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NATO Week

A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Anna Matilde Bassoli

After more than a year of disrupted global trade, the Red Sea Crisis appears to have no end in sight. Rather, in a series of leaked messages, senior U.S. officials have cast doubts over U.S. involvement and “having to bail Europe out again.” However, while frustration on each side of the pond is understandable, emotions fail to address the root causes of growing transatlantic distrust. The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy. A coherent NATO naval strategy requires the United States and its European allies to align their postures, without the EU as the third wheel.

On December 18, 2023, the United States called upon allies to respond to the Houthi attacks on global shipping with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. This multinational coalition was intended to include the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and others. However, only the UK, Canada, and Norway upheld their commitment. A few days after this announcement, most European navies withdrew to join the EU-led Operation Aspides, an overlapping defensive mission. Specifically, European navies explicitly rejected US leadership and command in an unprecedented transatlantic schism. The establishment of the EU-led Operation Aspides has resulted in a divided naval commitment and undermined efforts in the Red Sea Crisis in three crucial ways.

First, this divided effort has effectively deprived Prosperity Guardian of European naval assets over the past year. The Italian Navy has committed two destroyers and two frigates to Aspides, contrary to the single frigate initially announced in support of Prosperity Guardian. The French Navy has provided three frigates to Aspides, while it remains unclear what role they would have played in Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the German and Belgian navies each contributed a frigate. Other European navies have divided their limited commitments between both missions, although it is unclear under which command. For example, the Hellenic Navy provided two frigates to Aspides, while the Royal Netherlands Navy contributed one frigate, a joint support ship, and aviation assets. Even the newest members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, have shown inconsistent commitment, with both countries providing only limited personnel. Despite its initial commitment to the US-led effort, Spain made no contributions. Interestingly, however, Spain’s ports benefited from the crisis, placing the country in an ambiguous position.

These commitments – or lack thereof – contrast sharply with the United Kingdom’s contribution to Prosperity Guardian during the same timeframe. In addition to the destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Duncan, the Royal Navy provided two frigates and critical air support. While this still pales compared to the US show of force, it demonstrates the UK’s consistency in its transatlantic commitment. The other European powers cannot claim to have done similarly. The Danish Navy, for instance, sent the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt, but ship malfunctions plagued its performance, resulting in the dismissal of the Danish chief of defense. Furthermore, the French Navy has prioritized French-linked vessels, indicating that national interests rather than transatlantic ones drive their participation.

Second, the European decision to withdraw from participation in Prosperity Guardian shows how Europe was already veering towards strategic autonomy before the Trump administration came to the White House. Upon announcement, the Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense specified that Italy, France, and Germany were pushing for an EU-only operation of a purely defensive nature, without land strikes. This European insistence on going solo deserves a deep dive. For starters, Europeans have criticized the Trump administration’s stance on transatlantic relations in recent weeks, calling for renewed unity. However, the lack of European support for the US-led effort demonstrates that European conduct has been inconsistent with their leaders’ rhetoric and parallel maritime commitments. For instance, Europeans have been eager to participate in Indo-Pacific exercises and showcase these efforts as a sign of strong friendship. In the same breath, Spain has actively participated in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean. However, a key question arises: how can the United States truly trust its European allies if they only show up to train and not to engage?

In this respect, the US offensive approach against the European defensive posture demonstrates that the transatlantic allies could not be more distant. By the time European navies were rotating their naval forces in the summer of 2024, some commentators had already started casting doubts on the effectiveness of Prosperity Guardian as a purely defensive mission. In response to this lack of results, the United States doubled down on eliminating the Houthi threat and deterring further attacks with strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen under Operation Poseidon Archer. Once again, however, European commitment has been limited, and preference has been given to the defensive posture of Operation Aspides. The problem plagues transatlantic relations is not the Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards Europe. Rather, the lack of entente between the US’s forward-leaning posture and the EU’s defense posture has eroded trust and partnership across the Atlantic.

Third, the US’s lack of acknowledgment of the EU as a security actor has undermined its efforts. Most recently, Michael C. DiCianna has argued that “Europe needs to fight the Houthis.” However, his analysis focuses only on Prosperity Guardian, as if it were the only ongoing operation in the Red Sea, incorrectly accounting for the European contribution. Similarly, Doug Livermore acknowledges European contributions but employs a US-only perspective to make the case for using force in the Red Sea Crisis. Neither of these authors seems to grasp the actual problem. It is not that Europe does not fight – from the European perspective, they are protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Rather, the European and US perspectives on transatlantic security and interests do not align.

This analytical bias highlights two major problems in the US debate. First, it shows that the United States only views Europe through NATO lenses, while Europeans increasingly look to the EU to bolster their security needs. Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides began while transatlantic relations were still good. So, why did the Europeans part ways with the United States? The most evident answer points to European strategic autonomy, meaning a European defensive approach for European interests within the EU.

As evident in the Red Sea, none of this concerns the United States. Rather, Aspides attempts to demonstrate that Europe could rely on the EU as a security actor. The strong push behind an EU-led, European-only defense, particularly regarding defense spending and the primary US request since the first Trump administration, is not the result of a sudden storm. Instead, renewed US aggressiveness has further nudged the Europeans towards strategic autonomy. Indeed, Europeans have been most vocal and proactive regarding their security, not within NATO, but in the EU. The EU will never fight for US interests or in the US way. This is not what the EU was created for. On the contrary, this was why NATO was established, making it an organization suited to defend US and European interests in the American way.

