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Capability Analysis

The 50-Year Dilemma In Aircraft Carrier Design and the Future of American Naval Aviation

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By Brent D. Sadler

June 2024 marks the 90th year since commissioning the Ranger (CV-4), the first purpose-designed and built U.S. aircraft carrier. The Ranger stood on the legacies of several ships, most notably the converted collier Langley (CV-1), commissioned in 1922. A century of lessons learned from fleet experimentation during the interwar period, wartime experiences from World War Two, and the necessities of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War coalesced into today’s premier aircraft carrier, the Ford (CVN-78). 

This legacy is more than just the evolution of the aircraft carrier as a ship; it represents a complex interaction between aircraft design, operational requirements driven by the battle space, and technology like nuclear propulsion. That said, there are consistencies throughout the evolution of the aircraft carrier: the importance of sortie rates, the advantage of longer operational range (for aircraft and ships), sensor coverage (to include scouting aircraft), and secure communications. As such, American aircraft carriers persevered over the challenge of Imperial Japan’s Kamikaze attacks, Soviet bomber long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, and will likely again over China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles. The bottom line is that the threats are not new, but how the carrier and its airwing evolve will determine its future. Contemporary nuclear-powered supercarriers, like the Ford, are built with a service life of 50 years, a timeframe equal to half the period aircraft carriers existed.

Today, the aircraft carrier faces evolving challenges and emerging technological opportunities. Amidst these challenging times, there is no single or clear picture of how these warships and their airwings will best perform in a modern blue-water war. However, with the next major war shaping up to be a modern replay of the last war in the Pacific, geography shows it is highly likely the aircraft carrier will play a leading role again, but not in traditional battle or strike group formations.

The fifty-year dilemma of today’s aircraft carriers and airwings is how to embrace various technological developments in unmanned platforms, long-range weapons, and new methods of processing massive amounts of targeting data. Wartime experience in the Pacific clarifies that getting this right is never assured. Building flexibility and adaptability is paramount for today’s aircraft carriers and airwing.

Introduction

Aircraft carrier design is based on a simple premise: launching, recovering, and sustaining aircraft at sea. In addition, a range of naval missions—strike, air defense, and submarine detection—influence naval aircraft design and inform carrier design and operations. It is an iterative process with successes and failures littered throughout the century of aircraft carriers’ existence.

Today, as historically, there are technologies weighing on the aircraft carrier and its airwing. For example, weapon systems can hold the aircraft carrier and its airwing at risk well outside its organic sensors and weapons range. Top of the threat list is the much-hyped Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile (e.g., DF-21, DF-26) with a range of more than 3,000 miles. These weapons were in steady development for almost 20 years, building on a similar Soviet weapon system of the Cold War. Today, the Houthis are employing anti-ship ballistic missiles to limited effect in the Red Sea, and China’s military is certainly taking note to improve its designs and operational concepts. Chinese air-to-air weapons outrange today’s U.S. airwings with anti-air missiles like the PL-15 or newer PL-17, with ranges of around 186 miles, and exacerbate kinematic shortcomings. Importantly, weapons’ range is only effective if fed with precise targeting. Weapon evolution is nothing new, and the carriers and their airwings evolved to overcome such threats in the past. For example, the AIM-54C “Phoenix” air-to-air missile was developed to defeat Soviet Backfire bombers before reaching its weapons’ launch range against the carriers.

China’s long-range missile arsenal and the ranges of respective weapons. (Graphic via CSIS, April 2021)

The ability to make sense of massive amounts of networked sensor data is rapidly evolving for attack and defense. Effectively placing a weapon on a target hundreds of miles away or defending against such an attack is a team effort. Vital to success is the ability to reliably connect various platforms and sensors across hundreds of miles and rapidly process copious data. The key to these efforts is artificial intelligence and big data management systems to focus and speed up human decision-making. Networking the naval and even proximate land and space assets together is widely recognized as fundamental to success on the battlefield today and well into the future. Thus, it will be a key element of future carriers and their airwings.

A January 2024 Paris naval conference focused on how these forces will shape U.S. and allied navies’ next-generation aircraft carriers and naval airwings. For the host, the impending decision by the French Navy to determine the requirements for its next aircraft carrier loomed over many of the panels’ discussions.1 The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations reflected on 100 years of U.S. aircraft carrier experience: “…one thing that you really see from carrier aviation and carrier strike groups is their adaptability.” The theme resonated throughout the conference and was echoed in the over 40 submitted papers for review, which informed the event’s numerous panels. Adaptability is a common feature of successful warship designs in naval warfare. The history of the aircraft carrier, its airwing, and associated escort ships’ success is a testament to the persistent value of adaptability.

Aircraft carriers are a significant investment, costing over $13B and requiring a highly trained crew numbering in the thousands. As such, aircraft carriers are built to last 50 years and so must be adaptable. Fifty years ago, the U.S. Global Positioning System or networked fleet units did not exist. Today’s buzz concerns a fourth industrial revolution centered on quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Technology moves fast, and being adaptable is the only way to be ready. The best way to maintain adaptability in a naval warship is with ample space and excess power generation. Observers noted that after advanced electronic warfare systems modification, the Arleigh-Burke class Pinckney sported significant bulges on its superstructure to carry the added gear and new power systems that did not fit into the already full ship.2

Milestones in Aircraft Carrier and Airwing Design

The evolution of the aircraft carrier and its airwing can be boiled down into three evolutionary periods: creation, experimentation, and adaptation. Importantly, adaptation can be broken down into two periods: wartime, notably in the Pacific, and the Cold War. Finally, a fourth era, which arguably we are in today, could be called tessellation or the covering of a space without gaps. Before diving into what tessellation implies for the future of the aircraft carrier and its airwing, a brief overview of the earlier evolutionary periods is informative.

The Age of Creation

The evolution of the aircraft carrier shortly followed aircraft entering the battlefield. For the U.S. Navy, the origin story of the aircraft carrier began with the successful takeoff and landing on an improvised at-sea platform by a plane piloted by Eugene Ely. In 1912, the first U.S. naval aviation unit was established. By 1914, the naval aviation unit was connected to the warships’ command and control network with the adoption of radio.3 However, it would be the U.K.’s improvisation to fight the First World War’s German submarine threat that saw the first viable aircraft carriers put to sea.

