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African Maritime Forces Summit Week

Diversifying Threats to Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean Region 

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African Maritime Forces Week

By Captain Harifidy A. Alex Ralaiarivony, Director of Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) 

Introduction: The Strategic Importance and Threat Landscape of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) Region 

The WIO region serves as an essential gateway linking Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East, occupying a central position in the world’s economic and strategic balance. This criticality is underscored by the significant maritime traffic transiting through or operating within the region, including major routes and chokepoints like the Red Sea, Bab-El-Mandeb Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz. This latter alone sees the passage of 20.9 million barrels of crude oil and 130 ships daily, highlighting the region’s importance for global energy exports.1

The year 2024 demonstrated a notable intensification in the complexity and diversity of threats to maritime security in this vital area. While traditional concerns such as illicit trafficking (drugs, arms, human beings) and illegal fishing persist, new challenges, particularly the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and a re-emergence of maritime piracy, demanded significant attention. The RMIFC, through its fundamental missions of collecting and disseminating critical maritime information, actively participated in regional operations to respond to these challenges. 

The overall number of maritime security events recorded within the RMIFC’s area of interest has shown a steady increase over the past eight years, from 640 events in 2017 to 1145 events in 2024.2

Key elements contributing to the RMIFC’s ability to address these events include the expansion of its information exchange processes and efforts to build and maintain information sharing networks. The regional maritime security architecture, comprising regional (RMIFC and Regional Centre for Operational Co-ordination [RCOC]) and national centers and liaison officers, interacts with international communities and benefits from technical support and cooperation. Building on the foundation of the Program for the Promotion of Maritime Security (MASE) (2010-2023), which enhanced maritime security and created an enabling environment for economic development, the current EU-funded Safe Seas Africa Program (SSA) (signed July 2024) aims to consolidate and expand these achievements by strengthening the regional architecture, capacities of information centers, operational coordination, and national centers.3 The RMIFC’s main objectives include processing maritime information to create Maritime Situational Awareness and a Comprehensive Regional Maritime Picture, supporting regional maritime operations, serving as an information sharing platform, promoting cooperation, and contributing to reports and studies.

Salient Threats in 2024 

While all maritime security threats in the Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) region warrant attention, some demonstrated particular salience in 2024. 

Maritime Extension of Conflicts (Red Sea Crisis) 

This category saw the most significant increase in 2024, accounting for 128 out of 175 total acts of violence at sea, compared to only 69 incidents of maritime violence in 2023.4 The crisis stemmed from Houthi attacks starting in November 2023. These attacks initially targeted Israeli-linked vessels but expanded to include vessels of US and UK interest following airstrikes against the Houthis, and eventually, other vessels without clear affiliation. The main modes of action identified include pretending to be Yemeni authorities, using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), manned skiffs with weapons, and anti-ship missiles (terminal guided and ballistic). While the effectiveness of these methods was estimated to be less than 10%, they caused serious consequences, including fatalities and severe damage to vessels. This maritime extension of the conflict is undeniably the most salient new kinetic threat due to its direct impact on international shipping and the sheer volume of incidents recorded in this category. 

Figure 1: Evolution of Violent Acts at Sea5

Piracy 

Potentially linked to the unrest caused by the Houthi attacks and the subsequent reorientation of naval resources, piracy showed a concerning resurgence in 2024. While the phenomenon remains below the endemic levels of 2008-2013, 18 incidents classified as piracy were recorded in 2024, a sharp increase compared to previous years, and a notable rise since late 2023. This resurgence, particularly in the Somali Basin, reintroduces a threat that had been strongly contained for years, opening a window of opportunity for pirate networks. The pirates’ strategy involves hijacking fishing dhows to use as mother ships to attack larger vessels up to 600 nautical miles or more off the coast. The report notes that most pirated vessels did not have Private Armed Security Teams (PAST). 

Maritime Incidents 

While not inherently criminal, the significant increase in maritime incidents in 2024 highlights a critical safety and security challenge. A total of 512 maritime incident events were recorded, a 20% increase compared to 426 in 2023.6 This surge was particularly notable in the sub-categories related to pollution and accidents. Increased traffic, potentially due to the re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope, and the use of vessels in poor condition navigating bad weather, are identified as main factors contributing to incidents and loss of life. Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) and Medical Evaluation (MEDEVAC) operations also saw a considerable increase (8% and 16% respectively), indicating increased demands on response capabilities. The potential for major oil spills, such as the threat posed by the attack on MV Sounion, remains a high-risk incident within this category.

Illicit Trafficking 

Illicit trafficking, particularly of drugs and arms, continues to pose a significant and persistent challenge to regional stability.7 While the total quantity of drugs seized (42.24 tons) was significantly lower in 2024 compared to the preceding years (over 100 tons in 2021-2023), the number of drug smuggling incidents (127) remains high.8 This paradox is partly attributed to the Red Sea crisis diverting naval resources traditionally engaged in counter-narcotics missions. The northern Indian Ocean is the primary area for seizures, linked to proximity to production areas, though transshipments occur along routes towards the East African coast. Six cases of weapon and drone trafficking were documented, including arms destined for Houthi rebels.

Figure 2: Quantity of Drugs Seized, 2017 – 20249

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing 

IUU fishing is recognized as a major and ongoing challenge that threatens marine ecosystems, the blue economy, food security, and can contribute to social conflict and fuel criminal networks. The RMIFC recorded 69 incidents related to IUU fishing in 2024.10 While the total number is lower than trafficking incidents, the persistent nature and widespread environmental and economic impacts make it highly salient, particularly for coastal African states dependent on marine resources. IUU fishing also may contribute to the resurgence of piracy. 

