Notes to the New CNO Topic Week

By David Strachan

Undersea warfare is entering an era of profound transformation due to the increasing sophistication and proliferation of unmanned systems. But while their roles, missions, and concepts of operation have been thoroughly analyzed, the ultimate deployment of autonomous, expendable vehicles in a shadowy, hostile environment could unfold in ways that have yet to be fully imagined. When this is considered against the current geopolitical backdrop of hybrid warfare and gray zone operations (with the line separating competition from conflict growing blurrier by the day), conditions are ripe for the emergence of a new front in great power rivalry that could redefine the very nature of undersea warfare.

Operating within an opaque, clandestine domain, autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) will employ kinetic and non-kinetic means to disrupt, degrade, and destroy, subsuming every aspect of undersea warfare under the umbrella of autonomous undersea conflict, including:

• ISR: AUVs will conduct and actively counter covert monitoring of maritime operations on the high seas, in the littorals, and within ports, coastal facilities, and inland waters.

• Mine Warfare: No longer simply “weapons that wait,” AUVs will surveil, penetrate, blockade, stalk, strike, and defend against such operations by adversary vehicles.

• ASW: AUVs will detect, classify, track and engage adversary submersibles, and will actively disrupt and degrade adversary ASW operations.

• Seabed Warfare: AUVs will disrupt, infiltrate, strike and defend critical seabed infrastructure, such as undersea cables, recharging and data exfiltration stations, and listening posts.

In order to prepare for autonomous undersea conflict, future force investments should emphasize the counter-UUV (CUUV) mission, specifically:

• Artificial Intelligence: CUUV operations will require highly advanced AI, as they will occur in a complex, dynamic, communications-denied environment, and under intense conditions that demand rapid-fire decision-making based on real-time situational and contextual awareness.

• Energy: The complexity of CUUV operations will demand high levels of stored energy to power advanced processing and sophisticated payloads, as well as the propulsive power and maneuverability required for kinetic engagements.

• Collaboration: Pods of AUVs working together will provide expendability, redundancy, wide operating coverage, and will provide tactical overmatch during CUUV engagements.

• Miniaturization: Small, expendable, agile, and lethal AUVs will be preferable to slower, larger, high-value AUVs which will be vulnerable to adversary CUUV operations.

• Weaponization: CUUV operations will include non-kinetic effects to deceive, disrupt and degrade, and to infiltrate adversary undersea networks. Kinetic effects will include proximity and contact detonation for near or complete target neutralization, or “true” kinetic energy strikes to achieve mission kills.

For now, autonomous undersea conflict is the stuff of science fiction, and perhaps this vision may not come to fruition within the next few years. But an autonomous undersea revolution is coming, and with it the need to anticipate and prepare for the myriad operational scenarios that could ensue. The plans laid today will ensure that the Navy stands ready to confront the challenges and opportunities of tomorrow.

David R. Strachan is a naval analyst and founder of Strikepod Systems LLC (strikepod.com), a provider of current and strategic fiction intelligence (FICINT) on global naval affairs, with an emphasis on unmanned undersea systems. He can be found on Twitter @Strikepod, and can be reached at david.strachan@strikepod.com.

Featured Image: ROV Deep Discoverer documents the benthic communities at Paganini Seamount during the Deep-Sea Symphony: Exploring the Musicians Seamounts expedition. (Image courtesy of the NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, Deep-Sea Symphony: Exploring the Musicians Seamounts.)

Notes to the New CNO Topic Week

By Matthew Harper, CDR, USN (ret.) 

A lot has been written about the troubles of the U.S. Navy’s surface force, but two underlying institutional problems have not been fully addressed. The failure to address these flaws promises that the U.S. Navy’s surface force will continue to risk generating less capable Sailors who are more risk averse and less tactically astute.

There are far too many Junior Officers (JOs) aboard ships. Around 2000-2001 the Surface Navy began to put double or even triple the number of ensigns onboard ships. For a DDG-51-class destroyer, instead of having 4–5 ensigns, they would have 8–10 or even more. On larger ships such as cruisers or amphibious ships the numbers could be even higher.

Having too many JOs onboard a ship means many do not get the needed experience for when they become department heads and commanding officers. As a result, during their division officer tours, JOs were getting far less time learning how to make independent decisions on the bridge and in the CIC. If a junior surface warfare officer doesn’t develop proficiency at driving a ship, understanding all the instruments they have available, and coordinating with and utilizing the CIC, then they will have a much more difficult time developing those skills later in their careers. Now those original excess JOs are the current generation of surface ship COs and XOs.

