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By Raj Mohabeer, IOC and Kiruja Micheni, Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment, International Maritime Organization

Introduction

The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) and Red Sea region features a diverse and evolving array of maritime security architectures and initiatives. From international treaties to strategic partnerships and operational centres, these frameworks aim to counter maritime threats and enhance governance. However, questions remain regarding their effectiveness, efficiency, coordination and sustainability. This article examines the region’s key maritime security mechanisms—focusing in particular on the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC/JA) and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA)—and explores opportunities to strengthen collaboration among them.

As a vital maritime corridor linking major global trade routes, the WIO and Red Sea region holds significant strategic importance. Yet, it faces a range of persistent and interlinked maritime threats—including piracy and armed robbery against ships, illicit trafficking, irregular migration, and illegal fishing, pollution (including deliberate)—exacerbated by jurisdictional gaps and weak coordination among enforcement agencies.

Several international and regional initiatives have been undertaken to counter piracy and enhance maritime security in the WIO, primarily through capacity- and capability-building efforts. Key international efforts include the formation of the Combined Maritime Forces (CTF) in 2001, Operation ATALANTA (launched in 2008), the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in January 2009, and the formation of Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (SHADE) shortly thereafter. Regional initiatives include the Indian Ocean Rim Association’s 2013 designation of maritime security as one of its six priority areas, the establishment of the Colombo Security Conclave in 2011, and India’s launch of the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative in 2015, which also led to the creation of the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region.

There is a need to recognize the wide range of fora and think tanks that contribute to understanding and dialogue on maritime security issues in the Western Indian Ocean, including the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue, the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, the Global Coast Guard Forum, Ocean Beyond Piracy (now closed), One Earth Future, Stable Seas, the Institute of Strategic Studies, African think tanks, the University of Pretoria, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

Although the WIO region welcomed the above initiatives, it advocates for a sustained and indigenous regional mechanism. It is in this context that this article focusses and examines the region’s key maritime security mechanisms and explores opportunities to strengthen collaboration among them. The article focuses on the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC/JA) and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA).

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC)

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) was launched in 2009 with the support of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a direct response to the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Recognizing the urgent need for collective action, 20 of the 21 eligible countries from the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden signed on at its inception. The DCoC established a collaborative framework to address piracy and armed robbery at sea, structured around four foundational pillars: regional training, national legislation, information sharing, and capacity building.

As maritime threats in the region evolved, it became clear that piracy was only one aspect of a broader security challenge. This led to the adoption of the Jeddah Amendment in 2017, which expanded the DCoC to address a wider range of transnational maritime crimes, including human trafficking, illicit smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and environmental violations. This shift transformed the DCoC from a piracy-focused initiative into a more comprehensive and flexible maritime security framework.

One of the DCoC’s most valuable contributions lies in its role as a platform for political engagement and regional policy coordination. It promotes alignment among participating states on maritime security strategies, encourages mutual support, and strengthens collective capacity by facilitating joint training programs, exercises, and information-sharing. Building on this foundation, the DCoC is developing a Regional Maritime Security Strategy to provide a unified framework that harmonizes national and regional efforts, strengthens coordination with international partners, and enhances long-term sustainability and impact.

The Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA)

While the DCoC provides the strategic and policy-oriented framework for regional maritime security, the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA) plays a complementary role by building the operational and institutional capacities needed to put those strategies into action. The RMSA takes a holistic approach to maritime security. This multi-dimensional framework is designed to empower regional states to detect, deter, and respond to a broad range of illicit maritime activities and crimes.

Among RMSA’s most significant achievements are the creation of two vital regional institutions that have dramatically improved maritime domain awareness (MDA) and coordination:

The Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar: Serving as an intelligence-gathering and analysis hub, the RMIFC collects maritime data from diverse sources, processes it to generate real-time situational awareness, and shares threat information with partner states for the identification of vessels of interest. This enables early warning and proactive threat mitigation across the region.
The Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles: Functioning as the region’s operational nerve center, the RCOC enables quick response to illicit maritime threats by the pooling of the region’s expensive air and surface assets and coordinates joint responses to maritime security incidents. It facilitates multinational cooperation on law enforcement operations such as patrols, interdictions, and crisis management, ensuring swift and synchronized action against maritime crimes.

It is important to recognize the need for sustained inter-regional dialogue and collaboration. The focus of the RMSA is on the abnormal movement of vessels, which is not limited to the WIO but extends worldwide. Therefore, the threats and risks either affect the region directly or spread beyond it. Most maritime traffic is international in nature, and all types of vessels could be involved in illicit maritime activities. For example, there is evidence of fishing vessels being used to traffic arms, drugs, or humans. According to TRAFFIC, illegal wildlife trade involves the trafficking of several protected species from the region to distant markets. This is why the RMSA emphasizes partnerships with other regional and international entities.

Except for one, all RMSA members are also signatories to the DCoC/JA. These countries cannot afford to duplicate institutions and tools at either the national or regional levels. Following the DCoC High-Level Meetings in June and November 2022, the signatory states resolved to develop operational collaboration with the RMFIC and RCOC within the regional Information Sharing Network. This collaboration aims to enhance information sharing and coordination at sea, strengthening the region’s ability to respond appropriately to threats and combat illicit maritime activities. It will improve Maritime Situational Awareness, Maritime Threat Awareness, and ensure that necessary steps are taken to apprehend and prosecute offenders, thereby addressing the issue of catch-and-release practices. So far, the RMSA has significantly bolstered the WIO’s capacity to address maritime threats in a coordinated, resilient, and sustainable manner.

The Red Sea Council

Formally known as the Council of Arab and African States Bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea Council was established in January 2020. Its members are all signatories to the DCoC. Though not exclusively a maritime security agreement, the Council provides a political and strategic framework for addressing transnational threats and fostering regional dialogue. Once fully operational, the Council has the potential to foster strong partnerships with the DCoC in the Red Sea area—like the role the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) plays in the WIO—particularly in coordinating regional political support for maritime security initiatives.

Existing Important Initiatives

Initiatives such as SHADE, CMF, and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) contribute to improving maritime security and the implementation of the broader objectives of the DCoC, with the RMSA centers (RMIFC and RCOC) serving as operational hubs for countries within their respective areas. The RMSA seeks to develop operational collaboration with these initiatives, which would significantly contribute to enhancing regional maritime capabilities.

Additionally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) plays a crucial role in supporting the implementation of the DCoC/JA through political engagement, regional integration, and the harmonization of maritime security strategies among its member states in the Horn of Africa.

The African Union (AU) also has an important role, particularly through its Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, which provides a continental framework for maritime governance and security by promoting coordination and coherence among regional maritime security mechanisms.

The Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA), an informal forum that carries forward the work of the CGPCS provides a complementary platform that enables international maritime stakeholders, including the industry and non-governmental organizations, to coordinate regional efforts through transparency and high-level information sharing.

Complementary Strengths and Synergies Between DCoC and RMSA

Although the DCoC/JA and the RMSA were developed independently and under separate institutional frameworks, their convergence is both natural and necessary due to their complementary roles in strengthening maritime governance in the WIO. While the DCoC functions as a strategic and normative framework—anchored in political commitment, policy coherence, and regional dialogue—the RMSA translates this strategic vision into operational reality through institutional support, legal reforms, and technical capacity-building.

