Readiness

If the U.S. Navy can’t Repair Ships in Peacetime, how will it do so in War?

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By Michael Hogan

Introduction

The Navy has well-documented issues with building warships. Less discussed, but equally important, are issues with repairing the ships it already has, which jeopardizes its ability to meet its own goal of sustaining a across all platforms. As the Navy focuses on preparing for a great power conflict potentially, the Navy needs to improve not just its peacetime ship repair capability but also expand its capacity to account for wartime repair requirements. While the issues facing the U.S. shipbuilding industry are complex, and it will take time to expand shipbuilding capacity for large combatants, the U.S. shipbuilding sector does have a robust capacity to build smaller vessels that can improve the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities. In fact, there are 125 private U.S. shipyards that are capable of building small vessels needed for repair and salvage. The United States needs to prepare now for battle damage repair by investing in repair ships, and learning lessons from recent emergent repairs and the last major war it fought at sea.

Historical Precedent: World War II

A potential war with China will be fought mostly in the Pacific theater, which forces the United States into a major logistical challenge due to the tyranny of distance from the homeland. During the last great power naval conflict, the U.S. Navy learned the importance of battle damage repair for sustaining a distant fight. One important component of victory in the Pacific was the work of naval auxiliaries that supported combatants, generally organized in Service Squadrons. Initially equipped with just oilers and other logistics platforms to replenish warships, fleet commanders realized the importance of deploying repair assets, especially fleet and salvage tugs, with these service squadrons to provide at-sea capabilities for recovering damaged vessels.

Fleet tugs, often cited in historical accounts, were essential in rendering salvage services. These tugs towed damaged vessels to areas where repairs could be made, often preventing the permanent loss of ships. The absence of fleet tugs at the Battle of Midway likely foreclosed the fate of the precious aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, as the Navy had not yet fully grasped the vital importance of salvage tugs in saving battle-damaged ships. Similarly, the carrier USS Hornet, destroyer USS Porter, and cruiser USS Atlanta were lost largely due to inadequate salvage capabilities.

As the importance of tugs became clear during the war, they were used extensively throughout the Pacific campaign to save ships, allowing temporary repairs and enabling them to return home for more permanent fixes. The United States invested heavily in this capability during the war, building more than 200 tugs and over 40 rescue and salvage ships. Floating drydocks also played a crucial role, enabling the Navy to make the repairs necessary to restore ships to seaworthiness—even if only temporarily—so they could return to the United States for more extensive repairs. When ships could not be saved, salvage vessels stripped valuable repair parts, ensuring that forward-deployed ships had access to critical resources. The ability to recover damaged ships and clear sunken vessels from ports was vital to maintaining momentum in the American island-hopping campaign, extending the time that ships could remain on station.

USS ABSD-6 repairing USS South Dakota (BB-57) in Guam after an accidental explosion on May 6, 1945, while rearming from USS Wrangell (AE-12). (U.S. Navy photo)

Current State of the Salvage Fleet

Today, the U.S. Navy’s salvage fleet is far less robust than the one that was essential to winning the Pacific campaign. After the Cold War, the Navy dramatically downsized its auxiliary ship fleet, reducing the number of vessels from 113 in 1994 to 52 in 1997, including the decommissioning of nearly all tenders. Currently, Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates only three ocean-going tugs, two rescue and salvage ships, and two submarine tenders, with the newest of these vessels commissioned in the mid-1980s. In contrast, China, the pacing threat of the United States, has 30 tugs, 46 rescue and salvage ships, and 12 tenders between its navy and rescue and salvage bureau.

As analyst and retired naval officer Brent Sadler notes in U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century, there are no large floating dry docks capable of repairing Ohio-class submarines and large surface combatants—despite their critical role in post-accident recovery, such as the repair of the USS San Francisco after its grounding in 2005. Floating drydocks provide a mobile repair capability, allowing significant repairs to be conducted in locations where permanent infrastructure does not exist, such as forward deployed bases during a regional conflict. This results in the US Navy either needing to bring the damaged vessel back to one of the homeland drydocks, which are already at capacity with modernization and maintenance, or lease a floating drydock from private industry. The Navy must also rely on chartered commercial heavy-lift ships to move damaged vessels, such as when the USS Cole had to be transported to Pascagoula for repairs after the 2000 terrorist bombing.

