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NATO Week

French Maritime Strategy – Carrier-Led and Indo-Pacific Focused

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NATO Naval Power Week

By David Scott

French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.

The French Carrier Strike Group included various components:

  • FS Charles de Gaulle: nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
  • FS Forbin: air defense destroyer,
  • FS Provence: anti-submarine frigate,
  • FS Alsace: air defense frigate
  • FS Duguay-Trouin: nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
  • FS Jacque Chevallier: logistics support ship
  • Loire-class offshore support and assistance vessel

The air wing included 22 Rafale Ms, two E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and three helicopters. The CSG, commanded by Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard, left Toulon on November 28.

The planned operation had been denounced in the Chinese state media, in the Global Times on November 4, under the headline “French aircraft carrier’s planned deployment panders to NATO’s expansion into Asia-Pacific.”

Initially the French CSG was deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, where France, like Italy, has concerns over Russian basing in Libya. It was initially accompanied for escort duties in the Mediterranean by the Italian frigate ITS Virginio Fasan. The CSG then transited the Suez Canal on December 24 and on April 10. The Houthis did not interfere in the CSG’s transit on its way to and from the Indian Ocean. 

Strategic Interests

France is a resident state in the Indo-Pacific, with around 1.5 million French citizens inhabiting its overseas territories of Mayotte, La Reunion, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. These parts of France are located south of the Equator, spread across the southern reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and are key to France having the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), with 90 percent of it located in the Indo-Pacific. Freedom of navigation and Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) are wider concerns for France in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, under threat from Houthis in the Red Sea and China in the South China Sea. Maritime cooperation and maritime partnerships with other countries has been a particular feature of French strategy. France’s President led from the top in visits to Australia and New Caledonia in 2018 where Macron talked of an “Indo-Pacific axis” (l’axe Indo-Pacific) amongst China-concerned states; amongst which “France is a great power (une grande puissance) of the Indo-Pacific.”

French maritime strategy for the Indo-Pacific has focused around three planks. First are its maritime holdings in the southern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally Reunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia), and the base in Djibouti. Second are deployments from metropolitan France. Third are varied strategic partnerships around the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific (principally India and Japan) region. The latter two were very much on show with the deployment of its Carrier Strike Group for Operation Clemenceau.

Maritime interests require maritime assets to defend and maintain them. Here the French Navy is the only European navy, along with the British Royal Navy, that has a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and an aircraft carrier.

January 2025: Sailors from the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike celebrate the new year while deployed in the Indian Ocean as part of Mission CLEMENCEAU 25. (French Navy photo)

Carrier Capability

The nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle is the flagship of the French Navy. The ship, commissioned in 2001, is catapult-equipped for its three squadrons of Dassault Rafale M warplanes, which also allows for operations by U.S. Super Hornets. Its full load displacement is 42,500 tons, surpassing France’s earlier and conventionally-powered aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau and the Foch, which served from 1961 to 2000 and had a full load displacement of 32,780 tons.

With the successful construction of the Charles de Gaulle, there was initial consideration during the 2000s of building a second aircraft carrier, to be called the Richelieu, in collaboration with U.K. designs being used for the construction of HMS Queen Elizabeth. However, that co-development route was abandoned in 2008, and the 2013 French Defense White Paper likewise abandoned the pursuit of a second French carrier. In retrospect, might this have been a strategic error in force design?

Instead, attention eventually turned to a long-term replacement of the Charles De Gaulle. Macron’s announcement in 2020 was for another nuclear-powered New Generation Aircraft Carrier (Porte-avions de nouvelle generation, or PA-NG) which leaves France as a one-carrier navy. Nevertheless, this represents a jump in capacity, a super-carrier of 75,000 tons displacement, that was also longer and wider than the Charles de Gaulle. The main construction and assembly is envisaged between 2032-2035 with initial sea trials on nuclear power in early 2036. If this timetable can be met, then the ship is scheduled to commission in 2038, ready for the de-commissioning of the Charles De Gaulle.

Work has already started on the new French super-carrier. The commitment to the program was demonstrated by the placing of contracts for long lead items in April 2024. This included elements of the nuclear propulsion system and preparatory infrastructure work at the Chantiers de l’Atlantique shipyard. General Atomics landed a $41.6 million contract in December 2024 to design cutting-edge Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for the envisaged carrier.

With regard to general French maritime strategy the Charles de Gaulle is a particularly powerful aircraft carrier, its nuclear propulsion nature unmatched in Europe where the U.K. (HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales), and Italian aircraft carriers (ITS Cavour) remain conventionally powered. Only the U.S. has nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, 11 in all: CVN-68 to CVN-78, made up of 10 Nimitz-class carriers and one Gerald R. Ford-class carrier.

However, France remains hampered by its single status aircraft carrier, powerful though it is. China, India, and the U.K. have two aircraft carriers, which enables one to remain active while the other is refitted and maintained. The Charles de Gaulle’s mid-life refit between February 2017 and September 2018 removed her from operations for 18-months. Given this limitation, the French Navy’s decision to deploy this sole carrier to the Indo-Pacific for five months is all the more significant.

Aims of Operation Clemenceau

The operation was announced in November 2024. Rear Admiral Jacques Mallard announced that the deployment had “4 main objectives:”

(1) First of all, contribute to national and European operations in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean. These operations are meant to strengthen the maritime security in the area.

(2) To develop interoperability with partners and allies in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

(3) To promote through this deployment a free, open and stable Indo Pacific with our regional partners in the frame of international law.

(4) Finally, to contribute to the protection of our population and of our interests in the Indo Pacific where France is a coastal nation, and it must exercise its sovereignty on all its overseas territories.

In going across the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific various exercises were carried out with various partners and allies in the northern reaches of the Indo-Pacific, in effect a focus on objectives 3 and 4. However, in actually not deploying to French possessions in the southern reaches, the CSG did not particularly meet objective 4, where local forces continued to maintain French presence.

French Navy aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle sets sail for Operation Clemenceau on Feb. 21 2021. (French Navy photo)

Activities of Operation Clemenceau

Operations with India were in two phases. The first was after friendly port call at Goa, the CSG carried out varied exercises off Kochi on January 9. Tactical evolution maneuvers were carried out by the CSG with INS Mormugao, during which the fleet replenishment tanker FNS Jacques Chevallier refueled the Indian vessel; while Rafale fighters from the Charles de Gaulle carried out joint anti-aircraft drills with Indian Sukhoi and Jaguar fighters.