Other Threats (Terrorism, Cybercrime) 

Maritime terrorism incidents recorded in 2024 were few (2 events in Mozambique) but involved kidnappings and arrests of suspected terrorists near coastal areas, indicating insurgents maintain freedom of movement by boat in certain regions. Maritime cybercrime saw only one recorded event (hacking of the US Fifth Fleet), but the report highlights significant potential vulnerabilities in ports, vessels, and data systems, with potential for major disruption and financial loss.

Impacts Extending into Africa and Beyond 

The impacts of these maritime security threats extend significantly into African coastal states and have broader international consequences. The most direct and widespread economic impact in 2024 stemmed from the Red Sea crisis. The reorientation of shipping flows towards the Cape of Good Hope disrupted usual routes. This has resulted in a very sharp increase in insurance premiums, a lengthening of sea routes by almost 10 days (reducing vessel and container availability), and a collapse in revenues for Egypt from the Suez Canal transit.11 The maritime sector has been forced to reorganize permanently, with new alliances and logistics hubs emerging, suggesting a return to previous traffic levels is not expected soon. Piracy resurgence also increases costs for security, insurance, and potential ransom payments.12 IUU fishing losses, estimated at millions of dollars per year, harm local economies and prevent job creation in the blue economy.13 Illicit trafficking, particularly of drugs and arms, fuels terrorist and criminal networks and undermines regional stability. Arms trafficking linked to conflict zones further destabilizes the region, while ransom money from piracy can influence local politics and increase criminal activities. Weak governance and lawlessness in turn can enable criminal groups, including pirates, to gain control over institutions. Injury, loss of life, and environmental degradation result from all of these threats. 

Response Strategies: Direct, Multilateral, and Mitigation

Effectively addressing these diverse threats requires a comprehensive approach involving actions at national, regional, and international levels. National governments and their maritime agencies play a crucial role in responding directly to threats within their jurisdiction or involving their flagged vessels through law enforcement and patrols and strengthening laws and regulations. National maritime agencies conduct SAR and MEDEVAC operations, directly saving lives at sea. Anti-pollution teams respond to spills. Campaigns to inform local communities about risks and engage them in conservation are direct local actions. Implementing robust cybersecurity systems, training staff, and developing incident response plans are direct actions for shipping companies and ports. Merchant vessels can adhere to Best Management Practices (BMP) (version 5 recommended for piracy) and employ Private Armed Security Teams (PAST).14

Going beyond national responses, given the transnational nature of most maritime threats, multilateral cooperation is critical to successful mitigation. The Regional Maritime Security Architecture in the WIO region is built on this principle. The Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) is central to the regional mechanism, enabling information exchange and coordination. Its ability to fuse data from various sources is key to building maritime situational awareness for both national and international agencies. The European Union’s SafeSeas Africa (SSA) program specifically supports these centers.15 Programs like MASE and SSA aim to strengthen the technical, material, and human capacities of regional and national centers. Workshops and Tabletop exercises enhance collaboration and information sharing frameworks.16 

RCOC and international partners collaborate on joint operations targeting specific threats.17 Multinational forces like the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and the Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 that operates underneath it, conduct counter-narcotics operations. EUNAVFOR operations (ATALANTA, ASPIDES) respond to piracy and the Red Sea crisis.18

Private industry plays a role as well. Shipping interests have re-routed traffic around the Cape of Good Hope to mitigate the risk in the Red Sea, though this is not without its own set of challenges. The permanent reorganization of the maritime industry with new alliances and logistics hubs is a form of long-term adaptation. Increased insurance premiums are a market-based mitigation of financial risk. Adherence to safety regulations and BMP5 mitigates the risk of incidents and piracy. 

Putting all these together, strengthening early warning systems and climate change adaptation mitigate the impact of natural events, which can exacerbate other vulnerabilities. Improving information sharing and coordination of operations mitigates the potential for major maritime disasters, even if incidents occur. While complex, addressing underlying factors such as poverty, lawlessness, and IUU fishing (by strengthening governance, promoting sustainable practices, developing the blue economy) can help mitigate the conditions that fuel piracy and trafficking. Efforts to reduce the demand for illegal wildlife products also contribute to mitigation. Developing and strengthening oil spill contingency plans (regional and national) and having trained response teams in place are key to mitigating the environmental damage from pollution incidents. Waste reduction initiatives and clean-up campaigns mitigate the impact of marine litter on ecosystems like coral reefs.

Conclusion 

The maritime security landscape in the WIO region is dynamic and increasingly challenging. The RMIFC Activity Report 2024 clearly illustrates that while persistent threats like IUU fishing and illicit trafficking remain significant, the resurgence of piracy and, particularly, the maritime extension of regional conflicts in the Red Sea introduced critical new dimensions in 2024. These threats have profound and far-reaching impacts, affecting economic stability, human safety, environmental health, and regional governance across Africa and beyond. The Red Sea crisis dominated in terms of direct kinetic attacks and immediate global economic disruption in 2024, while IUU fishing and illicit trafficking represent high-volume, persistent challenges that fuel criminal networks and undermine long-term sustainability. The increase in maritime incidents highlights the growing pressures on safety and response capabilities in busy waterways, exacerbated by re-routing. 