This also highlights the second major problem in the US debate. Because the United States ignores the EU as a security actor, it fails to recognize that the EU and NATO rely on two opposite perspectives. Misunderstanding the difference between the EU’s inward-focused posture and the US’s forward-leaning one undermines US attempts to reset transatlantic relations. While US commentators correctly ask Europeans to contribute more, they overlook their counterparts’ perspective. From the US point of view, fighting the Houthis means not only preventing attacks on the seas but also bombing their positions on land. For Europeans, this is excessive, rendering US complaints about their conduct dangerously pointless.

In no other domain has this mistaken approach had more consequences than in the naval domain. The US viewpoint is forward-leaning – hence, offensive – towards protecting SLOCs, involving heavy military force. On the other hand, the European perspective is reactive, building convoy-like defenses around commercial ships. In short, Americans prefer to charge ahead, whereas Europeans tend to build trenches. The Red Sea Crisis exemplifies this dynamic.

The Euro-American split has resulted in two overlapping operations acting from different perspectives without a common end goal. While the EU-led Operation Aspides focuses solely on protecting commerce, US-led efforts have multilayered strategic goals: protecting SLOCs, demonstrating maritime strength on the global seas, and eroding Iran’s influence in the Middle East by striking its proxies. From the US viewpoint, these goals are not isolated but interconnected ends on a dynamic maritime chessboard, where the ultimate objective is to checkmate China. From the European perspective, China is not even on the board.

Indeed, contrary to popular US belief, the Red Sea Crisis is not about European trade; rather, it is about US sea power. The United States is not fighting the Houthis to bail out freeloading Europeans. This view is contrary to US interests and damaging to US strategy. The United States is taking charge of a maritime crisis because it can still be the premier global maritime power. This demonstration of maritime strength sends two messages. First, the United States still dominates the seas. Second, the United States is not a dead sea power to China. Underestimating the value of these messages in the context of strategic competition with China is a fatal mistake for the US.

To be fair, concerns about straining US naval forces are valid and must be addressed. However, once again, these concerns must be addressed in accordance with US naval strategy, not against it. Indeed, an increased European commitment should not continue on the premise of split naval strength. This is an open subversion of all the basic principles of US naval strategy: overwhelming naval power, control of the sea lines of communications, and maritime dominance. If the United States concedes any of these to either friend or foe, the sea power that has supported US freedom and prosperity will crumble.

The United States must leverage NATO to align transatlantic allies. This will require two key steps. First, the United States must tone down its anger towards its transatlantic allies. Autonomy-seeking Europeans might be more incentivized to maintain their defensive posture if they view the United States as an adversary. So far, this trend has been evident, and there is no reason for the United States to make Europeans even less inclined to contribute to transatlantic efforts.

The second step could involve a more structured division of labor in the Red Sea. Throughout history, very few maritime crises involving land-based attacks on commercial shipping have ended without a major deployment of strength. While the United States has a strong interest in striking the Houthis to keep Iran in check, the Europeans have an interest in keeping SLOCs open. The current approach – the United States striking the Houthis from the sea while the Europeans continue their convoy-like missions – is a good starting point. However, the split command and lack of matching European resources must cease. To make this work, the Europeans should reduce their commitments in the Indo-Pacific until the Red Sea Crisis is resolved. This would allow the United States to allocate resources effectively between the two connected theaters. Likewise, the United States should clarify that a unified command is crucial to bring this crisis to a halt.

A better understanding of expectations and goals in the Red Sea could generate premises to mend transatlantic fences. Presently, no one has the perfect recipe to bring this crisis to a halt, and a split approach has likely extended the crisis. Not only have the Houthis taken the lead in messaging victory, but the first true victim of this crisis – the Israeli port of Eilat – has fallen under financial pressure. Time has run out for the United States to complain about Europe without a plan. Likewise, time has proven that the European Union is still not a reliable security actor. An integrated NATO strategy that accounts for both US and European perspectives is the only choice for victory. The alternative option spells defeat.

Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a MLitt in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently works in the think tank industry, focusing on tech policy and security.

Featured Image: The UK Royal Navy (RN) Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (foreground) and Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond hand over on station as the RN vessel contributing to Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

NATO Week

Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas 

Based on our experience designing and analyzing recent Naval War College wargames in the Euro-Atlantic theater, U.S. and NATO maritime forces face several challenges in maintaining readiness, enhancing lethality, and accelerating decision-making—core priorities underscored by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. The North Atlantic and High North are increasingly contested, as Russian submarine operations and grey zone activities intensify and China extends its influence deeper into strategically critical Atlantic corridors.

There are several areas where greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces could enhance warfighting readiness and crisis response. These include streamlining command relationships, enhancing maritime domain awareness, harmonizing rules of engagement, strengthening maritime logistics, integrating NATO into North American defense planning, and improving amphibious force employment. While NATO navies bring significant capability to bear, optimizing these areas will ensure that the alliance is positioned to deter aggression, enhance decision advantage, and maintain maritime superiority in an increasingly complex and contested security environment.

This article offers insights and recommendations based on our wargaming experience to help U.S. and NATO naval leaders strengthen operational integration, refine force employment, and better prepare for future maritime challenges in the Euro-Atlantic theater.

Streamline Unity of Effort in the Atlantic and High North

With multiple U.S. and NATO maritime commands operating across the Atlantic and High North, there is a valuable opportunity to enhance unity of effort by refining command relationships, synchronizing force employment, and accelerating decision-making. Effective coordination among U.S. Naval Forces North (NAVNORTH), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM), and Striking Forces NATO (SFN) ensures that Allied maritime forces can operate seamlessly in a contested environment. Wargame insights consistently emphasize the importance of shared mission awareness, mission command, and persistent training to reinforce operational alignment and clarify multinational naval task force responsibilities.

