and most advanced submarines, launches in Germany,” the Straits Times, 18 FEBRUERY 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapores-first-type-218sg-submarine-launched-in-germany-named-invincible

25. IISS, 296-297.

26. Rahul Singh, “Andaman defence commander gets power over all three services,” Hindustan Times, 12 MAY 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/andaman-defence-commander-gets-power-over-all-three-services/story-LLhvEAs1CSF9nO2sVrTmBK.html

Featured Image: Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong berthed at a naval port in Sanya in December 2019. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn, photo by Feng Kaixuan)

Preventing the Collapse: Fighting Friction after First Contact at the National Training Center, Pt. 1

The following article appeared in the March-April 2020 edition of Military Review and is republished with permission. It will be republished in two parts. Read it in its original form here.

By Lt. Col. Brian P. Schoellhorn, U.S. Army

The commander stepped outside the stuffy command post tent and breathed in the night air as he tried to contain his growing frustration. His staff had just finished an update, painting a grim and incomplete picture of the brigade combat team’s (BCT) current state. The commander struggled to understand what had gone so wrong. The fight had started successfully with air insertions of deep observation posts, seizure of key terrain, and the successful prosecution of enemy targets with indirect fire, attack aviation, and fixed-wing aircraft. In short, the BCT had seized the initiative from the enemy.

That was over thirty-six hours ago. Since then, reporting had ceased, communications had collapsed, and units had repeatedly failed to attain their designated objectives. The cavalry squadron had not yet achieved its planned reconnaissance and security objectives, resulting in repeated surprise attacks and costly penetrations of the BCT’s zone. It had gained only two to three kilometers since its initial deployment. The field artillery battalion, which had started so well, had since fired only a few ineffective missions after the initial targets planned for the operation’s opening phase. Close air support (CAS) and attack aviation had ceased inflicting the devastating effects of the first day. Combined arms battalions had either stumbled into contact with significant losses for no appreciable gain or had been repeatedly surprised by the enemy in their attack positions. To make matters worse, the brigade support battalion commander had complained to him earlier in the day that every unit was clamoring for “emergency resupply” of all commodities. He had no idea how many casualties the BCT had taken in the recent contacts. Finally, the brigade engineer battalion operated in a constant state of crisis as insurgents and special purpose forces wreaked havoc across the BCT rear area with asymmetrical attacks and deadly accurate indirect fire that seemed to materialize out of nowhere and everywhere.

The BCT tactical operations center (TOC) was faring no better. Although everyone was working frenetically trying to resolve the friction that had ground the BCT to a halt, these efforts had resulted in no greater understanding of the BCT’s situation nor had they provided any realistic means to get it moving again. Some staff officers had started pointing to failures at the subordinate level, while others had exceeded their ability to process the multiple simultaneous issues that bombarded the BCT on an hourly basis. Few had slept more than a few fitful hours slumped over at their stations or in their vehicles. This included the BCT commander himself.

The attempted “two-minute” update had taken forty-five minutes but made clear that staff running estimates remained wildly inaccurate and incomplete. To make matters worse, the BCT executive officer (XO) had just completed a scratchy and decidedly one-way telephone call with the division operations officer, who demanded that the BCT regain the offensive as soon as possible. The commander was supposed to receive a staff planning update for the operation to seize the provincial capital, but he thought it would merely waste time given the TOC’s current state. The commander was unsure how to restore order and resume offensive action akin to that of the first day. It was frustrating and bewildering. What to do?

Introduction

The situation described above happens nearly every month at the National Training Center (NTC). Most BCTs come to the NTC with a solid baseline of training and preparedness for the first day of the fight. They routinely attack the contested reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process with alacrity. Many BCT leaders think that their unit is ready to go on the offense as soon as the fourth day of RSOI. No matter how far geographically or fast physically the BCT gets on the first day, however, the initial mission invariably devolves into twenty-four to forty-eight hours of what can be described as a BCT-wide collapse of offensive action.1 The BCT’s subunits and staff make contact with the enemy and are hampered by the terrain, which in turn produces a deleterious effect on time available to continue planning. These inputs compound, producing a level of friction that most units have not experienced in training. Units and staffs enter survival mode, trying desperately to work through the pressing problems in front of them to the detriment of the larger mission. In this situation, reporting, sustainment, communication, and planning break down, leaving battalion and BCT staffs in the dark as to the state of units and their adherence to orders. Any enemy contact reverberates throughout the BCT, causing further confusion. The net result of friction at every level causes a collapse in tempo and offensive action, resulting in paralysis across command posts and attack positions. Why does this happen?