(Jan. 27, 2005) Apra Harbor, Guam:  USS San Francisco (SSN 711) in dry dock to assess damages sustained after running aground approximately 350 miles south of Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Mark Allen Leonesio)

Recent Incidents and Issues

The U.S. Navy has not faced significant battle damage repairs since the 2000 terrorist bombing of USS Cole, the closest a U.S. Navy ship has come to combat damage in the last 30 years. Nevertheless, repair issues during recent forward-deployed collisions, allisions, and groundings mark a good approximation of what to expect, albeit on a smaller scale. Minor repairs following a collision, such as USS Jacksonville in 2013, can be made pier side, even in foreign ports, with the assistance of a submarine tender. Although, as noted above, the tender capacity has been drastically reduced in recent years. With public shipyards operating near capacity, however, more significant collision repairs require trade-offs.

Following two 2017 surface collisions in the Pacific, USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald both required extensive repairs prior to their return to service. McCain was repaired in Yokosuka at Ship Repair Facility-Japan vice bringing it back to the U.S. for repairs. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, was contracted out to Huntington Ingalls Industries shipyard in Pascagoula, MS. Both ships required leasing a heavy lift transport to their repair destination, like Cole. The grounding of the USS Connecticut in 2021 offers a different trade-off. After colliding with a seamount, the submarine remained at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard from December 2021 to July 2023, until entering dry dock for her previously scheduled Extended Dry-docking Selected Restrictive Availability (EDSRA), where the repairs would be made. In this case, Connecticut was “lucky” that the incident occurred close to a scheduled maintenance period.

The guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan, for repairs and damage assessments, July 13, 2017. The USS Fitzgerald sustained damage during a June 17 collision with a merchant vessel, resulting in the deaths of seven Sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Christian Senyk)

Even if the U.S. Navy added the recommended salvage tugs and floating drydocks, the navy’s shipyards are already stretched beyond their limits with planned modernization and maintenance. For example, faced a prolonged and costly repair timeline when the submarine’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 overhaul was canceled to accommodate ballistic missile submarine and aircraft carrier maintenance, losing its dive certification in 2017. Only in early 2024 was a contract signed to begin the overhaul, nine years after its last deployment, with expected completion in 2029 at the cost of $1.17 billion. The loss of operational capability, crew experience, and the daily upkeep costs over almost 15 years could add up to be more detrimental than the price tag itself, especially when the fleet is already straining to meet operational demands.

At a time when Congress is focused on getting newly built submarines delivered promptly, the inability to use one that the U.S. Navy already owns is unacceptable. These types of delays will only become more commonplace in a conflict without expanding our salvage and repair capabilities.

Congress has shown that it is willing to address such shipyard issues, for example, allocating, but this is focused on producing new construction submarines for the U.S. Navy and the AUKUS agreement. The 2018 investment in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan was important but it is over budget and behind schedule, and the chronic delay in ship repairs remains. In FY21 and 22, less than 40 percent of ships completed maintenance availabilities on time.

All these shortfalls come during planned, peacetime maintenance periods. If the U.S. Navy needs to make repairs to battle damage in a major conflict, they do not have the salvage capabilities to conduct repairs at sea or forward deployed, they do not have the industrial base to support the additional work, and they do not have the open shipyard space to put the damaged ships. To make U.S. ship repair shortcomings worse, China has more than 200 times more capacity for shipbuilding, including a large commercial capacity, that can likely be repurposed in time of conflict for repairs.

(October 31, 2000) The semi-submersible ship M/V Blue Marlin carrying the damaged USS Cole. (U.S. Navy photo)

The Way Ahead

To address these deficiencies in repair and salvage capabilities, the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, and Congress must learn from recent incidents and the lessons of World War II. First, the Navy should implement the recommendations from the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on ship repair, such as “developing a ship industrial base strategy that aligns with the National Defense Industrial Strategy.” As part of this, the Navy needs to examine all emergent repairs spurred by modern incidents starting with USS Cole to identify gaps in planning and capabilities, and the root causes of delays. This should include where salvage and repair ships were needed and unavailable. Any needed infrastructure or platform investments, such as forward-deployed floating drydocks, should be forwarded to Congress for supplemental funding. Immediate investments in these capabilities will bolster the U.S. Navy’s ability to better perform peacetime maintenance while building capacity to absorb battle damage repair in future conflict.