Recent initiatives have bolstered deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic theater, such as the establishment of a second maneuver fleet under NAVEUR’s temporary control and a forward deployed expeditionary Maritime Operations Center (MOC) in Europe. These efforts have improved multi-echelon coordination and operational flexibility between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, demonstrating the benefits of closer integration. Additionally, refining command integration between SFN and MARCOM—two key NATO maritime components—presents a further opportunity to strengthen transatlantic force employment. SFN, responsible for high-end maritime strike capabilities, reports directly to SACEUR, while MARCOM serves as both NATO’s Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) and the Maritime Component Commander for multiple Joint Force Commands (JFCs). Ensuring secure communications, clear command authorities, and persistent joint training will enhance NATO’s ability to employ maritime forces rapidly and effectively at the task force and task group levels.

Another key step toward greater unity of effort is elevating JFC Norfolk to a 4-star command. As NATO’s only transatlantic operational command, JFC Norfolk serves a vital role in linking U.S. and NATO maritime operations, yet its current structure requires balancing U.S. and Allied priorities across multiple echelons. Elevating JFC Norfolk would enhance command focus on transatlantic operations, improve decision-making agility, and better align command relationships within NATO’s maritime architecture. Most importantly, structuring Allied maritime commands for crises and conflict—rather than peacetime—will ensure standing U.S. and NATO maritime forces and planners are ready and integrated to deter aggression and respond decisively in the Atlantic and High North.

Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness and Situational Awareness

U.S. and NATO maritime forces have a unique opportunity to sharpen their maritime domain awareness (MDA) and situational awareness by strengthening intelligence-sharing and coordination across the Atlantic and High North. Both forces field some of the world’s most advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, but their full potential can only be realized through seamless integration of policies, technologies, and operational procedures. Enhancing coordination between key commands—NAVEUR, NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN—will create a more comprehensive and real-time picture of the maritime battlespace, enabling faster threat detection, more agile decision-making, and greater operational effectiveness in contested environments.

A critical step toward this goal is developing a federated Common Operating Picture (COP) that integrates multi-domain sensor data from both U.S. and NATO maritime forces. This approach would reduce ISR fragmentation, allowing commanders to detect, track, and respond to threats with greater speed and precision. Whether countering adversary submarine movements, grey-zone activities, or long-range maritime threats, a more connected ISR network would enhance decision-making, improve force employment, and reinforce deterrence, ensuring NATO and U.S. maritime forces maintain a strategic advantage in dynamic operational theaters.

However, technology alone is not the answer. Persistent joint training, operational scenario-driven wargames, and multinational staff exchanges will be essential to refining intelligence-sharing processes and breaking down procedural barriers. Regular stress-testing of ISR coordination in realistic threat conditions will enhance interoperability, clarify authorities, and increase confidence across the alliance. By taking these steps, U.S. and NATO maritime forces will build a more unified, resilient, and responsive transatlantic naval force—one that can anticipate, deter, and decisively respond to emerging threats in an increasingly contested maritime security environment.

Maximizing Authorities and Rules of Engagement 

In fast-moving maritime operations, commanders need the ability to act swiftly and in sync with their allies. U.S. and NATO forces operate under different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and authorities, but instead of seeing this as a constraint, there’s an opportunity to leverage these differences to enhance operational agility. A deeper understanding of how each nation’s approval processes work—who can authorize what and when—can reduce delays, increase interoperability, and open the door to more flexible force employment. When commanders operate with shared awareness of authorities, they are better equipped to act decisively and prevent adversaries from exploiting procedural gaps.

Expanding this understanding is a practical step toward greater coordination and combat effectiveness. If commanders know when and how NATO and U.S. assets can operate under each other’s authorities, they can more effectively integrate forces in real time. For example, U.S. and NATO surface and submarine forces could be tasked interchangeably in a crisis, making force posture more dynamic and responsive. Instead of working around bureaucratic seams, commanders could focus on maximizing the collective strength of the alliance to deter and respond to threats with greater speed and cohesion.

To further streamline decision-making, establishing pre-approved Crisis Response Options and real-time coordination cells would allow forces to act immediately when needed. Setting clear engagement triggers across all warfare domains—surface, subsurface, air, cyber, and electronic warfare—would synchronize responses across NATO and U.S. maritime forces, closing decision-making gaps that adversaries might otherwise exploit. Aligning ROE where possible, increasing transparency of authorities, and enabling faster approvals will ensure that U.S. and NATO maritime forces can operate as a unified force, projecting deterrence and strength in an increasingly complex security environment.

Enhancing Operational Resilience

Sustaining maritime operations in the Atlantic and High North is not just about moving fuel, munitions, and supplies—it’s about ensuring forces can stay in the fight when and where they’re needed most. The ability to rapidly resupply ships at sea, repair battle damage, and sustain operations away from fixed infrastructure is what separates an agile, combat-ready force from one that risks being sidelined when it matters most. Wargaming has provided a valuable way to stress-test sustainment strategies, identify weak points before they become real-world problems, and explore new ways to keep fleets operational in contested environments.

A major takeaway from these efforts is the importance of stronger coordination between key sustainment commands like NAVNORTH, NAVEUR, MARCOM, and SFN. In fast-moving operations, small misalignments in logistics planning can lead to big problems. Establishing dedicated logistics coordination cells and integrating sustainment planning more deeply into operational decision-making can help ensure the right resources are available at the right time. The more aligned NATO and U.S. sustainment efforts become, the better prepared forces will be to sustain prolonged operations across the Atlantic.