Responding effectively requires a multi-pronged approach. Direct actions by national forces and ship operators are essential for immediate response and deterrence. However, the transnational nature of these threats mandates robust multilateral cooperation through established Regional Maritime Security Architecture mechanisms like the RMIFC and RCOC, supported by international partners and joint operations. Furthermore, strategies focused on mitigation are necessary to address the broader consequences of these threats, from economic disruption and pollution to the underlying conditions that enable criminal activity. 

Future policy actions should prioritize sustaining and enhancing the regional maritime security architecture, fostering information sharing and coordination, building national capacities, and ensuring resources are available to address both persistent challenges and emerging crises. Continued vigilance and collaborative action, informed by timely and comprehensive data from centers like the RMIFC, are paramount to safeguarding the vital maritime domain of the WIO region for the benefit of all stakeholders.

Captain Harifidy A. Alex Ralaiarivony is the director of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center in Antanarivo, Madagascar. He is the former Head of International Relations in the Madagascar Ministry of Defence. Captain Ralaiarivony holds a Master 2 (M2) in Strategy, Defense, Security and Conflict and Disaster Management from the Center for Research and Political and Strategic Studies – University of Yaoundé II (Centre de Recherche et d’Etudes Politiques et Stratégiques -Université de Yaoundé II); earned a Secondary Military Teaching Certificate from the International Higher War School of Yaoundé (Ecole Superieure Internationale de Guerre de Yaoundé), and a Naval Higher Studies Diploma from the French Naval Academy. He is currently pursuing a degree in international law, international economics, and politics at the Center for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies in Madagascar.

Endnotes

1. “United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” November 21, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002 

2. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024. 

3. EIA, “The Strait of Hormuz,” 2023.

4. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024.

5. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024.

6. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024. 

7. “Indian Navy retakes merchant ship from hijackers in the Arabian Sea.” USNI News, January 7, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/01/07/indian-navy-retakes-merchant-ship-from-armed-attackers-in-the-arabian-sea 

8. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024.

9. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024.

10. Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre, Annual Report 2024.

11. “Regional Challenges Cost Egypt around $7 billion in Suez Canal Revenues,” December 26, 2024, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/regional-challenges-cost-egypt-around-7-bln-suez-canal-revenues-2024-sisi-says-2024-12-26/

12. Abdiqani Hassani, “Somali Pirates say Hijacked Ship MV Abdullah Released after $5 million Ransom was Paid,” Reuters, April 14, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-pirates-say-they-hijacked-ship-mv-abdullah-released-after-5-million-2024-04-14.

13. Dan Collyns, “Illegal Fishing Spurs Billions in Losses for Developing Countries, Study Says,” The Guardian, October 26, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/26/illegal-fishing-billions-losses-developing-countries.

14. Baltic and International Maritime Council, International Chamber of Shipping, International Group of P&I Clubs, Intertanko, and Oil Companies International Marine Forum, BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Maritime Global Security, 2018), https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/okxlfxae/bmp5-low_res.pdf.

15. Sedrick Nicette, “Seychelles and IOC Countries Partner with EU for Safe Seas Africa Programme,” Seychelles News Agency, July 4, 2024, https://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/20836/Seychelles+and+IOC+countries+partner+with+EU+for+Safe+Seas+Africa+programme

16. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “RECOPORT ESA 25: A Strategic Exercise to Strengthen Port Security in Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean,” February 3, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/recoport-esa-25_-a-strategic-exercise-to-strengthen-port-security-in-eastern-africa-and-the-indian-ocean.html

17. Indian Ocean Commission, “Operation Levante 2: A Regional Maritime Security Operation,” August 23, 2024, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/240823_Press-release-Levante2_ENG.pdf

18. Nicette, “Seychelles and IOC Countries Partner.”

References

Baltic and International Maritime Council, International Chamber of Shipping, International Group of P & I Clubs, Intertanko, and Oil Companies International Marine Forum, BMP5: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea (Maritime Global Security, 2018), https://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org/media/okxlfxae/bmp5-low_res.pdf 

Collyns, Dan. “Illegal Fishing Spurs Billions in Losses for Developing Countries, Study Says,” The Guardian, October 26, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/oct/26/illegal-fishing-billions-losses-developing-countries 

European Union Naval Force ATALANTA. “Merchant Vessel Basilisk Liberated,” May 24, 2024. https://eunavfor.eu/news/merchant-vessel-basilisk-liberated 

Hassani, Abdiqani. “Somali Pirates say Hijacked Ship MV Abdullah Released after $5 million Ransom was Paid.” Reuters, April 14, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-pirates-say-they-hijacked-ship-mv-abdullah-released-after-5-million-2024-04-14/ 

“Indian Navy retakes merchant ship from hijackers in the Arabian Sea.” USNI News, January 7, 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/01/07/indian-navy-retakes-merchant-ship-from-armed-attackers-in-the-arabian-sea 

Indian Ocean Commission. “Operation Levante 2: A Regional Maritime Security Operation,” August 23, 2024. https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/240823_Press-release-Levante2_ENG.pdf 

“Madagascar: Deux Bateaux de Migrants Somaliens Retrouvés à la Dérive près de Nosy Be.” RFI, November 24, 2024. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241124-madagascar-deux-bateaux-de-migrants-somaliens-retrouv%C3%A9s-%C3%A0-la-d%C3%A9rive-pr%C3%A8s-de-nosy-be 

Menear, Harry. “The Carbon Cost of Disruption in the Suez and Panama Canals.” Supply Chain Strategy, April 5, 2024. https://supplychainstrategy.media/blog/2024/04/05/the-carbon-cost-of-disruption-in-the-suez-and-panama-canals/ 

