Budget-Driven National Defense Strategy

This article is special to The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies).

Who's in the seat?
                                Who’s in the seat?

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 1-02 defines the term “Strategic Concept” as:  “The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation.  It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing military, diplomatic, economic, information and other measures which stem from it.”  The government’s estimate of the strategic situation can be found in the National Intelligence Council publication: Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds, December 2012. [1]  The course of action is reflected in the President’s 5 January 2013, defense strategy guidance entitled:  Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. [2]  Known as the DSG, this guidance was intended to serve as the basis for DoD policy and resource decisions based on projected fiscal constraints.  However, the DSG did not include the significant additional cuts triggered by the Budget Control Act, e.g. “sequestration.”

The Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), commissioned by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, was designed to produce guidance to the DoD to deal with the sequestration in 2014; formulate budgets for 2015-2019; and, serve as the basis for the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  On 1 Aug 2013 Secretary Hagel announced the findings of the SCMR and laid out two alternative paths.  One path would prioritize high-end capabilities over end-strength.  The other would keep end-strength but sacrifice modernization and research and development on next-generation systems.  In summary, the world situation is well-defined in the DNI’s Global Trends 2030 Alternative Worlds (footnote 1).  However, the strategy or course of action for national defense planning and programming is a mess given the certainties (or uncertainties) of fiscal levels resulting from sequestration.  For Congress, the question is which comes first: the national defense strategy (the chicken) or the funding levels (the egg)?  Clearly the egg is in charge.

The QDR, mandated by Congress, is to be conducted by the DoD every four years to examine  force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget plans.  The QDR is supposed to be a comprehensive effort to prepare a national defense strategy looking forward 20 years.  Logic would argue that if the national security threat is well-defined and understood, the strategy for addressing that threat would come first, with fiscal constraints causing adjustments to the strategy in areas of least risk.  The threat is projected thru 2030 and available to Congress.  The President has issued defense strategy guidance priorities for the 21st century which are available to Congress.  So, why does Congress require a QDR that, in effect, duplicates the executive branch processes?  Surely the congress understands that the DoD QDR has to be consistent with the President’s defense strategy guidance and consistent with the President’s budget submissions for DoD.

As presently defined, the QDR requires a substantial effort, delivers little value, and should be terminated.

Richard Mosier is a former Naval aviator (VQ/VP).  He served as a career civil servant working for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the 1970s and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff (OASD(C3I)), retiring from the government in 1997 as an SES.  From 1997 to 2010 worked as an engineer for a defense contractor.   


The Nucleus Crew: A Little Selective Starvation of One “Sacred Cow”

HMS_Exmouth_(1901)_in_Weymouth_Bay_ca._1906
HMS Exmouth, a nucleus-crew Royal Navy battleship

This article is a part of The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies). As part of the week we are also re-examining “Sacred Cows” – fundamental concepts that underpin the current approach to maritime security.

The effect of the ongoing budget crisis on the U.S. military is similar to the effect of drought on a farm. Farmers are sometimes forced to slaughter some animals during a drought in order to ensure the survival of a herd. The U.S. military also now appears poised to cut some pieces of weapon hardware in order for bulk of service programs to survive this particular period of fiscal shortages. In the case of the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet, this “culling of the herd” could include cuts in both current platforms and new construction. Rather than retire ships with useful remaining service life, or cut planned new construction, the Navy should bring back a manning concept with its roots in the age of sail.

Adoption of a nucleus crew system for those ships not deployed, or training to do so would ensure the retention of useful warships, maximize manning for deployed units, and save some money in personnel costs. Great Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) faced a similar demand by civilian authorities in the first decade of the 20th century to both cut its budget, and maintain its superiority in fleet strength over potential adversaries. The RN adopted the nucleus crew system and successfully preserved a number of middle-aged ships that saw useful service in the First World War. While it is never an ideal situation to have a warship manned at anything less than its authorized crew complement, the current budget crisis demands extraordinary action. Adoption of nucleus crews in some ships may allow the Navy a period of pause to develop more long-term solutions to extended periods of fiscal drought.

It is first useful to examine the British nucleus crew program. The RN experiment in nucleus crews was begun during the tenure of Admiral Sir John Fisher as the First Sea Lord (rough equivalent of the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations) from 1904-1910. An iconoclast who was not afraid to break established rules and traditions, Fisher was selected by the civilian First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, to both reduce naval budgets and reform and prepare the RN for modern warfare. Part of Fisher’s program involved accelerating the building of modern “Dreadnought-style” battleships and battle cruisers, modern submarines, and early experiments with naval aviation. His initial change to the existing fleet was to cut over 150 aging or ineffective warships from active service. While draconian in effect, these cuts allowed Fisher to preserve another cohort of “middle-aged” battleships, cruisers and destroyers that might also have been retired to meet budget goals. His ingenious program to retain these ships was to reduce their crew complements to a smaller “nucleus crew” of 3/5 normal crew complement. These reduced crew cohorts would be capable of maintaining the ships and taking them to sea for short periods of training. The nucleus crew consisted primarily of officers and technical experts who could care for the ship over periods of inactivity. In case of crisis, the nucleus crew ships could be brought to operational readiness through the addition of relatively untrained crew members such as stokers (necessary in large number for the coal-fired ships of the day), additional gunners and deck seamen.

