Tag Archives: Navy

Don’t Give Up on the Littoral Combat Ship

By LT Kaitlin Smith

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been subjected to heavy scrutiny, and much of it is justified. What is getting lost in the discourse is the real capability that LCS provides to the fleet. From my perspective as an active duty service member who may be stationed on an LCS in the future, I’m more interested in exploring how we can employ LCS to utilize its strengths, even as we seek to improve them. Regardless of the program’s setbacks, LCS is in the Fleet today, getting underway, and deploying overseas. Under the operational concept of distributed lethality, LCS both fills a void and serves as an asset to a distributed and lethal surface force in terms of capacity and capability.

Capacity, Flexibility, Lethality

The original Concept of Operations written by Naval Warfare Development Command in February 2003 described LCS as a forward-deployed, theater-based component of a distributed force that can execute missions in anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and mine warfare in the littorals. This concept still reflects the Navy’s needs today. We urgently need small surface combatants to replace the aging Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships and Cyclone-class patrol craft, as well as the decommissioned Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates. Capacity matters, and “sometimes, capacity is a capability” in its own right. We need gray hulls to fulfill the missions of the old frigates, minesweepers and patrol craft, and until a plan is introduced for the next small surface combatant, LCS will fill these widening gaps.

LCS was also envisioned as a platform for “mobility” related missions like support for Special Operations Forces, maritime interception operations, force protection, humanitarian assistance, logistics, medical support, and non-combatant evacuation operations. Assigning these missions to LCS frees up multimission destroyers and cruisers for high-end combat operations. We’ve already seen how LCS can support fleet objectives during the deployments of USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) and USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3). Both ships supported theater security operations and international partnerships with Pacific nations through participation in the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series. USS FREEDOM conducted humanitarian and disaster response operations following the typhoon in the Philippines, and USS FORT WORTH conducted search and rescue operations for AirAsia flight QZ8501. The forward deployment of the ships to Singapore allowed for rapid response to real-world events, while allowing large surface combatants in the region to remain on station for their own tasking. With an 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boat onboard, LCS is well-suited to conduct visit, board, search, and seizure missions in Southeast Asia to combat piracy and protect sea lanes.

The presence of more ships on station doesn’t just allow us to fulfill more mission objectives; capacity also enables us to execute distributed lethality for offensive sea control. One of the goals of distributed lethality is to distribute offensive capability geographically. When there are physically more targets to worry about, that complicates an enemy’s ability to target our force. It also allows us to hold the enemy’s assets at risk from more attack angles.

The other goals of distributed lethality are to increase offensive lethality and enhance defensive capability. The Fleet can make the LCS a greater offensive threat by adding an over-the-horizon missile that can use targeting data transmitted to the ship from other combatants or unmanned systems. In terms of defensive capability, LCS wasn’t designed to stand and fight through a protracted battle. Instead, the Navy can increase the survivability of LCS by reducing its vulnerability through enhancements to its electronic warfare suite and countermeasure systems.

LCS may not be as survivable as a guided missile destroyer in terms of its ability to take a missile hit and keep fighting, but it has more defensive capability than the platforms it is designed to replace. With a maximum speed of over 40 knots, LCS is more maneuverable than the mine countermeasure ships (max speed 14 kts), patrol craft (max speed 35 kts), and the frigates (30 kts) it is replacing in the fleet, as well as more protective firepower with the installation of Rolling Airframe Missile for surface-to-air point defense. Until a plan has been established for future surface combatants, we need to continue building LCS as “the original warfighting role envisioned for the LCS remains both valid and vital.

New Possibilities

LCS already has the capability to serve as a launch platform for MH-60R helicopters and MQ-8B FireScout drones to add air assets to the fight for antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare operations. LCS even exceeds the capability of some DDGs in this regard, since the original LCS design was modified to accommodate a permanent air detachment and Flight I DDGs can only launch and recover air assets.

USS Freedom (Lockheed Martin photo)

We have a few more years to wait before the rest of the undersea warfare capabilities of LCS will be operational, but the potential for surface ship antisubmarine warfare is substantial. A sonar suite comprised of a multifunction towed array and variable depth sonar will greatly expand the ability of the surface force to strategically employ sensors in a way that exploits the acoustic environment of the undersea domain. LCS ships with the surface module installed will soon have the capability to launch Longbow Hellfire surface-to-surface missiles. The mine warfare module, when complete, will provide LCS with full spectrum mine warfare capabilities so that they can replace the Avenger class MCMs, which are approaching the end of their service life. Through LCS, we will be adding a depth to our surface ship antisubmarine warfare capability, adding offensive surface weapons to enable sea control, and enhancing our minehunting and minesweeping suite. In 2019, construction will begin on the modified-LCS frigates, which will have even more robust changes to the original LCS design to make the platform more lethal and survivable.