Another critical piece is expeditionary logistics—the ability to keep ships on station without having to pull back to port for resupply and repairs. While the U.S. has made significant advances in vertical replenishment (VERTREP) and at-sea rearming, many NATO warships still rely on fixed facilities, which limits flexibility. Expanding interoperability in afloat logistics, forward-deploying repair capabilities, and developing mobile resupply facilities will keep ships in the fight longer. Additionally, prepositioning sustainment stockpiles across North America and Europe will help reduce dependence on major ports and ensure forces remain operational regardless of access challenges. Logistics isn’t just a support function—it’s a warfighting necessity. The ability to sustain combat operations anytime, anywhere will be a decisive factor in maintaining maritime superiority in the Atlantic.

Expanding U.S.-NATO Naval Integration for North American Defense

As security dynamics in the Atlantic and High North continue to evolve, there is a growing opportunity to strengthen U.S.-NATO naval integration and expand cooperation in North American defense. Traditionally, NATO’s maritime forces have focused on collective defense under Article 5, while homeland defense responsibilities have remained largely within national command structures. However, as adversaries increase activity across the Atlantic, greater alignment between U.S. and NATO maritime forces can enhance deterrence, improve crisis response, and provide more flexible force employment options.

One way to achieve this is by better integrating NATO maritime forces into existing U.S. defense planning and operations. Coordination among NAVNORTH, MARCOM, and SFN has often been episodic rather than institutionalized, making it more reactive than proactive. By establishing routine collaboration, expanding NATO’s operational footprint in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, and refining joint maritime situational awareness, NATO and U.S. commanders alike can improve force synchronization and enhance maritime domain awareness. This approach would allow for faster response times, increased interoperability, and a stronger deterrent posture in the event of a crisis.

There are several practical steps that could further this integration. Embedding NATO liaison officers within NAVNORTH and NORTHCOM would improve real-time coordination, intelligence sharing, and joint maritime-air defense planning. Additionally, posturing NATO naval and air assets for homeland defense missions in the North Atlantic and Arctic would provide an immediate and credible deterrent while ensuring NATO forces are better aligned with U.S. homeland defense efforts. Expanding NATO’s ISR capabilities—such as maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and early warning systems—into NAVNORTH’s defense networks would significantly strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), reducing strategic surprise and improving early threat detection.

Looking ahead, the current rotation of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) between JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples means that JFC Norfolk lacks dedicated forces assigned during competition, limiting its ability to establish a continuous deterrent presence and provide a rapid response in the Atlantic and High North. Given the operational demands in both European and transatlantic theaters, relying solely on the existing SNMG rotation is insufficient to maintain persistent maritime presence and readiness. To address this, SACEUR should consider establishing an additional SNMG and a dedicated Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) detachment under JFC Norfolk. This would ensure a standing force capable of sustained ASW, surface warfare, and air defense operations in the Western Atlantic and Arctic, reinforcing NATO’s ability to deter aggression and respond swiftly to emerging threats.

Strengthening U.S.-NATO Amphibious Integration

As maritime security threats evolve, U.S. and NATO amphibious forces have a unique opportunity to enhance integration, ensuring they are prepared for rapid employment in contested littorals. NATO fields highly capable amphibious units—including the U.S. Marine Corps, UK Royal Marines, Dutch Korps Mariners, and French, Italian, and Spanish Marine forces—yet their combined employment under NATO command remains a work in progress. Without a standardized framework for command relationships, questions around operational and tactical control can arise, creating opportunities to refine how these forces are assigned, tasked, and employed in competition, crisis, and conflict.

With near-peer competitors and regional actors expanding anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the ability to project power and secure key maritime terrain is becoming more critical. Wargame insights have highlighted how U.S. and NATO amphibious forces could serve as a key element of deterrence, enabling fleet maneuver while limiting adversary freedom of action. At the same time, the current NATO command structure—where Striking Forces NATO (SFN) oversees high-end strike capabilities and MARCOM serves as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC)—presents an opportunity to clarify how amphibious forces integrate into larger NATO maritime operations. Further alignment with Joint Force Commanders in Norfolk, Naples, and Brunssum will ensure these forces are positioned for effective and decisive employment.

To strengthen interoperability and readiness, aligning amphibious operations within a cohesive U.S.-NATO framework will be essential. This includes refining mission requirements across the continuum of competition, crisis, and conflict, as well as integrating these forces into routine joint planning, training, and execution cycles. Regular multinational exercises, wargames, and professional military education programs will reinforce interoperability, build familiarity between U.S. and NATO amphibious units, and enhance their ability to respond rapidly when called upon. By institutionalizing these efforts, NATO’s amphibious forces will be better prepared to operate as a unified, combat-ready force capable of deterring aggression and securing key maritime terrain in crises and conflict.

Way Ahead

Wargaming has long been a powerful tool for refining strategy, testing assumptions, and strengthening operational effectiveness. Over the past several years, we’ve seen firsthand how it can shape real-world planning and decision-making. By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.

Looking ahead, there is an opportunity to build on this momentum by further aligning command structures, intelligence-sharing, sustainment networks, and amphibious operations. As the maritime domain becomes more contested, ensuring seamless coordination between U.S. and NATO forces will be essential for maintaining freedom of movement, deterring aggression, and preparing for high-end conflict. Strengthening transatlantic maritime integration will not only enhance crisis response but also enable a more agile and lethal force, ready to operate across the spectrum of competition and conflict.

To sustain maritime superiority, the focus must remain on proactive planning, persistent training, and continued investment in warfighting capabilities. As adversaries seek to exploit operational seams, U.S. and NATO forces must stay ahead by reinforcing their deterrent posture and refining how they fight together. Through deliberate efforts to streamline command relationships, improve operational integration, and expand warfighting capabilities, the alliance will ensure it is ready—not just to compete, but to prevail in any future conflict.