As a reasonable approximation of combat, the NTC induces a level of friction not re-created anywhere else. Home-station training cannot replicate the space, terrain, time, enemy, and stress that the NTC produces at the tactical level. The first forty-eight hours probably represent the first simultaneous deployment of every BCT element at doctrinal distances under combat conditions against an enemy capable of dominating all forms of contact.2 In this light, the general collapse of tempo and offensive action is understandable and part of the training process. The first few days also expose the BCT’s systems to friction in a way that no other training event short of combat can. In many ways, the most powerful drivers of friction are BCT- and battalion-level staff organization, processes, and procedures. Most staffs are not adequately organized according to plans, current operations (CUOPs), and mobile command group sections. Even if they are, staff functions rarely remain clearly defined as the BCT makes contact, and everyone tries to understand the current problem to resolve the immediate threat. The BCT often outruns the plan; the staff does not continue planning, and consequently fails to prepare to transition the BCT from one operation to another. In this situation, battalions and companies stumble into unplanned contact with the enemy, unsupported by BCT-level enablers. These independent and desynchronized actions rarely result in BCT-wide offensive action and increased tempo.

Soldiers position vehicles to simulate taking over an enemy town during an exercise at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif., June 7, 2019. (Photo by Army Sgt. Mason Cutrer)

Communications difficulties due to range, terrain, load, training deficiencies, and mistakes cause difficulties even understanding what is happening, much less directing actions of subordinate units.3 To resolve this, BCT commanders often resort to understanding and directing the BCT by talking directly to battalion commanders on tactical radios. Although this can prompt action, it often results in plans developed in isolation from staffs and lacking BCT-level enablers. These radio conversations can also generate additional friction as battalion commanders often “talk their way out of” directed tasks because they lack assets, need more time, or their situation (combat power, casualties, sustainment, and communication) prevents continued offensive action.

How to shorten this inevitable loss in tempo is a topic of much discussion at the NTC, and its answer is existential in nature given the enemies and situations we are likely to face throughout the world. The following discussion is meant to spark thought, but it is not a prescriptive guide to resolving the friction inherent in combat.

Know the Collapse Is Coming

One of the main causes of the collapse is physiological. Units, leaders, and soldiers spend RSOI in a heightened state of alert and activity that cuts into sleep and interrupts the normal rhythms of garrison. RSOI at the NTC is designed to help a unit “see itself” in a way not possible in garrison. While enormously beneficial, this process can stress a unit and its leaders as unforeseen problems emerge and must be dealt with quickly, often at the expense of planning, eating, and rest. The planning and preparation for combat, as well as the unit’s exposure to the NTC, Operations Group, and its observer, coach, trainers (OC/Ts), only add to task and time demands, causing further stress. RSOI also introduces the unit to NTC’s contested environment, wherein it faces insurgent attacks, rocket strikes, and drone swarms, to name only a few forms of contact with which leaders must contend while building combat power. Finally, nervousness, anxiety, adrenaline, and a desire to prove oneself are intermingled to the point that the first twelve to twenty-four hours of action are a release from RSOI and the logistics support area. These emotional and physical conditions closely replicate those of precombat, and if harnessed effectively, can be a positive impetus for aggressive action.4 The costs of this heightened state, however, often remain hidden until manifesting themselves across the force in the subsequent twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the first operation.

BCT-level planning for the first attack is regularly the most complete and detailed of the rotation despite some initial unfamiliarity with the environment. OC/T coaching is also the least impactful at this stage since OC/T suggestions are largely theoretical for the unit until after it makes contact. As a result, plans are frequently overly ambitious in their geographical objectives and rarely take the enemy, terrain, and time into full account. Units also invariably fail to consider the amount of friction that their own systems and processes will encounter after first contact. Units deploy, have some success, and gain some ground but inevitably encounter the enemy at a time or place in an unplanned manner. The friction and shock of this first surprise encounter rapidly ripples up from the lowest unit and across the BCT, causing confusion, and routinely, the end of offensive action. Unit leaders look inward to solve their immediate problems, reporting breaks down, and the BCT ceases to act in concert as reacting to contact consumes its constituent parts. The hyperactivity of the preceding days rapidly turns into fatigue as the stress of initial contact combines with a lack of rest. Sustainment problems swiftly develop in these conditions due to deficiencies in reporting and planning. Additionally, training, equipment, and maintenance deficiencies accumulate to cause BCT-wide failures in communications, control, and sustainment.

Countless historical descriptions of first contact, from the phalanx to conflicts today, point to the commonality of this situation in combat.5 The adrenaline of preparation, the frenetic activity prior to the mission, followed by the shock of first contact create an unprecedented level of what Carl von Clausewitz described as friction, or the fabled “fog of war” experienced by every commander in conflict and training throughout military history.6 The fog of war is often thought of as a lack of information that leads to inaction. However, it is also the multiplication of inputs to the BCT after contact leading to a state of confusion that often results in paralysis and inaction. The NTC can inflict a BCT with every form of contact, stressor, and inducer of friction simultaneously, which compounds the fog of war in the first days. In fact, this is part of its mandate: to replicate the stress of combat in a way that causes the BCT and its soldiers “to have their hardest day in the desert so that they do not go untrained into combat.”7

While the fog and friction of the first days of combat cannot be completely eliminated, their time and effect can be reduced. Knowing they are coming and preparing the BCT’s leaders for the physical, mental, and emotional rigors of the first hours and days of the fight is the first step. Physical fitness that results in combat endurance is critical. Training the mind through historical examples in a leader professional development/self-development program will give leaders some context as they think about the trials likely facing them in the first fight. Tactical decision games that focus on actions after the breakdown of the plan and absence of further orders will train junior leaders to think through the fog of war.8 Leaders must develop and enforce rest plans throughout RSOI and especially during the first few days of contact, as the body and mind acclimate to the shock and rigors of combat, simulated or otherwise. Finally, leaders must share this understanding with their soldiers, from the most junior to senior levels, through discussion, and more importantly, training.