Second, Congress should pass the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act, providing 10 years of funding to boost the commercial shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine. This will help to provide more shipbuilding and repair capability and capacity throughout the United States in the event of future conflicts, and train qualified personnel for the MSC that mans and operates the Navy’s repair and salvage fleet. The combination of short- and long-term investments will turn the tide on the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities before ships are lost, while sustaining them for decades to come.

Third, the Department of Defense needs to recognize ship repair as equal to shipbuilding when prioritizing funding. Ship repair is a subset of some of the Secretary of Defense’s 17 FY26 budget priorities, and a priority of the CNO’s Navigation Plan. Repairing ships already in Navy service reduces the effect of problems in shipbuilding. Finding ways to repair ships quicker increases public shipyard capacity, but this alone is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to create its own surge capability for the desired increase in naval fleet size and invest in private industry surge capability that can be optioned in case of added battle damage repair. Allocating the requisite funding to improve capacity and capability now will better prepare the U.S. Navy for great power conflict.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy faces a growing challenge in maintaining a combat-ready fleet. It was lucky when a recent collision between the USS Harry S Truman and a merchant vessel outside the Suez Canal required only minor repairs before the carrier could return to sea. If the Navy is to meet the demands of a major conflict, it must prioritize not only shipbuilding but also ship repair and salvage capabilities. The lessons of the past are clear—effective battle damage repair and salvage can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This means not just adding to the capacity to repair current ships but also building capacity for the larger fleet of the future and creating a surge capacity for times of conflict. By addressing these gaps now, the United States can ensure the Navy is prepared for whatever the future holds.

Michael Hogan is a Commander in the United States Navy and a career submarine officer with tours aboard both fast attack and ballistic missile submarines, most recently as Executive Officer of USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (Blue). He is currently the Senior U.S. Navy Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.

Featured Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) departs Pier 9 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka, Dec. 1, 2017 to proceed to anchorage in Yokosuka Harbor aboard heavy lift transport vessel MV Transshelf in order to make underway preparations. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Benjamin Dobbs)

Wargaming

Wargaming the Future: A Year in Review of Wargaming at USC

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By Jack Tribolet

In Fall 2023, the University of Southern California reconstituted its previously abandoned wargaming club. Ultimately, wargaming reemerged in two places for USC’s midshipmen, one as a mandatory test of knowledge after a precursory look at the impending Taiwan crisis in the Introduction to Naval Science (NSC 101) course and, second, as part of an optional club that met once a week for two hours. Observed midshipman learning from each group, spotlighted valuable lessons and provided two options for wider curriculum installment across the NROTC enterprise and Fleet. The educational application of wargames reaped undeniable returns to midshipmen growth, thus demanding the question—why is the Fleet not installing wargaming as an official, curriculum-integrated means of junior officer education?

USC ROTC wargaming. (Photo by Lieutenant Jack Tribolet)

In military history, wargaming has undeniably been well-applied in the analytical sphere to test doctrine and capabilities spanning from a reeling Prussian Army in the Napoleonic Wars to the generation of War Plan Orange pre-WWII. Today, gaming continues to occur at the highest levels of the US military. However, as an educational tool, few concrete steps have occurred to gain the full benefit of this powerful tool.

A couple of anomalies exist, such as the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfighting at Marine Corps University (MCU), which has developed its Wargaming Cloud to provide easy online access to competitive games to its students. Additionally, the newest edition of the NROTC governing Professional Core Competencies (PCCs) includes three vague line items regarding instructing basic knowledge of wargaming. Still, the MCU alone does not have adequate reach, and the new PCCs fail to provide instructors with the “how-to” and “why” necessary for organizational change. Modern wargaming began at the Naval Academy five years ago in the form of an elective course and an extracurricular activity with plans for outreach to the fleet and the ROTC community. In its current incarnation, wargaming has been broadened but only within the confines of Annapolis. However, there is currently no coordination in its current state.

Filling the Sails of Organizational Change

When starting the USC Wargaming Club, my first instinct was to find the most up-to-date educational wargame, Sebastian Bae’s Littoral Commander, and entice midshipmen with pizza in their off time to gain attendance. Robust class and work schedules left the club only meeting once a week in the evening for two hours. Excitement about launching a new organization emerged quickly, however, the rationale behind wargaming was not immediately clear to the students. Consequently, I recognized that the club would not survive my departure back to the Fleet. The club had to become self-sufficient to create lasting organizational change within the USC Trojan Battalion. Going back to the drawing board, I realized that the midshipmen needed a complete comprehension of “why” wargaming served a purpose, see personal progression, and, most importantly, they needed to have fun while participating.

