A violent and extremist, but what of its organization?

Asymmetric Zombie Warfare

                       A violent and extremist, but what of its organization?

What can zombies teach the military and law enforcement about asymmetric warfare and counter-terrorism? San Diego is about to find out thanks to a privately run conference coinciding with Halloween. (Note: NOT part of International Maritime Satire Week):

“This is a very real exercise, this is not some type of big costume party,” said Brad Barker, president of Halo Corp, a security firm hosting the Oct. 31 training demonstration during the summit at a 44-acre Paradise Point Resort island on a San Diego bay. “Everything that will be simulated at this event has already happened, it just hasn’t happened all at once on the same night. But the training is very real, it just happens to be the bad guys we’re having a little fun with.”

 

Hundreds of military, law enforcement and medical personnel will observe the Hollywood-style production of a zombie attack as part of their emergency response training.

 

In the scenario, a VIP and his personal detail are trapped in a village, surrounded by zombies when a bomb explodes. The VIP is wounded and his team must move through the town while dodging bullets and shooting back at the invading zombies. At one point, some members of the team are bit by zombies and must be taken to a field medical facility for decontamination and treatment.

 

“No one knows what the zombies will do in our scenario, but quite frankly no one knows what a terrorist will do,” Barker said. “If a law enforcement officer sees a zombie and says, ‘Freeze, get your hands in the air!’ What’s the zombie going to do? He’s going to moan at you. If someone on PCP or some other psychotic drug is told that, the truth is he’s not going to react to you.”

It’s an interesting way to generate interest and use an outside-the-box scenario to develop insights into parallel reality based situations, similar to the way that military academics mine history for case studies or futurists use the intelligent prognostications of science fiction to think about the future of society and technology and its implications for warfare. Hopefully this scenario doesn’t fall into the latter category. Click on the link above for the full story.

Pirate Ship Down

The Tenacious Dutch: HNMLS Rotterdam v Pirates

                          Pirate Ship Down

The Dutch have done it again.  HNMLS Rotterdam, flagship of NATO’s OCEAN SHIELD counter-piracy operation yesterday decisively won an engagement with a suspected pirate dhow just off the coast of Somalia.  NATO’s Allied Operations site has the story:

A boarding team from Rotterdam was making an approach on a suspect dhow near the coast when they came under fire from ashore and from the dhow itself. Rotterdam returned fire in accordance with Rules of Engagement, during which the dhow was seen to ignite and crew members were observed leaping into the water. One crew member of the dhow was killed in this action and 25 people were subsequently rescued from the water by Rotterdam. Commodore Ben Bekkering, the commander of the NATO Task Force, said that the Rotterdam and her boats remained under sustained fire from the shore throughout, even while attempting to rescue the crew of the stricken dhow and one of Rotterdam’s rigid inflatable boats was damaged.
H/t Lucien. Check out the above site for more details.

Dutch vs Dhow: Small boat from HNMLS Rotterdam exchanges fire with suspected pirate dhow.

No Strait Shooting

Strait Talking: A Canadian Perspective on Hormuz

By Michael Bonner

What’s it really worth?

Late last year, Iran began threatening to close the strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. At their narrowest point between Iran and Oman, the Strait are only 21 miles wide, but they have a perceived significance out of all proportion to their size, as some 17 million barrels of oil pass through them every day.

This story was recently brought home in a long article in the Financial Times on 5 October by author, Javier Blas. His source was a report by the US Energy Information Administration published 22 August 2012 entitled World Oil Transit Chokepoints

Here is the gist of Blas’ argument. International sanctions have taken a grim toll on Iran. The Iranian economy is in horrendous shape, and the oil has lost 60% of its value since the beginning of the year. Merchants have gone on strike as a result. President Ahmadi-Nezhad is in his final term in office and he and his supporters have been increasingly sidelined by more conservative elements within the Iranian regime. Could it be, as Blas suggests, that Iran has less to lose now than ever before and that closing the strait — even if only a diversionary tactic by the president — is now more likely than ever?

It should be remembered that the 17 million barrels passing through the strait of Hormuz daily constitute only 35% of the world’s oil. Apart from Iran itself exporters of oil primarily threatened by closure of the strait would be the Gulf states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar. All their oil goes through the strait. Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, would also be affected, but not all their oil moves through the strait (the respective figures being 87%, 55%, and 48% of exported oil). So these countries, in so far as they are exporters of oil, would suffer greatly if the strait were closed.