Lethality is a Necessary but Insufficient Condition for Success

It is a truism that lethal squads, crews, platoons, and companies form the building blocks of victory at NTC and in combat. Although this is undoubtedly the case, lethality at the small-unit level is necessary but not sufficient to fight through the fog of war. Too often, even the most lethal formations are surprised by the enemy, make contact at an unexpected place and time, and are forced to fight on the enemy’s terms to shore up the situation. Win, lose, or draw, these small-unit actions inescapably result in combat losses that slow the tempo of the company, the battalion, and the BCT, if not immediately followed by a combined arms fight that reinforces success. Observations at NTC also indicate that deficiencies in the science and art of terrain and enemy analysis, and the inability to execute actions on contact at the platoon level contribute to combat losses, even with favorable system-to-system kill ratios.

An opposing force soldier from Killer Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
An opposing force soldier from Killer Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, fires a simulated tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile from atop a visually modified vehicle at an M1A1 Abrams main battle tank from 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, 3 August 2016 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Pvt. Austin Anyzeski, U.S. Army)

The enemy inevitably exploits these opportunities and weaknesses. Consequently, a spoiling attack can surprise a unit in a key location, penetrate its position, and wreak havoc throughout the BCT. Platoons and companies do not report in enough detail, eventually leaving the BCT ignorant as to the enemy and friendly situation. Orders are then given without regard or knowledge of the true situation, causing further confusion and disorder. A lack of discipline in field maintenance and during logistic package resupply also causes BCT-wide effects, as units utilize limited assets for “emergency” resupply and maintenance.10 The wear and tear on sustainment units, systems, and soldiers ultimately contribute to a collapse of tempo.

Preventing the accumulation of small-unit deficiencies that result in BCT-wide problems requires the discipline born of repetitive training. Leaders at the BCT level should never have to order a platoon or company to report, secure, and sustain themselves. The current live-fire-centric model of unit training requires a great deal of crew, squad, and platoon gunnery proficiency.11 This has yielded positive results for units at NTC. Live fire alone, however, will not ingrain the skills of automatic reporting, security, and sustainment without ruthless enforcement during training. Leaders should not assume that their small-unit leaders know how to perform these tasks to standard. They may need to start with a white board or a Micro-Armor (miniature model) explanation followed by a walk-through.

A review of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and reports may also prove necessary to ensure standardization across the BCT. Finally, training that requires small units to establish security, report, and sustain themselves for long durations under combat conditions—repeatedly—best builds the muscle memory required to perform these tasks in combat or at NTC. Each repetition should be executed and evaluated under increasingly more difficult conditions (day, night, chemical attack, degraded communication, drone observation, etc.) and for longer duration. Units must be evaluated on these tasks using training and evaluation outlines, be given an after action review, and be required to do it again. This kind of training can be done at a gunnery or at low cost in local training areas.12

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 163rd Cavalry Regiment, position their Bradley Fighting Vehicle during a defensive attack training exercise at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, Calif., June 1, 2019. A month-long NTC Rotation provides more than 4,000 service members from 31 states, including units from 13 National Guard states and territories, with realistic training to enhance their combat, support and sustainment capabilities. (Photo by Cpl. Alisha Grezlik, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Mission Command Requires Discipline and Accountability

Leaders routinely misunderstand the concept of mission command regarding planning and execution of operations at NTC. There is often a sense that orders, timing, requirements, reports, and battle-rhythm events are in some ways negotiable if they interfere with or do not conform to lower-unit actions or expectations. Missed suspenses and tardy reporting, unperformed requirements, and a lack of communication add to the general collapse as the BCT tries to understand why subordinate units have not accomplished their assigned missions. A reluctance persists to enforce these requirements either through direct or general admonishment. This disinclination to require compliance is frequently coupled with planning mistakenly deliberate in its lack of details, which the staff hopes will enable commanders to exercise initiative. These conceptual plans usually lack adequate graphic control measures, timing, tasks, and triggers, subsequently hindering the BCT’s ability to control the fight or combine arms effectively. These two factors—a lack of adherence to the plan and conceptual planning—often lead to problems of land management, coordination, synchronization, sustainment, and combining arms, as each unit fights its own war according to its perceived needs. Doing so does not result in a BCT fight that restores offensive action. Instead, it often leads to defeat in detail and fratricide.