Operations in the Indonesia Sea commenced with a historic port call at Jakarta, the first ever by a French carrier. This was followed by the 5th iteration of the multinational exercise La Perouse, from January 16-24, in which the French CSG led maritime security and cooperation drills with the Indian, Australian, Canadian, U.K. and U.S. navies. In addition to these established partners and allies, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in La Perouse for the first time.

La Perouse was divided into three components, in the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits locations reflecting the French mission statement that the exercise was designed and located “to secure strategic maritime lines.” The Malacca Strait phase ran from Thursday to Sunday, with the Forbin drilling first with RMN corvette KD Lekir (FSG26), training ship KD Gagah Samudera (271), an RMN fast combat boat, and two Royal Malaysian F/A-18D Hornet fighters in the Malacca Strait. These drills included a simulated local air-defense exercise, a surface firing exercise, and an advance interdiction and boarding exercise. The Forbin then conducted drills with the Singapore littoral mission vessel RSS Independence in the Singapore Strait, which joins the Malacca Strait’s southern exit. The Jacques Chevalier also pulled into Singapore for a logistical stop. In the Sunda Strait phase Indonesia provided base support for two French Navy Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) participating in La Perouse, which had arrived on January 11, after a four-day trip from Lann-Bihoue naval air base in France with a logistics stopover in India.

French Navy destroyer Forbin departing from her homeport of Toulon ahead of the Clemenceau 25 deployment. (Photo by Hervé Dermoune)

The largest part of the exercise, the Lombok Strait phase, involved the CSG drilling with established partners. Commanding officers from Australia’s destroyer HMAS Hobart, the Canadian frigate HMCS Ottawa, India’s destroyer INS Mumbai, the U.K. offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey and the U.S. Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah gathered aboard the carrier Charles De Gaulle on Saturday for a pre-exercise meeting. This six-state format was yet another permutation within the flexible Indo-Pacific strategic geometry that has evolved in response to China. Further spin-offs from the Carrier Strike Group were the friendly port call of the Forbin and Provence to Bali from January 28 to February 3, and the Jacque Chevallier to Darwin on February 4.

The next event for Operation Clemenceau was the CSG participation in Exercise Pacific Steller 2025, a Multi-Large Deck Event (MLDE) hosted by the French Navy in the Philippine Sea from February 8-18. For this first iteration, 14 units from the three participating nations deployed in the Philippine Sea. The French CSG was joined by the Japanese Self Defense Force’s JS Kaga helicopter carrier and the destroyer JS Akizuki, and by the American aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the destroyers USS Princeton, USS Sterett, and USS William P. Lawrence, and one P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.

PHILIPPINE SEA (Feb. 12, 2025) Ships and aircraft from the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (VINCSG) and Charles De Gaulle French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) travel in formation in the Philippine Sea with ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) during Pacific Steller 2025 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Pablo Chavez)

This tri-carrier exercise was visually striking, and the first of its kind between the three states. The high-level training drills included anti-submarine warfare, air defense, cross-decking aircraft, and replenishment at sea exercises. Cross-deck operations included F/A-18F Super Hornets and a CMV-22B Osprey from Carl Vinson landing on and taking off from Charles De Gaulle. In turn, Charles De Gaulle’s embarked Rafale fighters landed on and launched from Carl Vinson. The Jacques Chevalier performed a replenishment at sea for the Kaga, Princeton, and Sterret.

This high-powered trilateral carrier exercise was criticized in the Chinese State media, on February 9 in the Global Times, under the headline “Steller 2025 exercise shows Philippine attempts to expand foreign military presence in SCS.” The North Korean state-state Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) also denounced the trilateral exercise as involving “foreign invasion forces.” France responded by sending the frigate Alsace and oiler Jacque Chevallier from the CSG to Okinawa on February 13 to help in monitoring operations in support of U.N. sanctions on North Korea. One of the Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft dispatched for La Perouse were also sent on to Okinawa.

The next stop for the CSG was the South China Sea, where the CSG paid a port call to Subic Bay (Manila) on February 23. Its significance was three-fold. Firstly, this was the first ever appearance in the Philippines by a French aircraft carrier. Secondly, this visit was preceded by the largest bilateral drill between the two sides. Thirdly, the exercising with the Philippine Navy took place in the South China Sea waters off Western Luzon in the Philippine EEZ. The exercising involved the French CSG, the Philippine flagship BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Gregorio del Pilar, as well as French Rafale and Philippine FA-50PH fighter jets. Their exercise focused on aerial and anti-submarine warfare. This was a deliberate signal to Beijing and an equally measure of support to the Philippines which had faced rising Chinese pressure over the South China Sea during 2024. French trilateral exercising with the US and the Philippines in the South China Sea the previous year had been denounced in China.

The Provence was detached from the French CSG to carry out a week-long visit to Ho Chi-Minh City from March 1-7. Port call visits were combined with joint maritime search and rescue missions off the Vietnamese coast.

The final substantive operation for Operation Clemenceau, following friendly port calls at Singapore and Colombo, was the bilateral Varuna exercise with India from March 19-22. This involved dual carrier operations between the French Charles de Gaulle CSG and the India INS Vikrant CSG. This second round of exercising with India was an indication of the particularly strong maritime links developing between France and India.

Local Assets

Part of French maritime strategy is to base units in its island territories, and from there deploy around the Indo-Pacific. This is a complement to the periodic more powerful deployments from the French metropolitan waters, witnessed with the CSG between November 2024 and March 2025.

FNS Floreal was dispatched for CTF-150 operation in the Arabian Sea, for Eagle Claw One and Eagle Claw Two in November and December 2024, alongside Pakistan’s PNS Zulfiquar. Even as the CSG was operating in the Western Pacific in Pacific Steller, the French frigate FNS Vendemiaire (based at New Caledonia) docked in Denpasar, Bali, on February 14 as part of its participation in the multilateral exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy from February 14-17. Spring 2025 witnessed the Prairial visiting various places in the South Pacific, including the Cook Islands on February 27, whose government welcomed the visit as “strengthening regional security efforts” and demonstrating “Pacific solidarity.” The context for this is Chinese penetration of South Pacific island states. In a tidy local division of labor, the 2-yearly Southern Cross exercise hosted by France at Wallis and Futuna Islands from April 22 to May 3 brought together forces from Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and New Zealand. Colonel Frederic Puchois, Chief of the Joint Staff in New Caledonia announced its purpose was to test French “capacity to project forces” from New Caledonia.

Political Underpinnings

 The CSG deployment was not only complemented by ongoing use of local French assets, but also given political support from the highest level during 2025. In January Macron announced at the Ambassadors’ Conference that the Indo-Pacific “is obviously a priority for us.” Ministers also maintained this support.

