Sea Control and the Minimum Capability of Carriers

Sea ControlBy Simon of

Someone recently turned the tables on me with a question about what “military effect” I was actually after when I argue for the concept of a Sea Control Carrier. What follows is an attempt to indicate the minimum capabilities of such a platform necessary to achieve any realistic sustained defence or offence. It’s not really based on a known threat, but rather a “theoretical” nation [albeit using Royal Navy models] with aspirations of international reach and influence based on a series of requirements to “fly the flag”, protect an area of investment, or launch 3Cdo [3rd Commando Brigade] into hostile territory (ish). It assumes threats from land, sea and air in all circumstances.

After some careful consideration I have come up with the following requirements:

1.To provide 24-7 Combat Air Patrol (CAP – lead and wingman continually airborne).
2.To provide 24-7 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW – two helicopters continually in the air “dipping” and deploying sonobuoys)
3.To provide 24-7 Airborne Early Warning (AEW- a single asset continually monitoring the horizon for incoming threats)

My desire for 24-7 CAP is because I do not believe that Deck-Launched Intercept (DLI) will give a fast enough or far-reaching enough response in the future (see graph below). In addition, it “sizes” the requirement such that the ship can swing-role for rapid-response air support. The ASW capability is assumed to work in conjunction with a towed-array frigate. Now let’s work some rough math…

An enemy incoming at Mach 0.9 and a Deck-Launched and CAP Intercept. At point of detection (200km) both aircraft accelerate as fast as possible giving the enemy aircraft a massive advantage when up against the DLI jet starting from zero knots. Current technologies are probably about “break even” in terms of AMRAAM intercept distance and anti-ship missiles, however this is likely to change.
An enemy incoming at Mach 0.9 and a Deck-Launched and CAP Intercept. At point of detection (200km) both aircraft accelerate as fast as possible giving the enemy aircraft a massive advantage when up against the DLI jet starting from zero knots. Current technologies are probably about “break even” in terms of AMRAAM intercept distance and anti-ship missiles, however this is likely to change.

Flight Hours and Air Crew
The above requirements mean 48 flight-hours for the jets, which we’ll assume require 25 man-maintenance-hours per flight-hour (1200 maintenance hours) which equates to a minimum of 150 man-days. Likely to be more if the aircraft is Low Observable. Similarly, there is a total of 72 flight-hours for the helicopters which we’ll assume require 10 man-maintenance-hours per flight-hour (720 maintenance hours) which equates to a minimum of 90 man-days.

A total maintenance team of 240 men, along with around 60 further pilots and systems operators and another 10% for “management”. A total of about 330 airgroup personnel. Minimum.

It is my impression that a ~27,000 tonne, 20 aircraft, CVL can provide this with 8 jets, 8 ASW helicopters and 4 AEW helicopters.

However, I am asking for this airgroup to undertake three two-hour CAP sorties per day, per aircraft, forever (well at least for a couple of months). Regardless of how hard I try to push my head into the sand it simply isn’t going to happen. History has shown carrier air wings to deliver between one and two sorties per day over a sustained period so perhaps we can settle for 1.5 sorties per day and 16-18 jets.

The point here is that a small “Cavour-sized carrier can only deliver about half of my requirement. In other words it can deliver the “jet” component, or daytime cover, or single aircraft CAP and ASW. Any CVL will therefore need to be supplemented with enough escort/support ships to sustain the required ASW capability.

The Fleet
Following from this conceptual CVL I’d now like to examine how the fleet could operate to provide sustained presence, defence, and ultimately offence. Much of the numbers following are for illustrative purposes only, again representing a “theoretical” nation:

We’ll begin with frigates. Thirteen of them. 3-4 of them in deep maintenance/refit and the remainder providing 85% availability. This gives us eight active ships, with two assigned to each of four key locations around the globe – rotating back-to-back – operating independently, policing, and flying the flag.

In addition we’ll need a number of tankers to sustain their presence.

This is the real point of this section. This is the ability to supplement the active frigate as local tensions rise in one of the four key locations. This supplement increases the area of control/dominance from a ~20km to ~200km radius using the Sea Control Carrier above.

We therefore require a sustained sea control capability, which can only come about with at least three Sea Control Carriers.

