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Indo-Asia-Pacific

Geopolitical Competition and Economics in the Indian Ocean Region

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By Lieutenant Commander (G) Roshan Kulatunga, Sri Lankan Navy

Introduction

The geostrategic and geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean Region has been understood by many great maritime historians. During the Cold War the United States was the preeminent maritime power and the USSR the preeminent land power. Lack of maritime capability eventually became a losing point for the USSR where the U.S. dominated the global commons. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan stated the importance of sea power by highlighting six elements of geography (access to sea routes), physical conformation (ports), extent of territory, population, character of the people, and character of government. Mahan’s maritime concepts were so influential in the field of maritime studies that most of the contemporary maritime security architectures are designed around these concepts.

The 21st century Indian Ocean receives attention from state and non-state actors. According to Robert Kaplan “The Indian Ocean unified the oceans and it connects the world from Africa to far East.” Mariners use sea lanes for transportation, and today the Indian Ocean holds some of the most important sea lines of communication in the world. There are regional and extra-regional states operating in the IO. Extra regional countries such as the U.S., China, Japan, and Russia are keen to have some presence in the IO. They are interested in projecting sea power beyond their locale to garner economic and political sustainability in the world arena, and where the IO is a major arena of competition.

The Concept of Sea Power

Establishing preeminent sea power is a key geopolitical strategy successfully implemented by great maritime empires such as England. The famous professor for international relations, Barry Buzan, names five sectors of security that are namely military, political, economic, societal, and environmental. Maritime security lies over all these five sectors of security. Maritime historians such as Admiral Mahan, Julian Corbett, and modern maritime experts such as Robert Kaplan and U.S. Navy Admiral Michael Mullen are well-recognized persons who often talk about the value of maritime power. Admiral Mullen points out that “Where the old maritime strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the sea are controlled by one, but rather when they are made safe and free for all.”

Sea power is a larger concept than the field of maritime warfare. Humanity uses the sea for many reasons and these reasons are well-connected to each other. As historian Geoff Till puts it, the “Sea can be used as a resource, medium of transportation, medium of information and medium of dominion.” In history great civilizations founded primarily on maritime power were termed “thalassocracies,” which literally translates to “sea power.” Establishing sea power is directly helpful to strengthening a variety of national policies as it is the collective effect of the military and civil maritime capabilities of a country. Therefore, regional and extra-regional users in the IO are interested in projecting their sea power via both civil and military maritime capabilities.

Geostrategic and Geopolitical Significance of the Indian Ocean

Geopolitics has been defined as a struggle for power and national power can be evaluated in part by showing the interrelationships between geostrategic positioning, the relative economic and technological capabilities of states, international public opinion, international law and morality, international government and diplomacy, and the regional and global balance of power. Geo-strategy is required to deal with geopolitical problems and is the sum of the efforts to influence and act through these factors. With developing economies and growing energy requirements, users in the IO are struggling for power and this behavior influences the stability of the IO.

This is the container age of maritime trade. Bulk cargos are transported through chokepoints in the IO and through main ports such as Gawdar, Chabahar, Hambanthota, Colombo, Mumbai, and Chittagong. These major ports have given significance to IO nations and made them maritime influencers in their own right. There are also nearby flashpoints that can cause spillover effects in the IO with existing situations in Yemen, Somalia, and Iran. Therefore, security in this region is very important for the global economy and must be secured from Middle East turbulence. The countries in the IO are mostly in the developing stage and handling the third largest ocean in the world becomes a huge challenge for them. Therefore, extra-regional countries pay close attention to this region in an effort to influence stability.

Extra-Regional Powers in the Indian Ocean Region

There are 35 Littoral States and 12 landlocked countries, and altogether 47 counties in the Indian Ocean Rim (RIM). Apart from that, many extra regional countries such as China, U.S., Japan, and Russia are dependent on the IO and working to expand their influence. China is interested in the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), and according to Kaplan, China is expanding vertically while India expands horizontally in their maritime power projection. The U.S. sphere of interest is spreading from the Western Pacific to greater maritime Asia in the 21st century, and recently renamed its Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command in recognition of the growing importance of the IO. However, there are not any notable maritime power rivalries from within IO nations themselves. Countries are well aware of security in chokepoints, sea lanes, and strategic waterways. Trade security is the major substantial security factor in their developing economies. Therefore, countries are reluctant to disturb in good order at sea.