Although we later employed Littoral Commander to significant effect, the need to simplify gameplay for participants unfamiliar with hex-based wargames prompted a search for a more accessible alternative.” Eventually, the club settled on Axis & Allies. We had a physical copy and multiple digital copies running side-by-side. Axis & Allies, while set during WWII, provided the essential lessons I wanted the students to gain initially—geographical familiarity, combined arms, and, most importantly, economy of force.

Using a crawl, walk, run method, the students progressed from game familiarity to spending significant time developing pre-game team strategies reproduced across multiple iterations simultaneously as different crews clashed. Teams soon learned the necessity of flexible plans and the requirement to anticipate enemy strategy.

Furthermore, the juxtaposition of digital games coinciding with the physical version delivered some interesting observations regarding the pros and cons of digital versus analog gaming. Midshipmen clearly preferred the video game version, appreciating its built-in rule enforcement and streamlined mechanics. However, I noticed that the board game players, while taking significantly longer to complete their iteration, had more buy-in to their game, non-active players remained attuned to the action, while their compatriots observing the digital game on a large television often had their heads down in phones or idle conversation.

Despite sometimes lacking full attention, the digital gamers far outpaced their board game brethren, finishing games in a little more than half the time. Generation Z’s preference for video games cannot be overstated. Digital games must be the organizational choice, and, unlike MCU’s Wargaming Cloud, it should include AAA titles such as Command: Modern Operations and Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age to maintain midshipman attention. This generational bias is a lesson that Sebastian Bae has recognized as Littoral Commander has recently gone into production to digitize.

A Soviet Kiev-class carrier burns after taking multiple Harpoon anti-ship missile hits in Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age. (Screenshot via Sea Power wargame)

While not as robust as Littoral Commander, Axis & Allies served its purpose; it drew participation, and the lesser complexity ensured inexperienced gamers remained engaged. The digital versions felt more familiar to a video game-saturated generation, whereas many had never played complex board games. This basic introduction to gaming offered accessible decision-making opportunities while reinforcing key lessons mentioned earlier.

After a semester of Axis & Allies, the club shifted to some of Sebastian Bae’s microgames, Callsign and Find, Fix & Finish. Due to their simplistic mechanics and single focus, these mini-games took ten to twenty minutes for the midshipmen to complete, allowed for multiple rounds per session. Looking around the room full of engaged students, I recognized it was time to return to Littoral Commander.  

Sebastian Bae’s Littoral Commander has everything you’d want to instruct midshipmen on the Taiwan Crisis: scenarios based around Taiwan, Luzon, the Straights of Malacca, and Okinawa. The game contains all five domains of war and even informational warfare elements. Once learned, these attributes are perfect for future Navy/USMC leaders to simulate scenarios and provide realistic decision points. However, the initial learning curve can be time-intensive for board game amateurs. Furthermore, setting up the board can take thirty to sixty minutes, even with multiple helpers. Lastly, I found the students spending far too much time selecting Joint Capability Cards (JCCs), which include nearly a hundred unique abilities to choose from for play. To mitigate these issues, I began showing up an hour early to set the board and decided the JCCs each team would have.

Game pieces from the wargame Littoral Commander. (Photo via No Dice No Glory)

Littoral Commander subsumed the last three weeks of Wargaming Club at USC. To ensure maximum participation, I created a scenario that included Luzon and the Philippines so that we could have a total of twelve players. This time around, the game was a total hit. Participation and attentiveness soared, and unlike Axis & Allies, the midshipmen recognized their future platforms and weapon systems, instilling a sense of realism and urgency into the gameplay.

In the end, China maintained a foothold on Luzon but was repelled by Taiwan with heavy losses, resulting within the realm of possibility and aligned with published professional wargames. The eagerness to play Littoral Commander surpassed previously observed midshipman behavior, and most of all, when Sebastian Bae announced the video game version, the midshipmen applauded his decision to go digital. They will undoubtedly be some of his first customers.

Lessons in Integrated Gaming

Creating USC’s Wargaming Club arose after three years of running an end-of-semester wargame for the 4/C (freshman) NSC 101 course. The class objectives for the NSC 101 course span basic introduction topics: Navy organization, traditions, platforms, USMC, and UCMJ, among others, but by time demands, it leaves roughly half the class time to dive into other topics.