India enjoys a very high profile for France, already indicated by the two rounds of exercises held by the CSG with India, in January and March. Strategic convergence was reflected in the 7th India France Maritime Cooperation Dialogue held in New Delhi on January 14. It was co-chaired by Shri Pavan Kapoor, Deputy National Security Advisor and Alice Rufo, Director General for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry for the Armed Forces. Their Joint Declaration recorded their common interest in freedom of navigation and need to “support free and secure access to sea lanes of communication.”

On January 28, the French Carrier Strike Group made a port call to Jakarta, to lead the La Perouse exercise. Three days later, on January 31, the French Minister of the Armed Forces, Sebastien Lecornu, flew into Jakarta to meet with President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and Foreign Minister Sugiono. In the Philippines, the French Joint Commander for Asia Pacific, Rear Admiral Guillaume Pinget, met with Lt. Gen. Jimmy Larida, Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City on February 13, to push forward a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The French Foreign Minister’s visit Jean-Noel Barrot’s visit to Indonesia on March 26 brought their signing of the Indo-Pacific Port Security Project. Finally, President Macron’s Keynote Address at the IIIS Shangri La Dialogue on 30 May, made during his state visit to Indonesia, re-emphasized French interest and commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

The French CSG deployment fits into this pattern of growing European maritime involvement in the Indo-Pacific during the past few years. Indeed, the 2023 U.K.-France Summit had agreed on “the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence in the Indo-Pacific.” In this vein, the Italian CSG deployment in the second half of 2024 was followed by French CSG deployment in the first half of 2025 and immediately followed by U.K. deployment in the second half of 2025. The French CSG group can be seen as a “force multiplier” in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the event of a U.S.-China confrontation. 

Uncertainties

It remains to be seen how far the downturn in U.S.-Europe cooperation witnessed in splits over Ukraine arising in Spring 2025 will affect European juggling of resources between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. With Macron’s address on March 5 identifying Russia as a “threat to France and to Europe,” might France now focus on deploying in European waters rather than across the Indo-Pacific? In light of growing concerns about Russia and signals of American retrenchment from Europe, there may be a shift towards greater French focus on the Mediterranean, given Russian influence in Libya, and up to the Black Sea, in light of Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine. However, and perhaps crucially, France’s resident sovereignty and associated EEZ give France a continuing anchor in the Indo-Pacific, and interests to maintain, that other European actors do not have.

Dr. David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on Indo-Pacific maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].

Featured Image: April 25, 2024 – The French Navy carrier Charles de Gaulle off the coast of Toulon. (NATO photo)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Jewel of the Indo-Pacific: The Quad as a Maritime Security Diamond

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By LT Matt Little, U.S. Navy

On August 26th, ships, aircraft, and personnel from Australia, India, Japan, and the United States commenced, for the second year in a row, a combined naval exercise to demonstrate “cooperative planning, training, and employment of advanced warfare tactics.”1 The exercise, Malabar 2021, marks a significant step toward increased maritime cooperation between the four members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, which has emerged as a promising but unproven partnership for regional security in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad nations are united by their agreement on the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific but have not yet defined their mutual role in the region. Lingering ambiguity surrounding the Quad’s intended function breeds doubt about its potential for success and prompts dismissal by critics of the current, informal relationship.2

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first described a vision for the Quad as a “security diamond” meant “to safeguard the maritime commons” of the Indo-Pacific.3 How might the current leaders of the Quad nations defy the critics and bring Abe’s vision to fruition? Maritime security is an innately multinational interest with challenges such as unregulated fishing, smuggling, and piracy that occur in international waters and traverse borders between states.4 The Quad, comprised of four democratic nations committed to the rule of law, is well-suited to muster a collective response to these illicit activities. The United States, for its part, would be wise to embrace such cooperation. U.S. policymakers concede that America’s military advantage in the region is eroding and that allies and partners are crucial to achieving U.S. policy objectives.5 The combined national powers of the Quad provide an opportunity to exert the military and law enforcement presence necessary to respond to security threats while actively pursuing increased cooperation with rising regional powers. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue should focus the combined diplomatic, information, military, and economic power of its member nations to promote maritime security in the Indo-Pacific by fostering and strengthening rising partners in the region while coordinating to detect, analyze, and interdict illicit maritime activity.

Invest in ASEAN

The Quad’s main line of effort in the tense Indo-Pacific region should be diplomacy, and the primary avenues of approach should be relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Quad provides a vehicle for its members to engage ASEAN on common goals as one body, rather than as separate parties. ASEAN’s own published “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” echoes many of the Quad’s priorities for the region, indicating that engagement would likely be worthwhile. The ASEAN nations aspire to play a central role in promoting maritime security by combating transnational crimes such as “trafficking in persons or of illicit drugs, sea piracy, and armed robbery against ships” and by cooperating for “sustainable management of marine resources.”6 The Quad, in turn, has publicly committed to ASEAN centrality in the region and voiced support for ASEAN’s “Outlook.” Such agreement between the two multinational partnerships is a starting point for increased diplomatic efforts and consensus-building.

Another diplomatic component of maritime security in which the Quad nations are highly capable is the realm of humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR). The Quad could expand its soft power in the region with little political resistance by incorporating HADR into its diplomatic agenda.7 By continually promoting itself as a force for good in the region, the Quad will retain the necessary diplomatic capital to enforce maritime law and stave off allegations that its purpose is as a military alliance for great power competition. As China’s presence and power in the region continue to grow it will be increasingly important for the Quad to remain an attractive, non-threatening partner for ASEAN cooperation. HADR will likely prove a key component in sustaining goodwill among both ASEAN political leaders and the people of Southeast Asia.  

After establishing firm diplomatic ties with ASEAN nations and other cooperative partners, the Quad should coordinate economic investments to help those partners strengthen their own maritime security efforts. Several Quad nations already have existing economic programs meant to address such security challenges. The Maritime Security Initiative of the United States, for example, is a $425 million program that provides grants to ASEAN nations for technologies such as automatic identification systems; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; data collection capacity; and secure communications.8 The promise of the Quad is the ability to direct the economic efforts of all four nations toward a single purpose to maximize effectiveness. By acting as one body the Quad can dedicate more resources towards providing ASEAN nations with the technologies and capabilities required to make them effective maritime security partners. 

In addition to assisting ASEAN nations with their maritime security capabilities, the Quad could improve economic security in the region by responding to violations of ASEAN economic exclusion zones (EEZs). For example, as signatories to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Quad nations would share an interest in conducting boarding and inspection of fishing vessels to ensure compliance with international rules.9  Enforcing the rule of law in EEZs would help ensure that ASEAN nations have the right to protect and benefit from their own natural resources. Improving their economic situation would provide ASEAN nations with more financial resources to dedicate towards maritime security initiatives. 