Nicette, Sedrick. “Seychelles and IOC Countries Partner with EU for SafeSeas Africa Programme.” Seychelles News Agency, July 5, 2024. https://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/20836/Seychelles +and+IOC+countries+partner+with+EU+for+Safe+Seas+Africa+programme 

“Regional Challenges Cost Egypt around $7 billion in Suez Canal Revenues.” Reuters, December 26, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/regional-challenges-cost-egypt-around-7-bln-suez-canal-revenues-2024-sisi-says-2024-12-26/?utm_source=chatgpt.com 

Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre. Annual Report 2024. https://www.ifc.org.sg/ifc2web/Publications/Annual%20Report/2024/Annual%20Report%202024%20(Main).pdf 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2025, February 3). “RECOPORT ESA 25: A Strategic Exercise to Strengthen Port Security in Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean,” February 3, 2025. https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/recoport-esa-25_-a-strategic-exercise-to-strengthen-port-security-in-eastern-africa-and-the-indian-ocean.html 

United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” November 21, 2023. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php? id=61002 

Featured Image: SOMALIA (Oct. 3, 2008) The crew of the merchant vessel MV Faina stands on the deck after a U.S. Navy request to check on their health and welfare. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky)

African Maritime Forces Summit Week

Escalating Threats to Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean Region

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African Maritime Forces Week

By Brigadier General John M. Waweru (Ret.), IMO Consultant

Introduction 

The Western Indian Ocean Region (WIO) holds substantial geopolitical and economic importance due to its location along vital international sea lanes, facilitating maritime trade between Asia, Africa, and Europe. Approximately 80% of the world’s seaborne oil trade transits through these waters, underscoring their global relevance.1 Key chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait enhance this strategic importance. However, the region faces escalating maritime threats, including kinetic attacks on shipping, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, illicit trafficking, piracy, and terrorism.2 These challenges compromise economic stability and pose broader threats to regional and global security.

Salient Threats to Regional Maritime Security 

Kinetic Attacks on Merchant Shipping in the Red Sea 

Kinetic attacks in the Red Sea, often attributed to the ongoing conflict in Yemen, have significantly threatened global maritime trade. Armed groups such as the Houthis have targeted commercial vessels with missiles and drones, endangering crew safety and destabilizing global energy supplies.3 These incidents have increased shipping insurance premiums and triggered route deviations, inflating global trade costs. 

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) 

IUU fishing severely affects economic and ecological systems in the WIO. Coastal African states—including Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia, and Mozambique—report annual losses in the billions due to illegal fishing practices.4 These activities deplete marine stocks, disrupt food security, and exacerbate unemployment and migration pressures. The environmental degradation caused by IUUF also threatens long-term sustainability of the blue economy.5

Illicit Trafficking 

The WIO is a conduit for various forms of illicit trafficking, including narcotics, weapons, human smuggling, and wildlife trafficking. The region’s porous maritime borders allow transnational criminal networks to flourish, undermining governance and fueling corruption.6 Illicit trafficking also enables the financing of insurgencies and extremist movements, further destabilizing coastal and inland regions.7

Terrorism and Piracy 

Although Somali piracy has declined since its 2011 peak, emerging incidents suggest a possible resurgence.8 Moreover, terrorist groups have reportedly leveraged maritime spaces for logistical support, recruitment, and attacks—especially in regions around Lamu and the Gulf of Aden.9 The fusion of terrorism and piracy heightens risk for both commercial vessels and regional maritime governance. 

Comparative Salience and Extended Impact 

Kinetic attacks and IUU fishing are particularly impactful due to their economic consequences and global spillover effects. Strategic chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb amplify the risks of kinetic threats, while IUUF contributes directly to ecosystem collapse, economic displacement, and regional instability.10 These phenomena also contribute to migration crises, fuel maritime militarization, and alter trade patterns—creating ripple effects in Europe, Asia, and beyond.11 

Strategic Response and Mitigation Approaches 

Direct Responses 

IUU fishing can be curtailed through capacity-building, improved monitoring, and the use of satellite surveillance technology. Strengthening legal frameworks and investing in regional fisheries governance are also critical steps.12

Multilateral Approaches 

Due to their cross-border nature, threats like piracy and terrorism necessitate collective action. Regional cooperation through the Djibouti Code of Conduct and global coalitions like the Combined Maritime Forces has improved information sharing and joint patrol capabilities.13 Diplomatic solutions addressing political drivers of conflict—especially in Yemen and Somalia—are equally crucial. 

Threat Mitigation 

Illicit trafficking is best addressed through enhanced maritime domain awareness, harmonized regional legislation, and anti-corruption initiatives. Developmental interventions targeting root causes—such as poverty, unemployment, and institutional weakness—are essential for long-term security.14

Conclusion

The Western Indian Ocean Region remains a critical hub for international trade, energy transport, and ecological resources. Yet it faces multifaceted maritime security threats that demand urgent and coordinated responses. A balanced strategy combining direct enforcement, multilateral diplomacy, and developmental initiatives is essential. Regional stakeholders, supported by international partners, must adopt an integrated approach to secure the blue economy, foster peace, and promote sustainable development across the WIO.