India, the U.S., and China are main power blocks in IO and they are with the intention of extending their maritime power in pursuit of their national interest. When looking into the balance of power in IO, China seeks maritime expansionism through the South China Sea to IO. The U.S. is more allied with India in present day context than earlier times. Presidents Barack Obama in the past and Trump at present have had good maritime diplomacy with India. According to Morgenthau alliances are a necessary function of the balance of power, when nations competing with each other have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power through the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of the other partner nations of the adversary. Small states like Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Seychelles have to be considerate of their alliances with great powers as they are players in a larger competition.   

When linking this setup into the IO, China and the U.S. are competing with each other and India is also competing with China. China has its own issues with the South China Sea and the security dilemma in Malacca Strait especially affects her. Therefore, aligning with Myanmar and Bangladesh is important to China to transport energy if any rivalry worsens. Further, they have notable interests in the ports of Habmanthota, Gwadar, and Chabahar. The U.S. on the other hand has common interests with India. India has its own maritime strategy involving relationships with the smaller states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The recent past visit of two Chinese submarines to port Colombo was heavily criticized by Indians as a challenge to maritime security. The evolving nature of IO alliances could be further strengthened by the construction of oil pipelines for refueling and oil transportation in deep sea ports by India and China in Chabahar in Iran and Gawadr in Pakistan, respectively.

The Chabahar and Gwadar ports are strategically important to both India and China for their maritime expansion. India along with Japan introduced the Growth Corridor, which links Africa to Asia and Far East. Sri Lanka, for example, is situated along both the SLOCs for the Growth Corridor and One Belt One Road. Therefore, smaller littoral state like Sri Lanka have to open up trade to many parties to receive the benefits from competing trade routes and economic projects.

Maritime Security Threats and Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region  

Threats and challenges to the IO maritime domain can be divided into two major areas of traditional and non-traditional security threats. Both littoral and extra-regional states have to play a vital role to prevent the maritime domain from threats and challenges.

Interstate conflicts are rarely found in this region. With the economic expansionism, countries cannot neglect the threats of piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, maritime pollution, irregular migration by sea, illegal narcotic drugs, and small arms trafficking by sea. These threats may have traditional implications for extra-regional maritime users. As an example, small numbers of Somalian pirates are able to create a perception of threat to the entire maritime trade in the IO. Countries had to utilize their resources to counter this threat in a sustained and multilateral fashion. They had to have interdependencies to face this issue without considering individual rivalries.

Somali pirate operations. (EUNAVFOR/IMB)

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is another important issue. IUU fishing can also add economic power to actors that also perpetuate maritime terrorism, human trafficking, and illegal migration at sea. Countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are highly notable victim countries for human smuggling. Sri Lanka is considered a major source country on this issue. Suitable Maritime Domain Awareness mechanisms would be the possible solution to mitigate these threats in the IO. Diplomatic and multilateral solutions are the most viable action on this issue and again counties have to use conference diplomacy to peacefully engage in these types of challenges.

Conclusion

The IO is the third largest ocean in the world and for the balance of power extra-regional actors always wish to display their presence in this region. Therefore, geo-strategic and geo-political competitions in this region are inevitable. Regional and extra regional countries are much more concerned with China’s maritime expansionism in particular. China is especially interested in becoming a modern maritime civilization. This is evidenced by its constructions of harbors in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Myanmar. This has generated vulnerability to their balance of power and traditional regional relationships. Due to the economic advantages they littoral are reluctant to create any rivalries. However, their own game of survival is inevitable.

Security is an important factor for a nation state. To be survivable in the international arena nation states have to concern themselves with energy and trade security. Therefore, the nation state has to give much more concern for their maritime security in a world whose globalization is being fed by the world’s oceans. IO strategic waterways have taken special attention in maritime trade. Oil trade is flowing from the Middle East to Asia and elsewhere via these IO chokepoints and sea routes. Their protection is the responsibility of all.

Lieutenant Commander Roshan Kulatunga is presently performing duties in the Sri Lanka Navy. He is a specialist in Gunnery, from INS Droanacharya, India. He earned a Diploma in Diplomacy and World Affairs at Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute, Sri Lanka. He also holds a degree in BNS (Bachelor in Naval Studies) University of Kalaniya Sri Lanka, MSc in Security & Strategic Studies, MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies in Kotelawala Defence University (KDU), Sri Lanka. His research interest includes, Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indian Ocean Region

Bibliography

Colombage, A. J., 2017. Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Contest for power by major maritime users and non-traditional security threats. Defence and Security Journal, 1(1), p. 103.

Department of the USA Navy, 2009. Maritime Domain Awareness in the Department of the Navy. Washington: Secretary of the Navy.