Enforce Maritime Order

While diplomatic and economic efforts should largely be spent fostering new partnerships for the Quad, the information and military levers of power should be directed toward improving the Quad’s ability to respond to current issues in the region. One of the major challenges to fostering maritime security in the vast Indo-Pacific is maintaining continuous maritime domain awareness (MDA). The individual Quad nations already possess many of the resources and doctrine required to contribute to a robust MDA picture. In the area of maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, for example, all four nations field comparable assets. The United States, Australia, and India all operate the P-8 Poseidon, and while Japan chose to build the Kawasaki P-1, it shares many standard operating procedures and tactics with the United States and Australia from many years of operating the P-3 Orion.10 The Quad’s immediate focus in the information realm should be combining the MDA efforts of its assets into a shared Common Operational Picture (COP) that provides all four nations with situational awareness of maritime security concerns.

The primary hurdles for the development of a shared COP are limits on information sharing. The Quad should build upon recently signed agreements such as the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) between the U.S. and India and the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement (TISA) between the U.S., Australia, and Japan to craft a quadrilateral agreement that allows for universal sharing of maritime intelligence.11,12  With information sharing architecture in place, the Quad should next form a maritime intelligence fusion center where analysts from all four nations can assimilate information and coordinate military or law enforcement responses to illicit maritime activity. Ideally, this fusion center would be developed in a central, strategic location such as India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca.13

In addition to instituting formal information sharing and analysis, the Quad should take several steps to improve its military response to maritime security issues. First should be organizing and conducting ongoing training for proficiency and interoperability, both among its own nations and alongside willing participants from ASEAN. Most of the training should focus on law enforcement and response, which would be less politically sensitive than regular drilling of warfighting tactics and would address the most common concerns in the region, such as smuggling, piracy, human trafficking, and illegal fishing.14 The Quad could even consider involving Chinese authorities in law enforcement training as a way to foster cooperation on mutual concerns.

After a period of successful training, the next step for the Quad should be to create an on-call force comprised of Quad naval and coast guard assets that would share responsibility for responding to illicit activity across the region.15 The four nations would coordinate the placement of maritime assets across the region to minimize response time to any located threats. These assets could then respond to information gathered by the Quad maritime fusion center or reports from ASEAN nations concerning incursions of their sovereignty. By working together to detect, analyze, track, and respond to illicit maritime activity, the Quad could grow into a functional maritime security enforcement organization that would promote a rules-based order across the Indo-Pacific.

No NATO-of-the-Pacific?

More aggressive proponents of the Quad might argue that the group’s maritime security efforts should not be directed solely at partner-building and maritime domain awareness but rather towards deterring China’s malign actions in the region, such as the militarization of the South China Sea. But while recasting the Quad as a NATO-of-the-Pacific may seem like the arrangement’s logical strategic destiny, proceeding too quickly towards open opposition to China would inevitably break the partnership. The greatest challenge for the Quad will be keeping the strategic priorities of the four nations aligned in the face of inevitable pressure from the PRC.16  All four Quad nations are deeply entangled with China economically and, as democracies, would face the difficult task of messaging the economic consequences resulting from a military standoff. Forcing the Quad too quickly into an anti-China alliance would likely produce political pressures leading to its demise. Additionally, the various interests of ASEAN nations align with both China and the Quad. If the Quad were solely aimed at great-power competition with a rising China, ASEAN would not support it.17 Lacking cooperation with ASEAN, the Quad would have little influence or legitimacy in the region.

The Quad’s maritime security efforts should focus on politically insensitive missions that foster cooperation and interoperability and could later be scaled to meet deteriorating strategic conditions. If China continues its record of coercion and pressure in the region, the governments of Canberra, Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington will all recalibrate their threat perceptions, and may very well see the value in intensifying their military cooperation.18 In the meantime, the Quad can still take some steps to counter Chinese aggression. For example, the recent participation of the Quad nations in Malabar 2021 should be repeated. An annual exercise that brings together the capital assets of all four nations fosters high-end interoperability and builds the combined capabilities of the Quad militaries, thereby improving deterrence in the region by demonstrating an increased capacity for response.19

In conclusion, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue should focus the combined diplomatic, information, military, and economic power of its four member nations to promote maritime security in the Indo-Pacific by fostering and strengthening rising partners in the region while coordinating to detect, analyze, and interdict illicit maritime activity. The Quad is the premiere U.S. partnership in the region for addressing maritime security, a critical component of the U.S. vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. The U.S. will not achieve its objectives in the region if Quad efforts towards maritime security are misdirected or ineffective. Diplomacy and economic measures should focus on improving the willingness and capability of ASEAN nations to join the Quad in pursuing their mutual goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Quad information and military capabilities should be combined and coordinated to improve maritime domain awareness and provide a response mechanism to address illicit maritime activity. These measures would all be politically viable and would preclude a looming China from driving a wedge between the partners. U.S policy recognizes the Indo-Pacific as “the single most consequential region for America’s future.”21 If the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue embraces its potential for fostering maritime security, America’s future looks much brighter.

Lieutenant Matt Little, USN, is a Naval Flight Officer who most recently served as the P-3 NATOPS Program Manager aboard Patrol Squadron Thirty (VP-30). His views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of any U.S. government department or agency. 