Midshipmen love sea stories, which bring to life the job they aim for; however, in these dangerous times, I found it highly pertinent to study the Taiwan Crisis and Ukraine War with the extra time. This teaching strategy came to fruition in my second year when I assigned Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes’ excellent book, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2018). The midshipmen read and presented on various pertinent subjects: regional geography, history, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) platforms, US platforms, current events, and even culminated in a Q & A session with Dr. Holmes himself.

The final two instructional hours of the class weaved the entirety of their recently gained Taiwan knowledge into an instructor-led wargame. Dividing the class into two, they developed three courses of action, giving the CCP the initiative. The Allies had to create three scalable defensive strategies for their opening move. Forcing pre-planned responses emulated the fog of war surrounding a new conflict and demonstrated the rapidity with which plans can fall apart. Furthermore, I encouraged subterfuges at home and learned that many attempts occurred to steal one another’s plans during the interim between classes.

The NSC 101 wargame panned out on a large whiteboard, with me as a sort of “dungeon master” controlling the board and pushing the pace of play. I determined any probability-based moves or attacks by giving an odds of success and employing dice for the participants to roll. Like the final game of Littoral Commander, this wargame mainly centered around the Philippines, where the CCP gained a foothold despite enormous losses. Unlike Littoral Commander, this conflict iteration spread throughout most of Asia, including Korea and Japan, demonstrating the incredible danger a Taiwan War poses to spreading across the hemisphere.

The popularity of this semester-end wargame surged through the students, many even asking to continue the game despite the course ending. Thirty-five students participating in a single match proved a significant challenge, but I solved it by randomly cold calling to ensure maximum attentiveness and participation. This wargaming model in educational settings is easily replicable, which any Officer Instructor with Fleet experience could imitate.  

Ultimately, the purpose of wargaming remains to put the participant in the decision-making hot seat. To make important decisions under pressure, see the fallout of said decisions and enemy reaction, and most importantly, receive instructor feedback on their choices. The USMC has far outpaced the Navy in decision-making training with its Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) and Decision Forcing Cases (DFCs). The naval aviation community has simulator events and occasionally decent pre-flight walkthroughs. Still, these mainly revolve around platform tactics, techniques, and procedures, rarely forcing the participant to make gray-zone decisions.

Initiating decision-making training must begin early in officer accession pipelines and is best accomplished through curriculum-mandated wargaming. Incoming Officer Instructors could quickly receive instructional training to incorporate wargaming in NROTC at the Teaching in Higher Education course run biannually. The professional wargaming community has a deep bench full of capable instructors to maximize gaming in the NROTC enterprise, which would ultimately have a significant long-term effect and organizational change by delivering wargame literate officers to the Fleet. For now, the Trojan Battalion is preparing its first Wargaming Club meeting with the permanent absence of the Officer Instructor, who kicked the program off, meaning they achieved the first step towards organizational change.

Lieutenant Jack Tribolet was an Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Southern California ROTC and was the course coordinator for Seapower and Maritime Affairs. He recently returned to the fleet as a Tactical Action Officer assigned to the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69).

Featured Image: A student describes his strategy during hands-on exercises at the Basic Analytic Wargaming Course taught by the Naval Postgraduate School Wargaming Mobile Education Team in Wiesbaden, Germany, Aug. 30 thru Sept. 10, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by Thomas Mort)

Maritime Security

Security or Safety: What is AIS Really For?

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By Jessie Caldwell

The proliferation of spoofing techniques has diminished the value of Automatic Identification System (AIS) in the context of maritime law enforcement. The open nature of the system prevents higher levels of data security and verification, meaning spoofed and falsified information will remain difficult to prevent without changing the very foundation of AIS. Given the need for accurate data when dealing with problems like sanctions violations or illegal fishing, using AIS data only muddies the waters and makes successful enforcement more difficult. 

AIS uses very high frequency (VHF) transmissions to automatically transmit and receive vessel information.1,2 It was designed as a safety tool to complement radio, visual, and radar navigation for collision avoidance, and the UN Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention mandates all ships over 300 tons on international voyages and all passenger ships to maintain a functional AIS, broadcasting at all times. 

As AIS usage has increased, so have its applications. Sites like MarineTraffic and AISHub receive data from privately or publicly owned receivers and display it in real time, creating a public resource for maritime domain awareness. This data is used for cargo tracking, environmental research, search and rescue operations, sanctions enforcement, and illegal fishing investigations.3,4 AIS has additionally become an integral element of electronic chart and display information systems (ECDIS).5

What is Spoofing? 