Furthermore, we have already identified that the CVL above cannot sustain the level of aviation that is required to totally dominate the area. We can assume that the CVL can support the jets and AEW capability, but we need other ships to operate the ASW squadron. Well, we already have a frigate with an embarked helicopter and in order to sustain any kind of operation we are going to need one of the tankers on station for much of the time.

This therefore puts the onus on the tanker to embark the remaining seven helicopters with hangar facilities for at least three of them. This is hardly a tanker. The ship that fits the bill is probably more akin to RFA Argus or an aviation optimised Bay class. This means dragging another ship along in order to provide sustained control of the sea.

We now have a frigate, a tanker, a carrier and an aviation heavy support ship on station.

Obviously the above task group provides a fair level of offensive air power, however, here I mean “offence” in the form of amphibious assault.

RFA Argus
  RFA Argus

I’ll keep this relatively simple and just suggest that we need to sustain a single commando battalion in theatre or launch a heavy assault with almost all of 3Cdo. To this end we will need four amphibious assault ships all similar to the Rotterdam/Galicia design. These ships would generally be operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) with a small contingent of Royal Marines so the assumption is that four such ships will provide three operational, one for each of 40, 42 and 45 Commando [battalions].

Again, the point is not to discuss force balance or numbers, but simply to indicate that these ships could double up as the aviation heavy support ships as required above.

All-out war would see all eight frigates on the front line operating the majority of the ASW squadron, therefore freeing up space on the assault ships to operate utility/lift helicopters.

Total Approximate Numbers:
13 frigates (8 available, 4 tasks)
3 Sea Control Carriers (2 available, 1 task)
5-6 tankers (4 available, one per task)
4 assault ships (3 available, one per Commando)

Aircraft for Sea Control
16-18 jets on the carrier
4 AEW helicopters on the carrier
1 ASW helicopter on the frigate
1 ASW helicopter on the tanker
6 ASW helicopters on the assault ship operating as the aviation heavy support ship

What I have tried to do here is provide a minimal fleet design. It is not a fantasy fleet, it is simply an indication of how a fleet could be built to provide various levels of capability. The use of a small carrier keeps the cost minimal, but at a high price in terms of overall effectiveness. We are severely limited with our aviation assets because we have to “off deck” much of our sea control ASW squadron onto tankers and assault ships that would otherwise be operating utility/lift helicopters.

This means that our sustained offensive presence deploys almost zero utility/lift helicopters because the aviation space on the amphib is being used to operate the majority of the ASW squadron.

A larger carrier would be better, which I will cover in a second post entitled “CVF or LHD”.

“Simon” is a tax-payer (annoyed about: the aircraft carrier debacle, and generally the way the U.K. is run) – okay I’m just a grumpy old man! I have a degree in aerospace engineering and work as a self-employed IT consultant. Unfortunately the bottom fell out of the defence industry when I graduated so I was left high-and-dry with a degree in a discipline considered unimportant by HMG. I’m just biding my time until Britain wants to rebuild her empire with imagination, ingenuity, and a nice hot cuppa.

This post appeared in its original form and was cross-posted by permission from Think Defence.

Will China Fight Falklands-Style Wars?

The Pentagon’s analogy of China and Falkland-Style wars does not mean that it is yet meeting all such necessary criteria. Instead, the analogy tells us about the PLAN’s present and future rank in the hierarchy of navies. Although Europe is in decline, Europeans should not bury their heads in the sand. There are still useful efforts that can be done.

Does the analogy apply?
The Pentagon’s latest Annual Report to Congress says that China has increasing emerging expeditionary naval interests. The Report emphasizes China seeks the capabilities to fight a Falklands-Style wars:

“The PLA Navy’s goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of several months, similar to the United Kingdom’s deployment to the South Atlantic to retake the Falkland Islands in the early 1980s. However, logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles, particularly in the Indian Ocean.” (DoD 2013, p. 38)

One can question whether the historic analogy between the UK in 1982 and China after 2013 does really apply. China has no overseas territories like Britain’s Falklands, Diego Garcia, and Pitcairn; or France’s Martinique, Reunion, and Polynesia. Obviously, the geography in the North and South Atlantic is very different from the Indo-Pacific theater. And, being under sequester-siege, one can ask if the U.S. Admirals are over-hyping China’s rise to defend their budgets. On the other hand, one can be sure that the Pentagon’s officers are aware of what they are talking about when they use analogies. Moreover, when talking about expeditionary campaigns of navies underneath the U.S.’ full-scale war level, other cases are hard to find.