This complementary relationship exemplifies a balanced approach to maritime security. As maritime security scholar Dr. Christian Bueger has argued, effective governance at sea requires a combination of top-down strategic frameworks and bottom-up operational mechanisms.¹ In this context, the DCoC ensures a shared regional vision and high-level commitment among member states, while the RMSA provides the practical infrastructure, such as regional coordination centers and data-sharing systems, to implement this vision on the ground.

Legal and security expert Dr. Ian Ralby notes that maritime threats are inherently transnational, transcending jurisdictional boundaries and exploiting gaps in regional enforcement.² He emphasizes that sustainable maritime security must be built on collaborative frameworks that go beyond narrow national interests. The interaction between the DCoC and RMSA encapsulates this ideal by fostering intergovernmental cooperation, harmonizing policies, and promoting joint operational responses to common threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and maritime trafficking.

Dr. Carina Bruwer of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa highlights the extensive challenges posed by transnational maritime crimes across Africa’s coastal regions.³ She stresses the need for robust regional cooperation and the development of institutional capacities to effectively address these threats. Her analysis aligns with the collaborative objectives of initiatives like the DCoC/JA and the RMSA, underscoring the importance of integrating strategic frameworks with operational capabilities.

Together, DCoC and RMSA represent more than a sum of their parts—they form a layered maritime security architecture that aligns political vision with operational execution. This integrated model bridges the often-wide gap between intention and implementation, ensuring that regional dialogue translates into tangible maritime governance outcomes.

Common DCoC and RMSA Challenges and Limitations

While the DCoC and the RMSA have made significant strides in strengthening maritime governance in the WIO, their full potential remains constrained by several enduring challenges. One of the most critical obstacles is the irregular political commitment and varying capacities across the region. It is hoped that the work of the newly established DCoC Working Group 3 will encourage more regional states to actively engage in collective efforts for actions at sea in the wider region of interest.

In addition to national disparities, coordination among the numerous stakeholders involved in these initiatives is often difficult. The complexity of engaging national governments, regional actors, international development partners, and private sector entities frequently leads to overlapping mandates and fragmented decision-making. Bureaucratic bottlenecks, compounded by limited absorption capacity, differing strategic priorities, and competition for resources, can delay or dilute the effectiveness of otherwise promising programs. These gaps not only hinder policy alignment but also lead to duplication of efforts and inefficiencies in operational responses. Compounding these governance and coordination challenges is the rapidly evolving nature of maritime threats. Criminal syndicates operating in the region are becoming increasingly sophisticated, exploiting weak jurisdictions and advancing their tactics faster than regulatory bodies can adapt. Piracy, illicit trafficking, arms smuggling, and IUU fishing are no longer isolated activities; they are interconnected elements of complex transnational criminal networks.

Addressing these evolving and adaptive threats requires a proactive, coordinated regional response. This demands sustained investment in modern surveillance and enforcement technologies, alongside continuous capacity building. Cutting-edge tools—such as satellite imagery, artificial intelligence (AI) for threat prediction, and big data analytics for tracking maritime activity—hold great promise for enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA). However, effective deployment and maintenance of these tools require substantial technical expertise and financial resources, which are unevenly distributed across the region.

Despite these challenges, there are several pathways through which the DCoC and RMSA can work together to strengthen and further enhance regional maritime security. These include national institutional and structural improvements, a coordinated multi-agency approach at the national level, a shift towards cost-effective investment focusing on human resource development, leveraging technology, fostering improved and inclusive partnerships, and advancing political advocacy and diplomacy.

Conclusion

The foundation of addressing maritime security challenges remains the national maritime capability, which requires sustained and collaborative support from the international community. The absorption capacity of states must be carefully considered.

The collaborative efforts of the DCoC and RMSA have significantly enhanced the maritime security landscape in the WIO. By integrating strategic policy frameworks with operational implementation capacities, these initiatives address the region’s complex maritime threats in a holistic and adaptive manner. The synergy between the DCoC/JA and RMSA demonstrates the power of regional cooperation grounded in shared responsibility, mutual benefit, and respect for local ownership.

Achieving robust maritime security in the WIO and Red Sea requires halting the proliferation of frameworks; rather, it demands effective coordination among existing mechanisms and the international community. The DCoC/JA provides a comprehensive framework for cooperation, information sharing, legal harmonization, and capacity building. The RMSA, through the IOC, complements this by supporting practical implementation in the WIO region, particularly through regional centers and operational support. CGIMA can serve as an effective platform for advocating improved coordination of international efforts.

To extend these benefits to the Red Sea, the DCoC/JA should actively encourage engagement with the Red Sea Council. Just as the IOC has supported implementation in the WIO, a strengthened partnership with the Red Sea Council could foster similar arrangements in the northern part of the DCoC region. Anchoring such cooperation in political will and sustained capacity-building will be essential to building a resilient, inclusive, and regionally owned maritime security architecture. This should be further strengthened through the ongoing DCoC initiative to develop the regional maritime security strategy.

Mr. Raj Mohabeer has been the Officer in Charge at the General Secretariat of the Indian Ocean Commission since 2000. Prior to this period, he had been working as an economist at the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development of the Republic of Mauritius. His portfolio includes economic cooperation, trade, regional integration and infrastructure, maritime security and blue economy – areas of intervention that span to countries beyond the IOC Member States and region. Mr. Mohabeer has been promoting Blue Economy and has spearheaded the development of a Maritime Security Architecture for the Western Indian Ocean under the MASE Programme, actively advocating for the participation of the international community to join in. He has also been the head of the Secretariat for the Contact Group Against Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia.

Mr. Kiruja Micheni, currently works with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as Project Manager for the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment and has been with the project for the last 12 years. In his role, he oversees the implementation of the Revised Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and illicit maritime activity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden Area. Mr. Micheni started his career in the Kenyan Navy and has extensive experience in maritime security. He has also worked as a security expert for international NGOs and the corporate sector. He is an alumnus of the University of Wales (Cardiff University) in the UK and holds a master’s degree in International Transport.

Endnotes

1. Christian Bueger, “A Glue that Withstands Heat? The Promises and Perils of Maritime Domain Awareness,” in Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, ed. Edward R. Lucas, Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie and Felix Falck Jensen (IOS Press, 2020), 235-245, https://bueger.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Bueger-2020-The-promises-and-perils-of-MDA.pdf

2. Ian Ralby, “Cooperative Security to Counter Cooperative Criminals,” African Security Analysis Report. Defence IQ, 2017, 4-7, https://eco-cdn.iqpc.com/gfiles/_jci6qafrican_security_analysis_-_2017.pdf

3. Carina Bruwer, “Africa’s Ocean of Organised Crime,” Institute for Security Studies, 2023, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-ocean-of-organised-crime

References

Bruwer, Carina. “Africa’s Ocean of Organised Crime,” Institute for Security Studies, 2023.

https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africas-ocean-of-organised-crime

Bueger, Christian. “A Glue that Withstands Heat? The Promises and Perils of Maritime Domain Awareness,” in Maritime Security: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from Maritime Piracy and Narcotics Interdiction, ed. Edward R. Lucas, Samuel Rivera-Paez, Thomas Crosbie and Felix Falck Jensen. IOS Press, 2020. https://bueger.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Bueger-2020-The-promises-and-perils-of-MDA.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Who Secures the Western Indian Ocean? The Need for Strategic Dialogue.” Center for Maritime Strategy, September 19, 2024.