But Gulf states such as Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia have built pipelines which, when fully operational, will vastly reduce their reliance on the strait. It must be said, however, that the pipelines will only be ready in about 18 months, which may be too late. This strategy, though, is sound in principle, and other gulf states should find similar means to avoid relying on a single route of export.

What about the West? Though the effect of closing the strait would not be negligible, it would not be catastrophic either — at least as far as oil supply is concerned. Only 16% of America’s imported oil passes through the strait, followed by Germany’s total of 5% — numbers which are dwarfed by statistics for Japan, South Korea, India, and China whose respective figures are 82%, 74%, 63%, and 43%. So it would seem that western countries have much less to fear from a closure of the strait than does Asia, at least as far as oil supply is concerned.

None of this is to say that closure of the strait would not have a profoundly negative economic effect, which it certainly would. But the effect would not be permanent. And in every crisis lies opportunity. In the event that the strait were indeed closed, thereby denying enormous amounts of oil to Japan, South Korea, India and China, two countries may stand to gain from supplying them.

The first is Russia. Russia produces 10.41 million barrels of oil a day, just slightly higher than Saudi Arabia’s output. According to the CIA, Russian reserves must be about 60 billion barrels, and there is much more to be discovered, so we can expect output to go up. But this would surely be augmented by the supposed 100 or so billion barrels of oil in Central Asia, historically within the Russian sphere of influence, and which Russia would almost certainly monopolize. In theory Russia and Central Asia could well end America’s partial reliance on gulf oil and supply large amounts to Japan, South Korea, India, and China at the same time.

But the strategic concerns here would be enormous. Thanks to Presidents Putin and George W. Bush, Moscow now has renewed ties with Kabul, where it exercised influence throughout the 20th century. Could Russia pass up the opportunity to restart its drive towards the Indian Ocean in search of an ice-free port? Much of the necessary infrastructure is already in place, and if Russia developed oil reserves in the former Soviet Central Asian republics (as well as its own), transport to China and India via the Wakhan corridor in Afghanistan and rail links from Uzbekistan via Mazar-i Sharif through Afghanistan and Pakistan would be essential. Construction of such links has been in planning for some time. But a port on the Indian Ocean, perhaps with Pakistan’s coerced permission, would be ideal for transport of Russian oil to India and beyond. Thus American naval superiority in the Indian Ocean (based on the tiny British atoll of Diego Garcia) would be entirely outflanked, and the Fifth Fleet, stationed on Bahrain, could not offset this. The result might be naval race of terrifying scale.

If closing the strait of Hormuz could lead to Russian dominance of the Asian oil market, many will argue that it would be best to keep them open at almost any cost. Many may therefore be pleased to know that the second country standing to profit from closure of the strait is Canada. Alberta’s Oil Sands are expected to yield about 4 million barrels a day by 2015, a puny amount that is easily outstripped by Russia’s colossal daily output. But Canada’s reserves are greater than those of Russia and Central Asia combined. In 2008, the government of Alberta estimated that 1.75 trillion barrels of oil could be extracted from the Oil Sands. Admittedly, however, only about 10% of this can be extracted in an economically viable manner at present. But 1.75 billion barrels is still a formidable amount and might well match or surpass Russian and Central Asian reserves. Output could also be increased with more investment that would further benefit Canada by creating jobs.

Canadians might look forward to a day when domestic oil reserves foster a massive national industry with international reach, both to America to the south and across the Pacific — and this without the alarming geostrategic concerns attending the rise of Russia. It is also worth noting that exporting oil from Canada across the Pacific would obviate another oil transit chokepoint: the strait of Malacca connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. Canada’s dominance as an energy superpower, as some have said, would require an enormous amount of investment in infrastructure and political will to see it through, but it might well be worth it.

The high potential of the Oil Sands is not in doubt, but transport of oil through pipelines (notably the proposed expansion of the Keystone XL and the Gulf Coast Project) remains highly controversial both in Canada and the United States. And the environmental questions hanging over the Oil Sands themselves cannot be ignored either. So it may be some time before Canada can compete seriously with other oil-exporting countries — if ever. In the meantime, it will be best for everyone that the strait of Hormuz remain open. But Canadians may well wish to consider that Canada’s role as an ‘energy superpower’ may be infinitely preferable than other alternatives.