Ghosh, C. P. K., 2004. American-Pacific Sealanes Security Institute conference on Maritime Security in Asia. Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the Indian Ocean: Response Strategies.

Gunawardena, C., 2015. Sri Lanka Navy Outlines Importance of Maritime Hub in Seminar Sessions.

Jayawardena, A., 2009. Terrorism at Sea. Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia.

Kaplan, R., 2011. Monsoon. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Kaplan, R., 2013. The Revenge of Geography. New York: Random House Trad Paperbacks.

Mihalka, M., 2005. Cooperative Security. Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, Volume 3, p. 113.

Morgenthau, H. J., 2005. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

NMDAP, 2013. National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan. New York: Presidential Policy Directives.

Rabasa, A. & Chalk, P., 2012. Non-Traditional Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of South East Asia. p. 21.

Sheehan, M., 2006. International Security, An Analytical Survey. New Delhi: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

The Indian Ocean and the future of American Power. 2010. [Film] s.l.: s.n.

Thean, P. T., 2012. Institute for Security Studies Paper. Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: strategic setting and features, Issue No – 236, p. p.4.

Thiele, R. D., 2012. Building Maritime Security Situational Awareness, Issue No – 182.

Till, G., 2013. Sea Power, A Guide for the Twenty First Century. New York: Routledge.

Featured Image: North and South Malosmadulu Atolls in the Maldives. Image taken by the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) onboard NASA’s Terra satellite. Source: ASTER gallery. Courtesy of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center/Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry/Japan Space Systems and the U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team.

Indo-Asia-Pacific

China’s Rise and Indian Ocean Ambitions

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By Aswani Dravid

Though the Indian Ocean was considered exotic for centuries, it was transformed into a mere colonial sea by the 18th century. The European powers divided the South Asian continent among themselves to a degree that these South Asian countries no longer identified with the larger whole. However, the British retreat from the region and subsequent de-colonization spree around the periphery of the Indian Ocean raised a complex situation of an Indian Ocean vacuum. By the end of the 1940s many of the countries in Africa and Asia became independent from their colonial rulers and many of these newly emerged free countries lived in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. The British announcement in 1968 to withdraw from east of the Suez by the end of 1971 marked the end of over 150 years of British supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the Second World War ended colonialism and the European countries ceased to be the rulers of this ocean. The United States and the Soviet Union became the new involved parties. However, even though the Cold War divided the world into two blocs, both the U.S. and USSR did not seriously attempt to fill the vacuum left by the British in this area. Now in the Post-Cold War era, according to Ashwani Sharma, “the realm of world politics had transformed beyond all recognition, as was the Indian Ocean in its appearance and role, implicitly and explicitly due to the metamorphoses of the world.” During that period, the geo-strategic undercurrents of the Indian Ocean had changed significantly due to the tireless struggles of new players in the region, especially China and India, to achieve strategic aims in the IOR. Though the United States still holds an impressive locus in the Indo-Pacific, the complex upheavals during the last century only allowed them to restructure their strategy to truly sustain its dominance in the area only recently.

This region, the Indo-Pacific, is at present one of the fastest developing regions of the world, displaying unmatched vigor in socio-political, economic, and geo-security terms. Robert Kaplan has rightly stated that “the 21st-century power dynamics will be revealed in the backdrop of keen interest and influence of three key players, i.e., China, India, and United States and their interests could be some sort of an overlap and intersection.” In short, the Indo-Pacific has rightly emerged as the economic and geopolitical center of gravity of the world in the 21st century. China unlocked its economy in the year 1978 and accomplished approximately a rate of 10 percent growth for three decades. China has lifted millions of people out of poverty through a systematic growth pattern. China has now risen to become the second largest economy in the world, second only to the United States. Japan, which enjoyed the position of the only Asian developed nation for decades, was pushed to the world’s third position. With their vigilant strategic investments, China’s economic growth and global influence are increasing.

After China declared itself the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its naval operations were limited to defending the coasts for nearly three decades until the 1980s. By the end of that decade, the strategy sought to expand its naval capabilities beyond coastal waters. Most of the Sea Lines of Communications of China pass through the Indian Ocean and a few through the Pacific Rim. One of China’s foremost concerns is the protection of these SLOCs. The Indian Ocean is home to major chokepoints that Chinese vessels must traverse and where any threat in this ocean directly distresses the ambitions of China. The rise of China as a superpower in Asia and its revival of the ancient Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) have raised concerns in India. Any nation, in order to ensure its sphere of influence would not only accumulate strength to its camp but also take measures that ensure that the enemy’s camp would be weakened without adequate logistics. In addition to port construction and acquisition efforts in the Indian Ocean that add to the value of these SLOCs and strengthen China’s logistical infrastructure, China’s concurrent naval modernization efforts also generate concerns for India. The evolution of Chinese naval modernization has been steady and it has eventually become the largest navy in Asia today, with a plentiful addition of surface ships and submarines. Far seas training and deployments in this region have become the new norm for China’s Navy.