The first true aircraft carrier to enter service was the British warship Argus, a repurposed Italian cruise liner whose construction was halted in 1916. The Argus was put to sea in 1918, and it was too late to see combat, but its impact on Japanese and American navies was immense. Three design issues surfaced in this first aircraft carrier: speed, stability, and obstruction to flight operations from the exhaust stacks. In the case of Argus, modifications to the initially very stable cruise liner made the ship top-heavy and prone to rolls that imperiled flight operations. Smoke and physical obstruction from the exhaust stacks were remedied by placing them under the flight deck and aft. This was not a perfect solution, but it was workable. This solution also helped the third challenge, speed. For the underpowered airplanes of the day, wind speed over the flight deck to takeoff required a ship’s speed of 30 to 35 knots. Early wind tunnel studies showed that if the exhaust stacks had been above the flight deck, it would have caused unacceptable amounts of cross-deck turbulence. In 1918, flight trials were conducted with a canvas dummy island installed. With an island structure, the pilots found it easier to judge distances on landing.4 Many of these lessons informed the next era in aircraft carrier and airwing development.

The Age of Experimentation

1922 marked the beginning of a nearly 20-year process of experimentation and design improvements to the aircraft carrier and its airwing. That year, the Langley (CV-1) entered service as the first U.S. aircraft carrier after a two-year conversion from a collier. She became a test platform for naval aircraft carriers and airwing operations until her conversion to a seaplane tender in 1937, as a war in the Pacific loomed. During this timeframe, she was joined by the much larger converted cruisers Lexington and Saratoga. Through a series of major naval exercises called “Fleet Problems,” the Navy experimented with various operational approaches. Through the 1920s, the Navy learned that the larger aircraft carriers afforded stability, which enabled flight operations in rough seas. The Navy also realized the value of the aircraft catapult, the importance of open hangers for rapid aircraft readying, and the need to focus on sortie rate.5  The lessons learned from these three warships informed the first purpose-built aircraft carrier, the Ranger.

Ratified in 1922, the Washington Treaty ratified constrained naval construction by tonnage for the world powers. The treaty made naval aviation and aircraft carriers an attractive and powerful addition to the fleet for less tonnage. The Ranger design incorporated the lessons of the 1920s when it was commissioned in 1934. Originally designed with a flush deck like the Langley, an island superstructure was later added while being built to aid in flight operations, direct defensive weapons, and navigate the ship. The Ranger’s naval designers required an endurance of 10,000 miles to support long-range operations in the Pacific. War plans anticipated in the 1930s that American possessions, the Philippines and Guam, would be cut off in any war with Japan, with naval forces having to fight their way across the Pacific. During the design phase, consideration of aircraft accommodation, like deck weight constraints or catapult design limitations, weighed heavily on the Ranger’s final specifications. These considerations included compatibility with a 10,000-pound bomber with a flight deck of 665 feet.

Light cruisers, notably the New Orleans-class and the Benson-class destroyers, would eventually play a key role in supporting aircraft carrier air defenses. The Navy realized from the Fleet Problems by 1930 that surface warships, including the aircraft carrier, were susceptible to air attack, which resulted in efforts to improve air defenses at sea. Fleet Problem IX in 1929 was a watershed event; it demonstrated the value of independent carrier operations relying on the speed and range of its striking airwing while exposed to shore-based threats.6 Nonetheless, the too-short range of then naval aircraft and a too-modest speed advantage against surface warships meant the Navy’s early carriers were vulnerable. Eventually, this led to purpose-built escorts filling the air defense mission, mitigating the need for defenses on the aircraft carrier and freeing deck space and tonnage for more aircraft.

By 1930, the Navy considered operating heavier naval aircraft with greater range from carriers. This required greater strength of the flight deck, catapults for launching, stronger arresting gear for landings, larger hangars and elevators to move aircraft to the flight deck, and other design improvements. The airwing of the early 1930s consisted of 18 heavy-attack bombers, 12 scout planes, and 2 squadrons (36 planes) of fighters. The next generation of aircraft carriers, the Yorktown-class, was planned to carry four 18-plane squadrons, with various proposals that included dive-bombers with 1,000 payloads and fighter-bombers. All variations of the next airwing included long-range scouts, which were critical to spotting enemy fleets and launching attacks before the enemy. To accommodate the future airwing, the Yorktown-class aircraft carriers grew from Ranger’s 16,140 tons to well over 20,000 tons. The three carriers of this class played critical roles early in the Pacific theater of World War II. Yorktown was lost at the Battle of Midway, Hornet at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, and Enterprise survived the war. These three aircraft carriers provided important wartime lessons that continue to inform aircraft carrier and naval aviation designs today.

Adaptation – Wartime

The Atlantic theater of World War II differed from the long-range naval operations conducted in the Pacific. As such, the theater demands on the carrier and its airwing were incongruous, contributing to the Navy’s decision to send the operationally limited Ranger from the Pacific to service in the Atlantic. The Ranger ultimately served in the November 1942 invasion of North Africa in Operation Torch and attacked German shipping along the Norwegian coast in October 1943 in Operation Leader.7 The larger legacy carriers, Lexington and Saratoga, were retained in the Pacific and saw action early in the war. In the Pacific, operational range and striking power were paramount, correlated to the fuel carried onboard and the ability to sustain a large airwing.

Critically, the larger Lexington and Saratoga were able to operate the heavier new aircraft entering service in the late 1930s. Size and catapults mattered in ensuring an aircraft carrier could adapt to new aircraft. Wartime experience, especially during late-war countermeasures against Japanese Kamikaze suicide attacks, validated the expansion of air defenses and dedicated escorts. The loss of the Hornet and damage to the aircraft carrier Intrepid, both Essex-class, underscored the importance of machinery redundancy and the physical separation of engine rooms.8,9 The first post-naval limitation treaty-designed fleet carrier arrived a week after the end of the war. Unconstrained by the Washington Treaty, the Midway-class was able to bridge the technological divide from propeller aircraft to jet-powered naval aviation.

Damage to an unnamed escort carrier flight deck, June 1944. (Photo by Ensign William C. Sadler)

During World War II, the nation lost six aircraft carriers, and it was the only time U.S. aircraft carriers were sunk from hostile action.10 At the time of its sinking, the Langley was no longer an aircraft carrier but a repurposed seaplane tender ferrying crated fighters for the defense of the Dutch East Indies. Four carriers were sunk in the first year of the war, and the last loss was the light carrier (CVL) Princeton in October 1944 at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Once wartime industrial production hit its stride by January 1944, the Navy reached its zenith in August 1945 with a fleet of 99 aircraft carriers (28 fleet carriers and 71 escort carriers).11 The bottom line is that World War II experiences validated the importance of carrier designs to ensure the ship could fight despite battle damage.12 Modern U.S. aircraft carriers continue that legacy in stringent design specifications written in blood. Carriers are usually well protected and operated in concert with escort warships, providing air and submarine defense. 