The primary threat to AIS data is spoofing. Spoofing is a cybersecurity term, describing efforts by an actor to falsely represent themselves through illegitimate data. All types of data sent by the AIS, identified by C4ADS as dynamic, identifying, and voyage information, can be spoofed.6 

These threats are caused by weaknesses in the way the system generates, verifies, and transmits data. Both radio and software-based transmissions are vulnerable, but the distinction is rapidly becoming irrelevant due to software-defined radio. Traditional radio spoofing involves actors manipulating their systems to hide their identity or location while onboard. Trend Micro reported that after “purchasing a 700-euro piece of AIS equipment and connecting it to a computer in the vicinity of a port, the researchers could intercept signals from nearby craft and send out modified versions to make it appear to other AIS users that a vessel was somewhere it was not.”7 The cost of generating these signals is constantly decreasing. With the advent of software-defined radio, or radio that uses software instead of hardware, personal computers can be modified with a thirty-dollar piece of equipment and begin broadcasting.8

Software based spoofing is more versatile than radio-based. Global Fishing Watch describes the difference between software and radio frequency spoofing, “in past (radio frequency) cases, we observed vessels on the water that were broadcasting positions that corresponded to an area other than the true location of the vessel. In these new (software) examples, however, AIS tracks were present where vessels appear not to have been actually broadcasting AIS at all.”9 Many of the software-based spoofing exploits are caught because spoofers make identifiable mistakes. A telltale sign of software created ships are those detected outside the range of any terrestrial data receivers that could reasonably pick up their transmissions.

Bjorn Bergman, a data analyst with Global Fishing Watch, has another way of identifying digital intrusions. WIRED reported “the fake tracks were all shown as coming from shore-based AIS receivers, with none collected by satellites. Given that real AIS signals from civilian ships near the supposed warship tracks were received by satellites overhead, Bergman believes this shows the fake AIS messages were not generated by actual malicious transmissions.”4 The pattern in fake transmissions Bergman has identified is not public and has not been tested by outside sources, but he argues the problem is widespread:

“we don’t know how the false positions get combined with real data from terrestrial AIS antennas, though we can hypothesize that they could be produced by an AIS simulator program…While we initially thought the false data might be entering the data feed from a single terrestrial AIS station, it appears that false AIS positions were reported at a number of different terrestrial stations.”

Because of the lack of verification, it is not immediately clear where or which data is poisoning AIS feeds. This problem will only continue to develop as spoofers become more skilled in masking their activities and creating more realistic falsified data.

Illegal Fishing 

The back-and-forth between law enforcement and malicious actors is best demonstrated in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. Continuous enforcement at-sea presence is impractical given the sheer size of EEZ’s or restricted fishing zones, so AIS at first appears as an easy solution to tag broadcasting vessels that stray into unauthorized areas and appear to engage in fishing. However, as AIS monitoring became widespread, criminal behavior changed. To stay under the radar, vessels began to “go dark” by turning off their AIS before engaging in illegal activity. Numerous studies show fishing vessels allegedly engaging in this trick in the waters around the Galapagos.11 Therefore, a vessel with a nonfunctional or intermittently broadcasting AIS transmitter, potentially indicates that it is engaging in illegal fishing, warranting further investigation. To obfuscate this, spoofing is the logical alternative. Instead of “going dark”, vessels change their digital identity.

A vessel’s AIS signature has become a increasingly relevant to law enforcement case package development, helping to identify vessels engaged in illicit activities, and tracking them through time and space. A vessel’s digital identity is primarily made up of the information transmitted by AIS. Some elements are self-reported and can be purposefully entered incorrectly to disguise illicit activity. The most important piece of identifying information is the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number, a unique nine-digit number assigned to a vessel. It is supposed to remain unchanged save for during reflagging.6 There are security measures built into the hardware to prevent tampering and digital identity fraud. In some cases, the MMSI can only be changed after entering a passcode. These passcodes, while ostensibly only known by manufacturers and authorized technicians, can be found online, allowing sailors to reprogram and change their MMSI independently.