European Union. Maritime Security Program (MASE), 2012. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8592-2012-INIT/en/pdf

International Maritime Organization. Djibouti Code of Conduct (2009). https://dcoc.org/about-us/

International Maritime Organization. The Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of Conduct (2017). https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/A2%20Revised%20Code%20Of%20Conduct%20Concerning%20The%20Repression%20Of%20Piracy%20Armed%20Robbery%20Against%20Ships%20Secretariat.pdf

Ralby, Ian. “Cooperative Security to Counter Cooperative Criminals,” African Security Analysis Report.

Defence IQ, “African Security: 2017 and Beyond,” Defense IQ Press, 2017. https://ecocdn.iqpc.com/gfiles/_jci6qafrican_security_analysis_-_2017.pdf

Featured Image: DCoC High Level Meeting in Cape Town, RSA October 24-26, 2023. (DCoC photo)

African Maritime Forces Summit Week

India’s Evolving Role in Supporting African Maritime Security Architecture

June 18, 2025 Guest Author Leave a comment

African Maritime Forces Week

By Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi

Maritime security in an African context is increasingly assuming prominence within the wider African security agenda.¹ Despite the continent being surrounded by water on all sides, “the process of developing an agenda for maritime security has been a relatively new development.”² Africa’s colonial legacy prompted an inward and continental outlook, resulting in African nations being termed “sea blind.”³ Following the onset of Somalia piracy and attacks on commercial shipping, African countries and international organizations realized the vitality of ensuring maritime security. Nations, particularly ones that are endowed with long coastlines and extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZ), quickly realized the importance of protecting their maritime domain to facilitate national growth and development. However, the capabilities and capacities of African countries to undertake the task of ensuring maritime security remain limited. Lack of political will, inter-agency coordination, overlapping interests of regional and sub-regional organizations, lack of funding, and insufficient technical competencies and capacities are some of the persisting challenges.

For India and African nations, a safe and secure maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a prerequisite for achieving sustained national development. Such security is not simply restricted to guarding coastlines or territories. It also involves safeguarding national interests in EEZs and protecting sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs) and trading routes. The African continent’s stake in the maritime domain is reflected in the fact that 38 of its 54 countries have coastlines or are small island nations. The continent is endowed with a coastline of about 26,000 nautical miles and the overall maritime industry in the coastline is estimated to be worth around $1 trillion per year.⁴ This includes ‘offshore hydrocarbon, energy, tourism, maritime transport, shipping and fishing sectors.’⁵

Africa’s maritime environment is globally significant. Huge amounts of international shipping activity pass through African waters. “Around 90 percent of the continent’s trade is carried by sea, thereby making the African Maritime Domain (AMD) crucial for commercial, environmental, developmental and security reasons.”⁶

In Africa, “the initial continent-wide efforts to beef up search and rescue capacities evolved with the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,”⁷ following which a host of maritime rescue coordination centers and sub-centers were commissioned, ranging from Mombasa, Kenya, to Cape Town, South Africa, Lagos, Nigeria, Monrovia, Liberia and Rabat, Morocco.⁸ African maritime issues were discussed through a number of international meetings (conferences, symposiums, workshops) beginning in 2005, which provided platforms for African maritime stakeholders to come together and deliberate on issues of common interest in the maritime domain.⁹ These included Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS), Eastern and Southern Africa-Western Indian Ocean (EASWIO) conference, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) led by India.

The IMO also sponsored various meetings which led to the adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in 2009, which subsequently led to the opening of three information sharing centres (ISCs) in Mombasa, Kenya; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and Sana’a, Yemen. In 2012, the African Union’s 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) was released which realized the potential of the AMD and the possibility of exploiting Africa’s Ocean resources in a sustainable manner to achieve economic growth and development. This was followed by the Lomé Charter in 2016.

Since then, African countries are paying increasing attention to concepts such as “blue economy” or “blue growth” which is vital for the sustainable development of Africa’s coastal economies and ensuring food and energy security. Maritime security and blue economy are intimately linked: “secure oceans are a precondition for the development of the blue economy.”¹⁰ A stronger blue economy could play a pivotal “role in alleviating some of the root causes of maritime crimes” for African countries in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region.¹¹

The current African Maritime Forces Summit (AMFS) 2025 also reflects an attempt to bring service chiefs and senior leaders to discuss aspects of naval capabilities such as promoting shared awareness, interoperability, crisis response capability, and capacity building to improve Africa’s maritime domain security.

Locating Africa within the Indo-Pacific Discourse

The twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as a key maritime domain and a hub of global trade and energy supplies. The Indo-Pacific region’s geographical boundaries stretch from the eastern shores of Africa, i.e. the Western Indian Ocean, to the western shores of America, and include important maritime choke points at Bab el Mandeb and Malacca Strait.¹² Japan, India and France were among the first to recognize this geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific. Although the U.S.’ initial conception of the Indo-Pacific did not include any African states, Washington did affirm to “integrate African states in Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific forums” in the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan African document released in August 2022.¹³ Africa’s inclusion in the Indo-Pacific is today also backed by several European countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In many ways, East African and Western Indian Ocean countries are central to the Indo-Pacific discourse.¹⁴ From an African perspective, three main priorities have emerged. The first relates to the growing militarization in the region, especially in the Horn of Africa, in which countries are setting military bases, regularly deploying naval warships, and investing heavily in hard infrastructure. While African countries do have genuine infrastructural deficiencies which require investments, not all the big-ticket investments and hard infrastructure projects are aligned with the national development priorities of African countries. The extensive foreign presence and growing militarization of the region is a source of tension for African countries and could have a destabilizing impact on the region.¹⁵

The second priority relates to the imperative of combating and tackling the menace of piracy and transnational crime. This poses severe challenges to African countries in the WIO, given the volume of trade that goes on this increasingly significant maritime trade route. Afghanistan’s opium production fuels maritime crimes throughout the WIO and provides important funding for violent non-state actors. According to Stable Seas, there are “19 active violent non-state actors that operate in the Western Indian Ocean region.”¹⁶

The third priority is ocean pollution, including dumping of toxic waste and emission of fumes by ships. All these issues pose significant threats but also provide an opportunity for countries within the Indo-Pacific to engage and cooperate in a constructive manner to seek solutions. This has increased the significance of the WIO and its littoral states to the Indo-Pacific discourse.

India’s Role in Supporting African Maritime Security Architecture

Maritime security cooperation has emerged as an important subset of broader Africa-India ties. India, sitting astride critical sea-lanes of communication in the IOR is emerging as a maritime power. The Indian Navy is increasingly positioning itself as a regional security provider with the principal objective of effectively patrolling the regional commons, as “a source of positive deterrence and provider of regional goods.”¹⁷ At the same time, there has been a growing maritime consciousness amongst African States about the importance of securing their maritime domain and sustainable use of marine resources in order to foster wealth creation and development.