Fisher was very successful and far exceeded his political masters’ expectations. He was able to provide sufficient manning to fill new construction units and created accountable reserve formations of warships that could be activated through a precise system for war. The RN’s budget for 1905 was 3.5 million pounds less than 1904 while still supporting a full program of new constructions. RN budget estimates continued to fall from 1905-1907 and did not return to 1904 levels until 1909 when the Admiralty requested eight new battleships in response to the growing German battleship program. When the First World War began in August 1914, the RN was able to return many nucleus crew vessels to full operational capability for patrol, convoy escort, and shore bombardment duties. The march of naval technology however had made many of the nucleus crew ships even more antiquated then they were in 1905 when the entered the program. Three aging armored cruisers recommissioned for patrol duties in the North Sea were sunk in the space of two hours by a modern German submarine with the loss of over 1400 lives. Two more elderly cruisers were destroyed with all hands (1500 personnel) off the coast of Chile later that year fighting the crack gunnery cruisers of the German Navy. Five former nucleus crew battleships were later lost trying to force the Dardanelles strait in Winston Churchill’s abortive 1915 campaign to knock Ottoman Turkey out of the war. While Fisher’s program preserved ships for reactivation, it did not provide for their modernization against new threats. Overall though, the Royal Navy viewed the program as successful in providing needed force structure for fighting a global war.

The U.S. Navy could slay one of its own “sacred cows” by adopting a modified nucleus crew system for the manning of surface combatants and amphibious ships not deployed nor in the training cycle to do so. This would involve significant changes in the manning programs of surface ships but the “payoff” would be similar to the British results a century ago in avoiding cuts in modern force structure and the preservation of current building programs. There are however a number of lessons learned from the RN experience that could be applied to improve its 21st-century U.S. application. First, rather than preserve aging units that cannot be modernized to keep pace with naval warfare developments, the U.S. should apply the nucleus crew to all ships home-ported in the continental United States (CONUS). Those ships permanently forward-deployed with the 5th, 6th, and 7th fleets would not be included in the nucleus crew program. Older ships like the Perry-class frigates, the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships and the Cyclone-class patrol coastals would not be subject to the nucleus crew program, but cannot be cut from the active fleet as quickly as Admiral Fisher achieved his reductions. They would be retired as more littoral combat ships (LCS) are commissioned to replace them. Cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious warfare ships would regularly pass through a nucleus-crew phase in their normal deployment cycle rather then be reduced to a reserve status.

A typical ship would return from an operational deployment and be programmed by its Immediate Superior in Chain of Command (ISIC) and Naval Personnel Command to reduce its complement to 60% of nominal manning. The ship would be required to keep a viable inport watch organization and be capable of getting underway for short periods to avoid destructive weather or in response to other emergencies. The ship would retain a basic self-defense capability to include close-in weapons systems and small arms. It would be required to get underway monthly for one-day periods and quarterly for three-day periods to demonstrate equipment operation and nucleus crew skills. The experience of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) in manning ships, particularly the engineering and deck departments with minimal personnel may be useful in developing similar watch organizations for nucleus crew ships. This program of minimal underway training would continue until the ship entered a major shipyard availability or approached the next deployment training cycle.

If preparing to enter the shipyard for an extended period, the crew complement would be further reduced to 10% of overall manning. The shipyard authority would assume complete responsibility for the safety, security, maintenance, and upgrades to the ship in a formal turnover upon commencement of the availability. The shipyard team might also be organized and staffed based on MSC experience and rotate as required to manage ships in the yards. The remainder of the crew would be sent to schools and training commands for the duration of the yard period or augment deployed units with personnel shortages. The nucleus crew would return to the ship at the conclusion of the work and after a turnover period and completion of shakedown, resume full responsibility. The ship would remain in its nucleus crew status until it again prepared to conduct pre-deployment training. Additional crew members would be assigned to again swell the ship’s complement to full manning and return any equipment in layup maintenance to full capability. The ship would conduct it’s training cycle and deploy as scheduled. ISIC’s (destroyer squadrons, carrier and expeditionary strike groups) would closely monitor the transitions of nucleus crew ships from reduced to full manning and back to nucleus crew status.