China aims to create a counterbalance through economic and strategic partnerships with the various littoral nations in the IOR in order to reinforce her existence in the region. China’s investment in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, its electronic gathering amenities in isolated islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, and others are certain instances to prove China’s increasing interest in the IOR. China has maritime disputes with many of its neighbors and many of the Southeast Asian nations are in conflict with China over the latter’s expansionist tendencies and dominance. However, China has no major disputes or tensions with India’s neighbors in the IOR and is instead cultivating maritime partnerships with these states. For example, China is building maritime relations with Pakistan through its investments in Gwadar Port and a mainland highway connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in the Xinjiang region. All these efforts ensure that China will be somewhat relieved from the threat of chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and will have a smoothly flowing trade and supply chain.

Due to India’s growing dependence on oil and energy resources, any interference in the stability or peace of the Indian Ocean will have a cataclysmic impact on the economic and political stability of the nation. A peaceful and reliant Indian Ocean is the responsibility of the littoral and island states in this region to an extent that the “overall political character of the Indian Ocean had changed from one of European dominance to that of local assertion.”

Aswani Dravid is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Administration in University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.

References

Buckley, C. (2013, January 29). China Leader Affirms Policy on Islands. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/incoming-chinese-leader-will-not-to-bargain-on-disputed-territory.html

Dowdy, W. L., & Trood, R. B. (1983, September 1). The Indian Ocean: An Emerging Geostrategic Region. Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 38(3), 432-458.

Jain, B. (2017, April 4). India’s Security Concerns in the Indian Ocean Region: A Critical Analysis. Future Directions International. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/indias-security-concerns-indian-ocean-region-critical-analysis/

Kaplan, R. (2010). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York City: Random House.

Kumar, K. (2000). Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: APH Publishing.

Majumdar, D. (2016, June 27). Why the US Navy Should Fear China’s New 093B Nuclear Attack Submarine. The National Interest. Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-us-navy-should-fear-chinas-new-093b-nuclear-attack-16741

O’Rourke, R. (2017, January 5). China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report.

Pant, H. (2009). India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch between Ambitions and Capabilities. Pacific Affairs, 82(2), 279-297. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25608866

Sharma, A. (2018). The Indian Ocean: Cold War – Post-Cold War Scenario. International Journal of South Asian Studies , 23.

Wearden, G. (2010, August 16). Chinese economic boom has been 30 years in the making. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/aug/16/chinese-economic-boom

Featured Image: CSCL Pacific Ocean Elbe (Wikimedia Commons)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Call for Input: A Code of Conduct for the Indian Ocean

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By Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke and Admiral Dr. Jayanath Colombage

The Indian Ocean

The economic, strategic, and ultimately political importance of the Indian Ocean has been recognized for centuries. Mariners from Arabia, East Asia, and the Pacific, while plying their trade, studied weather patterns in the Indian Ocean and explored and traversed it regularly, laying the foundation of the rules of orderly maritime conduct. Intrepid mariners from Europe ventured through the Indian Ocean to the furthest reaches of East Asia and the Pacific in search of spices, as well as land and treasure to be acquired for their patrons, adding to the corpus of rules and practices that would become, over time, the Law of the Sea.

Today, the countries surrounding the Indian Ocean are home to some 2.7 billion people, or some 35 percent of the world’s population. The Indian Ocean provides vital access to the powerful economies of South Asia, East, and Southeast Asia, including supplies of energy from countries of the Persian Gulf and Africa. Some 70 percent of world trade and 50 percent of crude oil reaches their destinations through the Indian Ocean. More than 80 percent of the world’s maritime trade in crude oil passes through the chokepoints of the Indian Ocean, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 8 percent via the Bab el-Mandeb, and 35 percent through the Straits of Malacca. 

Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean

Sri Lanka’s geographically central location and its proximity to the major sea routes traversing the Indian Ocean may have inspired the nation’s political leaders to be proactive in initiating, from time to time, imaginative and broadly conservationist measures to protect and preserve this Ocean’s resources, as well as their concern that peace, order, and good governance be maintained among the communities that surround it to promote their well-being.