Although engagement has been mostly bilateral, India and African countries are increasing their multilateral engagement through regional organizations like Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and partaking in multinational maritime exercises like MILAN and Cutlass Express. Four principle avenues of India-Africa maritime cooperation have emerged:

Training African maritime and military personnel at various Indian institutes;
The Indian Navy regularly conducting anti-piracy patrols, escorting merchant vessels and maintaining a sustained presence in African waters due to its mission-based deployment patterns;
Increased information-sharing to develop maritime domain awareness (MDA) by establishing greater linkages with information fusion centers and maritime coordination centers in the region; and
Developing listening stations and posts, including one in Madagascar, another in Agalega island off Mauritius, and a proposed one in Assumption Island off Seychelles.

These efforts have been complemented by regular goodwill port visits, conclusion of white shipping agreements, conducting hydrographic surveys for African countries, and developing the Coastal Radar Surveillance network in Mauritius and Seychelles. India has recognized the varying priorities of African countries and has fine-tuned its own ways of maritime security cooperation in order to effectively respond to the emerging challenges.

Strategic Expansion: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR

Back in 2015 when Prime Minister Modi visited Mauritius, he articulated India’s vision of ‘SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region),’ which primarily focused on improving relations with India’s immediate neighbours like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles.¹⁸ It attempted to advance cooperation by utilizing Indian expertise and capability to address common maritime challenges. Fast-forward to 2025, India has now advanced the vision of Maritime Heads for Active Security and Growth for All in the Region (MAHASAGAR) which reflects a strategic recalibration intended to position India as a consequential maritime power in the Indian Ocean and extend its ambitions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It represents a strategic expansion of the SAGAR vision to encompass East African littorals and the wider Indo-Pacific region. This progression is not mere rhetorical evolution. As India seeks to deepen its naval diplomacy, Africa has emerged as the new strategic frontier and gateway for its “broader ambitions as a credible and preferred security partner.”¹⁹ Today, MAHASAGAR signifies India’s recognition of Africa as central to its strategic maritime calculus.

AIKEYME 2025 and IOS Sagar initiative

Under the MAHASAGAR framework, two landmark initiatives were launched. First was the Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) initiative, a naval wargame to increase interoperability with African navies and maritime agencies, which took place in off Dar es-Salaam, co-hosted by the Indian Navy and the Tanzanian Peoples’ Defence Force (TPDF) in April 2025.²⁰ Exercise participants included Kenya, Mozambique, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and South Africa. This was the first such multinational maritime exercise involving India and African nations designed to synergise combined operations to develop collaborative solutions to address regional maritime insecurities, including piracy, illegal fishing and trafficking of narcotics and small arms.

India also conducts trilateral exercises with Mozambique and Tanzania – known as the India-Mozambique-Tanzania Trilateral Maritime Exercise (IMT-TRILAT) – and with Brazil and South Africa — the India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR). African countries also regularly participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), MILAN exercises, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has 9 African countries as members. This is important since the IORA provides another vital platform to highlight Africa’s developmental ambitions and challenges. With India set to assume the chairmanship of IORA in November 2025, there is now another opportunity for India and African countries to work closely on maritime issues.

The second initiative involved the Indian Ocean Ship-SAGAR (IOS-SAGAR). Under this, Indian patrol vessel INS Sunayna successfully completed a month-long deployment in the south-west Indian Ocean with 44 international crew from 9 African countries who jointly manned the Indian ship. Training assistance and capacity building initiatives have been a hallmark of India’s maritime engagement with Africa for a long time. Initiatives like IOS Sagar provided an opportunity to exchange best practices, undertake coordinated patrols, and enhance interoperability and mutual understanding.

Future Considerations

Hosting joint exercises or deploying warships demands considerable time, funding and logistical commitment. While there are risks of stretching capacity due to Indian Navy’s balancing operations in the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and wider Indo-Pacific, there is also genuine value in deepening maritime ties between India and Africa.²¹ While burnishing credentials as a regional-security provider and cultivating closer defense ties with African nations is welcome, growing activities should not be mistaken for greater influence. India’s maritime presence in African waters must be backed by delivery, consistency and trust.

The year 2025 also marks the end of the African Union’s Decade of African Seas and Oceans. Rather than benefitting from insights into best practices for combating maritime threats, the past decade has exposed significant shortcomings in tackling maritime priorities. “Widespread gaps in implementation, coordination and lack of political will” persist.²² At the 5^th Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) held in October 2024, the message was clear: Reformulate the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050, reinforce information sharing among MDA centers, and establish a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA).²³

However, no African country can achieve these goals alone. The need of the hour is for African countries to express unity which is encapsulated under the concept of ‘Sisonke’ meaning “together” in isiXhosa.²⁴ In such endeavours, India, with its operational capability and maritime expertise, could become a key partner in fostering African maritime capacities and creating cooperative frameworks that offer modest and meaningful alternatives for African development and maritime security.

Dr. Abhishek Mishra is an Associate Fellow Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies in India. His research focuses on India and China’s engagement in Africa, aimed at developing partnerships under the framework of South-South cooperation, including a specific focus on maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. Dr. Mishra has published widely on African maritime security, Asian-African cooperation, and on a range of African security issues. He holds a PhD in African Studies from the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi. Before joining MP-IDSA, Dr. Mishra was working on African issues at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Endnotes

1. Abhishek Mishra, “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges,” MP-IDSA Occasional Paper No. 64, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 2024, https://www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/op-64-amishra-281024-1.pdf

2. Mishra “Evolution of African Maritime Security,” 41.

3. Timothy Walker, “From Missed Opportunity to Oceans of Prosperity,” Institute for Security Studies, October 13, 2015, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/frommissed-opportunity-to-oceans-of-prosperity

4. African Union, “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy),” Version 1.0, 2012, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11151/2050_aims_srategy.pdf

5. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Freedom C. Onuoha, “Whose Security Is It? Elitism and the Global Approach to Maritime Security in Africa,” Third World Quarterly, 44 no. 5 (2023): 946-966, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706

6. Abhishek Mishra, “India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 221, November 2019.

7. Ulf Engel, “The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf

8. Engel, “The African Union,” 8.

9. Christian Bueger, “Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime,” African Security, 6, no. 3/4, 2013, pp. 297-316, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2013.853579

10. Raj Mohabeer and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean,” Indian Ocean Commission, 2019, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strengthening-maritime-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean-policy-brief.pdf

11. Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security,” 1.

12. Elizabeth Roche, “India’s View of Indo-Pacific Stretches from East Coast of Africa to West Coast of US: Shringla,” The Mint, November 3, 2020, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-s-view-of-indo-pacific-stretches-from-east-coast-of-africa-to-west-coast-of-us-shringla-11604423464721.html

13. “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” August 2022, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf

14. Abhishek Mishra, ed, “Reflections on the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from Africa,” Observer Research Foundation, December 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230407120854.pdf

15. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma,” African Security Review 31, no. 2, 2022, 195-210, doi:10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

16. Meghan Curran, Christopher Faulkner, Curtis Bell, Tyler Lycan, Michael Van Ginkel, and Jay Benson, “Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain,” Stable Seas, One Earth Foundation, August 2020, 190, https://www.stableseas.org/post/violence-at-sea-howterrorists-insurgents-and-other-extremists-exploit-the-maritime-domain

17. Abhijit Singh, “India’s Evolving Maritime Posture in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf,” Emirates Diplomatic Academy, August 2020, https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/eda-insight-aug-2020-eng-abhijit.pdf?sfvrsn=6