Michael Bonner studied Iranian history at Brasenose College in the University of Oxford. He is widely published on pre-Islamic Iran in both English and French, and his master’s thesis was published a year ago by Studia Iranica in Paris. Michael is a member of the Balkh Art and Cultural Heritage project, an archeological team based in Oxford devoted to the study of the ancient city of Balkh near modern-day Mazar-i Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Any views or opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and the news agencies and do not necessarily represent those of the Atlantic Council of Canada. This article is published for information purposes only.

LCS: Screening The Battle Force from Littoral Threats

Nihil Novi Sub Sole

LCS: Screening The Battle Force from Littoral Threats

Using historical examples and parallels to predict the future can be dangerous, but is better than operating in a vacuum. It can also serve to break down to relatively simple and illustrative terms sometimes overwhelming complexities, in contrast with the more sophisticated analytic tools available.  The simpler method further helps to mitigate the marvelous talent of the human mind to justify whatever it is we want justified by framing the arguments in easy to follow logic.  What does this extended introduction say about LCS’ future development?  LCS has quite a long story, which CAPT Carney Powers tells in the pages of Proceedings’ September issue.  But if we draw a line between the past and present and try to answer the simple question, “What is LCS?” in no more than 10 words, my attempt would be something like this:

LCS screens battle force from asymmetrical threat of the time.

100 years ago, in 1912, the asymmetrical threats to a battle force were the torpedo, carried by the already well established flotillas of torpedo boats, and the rapidly maturing technology of submarines.  In this respect LCS is similar to early destroyers, which were basically outgrown torpedo boats.  Its mission was defined in the most direct way by the French name of this new class of ships – contre-torpilleur.  They were better fighting small and agile torpedo boats than cruisers, which formed the battle-force screen of the time, but they lacked seakeeping and range to keep pace with the fleet.  With time, due in part to the growing threat from submarines and later aircraft, destroyers evolved into two subcategories – escort and fleet destroyers.  In his recently published interview, Dr. John Lehman points to the problem of LCS’ inability to deploy with Carrier Battle Groups as a similarity with the early destroyers, and calls for a battle group-deployable frigate program that would replace the FFG 7s.  As FFGs were never intended to be a part of Carrier Battle Groups there is a danger that his idea would end  up as an attempt to procure fleet destroyers at the cost of escort destroyers, or using contemporary nomenclature to buy DDGs for the price of FFGs.  

Another way to look at LCS could be as a drone carrier.  Norman Friedman recently made this kind of parallel.  During the interwar period, the U.S. Navy searched for more scouting capabilities by pursuing many ideas in parallel.  One of them was a seaplane tender like Curtiss AV-4.  The task was to put at sea a maximum number of possible scouting planes.  Today we speak about autonomous vehicles but the mission is similar.  Quite contrary to destroyers, sea plane tenders disappeared from the seas.  What is the difference between these two parallels?  Contre-torpilleur is a statement of mission, screening the battle force, while seaplane tender is description of capabilities.  Capabilities will naturally evolve with stated mission and technology.  The art is to match both at given level of evolution.  Our ancestors used to say nihil novi sub sole.  Translated into modern language and applied to the Navy we can say that managing the fleet is not a mysterious science but an art of applying already invented ideas.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland. His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Tanzania

The Twin Tanker Terror of Tanzania and Tuvalu

“Pay no attention to the tanker behind the curtain…”

Okay, so I got a little carried away with alliteration, but if you’re curious about the nexus of maritime law, international sanctions, and Iran’s attempts to keep its oil economy afloat check out this article at Forbes.  It details the symptoms and clues, if not the actual action, of Iran’s efforts to keep its tanker fleet in use through the use of flags of convenience (Tanzania and Tuvalu), where it may or may not have actually registered the vessels.  Tuvalu reportedly delisted the Iranian vessels, which then attempted to register with Tanzania.  While it is unclear if they successfully registered (The Tanzanians claim not), the vessels are acting as if they had, including responding to radio hails using Tanzanian call signs. The calculus seems to be that if they can’t sail under their own flag, and they can’t sail under no flag (under international law they would therefore enjoy no protection and be subject to immediate seizure), the vessels have taken to faking their flag….