Decisive action requires a revitalization of command and control as the foundational pillars of mission command.13 Units and leaders must understand that fighting necessitates adherence to the plan, tasks, timing, and reporting. Many problems start with a lack of communication that extends for hours and even days without resolution. Leaders must realize that the subordinate units must gain and maintain communication with their higher headquarters. They then must report according to the battle rhythm; primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan; and SOP accurately and on time. There can be no exceptions or excuses for not doing so. Leaders must also understand that every subordinate action happens in time and space in conjunction and coordination with other units, assets, and activities. This makes actions such as making a designated start point and a line of departure times, as well as the requirements to establish support by fire (SBF) positions, target prosecution, and logistics release points nonnegotiable.

We are no longer in a situation in which subordinate leaders can decide that “the conditions are not set” or that it really does not matter if units operate independently from one another, as in a counterinsurgency fight where units were battlespace owners. This starts with BCTs adhering to division requirements and ends with soldiers executing their given tasks on time and on target. Noncompliance under a misconceived notion of mission command risks mission failure.

Controlling the BCT fight also necessitates detailed planning of actions, triggers, and timing. This staff work constitutes the science of combat and cannot be neglected if the BCT expects to combine arms effectively.14 NTC requires BCTs to conduct the meticulous work necessary to use indirect fire, attack aviation, CAS, special munitions, and other assets in the way they would have to in combat. Applying assets for a BCT fight requires detailed graphic control measures and synchronization of actions in time and space. Therefore, leaders must adhere to the plan if the conditions that the BCT sets remain in effect in order to accomplish their given tasks as part of the overall fight. If an internal condition prevents battalion adherence to the plan, it is a subordinate commander’s responsibility to report and have a discussion early enough for the BCT and the staff to mitigate risks and modify the plan.

Although control limits a leader’s scope of action in a theoretical sense, it actually provides the framework for exercise of initiative because it tells a commander what to do where and when, not how to do it.15 Ample room remains for a commander to exercise initiative and creativity in task organization, sequence, application of internal assets, etc. Good graphic control measures and the applied science of control also lend clarity to the situation, delineate boundaries, and allow for the effective use of combined arms. Control does not negate the art of command.16 Adhering to the plan, understanding the intent, and being accountable to the BCT reflect the tenants of mission command. It is the discipline in disciplined initiative.17

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1ST Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, Alaska, send a round downrange from an M777 Howitzer while conducting calibration during Decisive Action Rotation 19-04 at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., Feb 7, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Kimberly Riley, Operations Group, National Training Center)

The commander’s intent is also a powerful guide for action, especially when the plan breaks down due to the friction inherent in any fight. The key tasks in the intent statement not only have to be accomplished but also have to be done in time and space to be effective. Units will have to fight through the enemy and friction to accomplish these tasks that set the conditions for victory. None of these considerations preclude a commander or subordinate leader from assessing the situation, applying the commander’s intent, and then acting to exploit an opportunity that not only achieves the intent but also places the unit in a position of advantage vis-à-vis the enemy. For example, a battalion or company tasked to establish an SBF position could surprise the enemy and continue to maneuver around or behind a position to achieve a more decisive effect than a straightforward SBF. Doing so achieves the required result while also exploiting an opportunity inherent in mission-type orders. Conversely, the commander and staff retain responsibility to communicate intent clearly and to design straightforward, yet flexible plans, which allow for command, control, the exercise of initiative, and the assumption of risk.

The concepts of command, control, discipline, and accountability as they relate to mission command need to be explained and trained at home station in order to prevent misunderstanding and confusion for leaders throughout the formation. Taking the time to discuss the requirements of decisive action as they relate to mission command through conversation and reading can go a long way to building a shared approach to command and control prior to the rotation. Additionally, trainers should design scenarios that require leaders to exercise initiative and assume risk to meet their stated objectives in time and space according to the plan and the commander’s intent. This can be done through tactical decision games, training exercises without troops, and simulations.

Training leaders to think and adapt is the commander’s responsibility and will achieve the shared understanding and mutual trust required of mission command. Discipline and accountability, however, must be ruthlessly enforced in garrison, training, at NTC, and in combat. Leaders should attempt to find ways to match battle-rhythm events and reporting formats and requirements in garrison to those that they will use in combat. There can be no excuses for late or inaccurate reports. A climate of accountability will help to dissipate the fog of war quickly and allow the BCT to act in concert to achieve its mission.

Lt. Col. Brian Schoellhorn, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He previously served as the brigade combat team senior trainer at the National Training Center. A career armor officer, he has served in command and staff positions in Germany, Kosovo, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Alaska, and Fort Carson, Colorado. He commanded 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

Notes

1. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (2003), s.v. “collapse.” The term collapse is used throughout this article to describe the unexpected and widespread results of the friction the brigade combat team (BCT) experiences after first contact. According to Merriam-Webster, to collapse is “to suddenly lose force, significance, and effectiveness,” which best describes what happens to a BCT. The use of the term is not meant to imply that this takes place because of neglect or poor planning but to suggest that the consequences of friction are so sudden and its scope so unexpected that responding to it effectively is extremely difficult.

2. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], January 2016), 2-13. The eight forms of contact are direct; indirect; nonhostile; obstacles; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear; aerial; visual; and electronic warfare.