The light weight and small size of LCS also has tactical application in specific geographic regions that limit the presence of foreign warships by tonnage. Where Arleigh Burke-class destroyers weigh 8,230 to 9,700 tons, the variants of LCS weigh in from 3,200 to 3,450 tons. This gives us a lot more flexibility to project power in areas like the Black Sea, where aggregate tonnage for warships from foreign countries is limited to 30,000 tons. True to its name, LCS can operate much more easily in the littorals with a draft of about 14-15 feet, compared to roughly 31 feet for DDGs. These characteristics will also aid LCS’s performance in the Arabian Gulf and in the Pacific.

Of course, any LCS critic might say that all this capability and potential can only be realized if the ships’ engineering plants are sound. My objective here is not to deny the engineering issues—they get plenty of press attention on their own—but to highlight why we’ll lose more as a Navy in cutting the program than by taking action to resolve program issues. It’s worth mentioning that the spotlight on LCS is particularly bright. LCS is not the only ship class that experiences engineering casualties, but LCS casualties are much more heavily reported in the news than casualties that occur on more established ship classes.

Conclusion

LCS was designed as one part of a dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet,” and that’s exactly what we need in the fleet today to build operational distributed lethality to enable sea control. Certainly, we need to address the current engineering concerns with LCS in order to project these capabilities. To fully realize the potential of the LCS program, Congress must continue to fund LCS, and Navy leaders must continue to support the program with appropriate manning, training and equipment.

LT Nicole Uchida contributed to this article. 

LT Kaitlin Smith is a Surface Warfare Officer stationed on the OPNAV Staff. The opinions and views expressed in this post are hers alone and are presented in her personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

Featured Image: PEARL HARBOR (July 12, 2016) – The littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) transits the waters of Pearl Harbor during RIMPAC 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by MC2 Ryan J. Batchelder/Released)

Counter Influence Activities to U.S. Posture in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf

By Chad M. Pillai

The year is 2030, five years after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) officially expired, and Iran has made its move to go nuclear. As the United States and its allies attempt to militarily respond, they face a new reality: assured access and freedom of movement (FOM) is no longer guaranteed due to Russian and Chinese counter influence activities in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf Region. Should this scenario come as a surprise?  The answer is no, because the Russians and Chinese are putting the pieces in position now.  

Since the end of WWII, the most potent aspect of the U.S. military has been its forward posture consisting of a network of forces, footprints, and agreements. With Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran being identified as the four primary state challengers to the U.S.-led global order, the Defense Department is examining its global posture to ensure it has the means to assure allies, deter challengers, and if necessary defeat aggressors. However, Russia and China have not been sitting idle as the U.S. seeks to strengthen its position. In fact, they have studied our doctrine and are implementing their own global posture initiatives to secure their national interests and, if necessary, threaten our interests. Their focus has been around the three critical maritime chokepoints: the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz.   

Russia

Russia has been the most visible in re-asserting itself in the Middle East with its military campaign to support the Assad Regime in Syria. Russia’s principal interest in Syria is ensuring its continued access to a warm water port in the Mediterranean. The U.S. and its western allies’ early attempts to prevent Russian support for Syria by denying the Russians the ability to ship helicopters in 2012 motivated Russia to reposition its naval forces in the area and build relationships with countries in the region.

Tartus naval base in Syria. (Google Earth, DigitalGlobe)
Tartus naval base in Syria. (Google Earth, DigitalGlobe)

Its reinforcement of advanced air-defense systems in Syria extended Russia’s Anti-Access/Anti-Denial (A2/AD) network from the Baltic region to the Eastern Mediterranean. Recent reports also indicate that Russia is seeking to re-establish its military presence in Egypt at a former air base abandoned in 1972. If Russia is able to establish a foothold in Egypt, its bases in Syria along with its fleet operating in the Eastern Mediterranean would pose a significant challenge to U.S. and allied forces in a potential future conflict while attempting to conduct strikes or move through the Suez.