Dr. Walter Berbrick is a senior military analyst with Netsimco, a Saalex Company, and the Lead Analyst of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa. He served 15 years on the Naval War College’s faculty, leading the research design and analysis for the Trans-Atlantic Maritime Command and Control (TAMC2) wargame series from 2019 to 2024.

Dr. Terence Nicholas is an Assistant Professor in the Wargaming Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He currently serves as the Lead Designer of Euro-Atlantic Wargame Series for Commander, Naval Forces Europe & Africa.

The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government organization. Wargames, including the TAMC2 series described here, are not predictive and do not forecast future events; they serve as independent analytical research events intended to provide insights and inform decision-making.

Featured Image: HMS Prince of Wales and the embarked Air Wing leads NATO maritime forces as part of Joint Warrior 24-1, part of NATO’s Steadfast Defender exercise series. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)

NATO Week

Keeping America Engaged: Three Possibilities for European Navies

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NATO Naval Power Week

By Michael D. Purzycki

Introduction

For the next several years, European security is likely to appear less prominent within United States foreign policy. Even if the U.S. remains militarily present in Europe and the North Atlantic, it may demand some form of financial compensation for doing so, as evidenced by the potential U.S.-Ukraine natural resources deal. Although the increase in defense spending by many NATO members since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a positive development for European security writ large, it will likely be years before European navies are ready to face Russian aggression independently, should the U.S. withdraw its support.

To keep the U.S. engaged in the waters around Europe, European NATO members must find areas of common interest with the U.S. The threat of China to both European and American security interests creates many such opportunities. By monitoring China’s activities in the Arctic, becoming more active in the Indo-Pacific, and buying American, Europeans can maintain a strong military and industrial link to the U.S. even if U.S. military presence in and around Europe shrinks in the near future.

Guarding the Arctic

The Arctic has become an arena for great power competition between the U.S., Russia, and China. China recently declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” and is establishing mining and drilling operations in the region. By collaborating with Russia, China has expanded its economic and military presence in the far north. China launched its first domestically built polar icebreaker in 2019 and its container ships have transited the Arctic Ocean more than 100 times since 2013. In late 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard spotted a joint Chinese-Russian naval patrol within 12 nautical miles of the Alaskan coastline. By drawing attention to China’s presence in the Arctic, either by China itself or China in partnership with Russia, Europe can increase the chances of America looking north.

Throughout the Cold War, the High North was an area of concern for NATO. For decades, surveilling Soviet submarines navigating the GIUK gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) was a critical task for NATO forces. American-built naval systems are already present in NATO forces with a major stake in the Arctic. Both Britain’s Royal Air Force and the Royal Norwegian Air Force use the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, while Germany is beginning to acquire P-8s of its own. As the U.S. begins to operationalize its response to China’s growing Arctic presence, it can look to NATO’s latent, modernized maritime patrol capability to bolster its efforts, one that is perfectly suited to sustain a watchful eye over the High North.

Contributing to Indo-Pacific Security

There are economic and political reasons for Europe to reduce its dependence on China, even if it does not result in a “decoupling” to the extent some have advocated for the U.S. to achieve. Europe has lost numerous manufacturing jobs to China, akin to the “China shock” discussed in America. The Center for European Reform has warned of a second China shock in the near future.

However, the damage done by further manufacturing outsourcing would pale in comparison to that done by outright war. In 2023, then-U.K. Foreign Secretary James Cleverly warned that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would effectively destroy world trade, harming European as well as Pacific Rim nations:

“About half of the world’s container ships pass through these vital waters [the Taiwan Strait] every year, laden with goods bound for Europe and the far corners of the world. Taiwan is a thriving democracy and a crucial link in global supply chains, particularly for advanced semi-conductors.”

In December 2024, Luke Patey, a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, warned European policymakers that “the European Union needs a China contingency,” to prepare for the effects of a Chinese-Taiwan conflict on the availability of such vital products as semiconductors, solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.

It is not out of the realm of possibility that European vessels may find themselves fighting alongside Taiwanese and American ships against the People’s Liberation Army Navy. If Washington prioritizes competition with China for the next several years, European countries willing to share the burden would likely see the U.S. reciprocating in European security affairs. 

How to accomplish this? The playbook is already well established. Several European navies have operated in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. In 2021, the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth carried American and British F-35s through the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific. After striking ISIS targets in the Levant, the bilateral task force participated in Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 with Australian and Japanese forces.

Meanwhile, France, the only country besides the U.S. with a nuclear-powered carrier, recently deployed its flagship Charles de Gaulle to the Pacific for the first time, taking part in the exercise Pacific Steller alongside Japan and the U.S. Italy, though maybe not known as a country with Indo-Pacific interests, deployed its carrier Cavour to the region last year in a trip that included a visit to Japan. Germany too deployed frigates to the Pacific in 2024, asserting the importance of freedom of navigation to China’s disapproval. NATO partners should consider more of the same, by embedding in U.S.-led task forces and operations in the Indo-Pacific to further advance U.S.-European partnerships.

Buying American

Buying U.S. defense products allows Europe to keep the U.S. close. At a time when Europe’s most important ally seems to have grown fickle in its friendship, Europeans may find they have an interest in placing political considerations before strictly military ones.

Take the Constellation class frigate (FFG-62) for example. Norway is considering this design for the replacement for its current frigates, along with British, French, and German bids. If those four European countries desired to ensure an American role in building up NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Arctic Ocean, it may be in their interest to collectively ensure Norway chooses the Constellation class.

