The Roles of Navies in the Yemeni Conflict

March 31, 2015 Guest Author 7 Comments

By Claude Berube, Stephanie Chenault, Louis M-v, Chris Rawley

Although the Saudi-led Operation RESOLUTE STORM (alternately translated as DECISIVE STORM) began with air strikes into Yemen on March 26 and continue as of this writing, the heightened level of regional activity also includes maritime operations. These national and multi-national operations highlight the importance of naval platforms and presence. Yemen is strategically located with the heavily-trafficked Red Sea to its west and the Gulf of Aden along its southern coast. Some twenty thousand ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually. Yemen’s ports have been largely closed to commercial traffic.

Graphic courtesy of CIGeography and Political Geography Now.

Evacuation of Citizens

Earlier this year, the US and other nations began pulling out of embassies and recommending their citizens leave Yemen at the earliest opportunity. Once RESOLUTE STORM began, airspace was restricted with limited flights out of the country. Consequently, several countries have been evacuating its citizens via comparatively safer ports such as Aden in the Gulf of Aden and Hodeida situated along the Red Sea. One Pakistan Navy ship got underway from Pakistan on Sunday while a second planned to depart the following day, both for the port of Hodeida where some 600 Pakistani citizens were converging.

India sent five ships to evacuate approximately four thousand nationals from Hodeida. The passenger ships include the M/V Kavaratti and M/V Corals. The Indian Navy ships include the Delhi-class destroyer Mumbai, the Talwar-class frigate Tarkash, and the Saryu-class patrol vessel Sumitra.

China also interrupted the duties of its 19^th anti-piracy flotilla off the Horn of Africa to evacuate citizens from Yemen. The PLA/N frigate Weifang was sent to Yemen and evacuated 449 Chinese citizens and others. Evacuations had taken place at both Aden and Hodeida. Chinese citizens were then taken to Djibouti.

Saudi Arabia’s “Tornado Plan” was employed to transport diplomats in Yemen. The ships included the Al-Riyadh (Lafayette)-class Al-Damman, and a modified Durance-class replenishment ship Yunbou

Maritime Security

Several countries have some concern about the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, approximately 18-20 miles wide at its narrowest point “limiting tanker traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments.” According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, approximately 3.8 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products transited the Bab el-Mandeb every day in 2013. Although the Iranian-backed Houthis leading the insurgency in Yemen have announced that they would not seek to impact transit through the strait, the more likely threat would be from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2013, for example, the Yemeni government reportedly disrupted one AQAP plot to attack ships in the Bab el-Mandeb.

According to Reuters, four ships from the Egyptian Navy transited the Suez Canal to secure the region on the first day of the air strikes.

Search and Rescue

The Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Sterrett (DDG 104) rescued two Saudi Arabian airmen from the Gulf of Aden after their two-seater F-15 fighter jet crashed on the first day of the air strikes.

Naval Gunfire Support

According to one source, Egyptian warships began shelling Houthis outside Aden on March 30. The Egyptian flotilla includes the U.S. produced Perry-class frigate Alexandria (F911), whose 76 mm OTO-Melara gun can bombard surface targets out to 16 km away.

Analysts’ Assessment

While the majority of Operation RESOLUTE STORM activities have been air strikes with the possibility of a future ground conflict, the domestic instability in Yemen and on-going military operations underscore the importance of naval platforms, presence, and the varied operations that can be conducted by navies. Naval activity in the region by regional and international actors can be expected to continue for the foreseeable future. Possible future naval missions could include patrols designed to prevent Iran’s resupply of Houthi forces from the sea. Previous attempts by the Iranians to smuggle modern weapons to Houthi forces, such as the Jeehan 1 in January 2013, were foiled by Yemeni government forces. It is doubtful such naval capability still exists in non-Houthi Yemeni elements so multi-national forces will need to take on the maritime interdiction role.

The operations also highlight the PLA/N’s increasing capability. China began sending anti-piracy flotillas off the Horn of Africa in 2008 at the height of Somali pirate activity. To date, the PLA/N has sent nineteen flotillas, each comprised of two warships and one supply ship. These uninterrupted operations have enabled the Chinese to become familiar with long-term operations, logistics, and the importance of presence. Without the PLA/N’s experience in the region, it is unknown how or if it could have extracted its citizens from Yemen in a timely fashion.

A new op-ed in a Chinese newspaper on March 30 points out that “China has evacuated hundreds of its nationals from war-torn Yemen by Monday, in demonstrating responsibility and humanistic care toward its citizens. In the era of globalization, coupled with China’s increasing presence in the world, more Chinese nationals are living and working overseas.” Another online commenter on China’s Sina Weibo stated: “The strength of the motherland is not about the visa-free agreements with other countries, but that it could bring you home from danger.” Put simply: The Navy protects you.

One might ask, given budget priorities, have Americans and Europeans forgotten this?

Claude Berube is a history instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy and author.

Stephanie Chenault is the Chief Operating Officer of Venio Inc. and a Policy & Strategy Consultant for the Department of Defense.