What “Falklands-Style” is not about:

Ye Olde British Refueling Plan
          Ye Olde British Refueling Plan

Britain’s major obstacle in 1982 was that its “closest” airbase was on the tiny island Ascension 6,300 kilometers from the Falklands. Thus the Falklands-style does not apply to scenarios like Taiwan or the East and South China Sea; China’s military facilities are right next to the theater. Any Chinese campaign in these areas would more be more like NATO’s Libya campaign than the Falklands due to PLAAF bases close to the battlefield. In 1982, Britain conducted some symbolic air raids with Avro Vulcan bombers on Port Stanley’s airfield, however only made possible by a very complex chain of aerial refueling. Britain’s success or failure was dependent on the two carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. If one or both of them would have been sunk, Britain would have lost, because the Royal Navy could only succeed due to the air power delivered by the seaborne Harriers.

“Falklands-Style” means a carrier-centric operation far away from the homeland. Carriers are an inevitable necessity for expeditionary campaigns due to the need for air superiority. Moreover, such a “Falklands-Style” operation would include some, but not a lot of support from overseas bases and be out of reach of homeland airbases, as Port Stanley was 11,000 kilometers away from London. A “Falklands-Style” campaign’s ultimate operational target is to bring boots on the ground by amphibious landings. Politically and strategically, the aim is to achieve military superiority over another state in certain geographical areas, but not over a whole country – that would be “Iraq-Style.” In addition, Falklands-Style does not apply to non-state actors. They lack the ability to deliver significant, nearly equal air and sea power in the theater as the Argentinians did.

China’s “Falklands-Style” Capabilities
Applied to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), geographically “Falklands-Style” means an operation beyond the Second Island Chain or “West of Malacca”. However, China does not meet the carrier criteria and it is unlikely to do so before 2020. Moreover, overseas bases are planned, but their operational worth cannot be taken for granted. Gwadar in Pakistan is the PLAN’s only project which can be taken seriously right now. However, in any action, Gwadar would have to be supplied by complex air logistics (the forthcoming Y-20). Railroads or even useable roads from Pakistan to China just don’t exist.

Beside the two carriers with their 48 Harriers, the Royal Navy’s Task Force included two LPDs, eight destroyers, 15 frigates, five nuclear subs (SSN), one conventional sub and dozens of support vessels. In total, Britain sent over a hundred ships. Many of the supply ships were requisitioned civilian vessels. China’s fleet in 2013 includes one carrier (Liaoning, not yet operational), three LPDs, 14 destroyers, 62 frigates, four SSBNs, five SSNs, 55 conventional subs, and 205 logistic and support ships (IISS 2013: 289-290). Thus, in all cases except the carriers China’s numbers meet or exceed Britain’s Task Force.

Moreover, China’s is the world’s largest shipbuilder. While hulls for sophisticated military vessels like carriers may still be challenge, China can easily mass-produce simple hulls for transport and supply ships or confiscate ships present in Chinese ports, as the UK did. China is working on further tanker and supply ships to support expeditionary operation. Other observers like Information Dissemination, one of best-informed blogs, note that China is already able to build sophisticated ships like LHDs:

“Last year, we were introduced to a LHD design that China was offering for export. A couple of months ago, we’ve seen this LHD design displayed for export to Turkey and also at Abu Dhabi. This mysterious design is said to be 211 m long, 32.6 m in beam and 26.8 m high for a displacement of 20,000 to 22,000 ton. It’s a little wider than Type 071 and has a flat top, so it can hold 8 helicopters with the hangar space for 4. This is an increase over Type 071, but I would imagine the first Chinese LHD (let’s call it Type 081) to be much larger than this (30,000 to 40,000 in displacement) and able to hold carry more helicopters and armored vehicles. I personally think PLAN has studied USMC long enough that it would also want the LHD to be able to support STOVL fighter jet. Such a ship would be much more complex than Type 071, but is well within the technical capabilities of Chinese shipyards.” 