Vessel owners can also purchase multiple AIS transponders and use them to generate new ship identities with a “clean” MMSI number to confuse authorities. C4ADS refers to these two processes as MMSI tampering, occurring “when a vessel transmits the MMSI number of another vessel or an entirely fraudulent one in order to obfuscate its identity and activities. In effect, MMSI tampering creates new digital identities that severely impair the ability of maritime authorities and other vessels to identify a vessel and monitor its movements.”6 As such, spoofers can now generate an entirely false vessel history or steal a clean vessel’s data. 

Sanctions Enforcement 

North Korea is well known for spoofing the identities of their vessels to make it more difficult to timely identify which ships are violating sanctions.10 The 2019 case of the Tae Yang, a North Korean-flagged vessel, demonstrates this. The ship began broadcasting its location with the MMSI number of another vessel, the Mongolian-flagged Krysper Singa, while visiting North Korea. The real Krysper Singa was around Singapore. By stealing the Krysper Singa’s digital identity the Tae Yang made it appear that the other vessel was violating sanctions and kept its own MMSI number clean. This appeared on commercial databases as a “teleporting” ship since both vessels were broadcasting the same number the ship would appear first around Singapore, then suddenly seem to teleport to North Korean waters, then back. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as part of its Project Sandstone series discovered that commercial AIS tracking systems automatically clean and correct data, instead of highlighting anomalies. In this case they “inadvertently and incorrectly (linked) the real Krysper Singa to sanctions violations committed by the Tae Yang.”9 A careful review of satellite imagery was required to correctly identify the Tae Yang as the ship engaging in ship-to-ship transfers (STS) to violate sanctions. Another North Korean vessel, the KUM RUNG 5, cycled “through around 30 different identifiers, including names, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, callsigns, and even IMO numbers, which are meant to be unique to just one vessel throughout its lifetime. This includes the use of at least four names in 2020 alone. Because the identifiers are programmed onboard the vessel, confirming the authenticity of the broadcast is not possible without other means of verification.”12 The Tae Yang didn’t hide the presence of a vessel at their location, but by switching their identification, made it more difficult to determine the real culprit. 

This problem extends beyond the vessel actively engaging in identity theft . Innocent third parties like the Krysper Singa are affected. Even if mariners correctly program their MMSI and other information, malicious actors can intercept and change the data from a terrestrial receiver as it is transmitted to online maritime tracking sites. 

Many tracking providers use the same data sources so a faked ship will appear on multiple maritime traffic sites.4 The malicious actor can therefore be on the other side of the globe from the targeted vessel, widening their reach, and achieve results similar to VHF spoofing. Hackers can intercept data packets and change a ship’s identity by changing their MMSI number, name, IMO number, and altering coordinates or headings. They can even “move” a vessel to an entirely new location. 

For example, at a 2013 hacking conference, two researchers moved a real vessel, the Eleanor Gordon, that was at the time located in the Mississippi River, to appear on a lake in Dallas.13 The false positions or identities generated by this type of threat are less likely to threaten vessels directly, as they rely on their onboard AIS and other methods of navigation, but they directly impact the other uses of AIS. Maritime law enforcement cannot rely on the publicly available aggregate data where these fake digital signals appear. Sanctions monitoring, fisheries enforcement, marine traffic analysis, and environmental research all rely on this data and spoofing leaves is meaningfully compromised.

Conclusion 

Under the present framework and technologies, it is extremely challenging to eliminate AIS spoofing. The system itself was not designed to pass along verified data – it was meant to be open and easy to transmit employ as a safety tool. It lacks inherent virus or malware protection, encryption, or data verification tools.14 Encryption is a potential method,15 however, as Ken Munro writes on Pen Test Partners blog,

“if nearby vessels don’t have the ability to decrypt the data, the safety benefit of AIS is lost…Finally, even if all transceivers featured and used encryption, a rogue user could simply purchase a legitimate transceiver from which to transmit tampered data.”3

Part of AIS as currently designed is that all ships can access it for safety. Attempts to limit bad actors from transmitting run the risk of preventing legitimate vessels from using AIS.

If spoofing is impossible to stop, the best option in the short term is to continue to improve detection capabilities. Machine learning and other big data tools have begun automating detecting certain patterns in AIS data that suggest activities like fishing or STS transfers and identifying vessels from vessel registry databases.7 Global Fishing Watch has developed an algorithm for identifying ghost ships and other researchers are developing similar programs to catch “teleporting” or identity switching vessels.11 This would limit the benefits to spoofing for illicit actors, as they would no longer be able to conceal and confuse their identity as successfully.