Thus, in 1971, at the initiative of Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike, later joined by the President of Tanzania, the United Nations General Assembly declared:

“The Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto … designated for all time as a Zone of Peace.” (A/RES/2832 (XXVI)

Adopted by the General Assembly at its 26th Session by a vote of 61 in favor and none against, but with some 55 abstentions, the Declaration called on the “great Powers” (a) to halt further escalation and expansion of their “military presence” in the Indian Ocean, and (b) to remove from the Indian Ocean all fixed elements of their rivalry, such as military bases, installations and logistical supply facilities, and even warships and aircraft, to the extent that they were intended to maintain a “military presence” in the area, and were not merely in transit on their lawful occasions. Implementation of the Declaration was to be through conclusion of an international agreement that would include (1) prohibition of the use of ships and aircraft against the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the U.N. Charter; and (2) guarantee the right of ships and aircraft of all nations, whether military or other, “free and unimpeded” use of the Indian Ocean and its airspace in accordance with international law. Efforts to implement the Declaration by its proponents supported by the Non-Aligned Group and some other States continued within the U.N. General Assembly until by the close of the Twentieth Century. Since then, such efforts seemed to have lost all momentum.

While the “great power rivalry” that caused concern in the 1970s might have receded, new developments of concern and the prevalence of illegal and criminal activity in the Indian Ocean moved President Maithripala Sirisena, when addressing the States of the Indian Ocean Rim at the Group’s Twentieth Anniversary Meeting in Jakarta in March 2017, to call on them to work out a stable legal framework that would put an end to trafficking of illicit drugs and other criminal activity in the Indian Ocean, while maintaining freedom of navigation in accordance with international law.

In February 2017, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, in an address at Deakin University in Australia, expressed concern that the post-Cold War multi-polar world had brought about “A massive transition of economic and military power to Asia within the Indian Ocean and the Pacific” and he concluded that, “the global political order, which produced the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is radically different from the current global dynamics…” He warned that “current agreement ambiguities could generate global economic disruption,” and said “The ideal solution for the Indian Ocean is for all parties to agree on a code of conduct for military vessels traversing the Indian Ocean” and that “the Code on the Freedom of Navigation in the Indian Ocean must include an effective and realistic mechanism on dispute resolution…” He concluded saying “any agreement, also needed to recognize the escalation in human smuggling, illicit drug trafficking and the relatively new phenomenon of maritime terrorism.”

The need to keep the vital sea lanes open for all and to maintain peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region, and ensure the right of all states to the freedom of navigation and overflight, was expressed by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe once again at the 2nd Indian Ocean Conference held in Colombo in September 2017.

Meanwhile, at the same event, the Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj said “The Indian Ocean is prone to non-traditional security threats like piracy, smuggling, maritime terrorism, illegal fishing, and trafficking of humans and narcotics. We realize that to effectively combat transnational security challenges across the Indian Ocean, including those posed by non-state actors, it is important to develop a security architecture that strengthens the culture of cooperation and collective action.” 

While waiting for further developments in the South China Sea negotiations between the ASEAN and China, as well as negotiations between the U.S and China relating to safety in the air and maritime encounters that could serve as inspiration to the 21 States currently members of IORA, the Pathfinder Foundation offers herewith a preliminary draft of a Code of Conduct aimed at organizing cooperative efforts to take action to meet security challenges in the Indian Ocean, including those posed by non-state actors. The draft which, where appropriate, follows the structure of Codes of Conduct designed for East Africa (Djibouti Code of Conduct) and West Africa (Yaoundé Code of Conduct) concluded under the auspices of IMO, is offered for review and comment.

View the draft Code of Conduct below or download here. Please submit your input and recommendations to indolankainitiatives@mmblgroup.com.

Pathfinder Foundation Indian Ocean Code of Conduct

A “Code of Conduct,” as commonly conceived, is not a legally binding document, but would prescribe rules to be observed in organizing cooperation in the pursuit of a common set of objectives. It should be noted that, in contrast, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea which is legally binding on States Parties to it, include the States participating in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Pathfinder Foundation commenced the New Year by inaugurating its Centre for the Law of the Sea (CLS) in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The draft Code of Conduct for the Indian Ocean was created to assist consideration of the idea by the 21 littoral States members of the ‘Indian Ocean Rim Association’ (IORA).

Through an inclusive process and cooperative engagement, a Code of Conduct may be devised and disseminated to further enhance peace and prosperity in the Indian Ocean. 