Brigadier General John Waweru (Ret.) is a seasoned security strategist, educator, and conservation advocate with over three decades of distinguished service. He is currently a Fellow at the African Leadership University (ALU) and serves as Adjunct Faculty at the ALU School of Business, where he develops and teaches curriculum on security, leadership, and governance. A retired officer of the Kenya Defence Forces, General Waweru previously served as the Director General of the Kenya Wildlife Service, where he led national conservation efforts and advanced cross-sector partnerships for environmental security. Waweru holds a Master of Management in Security and is due to graduate in 2025 with a PhD in International Studies, reflecting his deep academic engagement with global security and governance issues. His areas of expertise include strategic leadership, crisis management, maritime security, and organizational transformation. He is widely respected for his contributions to regional security dialogue and for integrating conservation into national security frameworks. Waweru continues to mentor emerging leaders and contribute to thought leadership across Africa’s security and governance landscape.

Endnotes

1. Christian Bueger, “Who Secures the Western Indian Ocean? The Need for Strategic Dialogue” (Center for Maritime Strategy, September 19, 2024), https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/who-secures-the-western-indians-ocean-the-need-for-strategic-dialogue/

2. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Blue Crime: Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime at Sea,” Maritime Policy 119 (2020), 104067; Laura C. Burroughs and Robert Mazurek, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Perceived Threats, Impacts, and Solutions,” (One Earth Future Foundation, June 14, 2019), https://oneearthfuture.org/en/secure-fisheries/publication/maritime-security-indian-ocean-perceived-threats-impacts-and-solutions

3. Francois Vrëy and Mark Blaine, “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability,” (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 9, 2024), https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa-maritime-vulnerability/ 

4. WWF, “US $142.8 Million Potentially Lost Each Year to Illicit Fishing in the South West Indian Ocean,” May 4, 2023, https://www.wwf.eu/?10270441%2FUS1428-million-potentially-lost-each-year-to-illicit-fishing-in-the-South-West-Indian-Ocean; Oceans 5, “Ending destructive industrial fishing in Madagascar and the Western Indian Ocean,” (Oceans 5, n.d.), https://www.oceans5.org/project/ending-destructive-industrial-fishing-in-madagascar-and-the-western-indian-ocean/ 

5. Margherita Camurri, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: The Practice of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing (Mondo Internazionale, February 10, 2022), https://mondointernazionale.org/focus-allegati/maritime-security-in-the-indian-ocean-the-practice-of-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing

6. Blue Ventures, “A Shared Vision to Tackle Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Western Indian Ocean,” June 16, 2023, https://blueventures.org/a-shared-vision-to-tackle-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-in-the-western-indian-ocean/

7. Bueger and Edmunds, “Blue Crime.” 

8. “Piracy off the coast of Somalia,” Wikipedia Foundation, accessed April 21, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia

9. Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” Africa Security Brief No. 30 (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 28, 2015); J.W. Mwangi, Maritime Terrorism in Kenya: Threats and Responses. (Nairobi: KeMU Press, 2021). 

10. G. Macfadyen and G. Hosch, The IUU Fishing Risk Index: 2023 Update (Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Limited and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023), https://iuufishingindex.net/downloads/IUU-Report-2023.pdf.

11. Abhishek Mishra, “Maritime Security Architecture and Western Indian Ocean: India’s Stakes,” IDSA Comments, January 18, 2024 (Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/maritime-security-architecture-and-western-indian-ocean-indias-stakes/.

12. U.S. Embassy Antananarivo, “United States Partners with Western Indian Ocean Countries to Tackle IUU Fishing (U.S. Embassy in Madagascar, June 5, 2023), https://mg.usembassy.gov/united-states-partners-with-indian-ocean-countries-to-tackle-iuu-fishing/

13. Djibouti Code of Conduct, “Combating Maritime Security Threats in Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden (n.d.), https://dcoc.org/combating-maritime-security-threats-in-western-indian-ocean-and-gulf-of-aden/; International Maritime Organization, “Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden States Push Coordinated Action on Maritime Security,” December 4, 2024, 

https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-2193.aspx 

14. Bueger, “Who Secures the Western Indian Ocean.”

References 

Blue Ventures, “A Shared Vision to Tackle Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Western Indian Ocean,” June 16, 2023. https://blueventures.org/a-shared-vision-to-tackle-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-in-the-western-indian-ocean/

Bueger, Christian, “Who Secures the Western Indian Ocean? The Need for Strategic Dialogue. Center for Maritime Strategy,” September 19, 2024. https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/who-secures-the-western-indian-ocean-the-need-for-strategic-dialogue/

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds, “Blue Crime: Conceptualizing Transnational Organized Crime at Sea,” Marine Policy 119 (2020), 104067. 

Burroughs, Laura C. and Robert Mazurek, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Perceived Threats, Impacts, and Solutions,” One Earth Future, June 24, 2019. https://oneearthfuture.org/en/secure-fisheries/publication/maritime-security-indian-ocean-perceived-threats-impacts-and-solutions 

Camurri, Margherita, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: The Practice of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing.” Mondo Internazionale, February 10, 2022. https://mondointernazionale.org/focus-allegati/maritime-security-in-the-indian-ocean-the-practice-of-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-iuu-fishing

Djibouti Code of Conduct, “Combating Maritime Security Threats in Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden,” (n.d.). https://dcoc.org/combating-maritime-security-threats-in-western-indian-ocean-and-gulf-of-aden/ 

International Maritime Organization, “Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden States Push Coordinated Action on Maritime Security,” December 4, 2024. https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-2193.aspx 

International Maritime Organization. Djibouti Code of Conduct. London: IMO, 2009. 