Adaptation – Cold War

The war in the Pacific set important precedents in carrier design and reaffirmed during the conflicts of the Cold War, namely Vietnam, Korea, and the Gulf War. The Midway-class began its design process in 1940 to lead attacks on Japanese island garrisons and surface action groups. These new aircraft carriers were nearly double the size of the Essex-class at 58,600 tons and a flight deck almost 100 feet longer at 968 feet. Arriving too late to see service in World War II, the Midway-class made its mark in the early Cold War evolution of jet-powered naval aviation. The larger size enabled the carriage of more fuel, defenses, radar, and aircraft. It also allowed modernization in the 1950s to carry the first jet-powered carrier-based naval aircraft, the FH-1 Phantom. The final ten Cold War carriers were of the nuclear-powered Nimitz-class, which remain in service today. The airwing also adapted throughout this period to counter the potent Soviet submarine threat with dedicated anti-submarine warfare aircraft. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat was deemed minimal and could be adequately covered by land-based aircraft and shipboard helicopters. The last carrier-based anti-submarine fixed-wing aircraft, the S-3 “Viking,” ended its sea service in 2009.

What will be the carrier strike group’s development focal point for future naval combat?

Two factors weigh on the response to this question: the survivability of the carrier and its airwing under modern threats, principally Chinese, and the effective long-range employment of the airwing beyond effective enemy defenses. Of these, the factor meriting the greatest focus, given the maturity of the current Ford-class design today, is the need for longer-range aircraft and weapons. This will impact the mission-airwing-carrier developmental cycle going forward.

Today, the U.S. Navy struggles to adapt its current F/A-18 attack aircraft and increasing numbers of the F-35 to meet longer-range requirements. One bridging solution is with drones repurposed to function as tanking aircraft like the MQ-25. Of course, the F/A-18 also doubles today as a tanker, but this detracts from available aircraft to execute strike missions. This modus operandi must change and will propel designs of future carrier aircraft with operational ranges exceeding 1,500 miles. New operational requirements will also inform future carrier design, such as the requirement for larger ammo elevators, support systems, and size of the airwing, amongst other considerations. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) is an example of a new system to avoid costly future catapult re-designs that, without, would lead to aircraft or weapon capability sacrifices.13 EMALS can adjust the force more precisely and across a larger spectrum used to launch aircraft, using more force for future heavier-loaded aircraft and less for lighter unmanned aircraft.

Effective long-range employment of the airwing will rely on an effective and dispersed sensor network. Much is written on this concept, referred to by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as Mosaic Warfare. This concept would, if achieved, employ a network of sensors and weapon systems that would overwhelm an adversary while providing seamless sensor coverage, like tiles in a mosaic.14 What is needed to achieve this tessellation is largely known, leaving the resolution of various engineering and operational problems to endeavors such as the Department of Defense’s Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2).15 What is clear is that target-level data will need to be passed seamlessly amongst various platforms to create the opportunity for the best-placed weapon to be employed against the enemy. The carrier will be a network-making node in this construct, providing platforms and operational control to manned and unmanned platforms. That said, given the distances and enemy interference, dispersed command nodes of the airwing will be needed beyond the carrier.

Longer-range air-to-air missiles will be another key element informing the composition and design of airwings and the aircraft carrier. New missiles may require modifications to existing carrier elevators as longer-range weapons typically are larger and heavier. These long-range weapons may include hypersonic missiles with a larger fuselage and weight, adding demands on the carrier and aircraft design.

Sortie rates still matter, giving rise to the need for what could be called a modern escort carrier. Such ships would allow large, manned carriers to focus on strike missions using heavier payloads. In contrast, largely drone-equipped carriers could provide the strike group’s air defense at a shorter range but with longer sustained operations. Given the threat of massed air, drone, and missile threats, the ability to mass large numbers of airborne aircraft continues to matter and is playing out in the Red Sea under massed Houthi missile and drone attacks.

Era of Tessellation – Carrier Operations in a Modern Pacific War

Taking the above together, the aircraft carrier and its airwing of the future are perhaps best viewed as a link between platform tiles in a sensors-weapons mosaic. The aircraft carrier sustains a robust aerial network of aircraft and assists in coordinating massive targeting data processes for prolonged periods. The carrier will critically retain the ability to execute five or more days of combat operations before leaving station to rest and refit. This aligns with the aircraft carriers’ historical experience, role, and mission. At the same time, U.S. systems’ range and response time are crucial in overwhelming the enemy’s sensors-weapons network. The U.S. system must integrate sensor coverage from carrier airwings, naval warships, shore, and space-based sensors to support long-range weapons. Response time will be critical as a modern adversary like China should be assumed to possess parity with the ability to detect and target U.S. forces. To accelerate decision cycles and targeting, Mosaic Warfare envisions massive data processing using artificial intelligence to synthesize and recommend placement for naval platforms for the best chance of victory.

In such a construct, future carrier operations offer mobility that adds significant complexity to an adversary that fixed targets cannot. Taking the fight to China inside the first island chain requires penetrating deep into China’s anti-access envelope to conduct strikes. Another carrier mission that will see added emphasis is the need to provide a screen for Army and Marine Corps forces operating within the first island chain. Those ground and amphibious forces will provide land-based weapons and sensor coverage to cue naval operations. Air Force and Navy land-based aircraft must be integrated into this tessellated sensors-weapons battlespace. Of course, to remain in the fight, land forces must also be resupplied.

The Marine Corps and the Army plan a maneuver campaign within the first island chain, which is intended to contest China’s naval and air operations. The Marine Corps concepts are expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and littoral operations in a contested environment (LOCE).16 These concepts inform the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, envisioning a light, mobile amphibious force. The Army’s concept is similar but less mobile, emphasizing long-range missile systems to include air and missile defenses. The Marines are restructuring their forces to include new formations called littoral regiments.17,18 These new regiments are purpose-built to provide highly mobile air defenses centered on the new AN/TPS-80 radar system and road-mobile launchers of anti-ship missiles to hold enemy warships at risk just over 100 miles from shore.19

For the Army, the concept of operations is multi-domain operations (MDO). The Army will likely deploy tailored multi-domain task forces (MDTF) to counter the first island chain’s specific threats.20 The MDTF would likely be equipped with air defenses, radars, and long-range rockets like the Precision Strike Missile, with an approximate 300-mile range.21 Also under development is long-range hypersonic weapons (LRHW) modeled on the Navy’s hypersonic weapon development with an estimated range of 1,725 miles.22

To succeed in the first island chain, the Marines and the Army will need logistics ships and mobility to complicate Chinese targeting. A carrier and airwing designed for air dominance could provide that screen as those ground forces are re-positioned or resupplied. At the same time, ground forces would receive and provide targeting data for threats as the carrier screening force sweeps through the area.

