By Raj Mohabeer, IOC and Kiruja Micheni, Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment, International Maritime Organization
Introduction
The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and Red Sea region features a diverse and evolving array of maritime security architectures and initiatives. From international treaties to strategic partnerships and operational centres, these frameworks aim to counter maritime threats and enhance governance. However, questions remain regarding their effectiveness, efficiency, coordination and sustainability. This article examines the region’s key maritime security mechanisms—focusing in particular on the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC/JA) and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA)—and explores opportunities to strengthen collaboration among them.
As a vital maritime corridor linking major global trade routes, the WIO and Red Sea region holds significant strategic importance. Yet, it faces a range of persistent and interlinked maritime threats—including piracy and armed robbery against ships, illicit trafficking, irregular migration, and illegal fishing, pollution (including deliberate)—exacerbated by jurisdictional gaps and weak coordination among enforcement agencies.
Several international and regional initiatives have been undertaken to counter piracy and enhance maritime security in the WIO, primarily through capacity- and capability-building efforts. Key international efforts include the formation of the Combined Maritime Forces (CTF) in 2001, Operation ATALANTA (launched in 2008), the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in January 2009, and the formation of Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (SHADE) shortly thereafter. Regional initiatives include the Indian Ocean Rim Association’s 2013 designation of maritime security as one of its six priority areas, the establishment of the Colombo Security Conclave in 2011, and India’s launch of the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative in 2015, which also led to the creation of the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region.
There is a need to recognize the wide range of fora and think tanks that contribute to understanding and dialogue on maritime security issues in the Western Indian Ocean, including the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue, the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, the Global Coast Guard Forum, Ocean Beyond Piracy (now closed), One Earth Future, Stable Seas, the Institute of Strategic Studies, African think tanks, the University of Pretoria, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
Although the WIO region welcomed the above initiatives, it advocates for a sustained and indigenous regional mechanism. It is in this context that this article focusses and examines the region’s key maritime security mechanisms and explores opportunities to strengthen collaboration among them. The article focuses on the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC/JA) and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA).
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) was launched in 2009 with the support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a direct response to the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Recognizing the urgent need for collective action, 20 of the 21 eligible countries from the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden signed on at its inception. The DCoC established a collaborative framework to address piracy and armed robbery at sea, structured around four foundational pillars: regional training, national legislation, information sharing, and capacity building.
As maritime threats in the region evolved, it became clear that piracy was only one aspect of a broader security challenge. This led to the adoption of the Jeddah Amendment in 2017, which expanded the DCoC to address a wider range of transnational maritime crimes, including human trafficking, illicit smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and environmental violations. This shift transformed the DCoC from a piracy-focused initiative into a more comprehensive and flexible maritime security framework.
One of the DCoC’s most valuable contributions lies in its role as a platform for political engagement and regional policy coordination. It promotes alignment among participating states on maritime security strategies, encourages mutual support, and strengthens collective capacity by facilitating joint training programs, exercises, and information-sharing. Building on this foundation, the DCoC is developing a Regional Maritime Security Strategy to provide a unified framework that harmonizes national and regional efforts, strengthens coordination with international partners, and enhances long-term sustainability and impact.
The Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA)
While the DCoC provides the strategic and policy-oriented framework for regional maritime security, the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA) plays a complementary role by building the operational and institutional capacities needed to put those strategies into action. The RMSA takes a holistic approach to maritime security. This multi-dimensional framework is designed to empower regional states to detect, deter, and respond to a broad range of illicit maritime activities and crimes.
Among RMSA’s most significant achievements are the creation of two vital regional institutions that have dramatically improved maritime domain awareness (MDA) and coordination:
- The Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar: Serving as an intelligence-gathering and analysis hub, the RMIFC collects maritime data from diverse sources, processes it to generate real-time situational awareness, and shares threat information with partner states for the identification of vessels of interest. This enables early warning and proactive threat mitigation across the region.
- The Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles: Functioning as the region’s operational nerve center, the RCOC enables quick response to illicit maritime threats by the pooling of the region’s expensive air and surface assets and coordinates joint responses to maritime security incidents. It facilitates multinational cooperation on law enforcement operations such as patrols, interdictions, and crisis management, ensuring swift and synchronized action against maritime crimes.
It is important to recognize the need for sustained inter-regional dialogue and collaboration. The focus of the RMSA is on the abnormal movement of vessels, which is not limited to the WIO but extends worldwide. Therefore, the threats and risks either affect the region directly or spread beyond it. Most maritime traffic is international in nature, and all types of vessels could be involved in illicit maritime activities. For example, there is evidence of fishing vessels being used to traffic arms, drugs, or humans. According to TRAFFIC, illegal wildlife trade involves the trafficking of several protected species from the region to distant markets. This is why the RMSA emphasizes partnerships with other regional and international entities.