Macfadyen, G. and G. Hosch, “The IUU Fishing Risk Index: 2023 Update.” Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Limited and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2023. https://iuufishingindex.net/downloads/IUU-Report-2023.pdf

Mishra, Abhishek, “Maritime Security Architecture and Western Indian Ocean: India’s Stakes,” IDSA Comments, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. January 18, 2024. https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/maritime-security-architecture-and-western-indian-ocean-indias-stakes/

Mwangi, J. W. Maritime Terrorism in Kenya: Threats and Responses. Nairobi: KeMU Press, 2021. 

Oceans 5, “Ending Destructive Industrial Fishing in Madagascar and the Western Indian Ocean,” Oceans 5, n.d. https://www.oceans5.org/project/ending-destructive-industrial-fishing-in-madagascar-and-the-western-indian-ocean/

Osinowo, Adeniyi Adejimi, “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” Africa Security Brief no. 30 Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 28, 2015. 

“Piracy off the coast of Somalia,” Wikipedia Foundation, accessed April 21, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia 

U.S. Embassy Antananarivo, “United States Partners with Western Indian Ocean Countries to Tackle IUU Fishing. U.S. Embassy in Madagascar, June 5, 2023. https://mg.usembassy.gov/united-states-partners-with-indian-ocean-countries-to-tackle-iuu-fishing/

Vogel, Augustus. “Investing in Science and Technology to Meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges.” Africa Security Brief, No. 10. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2011. https://africacenter.org/publication/investing-in-science-and-technology-to-meet-africas-maritime-security-challenges/

Vrëy, Francois and Mark Blaine, “Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean Attacks Expose Africa’s Maritime Vulnerability.” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 9, 2024. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/red-sea-indian-ocean-attacks-africa-maritime-vulnerability/ 

WWF, “U.S. $142.8 million Potentially Lost Each Year to Illicit Fishing in the South-West Indian Ocean,” May 4, 2023. https://www.wwf.eu/?10270441/US1428-million-potentially-lost-each-year-to-illicit-fishing-in-the-South-West-Indian-Ocean 

Featured Image: Suspected pirates surrender to a multinational naval force in 2009. (Photo via Reuters/Jason R. Zalasky/U.S. Navy)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Geopolitical Competition and Economics in the Indian Ocean Region

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By Lieutenant Commander (G) Roshan Kulatunga, Sri Lankan Navy

Introduction

The geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean Region has been understood by many great maritime historians. During the Cold War the United States was the preeminent maritime power and the USSR the preeminent land power. Lack of maritime capability eventually became a losing point for the USSR where the U.S. dominated the global commons. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan stated the importance of sea power by highlighting six elements of geography (access to sea routes), physical conformation (ports), extent of territory, population, character of the people, and character of government. Mahan’s maritime concepts were so influential in the field of maritime studies that most of the contemporary maritime security architectures are designed around these concepts.

The 21st century Indian Ocean receives attention from state and non-state actors. According to Robert Kaplan “The Indian Ocean unified the oceans and it connects the world from Africa to far East.” Mariners use sea lanes for transportation, and today the Indian Ocean holds some of the most important sea lines of communication in the world. There are regional and extra-regional states operating in the IO. Extra regional countries such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia are keen to have some presence in the IO. They are interested in projecting sea power beyond their locale to garner economic and political sustainability in the world arena, and where the IO is a major arena of competition.

The Concept of Sea Power

Establishing preeminent sea power is a key geopolitical strategy successfully implemented by great maritime empires such as England. The famous professor for international relations, Barry Buzan, names five sectors of security that are namely military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Maritime security lies over all these five sectors of security. Maritime historians such as Admiral Mahan, Julian Corbett, and modern maritime experts such as Robert Kaplan and U.S. Navy Admiral Michael Mullen are well-recognized persons who often talk about the value of maritime power. Admiral Mullen points out that “Where the old maritime strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the sea are controlled by one, but rather when they are made safe and free for all.”

Sea power is a larger concept than the field of maritime warfare. Humanity uses the sea for many reasons and these reasons are well-connected to each other. As historian Geoff Till puts it, the “Sea can be used as a resource, medium of transportation, medium of information and medium of dominion.” In history great civilizations founded primarily on maritime power were termed “thalassocracies,” which literally translates to “sea power.” Establishing sea power is directly helpful to strengthening a variety of national policies as it is the collective effect of the military and civil maritime capabilities of a country. Therefore, regional and extra-regional users in the IO are interested in projecting their sea power via both civil and military maritime capabilities.

Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of the Indian Ocean

Geopolitics has been defined as a struggle for power and national power can be evaluated in part by showing the interrelationships between geostrategic positioning, the relative economic and technological capabilities of states, international public opinion, international law and morality, international government and diplomacy, and the regional and global balance of power. Geo-strategy is required to deal with geopolitical problems and is the sum of the efforts to influence and act through these factors. With developing economies and growing energy requirements, users in the IO are struggling for power and this behavior influences the stability of the IO.

This is the container age of maritime trade. Bulk cargos are transported through chokepoints in the IO and through main ports such as Gawdar, Chabahar, Hambanthota, Colombo, Mumbai, and Chittagong. These major ports have given significance to IO nations and made them maritime influencers in their own right. There are also nearby flashpoints that can cause spillover effects in the IO with existing situations in Yemen, Somalia, and Iran. Therefore, security in this region is very important for the global economy and must be secured from Middle East turbulence. The countries in the IO are mostly in the developing stage and handling the third largest ocean in the world becomes a huge challenge for them. Therefore, extra-regional countries pay close attention to this region in an effort to influence stability.