Endnotes

  1. Task Force 71 Public Affairs. “Australia, India, Japan, U.S. Kick Off Exercise Malabar 2021.” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command News. 26 August 2021. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2748502/australia-india-japan-us-kick-off-exercise-malabar-2021/.
  2. Jaishankar, Dhruva. “The Real Significance of the Quad.” The Strategist. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 24 October 2018. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-real-significance-of-the-quad/.
  3. Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” Project Syndicate. 27 December 2012. https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe.
  4. Percy, Sarah. “Maritime Crime in the Indian Ocean: The Role of the Quad.” Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific. The Centre of Gravity Series – Debating the Quad. March 2018. P. 24. http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-03/cog_39_web_-_debating_the_quad.pdf.
  5. S. Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” June 2019. P. 16. https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-798267-dt-content-rid-3941012_1/courses/T.SHARED.FSP.TSDM/tsdm_fsp_19_20/bb_reads_19_20/strat_4_4.pdf.
  6. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” 23 June 2019. P. 3. https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.
  7. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Australia-India-Japan-United States ‘Quad’ Consultations.” Media Release. 4 November 2019. https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/australia-india-japan-united-states-quad-consultations.
  8. Smith, Jeff M. “The Quad 2.0: A Foundation for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The Heritage Foundation Asian Studies Center, Backgrounder No. 3481. 6 July 2020. P. 7. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-07/BG3481.pdf.
  9. Hornung, Jeffrey W. “The Potential for the Quadrilateral” The RAND Blog. 22 February 2018. https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/the-potential-of-the-quadrilateral.html.
  10. “The Potential for the Quadrilateral.”
  11. Cheng, Dean. “The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for the Indo-Pacific Quad Countries.” The Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder No. 3392. 6 March 2019. P. 8. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/BG3392.pdf
  12. Australian Government, Department of Defence. “Australia, Japan, U.S. Sign Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement.” Media Release. 28 October 2016. https://news.defence.gov.au/media/media-releases/australia-japan-us-sign-trilateral-information-sharing-arrangement.
  13. Panda, Ankit, “What the Recently Concluded US-India COMCASA Means.” The Diplomat. 9 September 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/what-the-recently-concluded-us-india-comcasa-means/.
  14. “The Quad 2.0: A Foundation for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” P. 21.
  15. “The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for the Indo-Pacific Quad Countries.” P. 9.
  16. “The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for the Indo-Pacific Quad Countries.” P. 8.
  17. Shearer, Andrew. “Quad Redux: A New Agenda for Asia’s Maritime Democracies.” The Interpreter. 10 November 2017. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-redux-new-agenda-asia-maritime-democracies.
  18. Saha, Premesha. “The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: Why ASEAN Remains Cautious.” Observer Research Foundation. 26 February 2018. https://www.orfonline.org/research/asean-quad/
  19. Graham, Euan. “The Quad Deserves Its Second Chance.” Australian National University College of Asia and the Pacific. The Centre of Gravity Series – Debating the Quad. March 2018. 7. http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-03/cog_39_web_-_debating_the_quad.pdf
  20. “Quad Redux: A New Agenda for Asia’s Maritime Democracies.”
  21. S. Department of Defense. “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.” P. 1.

Featured Image: Leaders of the Quad countries meet virtually in March 2021. (Olivier Douliery/AFP/Getty Images)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The Porcupine in No Man’s Sea: Arming Taiwan for Sea Denial

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By Collin Fox

Precision munitions have been sinking warships for the better part of a century, but never before have they been so capable, so widely proliferated, or benefited so much from omniscient surveillance and precise targeting. These convergent factors have propelled modern sea combat in a violently stagnant direction that strongly favors the defensive. A transit through contested waters in the Western Pacific would draw effective fire like a casual stroll through no-man’s land on the Western Front, circa 1916. Now, as then, tactical forces must stay invisible or out of range to stay alive and combat effective, lurking to deploy their own withering fires against emergent targets.

After years of bemoaning the impact of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) on its own power projection paradigm, the United States military is belatedly adapting the same methods with its own forces, while overlooking the geopolitically unique contributions that certain allies and partners can bring to the fight. The factors that have made sea denial easier, sea control harder, and contested power projection a real challenge apply to virtually all potential belligerents – including China and Taiwan. The United States should not simply rely on its own conventional military forces to deter Chinese aggression in the Pacific, but should also start major military foreign assistance to Taiwan and so transform the island into a prickly fortress of sea denial.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen reviews a Republic of China Marine Corps battalion in Kaohsiung in July 2020. (Photo via Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China)

Omnipresent Weapons, Omniscient Surveillance

A degrading security environment and the convergence of accessible technologies have democratized precision strike. The notable trends seen during 2020’s Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also apply at sea; even lesser powers like Australia, Iran, Pakistan, Serbia, Taiwan, and Turkey are now producing their own anti-ship missiles. The great powers are going a step further, with China deploying “carrier killer” ballistic missiles and the United States converting land attack cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and air defense weapons into long-range ship-killers.

The improvements in the intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting cycle are even more impactful than these growing arsenals. Satellite constellations produce optical, infrared, and radar-generated imagery of every non-polar square meter on the planet several times per day. When combined with other sources and then distilled through increasingly capable artificial intelligence algorithms, this data can pinpoint most naval surface forces. The title of a recent USNI article encapsulated the change: “From Battleship to Chess.” Hiding is ever-harder, finding is ever-easier.

The reality of tactical omniscience applies to all major surface vessels, and catalyzes long-range precision weapons to create a massive maritime no-man’s land. To be seen is to be targeted, and, more than likely, killed.

Keeping Below the Trenchline

Prevailing in this future battle hinges on keeping forces alive, supplied, connected, and tactically relevant within a thousand-mile no-man’s land. Each service’s operational concept tackles this challenge through the same basic approach of survival through networked dispersion.

Both the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and the Army’s Multi-Domain Transformation concepts would disperse missile-equipped forces on islands around China, creating unsinkable and hard-to-find fire bases that could persistently hold Chinese forces at risk. The Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment concept would likewise bounce platforms between airfields, “diluting the amount of firepower that [enemies] can put down on any one of those targets.” The Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept would leverage the inherent mobility and firepower of naval vessels to similarly frustrate enemy targeting.

Each service’s distributed concept would still incur significant risk—stationing offensive fires on foreign soil demands dangerously uncertain political assent from each host nation, while the Air Force would be hard-pressed to maintain enough persistent and timely fires within a distant and contested environment. The Navy’s existing surface platforms might bring the assured access, persistence, and mass that the other services lack, but would nevertheless remain more exposed to enemy targeting and fires. Aside from service-specific risks, each of these disaggregated concepts rests on the dangerously flawed assumption of assured communications. In sum, victory is hardly assured and defeat is possible.

The net uncertainty of American overmatch erodes conventional deterrence against China, which increases the risk of miscalculation, escalation, and conflict. The United States should zoom out to reframe the strategic problem, rather just fixating on tactical and operational solutions.

Building a Better Porcupine, or Subsidized Buck-Passing

The conventional problem framing for defending Taiwan casts the deterrent value of American forces as the essential guarantor of regional stability. As the balance of power continues to shift, this binary framing—either China can be deterred by American power, or it can’t— has produced strongly divergent policy proposals. Richard Haass and David Sacks argued that an unambiguous security guarantee for Taiwan would restore deterrence and so keep the peace; Charles Glaser advocated “letting go of Taiwan” to mitigate the decreasingly justifiable risk of a major war with China. Like other proposals, both frame the problem too tightly – through the basic paradigm of American military power. 

The Lowy Institute’s insightful study takes a more nuanced and Australian perspective on the problem. It skips the false choice between doubling down and retrenchment, advocating instead that the “United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor.” The logic is sound:

“If Taiwan acquires, over roughly the next five years, large numbers of additional anti-ship missiles, more extensive ground-based air defence capabilities, smart mines, better trained and more effective reserve forces, a significantly bolstered capacity for offensive cyber warfare, a large suite of unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities able to hit coastal targets on the mainland, it will continually increase the price China will have to pay to win a war.”

