Questioning the Carrier with Jeff Vandenengel

By Dmitry Filipoff

Jeff Vandenengel spoke with CIMSEC about his new book, Questioning the Carrier: Opportunities in Fleet Design for the U.S. NavyIn this book, Jeff makes critical contributions to ongoing debates about what kind of fleet the Navy needs and how it can evolve beyond its carrier-centric force design. 

In this conversation, Jeff talks about the carrier’s liabilities, what opportunities can be seized with a new force structure, and the challenges of moving beyond the carrier.

Intense debates on the carrier have existed for as long as the platform itself. Why write a book on questioning the carrier, and why now?

Navies’ force designs are a function of both the era’s available technology and the fleet’s intended missions. To question the carrier requires an alternative answer, a realistic force structure that can better execute those missions.

For much of the aircraft carrier’s history, there was no alternative that could outperform the platform and its supporting force structure. Following World War II, the technology either did not exist or was not robust enough to support alternative force structures, and the carrier, despite its flaws, repeatedly proved itself the worthy flagship of the fleet. It defended the Pusan Perimeter in the Korean War, launched the majority of U.S. sorties in the Vietnam War, and was the right choice to lead the U.S. Navy against the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

Starting in the 1990s, the technology likely existed to improve on the carrier-centric model, but the mission did not. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the People’s Liberation Army Navy being a weak coastal force, there were no credible naval adversaries and so the U.S. Navy shifted its focus to power projection from uncontested seas, a mission the large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier excels at.

Today, we have both the technology and the mission to move past the carrier-centric fleet. The Navy, partnered with industry, has worked hard to develop the technologies that will enable such a change, including advanced sensors, communications, and missiles. At the same time, with the rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), there is a mission demanding a change in the fleet’s structure: sea control and contested power projection against a peer adversary.

Therefore I wrote this book to show that, with today’s technology and the Navy’s evolving missions, it is time to question the carrier’s centrality to the fleet’s structure. It will remain a key component of that fleet for decades to come, but today’s technologies provide better options to accomplish the Navy’s peacetime and combat missions.

The large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the reason for our Navy’s success for so many years, is now holding us back from an ever better future.

In the book you say that, “The mission has become the protection of the carrier rather than attacking effectively first. Yet the perfect defense for a priceless platform has rarely if ever been possible in naval history.” Why does this tension exist between protecting the carrier and enabling more of the fleet to take on offensive roles? How is the carrier-centric model incurring an opportunity cost in fleet design, and forcing the Navy to focus on defending a single point of failure?

The large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is the single most powerful surface warship in all naval history, in part because it concentrates a great deal of capabilities onto a single ship. When that ship can operate as intended, that concentration makes the carrier an efficient and flexible means of deterring adversaries and delivering firepower. However, if that ship is lost, all those impressive capabilities are lost at the same time.

More seriously, the sinking of a Ford- or Nimitz-class carrier would likely be catastrophic for the Navy and perhaps the nation. The destruction of a $12 billion ship serving as a symbol of American might would have unmatched military, diplomatic, and political consequences. The casualties could exceed those of previous momentous Navy losses such as USS Chesapeake, USS Maine, USS Arizona, USS Houston, USS Indianapolis, and USS Thresher—combined.

To prevent that from occurring, the Navy has little option but to devote great operational and financial resources to the ship’s defense, a task the Navy has excelled at—a U.S. aircraft carrier is the best defended ship in the world. However, that defense must operate to a different standard than that of every other warship – it must be perfect to avoid the unthinkable, the loss of an American supercarrier. There is little naval history to suggest we can generate such a perfect defense, and trends in scouting and weapons technology indicate that task is only getting harder. More importantly, within the Navy’s finite resources, every sailor, ship, and dollar focused on the defense of the aircraft carrier is not focused on “attacking effectively first,” which Captain Wayne Hughes showed to be the key to combat at sea.

For example, consider the Surface Force leadership’s 2015 introduction of the exciting idea of “Distributed Lethality,” which evolved to “Distributed Maritime Operations” today. They boldly outlined an initiative to distribute the surface fleet and better enable all ships to launch their own attacks, writing that “a shift to the offensive is necessary.” However, the Navy will always be limited in how many platforms it can distribute for offensive operations when so many of them are concentrated for the defense of eleven capital ships. The admirals even indirectly acknowledge that limitation in the opening paragraph of their work, writing, “The surface fleet will always defend the high-value and mission-essential units; that is in our core doctrine.”