Bonus points if you can point to Tanzania and Tuvalu on a map without searching.

 

ODB

CIMSEC’s October DC Meet-Up

It’s the time of the month again when CIMSECians get hungry and/or thirsty. For October’s DC meet-up we’ll be returning to the Old Dominion Brewhouse in the Convention Center area, just north of Gallery Place/Chinatown.  We hope you’ll join us to discuss the maritime issues of the day, recap our International Maritime Satire Week, nominate topics for our next “week” of analysis, or just meet some interesting people.

 

Time:   Friday, 26 Oct, 6-10pm            Happy hour lasts til 7:00pm

Place:   Old Dominion Brewhouse, (look for a sign or ask up front for our area)

            1219 9th St., NW (Exit at the Mt. Vernon/Convention Center stop on the red line, on the other side of the convention center tunnel)

All are welcome and no RSVP is required, but if you’re planning on coming please drop me a line so we have an idea of how many seats to reserve: director@cimsec.org

Can Every Drone Be a Minesweeper?

What You Can’t Find…

 

Every Drone Can Be a Minesweeper?

A frequently cited fact in my days training to be a naval officer was that the most common weapon for damaging a warship since World War II was the naval mine.  The recently concluded International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2012 (IMCMEX 12), held in 3 distinct OPAREAs throughout the U.S. Fifth Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR), demonstrated both the difficulty of mine countermeasures (MCM) operations (detecting and clearing mines) and the potential of new technology to mitigate those dangers.

PBS’ News Hour quotes a retired naval officer and observer of the exercise, Capt. Robert O’Donnell, stating of the 29 simulated mines in the exercise, “I don’t think a great many were found…It was probably around half or less.”

The response from the Navy is a little confusing:

The Navy declined to provide data on how many practice mines were located during the two-week naval drill but did not dispute that less than half were found. However, a spokesman insisted that the figures do not tell the whole story and that the event was “‘not just about finding” the dummy mines.

“We enjoyed great success,” said Cdr. Jason Salata, the top public affairs officer for the 5th Fleet. “Every platform that was sent to find a shape found a shape. We stand by that.” Salata asserted that “there were no missed mines, each platform that had an opportunity to find the mine did so.”

While it is true that a 100% detection rate is not what the exercise was all about, that rate is still an interesting figure.  It could indicate that every mine was found, but perhaps not by every platform – instead as a result of the cumulative MCM effort.  It’s likewise unknown how the success rate broke down by platform and nation – more than 27 international partners operated with U.S. Fifth Fleet as part of the exercise.  What is known is that MCM remains a difficult and deadly business, particularly in the context of some of the most likely future conflict scenarios, including Iran and North Korea. 

While the exercise results will disappoint some (again, we don’t know who or what had difficulty finding what types of mines), they will also serve to reinforce the arguments for recapitalizing the Avenger-class MCMs, outfitting the USS Ponce as an Afloat Forward Staging Base, and placing rigorous demands on getting the LCS MCM mission package right.  As mentioned above, the exercise was additionally an opportunity to test out some new kit.  Before the exercise got underway, NavalDrones provided a preview of some of the Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) slated for testing in the drill, as well as a recap of other drones designed for MCM duties.  Furthermore, a pair of similar threats might spark the development of crossover technology for use in MCM.

In addition to the more traditional types of naval mines, detecting and defeating the waterborne IEDs and enemy drones (AUVs and ROVs) of both state and non-state actors is seen by some as increasing in importance, and may rely on many of the same technologies used in MCM.  Like the land-based IED/counter-IED arms-race of the past decade, we could be witnessing the start of a similar set of opposing innovation escalations.  Foreign Policy earlier this week reported that the creation of the Iraq/Afghanistan wars, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), is executing its own Pivot to the Pacific to focus on the typically lower-tech threats of waterborne terrorists and IEDs.  Meanwhile NavalDrones last week highlighted some of the detection and clearance technologies that could be used against the evolving undersea drone fleets.  The next decade is shaping up to be an interesting time for technology under the waves.

 

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

 

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.