China

When it comes to China’s military expansion, most observers focus on events in the East and South China Seas and its susceptibility to the “Malacca Straits” dilemma. Like Russia, China has not been idle in developing a “globalized security posture” to secure its interests abroad. The construction of China’s first military outpost in Djibouti is a clear manifestation of China’s global outlook. This is a worrying development for the U.S., which operates from Camp Lemonier, a military base not too far from where China is establishing their base. The future danger of a Chinese base in Djibouti is demonstrated by the recent attacks against U.S. ships off the coast of Yemen. While the U.S. is capable of defending itself and responding to untrained Houthi rebels in Yemen, it may find a more competent and better equipped Chinese force threatening access to the Bab-el-Mandeb a more difficult challenge.

A People’s Liberation Army Navy soldier stands guard as Chinese citizens board a Chinese naval ship at a port in Aden last year. Photo: Reuters
A People’s Liberation Army Navy sailor stands guard as Chinese citizens board a Chinese naval ship at a port in Aden last year. (Reuters)

Besides Djibouti, China is reaching out to Oman for access and has established an agreement with Pakistan to use the Port of Gwadar. While the Port of Gwadar is viewed by many as a means for China to challenge India’s influence in the region, it could also be used to challenge the U.S. Navy from operating in the region as well, especially to reinforce its position near the Straits of Hormuz. In a nutshell, China in partnership with Russia and Iran, could shut down three of the most important maritime chokepoints in the world.

Conclusion

General Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognizes the threat of Russia and China along with Iran, North Korea, and Violent Extremists in his 4+1 construct. However, our efforts to deter these actors individually could have the unfortunate consequence of drawing them closer together as an unholy alliance seeking to diminish U.S. influence. The scenario in the beginning is clearly possible if Russia and China in partnership with Iran choose to deny the U.S. assured access and freedom of movement. While the U.S. is developing numerous concepts to defeat various forms of A2/AD in the Pacific and Persian Gulf regions already, it must accept that for future operations against determined enemies who have studied our doctrine of warfare, the cost of winning will be considerably greater.  

Chad M. Pillai, an Army Strategist, is a member of the War on the Rocks (WOTR) Founders Club, the Military Writers Guild, and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC). He has previously published The Bear, Dragon, and Eagle: Russian, Chinese, and U.S. Military Strategies and India as the Pivotal Power of the 21st Century Security Order for CIMSEC. He has also contributed to the Strategy Bridge, War on the Rocks (WOTR), Infinity Journal, Small Wars Journal, Offizier, and Military Review. He earned his Masters in International Public Policy (MIPP) from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).  

Featured Image: Iranian naval ships conduct an attack on a mock U.S. warship in the Strait of Hormuz (Hamed Jafarnejad/AFP/Getty Images)

9-14 May 2016 Maritime Security Events

This is a roundup of maritime security and national security events that our readers and members might find interesting. As CIMSEC has a global presence, our events list reflects events from around the world. Inclusion does not equal endorsement – those bolded are most apparently related to maritime security. See one we missed?  Email our Director of Operations at [email protected].

CIMSEC May 18th Meet-up at Archipelago

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9-14 May 2016 Maritime Security Events

09 May 2016 – Philippines Presidential Election

10 May 2016 – Washington, DC – CSIS – “The State of Defense Acquisition”

10 May 2016 – Canberra, Australia – ANU – “Is the Taiwan Strait still a flash point?”

11 May 2016 – Washington, DC – The Heritage Foundation – “The National Security Implications of Rapid Access to Space”

11-12 May 2016 – Singapore – ACI – “Maritime Security Management” 

11-15 May 2016 – Portland, Maine – Maritime History Conference” 

11-20 May 2016 – New York – UN IMO Maritime Safety Committee Meeting

12 May 2016 – Washington, DC – The Heritage Foundation – “Helping Secure Asia’s Future through Enhanced U.S.-India Defense Partnership”

13 May 2016 – Washington, DC – Defense Entrepreneurs Forum – “DEFxDC”

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Long-Range Maritime Security Events

16-18 May 2016 – Washington, DC – Navy League – “Sea, Air, Space Symposium”

20 May 2016 – Taiwan’s Presidential Inauguration

24-27 May 2016 – Vientiane – ASEAN – 10th ADMM 

26-27 May 2016 – Ise-Shima, Japan – G7 Summit

June-July 2016 – Hawaii – Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Naval Exercise 

June 2016 – Baltic Sea – BALTOPS Naval Exercise

03-05 June 2016 – Singapore – IISS – “Shangri-La Dialogue” 