In a modern Pacific war, the aircraft carrier and its airwing must execute a screening force along the first island chain and a surge strike force. Historically, carriers acted as screens, notably during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands as Marines fought on Guadalcanal.23 Also, while evading Japan’s extended maritime defenses, carriers famously executed a series of strikes during the Doolittle Raid. By the end of the war, large fast carrier task forces executed raids on the Japanese home islands and Taiwan. As proven in that war, carriers are remarkably survivable and complicate China’s ability to defend and target U.S. forces.

A track chart of the Battle of Santa Crus. (Graphic via Warfare History Network, May 2009)

An attempt was made to achieve operational integration between naval carriers and their airwings with other services called Air-Sea Battle. The concept was born from a collaboration between the Navy and Air Force in 2009 to address the challenge of China’s capabilities by developing and practicing new joint tactics.24 However, it failed to gain traction and funding, and by January 2015, it had been folded into the Joint Staff, effectively sideling the effort.25 In a January 2023 article, Admiral James Foggo and Steven Wills argued for resurrecting the Air-Sea Battle, given developments in long-range weapons advances in networks.26 The time is ripe for a relook. After all, achieving effective operational tessellation of the Western Pacific requires a high degree of integration. The carrier and its airwing will be a critical, mobile platform enabling significant sensors-weapons tessellation of the battlefield. The carrier and its airwing must be seamlessly integrated with land and space-based platforms and sensors to overcome China’s significant sensor and missile threats. This will require technological advances as advocated by the proponents of Mosaic Warfare, but also developing the operational rigor learned through a new series of fleet problems backed by a resurrected Air-Sea Battle initiative.

Notional carrier operations in the Western Pacific. (Author graphic)

Conclusion

The good thing is that the technology being proven now on Ford, like the advanced arresting gear and electromagnetic aircraft launch systems, provides the flexibility needed for deploying a wider range of aircraft with future munitions. The key will be how well these systems have performed recently in the Eastern Mediterranean during the ship’s 2023 deployment. This information will inform decisions for future carrier and airwing designs and operations that maximize flexibility and adaptability – a core feature and advantage of the aircraft carrier stretching back to its origin.

Captain Brent Sadler (Ret.) joined the Heritage Foundation as a Senior Research Fellow in 2020 after a 26-year naval career in nuclear submarines and as a foreign area officer. He has extensive operational experience in the Western Pacific, having served at Seventh Fleet, Indo-Pacific Command, as Defense Attache in Malaysia, and as an Olmsted Scholar in Tokyo, Japan.

References

1. “Paris Naval Conference 2024: The Evolving Role of the Carrier Strike Group,” French Institute of International Relations, January 25, 2024 (accessed February 27, 2024).

2. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Refining Plan for its $17B Destroyer Electronic Warfare Backfit with 4 Test Ships,” USNI News, January 19, 2024 (accessed February 27, 2024).

3. E. B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History, second edition (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1981), pg. 500-501.

4. David Hobbs, British Aircraft Carriers (Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), pg. 119-129.

5. Norman Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pg. 47.

6. Albert A. Nofi, To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923-1940 (Newport: U.S. Naval War College Press, 2010). Pg. 109-126.

7. “USS Ranger (CV-4),” Naval History and Heritage Command, (accessed March 7, 2024).

8. “Structural Repairs in Forward Areas During World War II,” Bureau of Ships, December 1949, pg. 82-84,  (accessed March 8, 2024).

9. Norman Friedman. U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1983), pg. 91 and 154-155.

10. Cid Standifer, “Sunk, Scrapped or Saved: The Fate of America’s Aircraft Carriers,” USNI News, August 18, 2014 (accessed May 1, 2024).

11. Thomas Heinrich, Warship Builders: An Industrial History of U.S. Naval Shipbuilding 1922-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020), pg. 91-92, 97-102 and 114-116.

12.  Bureau of Ships, “Structural Repairs in Forward Areas During World War II,” U.S. Navy Department, December 1949, pg. 89-97, (accessed May 2, 2024).

13. “Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS),” Naval Air Systems Command (accessed May 2, 2024).

14. “DARPA Tiles Together a Vision of Mosaic Warfare: Banking on cost-effective complexity to overwhelm adversaries,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (accessed May 1, 2024).

15. “Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy,” Department of Defense, March 2022 (accessed May 2, 2024).

16.  Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Marine Corps Force Design 2030 Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 30, 2023, pg. 1,3,7 and 11, (accessed April 27, 2024).

17. “Marine Littoral Regiment,” U.S. Marine Corps, January 11, 2023 (accessed May 2, 2024).

18. “Marines Strike Ship With Pair of Naval Strike Missiles,” U.S. Marine Corps, August 21, 2021 (accessed May 2, 2024).

19. “2nd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment Becomes First Marine Unit to Fire NMESIS Missiles,” U.S. Marine Corps, June 29, 2023 (accessed May 2, 2024).

20. Andrew Feickert, “Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO),” Congressional Research Service, January 2, 2024 (accessed April 27, 2024).

21. Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Army Long-Range Precision Fires: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2021, pg. 16-18, (accessed May 2, 2024).

22. Andrew Feickert, “The U.S. Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle,” Congressional Research Service, March 13, 2024 (accessed May 2, 2024).

23. Lars Celander, How Carriers Fought: Carrier Operations in World War II (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2018), pg. 158-171.

24. “Air-Sea Battle,” Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013, pg. 4, (accessed May 2, 2024).

25. Sam LaGrone, “Pentagon Drops Air Sea Battle Name, Concept Lives On,” USNI News, April 27, 2024 (accessed May 2, 2024).

26. James Foggo and Steven Wills, “Back to the Future: Resurrecting ‘Air/Sea Battle’ in the Pacific,” Breaking Defense, January 24, 2023 (accessed May 2, 2024).

Featured Image: Eugene Ely flies his Curtiss pusher biplane from the USS Birmingham in Hampton Roads, Virginia, on Nov. 14, 1910, the first time an airplane took off from a U.S. warship. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Red Sea Topic Week

The Crucial Role of Public/Private Partnerships in the Red Sea Crisis

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Joseph F. Greco, Ph.D 

As a critical chokepoint on major global shipping routes, the Red Sea has always had the potential to become a prominent area of tension, underlining the immediate necessity for strong maritime security measures.1 The Houthi rebels have increased regional tensions by employing a seemingly inexhaustible supply of armaments, raising the question – how might the strategic employment of navies be brought to bear against the Houthi threat to definitively restore stability in the global commons?