For decades the centralization of resources and missions on the “high-value and mission-essential” carrier was a good thing, as it proved to be an effective and efficient means of accomplishing the Navy’s tasks. With no credible adversaries at sea, there was little risk of losing a carrier. There was no one to attack at sea, so there was no reason to focus on attacking effectively first.

Today the situation at sea has obviously changed. To effectively execute the sea control and contested power projection missions against a peer adversary, the fleet must be focused on attacking effectively first. It cannot do that while huge portions of that fleet are focused on the defense of eleven ships. To maximize the Navy’s readiness for combat against our adversaries, it is necessary to move past the carrier-centric model.

The effectiveness of a fleet force structure can be weighed through numerous factors and considerations. What are your criteria for valuing the peacetime utility and wartime combat power of fleet force structure?

A fleet should be judged by its ability to execute the Navy’s peacetime and wartime missions, within existing financial, technological, industrial, operational, and political constraints.

In peacetime, the U.S. Navy is responsible for the “promotion of the national security interests and prosperity of the United States,” as the recently amended Title 10 language directs. The Navy’s presence operations, or campaigning, can include deterring adversaries, reassuring allies, protecting trade, conducting exercises, and ensuring freedom of navigation. We are seeing the importance and value of those operations off Israel and in the Red Sea right now.

Part of that evaluation must be the quantity of platforms in the fleet, as ships can only be in one place at a time and, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “A smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places and be able to do fewer things.” However, simply counting ships tells only part of the story, as they are not all equal in their ability to influence the nation’s allies and adversaries. Today, no single ship can match a Nimitz­- or Ford­-class aircraft carrier in presence value—but the correct metric is the fleet’s overall presence value, not that of a single ship.

In wartime, the force structure should be evaluated by its ability to conduct primary mission areas such as reconnaissance, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, integrated air and missile defense, and strike warfare, all to gain sea control and project power ashore. Again, there are both quantitative and qualitative factors to that evaluation. Numerically, a fleet with more ships has better geographic coverage, better distributes its capabilities, is more difficult to track, and better retains its combat power after suffering losses. However, fleet capability is also a function of warship quality, accounting for their sensors, weapons, command and control systems, survivability, and logistics capabilities. Today there is no single more powerful surface warship than a large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier—but there are more powerful force structures than one centered on those carriers.

You propose an alternative fleet force structure called the Flex Fleet. How is this fleet different than the Navy’s current and proposed force structures, and how is it more competitive?

The primary purpose of the hypothetical Flex Fleet is to disprove the argument that we cannot do better than a fleet centered on the large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Flex Fleet is designed to show that it is operationally, technologically, and financially possible to generate a force structure that outperforms today’s already impressive fleet. When the Navy decides to move past the limits of a fleet concentrated around the CVN, it can surely develop a force structure better than both the Flex Fleet and today’s force, drawing on its own staffs’ designs, the work of Captain Jeff Kline and his colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School, and your “Fighting DMO” series, Dmitry.

The Flex Fleet is designed to attack effectively first, seeking to fulfill Captain Wayne Hughes’ tactical maxim, as described in Fleet Tactics. To do that, it seeks to capitalize on modern opportunities in fleet design, opportunities that the Navy has made great progress on but cannot fully benefit from while operating within the confines of the carrier-centric model. The Flex Fleet seeks to embrace the Age of the Missile, network the distributed fleet, and thus diversify the fleet’s kill chains. To do that, it adds missile corvettes, missile arsenal ships, and light carriers, and increases the number of planned Constellation-class frigates. To pay for that, it stops producing Ford-class carriers, reduces the number of planned new construction Arleigh Burke and follow-on DDGs, and cancels plans for conventionally armed Columbia-class SSGNs, as called for in the Navy’s most recent Thirty-Year Shipbuilding Plan.

The resulting Flex Fleet shifts the Navy from an all-capital ship structure to a better mix of large and small platforms. In peacetime, its improved platform numbers and combat credibility means the collective fleet can better conduct the Navy’s presence operations, even if no single ship in that fleet can match the CVN’s presence value. In combat, its distributed structure and large missile inventory means it is better at finding the enemy and attacking effectively first, can more effectively project power ashore from contested seas, and is better able to survive the inevitable losses of war.

The Flex Fleet, operating within existing financial and technological constraints, has more platforms launching more weapons from more vectors and from more domains than the Navy’s already formidable “program of record” fleet. It is a fleet focused on deterring a peer adversary, and if that fails, winning sea control and projecting power from contested seas.