A graduate in History and post graduate in International Relations (The Hague), Bernard Goonetilleke spent nearly four decades as an officer of the Sri Lanka Foreign Service.  He took over the post of chairmanship of Sri Lanka Institute of Tourism and Hotel Management (SLITHM) in August 2008 and later appointed as Chairman of Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority (SLTDA) and Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau (SLTPB) with effect from November and December 2008, respectively until February 2010. His career as a Foreign Service officer began in 1970 and has included postings to Sri Lanka diplomatic missions in Kuala Lumpur, New York, Bangkok, Washington D.C., Geneva and Beijing. He held several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including Director General (Multilateral Affairs) (1997-2000) and ending as Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003-2004). During his career, he served as Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva (1992-1997), during which period he was concurrently accredited to the Holy See and as Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations in Vienna.  Later he served as Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (2000-2003), during which assignment he was concurrently accredited as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of Mongolia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  He also served as Acting Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the UN in New York (2004-2005) and ended his diplomatic career as Ambassador to the United States of America (2005-2008). Following the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE in 2002, he headed the Secretariat as Director General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) and functioned as one of the four members of the government negotiating team. Mr. Goonetilleke functions as Chairperson of the Pathfinder Foundation since 2010.

Admiral (Dr.) Jayanath Colombage is a former chief of Sri Lanka navy who retired after an active service of 37 years as a four-star Admiral. He is a highly decorated officer for gallantry and distinguished service. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College in India and Royal College of Defence Studies, UK. He holds a PhD from General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University. He also holds MSc on defence and strategic studies from Madras university and MA on International Studies from Kings college, London. He is a visiting lecturer at the University of Colombo, Defence Services Command and Staff college (Sri Lanka), Kotelawala Defence University, Bandaranaike Center for International Studies and Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute. He was the former Chairman of Sri Lanka Shipping Corporation and an adviser to the President of Sri Lanka on maritime affairs. He is a Fellow of Nautical Institute, London UK. Admiral Colombage is currently the Director of the Centre for Indo- Lanka Initiatives of the Pathfinder Foundation. He is also a member of the Advisory council of the ‘Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka.’ And a Guest Professor at Sichuan University in China.

Featured Image: 1941 map of Indian Ocean (National Geographic)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The Indian Navy’s Master Defense Plan 

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By Periklis Stampoulis

Introduction

The South Asian region is dominated by India. Along with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, it forms a self-contained geographic region called the Indian subcontinent. Geopolitical imperatives for India’s security and independence are the control, or at least influence, of the sub-continent and maritime expansion through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).1

The Strategic Environment and Maritime Requirements

By fulfilling its “destiny,” India bumps into Chinese regional interests. Attempting to expand its own interests, commercial activities, and energy goods imports, China has launched the “String of Pearls” project, namely the construction of a web of naval infrastructure (ports and bases) throughout the IOR. These activities, along with the arms sales to IOR states, cause fears of Chinese encirclement and thus fuel a long simmering rivalry between India and China.2

China has already built and operates a military base in Djibouti, while Chinese-financed ports in the IOR such as Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, along with Chittagong and Sonadia in Bangladesh, provide amenities in Chinese Navy (PLAN) ships.

In order to address these upcoming issues in its “natural” maritime environment, Indian political leaders realized that a strong and formidable Indian Navy (IN) is the answer to increasing maritime competition in the IOR. Therefore, a Maritime Security Strategy was promulgated, where it is stated that the primary interest in the region is the IOR.3

The implementation of this strategy is primarily centered on the Indian Navy. Critical missions and tasks are outlined in 2015 Indian Maritime Doctrine. There are four types of operations in which the Indian Navy (IN) is (and will be) involved: a) military, b) diplomatic, c) constabulary and d) benign.4

The military role is a navy’s essence. The most important military missions derived from the IN’s objectives adhere to Corbettian theory (Sea Control, Sea Denial, and SLOC protection),5 while tasking entails the whole spectrum of modern naval warfare such as Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), and Electronic Warfare (EW).6

Diplomatic and constabulary roles cover a range of activities from participation in Peace Support Operations to anti-piracy and anti-terrorist operations.7 The benign role of the IN is comprised of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Search and Rescue (SAR).8

The Indian Navy’s Current and Future Situation

However ambitious the IN’s official documents are, they are limited by the IN’s real capabilities. A quick analysis reveals the numbers are not yet there. The IN currently operates:9

  • 1 Aircraft Carrier (INS Vikramaditya), capable of carrying 26 MiG-29 fighters and 10 Ka-31 helicopters – a second, the INS Viraat, is slated for decommissioning this year
  • 11 Destroyers
  • 14 Frigates
  • 23 Corvettes
  • 1 nuclear-powered submarine
  • 13 conventionally-powered submarines
  • 4 Mine countermeasures vessels
  • 1 Landing Platform Deck (LPD)
  • 8 Landing Ships (LST)
  • 4 Fleet Tankers (AORs)
  • 10 large Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs)