Some answers can be found in the success of Operation Atalanta, which has been ongoing since 2008. This operation, deployed by the European Union Naval Force as a proactive measure to address piracy on the Somali coast, demonstrated the undeniable effectiveness of public/private partnerships between naval forces and the commercial maritime industry.2 Combining naval power with commercial maritime operations, the lessons learned from Operation Atalanta resulted in improved intelligence sharing, enhanced logistical support, and updated best management practices. In a relatively short time, the mission significantly reduced the risk of piracy along the Somali coast. It offers useful lessons for maritime security operations in the ever-changing threat landscape.

Sharing Intelligence, Logistics, and Best Practices

Operation Atalanta’s successful campaign against piracy off the Somali coast featured a cooperative intelligence-sharing strategy. Based on a public/private framework, the partnership prioritized immediate communication and seamless information sharing, enhancing the ability to forecast and address maritime dangers. Known as interconnected situational awareness systems (ISAS), they became arguably the most crucial capability in improving the capacity of all involved parties to make well-informed decisions. ISAS are a collection of linked systems that analyze and distribute real-time data to improve operational efficacy and decision-making in maritime security. They are composed of sensor networks, platforms for exchanging information, analytics, data fusion, and command and control systems. These technologies give stakeholders a shared, all-encompassing view of the maritime realm, making identifying, following, and reacting to possible hazards easier and providing a reassuring solution to the maritime security challenges.3

With respect to forming public/private partnerships, the logistical support that commercial shipping companies offer can greatly expand the operational reach and sustainability of naval forces.4 This assistance was crucial in stopping piracy along the Somali coast during Operation Atalanta, improving the sustainability of naval presence in the Gulf of Aden. Commercial shipping can directly impact naval forces’ readiness and operations by facilitating access to regional ports and providing essential supplies, including food, energy, maintenance services, and technical support. When conducting naval operations away from home bases, having trusted access to maritime infrastructure is essential.

During Operation Atalanta, creating and implementing best management practices (BMPs) greatly enhanced ship security against maritime threats and addressed increased piracy concerns. Various protocols involved journey planning, ship fortification, and crew instruction to reduce vessels’ susceptibility to pirate assaults. Extensive input from naval forces, security specialists, and the commercial maritime industry factored into the establishment of these practices. It also demonstrated the efficacy of naval escorts and the significance of timely intelligence exchange, which were eventually integrated into BMP guidelines. The knowledge acquired during Operation Atalanta underscores the importance of adaptability in BMPs, enabling modifications in response to distinct regional risks and operating circumstances.

Italian frigate Carlo Bergamini (F 590) operating in Operation Atalanta. (EUNAVFOR photo)

The Red Sea Crisis and Operation Prosperity Guardian 

The Red Sea Crisis poses a multidimensional problem that calls for a thorough grasp of regional dynamics as well as the limits of previous approaches. It is crucial to consider the important elements that set this crisis apart from earlier maritime security problems, such as Somali piracy. The involvement of state actors, the use of asymmetric warfare tactics, and the strategic significance of the Red Sea distinguish the current crisis from Somali piracy. The limited mechanisms and appetite for regional cooperation add further distinctions. The present analysis aims to establish a basis for understanding the prevailing circumstances and identifying possible paths toward restoring maritime security. It also underscores the necessity for inventive and tailored strategies considering the region’s unique features.

Geopolitical Complexities 

Although networked situational awareness successfully mitigated Somali piracy risk in 2008, a complicated web of political, economic, and security issues are at work in the Red Sea region, making it more difficult to holistically address the crisis. The current crisis reflects the chronic struggle for control between Sunni and Shia factions that overlays much of the region’s geopolitics. While the Houthis publicly claim their attacks on commercial shipping are a way to support the Palestinians, there exists widespread political instability and violence in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Sudan, and especially in Yemen.

While Iran appears to be the main state player backing the Houthis, other nations with strategic stakes in Yemen offer diplomatic, financial, or logistics as part of their larger regional ambitions.5 These nations may show support or sympathy for the Houthi rebels, but the level of commitment and assistance may differ. Even though Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar have little direct involvement in the Yemeni crisis, they back Iran diplomatically and have a shared goal of countering Saudi influence in the area. By comparison, Somali pirates had little in the way of state backing, making it easier for regional actors to build partnerships and information sharing arrangements. Competing geopolitical strains will challenge the ability to build regional cooperation and efficient maritime security measures that are targeted toward the Houthis.

Unlike the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast, where the threat of piracy led to the development of robust international cooperation mechanisms such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), the Red Sea region lacks a similar unified framework.6 In addition to the climate of distrust, many regional states face significant economic challenges such as the lack of modern port facilities, inadequate naval capabilities, and limited access to advanced technology and communication systems. Due to concerns over sovereignty and the sharing of sensitive information, some countries may be hesitant to fully engage in interconnected situational awareness systems and regional information-sharing initiatives for fear of compromising their national security.

Operation Prosperity Guardian will struggle to definitively end this crisis if it cannot degrade the logistics networks that are underpinning the Houthis’ capability to threaten maritime shipping. Stronger information sharing would be invaluable for defeating these networks. Besides Iran, other parties are providing the Houthis with a continuous supply of arms and ammunition.7 These deliveries occur by way of local smuggling channels, especially illicit arms networks that operate regionally and globally. Often involving the clandestine transfer of arms through various channels, including land, sea, and air routes, they exploit Yemen’s weak border controls and porous maritime routes. They are partly facilitated by complicit border officials or local militias, whose influence may extend beyond the Houthi-controlled territories of Yemen. Yemen’s long coastline and many ports make it possible for weapons to be smuggled into the nation via small boats or shipping routes. Smugglers can use numerous ports, fishing communities, and isolated coves scattered along the coastline as possible entry sites. Major ports in Yemen, including Hodeidah, Aden, and Mukalla, are known crossroads for legal and illegal maritime traffic, posing challenges to controlling arms shipments.

The presence of multiple littoral states with different levels of infrastructure development, naval capabilities, and political amity poses a challenge to establishing a cohesive logistical support network. The absence of a strong regional mechanism or organization, like the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in the case of Operation Atalanta, hinders the coordination of logistical support efforts among regional states and commercial maritime partners.8 The ongoing conflicts and instability in countries like Yemen and Sudan disrupt port access, supply chains, and other logistical arrangements, making it more difficult to sustain naval operations and provide adequate security for commercial vessels.