18. “Text of PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India,

March 12, 2015, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=116881

19. Ashish Singh, “India’s Maritime Pivot: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR with Africa on Sight,” The Sunday Guardian, April 13, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/indias-maritime-pivot-from-sagar-to-mahasagar-with-africa-on-sight

20. “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiative of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME),” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 24, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491

21. Abhijit Singh, “Delhi’s Balancing Act in Western Indian Ocean,” Hindustan Times, 18 April 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/delhis-balancing-act-in-western-indian-ocean-101744989142768.html

22. Timothy Walker, “Sink or Swim: Africa’s Crucial Milestones in 2025,” Institute for Security Studies, 16 January 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sink-or-swim-africa-s-crucial-maritime-milestones-in-2025

23. “Sea Power Conference Produces Cooperation Goals,” Africa Defence Forum, 30 April 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/04/sea-power-conference-produces-cooperation-goals/

24. “SA Navy Chief Seeks Improved African Maritime Security through Cooperation, Exercises,” defenceWeb, 4 September 2023, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/sa-navy-chief-seeks-improved-african-maritime-security/

References

African Union, ‘2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy),’ Version 1.0, 2012. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30929-doc-2050_aim_strategy_eng_0.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime.” African Security, 6 no. ¾ (2013): 297-316. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2013.853579

Bueger, Christian and Jan Stockbruegger. “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma.” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210. doi:10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

Curran, Meghan, Christopher Faulkner, Curtis Bell, Tyler Lycan, Michael Van Ginkel, and Jay Benson. “Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain.” Stable Seas, One Earth Foundation, August 2020. https://www.stableseas.org/post/violence-at-sea-howterrorists-insurgents-and-other-extremists-exploit-the-maritime-domain

Engel, Ulf. “The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf

“Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiative of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME).” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 24, 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491

Mishra, Abhishek. “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges,” MP-IDSA Occasional Paper No. 64. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 2024.

Mishra, Abhishek. “India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean.” ORF Occasional Paper No. 221, November 2019.

Mishra, Abhishek, ed. “Reflections on the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from Africa.” December 2021, Observer Research Foundation.

Mohabeer, Raj and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean.” Indian Ocean Commission, 2019. https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strengthening-maritime-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean-policy-brief.pdf

Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi and Freedom C. Onuoha, “Whose Security Is It? Elitism and the Global Approach to Maritime Security in Africa.” Third World Quarterly 44 no. 5 (2023): 946-966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706

Roche, Elizabeth. “India’s View of Indo-Pacific Stretches from East Coast of Africa to West Coast of US: Shringla.” The Mint, November 3, 2020. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-s-view-of-indo-pacific-stretches-from-east-coast-of-africa-to-west-coast-of-us-shringla-11604423464721.html

“SA Navy Chief Seeks Improved African Maritime Security through Cooperation, Exercises.” defenceWeb, September 4, 2023. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/sa-navy-chief-seeks-improved-african-maritime-security/

“Sea Power Conference Produces Cooperation Goals.” Africa Defence Forum, April 30, 2025. https://adf-magazine.com/2025/04/sea-power-conference-produces-cooperation-goals/25

Singh, Abhijit. “Delhi’s Balancing act in Western Indian Ocean.” Hindustan Times, April 18, 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/delhis-balancing-act-in-western-indian-ocean-101744989142768.html

Singh, Abhijit. “India’s Evolving Maritime Posture in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf.” Emirates Diplomatic Academy, August 2020. https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/eda-insight-aug-2020-eng-abhijit.pdf?sfvrsn=6

Singh, Ashish. “India’s Maritime Pivot: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR with Africa on Sight,” The Sunday Guardian, April 13, 2025. https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/indias-maritime-pivot-from-sagar-to-mahasagar-with-africa-on-sight

“Text of PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 12 March 2015. https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=116881

“U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” Executive Council of the President National Security Council, August 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf

Walker, Timothy. “From Missed Opportunity to Oceans of Prosperity,” Institute for Security Studies, October 13, 2015. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/frommissed-opportunity-to-oceans-of-prosperity

Walker, Timothy. “Sink or Swim: Africa’s Crucial Milestones in 2025,” Institute for Security Studies, January 16, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sink-or-swim-africa-s-crucial-maritime-milestones-in-2025

Featured Image: INS Chennai (D65) and KNS Jasiri (P3124) carrying out drills of the coast of Dar-es-Salaam during the Africa India Key Maritime Exercise. (Photo by Kenyan MoD)

African Maritime Forces Summit Week

Africa’s Maritime Security Relations and the Global Responsibility to Protect the Sea

June 18, 2025 Guest Author Leave a comment

African Maritime Forces Week

By Dr. Christian Bueger, University of Copenhagen

Maritime security is a global responsibility. All nations, including those without coastal waters, depend on the sea for trade, food, energy, and digital communication. Safeguarding shipping, protecting energy infrastructures, subsea data cables and the marine environment, fighting pollution, illicit fishing and other blue crimes are tasks that require nations worldwide to work together.

The global distribution of resources, capital and expertise, post-colonial legacies, but also the roles that states are given under the law of the sea, imply that states perform different functions in providing maritime security. States have regulatory roles as coastal, port or flag states, in providing search and rescue services, but also in terms of the maritime industries within their jurisdictions, whether that is shipping, fishing, or energy production.¹

Some states, such as the small island nations of Cabo Verde and Seychelles are responsible for managing and safeguarding enormous maritime zones, with very limited resources. Other states, such as Congo, Mozambique or Somalia, are witnessing violence, are recovering from armed conflict, or deal with severe economic problems, and struggle to prioritize effective governance of the sea. This implies significant gaps in capacity – whether in terms of institutions, staff, equipment, technology or expertise – leading to situations where states de facto cannot control, govern and protect activities in their maritime zones.

While all nations benefit from the sea in one way or another, the income gained from the oceans is heavily concentrated. Research has documented that 60 per cent of the wealth generated by the sea ends up in the hands of only 100 corporations.² The revenues from these corporations benefit only a few powerful states economically. This implies that these ocean economies have the responsibility to make strong contributions to safeguard the seas.

Also, maritime security and safety risks are unequally distributed. For example, large proportions of global ship traffic pass by the island states of Mauritius and Madagascar, implying severe risks of accidents and oil spills that can devastate the marine environment. Since ships enjoy freedom of navigation and do not stop in the island ports, these nations face high risks, but zero benefits.

Maritime spaces are interdependent, and so are blue crimes. As the Evergreen accident in the Suez Canal highlighted, a maritime incident in a strategic location can have large scale repercussions for world trade and global supply chains.³ Blue crimes, such as piracy, illicit fishing, the smuggling of narcotics or of people take place across states and regions and have trans-regional and often global effects.⁴ Moreover, in international waters all states that have signed, or comply with, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea have the “obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment” (Article 192).

While maritime security is a global responsibility, given the unequal distribution of territories, capabilities, risks and revenues burden sharing is required. In Africa many nations need support in providing maritime security, while not undermining their sovereignty and regional integration processes. This creates at least three major challenges: Problems linked to (1) how to deal with multi-level governance, (2) how to render capacity building effective, and (3) how to mitigate potential tensions of militarization.

Recalibrating the Maritime Security Multi-Level Governance System

Maritime security is an object of a quite complicated international regime complex. At which level maritime security is best provided is debatable. While the national level is obviously pivotal, most maritime security issues are transnational in character. On a global scale, more than twenty global international organizations deal with maritime security as a recent report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has documented.⁵ This includes the ‘big five’ of international maritime security agencies: the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which each address maritime security from a different mandate.