Extra-Regional Powers in the Indian Ocean Region

There are 35 Littoral States and 12 landlocked countries, and altogether 47 counties in the Indian Ocean Rim (RIM). Apart from that, many extra regional countries such as China, U.S., Japan, and Russia are dependent on the IO and working to expand their influence. China is interested in the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), and according to Kaplan, China is expanding vertically while India expands horizontally in their maritime power projection. The U.S. sphere of interest is spreading from the Western Pacific to greater maritime Asia in the 21st century, and recently renamed its Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command in recognition of the growing importance of the IO. However, there are not any notable maritime power rivalries from within IO nations themselves. Countries are well aware of security in chokepoints, sea lanes, and strategic waterways. Trade security is the major substantial security factor in their developing economies. Therefore, countries are reluctant to disturb in good order at sea.

India, the U.S., and China are main power blocks in IO and they are with the intention of extending their maritime power in pursuit of their national interest. When looking into the balance of power in IO, China seeks maritime expansionism through the South China Sea to IO. The U.S. is more allied with India in present day context than earlier times. Presidents Barack Obama in the past and Trump at present have had good maritime diplomacy with India. According to Morgenthau alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power, when nations competing with each other have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power through the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of the other partner nations of the adversary. Small states like Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Seychelles have to be considerate of their alliances with great powers as they are players in a larger competition.   

When linking this setup into the IO, China and the U.S. are competing with each other and India is also competing with China. China has its own issues with the South China Sea and the security dilemma in Malacca Strait especially affects her. Therefore, aligning with Myanmar and Bangladesh is important to China to transport energy if any rivalry worsens. Further, they have notable interests in the ports of Habmanthota, Gwadar, and Chabahar. The U.S. on the other hand has common interests with India. India has its own maritime strategy involving relationships with the smaller states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The recent past visit of two Chinese submarines to port Colombo was heavily criticized by Indians as a challenge to maritime security. The evolving nature of IO alliances could be further strengthened by the construction of oil pipelines for refueling and oil transportation in deep sea ports by India and China in Chabahar in Iran and Gawadr in Pakistan, respectively.

The Chabahar and Gwadar ports are strategically important to both India and China for their maritime expansion. India along with Japan introduced the Growth Corridor, which links Africa to Asia and Far East. Sri Lanka, for example, is situated along both the SLOCs for the Growth Corridor and One Belt One Road. Therefore, smaller littoral state like Sri Lanka have to open up trade to many parties to receive the benefits from competing trade routes and economic projects.

Maritime Security Threats and Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region  

Threats and challenges to the IO maritime domain can be divided into two major areas of traditional and non-traditional security threats. Both littoral and extra-regional states have to play a vital role to prevent the maritime domain from threats and challenges.

Interstate conflicts are rarely found in this region. With the economic expansionism, countries cannot neglect the threats of piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, maritime pollution, irregular migration by sea, illegal narcotic drugs, and small arms trafficking by sea. These threats may have traditional implications for extra-regional maritime users. As an example, small numbers of Somalian pirates are able to create a perception of threat to the entire maritime trade in the IO. Countries had to utilize their resources to counter this threat in a sustained and multilateral fashion. They had to have interdependencies to face this issue without considering individual rivalries.

Somali pirate operations. (EUNAVFOR/IMB)

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is another important issue. IUU fishing can also add economic power to actors that also perpetuate maritime terrorism, human trafficking, and illegal migration at sea. Countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are highly notable victim countries for human smuggling. Sri Lanka is considered a major source country on this issue. Suitable Maritime Domain Awareness mechanisms would be the possible solution to mitigate these threats in the IO. Diplomatic and multilateral solutions are the most viable action on this issue and again counties have to use conference diplomacy to peacefully engage in these types of challenges.

Conclusion

The IO is the third largest ocean in the world and for the balance of power extra-regional actors always wish to display their presence in this region. Therefore, geo-strategic and geo-political competitions in this region are inevitable. Regional and extra regional countries are much more concerned with China’s maritime expansionism in particular. China is especially interested in becoming a modern maritime civilization. This is evidenced by its constructions of harbors in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Myanmar. This has generated vulnerability to their balance of power and traditional regional relationships. Due to the economic advantages they littoral are reluctant to create any rivalries. However, their own game of survival is inevitable.

Security is an important factor for a nation state. To be survivable in the international arena nation states have to concern themselves with energy and trade security. Therefore, the nation state has to give much more concern for their maritime security in a world whose globalization is being fed by the world’s oceans. IO strategic waterways have taken special attention in maritime trade. Oil trade is flowing from the Middle East to Asia and elsewhere via these IO chokepoints and sea routes. Their protection is the responsibility of all.

Lieutenant Commander Roshan Kulatunga is presently performing duties in the Sri Lanka Navy. He is a specialist in Gunnery, from INS Droanacharya, India. He earned a Diploma in Diplomacy and World Affairs at Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute, Sri Lanka. He also holds a degree in BNS (Bachelor in Naval Studies) University of Kalaniya Sri Lanka, MSc in Security & Strategic Studies, MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies in Kotelawala Defence University (KDU), Sri Lanka. His research interest includes, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indian Ocean Region

Bibliography

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Department of the USA Navy, 2009. Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy. Washington: Secretary of the Navy.