3. Communications difficulties typically include issues with retransmission system positioning and functionality, establishment of Army Battle Command Systems using upper tactical internet, and the consistent ability to communicate using Blue Force Tracker or the Joint Capabilities Release systems. Many other issues are the result of incomplete precombat checks and inspections, a lack of critical equipment or not-mission-capable systems that are unreported, or a lack of proper training and supervision. The accumulation of these soldier-level tasks lead to BCT-wide friction.

4. Robert L. Maginnis, “Battle Stress: Are We Prepared?,” Armor 93, no. 6 (November-December 1984): 35–40; Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War (Millstadt, IL: Warrior Science Publications, 2008).

5. There are countless historical examples and references that can inform personal professional reading and leader development in helping understand the conditions, toll, and consequences of preparation for combat and the first fight. Some examples include Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1979); S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947); T. R. Ferhrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
For engaging descriptions of training at the National Training Center (NTC), see Daniel P. Bolger, Dragons at War: 2-34th Infantry in the Mojave (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1986); James R. McDonough, The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Mechanized Combat (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988); Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Developments of the National Training Center, 1976-1984 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 1992), 85–90, 106–9; Anne W. Chapman, The National Training Center Matures, 1985-1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1997), 107–36, 281–305.
For fictional accounts of mechanized combat, see Harold Coyle, Team Yankee: A Novel of World War III (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2016); Ralph Peter, Red Army: A Novel of Tomorrow’s War (New York: Pocket Books, 1989).

6. Carl von Clausewitz, “Friction in War,” in On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 65–68, 88. Clausewitz’s explanation of friction is undoubtedly amongst his greatest contribution to the theory of war since, in his words, “friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” His equally famous dictum that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” elucidates the straightforward, but profound, truth that governs and limits every action in combat. As he further explains, “We should bear in mind that none of its [the unit’s] components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential friction.” The entire chapter seven is required reading and gives context to the friction, difficulties, and state of collapse that units struggle with at the NTC; Clausewitz, “Third Property: Uncertainty of All Information,” in Howard and Paret, On War, 88–89. Although Clausewitz does not specifically use the term “fog of war,” his description of the components of friction: physical exertion, intelligence (or lack thereof), and danger combined with the complex nature of moving, maneuvering, and leading a military organization filled with individuals suggest that all actions in war take place under a fog or haze of uncertainty. For a contrary interpretation of Clausewitz’s notion of “fog and friction,” see Eugenia C. Kiesling, “On War: Without the Fog,” Military Review 81, no. 5 (September-October 2001): 85–87.

7. Brig. Gen. Christopher R. Norrie, then commander, Operations Group, author’s personal notes from Senior Trainer In-Brief, July 2018.

8. For resources for using and developing tactical decision games (TDGs), see John F. Schmidt, Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision Game Workbook (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1994); see also “Tactical Decision Games: Your Index for TGDs,” The Company Leader, accessed 12 September 2019, http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/tdg. TDGs are an easy and cost-effective way for battalion and brigade combat team commanders to not only train subordinate leaders but also to see how they think about tactical problems. Giving an officer or a noncommissioned officer a TDG to solve during staff duty or professional development sessions is a relatively simple way to build tactical competence, provide repetitions, and convey intent through feedback.

9. ATP 3-20.15, Tank Platoon (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012), 6-1–6-5, 6-12–6-15.

10. Ibid., 9-1–9-14.

11. See Leader’s Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 29 September 2017), accessed 12 September 2019, https://atn.army.mil/unit-training-management-(utm)/standards-for-training-proficiency-(stp) (CAC required).

12. For discussions of small-unit training, see Arthur Collins, Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); Dandridge A. Malone, Small Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1983); Training Circular 25-10, A Leader’s Guide to Lane Training (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) [obsolete]; James B. Hickey, Closing with the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 1998); Field Manual 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2016).
For insights from Operations Group on preparing for an NTC rotation, see Alan R. Cocks, “Objective NTC: Some Ideas for Leaders on How to Get There From Here,” Armor 95, no. 4 (July-August 1986): 11–19; Larry E. Word, Observations from Three Years at the NTC (Monterey, CA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1987), accessed 13 September 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a179386.pdf; Christopher R. Norrie, Thomas E. Lamb, and Michael J. Culler, “Ready Now-Our Number One Priority,” Military Review 98, no. 5 (September-October 2018): 61–69.

13. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 [obsolete]), 2-17, superseded by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, July 2019.

14. Ibid., 2-12–2-17.

15. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 [obsolete]), 4-1–4-2, superseded by ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, July 2019.

16. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 2-5–2-17.

17. Ibid., 1-1–1-4.

Featured Image: U.S. Army tank crews engage targets downrange during gunnery training at Camp Ripley, Minn., April 3, 2019. (Photo by  Army Sgt. Mason Cutrer)

Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest CDR Salamander

By Alex Clarke

We’ve made it to Episode 14 and no Russian ships have broken apart on us, although apparently their floating docks are now their biggest threat, and we did warn them in Episode 13. Well, as that is the norm, here is Bilge Pumps as we three regular naval geeks of easy listening disposition do call it.