There are far too many internal requirements. It is already known that the Surface Navy’s operational tempo is crushing, but a significant increase in mission area requirements within the lifelines of the ship itself also impacts operations. Navy surface ships are required to do far too many certifications, inspections, and qualifications, and with too few Sailors the ship as a whole has less time to effectively train and earns less experience in all mission areas to include seamanship and navigation.

At roughly the same time ships were getting more JOs they also received three additional mission areas that added significant strain to an already overloaded set of requirements. Specifically, all Navy ships added Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection after the USS Cole bombing and 9/11, a few years later certain DDGs began adding Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and more recently all have added cybersecurity. All three missions require significant calendar time for the crew and impose additional requirements for leaders to learn. Put another way, using rough numbers and dropping areas that have minimal impact on the entire ship, the Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, Ballistic Missile Defense, and cybersecurity mission areas have added roughly 20 percent more requirements to the workload of a U.S. Navy BMD destroyer.

While these missions have real value, their introduction was not matched by a corresponding offset of other requirements, inhibiting the crews’ abilities to develop real proficiency in not only those three new mission areas but all others as well. By failing to adjust the risk calculus as it is reflected in the mission areas and requirements assigned, the Navy only incurred more risk.

All of the mistakes made on the Fitz and McCain could and should have been mitigated by an experienced crew of officers, including the JOs on the bridge, the department head and JOs in CIC, and the XO and CO. But both the COs and XOs of Fitz and McCain were the products of having too many ensigns aboard and suffocating internal requirements that demanded significant increases in focus, time, and training when there was zero to spare. While this doesn’t necessarily point to direct causation of those fatal collisions, these two problems significantly contributed to the Fitz and McCain disasters and risk the systemic atrophy of the Surface Navy as a whole.

Matthew Harper, Commander, U.S. Navy (ret.) was a Surface Warfare Officer who served on three DDG-51 class destroyers, USS Cole (DDG 67), USS Shoup (DDG 86), and most recently as Executive Officer on USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54). In addition to performing three days of damage control after a terrorist attack on USS COLE, he holds a Masters in Public Administration from Harvard Kennedy School and is an award winning author for “Chinese Missiles and the Walmart Factor,” published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Featured Image: 190711-N-DX072-1117 TASMAN SEA (July 11, 2019) The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110) transits with the amphibious transport dock ship USS Green Bay (LPD 20) in a photo exercise (PHOTOEX) during Talisman Sabre 2019. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Anaid Banuelos Rodriguez)

By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC received a tremendous response to our Call for Articles requesting short submissions where contributors offer their suggestions to the U.S. Navy’s new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday. (This is an independent CIMSEC initiative and is not produced in cooperation with any U.S. Navy organization or entity.)  

Below are the articles and authors featuring during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions. 

“Two Unaddressed Problems in the Surface Navy” by Matthew Harper, CDR, USN (ret.) 
“Prepare for Autonomous Undersea Conflict” by David Strachan
“Make Crew Endurance an Operational Warfighting Imperative” by Captain John Cordle, USN (ret.)
“Reestablish the Strategic Studies Group” by Commander Chris O’Connor, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Ryan Hilger, USN
“Recapitalize Sealift or Forfeit the Next Great Power War” by Stephen M. Carmel
“Every Sailor a Cyber Warrior” by Lieutenant Douglas Kettler, USN
“Defend and Advance Core Undersea and Network Capabilities” by John T. Kuehn, Ph.D., Commander, USN (ret.)
“To Win Great Power War, Treat Information As a Strategic Resource” by Lieutenant Commander Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN
“Restore Authority and Accountability” by Commander Rob Brodie, USN
“Tackle Force Dynamism and Administrative Structure For a Stronger Navy” by Petty Officer Second Class Jacob Wiencek, USN
“The Navy Reserve is Broken” by Lieutenant Blake Herzinger, USN
“Junior Personnel: The X-Factor in Great Power Competition” by Lieutenant Adam Johnson, USN, and Lieutenant Junior Grade John Maslin, USN
“Kill the Darlings and Pet Programs” by Lieutenant Commander Ryan Hilger, USN
“Don’t Forget Seapower’s Dry Foundation” by J. Overton
“Improve Mutual Cooperation with Small and Medium-Sized Navies” by VADM. (Ret) Omar Eduardo Andujar-Zaiter, DRN
“Please Stop Making Sailor-Soldiers” by Lieutenant Zachary George, USN

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org. 

Featured Image: MAYPORT, Fla. (Sept. 17, 2019) – Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Mike Gilday visits with Sailors assigned to Patrol Squadron (VP-26). (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Nick Brown/Released)