With help, Taiwan could deny China the sea and air control it requires to take the island, while also imposing significant costs on the mainland. Thousands of anti-ship missiles and sea mines would reinforce the stopping power of water, while dispersed air defense systems would help deter or attrite Chinese airpower. The United States should help Taiwan become a better porcupine by subsidizing and directing a new arsenal of democracy.

A delegation from the American Institute in Taiwan with Republic of China naval officers in Kaohsiung, August 20, 2019. (Photo via AIT)

This approach recalls the effective grand strategy that first Britain and then the United States executed as offshore balancers through the 19th and 20th centuries. Offshore balancing is not mere isolationism, retrenchment, or simple buck-passing. When a rising power threatens the regional balance, along with the offshore balancer’s interests, a savvy offshore balancer first puts money and arms on the scale to restore balance through allies, partners, and proxies. For insular great powers like the United States, this initial option of external balancing, or subsidized buck passing, represents a far better option than joining every war on the Eurasian Rimlands. Whenever this subsidized buck passing proves insufficient, though, the offshore balancer has the option, though not the obligation, to enter the conflict with military force against a weakened enemy and so restore the balance of power.

The key to both external balancing and buck-passing against a competitor is that the ally needs to stay in the fight, at least for a while. Britain’s buck-passing to France in the late 1930s did little to help Britain after France’s rapid and calamitous defeat. Offshore balancers should subsidize and strengthen their allies and partners so they can deter, defeat, or at least bleed their mutual foes, buying time and buying down the risk of rapid defeat.

Simply “letting go of Taiwan” would be an unforced error for the United States; any grand bargain that China might offer to encourage appeasement over Taiwan would have no more credibility or durability than the breached Sino-British Joint Declaration concerning Hong Kong. Letting go of Taiwan would unilaterally cede strategic terrain and advantage to China, allowing it to sidestep the potentially ruinous and deterrent costs that a subsidized defense would impose.

Gifts Come with Strings

Taiwan has not received significant military foreign assistance since the United States shifted recognition to Beijing in 1979, and so has a long history of buying American military hardware with its own funds. This cash-and-carry arrangement has allowed it to choose prestige platforms like M-1 tanks and F-16 fighters that better support anachronistic fantasies of retaking the mainland than a realistic defense of the island.

On the other hand, security assistance and security cooperation funds come with focused caveats that seek to build specific capabilities of mutual importance. These funds include Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants under Department of State authorities, and Building Partner Capacity and other authorities under the Department of Defense.

Congress could include Taiwan in one or more of these appropriations while creating structured incentives aimed at both Taiwanese and Chinese policy choices. For Taiwan, FMF appropriations above a certain base level could be contingent on Taiwan’s defense reforms and funding levels, or come in the form of matching funds for specific capabilities, such as those ideal for sea denial. Provocative Chinese actions, such as air and sea incursions over the past year, could also trigger additional FMF funding. If each Chinese incursion essentially bought another anti-ship missile for Taiwan, Beijing might not be so casual about the practice.

Republic of China sailors walk by the corvette Tuo Chiang (Photo via AFP/Sam Yeh)

For context, the United States subsidizes Israel’s defense with $3.3 billion per year, which is a bit less than the annual operating costs for two Armored Brigade Combat Teams. Funding Taiwan’s security to a similar or greater level would create a fearsome A2/AD challenge for China, while also reducing plausible American costs and risks for a Taiwan contingency scenario. It would certainly provide better warfighting value than two armored brigades in a maritime theater. This level of assistance would buy greater access, influence, and amicable leverage to pursue American strategic interests in both defense and non-defense areas, such as chip supply chains.

China would certainly protest this security funding, just as it protests existing weapons sales, but these specific investments would constrain China’s escalation options. Arming Taiwan to the teeth with A2/AD weaponry could effectively and quickly deter China through denial without the escalation and entrapment risks that would come with aggressive proposals to base American forces in Taiwan.

The Limits of Power Projection

Notable critics have argued that Taiwan is simply indefensible, asserting that a “Chinese attack would be shock and awe with Chinese characteristics, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket artillery, drones, and probably thousands of aircraft. There would be decapitation, disruption of Taiwan’s air force and navy in their bases, targeting of U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa.” To be sure, China could batter Taiwan from across the 100-mile strait, but would this “shock and awe with Chinese characteristics” compel Taiwan’s rapid capitulation or even prepare the battlespace for a successful amphibious assault?

Every comparison is fraught, but China would be hard-pressed to match the intensity of fires that American forces once directed at Okinawa – an island 1/30th the size of Taiwan and 400 miles distant, but sharing its mountainous geology. Despite a full week of hellish pre-invasion bombardment from battleships and attack aircraft, the island’s entrenched Japanese defenders not only survived this “the typhoon of steel and bombs,” but then emerged to fight another three months in the longest and bloodiest battle of the Pacific theater. “Shock and awe” only goes so far – particularly when it can be reciprocated.

Technological progress since the Battle of Okinawa has also not alleviated the fundamental difficulty of taking well-defended terrain or targeting elusive defenders. Indeed, the American military’s frustration in hunting for SCUD missiles in the Iraqi desert, for military vehicles in Kosovo, and for Taliban fighters in Afghan caves simply reflects the limits of airpower – even with functional or complete air supremacy. These limits also apply to China, which would have no less difficulty in finding, fixing, discriminating, tracking, targeting, and neutralizing the thousands of mobile anti-ship, anti-air, and strike missile launchers hiding amongst many more decoys, and all scattered through the jungles, mountains, caves, and cities of Taiwan.

Buying Time, Buying Options

Heavily reinforcing Taiwan through focused security subsidies while maintaining a policy of strategic ambiguity would maintain conventional deterrence through denial against China. This approach would also greatly reduce the risk of a fait accompli, thereby giving American political leadership time to discover the best outcome for its strategic ambiguity: to rally support at home and abroad, to pressure China through a variety of means, and to enter combat at a time, place, and manner of its own choosing – or even to forego the conflict entirely.

These investments to harden Taiwan would buy time on the order of months and so enable slower, de-escalatory strategies like offshore control while also preserving more aggressive options. On the other hand, Taiwan might only be able to hold out for weeks under a plausible status quo scenario. In such a case, the United States would either risk major escalation by immediately executing a rapid but confrontational approach like JAM-GC, or watch Taiwan collapse from the sidelines.