Today we are joined by the highly esteemed CDR Salamander for a two-part show that can best be described as what would happen if you sat four naval history geeks down in a room and gave them endless drinks, snacks, and told them to fix what was wrong with navies today. Although, we’re not in the same room, not even the same time zone, and definitely not the same continent. Alongside our love of naval history, one of us boxes with springy creatures and fights daily battles with ravenous wildlife, another builds model railways, the third’s Australian, and the special guest hobby farms something the size of most UK dairy farms.

So after all that what is Episode 14 about? Well the #Bilgepumps team is being topical, so the Chinese fleet is massive, ever growing more as an employment mechanism than a sensible strategy, but how does the west counter that? CDR Salamander joins us to help divine the answer.

#Bilgepumps is a still newish series and new avenue, although it may no longer have the new car smell, in fact more of pineapple and irn bru smell, with the faint whiff of cork, but we’re getting the impression it’s liked. So we’d very much like any comments, topic suggestions or ideas for artwork tweeted to us the Bilge Pumps crew (with #Bilgepump) at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).

Download Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest Cdr Salamander, Part 1


Download Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest Cdr Salamander, Part 2

Links

Alex Clarke is the producer of The Bilge Pumps podcast.

Contact the CIMSEC podcast team at [email protected].

Why Military Sealift Command Needs Merchant Mariners at the Helm

By Dr. Salvatore R. Mercogliano

COVID and the Straining Merchant Marine

On July 29, 2020, the heads of three maritime unions – Marshall Ainley of the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association, Don Marcus from the International Organization of Masters, Mate & Pilots, and Michael Sacco, the long-time President of Seafarers International Union – jointly penned a letter to Rear Admiral Michael A. Wettlaufer, the Commander of the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command. In their one-page letter, they were blunt and to the point: “We are writing to you today to communicate our ongoing and increasingly grave concerns regarding the mental health and well-being of MSC’s CIVMARS [civilian mariners].”

The letter sent to the commander of Military Sealift Command by the three union heads (Click to expand)

They highlighted three specific issue. First, the March 21, 2020 “Gangway Up” order that restricted merchant mariners to their ships due to the COVID-19 outbreak. While the act was prudent and ensured the readiness of the vessels to respond to missions, it was done with no warning and more importantly, did not apply to naval personnel assigned to the vessels or contractors. Therefore, the quarantine intended to be in place on board ship was broken daily, while crewmembers who reported on board for work that morning found themselves trapped and threatened with termination if they left the vessel, while others moved freely on and off the ship. This became apparent with a breakout on board USNS Leroy Grumman undergoing a yard availability in Boston.

The second issue involved the recent tragedy on board USNS Amelia Earhart. On July 22, third officer Jonathon J. Morris of San Mateo, CA fatally shot himself on board. The letter from the three union heads noted, “the ongoing and selective ‘Gangways Up’ restriction may have, in some part, contributed to the unnecessary and senseless act.”’ While there is no evidence to indicate this, my personal communications with crewmembers on board Amelia Earhart indicate that the event has not triggered any change in the operation of the vessel. While counselors were sent to the ship, its operations continue with no safety stand down, and not even a chaplain accompanied the vessel as it sailed to perform services for the fleet with some of the mariners not setting foot on ground for almost a half a year, except to remove the body of their shipmate. Mariners remained restricted to the ship in port, while active duty Navy personnel left the vessel.

The final issue is the delay in reliefs for crews, up to 90 days late in some cases. Many mariners have not been home since the COVID-19 outbreak hit the United States or were permitted ashore in that time period. MSC’s leave policy for its mariners is well outside the norms of common maritime industry practice because mariners hired directly by MSC must conform to government employment rules, even though they operate in an environment completely different than the normal federal employee. Mariners earn a set number of hours of leave every two weeks.  The only addition is 14 days of annual shore leave. For new employees to MSC, this means 10 months onboard ship (tours are usually limited to four months, but delays are typical) and only two on land in a year.

While shore-side government workers enjoy flex work schedules, weekends at home, get holidays off, enjoy the occasional snow day, and can schedule vacations well in advance, MSC mariners are toiling at least eight hours a day, seven days a week for a minimum of four months at a time when wages are comparable to those ashore. They miss weekends, holidays, birthdays, anniversaries, events with children, and now they face prolonged wait for relief. Unlike Navy sailors, MSC mariners do not rotate to shore billets or have many of the opportunities for education and training afforded to naval personnel. Even worse, those waiting to get out to ships have used all their leave and are now ashore, considered absent without leave, and not being paid as they await a call to report back to work for a potential assignment out to the fleet.

This is the situation facing 5,383 MSC mariners who crew 20 percent of the 301 ships in the U.S. Navy.  Let that number sink in for a moment: one out of every five ships in the battle force of the U.S. Navy is crewed by merchant mariners and not U.S. Navy sailors. All 29 of the auxiliary supply ships, the dozen fast transport ships, and the fleet tugs and salvage ships are all operated and commanded by merchant mariners. Some ships, such as the submarine tenders, command ships, and expeditionary support bases, while commanded by a naval officer, have merchant mariners who operate the deck, engine, and steward departments on board. This does not include the fleet of contract operated vessels in the afloat prepositioning force, sonar surveillance, ocean survey or sealift vessels with another 1,400 contract merchant mariners.