It really is important to know the location of your liferaft station.
It really is important to know the location of your liferaft station.

In addition, “Falklands-Style” campaigns depend on a capable nuclear-powered submarine force. Argentina withdrew its surface fleet after the cruiser Belgrano was sunk by the SSN HMS Conqueror, which provided the Royal Navy the freedom of action for amphibious landings. If you want your subs to go to places, you need nuclear power. Recently the PLAN has demonstrated that her SSNs are able to reach the Indian Ocean. In contrast to the Royal Air Force in 1982, China is incapable of undertaking long-range airstrikes in order to support expeditionary operations. Its so-called Xian H-6 “bombers” (combat radius 970nm) are a further-developed Soviet Tupolev TU-16 aircraft. These are supported by very few aerial refueling capabilities and have no operational experience at all in conducting long-range airstrikes. Operational experience matters, as can be seen in the discussions about the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran.

Finally, “Falklands-Style” wars and expeditionary operations also require a lot of operational experience. Officers and crews need to be able to deal with and adjust to friction immediately. The service (wo)men must have a pragmatic problem-solving attitude because rapid help from home is unavailable. The Royal Navy had such a capacity, gained over decades of experience leading to 1982. China today is working from slight operational experience developed by anti-piracy operations, regular drills, and friendly ports visits, but is far away from the human skills navies like the U.S. or British posses.

What the Falklands Analogy Really Tells Us
Discussing where Chinese “Falkland-Style” wars could take place is just like reading tea leaves. Will China raid Diego Garcia or Darwin in case of a fight against the U.S.? Could Pacific Island states Sri Lanka, the Seychelles, or Mauritius somehow become objectives of PLAN amphibious invasions? Will China strike Persian Gulf or East African countries in order to secure their resources? Nobody can know for certain. We will see when we (don’t) get there.

What the analogy really tells us is where China is going in the hierarchy of navies. Geoffrey Till emphasized that the most sophisticated attempt ever undertaken at classifying navies was done by Eric Grove (Till 2013: 114). In 1990, Grove classified navies from a Rank of 9, “Token”, to a Rank of 1, “Major Global Force Projection – Complete” (Grove 1990: 237-240). Of course, Rank 1, until present, was only achieved by the U.S. Rank 2 Major Global Force Projection – Partial was achieved just one time by the Soviets during the 1980s until 1991/92, but never again by any country.

Relevant for the given case are Rank 3, “Medium Global Force Projection”, and Rank 4, “Medium Regional Force Projection.” Rank 3 means that a navy posses at least one carrier, amphibious capabilities, SSBN, SSN and a larger number of surface warships like destroyers and frigates. According to Grove, a Medium Global Force Projection Navy would “be capable of conducting one major ‘out of area operation and (…) would be capable of engaging in high-level naval operations in closer ocean areas” (Grove 1990: 238). Thus, Britain in 1982 has to be understood as a Rank 3 case.

Grove considered the PLAN to be a Rank 4 Medium Regional Force Projection case (Grove 1990: 238). With no carriers or expeditionary amphibious capabilities, the PLAN was able by its submarines and surface warships to exercise maritime power in the West Pacific, but not beyond.

The Pentagon’s Annual Report is talking about China “becom[ing] a stronger regional force that is able to project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of several months” (p. 38). Hence, the Pentagon’s analysis matches exactly with Grove’s criteria (surprise, surprise?). Most remarkable is that even in 1990 Grove foresaw that China could become a candidate for Rank 3 “in the medium- to long-term” and could even move “into Rank 2, but not for several decades” (Grove 1990: 238). Now – 23 years after Grove’s excellent classification – China is on the way to move(sic) from Rank 4 to 3. However, it is not there yet. The criteria for operational carriers is not fulfilled. Moreover, the main reason why I personally would not rank China a 3 is that its military has had no combat experience since 1979. Therefore, what the Pentagon’s analogy and Grove’s classification really tell us, is how hard it is to climb up the Ranks in the hierarchy of navies.