In the long term another system could be developed to directly address the deficiencies of AIS. Navigators can use other methods to augment AIS and prevent collisions while at sea. On shore, AIS was not designed for law enforcement. There is no way of verifying data to a high enough standard while keeping the system true to its roots as a safety tool. In the balancing act of openness and security, AIS was designed to be as open and easy to access as possible. Trying to force it to be more secure lessens its applicability as a universal safety tool. 

Jessie Caldwell is a recent graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She holds a Masters in International Affairs, focusing on transnational security issues.

These views are expressed in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official view of any government agency.

References

1. NAVCEN. “AIS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS.” AIS Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Coast Guard, 17 Feb. 2022, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISFAQ. 2

2. NAVCEN. “HOW AIS WORKS.” How Ais Works, U.S. Coast Guard, 8 Sept. 2016, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISworks.

3. Munro, Ken. “Hacking AIS.” Pen Test Partners RSS, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hacking-ais/.

4. Harris, Mark. “Phantom Warships Are Courting Chaos in Conflict Zones.” Wired, Conde Nast, 29 July 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/fake-warships-ais-signals-russia-crimea/. 

5. Fisk, Samantha. “Gloves off as Criminals Move from AIS Spoofing to AIS Hacking -.” Fathom World – Shipping and Maritime Industry News, 16 Sept. 2019, https://fathom.world/gloves-off-as-criminals-move-from-ais-spoofing-to-ais-hacking/.

6. Boling, Andrew, et al. “Unmasked: Vessel Identity Laundering and North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion.” C4ADS, 2021, https://c4ads.org/unmasked. 

7. Simonite, Tom. “Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View.” MIT Technology Review, 18 October 2013, https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/10/18/82918/ship-tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/. 

8. Balduzzi, Marco. “AIS Exposed Understanding Vulnerabilities & Attacks 2.0.” Blackhat.com, Black Hat Asia, 2014, https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Balduzzi/Asia-14-Balduzzi-AIS-Exposed-Understanding-Vulnerabilities-And-Attacks.pdf. 

9. “Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 14 May 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions. 

10. Trainer, Cameron, and Izewicz, Paulina. “Unauthorized Flags: A Threat to the Global Maritime Regime.” Center for International Maritime Security, 20 July, 2020, https://cimsec.org/unauthorized-flags-a-threat-to-the-global-maritime-regime/. 

11. “Fisheries intelligence report reveals vessel behaviors associated with spoofing activity.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 17 October 2023, https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-release/fisheries-intelligence-report-reveals-vessel-behaviors-associated-with-spoofing-activity/ 

12. Storm, Darlene. “Hack in the Box: Researchers Attack Ship Tracking Systems for Fun and Profit.” Computerworld, Computerworld, 21 Oct. 2013, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2475227/hack-in-the-box–researchers-attack-ship-tracking-systems-for-fun-and-profit.html. 

13. Bergman, Bjorn. “Systematic Data Analysis Reveals False Vessel Tracks.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 29 July 2021, https://globalfishingwatch.org/data/analysis-reveals-false-vessel-tracks/. 

14. Bateman, Tom. “Fake Ships, Real Conflict: How Misinformation Came to the High Seas.” Euronews, 28 June 2021, https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/06/28/hms-defender-ais-spoofing-is-opening-up-a-new-front-in-the-war-on-reality. 

15. Katsilieris, Fotios, et al. “Detection of Malicious AIS Position Spoofing by Exploiting Radar Information.” IEEE Xplore, 12 July 2013, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6641132.

Featured Image: A containership steaming during sunset. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Podcast

Sea Control 572: Arms for Russia with Andrew Boyd

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By Jonathan Selling

Author Andrew Boyd joins the podcast to discuss his book, Arms for Russia and the Naval War in the Arctic, 1941-1945. He discusses the importance of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union and the importance of the Arctic route in supplying them.

Andrew Boyd CMG, OBE, DPhil was educated at Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth and St John’s College, Oxford. He served as a submariner in the Royal Navy in the 1970s and subsequently the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. He received his DPhil in naval history from the University of Buckingham in 2015 and is the author of two widely acclaimed works, The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942 and British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century.

Download Sea Control 572: Arms for Russia with Andrew Boyd

Links

1. Arms for Russia and the Naval War in the Arctic, 1941-1945, by Andrew Boyd, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2024.

2. Andrew Boyd Twitter.

Jonathan Selling is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Andrew Frame edited and produced this episode.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.