Except for one, all RMSA members are also signatories to the DCoC/JA. These countries cannot afford to duplicate institutions and tools at either the national or regional levels. Following the DCoC High-Level Meetings in June and November 2022, the signatory states resolved to develop operational collaboration with the RMFIC and RCOC within the regional Information Sharing Network. This collaboration aims to enhance information sharing and coordination at sea, strengthening the region’s ability to respond appropriately to threats and combat illicit maritime activities. It will improve Maritime Situational Awareness, Maritime Threat Awareness, and ensure that necessary steps are taken to apprehend and prosecute offenders, thereby addressing the issue of catch-and-release practices. So far, the RMSA has significantly bolstered the WIO’s capacity to address maritime threats in a coordinated, resilient, and sustainable manner.
The Red Sea Council
Formally known as the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea Council was established in January 2020. Its members are all signatories to the DCoC. Though not exclusively a maritime security agreement, the Council provides a political and strategic framework for addressing transnational threats and fostering regional dialogue. Once fully operational, the Council has the potential to foster strong partnerships with the DCoC in the Red Sea area—like the role the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) plays in the WIO—particularly in coordinating regional political support for maritime security initiatives.
Existing Important Initiatives
Initiatives such as SHADE, CMF, and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) contribute to improving maritime security and the implementation of the broader objectives of the DCoC, with the RMSA centers (RMIFC and RCOC) serving as operational hubs for countries within their respective areas. The RMSA seeks to develop operational collaboration with these initiatives, which would significantly contribute to enhancing regional maritime capabilities.
Additionally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) plays a crucial role in supporting the implementation of the DCoC/JA through political engagement, regional integration, and the harmonization of maritime security strategies among its member states in the Horn of Africa.
The African Union (AU) also has an important role, particularly through its Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, which provides a continental framework for maritime governance and security by promoting coordination and coherence among regional maritime security mechanisms.
The Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA), an informal forum that carries forward the work of the CGPCS provides a complementary platform that enables international maritime stakeholders, including the industry and non-governmental organizations, to coordinate regional efforts through transparency and high-level information sharing.
Complementary Strengths and Synergies Between DCoC and RMSA
Although the DCoC/JA and the RMSA were developed independently and under separate institutional frameworks, their convergence is both natural and necessary due to their complementary roles in strengthening maritime governance in the WIO. While the DCoC functions as a strategic and normative framework—anchored in political commitment, policy coherence, and regional dialogue—the RMSA translates this strategic vision into operational reality through institutional support, legal reforms, and technical capacity-building.
This complementary relationship exemplifies a balanced approach to maritime security. As maritime security scholar Dr. Christian Bueger has argued, effective governance at sea requires a combination of top-down strategic frameworks and bottom-up operational mechanisms.1 In this context, the DCoC ensures a shared regional vision and high-level commitment among member states, while the RMSA provides the practical infrastructure, such as regional coordination centers and data-sharing systems, to implement this vision on the ground.
Legal and security expert Dr. Ian Ralby notes that maritime threats are inherently transnational, transcending jurisdictional boundaries and exploiting gaps in regional enforcement.2 He emphasizes that sustainable maritime security must be built on collaborative frameworks that go beyond narrow national interests. The interaction between the DCoC and RMSA encapsulates this ideal by fostering intergovernmental cooperation, harmonizing policies, and promoting joint operational responses to common threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and maritime trafficking.
Dr. Carina Bruwer of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa highlights the extensive challenges posed by transnational maritime crimes across Africa’s coastal regions.3 She stresses the need for robust regional cooperation and the development of institutional capacities to effectively address these threats. Her analysis aligns with the collaborative objectives of initiatives like the DCoC/JA and the RMSA, underscoring the importance of integrating strategic frameworks with operational capabilities.
Together, DCoC and RMSA represent more than a sum of their parts—they form a layered maritime security architecture that aligns political vision with operational execution. This integrated model bridges the often-wide gap between intention and implementation, ensuring that regional dialogue translates into tangible maritime governance outcomes.
Common DCoC and RMSA Challenges and Limitations
While the DCoC and the RMSA have made significant strides in strengthening maritime governance in the WIO, their full potential remains constrained by several enduring challenges. One of the most critical obstacles is the irregular political commitment and varying capacities across the region. It is hoped that the work of the newly established DCoC Working Group 3 will encourage more regional states to actively engage in collective efforts for actions at sea in the wider region of interest.
In addition to national disparities, coordination among the numerous stakeholders involved in these initiatives is often difficult. The complexity of engaging national governments, regional actors, international development partners, and private sector entities frequently leads to overlapping mandates and fragmented decision-making. Bureaucratic bottlenecks, compounded by limited absorption capacity, differing strategic priorities, and competition for resources, can delay or dilute the effectiveness of otherwise promising programs. These gaps not only hinder policy alignment but also lead to duplication of efforts and inefficiencies in operational responses. Compounding these governance and coordination challenges is the rapidly evolving nature of maritime threats. Criminal syndicates operating in the region are becoming increasingly sophisticated, exploiting weak jurisdictions and advancing their tactics faster than regulatory bodies can adapt. Piracy, illicit trafficking, arms smuggling, and IUU fishing are no longer isolated activities; they are interconnected elements of complex transnational criminal networks.