How Europe Should React
China’s expeditionary ambitions are more westward looking than eastwards. As the Report outlines, Beijing’s areas of concern are the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and even the Mediterranean. The Times of India, for example, reported something similar:

“(…), and the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is expected to grow. David Shinn, a former U.S. ambassador in Africa, expects China’s navy to make more frequent visits to port cities across the Indian Ocean – in South Asia, the southern Middle East and on the east coast of Africa – within the next 10 years and to expand its reach to North African ports on the Mediterranean Sea.” 

Thus, Europeans should pay as much or even more attention than the U.S. to what the Chinese are doing. Given that the U.S. really continues to retreat from the Middle East, the Western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf will become areas of major concern in particular for Europe.

Instead of living in the world of political correctness and talk about utopian ideas, said German EU-Commissioner Günter Oettinger in May, many Eurocrats from the Brussels Bubble must abandon their geostrategic blindness. Except for themselves, in real life nobody outside Europe cares that the EU is promoting human rights, environmental protection, and gender equality. Europe will never become an international actor taken seriously on other continents as long as geopolitical, geostrategic, and strategic thinking only happens in Paris and London. Therefore, it is not a surprise, that China’s media scoffs about European decline and tells the Europeans to shut up.

However, there is no need for unconditional surrender. Many useful things can be done today. Maritime cooperation between NATO and China has already started and seems to work. Thus, this program should be continued and extended to build mutual trust. Moreover, Chinese and European interests for safe and secure sealanes in the Indian Ocean are the same. Some kind of permanent maritime security cooperation, maybe even including India, would absolutely make sense.

To implement this, Europeans must in composite preserve a Rank 3 status as a “Medium Global Force Projection Navy”; either uni-/bilaterally by France and Britain or by a broader European coalition. If Europe would be unable to deliver significant maritime power eye to eye with China, leaders in Beijing with command over a Rank 3 navy (maybe moving towards Rank 2) would tell the Europeans to simmer down when Brussels calls for a “political solution” or “multilateral dialogue” about the Indian Ocean.

Britain and France will continue their fight not to drop down to Rank 4. The UK’s coming Queen-Elizabeth-Carriers are definitely a boost to British (and European) power-projection capabilities. However, the economic and financial situation raises large questions as to whether both countries will be able to sustain their levels of defense spending, especially France. While London has, Paris has not undertaken any serious cuts yet. Needless to say that France’s terrifying financial and economic situation will bring the question of cutting defense spending on the table. The most likely scenario is that Britain and France will continue to go together, whenever they cannot go alone. However, due to harsh cuts in the French military budget, the time could come, where Anglo-French cooperation will not be enough anymore. Without any U.S. military bailout in sight, a pivotal indicator for Europe’s future as a maritime power is whether countries like the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and in particular Germany are more willing to pool and share substantially and to go to places together.

By Felix Seidler, Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel, Germany / German security affairs  writer. This article appeared in original form at his website, Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik.

Grove, Eric 1990: The Future of Seapower. Annapolis.
IISS 2013: The Military Balance. London.
Till, Geoffrey 2013: Seapower. London.

Midrats and Meet-Ups

Galway BayTomorrow (Sunday) evening, from 5-6pm (EST) I’ll be on Midrats, the webcast radio show run by naval blogosphere personalities CDR Salamander and EagleOne from “EagleSpeak“. Feel free to drop by where we’ll be discussing the first year of CIMSEC and whatever else crops up.

Next Saturday, June 15th, we’ll take the monthly DC Meet-up on the road to Annapolis, Maryland, home of the U.S. Naval Academy. We hope you’ll join us at the Galway Bay at 1pm – all are welcome (ask at front for our location if you don’t recognize anyone):

Time: June 15th, 1-5pm
Location: Galway Bay Irish Restaurant and Pub, 63 Maryland Ave., Annapolis, Maryland, 21401

Update on Polish Navy Progress

Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers are mod 2.
Maritime Infrastructure Protection System: The sharks with lasers come in mod 2.

Last week was a good one for Polish Navy. A few things happened which look minor if considered separately, but put together show a glimpse of how the Polish Navy will look in the future. As publicly available information about military matters in Poland is still scarce, there is also room to put these events in broader perspective and explore their philosophical underpinnings.