The United States can make wise investments to pursue its own strategic interests, frustrate Chinese hegemony, and save a threatened democracy in the process. Taiwan needs focused U.S. support to substantially grow its sea denial capabilities quickly. Congress should update legislation and appropriate funds to that end.

Commander (select) Collin Fox, U.S. Navy, is a Foreign Area Officer serving as a military advisor with the Department of State. He is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and the Chilean Naval War College. The views presented are his alone and do not necessarily represent the views of Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the Department of the Navy.

Featured Image: Taiwanese sailors at Kaohsiung’s Zuoying naval base in 2018. (Photo via Tyrone Siu/Reuters)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Mind the Gap: German Security Policy in the Indo-Pacific Between Aspiration and Reality

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By Michael Paul and Göran Swistek

Introduction

With the Indo-Pacific Guidelines published in August 2020, the German government has taken a clear position for a geographical area that is characterized by the multidimensional competition between the West, led by the United States, and China. The Indo-Pacific region is rightly perceived as the trade and economic engine of a globally interconnected and mutually interdependent market. In particular, the security policy aspects outlined in these recent guidelines, along with Germany’s interests in the region and some prospective measures to support these interests have fueled high expectations amongst partners and Indo-Pacific Rim nations for a visible and strong German commitment.

Individual German government representatives have presented the deployment of the frigate BAYERN in the second half of 2021 as a first performance test of Germany’s positioning. As the planning for the frigate’s deployment gains concrete shape, the high degree of caution exercised by the German government in implementing the guidelines is becoming manifest. The German government is trying to avoid taking a clear position in the security policy competition with China. Irrespective of the claims formulated in the Guidelines, Berlin also seems to play its foreign policy feel-good role as mediator and balancer of the most diverse poles in the Indo-Pacific rather than advocate a rules-based international order. German partners in the region increasingly perceive this gap with justifiable criticism.

The Security Policy aspirations of the German Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific

The publication of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines by the German Federal Government in August 2020 has generated a great deal of attention among many partners in the Asian and South-East Asian region. For some, this is associated with the perception and hope that Germany will show more presence in line with its economic importance as a ‘global player,’ and will make a greater contribution to maintain the regional order and stabilize the region.1 The Indo-Pacific – as an area of profound geostrategic, political, and economic interests – has become the focus of public debate and political strategy papers, especially within the last decade.

The multidimensional competition between China and Indo-Pacific Rim nations has spurred this interest. The competition has an economic, technological, systemic and, not to be neglected, a security policy dimension. Owing to the region’s numerous security challenges, Germany has proceeded with great caution over the recent years. Individual measures have mainly been directed at supporting and training local police forces and other civilian security organizations, or contributing to reconstruction after humanitarian and environmental disasters. Apart from providing humanitarian aid after the tsunami in Banda Aceh (2004/2005) and, most recently, individual contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, the German armed forces have not been present in the region for the last two decades. Yet, this Indo-Pacific region, with all its challenges, is of particular geostrategic importance for many nations – including for Germany.

This predominantly maritime region is one of the largest economic hubs and is home to the largest share of global maritime trade by far. The South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait sit at the center of the Indo-Pacific geography – both cartographically and economically – at the transition from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Almost one third of the international trade in goods is shipped2 through these straits every year. These trade flows are not only indispensable prerequisites for a functioning and flourishing global economy, but they can also pose a threat to the maritime environment, the security of coasts as well as port cities and their populations in the event of a disruption or disaster at sea. Moreover, access to the sea and its resources – including fossil deposits (oil and gas), minerals, and fish – is increasingly contested. Finally, there is a causal relationship between trade and prosperity; trade requires secure and stable trade routes to be fully developed. Prosperity is hence directly dependent on security. Germany’s way of life and economic prosperity are largely dependent on secure sea routes, and this is particularly true of the Indo-Pacific. The share of Germany’s trade in goods with the countries of the Indo-Pacific, measured in terms of total volume, amounts to about 20 per cent.3

The potential threats in the region are multi-layered: In addition to the often overarching strategic, economic, and systemic rivalry between the US and China, there are three nuclear powers in the Indo-Pacific (China, India, Pakistan) plus North Korea as a de-facto nuclear power whose intentions are especially difficult to calculate. This fragile constellation is made even more precarious by unresolved border disputes, internal and interstate conflicts, regionally and globally active terrorist organizations, piracy, organized crime, and the effects of natural disasters and migration movements. The latter aspects in particular, which tend to be summed up as non-traditional security threats, are high on the security policy agenda of the Indo-Pacific Rim nations.

The broad spectrum of security threats is in obvious contradiction with the importance of the Indo-Pacific for global flows of goods. In response to this security situation and as a perceptible implementation of the guidelines, the Federal Government intends to expand German engagement with the region in the future. It intends to intensify security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, depending on the context, with individual states or organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and with actors who also have interests in the region. This can take place both unilaterally and within the framework of the EU, NATO, or the United Nations (UN).

In terms of content, Germany wants to be engaged in the following areas: Arms control, non-proliferation, cyber security, humanitarian and disaster relief, combating piracy and terrorism, conflict management and prevention, including the preservation of the rule-based order and the enforcement of international legal norms such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The instruments that the German government would like to use to these ends range from expanding and deepening cooperation in the region, to civilian and military diplomacy, to military presence in the context of exercises or other forms of on-site presence.

The BAYERN frigate as a symbol of the operationalization of the guidelines

For almost two years now, the German Navy has been planning to send a ship into the Indo-Pacific region. The deployment of the frigate HAMBURG planned for 2020 had to be cancelled at short notice in favor of the German contribution to the EU-led Operation IRINI off the coast of Libya. In her first policy guideline speech as Minister of Defense on November 7, 2019, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer formulated the associated intent that the Federal Republic would like to set an example vis-à-vis its partners, Germany cannot simply stand at the sidelines and watch but rather intends to contribute to the protection of the international order4. At the same time, the participation of German forces and units in the EU’s Operation Atalanta off of the Horn of Africa was only sporadically exercised by maritime patrols due to their maintenance availability. The navy has now temporarily suspended this deployment with units in the operation and will also withdraw its supporting logistical presence from Djibouti as of May 2021. The mandate for this operation has been extended by the German Parliament for the time being, but the navy has no units available for a permanent presence. Despite Djibouti’s pivotal geostrategic location, situated between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, at the gateway to Africa, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Arabian Peninsula, the location no longer be available for use as a possible logistics and base in support of regional developments. A temporary participation remains possible when German warships pass through this maritime region.