The key to making this program work is the precise management of the personnel assigned to nucleus crew ships. The Navy would also need to ensure that the Department of Defense and Congress fully understand the nucleus crew policy and the limitations it will place on the ability of the Navy to rapidly deploy large formations of ships. British Admiralty officials spent a great deal of time answering questions in Parliament from 1905-1914 on the nucleus crew program. The historical record would indicate they understood the limitations the RN was imposing on a large part of its force to meet fiscal demands. Congress and Department of Defense would likely require a similar level of confidence in order to support the concept. While the program preserves important modern naval force structure, it limits the freedom of action decision-makers had in the past in using the Navy to react to crisis situations. A full force could be made available for a major war or engagement on par with the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003, but with regard to operations of less scope and shorter length such as the 2010 Odyssey Dawn campaign against the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, only those forces already deployed in theater would be available. The U.S. Navy budget savings would also be less than that achieved by the British in the early 20th century. Unlike the RN, who could operationally afford to keep their nucleus crew ships in port for long periods, the U.S. would need to re-man and deploy them on a regular basis. The end result could be much larger deployed U.S. formations in the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Arabian Seas than those in home waters, thus obviating the need for many traditional deployment cycles.

Adoption of the nucleus crew concept for CONUS-based combatants and amphibious warfare vessels would protect valuable force structure from budget cuts, provide additional flexibility in ensuring deployed ships are fully manned and afford some cost savings in personnel. Disadvantages include less flexibility in responding to crisis operations, a less cohesive training plan for nucleus crew ships since 40% of the crew is absent for a large part of the deployment cycle, and less ability to use nucleus crew ships in home waters. The one overriding argument for this plan however is that is preserves surface fleet force structure, albeit in reduced capacity rather than losing it wholesale to budget cuts. Quantity has a quality all its own, and in order to effectively police the “global common spaces”, the U.S. Navy must preserve the force structure necessary to achieve sea control when and where required by national command authority. The Navy can recruit and train new sailors with reasonable speed and efficiency.  Once ships however are “mothballed” or scrapped, it may take a decade or more for replacement units to reach the fleet. Adoption of the nucleus crew concept by the U.S. Navy would ensure retention of valuable surface units in a continuing period of fiscal austerity.

For more on the nucleus crew concept, see Lazarus’ post at Information Dissemination. 

The Road to the QDR, Part I

This article is special to The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies).

 

Les is More.
                                                Les is More?

Before our other writers suggest ways ahead for strategic guidance I thought I’d take a brief look at the origins and of the American institution of what has come to be the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Our first stop: 1993. The Soviet Union, “the threat that drove our defense decision-making,” had died in an aborted coup two years prior, at the barricades of the Russian White House. At the request of Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense conducted what it called the Bottom Up Review (BUR), an analysis of the nation’s strategic outlook, the forces required to meet the still-present dangers of the world and the thorough scrubbing of Department-wide processes to best support those capabilities. The BUR was developed to respond to a changed world, but one recognizable today, with such headlining concerns earlier outlined to the Atlantic Council by Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense at the time of the BUR, as terrorism, “regional thugs”, and Japanese economic power (so some things have actually changed).

One of the most important decisions made in the BUR was to choose as its force structure-requirement benchmark the ability to fight and win to major regional contingencies (MRCs). As a result, a critique leveled at the BUR was that while it paid lip service to other objective-driven force structure requirements – such as the naval need to furnish 11 carriers (plus a reserve training carrier) to sustain a global presence – it nonetheless rested on an assumption that the ability to prevail in two MRCs would provide enough force structure to handle all requirements from “lesser-included cases.” The fault in this assumption, the critique posited, was that it did not fully recognize the specific and perhaps different capabilities, nor the straining operational tempo, such lesser contingency or peacetime operations would demand from the active duty force.

Another guiding assumption in the BUR was the belief that even in a fiscally constrained environment the military could sustain its readiness without risking what it termed “force enhancement”. This was essentially a gamble that procurement, and research and development efforts to modernize the force could be sustained along with readiness, at the cost of some downsizing of the Armed Forces.

By 1997 the BUR’s 2 MRC requirement had been adopted by the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. However, Eric Larson notes that by this point it had also become clear that high deployment-rates and operational tempos were not only degrading readiness but were risking the vaunted force enhancements, as funds marked for modernization were shifted to operations and maintenance accounts whenever one of those ol’ lesser –case contingencies reared its head. Additionally, Larson wrote that “research in fact suggests that the cumulative level of peacetime operations approximated a full MRC or more of force structure.” Against this backdrop Congress would act (yes, there was a time those two words could appear together in the same sentence). With the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act Congress formally established the requirement for a “comprehensive examination” every four years, specifically entitled the Quadrennial Defense Review, tasking the Secretary of Defense to examine:
─ Force structure
─ Force modernization plans
─ Infrastructure
─ Budget plan
─ Other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States

How did the first QDR play out? Stay tuned…

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy. 