Louis Martin-Vézian is the co-president of the French chapter at CIMSEC.org, and the founder of CIGeography, where he post his maps and infographics on various security and defense topics. He is currently studying Geography and Political Science in Lyon, France.

Chris Rawley is an entrepreneur and reserve naval officer.

Africa, Europe, Middle East

Migration Crisis in the Mediterranean: A Contact Group is Needed

March 31, 2015 Guest Author 1 Comment

The Mediterranean is in crisis. The flow of migrants trafficked illegally by sea has reached the level of a humanitarian tragedy. It also places a heavy burden on the shipping industry. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recently convened a meeting to identify ways out of the crisis. As became clear, responding to the crisis requires new forms of coordination. Various actors ranging from humanitarian agencies to coast guards, navies and the shipping industry will have to start to act concertedly. Information on the launch and movement of migrant vessels needs to be shared, but also evidence on the criminal networks organizing the trafficking. At the meeting participants pointed to the parallels to another maritime security crisis: the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Escalating from 2008-2012, piracy in this area has since been successfully contained. Are there indeed useful lessons from Somali piracy? The results from the ongoing lessons learned project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, led by Cardiff University, show, there are at least three:

Responding to crisis requires to build trust and reach political consensus among states, but also national and international agencies. The IMO meeting was a right step into this direction, but more will be needed. To fight piracy a contact group was created which worked in a flexible and inclusive manner. The group meets bi-annually and over 80 states and agencies concerned about piracy participate. The Contact Group has also dedicated working groups that meet more frequently and address specific issues, such as the legal situation, or the coordination of criminal investigations. This format allows for consensus building, information exchange and perhaps most importantly to develop shared understandings of the situation and what action is required. In such a format actors met as equals. None is on top, no one on tap. Political tensions and geopolitical disagreements can be circumvented. A contact group format allows for a close engagement with littoral states. Adopted to the migration crisis, it will allow to better integrate the North African states into activities. Creating specialized working groups on operations at sea, coordination with shipping industry, criminal investigations, and harmonizing law is promising to improve the response in the Mediterranean.

Tackling a maritime crisis requires efficient information sharing and coordinated operations. In addition to the Contact Group, in counter-piracy this was achieved through a regular shared awareness meeting, known as SHADE, and an Internet based information sharing network, called Mercury. Mercury is the Facebook of counter-piracy. It allows for speedy communication through online chat, and the voluntary reporting of the position of vessels, aircrafts and patrols. Surveillance can be optimized, rapid responses to incidents organized, and an overall division of labour facilitated. It is a system that has proven to deliver. Focused on operational coordination, it allows to avoid political tensions. SHADE and Mercury were initiated by the three major multi-lateral counter-piracy naval missions led by the EU, NATO and the US. These launched the process and soon handed over the chairmanship that became rotating. A similar system can easily and quickly be installed in the Mediterranean Sea. The two multilateral operations could take the lead, that is, the EU’s Frontex and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour. Given the significant presence of the U.S. navy in the region, also the US might assume a leading role.

The third major lessons from piracy is that long term solutions lie on land. Although we are facing a maritime crisis, vessels are launched from land and transnational criminal networks, whether it is pirates or human traffickers, require coastal infrastructure and anchorage. When counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden started Somalia was in a disastrous state. Back then no one believed that it could soon be on the way to a functioning state. Today, the villages that used to harbour pirates have stopped doing so. Somalia has a functioning government. Although it still has a long way to go, it is on the path to recovery. None of this would have been possible without the increased efforts of the entire international community. Today, it is Libya that requires a similar new deal, should there be any prospects to halt the trafficking of migrants.

What should be clear in the meantime: the migration crisis is no longer a European problem. Rightfully, international actors such as IMO and other United Nations agencies have started to engage. Concerted efforts by the entire international community are required. New frameworks of coordination are needed. With all the crisis talk, one should however not forget about long term consequences. Once the immediate crisis is over, the new mechanisms will have to be transferred to other organizations. There is a range of mechanisms in the Mediterranean that could play this role, such as the Union for the Mediterranean or NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Addressing the crisis will require new ad hoc solutions. But also a strategy of how the problem can be managed in the long run. This is yet another lesson from counter-piracy.

Further information on the Lessons Learned Project is available at http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net

Dr. Christian Bueger is Reader in International Relations at Cardiff University. He is the principal Investigator of the ESRC funded Counter-Piracy Governance project [ES/K008358/1] . He is also one of the lead investigators of the Lessons Learned Project of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and an Associate Editor of Piracy-studies.org – The Research Portal for Maritime Security. Further information is available on his personal homepage.

Africa, Podcast

Sea Control 72 – Obangame Express, Gulf of Guinea

March 30, 2015 Guest Author Leave a comment

We interview CAPT Rinko, USN, and CDR Sune, Cameroon, about Obangame Express, the 23 Nation Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security exercise. We discuss the scope and purpose of the exercise, the challenges of building cross-organizational/ cultural/ national inter-operability, and lessons learned. For context on the ongoing expansion and conduct of Obangame Express, CIMSEC Africa expert, Dirk Steffen assessed this exercise last year.