In her second policy guideline speech a year later, on 17 November 2020, the Defense Minister held out the prospect of sending a frigate in 2021 and linked its deployment directly to the requirements of the recently issued Indo-Pacific Guidelines: “We will fly the flag for our values, interests and partners.”5 At the beginning of March 2021, the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defense then published concrete details on the upcoming tour of the frigate BAYERN. Starting in August, the frigate is scheduled to embark on a six-month journey, conducting more than a dozen official port visits between the Horn of Africa, Australia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. In line with the guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, the task for the ship is initially to show presence in the region and deepen diplomatic relations, including official receptions on board. The German Defense Minister therefore formulates the mission of the frigate BAYERN primarily as a symbol that will show the German solidarity and interest in the region6. In addition, various exercises and drills with naval units of the host states, e.g. in Japan, as well as a short-term participation in Operation Atalanta are planned. The functional cause of the German deployment is to highlight the cooperation with the democracies in the region and to prove the German engagement in the security dialogues on the ground.7 The operational culmination of the tour is a three-week participation in the UN sanctions measures against North Korea. In this respect, the deployment of the frigate fulfils a mission that can be directly derived from the guidelines.

The German frigate Bayern (EUNAVOR photo)

In contrast, the German government and the Armed Forces are much more attentive in their relations with China. Beijing’s behavior towards regional neighbors is not in line with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing is making disputed territorial claims to the Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and, beyond that, to most of the South China Sea – with the claimed territory also including the sovereign Republic of Taiwan. The International Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on 12 July 2016 that Beijing’s claims did not comply with the Law of the Sea Convention and were therefore invalid.8

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense avoids conflict-prone sea areas when planning the details and route of the German warship. The frigate BAYERN will therefore not sail through the Taiwan Strait, but will bypass Taiwan on a longer route to the east. Similarly, in the South and East China Seas, the territories claimed by the People’s Republic of China will be bypassed and the frigate will move along the main international traffic and trade routes. Based on the time and distance factors for the tour of the German Warship, there will also be no interaction with the UK led carrier strike group assembled around the HMS Queen Elizabeth. The carrier strike group will start its deployment to the Indo-Pacific in May 2021 and intends to sail as far as to the Japanese Islands as well. Like the German frigate, it will bypass the Taiwan Strait. But unlike the German plans for its warship, the carrier strike group with its Dutch, US, and temporary Australian participating9 units is planning to conduct a Freedom of Navigation transit through the South Chinese Sea.10

Conclusion: Disappointed expectations

The presence of the BAYERN frigate is a first visible symbol of German interests in the Indo-Pacific, but it does not support the freedom of navigation called for in the Indo-Pacific Guidelines and its underpinning in international law through appropriate navigation in these free and open international sea lanes. It was precisely this contribution to international law and regional order that some Pacific Rim nations states had hoped for from Germany as a prominent representative of the EU canon of values.11 This made governments in the region all the more surprised about Germany’s announcement that it would also conduct a port call in China as part of the tour. On completion of its participation at the UN sanctions measures against North Korea the frigate BAYERN will sail through the East China Sea and conduct an official diplomatic port visit to Shanghai.

Since the initial announcement of the details for the deployment of the frigate BAYERN in March 2021, the German Minister of Defense repeatedly stated that the Freedom of Navigation aspect and the embedding in multilateral cooperation are key elements of this journey.12 The lack of cooperation with the UK-led carrier strike group invites speculation: Was it ignored or neglected for a certain reason, or simply missed in the planning process? Based on the publicly available information and announcements of the official German government agencies, the details of the tour have never been purposely altered since its publication to avoid any interaction with ships around the HMS Queen Elizabeth, as recently stated by some analysts.13 The more likely possibility is that the German Ministry of Defense never even considered any cooperation with the carrier strike group from the beginning, as such a combined naval force would send too strong signal for the German appearance in the Indo-Pacific.

Germany likes to present itself as a global player in foreign economic policy, but in foreign and security policy it hides behind limited capabilities as a middle power. This neither helps its partners in the Indo-Pacific, nor does it correspond to the often declared willingness to assume more responsibility. The BAYERN deployment plots a steady and cautious course to continued German reluctance.

Dr. Michael Paul is a Senior Fellow and Commander Goeran Swistek is a Visiting Fellow in the International Security Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Endnotes

1. The Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi expressed his expectations during the virtual Asia tour of the German Defense Minister in autumn and winter 2020 in a round of talks on 17 December 2020, hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. See, among others, Ryall, Julian, Japan calls on Germany to send warship to East Asia, Deutsche Welle, 18 December 2020, on the Internet at: https://www.dw.com/en/japan-germany-china-defense-challenges/a-55985940, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

2. The data was taken from the publications of the China Power Project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On the Internet at: https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. Last viewed: 03.05.2021.

3. The Federal Government/Foreign Office: Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific. Available online at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380500/33f978a9d4f511942c241eb4602086c1/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien–1–data.pdf, last viewed: 13.01.2021.

4. Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, First Policy Address by the Minister of Defense: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/rede-der-ministerin-an-der-universitaet-der-bundeswehr-muenchen-146670, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

5. Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, Second Policy Address by the Minister of Defense, Translation into English by the Authors, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/zweite-grundsatzrede-verteidigungsministerin-akk-4482110, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

6. Internationale Politik, Interview with Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Das Deutschland führen soll, macht viele Angst, in: Internationale Politik, 28 April 2021, on the Internet: https://internationalepolitik.de/de/dass-deutschland-fuehren-soll-macht-vielen-angst, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

7. Ibid.

8. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), PCA Case Nº 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between The Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. Award, 12.7.2016.

9. Tillett, Andrew, Australian navy to join UK carrier in regional show of strength, in: Australian Financial Review, 11. Feb 2021, in the internet: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/australian-navy-to-join-uk-carrier-in-regional-show-of-strength-20210210-p57150, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

10. UK Defence Journal, British Carrier Strike Group to sail through South China Sea, in the internet: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-carrier-strike-group-to-sail-through-south-china-sea/, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

11. Cf. Michael Paul, “Europe and the South China Sea: challenges, constraints and options”, in: Sebastian Biba and Reinhard Wolf (eds.), Europe in an Era of Growing Sino-American Competition. Coping with an Unstable Triangle, London and New York: Routledge, 2021, pp. 92-106.

12. See also Interview with the German Minister of Defense, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, in the internet: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/verteidigungsministerin-akk-interview-multilateralismus-5049504, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

13. Kundnani, Hans & Tsuruoka, Michito, Germany’s Indo-Pacific frigate may send unclear message, in the internet: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/germanys-indo-pacific-frigate-may-send-unclear-message, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

Featured Image: The German naval ship BAYERN sets course for the Horn of Africa in 2011. The BAYERN led the European task force for the anti-pirate operation “Atalanta” for four months. Photo: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) 07/18/2011