Also, a wide range of regional cooperation mechanisms deal with maritime security. ‘Terrestrially’ organized regional organizations, such as the African Union or Africa’s regional economic communities have outlined maritime strategies and programmes. ‘Aquatic-oriented’ regional organizations addressing maritime security include those established under the Regional Seas Conventions supported by UNEP⁶ – the Abidjan, Nairobi, Jedda and Barcelona Conventions –, dedicated maritime security arrangements – such as the Djibouti and Yaoundé Code of Conduct facilitated by the IMO – or issue-specific regional organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission supported by FAO. Mini- and bi-lateral cooperation, such as the jointly managed maritime zone between Mauritius and Seychelles, complement the picture.

Such governance arrangements can significantly overlap and create the risks of duplication or interface conflicts between organizations. Is a problem such as illicit fishing best addressed through a global mechanism (e.g., the Food and Agricultural Organization), through a terrestrial-oriented body, such as the African Union, a dedicated maritime body, such as the Indian Ocean Commission’s Maritime Security (MASE) architecture operative in the Western Indian Ocean, or by an issue-specific regional body, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission?

Moreover, is African maritime security provision best organized in continental terms – through pan-African mechanisms – or better approached through the lenses of ‘African seas’ with dedicated arrangements for the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean? And what happens if regional actors or international donors prefer one arrangement over the other, or, even worse, sideline and ignore one another?

These questions escape easy answers. Transparency and information sharing between organizations, and considerations of the principle of subsidiarity can be key to addressing them. Informal formats such as the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) for the Western Indian Ocean, or the G7++ coordination mechanism in the Gulf of Guinea can play very important roles in facilitating the needed transparency, information sharing, and strategic dialogues.

Informal maritime security governance arrangements that do not draw on formal legal treaties or have standing secretariats are often beneficial, since they allow for flexibility and experimentation, and avoid lengthy negotiations.

However, informality comes at a price. It often implies a lack of accountability – participants cannot be held accountable for their (in)actions. Moreover, the absence of formal rules for membership implies that important stakeholders might be excluded, and the lack of permanent administration can limit efficiency and the buildup of specialized expertise over time.

While this calls for efforts at formalizing cooperation, cases such as the failure to ratify the 2016 ‘African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa’ (known as the Lomé Charter) illustrate that formalization and treaty making is not an easy process, either. Hence, careful and realistic calibration between formal and informal cooperation across different regional constructions is necessary.

Learning to Learn: Capacity Building Traps

The global responsibility to protect the sea under the condition of unequal distribution of revenues and risks implies that states benefiting from the ocean economy have a duty to assist through capacity building and technical assistance. Capacity building aims at enabling states and regions in performing crucial maritime security functions and developing their potential to govern the sea. Yet, research has shown that successful delivery of capacity building is full of intricacies.⁷

Project cycles of two to three years and emphasis on ‘low hanging fruits’ – short-term workshops, exercises or provision of equipment – can imply that there is limited focus on sustainability and long-term maintenance of capabilities. Donors bring with them their own priorities, idealized ways and institutional preferences of how maritime security challenges should be handled. They might prefer one agency over another, leading in the worst cases to organizational rivalry or political disruption. Capacity building is always a political intervention and hence implies effects on national and regional power constellations or might be perceived as threatening national sovereignty and hence evoke resistance. Some donors might, moreover, directly pursue commercial or political interests in providing capacity building, such as market development, arms trades, or countering the political influence of another state.

Such challenges are not easily overcome and hence place severe restrictions on what can be achieved through capacity building. Yet, success stories such as the building of the MASE structures by the Indian Ocean Commission supported by the European Union, or country cases, such as Seychelles, that have successfully disrupted piracy,⁸ illustrate the significant benefits that capacity building can bring, nonetheless.

The Militarization Dilemma: Avoiding Geopolitical Tensions

Not all gaps can be addressed through capacity building. Sustainable capacity building takes time. Human resources can be constrained. Maritime security threats can escalate to a scale that they become impossible to handle operationally by one state alone, as was the case with piracy off the coast of Somalia, or the increase in narcotics trade in the South Atlantic or Western Indian Ocean. High sea crimes demand international action.

To live up to their obligations, global ocean powers and other states need to directly contribute to maritime security through operations at sea. Since most coast guards and maritime police forces lack the capabilities to operate far from their home shore or stay out for prolonged periods at sea, operations usually require the employment of naval forces.

The use of high-end military forces leads to a dilemma.⁹ More military forces enhance maritime security on the one side. Their presence strengthens law enforcement and surveillance at sea and provides more robust deterrence of maritime crime. Indeed, military operations, including by the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, have been vital in curbing piracy off the coast of Somalia or in fighting the maritime narcotics trade.

Yet, on the other side, the employment of naval forces is also a form of power projection and geopolitical signaling. Growing numbers of military vessels in regional seas, while beneficial for fighting maritime crimes, can lead to growing tensions or even escalatory dynamics. They also might undermine national sovereignty and lead to unintended dependencies or claims to permanent bases if countries are too reliant on outside military forces. Effective mechanisms of confidence building and deconfliction are vital to mitigate this challenge.

Navigating the Challenges: A Maritime Security Clearing House?

Translating the global responsibility to protect the sea into action requires innovative approaches to these complex challenges. Raising awareness among African nations and their international partners is fundamental. High-level attention must focus on recalibrating governance structures, ensuring the sustainability of capacity building, and mitigating tensions arising from militarization. Information sharing that enhances transparency and builds confidence is essential. This necessitates effective clearing house mechanisms that not only facilitate these processes but simultaneously promote ocean literacy and maritime domain awareness.

Formats such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings or the Indian Ocean Commission’s Regional Operational Coordination Center are important instances of a growing number of operational mechanisms and maritime domain awareness centers aim at facilitating this flow of information. Yet, equal efforts are needed at strategic, diplomatic, and political levels. The revitalization of the Sea Power for Africa Symposium in 2024 and ambitions to initiate a pan-African coastguard functions forum are important steps in this direction. The question of whether maritime security is best addressed at a terrestrial continental pan-African level or through regional seas cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea, however, needs serious consideration.

Acknowledgments: Research for this article has benefitted from support by the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group funded by the Velux Foundation.

Dr. Christian Bueger is a professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, where he leads the ocean infrastructure research group, and a research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). He is the author of Understanding Maritime Security (Oxford University Press, 2024, with Timothy Edmunds). He has explored questions of international security and the sea in over 200 publications. In his current research he is investigating global maritime security governance and the challenges of critical maritime infrastructure protection. Further information is available on his personal website at www.bueger.info.

Endnotes

1. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024).

2. J. Virdin, T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner, “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy,” Science Advances 7, eabc8041 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

3. Nguyen Khoi Tran, Hercules Haralambides, Theo Notteboom, and Kevin Cullinane, “The Costs of Maritime Supply Chain Disruptions: The Case of the Suez Canal Blockage by the ‘Ever Given’ Megaship,” International Journal of Production Economics 279 (2025), 109464, doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109464.

4. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea,” Marine Policy 119 (2020),104067. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

5. Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger, “Securing the Seas: A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

6. Elizabeth Mendenhall, “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program,” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

7. Christian Bueger, “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit,” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no.2 (2019): 149–56; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), 180-187.

8. Christian Bueger, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon, “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles,” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

9. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma,” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

References

Bueger, Christian and Jan Stockbruegger. “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma.” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea.” Marine Policy 119 (2020): 1040670, doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. Understanding Maritime Security. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Bueger, Christian, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles.” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

Bueger, Christian, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger. “Securing the Seas. A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024. https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit.” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no. 2 (2019): 149–56.

Mendenhall, Elizabeth. “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program.” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating. Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming.

Virdin, J. T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner. “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy.” Science Advances 7 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

Featured Image: A boarding team undertakes an operation as part of the simulated exercise in Seychelles. (Photo via UNODC/Global Maritime Crime Programme)

African Maritime Forces Summit Week

Direct and Indirect Maritime Security Threats in the Western Indian Ocean

June 17, 2025 Guest Author Leave a comment

African Maritime Forces Week

By Captain Mark Blaine (Ret.), SIGLA Stellenbosch and SA Navy

Executive Summary

The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region is a vital route for global commerce and a strategic zone for geopolitical interests. Despite its global and regional importance, its maritime security landscape is increasingly troubled with threats which include piracy and armed robbery, illicit trafficking, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, maritime terrorism, environmental threat and climate change, geopolitical rivalries and militarization, port security and infrastructure vulnerabilities, and weak maritime governance and limited regional cooperation. These threats have direct and indirect impacts on Africa’s economic, social, and political stability, while also affecting global trade and security. This paper evaluates these threats, levels of response, and outlines strategies for addressing them.

Introduction

The WIO encompasses the coastal states of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa and the island states of Madagascar, Reunion, Mayotte, Mauritius, Comoros and Seychelles.¹ Maritime security in the WIO is crucial for the prosperity of the littoral and landlocked East African states and the broader international community as it includes critical sea lanes such as the Mozambique Channel and proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a chokepoint for global oil shipments and commerce.²

According to Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada 35% of the global population live in countries bordering the Indian Ocean, there are currently 29 foreign militaries operational in the northwest Indian Ocean, 80% of oil exports transit across this region and 23 of the of the world’s 100 busiest container ports are found in the Indian Ocean.³

The region supports a rich and diverse marine ecosystem that sustains millions of livelihoods while facing a complex array of maritime security threats that undermine regional stability, economic development, and environmental sustainability. Approximately 60 million people in this coastal region depend on the ocean for fishing, shipping and tourism for their livelihoods. As African states pivot to the ocean to support economic growth through blue economy initiatives, maritime security becomes a vital component of sustainable development.⁴ This paper explores the key maritime security threats in the WIO and their broader impact on Africa and beyond.

Maritime Security Threats in the Western Indian Ocean

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

The WIO has long been a hotspot for maritime piracy, particularly off the coast of Somalia. Although international naval interventions and regional capacity-building have significantly reduced the number of successful hijackings since the height of Somali piracy between 2008 and 2012, the threat remains. Armed groups, driven by economic desperation and governance voids on land, continue to pose risks to commercial vessels, fishing boats, and humanitarian shipments.⁵

Piracy, particularly off the Somali coast, has declined from its peak in the early 2010s but remains a persistent threat due to the lack of state control and economic instability. Piracy statistics from November 2023 to May 2025 highlight 47 events, including piracy and armed robbery, hijacking, boarding, and suspicious approaches and manoeuvring.⁶

Piracy in this region has a broader impact beyond immediate security concerns. It increases the cost of shipping due to higher insurance premiums, deters foreign investment in coastal infrastructure, and undermines the confidence of maritime industries. In countries like Somalia and parts of Kenya, piracy is closely linked with other forms of organized crime and conflict, making it a persistent regional threat.⁷ Piracy in the Horn of Africa remains suppressed but by no means eradicated as the root causes, such as coastal violence, weak economic conditions and crime prevalence are all still present.⁸

Piracy and armed robbery at sea disrupt trade and increase shipping costs, undermine investor confidence, threaten humanitarian aid routes and lead to militarization of maritime routes.⁹

Multilateral international coalitions such as Combined Task Force 151 and EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) have been effective in the suppression of piracy. Regional countries can opt to work together under specific terms or Memoranda of Understanding in combating piracy, armed robbery and other maritime insecurities, such as that between South Africa and Mozambique under Operation Copper. Coastal nations can enhance naval and coast guard capabilities. Engagement with local communities to offer alternatives to piracy can serve to mitigate threats.

Illicit Trafficking

The WIO is a conduit for various illicit trafficking activities. Narcotics from Asia pass through East African ports enroute to Europe and North America. Arms trafficking fuels conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Central Africa.¹⁰

The Western Indian Ocean serves as a corridor for various forms of maritime trafficking. This includes human smuggling, particularly from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula, as well as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and counterfeit goods. The porous maritime borders and vast, under-monitored sea space provide many opportunities for criminal networks to operate. East and Southern Africa are part of the main global heroin and cocaine traffic flows. All the littoral countries except Somalia and Madagascar serve as transit points. Southern Africa is also one of the main methamphetamine trafficking routes.¹¹ A 2019 report indicates that 40 tons of heroin transit the WIO into East Africa annually, while 262 kg of “new” drugs such as cocaine was seized in the region in 2017. Furthermore, the convergence of trafficking routes with terrorist networks in East Africa poses a direct threat to national and regional security.

Illicit trafficking fuels internal conflicts and terrorism, undermines rule of law, corrupts institutions and increases violence and social instability. Efforts to combat illicit trafficking include international partnerships and intelligence sharing (Interpol, UNODC) and national port security enhancements and coastal surveillance. Socio-economic development can reduce incentives for criminality.

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

Fishing provides a major source of protein to the continent and any threat to the sector is a major threat to the food security on the entire continent. IUU fishing depletes fish stocks, damages marine ecosystems, and undermines legitimate economic activities. Foreign vessels exploit weak governance in African waters while IUU fishing can be categorized as one of the most significant threats to maritime security and food security in the WIO.¹²

Foreign and domestic vessels often engage in unauthorized fishing in exclusive economic zones (EEZs), depleting fish stocks and depriving local communities of critical resources. The lack of effective maritime surveillance, limited enforcement capacity, and corruption exacerbate this problem.¹³

The economic losses from IUU fishing in Africa are estimated at over $2 billion annually. The annual loss associated with IUU fishing in the SADC is estimated at approximately $40 million for Mozambique and $37 million for Madagascar. While statistics for South Africa are not readily available, it is agreed that the loss is worse than in the remainder of the SADC member states.¹⁴

The effect of IUU fishing in the region can be felt in the economic, ecosystem and social spheres. Moreover, IUU fishing often occurs in tandem with other crimes, such as human trafficking and the smuggling of arms and narcotics, further complicating enforcement efforts.

IUU fishing leads to economic losses for local communities, food insecurity, loss of biodiversity and weakening of maritime governance. Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, national maritime patrons and legal reforms and capacity building and international funding for monitoring are among responses to IUU fishing.