New Approaches and Strategies

Addressing the issues raised by the Red Sea crisis and protecting the global commons requires the strategic use of naval forces, especially the U.S. Navy. Because of its skills, worldwide reach, and relations with maritime industry, the U.S. Navy can play a major role in stabilizing the region and protecting key maritime trade routes. It can take the lead in creating regional frameworks that apply the relevant lessons from Operation Atalanta to the crisis at hand.

The U.S. Navy can facilitate greater cooperation and communication between commercial and littoral states. Leveraging its partnerships, the U.S. Navy can promote information exchange, cooperative training, and initiatives to foster mutual trust. A heightened level of engagement between regional entities can enhance confidence and facilitate more efficient intelligence sharing, a crucial aspect of proactively addressing maritime security challenges.

BMPs can be updated and modified under the U.S. Navy’s direction to consider the Red Sea’s unique threats. These procedures ought to be made to strengthen crew readiness, enhance vessel security, and reduce the dangers connected with the Houthis’ specific capabilities. BMPs developed during Operation Atalanta were specifically tailored to address the threat of Somali piracy, which primarily involved small skiffs and armed boardings, whereas the security threats in the Red Sea region are more diverse and intense. Due to the Houthi’s utilization of advanced weaponry, such as missile and drone attacks, BMPs should be revised to incorporate ship-hardening measures tailored to these risks, such as heightened surveillance and early warning systems. Furthermore, crew training programs should undergo revisions to incorporate drills and protocols for addressing missile and drone attacks, damage control, and emergency communications. 

The Red Sea crisis can look to replicate the ISAS capability of Atalanta, which blends cutting-edge technology, regional collaboration, and capacity-building activities, is one such strategy. The primary objective of ISAS would be to improve the collection and exchange of intelligence among international stakeholders, commercial marine partners, and littoral states. ISAS can offer a thorough, up-to-date picture of the Red Sea’s security situation using capabilities such as drone surveillance, artificial intelligence-powered data analysis, and satellite images. More efficient logistics support, incident response, and naval operations coordination would be made possible by this improved situational awareness. Additionally, ISAS would prioritize involving local stakeholders and enhancing regional capability via initiatives for technology transfer, cooperative exercises, and training programs. By promoting a shared sense of accountability and ownership among regional stakeholders, ISAS can aid in creating enduring, long-term solutions to the Red Sea’s maritime security issues. This wide-ranging approach offers a new paradigm for handling the intricate security dynamics of the Red Sea crisis by blending technology innovation with regional collaboration and capacity-building.

The most important and necessary measure is developing a broader strategy that can operate within the geopolitical complexity of the Red Sea region. The United States and other major powers should call a summit with all major players to devise a strategy for resolving the Red Sea situation. The primary goal of this meeting would be to develop a strategy and earn buy-in for a comprehensive approach that will solve the fundamental drivers of the crisis.

Conclusion

Operation Atalanta demonstrates the importance of intelligence sharing, logistical support, and BMP implementation in enhancing maritime security. It also demonstrated the efficacy of public/private partnerships between naval forces and the commercial shipping industry while establishing a holistic strategy for addressing risks. The obstacles posed by the Red Sea crisis and the effective use of naval power are distinct, requiring a considered evaluation of the applicable lessons from Atalanta. Longstanding geopolitical rivalries are prevalent in the region and challenge the ability to develop regional partnerships. The lack of a robust regional cooperation framework restricts the application of previous lessons to the current crisis. For Operation Prosperity Guardian to succeed in securing the Red Sea commons, these complex difficulties must be addressed.

Joseph F Greco, a professor at California State University, Fullerton, holds a BA in history from Pennsylvania State University and a Ph.D. in financial economics from the University of California. He has secured over $8 million in grants, focusing on multinational corporations and Chinese capital markets. Dr. Greco founded Tritech, the first high-tech small business development center within the U.S. Small Business Administration. He currently serves as a Blue and Gold officer for the U.S. Naval Academy and the president of the Orange County Council of the Navy League. His present research explores the link between U.S. naval power, cyberwarfare, and the global economy.

References

1. Bueger, C. (2015). What is maritime security? Marine Policy, 53, 159-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.12.005

2. European Union Naval Force Somalia. (2020). Operation Atalanta. https://eunavfor.eu/mission/

3. Cusumano, E., & Ruzza, S. (2020). Piracy and the privatisation of maritime security: Vessel protection policies compared. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46965-9

4. Kraska, J., & Pedrozo, R. (2013). International maritime security law. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004233577

5. Stavridis, J. (2024, January 3). Hit the Houthis and Iran where it counts. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-01-03/hit-the-houthis-and-iran-where-it-counts/

6. Papastavridis, E. (2013). The interception of vessels on the high seas: Contemporary challenges to the legal order of the oceans. Hart Publishing. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472561404

7. Holtom, P., & Pavesi, I. (2018). Trade Update 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa in Focus. Small Arms Survey. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/S-Trade-Update/SAS-Trade-Update-2018.pdf

8. Bueger, C. (2021). Coordination in maritime security: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. Ocean Development & International Law, 52(2), 110-127. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2021.1894471

Featured Image: Italian frigate Carlo Bergamini (F 590) operating in Operation Atalanta. (EUNAVFOR photo)

Red Sea Topic Week

Maritime Traffic Trends and Considerations in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Dirk Siebels

The importance of maritime trade is often highlighted to justify naval spending and operations. When commercial traffic in the Red Sea started to be impacted by Houthi attacks, countless statements were subsequently issued that included the percentage of world trade or specific types of cargoes that are normally moved through this area. Maritime trade did not come to a standstill despite the threat. Ships were – and still are – re-routed around Africa to avoid Red Sea passages. While a longer route is more expensive, it is important to consider that maritime transport in general is extremely efficient – and therefore cheap. Freight rates have accordingly stabilised as shipping companies settled into a ‘new normal.’

Operations of international naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been hampered by various shortcomings. On the tactical and operational level, problems have included ammunition shortages, a lack of coordination between allied nations, as well as deficient equipment. Despite the negative headlines, naval forces can also point to large numbers of intercepted missiles and drones, as well as dozens of escorts of merchant ships.

Launching a multinational operation with little time for preparation and planning to counter an unprecedented threat is no small feat. It would be unreasonable to expect neither mistakes nor problems. At the same time, it is questionable at best whether the current naval operations can become a success on the strategic level. So far, military interventions responding to Houthi attacks have been characterized by complicated coordination on the political level, virtually non-existent broader engagement with Houthi leaders, as well as a lack of clearly identified – and achievable – aims. Moreover, cooperation between naval forces and commercial shipping is limited and often confusing in execution. This aspect is particularly problematic, considering that naval operations were launched as a direct response to Houthi attacks against merchant vessels.