SOUTH CHINA SEA (Sept. 17, 2015) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82), right, receives fuel from the Military Sealift Command dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Amelia Earhart (T-AKE 6) during an underway replenishment. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Corey T. Jones/Released)

Yet these recent issues facing the Merchant Marine are not simply the product of COVID or other recent events. They are simply yet another expression of the longstanding problems of status the Merchant Marine has faced within the U.S. Navy.

Inequality in the Merchant Marine

Throughout the U.S. Navy, specialized communities are commanded by one of their own – submariners command submarines, aviators command squadrons and carriers, SEALs command special operations, and so forth. Yet, when it comes to merchant mariners, they fall under the command of serving U.S. naval officers with little to no experience with merchant mariners.

Recently, MSC had two commanders – Mark Buzby and T. K. Shannon who graduated from merchant marine academies and were at least familiar with the U.S. merchant marine. The last two MSC commanders – Dee Mewbourne and Michael Wettlaufer – are both aviators. In the past, non-surface warfare commanders have done exceedingly well, particularly two submariners – Glynn Donaho and Lawson Ramage. They oversaw MSC’s forerunner – Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) – during the Vietnam era, when the service handled mainly passengers, cargo, and fuel and they were experts in disrupting those services due to their experience with sinking the Japanese merchant marine in the Second World War.

Today, MSC is integrated into the fleet structure and many of its previous sealift missions are shared with the Army’s Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the United States Transportation Command. With the end of naval manning of auxiliaries in 2010, all of them are operated by MSC mariners, with some hybrid crews. No longer do MSC tankers and supply ships shuttle up to U.S. Navy auxiliaries attached to battle groups, but mariner-crewed oilers and combat supply ships are both shuttle and station ships for the U.S. Navy. Yet these ships lack two critical assets from their grey hull counterparts.

First, they have no means of defense at all. MSC ships, except for small arms, are completely unarmed. Ships that are intended to provide the fuel, ammunition, and vital supplies to keep an entire carrier strike group or Marine amphibious assault task force at sea lack even point-defense weapons. In the world wars, the U.S. Navy assigned armed guard detachments to merchant vessels to defend the ships. While Kaiser-class oilers have the mounts for close-in weapons systems (CIWS), they lack the weapons. If an enemy nation wanted to eliminate the threat of the U.S. Navy, why would it go head-to-head with a Nimitz-class carrier when all it could to do is wait, shadow, and sink unarmed supply ships and then wait for the task force to run out of gas?

Additionally, those mariners who now find themselves not dead or killed in the initial attack, but afloat in a life raft, face another challenge – what is their status? Not whether they are dead or alive, but are they considered veterans? They face on a common day the same challenges and threats as that of U.S. Navy sailors, but they are not considered veterans. Even those mariners that experienced the Second World War had to wait over 40 years, until 1988, to get their service acknowledged as veteran through a lawsuit.

Some argue that merchant mariners are contractors and therefore do not deserve this. But how many contractors command assets in the Unified Command Structure of the military? No contractor commands a squadron in the Air Force, or a battalion in the Army or Marines, yet one-fifth of the Navy’s ships have a merchant mariner in command. The Navy gets all the benefits of a sailor without giving the mariner those same benefits. That is a deal, but for the Navy.

PHILIIPPINE SEA (May 8, 2020) – Civilian mariners assigned to the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Carl Brashear (T-AKE 7) attach supplies to Carl Brashear’s AS-332 Super Puma helicopter during a replenishment-at-sea with the forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76). (U.S. Navy photo by Ordinary Seaman DJ Hinahon)

Some say the easiest solution is to replace mariners on the 60-plus ships with U.S. Navy sailors, but it has been tried before. This unique arrangement came into being at the founding of the Navy. The first ships brought into the Navy were merchant ships along the dock in Philadelphia. The two founding fathers of the Navy – John Paul Jones and John Barry – learned their trade as master mariners. In the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, private men of war (privateers) vastly outnumbered public men of war. In the Civil War, mariners kept the Union army supplied along the coasts and rivers. At the end of the Spanish-American War, with a global empire, the Navy needed to prioritize its personnel and decided to hire a civilian crew to man USS Alexander, a collier. By 1917, almost all the Navy fuel ships were civilian manned by elements of the Naval Auxiliary Service. With the outbreak of war, and concerns of foreign elements in some of the crews, and a massive increase in the size of the Navy personnel, the crews of the NAS were militarized, and later the commercial passenger ships in the Transport Force. The Navy resisted civilian crewing, and in 1942 President Roosevelt placed the building, crewing, and operating of the commercial merchant marine in the hands of one person – Emory S. Land.

After the successes of the Second World War, the use of civilian-crewed merchant ships was cemented with the creation of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). It was expanded in 1972 when the first underway replenishment oiler, Taluga, was transferred to civilian control. While some in the Navy may advocate for removing the civilian crews from the MSC ships today, the Navy already lacks the necessary personnel for its current assets, let alone an additional 60 ships, or the expertise in handling such assets.