The week started with information that REMUS 100 won a tender to provide 2 systems for harbor-defense use by the naval bases in Swinoujscie and Gdynia. Later, at the Maritime Systems and Technologies 2013 Europe (MAST) conference and the NATO Naval Armaments Group meeting, both taking place in Gdansk, participants had the opportunity to see a live demonstration of Maritime Infrastructure Protection Systems, a multi-sensor maritime-monitoring system designed by CTM Gdynia. The next day, the Polish MoD issued a Request For Information (RFI) for just such a system, and, the very same day issued an RFI for patrol ships and corvettes. Little is known about these ships but the patrol ship is supposed to be in the range of 1,700 tons and possess the “capability to search and destroy naval mines and other dangerous underwater charges”. The corvette, which is officially called the Coastal Defense Ship, is expected to carry among other things weapons for “precision strike of land targets”. In parallel, the MoD prepared a tender for highly publicized project of Air and Anti-missile Defense, which will consist of 6 medium-range (100 km) and 11 short-range (25 km) batteries. Although that was not a predominantly naval development, the Navy’s modernization plan foresees 2 short-range batteries to be included in force structure. Add to that announcement the following and the overall picture becomes clearer: the newly commissioned Nadbrzezny Dywizjon Rakietowy (Coastal Defense Battery), equipped with Kongsberg NSM missiles will be extended to have a 2nd unit, there are rumors that planned submarines should be armed with “deterrence weapons”, and an ambitious plan that 3 new mine-hunters should join the fleet starting from 2016.

The first impression that comes to mind is that the protection of infrastructure and naval bases is viewed as a critical priority. This is also the message from the recently concluded mine-counter measures (MCM) exercise, IMCMEX 2013 – “It is more than just MCM”. The logic is simple – Two naval bases, one Swinoujscie and one in Gdynia, requires two sets of defensive weapons and systems. Taking a step back, the MoD seems to be building A2/AD fleet or modern version of Jeune Ecole, which is not surprising for a continentally oriented armed forces. At this point I start to have some problems with terminology in defining what kind of navy the Polish Navy will be. If we measure distance between major ports or naval bases in the Baltic Sea in a straight line we get following results:

Szczecin to Kiel, Germany: 147nm
Szczecin to Korsoer, Denmark: 139nm
Gdynia to Karlskrona, Sweden: 144nm
Gdynia to Baltijsk (In Kaliningrad, Russia): 47.5nm

Too close for comfort, or sea control.
Too close for comfort, or sea control.

This situation is not unusual in narrow waters but raises the question as to what degree we can speak about “area denial” when this area is congested, contested, and probably beyond control for anybody. In such a case the term “sea control” should have a very Corbettian meaning: “here and now”. In the extreme case of Gdynia and Baltijsk we observe a sort of direct contact within the range of modern artillery. It becomes hard to speak about any area to deny.

On the other hand if we use term Jeune Ecole, which heavily relied on torpedo boats, then another question emerges: how effective was this asymmetrical weapon of époque against an enemy battle force? Sir Julian Corbett, as Prof. James Holmes recently reminded us, was very concerned by the fact that the first torpedo-armed flotillas made fleets structureless, the weapons greatly empowering small craft and upsetting defined roles. Can we say something more on that subject after 100 years of experience? My not very scientific and brief review of Conway’s Battleships reveals that out of roughly 194 battleships constructed and commissioned (including a few completed as aircraft carriers), only three have been sunk as a result of torpedo attacks of surface flotilla ships [Scott C-P did an unscientific review last year of all types of sinkings]. These were Szent Istvan, Fuso and Yamashiro. In addition four were torpedoed and sunk by submarines, which at least at the time of Corbett’s writing were considered flotilla vessels. They were Barham, Royal Oak, Courageous, and Shinano. This produces a total of 3.6% — not much, and an invitation to reconsider the viability of a coastal navy focused on asymmetric weapons only. We need some symmetry in force structure as well.

The conceptual roots of the Polish Navy maybe lies in von Clausewitz’s thesis that defense is a stronger form of war than offense, but seeks an opportunity to switch to offense as soon as possible. Using Sir Julian Corbett’s subtitle from his “Green Pamphlet”, this Navy will seek a decision on land engaging in “offensive operations used with a defensive intention”. It leads me to my final and perhaps banal conclusion that the closer to the coast the Navy acts, the more land-warfare theories apply.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland.  His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.