One important question is whether military operations have had an impact on merchant shipping through the Red Sea and what the outlook now is. Finding answers requires a detailed look at figures for maritime traffic.

Maritime Traffic Patterns

The number of merchant ship transits through the Bab el Mandeb has declined considerably due to Houthi attacks. By mid-December, many container lines declared that most or all of their ships would be re-routed around the Cape of Good Hope. Figure 1 shows that the announcement was followed by an immediate drop in container ships passing the Bab el Mandeb. While that does not mean that all container traffic in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden has stopped, most vessels which are still transiting the Bab el Mandeb are relatively small and mostly trading within the region.

Figure 1: Weekly Bab el Mandeb passings by ship type, including merchant vessels >10,000 dwt. (Author graphic, based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

The decline for other ship types has been more gradual, likely due to the fact that the container market is heavily concentrated. In this sector of the shipping industry, the five largest companies control almost two-thirds of the entire market. In other sectors, notably in the bulk carrier and tanker markets, concentration is much less significant. Many companies of all sizes therefore have to consider the risk levels to their vessels before deciding whether or not to transit through the Red Sea.

So far, military operations have not led to a recovery in maritime traffic levels. Instead, traffic figures have been relatively stable since mid-January at between 40 to 50 percent of Bab el Mandeb transits compared to the same period during the previous year (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Weekly Bab el Mandeb transits by merchant ships >10,000 dwt. (Author graphic, based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

The fact that there have been very little changes to current traffic levels between January and April highlights how operators of commercial vessels remain hesitant about a full return to the Red Sea. Whether that is due to the current level of military operations or the apparent lack of additional efforts to negotiate with Houthi leaders is open for debate.

In this context, it is interesting that the EU-led Operation Aspides has been hailed as a major success. On April 8, EU representatives stated that 68 merchant vessels had been escorted since the beginning of the operation. However, that amounts to less than two ships per day, compared with the 30 to 40 ships transiting the Bab el Mandeb per day even at the current level of traffic. No similar statistics have been provided for Operation Prosperity Guardian, but the numbers are very unlikely to be significantly higher.

Moreover, naval forces have recommended that ship operators should consider Red Sea transits with AIS switched off. EU naval forces have tried to underline this recommendation with an alarming statistic: “Around 80% of vessels that have been hit had AIS .”

Whether this is really useful advice is at least questionable. Despite naval recommendations to the contrary, more than 90 percent of merchant ships are transiting the Bab el Mandeb with AIS switched on. The situation has not changed significantly over time either, shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Bab el Mandeb passings by merchant ships >10,000 dwt with and without AIS. (Author graphic, based on data from Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Political Considerations

In combination with the broader regional context, political decision-makers are left with a complicated dilemma. Should there be a military response against the Houthi attacks? Should military operations be purely defensive? Would strikes against Houthi targets lead to another escalation in the Middle East?

There is still no definitive agreement about the answers to these and related questions. The U.S. government launched Operation Prosperity Guardian already in December with a defensive mandate. Despite its multinational character, countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia were unwilling to contribute. Several European countries also decided against participating in the U.S.-led operation and ultimately agreed on the EU-led Operation Aspides, launched in February with a stricter defensive focus. Meanwhile, U.S. forces launched military strikes against Houthi forces. In some cases, these were supported by other nations, yet offensive actions are part of a separate operation (Poseidon Archer). This separation is purely political as offensive actions are not supported by all countries participating in Prosperity Guardian.

Houthi attacks are a challenge to freedom of navigation. The actual extent of this challenge, however, is open for debate. Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign in November, the U.S. and several other governments have frequently stated that the attacks against merchant ships have been “indiscriminate.” Houthi forces have publicly stated their targeting parameters and initially wanted to target ships which are directly owned by Israeli companies. Such vessels quickly stopped Red Sea transits, leading the Houthis in early December to expand their potential targets to ships trading with Israel. Military strikes by American and British forces in January then led to another expansion of the potential targets to merchant ships owned by U.S. and UK companies. Some attacks were very likely carried out based on outdated commercial information about individual ships. Overall, this has resulted in a situation where the threat level for merchant vessels is closely linked to individual characteristics while all ship operators have to take the potential for collateral damage into account.

It should be noted that the reassuring presence of warships must be better coordinated. With MSCHOA and UKMTO, there are two reporting centers responsible for broadly the same region. Neither center has a full picture which includes all attacks or attempted attacks by Houthi forces since November. In addition, neither center even acknowledges the presence of another reporting center in their frequent updates to the shipping industry. The question of cooperation between MSCHOA and UKMTO has been a more or less theoretical question for many years. In the current situation, it deserves concrete resolution.

Conclusion

Naval missions to counter the threat posed by Houthi attacks may be worthwhile operations, particularly from the perspective of seafarers who rarely have a choice whether they want to transit the Red Sea. However, many of the military operations so far have been tactically focused on day-to-day operations, and much less focused on affecting the longer-term outlook. The number of ships which have been escorted has been highlighted as a success, yet many of these ships arguably would have transited anyway. More importantly, Houthi forces have firmly established the threat of drone and missile attacks, and shipping traffic is still about half of what it was before the Houthis began their attacks.

It is very likely that a longer-term mission would be necessary to meaningfully reduce the threat posed by the Houthis. But would it be possible to verify that the threat for merchant ships has been reduced enough – and how much of a reduction is enough to begin with?

Navies have been able to show their capabilities in an operational context and identify valuable lessons learned. Success on the tactical level, however, is very different from the strategic level which would include a return to normal levels of commercial traffic in the Red Sea. As it stands, it is impossible to predict when a sustainable increase in maritime traffic will take place. Such an increase, however, will very likely be based on commercial considerations rather than on the presence of warships. Frigates and destroyers may be reassuring to seafarers, yet they are unable to intercept every incoming missile or drone. More importantly, the current level of naval operations is not sustainable in the long term. Other solutions to address the threat are needed.

Dr. Dirk Siebels is a Senior Analyst for Risk Intelligence, a Denmark-based security intelligence company. The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity.