Creating Paths to Command

This comes to the final point – how to address the issues raised by the heads of the unions based on the current situation facing the Military Sealift Command. The solution comes from the history of MSC’s forerunner, MSTS, and its counterpart across the seas, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) of Great Britain. Within MSC’s command structure are five Senior Executives – Legal Counsel, Director of Total Force Management, Director of Ship Management, Director of Maritime Operations, and Executive Director. They are all stellar and outstanding qualified people, and MSC is fortunate to have them. I know many of them and have worked with some of them in the past. They have impressive biographies and two of them graduated from merchant marine academies.

Yet nowhere in the chain of command for MSC is a Master or Chief Engineer from the fleet. They serve as Port Captains and Engineers and advise area commands, but there is no career path from the deckplate to the headquarters. That is a fundamental flaw in the organization and leads to the disconnect currently besetting the fleet.

In comparison, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary is commanded by Commodore Duncan Lamb. He has been in the RFA for 38 years and commanded many vessels in the fleet. His announced successor, Capt. David Eagles, has served with the RFA for more than 30 years. Unlike MSC, the RFA integrates their personnel into the command structure of the Royal Navy and therefore they have the opportunity for billets ashore and work within the shore base Navy.

What works for the Royal Navy may not work for the U.S. Navy, such as how Prince Edward* is the Commodore-in-Chief of the RFA, and they are much more regimented than MSC. However, they do have Royal Navy detachments on board for self-defense. The Royal Navy has a better understanding of how RFA ships work as demonstrated by their integration into the fleet during the Falklands Conflict of 1982.

A model where MSC mariners, starting at the junior level – 2nd Mate or Engineer – have the option for a career path that would involve assignment ashore to MSC area commands and fleets may better inform naval personnel of the particular needs of merchant mariners. Additionally, the appointment of senior master or chief engineer as vice commander at both the area command and headquarters level could ease the transition of new commanders who have little to no experience with MSC and provide a conduit and perspective from the fleet to the headquarters.

PHILIPPINE SEA (June 12, 2020) – The Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Alan Shepard (T-AKE 3), right, and the forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) steam together during a replenishment-at-sea as an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the “Flying Carabao” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 25 Det. 3 flies overhead. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Gabe Pogliano)

It is very doubtful that the Navy would allow any of its commands to be structured in a similar way. A small group of naval officers – 323 active Navy sailors – oversees MSC from its headquarters in Norfolk, to the five area commands and in dozens of offices around the world. This disconnect, with officers and civilians who have never served or commanded vessels with merchant marine crews or any of the types operated by MSC, explains why the issues raised by the union heads pervade the fleet. It appears that the role of merchant mariners in the role of national defense is reaching an inflection point.

Conclusion

Merchant mariners crew the fleet auxiliaries providing fuel, ammunition, and supplies to the U.S. Navy at sea. They operate the afloat prepositioning ships that would deploy the initial elements of Marine and Army brigades, along with materiel to a potential battlefield. They crew the 61 ships maintained by the Maritime Administration in the Ready Reserve Force and MSC’s sealift force, and they crew the 60 commercial ships of the Maritime Security Program. They are foundational to the nation’s ability to maintain, deploy, and sustain its armed forces abroad, and they cannot be easily replaced by naval personnel.

Yet despite this vital role, they lack representation within the command structure of the U.S. Navy. They are taken for granted by the Department of Defense and the public in general. They are overlooked in most strategic studies of American military policy and posture. And yet it is not clear whether in a future war the nation will be able to count on the U.S. merchant marine as it has in past conflicts.

This issue is not one caused by Admiral Wettlaufer, or any of the previous MSC commanders. It is a problem that has manifested itself as the command evolved from a primarily transport force of cargo, troops, and fuel, to one that is firmly integrated into the fleet structure in terms of ships. But the same cannot be said of its personnel.

MSC has undergone periodic transformations, alterations, and inflection points, and COVID-19 may be one of those moments. A group of former commanders, retired masters and chief engineers, and experts in the field should be formed to examine how to restructure MSC and present recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary and past civilian shipping entities can serve as models for how Military Sealift Command can proceed into its 72nd year of existence, and ease the issues facing the fleet and mariners today.

Salvatore R. Mercogliano is a former merchant mariner, having sailed and worked ashore for the Military Sealift Command. He is an associate professor of history at Campbell University and an adjunct professor at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. He has written on U.S. Merchant Marine history and policy, including his book, Fourth Arm of Defense: Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War, and won 2nd Place in the 2019 Chief of Naval Operations History Essay Contest with his submission, “Suppose There Was a War and the Merchant Marine Did Not Come?”

*Editor’s Note: Prince Andrew was originally listed as being the Commodore-in-Chief of the RFA when it is Prince Edward.

Featured Image: SEA OF JAPAN (Nov. 16, 2016) The forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts an underway-replenishment with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4). (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham/Released)