Taking a closer look at India’s primary area of interest, the IOR, it is appararent that it can be divided into smaller areas. Two of the areas are especially critical for Indian maritime policy: the Arab Sea and the Gulf of Bengal. The IN has only one aircraft carrier, thus one fully operational Task Force (TF). This means that only one of the two vital areas can be adequately covered at any given time in the event of armed conflict. This TF’s missions could vary from sea control of the assigned area to escorting the LPD and LST-comprised Amphibious Task Force (ATF).Therefore, the Indian Naval High Command must prioritize which of these areas is more critical and assign the carrier group within. Remaining units will deploy in the “secondary” area, maintaining a more defensive posture and with the aid of shore-based aircraft.

Submarines could monitor critical chokepoints such as the Hormuz Strait, Bab el Mandeb, and Andaman and Nicobar islands. Additionally, the IN would mostly likely establish patrols along critical Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs). Strategic missiles submarines would deploy in the open sea, ready to launch their payload if ordered.

Tensions with neighboring states and China’s ascent have forced India to re-evaluate its naval strategy and strengthen its navy. The IN has launched an ambitious 200-ship-navy initiative utilizing Indian shipbuilding industry and indigenous research and development programs (R&D), along with foreign defense firms (e.g. Rafael).10 Between 2025 and 2030, the projected IN will consist of the following units:

  • 3 Aircraft Carriers (AC), one of them nuclear-powered, capable of carrying 26, 30, and 45 fixed-wing aircraft respectively.
  • 12 Destroyers
  • 20 Frigates
  • 12 ASW, 16 Shallow Water ASW, and 6 ASuW Corvettes.
  • 12 Minesweepers
  • 18 Attack Submarines (SSNs)
  • 4-7 nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
  • 4-5 LPDs
  • Various offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) capable of carrying SR SAMs (e.g IGLA SA-18)
  • Various multi-role helicopters and UAVs
  • 5 AORs and 4 Multi-Utility Vessels

Zone Defense

With a fleet of this size, the IN is significantly more capable of addressing regional military tensions  with another major power such as China, along with its regional allies (mainly Pakistan), or provide support to a friendly country attacked by an adversary – e.g. Myanmar attacked by China.

As part of the ongoing sea trials, the first indigenously built, Scorpene class submarine Kalvari undertook it’s first torpedo firing on 26 May 2017. The submarine is being built by the Mazagaon Docks Limited (MDL) at Mumbai. As part of the project, MDL will build a total of six submarines. (Wikimedia Commons)

India can currently exert influence over a large portion of the IOR and has no desire to expand its territory in the littorals. Therefore, it can be classified as a status quo power. Its main objective is to defend its dominant position, relative to the rest of the sub-continent, against any outsider’s attack. But how is this defense best accomplished?

The most suitable strategy would be zone defense. The overall area to be defended by the IN can be divided into two distinct sub-areas, where the first contains the Indian littoral. Therefore, small surface combatants, attack submarines, land-based aircraft, and shore installations are most useful here.11

The second sub-area covers the vast oceanic region starting from the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and covering the rest of the IOR, namely of the Arab Sea, the Gulf of Bengal, and the region south of Sri Lanka. It is a vast sea mass without any sign of land, except for minor islets in the southern part (e.g. Ascension Island, Diego Garcia). Consequently, the most appropriate form of naval warfare involves carrier-based task forces with ships and aircraft equipped with long-range sensors and weapons for the purpose of exercising sea control.

There is also another key geographic feature: the Andaman-Nicobar island complex, which is a perfect setting for Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) operations due to its infinite bays. These can provide safe havens for small craft or submarines, air defense installations, and anti-ship missile batteries. The significance of the Andaman-Nicobar A2/AD “bubble” has already been acknowledged by the Chinese.12

The Andaman & Nicobar islands. (Himfact via Youtube)

In this plan, India would deploy a basketball-style two-zone defense (inner-outer, each one favoring different types of naval operations) and an A2/AD “bubble” in the vicinity of the Andaman-Nicobar island complex to act as a bulkwark against Chinese intrusions from the east.