Featured Image: Red Sea (Jan. 31, 2024) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mason (DDG 87), sails in the Red Sea in support of Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Chris Krucke)

Red Sea Topic Week

Escalation Beneath the Waves: The Looming Threat of Houthi UUVs in the Red Sea

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Red Sea Topic Week

By Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy

A New Threat Looms

The Red Sea, a narrow waterway snaking between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, serves as a vital route for global trade. Significant energy resources transit the Red Sea, including an estimated 12 percent of total seaborne-traded oil in the first half of 2023, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments that account for about 8 percent of worldwide LNG trade. However, this crucial passage now faces a new and unexpected threat – Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) deployed by the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

The Houthis’ use of UUVs marks a significant escalation in the ongoing Red Sea crisis. These submersible drones, while not as sophisticated as military submarines, pose a significant challenge to naval operations designed primarily to counter surface and aerial threats. The emergence of the Houthi UUVs threat necessitates a comprehensive reassessment of the naval defense strategies and tactics being employed in the Red Sea.

How can coalition forces adapt Red Sea operations to enhance undersea defense against unconventional threats such as Houthi UUVs? What steps are required to restore stability in the Red Sea region, emphasizing a decisive response to the Houthi UUVs threat? Furthermore, how must global navies adapt their warfighting techniques to effectively counter the distinct challenges posed by these emerging undersea threats?

By effectively addressing these critical questions, the international community can ensure the safety of vital sea lanes in the Red Sea and establish a framework for countering emerging undersea threats in the future.

Houthi UUV Capabilities and the Evolving Threat

The Houthi rebels in Yemen have injected a new and unsettling element into the Red Sea’s already tense security landscape. In March three undersea telecommunication cables were cut in the Red Sea, which the Houthis have denied doing, but nonetheless suggests a contested undersea domain. While details about Houthi UUVs remain murky, open-source intelligence suggests they are likely commercially-adapted or relatively unsophisticated submersible drones. Despite their presumed lack of sophistication compared to military submarines, these low-cost UUVs pose a significant threat due to several key factors.

The operational range and payload capacity of Houthi UUVs are currently unknown. However, even a modest range, measured in tens of miles, could enable them to target commercial shipping within the Red Sea. Their potential payload could include mines, torpedoes, or explosives packed into the hull, possibly enough to inflict significant damage on unsuspecting commercial vessels.

Houthi UUVs likely lack sophisticated guidance and targeting systems compared to military-grade undersea drones. They may rely on basic GPS or pre-programmed routes, as well as wire guidance. However, this simplicity can also make them difficult to detect and eliminate before they reach their targets.

Traditional naval defenses designed to counter surface and aerial threats are largely ineffective against undersea drones. Sonar technology and undersea surveillance systems are crucial for detecting and tracking UUVs. The preferable escort and maneuver patterns of warships searching for undersea threats may be at odds with the operational patterns that optimize air defense coverage, potentially creating difficult tradeoffs and tensions. This can create a significant challenge for the international coalition forces operating in the Red Sea.

The impact of Houthi UUVs extends far beyond potential damage to individual ships. The very presence of undersea threats is disruptive, given how the stealth of undersea platforms can magnify the effects of their operations and substantially shape the behaviors of those under threat. According to a recent report by the Global Trade Research Institute, even minor disruptions to Red Sea shipping could have a cascading effect on economies in Asia, Africa, and Europe. The specter of undersea threats can stimulate outsized uncertainty and risk, potentially driving up insurance costs and impacting global supply chains further.

Responses and Challenges in a Multi-Domain Environment

Faced with Houthi UUVs lurking beneath the waves, the international coalition in the Red Sea is grappling with a new and demanding challenge. However, the coalition is not without options. There are various strategies and capabilities that can be employed by coalition forces.

Mine Countermeasures warships (MCMs) are crucial for clearing mines potentially deployed by the Houthis, which can be deployed by the UUVs in sea lanes and also deployed near the UUV launch sites. The sonar and mine disposal capabilities of MCM ships can play a vital role in safeguarding sea lanes and improving undersea domain awareness.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities can be adapted to the UUV fight, including sonobuoys, towed array sonars, dipping sonars, and deployable hydrophone arrays. These tools can help create a more comprehensive undersea surveillance network in the Red Sea and gather critical intelligence on the telltale signatures of UUVs. An undersea surveillance network can be useful for cueing UUV hunters toward detections, rather than relying hunters to find UUVs using only their organic sensors.

The information-intensive nature of surveilling the complex undersea domain demands thoughtful approaches to intelligence coordination. Information sharing and collaboration among coalition members is critical for locating Houthi UUVs. Real-time data exchange can help predict potential attacks and enable a more coordinated response. Faster reaction times and improved targeting capabilities could potentially be used to intercept Houthi support vessels or launch platforms before they deploy UUVs. Ultimately coalition forces can aspire to strike Houthi UUVs before they are ever deployed by degrading their enabling infrastructure.

Despite the possibility of adaptation, current undersea surveillance capabilities may not be optimal for detecting low-signature Houthi UUVs, particularly in the acoustic environment of the Red Sea. The maritime shipping that continues to transit may transmit significant sound into the undersea environment that complicates UUV hunting, especially as a UUV nears a target merchant vessel. Advanced undersea drones and sensor networks specifically designed for UUV detection are urgently needed. Employing new tactics for UUV detection, engagement, and neutralization will require tailored training and exercises that realistically simulate hostile UUV encounters.

Conclusion

The Red Sea crisis serves as a pivotal moment in the evolution of maritime security. The lessons learned here – the importance of adapting naval power, the dangers of escalation, and the necessity of international cooperation – will reverberate far beyond the shores of this strategically vital waterway. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and developing effective strategies for the undersea battlefield, the international community can ensure the safety and security of global trade routes and navigate the challenges of the 21st-century maritime security landscape.

Forces must consider what adaptations can meet the emerging UUV threat. Investing in cutting-edge drone detection and undersea surveillance systems is crucial for creating a comprehensive UUV defense network. Research and development efforts should focus on advanced sonar technologies and autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) specifically designed for UUVs countermeasures. Improved intelligence gathering and information sharing among coalition partners is essential for tracking UUVs and anticipating potential attacks. This includes intelligence cooperation with regional partners and leveraging advanced surveillance technologies.

The Red Sea crisis underscores the importance of international cooperation in addressing emerging maritime threats. Sharing best practices, conducting joint training exercises, and fostering closer collaboration on technology development are all crucial steps towards a more robust response to UUVs. The Houthi UUV threat offers a stark reminder of the need for continuous adaptation and innovation in the realm of naval warfare. Long-theorized unmanned undersea threats have now arrived.

Commander Amila Prasanga, Sri Lankan Navy, is Military Research Officer at the Institute of National Security Studies, the premier Sri Lankan think tank on national security, established and functioning under the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence. The opinions expressed are his own and are not necessarily reflective of the official views of the institute or the Ministry of Defence.

Featured Image: A Remus 600 UUV being operated by U.S. Navy sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Capt. Gary Loten-Beckford).