To be sure, FFG-62 has issues that might make it a suboptimal pick from a strictly military perspective. The fact that Fincantieri Marinette Marine has announced that the delivery of USS Constellation to the U.S. Navy will be delayed, from 2026 to 2029, must give the Royal Norwegian Navy pause about selecting it. Nevertheless, keeping America involved in North Atlantic maritime security may be worth the downside of Norway not procuring its first choice.

Greece is another nation considering the Constellation class. Since Athens has declined the chance to purchase soon-to-be-decommissioned littoral combat ships from the U.S., the Hellenic Navy choosing FFG-62 despite technological qualms can do significant good for transatlantic relations. Former U.S. Coast Guard cutters are another item European fleets may look at. The U.S. has already sent such vessels as Excess Defense Articles to European nations including Georgia and Greece. Would it be worth European navies purchasing cutters instead, if the incoming money kept Washington’s eyes on the Mediterranean and Black Seas?

A large number of NATO members buying American-designed ships will likely be of particular worry to one influential member of the alliance: France. Arms exports are an economic and defense priority for the French government – all parties involved remember the row caused in 2021 when Australia cancelled its planned purchase of French diesel-electric submarines to build nuclear-powered boats with America and Britain through AUKUS.

How can America and France both sell arms to their own benefit in a way that also ensures a continued American role in NATO at sea? Perhaps with a de facto cartel. Paris and Washington can decide among themselves who will sell systems to a given third country, rather than the two continuing to fiercely compete. The defense industries in both countries will benefit, as will transatlantic security. If World War II-era America was the Arsenal of Democracy, this Franco-American partnership can become a Cartel for Democracy.

Conclusion

European maritime security is in a state it has not been in since the Second World War. The extent to which the U.S. will contribute to peace and stability in the North Atlantic is in flux. To increase the chances of the U.S. continuing to be active in the region, European countries must endeavor to marry their maritime security to the greatest extent possible to that of the U.S. In the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, and in defense industrial policy, Europe has chances to keep America engaged. It must take advantage of these opportunities.

Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked for the United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army.

The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any government organization.

Featured Image: NATO forces in exercise Trident Juncture 21. (NATO photo by WO FRAN C.Valverde)

Europe

On The Decline of European Naval Power: A Conversation with Jeremy Stöhs, Pt. 2

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Read Part One here.

By Roger Hilton

RH: You state that after the end of the Cold War many states had been able to consolidate their militaries despite fiscal restrictions. This all changed in 2007-2008, this groundswell of financial issues, tanking economies, and soaring national debt. You argue that even previous levels of defense spending and the corresponding force structures were unsustainable in many cases. It is evident that we have fairly polarizing periods here. On the one hand we have the reduced defense spending period of the immediate post-Cold War, and then the high defense spending in the latter 2000s, immediate post 9/11 era. Can you help us understand the short and long-term impact that the global financial crisis had on naval procurement?

JS: In the 1990s a lot of states still invested heavily in modernizing their militaries, and you see a real strengthening of naval forces. Just take a look at the Greek Navy; also the French are still spending quite a lot on national defense. The real problem really starts in the 2000s. Purely from a platform-centric point of view, much of the damage to European navies began in the 2000s I would say. You see the decommissioning of numerous vessels and platforms without replacements – the Danish submarine flotilla for example or large parts of the Dutch escort fleet. You have problems with procurement processes, you see this with the German and Spanish submarine programs. This was really exacerbated by the financial crisis, putting procurement projects on hold or canceling them outright. My British colleagues will attest to this, most infamously the cancellation of the British Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft, which left the Brits without any dedicated fixed wing maritime surveillance platform. But that’s just one of many examples.

RH: When it comes to specific examples in your book you describe a bleak picture that in the decline of the 2000s, on top of the financial crisis, it essentially removed some features of European navies, possibly for good. You cite the devastating example of the Dutch, who went from having one of the most capable Cold War fleets to what some observers describe today as a second-rate Navy. Could you elaborate a bit on this example?

JS: I think this is one of the best examples of the decline of European naval power. This also happened before the financial crisis. The Dutch defense studies postulated in 2003 and 2005, they spelled out that the Navy had to find a new balance, and this meant selling six of their frigate to Belgium, Chile, and Portugal. This would leave them with a fleet escort of a total of six frigates. And instead of buying new frigates, they would receive Holland-class OPVs, which while being the “Rolls Royce” of OPVs, don’t have the fighting power of a frigate of course.

And then you have at the same time the earlier 2000s, the fleet of Orion maritime patrol aircraft being sold to Germany, and all that happens prior to the crisis. I think what the crisis then did, including for the Netherlands, is that it significantly impacted training and readiness, and that definitely had long-term effects on naval forces. Another example is the new submarine that should be commissioned will probably be introduced sometime in 2028 or 2030, something like that, and the current submarines will have reached 40 years by then, which is quite a long period of time. So that just shows these long procurement processes and the problems they suffered.

RH: To shift to some encouraging news, despite the tight national purses that affected procurement, what are your thoughts on the FREMM project between France and Italy that was designed to build a multi-purpose frigate? In the book you said the project was deemed as a success, but is still subject to economic limitations. Today with more appetite for spending, is this a concept that can be recreated with success today?