On Stockdale and Strategy

The following article kicks off The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies).

stockdaleFor two weeks in September, I participated in a Navy fleet exercise, supporting our nation’s defense by flinging razor-sharp PowerPoint slides at the enemy.

The nature of the exercise – which featured U.S. and coalition ships sailing into an escalating regional tiff – raised an important question with which fans of Admiral Stockdale may be familiar: “Who are we? Why are we here?” In other words, why did this fleet of American warships exist and why did it bother coming to this forsaken, if fictional, part of the world?

We can talk about Quadrennial Defense Reviews and Strategic Choices Management Reviews and TPS Reports endlessly, but they’re all at a level of granularity that misses the point, which is – why do we bother?

The national security strategy answers the question. At least, it should. But lately, it’s hard to define what it is.

Time was, it could be summed up as a doctrine (think Monroe or Truman) or perhaps in a word, such as “containment.” The armed forces were structured to support some overarching goal and their missions were more or less guided by it. But that time is past. This isn’t to say we don’t have a national security strategy – we do– but does the general public possess any common notion of what it might be?

Luckily, I know some members of this “public,” so I asked them. Respondents to my unscientific inquiry included teachers, scientists, cops, economists, retired military officers and everything in between. A sampling of responses follows.

 

“Our national strategy in foreign affairs seems to lack a strong guiding principle, well-founded or misguided or anything else it might be.  We seem to be reacting to a series of foreign crises (often in philosophically inconsistent ways) rather than making any serious attempt to proactively influence the course of foreign affairs.”

“Our national strategy in foreign affairs seems to be one of PR rather than defense.”

“Simply put… ‘might makes right.’”

“Strategy seems like a generous term – it suggests deliberate action. U.S. policy is set ad hoc and largely reactive. The terms “incoherent” and “ineffective” come to mind… though the administration would say it is promoting democracy and U.S. interests broadly.”

“Promote democracy, protect trade, maintain world power status.”

“Our national strategy is, despite all pronouncements, a strategic retreat from aggressive foreign policy, and a return to more diplomacy, less stick.”

“We either do not have one, or it is to shoot from the hip.”

“I’d have to surmise that our national strategy is to act in accordance with what we view to be our own short-term economic self-interest.”

“The U.S. post-WWII strategy has been to promote political and economic stability in those parts of the globe in which there is a perceived national interest… the last three administrations have done a terrible job articulating a foreign affairs strategy to the American people, or Congress.”

 

A couple of themes emerge here: First, respondents don’t know much about the national strategy, and events don’t give them a “warm fuzzy” that it either exists or is being executed. Second, they perceive a reactive streak to current U.S. strategy – events drive our actions, not the other way around.

Well, America, I’m happy to report we do have a National Security Strategy. Our nation’s actual priorities, per the National Security Strategy of 2010, can be summed up as Security, Prosperity, Values and International Order. I think. Actually, it might be Building Our Foundation, Pursuing Comprehensive Engagement, and Promoting a Just and Sustainable International Order. It’s hard to tell as written. Maybe I’m not so happy to report we have it, after all.

From a communications standpoint, this is a problem, which leads to at least one of three other problems in the real world (possibly – probably? – all three):

1.) Nobody understands it.

2.) Policymakers don’t follow it.

3.) Foreign powers don’t take it seriously.

What to do?

Hunted to extinction in 1991
Hunted to extinction in 1991

Let’s start by acknowledging that in this arena, the U.S. is a victim of its own success. With the Cold War won, the population of foreign dragons to slay was drastically reduced (though Christian Bale continued to find employment). The U.S. has become, in effect, a status quo power, whose chief goal is maintaining the world system (economic, diplomatic and otherwise) and bringing the outliers into it. “Okay, guys, let’s just keep things the way they are and try to encourage incremental improvement at the margins” is not a very sexy mission statement.

But that is no excuse. Whatever the challenges, a clear and concise strategy must be articulated. And most importantly, it has to be meaningful to the layperson, whose taxes are paying for it and whose children are wearing the uniforms.

My recommendation: Get back to basics. The security establishment is spending a disproportionate amount of time on the means – budgets, force structures, manpower reviews – when what needs some articulation is the end. What does the U.S. want the world to look like? What goals are we working toward? Even a status quo power can have ideals to strive for. We could do far worse than refer back to Admiral Stockdale and ask ourselves, “Who are we? Why are we here?”

 

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant and strategic communications consultant who doesn’t work on that kind of strategy. Opinions expressed do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, or his employer.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.