06-07 June 2016 – Lisbon – G7++ Friends of Gulf of Guinea Meeting

13-15 June 2016 – Ontario, Canada – Queens University – “Engagement Between Peace and War:
How Soldiers and Military Institutions Adapt”

13-15 June 2016 – Newport, RI – USNWC – “Naval Strategist Forum and Current Strategy Forum” 

19-24 June 2016 – Hawaii – U of Hawaii– “International Coral Reef Symposium” 

20-22 June 2016 – Gdansk, Poland – “BaltMilitary Expo”

21 June 2016 – Kiel, Germany – “Maritime Security Challenges and the High North” 

23 June – 02 July 2016 – Aspen, CO – Aspen – “Aspen Ideas Festival”

23 June 2016 – Washington, DC – Booze Allen/CSBA – “Directed Energy Summit 2016” 

27-28 June 2016 – New York City – ICAS/UVA/UN – “Legal Order in the World’s Oceans: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”

5-7 July 2016 – Norfolk, VA – NATO C2COE – “C2 in Emerging Warfare – Challenges to the Alliance and Coalitions” 

July 2016 – Yaounde Meeting and Operationalization of Interregional Coordination Center (ICC) for Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa

27-30 July – 02 July 2016 – Aspen, CO – Aspen – “Aspen Security Forum”

01-04 Aug 2016 – Aspen, CO – Aspen – “Roundtable on Artificial Intelligence”

02-04 Aug 2016 – Everett, WA – Maritime Security West 2016

08-09 Aug 2016 – Venice, Italy – WASET – “International Conference on Port and Maritime Security”

09-12 Aug 2016 – Hawaii – East-West Center – “North Pacific Arctic Conference on Arctic Futures”

Sep 2016 – Thailand – ASEAN – ADMM-Plus Military Medicine and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercise (AM-HEx)

Sep 2016 – Panama – UNITAS Naval Exercise

Sep 2016 – Newport, RI – USNWC – International “Seapower Symposium”

06-09 Sep 2016 – Hamburg, Germany – SMM – “International Conference on Maritime Security and Defense”

07 Sep – Micronesia – Pacific Islands Forum

15-16 Sep 2016 – Washington, DC – State Dept. – Our Ocean Conference 2016 

25-28 Sep 2016 – Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – International Sociological Association – “Transformations of the Military Profession”

Oct 2016 – Southeast Asia – U.S. Navy – SEACAT Naval Exercise

Oct 2016 – Indian Navy, U.S. Navy, JMSDF – Malabar Naval Exercise

03-06 Oct 2016 – Vancouver, Canada – Navy League of Canada – “Maritime Security Challenges 2016”

15 Oct 2016 – Lome, Togo – AU – AU Regional Conference: Maritime Security and Development in Africa

17-21 Oct 2016 – Paris, France – “EuroNaval 2016”

01-02 Nov 2016 – Kuala Lampur, Indonesia- “13th Annual Maritime Security and Coastal Surveillance Conference”

02-05 Nov 2016 – Jakarta, Indonesia – IndoDefense Expo 2016”

13-16 Nov 2016 – Auckland, NZ – ASEAN – ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Exercise: Exercise Mahi Tangaroa

21-25 Nov 2016 – New York – UN IMO Maritime Safety Committee Meeting

29 Nov-02 Dec 2016 – Vino del Mar, Chile – “ExpoNaval 2016”

Dec 2016 – Expiration of EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operationa Ocean Shield Counter-Piracy Mandates 

14-15 Jan 2017 – New York City – SMM – “2017 TELOS Conference: Asymmetrical Warfare – The Centrality of the Political to the Strategic” (Call for Papers Deadline: 31 July 2016)

03-05 Oct 2017 – Mumbai, India – SMM – “INMEX“

Sea Control 117 – Niger Delta Pirates Declare War?

seacontrol2Niger Delta violence returns as oil prices plummet and both the Nigerian government’s ability and willingness to pay off former militants decreases. As the Nigerian Navy moves to counter this new violence, a largely unknown group called the “Niger Delta Avengers” has responded by “declaring war” on the Navy. Dirk Steffen, who recently published a CIMSEC article on this development, joins us to discuss the current situation in the Gulf of Guinea, the militant threats, government capabilities & intentions, as well as the methods and background of these pirate operations. 

This is not the podcast to miss! It won’t make you an expert like Dirk, but he’ll have given us enough information to pretend to be one by the end of the podcast.

DOWNLOAD: Niger Delta Pirates Declare War?