Addressing these evolving and adaptive threats requires a proactive, coordinated regional response. This demands sustained investment in modern surveillance and enforcement technologies, alongside continuous capacity building. Cutting-edge tools—such as satellite imagery, artificial intelligence (AI) for threat prediction, and big data analytics for tracking maritime activity—hold great promise for enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA). However, effective deployment and maintenance of these tools require substantial technical expertise and financial resources, which are unevenly distributed across the region.
Despite these challenges, there are several pathways through which the DCoC and RMSA can work together to strengthen and further enhance regional maritime security. These include national institutional and structural improvements, a coordinated multi-agency approach at the national level, a shift towards cost-effective investment focusing on human resource development, leveraging technology, fostering improved and inclusive partnerships, and advancing political advocacy and diplomacy.
Conclusion
The foundation of addressing maritime security challenges remains the national maritime capability, which requires sustained and collaborative support from the international community. The absorption capacity of states must be carefully considered.
The collaborative efforts of the DCoC and RMSA have significantly enhanced the maritime security landscape in the WIO. By integrating strategic policy frameworks with operational implementation capacities, these initiatives address the region’s complex maritime threats in a holistic and adaptive manner. The synergy between the DCoC/JA and RMSA demonstrates the power of regional cooperation grounded in shared responsibility, mutual benefit, and respect for local ownership.
Achieving robust maritime security in the WIO and Red Sea requires halting the proliferation of frameworks; rather, it demands effective coordination among existing mechanisms and the international community. The DCoC/JA provides a comprehensive framework for cooperation, information sharing, legal harmonization, and capacity building. The RMSA, through the IOC, complements this by supporting practical implementation in the WIO region, particularly through regional centers and operational support. CGIMA can serve as an effective platform for advocating improved coordination of international efforts.
To extend these benefits to the Red Sea, the DCoC/JA should actively encourage engagement with the Red Sea Council. Just as the IOC has supported implementation in the WIO, a strengthened partnership with the Red Sea Council could foster similar arrangements in the northern part of the DCoC region. Anchoring such cooperation in political will and sustained capacity-building will be essential to building a resilient, inclusive, and regionally owned maritime security architecture. This should be further strengthened through the ongoing DCoC initiative to develop the regional maritime security strategy.
Mr. Raj Mohabeer has been the Officer in Charge at the General Secretariat of the Indian Ocean Commission since 2000. Prior to this period, he had been working as an economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development of the Republic of Mauritius. His portfolio includes economic cooperation, trade, regional integration and infrastructure, maritime security and blue economy – areas of intervention that span to countries beyond the IOC Member States and region. Mr. Mohabeer has been promoting Blue Economy and has spearheaded the development of a Maritime Security Architecture for the Western Indian Ocean under the MASE Programme, actively advocating for the participation of the international community to join in. He has also been the head of the Secretariat for the Contact Group Against Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia.
Mr. Kiruja Micheni, currently works with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as Project Manager for the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment and has been with the project for the last 12 years. In his role, he oversees the implementation of the Revised Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and illicit maritime activity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden Area. Mr. Micheni started his career in the Kenyan Navy and has extensive experience in maritime security. He has also worked as a security expert for international NGOs and the corporate sector. He is an alumnus of the University of Wales (Cardiff University) in the UK and holds a master’s degree in International Transport.
Endnotes
1. Christian Bueger, “A Glue that Withstands Heat? The Promises and Perils of Maritime Domain Awareness,” in Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, ed. Edward R. Lucas, Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie and Felix Falck Jensen (IOS Press, 2020), 235-245, https://bueger.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Bueger-2020-The-promises-and-perils-of-MDA.pdf
2. Ian Ralby, “Cooperative Security to Counter Cooperative Criminals,” African Security Analysis Report. Defence IQ, 2017, 4-7, https://eco-cdn.iqpc.com/gfiles/_jci6qafrican_security_analysis_-_2017.pdf
3. Carina Bruwer, “Africa’s Ocean of Organised Crime,” Institute for Security Studies, 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-ocean-of-organised-crime
References
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https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-ocean-of-organised-crime
Bueger, Christian. “A Glue that Withstands Heat? The Promises and Perils of Maritime Domain Awareness,” in Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, ed. Edward R. Lucas, Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie and Felix Falck Jensen. IOS Press, 2020. https://bueger.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Bueger-2020-The-promises-and-perils-of-MDA.pdf
Bueger, Christian. “Who Secures the Western Indian Ocean? The Need for Strategic Dialogue.” Center for Maritime Strategy, September 19, 2024.
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Featured Image: DCoC High Level Meeting in Cape Town, RSA October 24-26, 2023. (DCoC photo)