JS:  I like the FREMM frigates not only because they are beautiful ships, both the French and Italian version, and they might also be the U.S. Navy’s next frigate, so that this is a first…but what I find interesting is that this Franco-Italian cooperation project worked relatively well. They included lessons learned from the previous cooperation which was the Horizon project, an air defense destroyer, a trilateral cooperation between the British, the French and the Italians. It ultimately produced only two destroyers for France and Italy, and the British went on to produce their own destroyer, the Daring-class. What they learned is that you don’t have to build an identical ship, but actually can have some similarities and at the end of the day you have ships that are cousins. That really is an example of how corporations in the defense sector can work. But of course the French aren’t procuring nearly as many as they initially planned, and now they’re selling some to Morocco and Egypt. There are other examples but that is one.

RH: On Greek and Turkish maritime capabilities, you established that unlike most European nations, the Hellenic Navy had seen the fewest doctrinal changes. It remained focused on defending its adjacent waters and fulfilling its NATO obligations. At the same time you assert that the naval balance of power in the region had shifted to its traditional regional competitor, Turkey. How do you forecast the competition in the maritime domain playing out between these two ‘allied’ powers?

JS: This was the most interesting case study to me because those were two countries that in the 1990s and 2000s adhered to traditional national defense strategies and did not jump on the power projection bandwagon. You only see a little bit of it in Turkey’s force structure and operations, but Greece is really still adhering to territorial defense, SLOC protection, and it has the fleet for that.

You see a similar trajectory in recent years, both have had shed unnecessary addendums and allowed the older combatants and ships to be decommissioned to more effectively modernize their fleets through this period of the 1990s and 2000s. Both of them actually have larger fleets now than they had in the 1990s, not only in regard to the order of battle, but also more capable fleets relative to other powers.

Greece was of course hit very hard economically and put a number of programs on hold such as its fast attack craft and German submarines. Turkey on the other hand has incrementally been creating a capable domestic defense sector, despite setbacks. They’re really trying to create their own capability in terms of being able to build their own weapon systems, everything from tanks, UAVs, and now up to frigates. They started building licensed, state-of-the-art German submarines. Now they are also building the Spanish-designed TCG Andalou aircraft carrier which is a very interesting development of course for power projection.

But on the other hand, two caveats I want to add here, both of them have challenges they face, and one is of course fiscal for the Greeks. For the Turks, I believe it’s hard to imagine after two consecutive purges in the military so I’m told, that that has not had a negative effect on the Navy. While the current naval officers are loyal to President Erdogan, I would be looking over my shoulder if I were them.

The Turkish Navy also has to keep a close eye on the Russian fleet, which unlike the Baltic in my opinion, is considerably more powerful than it was a couple years ago. It’s a development that is evolutionary rather than revolutionary as long as Turkey remains in NATO.

RH: For the third period you cover, 2014 to the present, post Crimea annexation, we arrive at a juncture for European navies. The annexation of Crimea set off waves of reverberations that are still being felt today. Russia’s annexation caught policymakers by surprise, and in response to bolster their defense, actions taken by NATO and the EU have attempted to address this previous complacency. Compounding matters, as you state, is the proliferation of terrorist attacks in Europe, creating a permanent sense of insecurity. Then enter a wild card – President Trump’s America First nationalist policy and Washington’s rebalancing toward the Indo-Pacific region. When taken together these events have only amplified the sense of uncertainty. Is it a little too late for European naval forces to defend themselves without the full support of the U.S.?

JS: Does the U.S. have an interest in staying engaged in Europe? There is no doubt about it. I think for the foreseeable future, it’s a pipe dream to believe Europeans will gain full strategic autonomy from the U.S. I think that is a buzzword that is being spread in Brussels and throughout Europe. There are several areas in which the European Union wants to become truly autonomous. This includes politically, operationally, and also industrially and technologically autonomous.

And while there is a sense in the globalized world that there is such a sense of technological autonomy, I find it really difficult to believe that there will be operational autonomy, in terms if when push comes to shove and European states are engaged or see a necessity to engage in high-intensity warfare or a military campaign, they will not only need the U.S. they will need other European countries to support them in some way. I don’t see any scenario where that need will be lessened at the operational level, or at the political level. What they need is as much independence as possible, but that does not mean autonomy.

RH: As a product of this tumult you state how closer cooperation between Europe’s armed forces has emerged. Can you discuss some of the future and completed programs, and if this cooperative model is sustainable in the long-term when it comes to naval forces?

JS: What I think is important is that with respect to fiscal austerity, there is a very interesting idea on how European naval forces can deal with times of fiscal austerity. It provides four possibilities on fiscal austerity. First, shortcuts, or settling for less. Next, jointness and working with other military services. Then, multilateral and combined operations in cooperating with other states. And the fourth is leap-frogging or offsetting and using asymmetric technologies. European navies have been doing a bit everything, but their governments have been choosing number one too much, namely settling for less.

They are closing their interoperability gaps, which is an obvious problem of course.  I have to say, we complain a lot, but no alliance has had better interoperability than NATO. There’s been discussion of including Japan and Germany in the Five Eyes agreement. We have a multitude of bilateral and multinational naval cooperation: the Swedish-Finnish efforts, the German-Dutch amphibious forces, the Belgian-Dutch BeNeSam; I could go on. What I would like to see is an equivalent of a NATO AWACS, or an equivalent to the aerial tanker and transport fleet. I thought when the deal didn’t go through with the Mistral-class amphibious assault ships the French were building for the Russians, that could have helped trailblaze this idea of having a ship under the NATO flag with different countries providing the crews and aviation platforms. But from what I heard it was  discussed for about ten minutes and then the idea was laid to rest. But maybe ten years from now we’ll actually see something like that happen.