Maritime Terrorism

Although rare, the potential for maritime terrorism exists, especially in choke points and ports. Groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Houthis in Yemen have threatened port infrastructure in East Africa. While direct maritime terrorist attacks have been limited, the threat remains, especially given the economic and symbolic value of port facilities and coastal cities.¹⁵

The vulnerability of critical maritime infrastructure, including ports, oil terminals, and undersea cables, poses a strategic risk to the region. Disruption of these assets can have cascading effects on national economies, regional trade, and global supply chains. Protecting this infrastructure requires both physical security measures and cyber-resilience capabilities.

The relative prosperity and weak institutional systems of the region create an attractive environment and target for transnational terrorist groups. The threat of global terrorism is a further matter of concern due to the known connections between this region and terrorist activity in Africa and beyond. Long and porous borders exacerbated by weak governance, the growing radicalisation of the Southern and Eastern African migrant populations can be seen as contributing factors of a climate conducive to international terrorism and spill-over effects that, although more landward focused, do not exclude the sea.¹⁶

Maritime terrorism negatively impacts national and regional security, threatens international shipping and port security, increases insurance and freight costs, and diverts resource from economic development to security. Responses include international coordination through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and regional agreements, national counter-terrorism strategies and port security upgrades, and regional intelligence sharing and early warning systems.

Geopolitical Rivalry and Militarization

The WIO has become a theatre for strategic competition among global powers including China, the United States, India, and France. Military bases and port acquisitions heighten tensions.¹⁷ This global competition increases the risk of confrontation and has the potential to undermine local sovereignty, shift political alliances and increase strategic dependency on foreign powers. Regional dialogue platforms such was the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), strategic balancing by African nations through diversified partnerships, and policy harmonization and regional codes of conduct can mitigate these risks.

Port Security and Infrastructure Vulnerability

Ports located within the WIO region are increasingly exposed to a range of security threats, including cyber-attacks, physical sabotage, and systemic operational inefficiencies. A considerable number of these ports are characterized by outdated or insufficient infrastructure, particularly in relation to cargo scanning technologies, surveillance capabilities, and cybersecurity measures.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, served as a pivotal moment in global maritime security, catalysing a transformation in port security protocols worldwide. In response, the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was instituted to enhance the security of ships and port facilities. This regulatory framework remains critical for the effective screening of cargo containers and for mitigating the risks associated with the illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and other contraband via maritime routes.

Due to their security, surveillance and inspection gaps, organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking and theft activities particularly target African ports. These groups are not just regional but often linked to broader transnational organized crime syndicates.

Given that these play an indispensable role in the economic development of the continent, threats to ports can create trade disruptions, revenue losses, national security threats, and damage international supply chains.¹⁸ Technical assistance and best practice sharing from the IMP and World Customs Organization (WCO), increased investment in infrastructure and cybersecurity, and public-private partnerships for port management can mitigate these threats.

Conclusion

Maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean constitutes a complex and multidimensional challenge that necessitates an integrated approach encompassing direct action, multilateral cooperation, and preventive strategies. Although the African continent disproportionately experiences the impact of these maritime threats, their consequences extend well beyond regional boundaries, carrying significant global implications. Addressing these challenges effectively requires a sustained commitment to strategic collaboration, the promotion of sustainable development, and the establishment of inclusive and accountable governance frameworks aimed at preserving the security and stability of this critical maritime domain.

Captain (Rtd) Mark Blaine is a former combat officer of the South African Navy with close to forty years’ military experience and with command experience of various SA Navy warships. He spent more than four years as Defence Advisor to the South African High Commission in Kenya and completed his master’s degree in maritime security through Coventry University. In the period leading up to his retirement in January 2023, he lectured at the South African Military Academy. He is currently a researcher for the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) of Stellenbosch University.

Endnotes

1. S. Mwachireya, J. Ndagala, S.M. Moorgawa, H.R. Ali, J. Ramdrianandrasana, I. Kimirei and V. Bhoyroo, “Ocean Acidification (OA) White Paper: Draft Ocean Acidification Paper for Western Indian Ocean Region,” (unpublished manuscript, 2018), 4. https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/25701

2. IORA, “IORA Action Plan (2022–2027): Enhancing Regional Cooperation,” Indian Ocean Rim Association, 2022, https://iora.int/maritime-safety-security

3. Raj Mohabeer and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. “Strengthening Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean.” Indian Ocean Commission, 2019, 3, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strengthening-maritime-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean-policy-brief.pdf

4. Denning Metuge, Amanda T. Lombard and Bernadette Snow, “Policy Brief: Western Indian Ocean Marine Spatial Planning Strategy,” Institute for Coastal and Marine Research, Nelson Mandela Bay University, September 29, 2021, 1. https://nairobiconvention.org/clearinghouse/sites/default/files/WIO%20MSP%20Policy%20Brief_6%20Oct2021.pdf

5. Brigid Gesami, “Maritime Security Threats in Africa,” Academia Letters, Article 3564, 2-3, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4319050

6. EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, “Protecting Sea Lanes and Combatting Piracy,” EU NAVFOR, 2023, https://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures

7. Gesami, “Maritime Security Threats in Africa,” 2-3.

8. Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security,” 4.

9. Alex Mills, “The Long Shadow of Red Sea Shipping Disruption,” Atlantic Council, January 8, 2024, 1-3, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-long-shadow-of-the-red-sea-shipping-disruption/

10. Interpol, Maritime Crime: Global Threats and Regional Responses (Interpol, 2023).

11. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2023, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2023.html

12. Martin Purves, “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Maritime Security in Southern Africa,” in Maritime Security in Southern African Waters, ed. Thean Potgieter and Reiner Pommerin (Sun Press, 2009), 113-116.

13. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Towards Blue Transformation (FAO, 2022), https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9df19f53-b931-4d04-acd3-58a71c6b1a5b/content/cc0461en.html

14. Maritime Resources Assessment Group, Study and Analysis of the IUU Fishing Situation in the SADC Region and an Estimate of the Economic, Social and Biological Impact of this Situation, Main Report, (MRAG, 2008), 6-7.

15. International Maritime Organization, SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code (IMO, 2021), https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx

16. Eric Rosand and Jason Ipe, “Enhancing Counterterrorism Cooperation in Southern Africa,” African Security Review 17, no. 2 (2008), 43-46.

17. Ash Rossiter. “Chasing Basing: Great Power Maneuvering in the Western Indian Ocean,” Trends Research and Advisory, March 30, 2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/chasing-basing-great-power-maneuvering-in-the-western-indian-ocean/?srsltid=AfmBOor3gOxjtj7wlC5DJyw9-eg-j1U3XMQp_3CmGv44IizTRSKR36Ij

18. Barthélémy Blédé, “Safeguarding Africa’s Seaports to Safeguard its Economies,” ISS Today, July 26, 2016, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/safeguarding-africas-seaports-to-safeguard-its-economies

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Featured Image: Somali men look out across Mogadishu’s fishing harbour in the early morning as fishermen land their catch and transport their fish to the market in the Xamar Weyne district of the Somali capital, 16 March, 2013. (AU-UN IST photo by Stuart Price via Wikimedia Commons)

Center for International Maritime Security

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Developing Robust Regional Maritime Security Mechanisms for the WIO

India’s Evolving Role in Supporting African Maritime Security Architecture

Africa’s Maritime Security Relations and the Global Responsibility to Protect the Sea

Direct and Indirect Maritime Security Threats in the Western Indian Ocean

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.