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Gunawardena, C., 2015. Sri Lanka Navy Outlines Importance of Maritime Hub in Seminar Sessions.

Jayawardena, A., 2009. Terrorism at Sea. Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia.

Kaplan, R., 2011. Monsoon. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Kaplan, R., 2013. The Revenge of Geography. New York: Random House Trad Paperbacks.

Mihalka, M., 2005. Cooperative Security. Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, Volume 3, p. 113.

Morgenthau, H. J., 2005. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

NMDAP, 2013. National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan. New York: Presidential Policy Directives.

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The Indian Ocean and the future of American Power. 2010. [Film] s.l.: s.n.

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Featured Image: North and South Malosmadulu Atolls in the Maldives. Image taken by the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) onboard NASA’s Terra satellite. Source: ASTER gallery. Courtesy of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center/Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry/Japan Space Systems and the U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team.

Indo-Asia-Pacific

China’s Rise and Indian Ocean Ambitions

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By Aswani Dravid

Though the Indian Ocean was considered exotic for centuries, it was transformed into a mere colonial sea by the 18th century. The European powers divided the South Asian continent among themselves to a degree that these South Asian countries no longer identified with the larger whole. However, the British retreat from the region and subsequent de-colonization spree around the periphery of the Indian Ocean raised a complex situation of an Indian Ocean vacuum. By the end of the 1940s many of the countries in Africa and Asia became independent from their colonial rulers and many of these newly emerged free countries lived in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. The British announcement in 1968 to withdraw from east of the Suez by the end of 1971 marked the end of over 150 years of British supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the Second World War ended colonialism and the European countries ceased to be the rulers of this ocean. The United States and the Soviet Union became the new involved parties. However, even though the Cold War divided the world into two blocs, both the U.S. and USSR did not seriously attempt to fill the vacuum left by the British in this area. Now in the Post-Cold War era, according to Ashwani Sharma, “the realm of world politics had transformed beyond all recognition, as was the Indian Ocean in its appearance and role, implicitly and explicitly due to the metamorphoses of the world.” During that period, the geo-strategic undercurrents of the Indian Ocean had changed significantly due to the tireless struggles of new players in the region, especially China and India, to achieve strategic aims in the IOR. Though the United States still holds an impressive locus in the Indo-Pacific, the complex upheavals during the last century only allowed them to restructure their strategy to truly sustain its dominance in the area only recently.

This region, the Indo-Pacific, is at present one of the fastest developing regions of the world, displaying unmatched vigor in socio-political, economic, and geo-security terms. Robert Kaplan has rightly stated that “the 21st-century power dynamics will be revealed in the backdrop of keen interest and influence of three key players, i.e., China, India, and United States and their interests could be some sort of an overlap and intersection.” In short, the Indo-Pacific has rightly emerged as the economic and geopolitical center of gravity of the world in the 21st century. China unlocked its economy in the year 1978 and accomplished approximately a rate of 10 percent growth for three decades. China has lifted millions of people out of poverty through a systematic growth pattern. China has now risen to become the second largest economy in the world, second only to the United States. Japan, which enjoyed the position of the only Asian developed nation for decades, was pushed to the world’s third position. With their vigilant strategic investments, China’s economic growth and global influence are increasing.

After China declared itself the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its naval operations were limited to defending the coasts for nearly three decades until the 1980s. By the end of that decade, the strategy sought to expand its naval capabilities beyond coastal waters. Most of the Sea Lines of Communications of China pass through the Indian Ocean and a few through the Pacific Rim. One of China’s foremost concerns is the protection of these SLOCs. The Indian Ocean is home to major chokepoints that Chinese vessels must traverse and where any threat in this ocean directly distresses the ambitions of China. The rise of China as a superpower in Asia and its revival of the ancient Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) have raised concerns in India. Any nation, in order to ensure its sphere of influence would not only accumulate strength to its camp but also take measures that ensure that the enemy’s camp would be weakened without adequate logistics. In addition to port construction and acquisition efforts in the Indian Ocean that add to the value of these SLOCs and strengthen China’s logistical infrastructure, China’s concurrent naval modernization efforts also generate concerns for India. The evolution of Chinese naval modernization has been steady and it has eventually become the largest navy in Asia today, with a plentiful addition of surface ships and submarines. Far seas training and deployments in this region have become the new norm for China’s Navy.

China aims to create a counterbalance through economic and strategic partnerships with the various littoral nations in the IOR in order to reinforce her existence in the region. China’s investment in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, its electronic gathering amenities in isolated islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, and others are certain instances to prove China’s increasing interest in the IOR. China has maritime disputes with many of its neighbors and many of the Southeast Asian nations are in conflict with China over the latter’s expansionist tendencies and dominance. However, China has no major disputes or tensions with India’s neighbors in the IOR and is instead cultivating maritime partnerships with these states. For example, China is building maritime relations with Pakistan through its investments in Gwadar Port and a mainland highway connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in the Xinjiang region. All these efforts ensure that China will be somewhat relieved from the threat of chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and will have a smoothly flowing trade and supply chain.

Due to India’s growing dependence on oil and energy resources, any interference in the stability or peace of the Indian Ocean will have a cataclysmic impact on the economic and political stability of the nation. A peaceful and reliant Indian Ocean is the responsibility of the littoral and island states in this region to an extent that the “overall political character of the Indian Ocean had changed from one of European dominance to that of local assertion.”

Aswani Dravid is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Administration in University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.

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Featured Image: CSCL Pacific Ocean Elbe (Wikimedia Commons)