At the beginning I pointed out that even a land-locked country like Austria can have agency at sea, and Austrian Special Forces were deployed and embarked on a German vessel in an EU operation at sea. If 20 years ago you had suggested that the EU would be conducting naval operations in the Med, and there would be Austrian Special Forces embarked on that vessel, they would have probably thought you were crazy. But that just goes to show what naval forces can do, and that we all can contribute and that sea power is shared.

RH: Coming to the last point here in the third period, in parallel to this cooperation theme, you stress the need for nations to strike a capabilities balance. In search of harmony, how do European navies reconcile investing resources in high-intensity capabilities aimed at deterring conflict with other navies rather than in investing in low-intensity capabilities designed for the maintenance of maritime order?

JS: In general, what I currently see, at least in some circles, is that the pendulum has swung too far in one direction. Yes, I believe naval forces are built for warfighting, that’s their primary mission and function. But people are readily forgetting about all the other things naval forces can do, from constabulary duties, the diplomatic roles, that’s often brushed aside because it’s not as glamorous. I think we have to be careful that we don’t only emphasize that because for the first time naval forces will have to do really everything because the challenges are so great. The range of missions runs the gamut of the intensity spectrum and we can’t just say, well, we’ll do collective defense or anti-submarine warfare and we won’t worry about migration, for example.

What I argued for is that niche specialization is important. It provides small countries that have very limited budgets the ability to add something to the greater whole, to NATO or the EU for example. But that can be taken too far as well or not suffice. What I argue for are baseline capabilities. Rich states such as Germany and the Netherlands can invest in having balanced navies that can conduct a wide range of missions not specialize in niches. However, I think for smaller states that specialization can be dangerous because it can limit possibilities and can make you very dependent on others for aid.

The limit of course is GDP, and whether there is funding for naval forces. For a Latvia or a Slovenia that will be difficult. But what is necessary is prudent thinking about contributing to naval operations. I mentioned earlier Austrian boarding teams that can be deployed on EU missions or the possibility of a small Swedish warship operating off the Horn of Africa.

I would also argue to not make the mistakes of the past. Perhaps as a scholar that didn’t live through the Cold War, it seems to me I see people reverting to an older, more comfortable view. Kaliningrad Oblast is often described by NATO zealots as a seemingly impenetrable fortress that renders all NATO and partner navies in that area sitting ducks. A scholar at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia, Steven Wills, who has a piece on CIMSEC, discussed how the West got Soviet naval strategy entirely wrong in the 1960s and 1970s. I wonder today if we’re prudent enough to get our analysis right.

RH: Let’s return to our initial question. Are European naval forces doomed to impotency, or is reform and renewed power projection possible? How do you rate their chances for success?

JS: I wrote an article recently for The Naval War College Review titled “Into the Abyss” where I argued that by 2014 the situation was quite bleak. The decline was so pronounced in many of the navies and their capabilities were so atrophied that this really called into question their ability to provide credible deterrence. And they were smaller than any time in recent history, they lost capability, and the idea of deploying them in contested environments had almost been forgotten. There was a preoccupation with low-intensity operations, counter-piracy operations, but the basic function of warfighting had been forgotten to a certain extent.

But, at the same time, I see light at the end of the tunnel. I know for a lot of people who want to see change happen quickly and see budgets rise very quickly. It bears remembering that in the 1990s they were using vessels designed in the 80s and 70s, so it will take time for the changes to take place and we have to be very smart in the risks we assume in defense spending. But I do see light at the end of the tunnel what European naval forces are concerned.

RH: This positivity you’re sharing with us is certainly an exercise in patience and prudent decision-making in defense spending. Looking to the future, do you have any last strategic takeaways that we should be conscious of?

JS: For anyone who is interested in European naval matters it is important to scale down your expectations. European navies and their militaries are sometimes seen as collectively powerful because Europe as a whole is more populous than the United States and its cumulative GDP is also higher. The United States and Europe are similar, so it seems. And that’s a very inviting idea, but it just does not work because Europe has different states with very different interests.

It’s important to remember that the individual defense budgets of the respective states are but a fraction of that of the United States. But what is more important for the smallish navies is that they still play an important role in the freedom of the seas and good order at seas, and also in military operations. There is a necessity for far greater research on European naval forces, especially of their development over the past decades. There is very little comprehensive research on what they have been doing, what their policies were, what they changed what the force structures were, and so on. So, I am just trying to contribute to that a bit.

Finally, as a strategic takeaway, without giving away too much of what’s in my book, I believe that in an age of great power competition it is very likely that the 21st century will be one of continued American naval power despite all the naysayers. I believe it will also be an era of rising (or already risen) Asian naval power. The question is really to what degree it will involve European sea power and naval power.

I encourage readers to reach out to us at ISPK and the Center for Maritime Strategy and Security to discuss these pressing questions. We believe shared knowledge is empowerment.

RH: On that note Jeremy, thank you for taking the time for helping us to discuss this pressing but under-the-radar issue. If our readers would like to follow up on Jeremy’s work, please check out his book The Decline of European Naval Forces. You can also look for the Routledge handbook of Naval Strategy and Forces, edited by Sebastian Bruns and Joachim Krause, which is an indispensible resource. For more info on the book and other podcasts, don’t forget to visit https://www.kielseapowerseries.com/en/ and follow us on Twitter at @SeapowerSeries for more updates.

Jeremy Stöhs is a security and defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy & Security as well as a fellow at the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda & Security Studies (ACIPSS).

Roger Hilton is the defence and Security stream manager at GLOBSEC, a global think-tank based in Bratislava, Slovakia  as well as a research fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI).

Featured Image: Norwegian Sea, Nov 7. 2018. TRIDENT JUNCTURE 18 PHOTEX. (NATO Photo by Wo Fran C. Valverde)