The Scope of Potential Operations

The IN’s master naval war plan is probably based on the establishment of Sea Control of the IOR obtained by the three CBGs. Depending on the prioritization of threats, two CBGs could unite and form a Carrier Task Force (CATF), with significant firepower capable of bringing a decisive outcome. By obtaining Sea Control of the Arab Sea, the Gulf of Bengal and the region south of Sri Lanka, CBGs/CATF, could provide long-range protection to an Amphibious Task Force in order to occupy an enemy naval base or to reoccupy a previously lost national territory.

A CBG’s probable composition could consist of 3-4 Destroyers, 5-6 Frigates, 4 ASW Corvettes, and probably one submarine. Every CBG possesses enhanced ASuW capabilities because of BrahMos anti-ship missiles (240nm range), and organic air assets (fighter/-helicopters),  defense-in-depth against air threats (fighters, Barak-8 MR SAM, Barak-1 SR SAM, SA-16 SR SAM and AK-630 CIWS), ASW capabilities (e.g. towed sonar arrays), EW capabilities, and a submarine capable of executing multiple tasks (ASuW, SSK, patrolling, intelligence gathering, etc.)

There are some remaining units not joining a CBG: 2-3 Destroyers, 2-5 Frigates, and probably a number of ASuW Corvettes. This task group could be assigned various additional tasks from the close escort of the ATF(s), to the harassment and outflanking of an enemy naval force.

Amphibious operation capabilities are upgraded with the presence of 5 LPDs which can form one or two ATFs occupying a hostile naval base (e.g. a Pakistani or another “String of Pearls” base) or re-capturing national territory. Minesweepers can be utilized for “paving” the way for the ATF to come or clear national territory from enemy mines.

Indian maritime security strategy acknowledges 10 chokepoints in the entire IOR as of critical importance.13 Monitoring them is an appropriate task for attack submarines. Apart from 3 submarines for CBG support (1 per CBG), remaining units could be utilized as their substitutes or establish patrols in assigned sectors covering the IOR SLOCs. SSBNs are expected to deploy in certain areas in order to strike enemy strategic infrastructure. A certain number of them could be expected to deploy in the South China Sea.

Other small units such as patrol vessels could be a threat in the littorals, harassing the advancing enemy force in coordination with shore batteries. Patrol vessels could be an asset in an Andaman and Nicobar A2/AD outpost. Unconventional swarm attacks by fast patrol boats, missile “traps” by armored OPVs or UAVs, minefields, and other types of operations against westbound “incomers” could severely impede their passage and cause significant losses.

The same concept of operations applies in the “inner” zone of the Indian littoral. OPVs, land-based aircraft and UAVs, and shore installations will operate against “incomers.” There is however a vital difference: unlike the other areas of operations, this inner zone constitutes the final line of defense in case of other areas’ breach.

Conclusion

There is an escalating tension in the IOR between two regional powers: India and China. The latter hopes to extend its influence by controlling IOR SLOCS (among other things), which deprive India of its natural maritime environment. India is trying to create a formidable navy, capable of addressing ever-growing Chinese ambitions and supporting its regional rivals in the Indian sub-continent (e.g. Pakistan). Judging by the IN’s future composition, a basketball-style two-zone defense, along with an A2/AD outpost in the Andaman/Nicobar islands, is the most probable way of the IN defending the country’s vital areas.

Periklis Stampoulis is a Hellenic Navy Officer. He holds a Master of Arts (MA) in International Relations and Strategic Studies from Panteion University, Greece.

Views expressed in this article are the author’s personal opinion and do not necessarily coincide with the official view of the Hellenic Navy.

References

[1] Stratfor, 2012, ‘The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World’, 01/04/12, [online], available in < https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-india-shifting-self-contained-world>, access 14/06/17

[2] Kaplan R.D., 2009, ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, [online], available in < https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2009-03-01/center-stage-21st-century>, access 15/06/17

[3] Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) 2015, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (Naval Strategic Publication (NSP) 1.2), October 2015, p.32, [online], available in < https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf>, access 16/06/17

[4] Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) 2015, Indian Maritime Doctrine (Naval Strategic Publication 1.1), first print August 2009, p.91, [online], available in https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf, access 17/06/17

[5] Ibid, p.92-97

[6] Ibid, p.97-105

[7] Ibid, p. 116-119

[8] Ibid, p.120-122

[9] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016, ‘The Military Balance 2016’, Routledge, London- New York, p.252

[10] Further information at www.janes.com

[11] Vego M., 2005, Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Waters, second revised and expanded edition, Frank Cass, London-Portland OR, p.134

[12] Kaplan R.D., ‘Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean’, ibid

[13] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, ibid, p.18-21

Featured Image: INS Rajput firing a BrahMos missile (Wikimedia Commons)