The Flex Fleet does not do away completely with carriers, but rather narrows their mission set and distributes their capacities more broadly into CVL “lightning carriers.” How can these carriers and their roles offer a better alternative to the fleet?

Without a credible threat at sea, concentrating the fleet’s missions on the CVN is an efficient and effective method. However, against a peer adversary, there are certain missions that naval aviation is best suited for, and other missions that different platforms and weapons can perform more effectively.

As a result, the Flex Fleet seeks to alleviate the burden on today’s carrier force and shift some of its missions to the rest of the fleet, which would reduce the need for CVNs. Shifting to CVLs allows for the use of an increased number of carriers, allows for naval aviation to achieve improved geographic spread and a more distributed structure, and reduces the fleet-wide impact if one is lost.

Make no mistake, a CVL is less capable than a CVN. Furthermore, if all we do is take the money for CVNs and buy an increased number of CVLs, it will result in a weaker fleet overall. But, as then-Chief of Naval Operations Michael Gilday said in 2020, previous Pentagon carrier studies have tried to make an “an apples-to-apples comparison” that “lead to fait accompli that a smaller carrier just does not compete with a super carrier. I think that’s a false choice.”

The best comparison is not CVN versus CVL, but fleet versus fleet: the carrier-centric fleet versus an alternative force structure that benefits from carriers’ many attributes without being wholly dependent on them.

You dive extensively into the recent combat history and dynamics of the major warfare areas to understand how they may affect carrier capability and survivability. What aspects and trends of the undersea domain in particular, especially submarine and mine capability, most affect the future of the carrier?

One of the carrier’s greatest attributes is its ability to stay mobile to avoid targeting while accomplishing its tasking. Today, with over-the-horizon radars, satellite networks, cyber penetration tools, and networked communications, it is harder to hide the carrier than at any point in its history.

On the other hand, submarines’ improved quieting and elimination of historical vulnerabilities means undersea scouting is getting more difficult. For example, Admiral James Foggo III and Dr. Alaric Fritz wrote in 2016 that modern Russian submarines are “significantly quieter,” meaning “The clear advantage that we enjoyed in antisubmarine warfare during the Cold War is waning.”

The Falklands War demonstrated those diverging trends in scouting. The nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror found the Argentinian cruiser ARA General Belgrano within 24 hours of receiving orders to do so. It stalked the ship and her escorts undetected for more than 24 hours while waiting for permission to attack, and then destroyed Belgrano and escaped without the escorts ever knowing the submarine’s location. As a result, the Argentinians withdrew their entire surface fleet to port for the remainder of the war. In the only case of a nuclear-powered submarine entering combat, it found and destroyed a single ship without ever being found—and defeated an entire navy in the process.

That is not to suggest that surface ships are suddenly obsolete. Submarines’ poor presence abilities, communications, and cargo capacity means they cannot perform many of the Navy’s missions. However, it does indicate that we can better capitalize on submarines’ potential while shifting away from a fleet structure that requires a perfect—and therefore unlikely—defense against the undersea threat.

Mines are just as problematic. While they are a threat to all warships, the nation’s low risk tolerance regarding CVNs means even an adversary’s press release about a supposed minefield could lead commanders to not commit their most powerful ship.

Numerous constituencies are heavily invested in continued carrier procurement. What will it take to make a major course change in fleet force structure?

There are many institutions and individuals with both the incentive and ability to influence the Navy’s force structure decisions to protect the carrier. This is not to argue that they are doing anything wrong—they are not. This is to argue that their strong connections to military leadership and Congress gives them the ability to affect the Navy’s shipbuilding decisions, and their valid financial, political, or organizational motivations give them a reason to exert that influence. As a result, a change away from the carrier-centric model will be one of the most difficult evolutions our Navy has ever faced.

Within the military, shifting away from the large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier would upset the balance of power between warfare communities, have huge implications for resource decisions, restrict aviators’ primary path to flag rank, eventually end the entire community of nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers (Nuke-SWOs), and constrain Naval Reactor’s influence to just the submarine force.

Within the defense industry, there are entire organizations that advocate for CVNs, such as the Aircraft Carrier Industrial Base Coalition representing thousands of companies. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of retired flag officers working for those companies. For example, Huntington Ingalls Industries employs a former Combatant Commander, a former Director of Naval Reactors, a former Naval Air Forces Commander, a former Naval Sea Systems Commander, and a former Chief of Legislative Affairs, all distinguished leaders who formerly oversaw the Navy’s financing, production, or operation of aircraft carriers, and now work for the sole producer of those carriers.

Finally, within Congress, approximately 96 percent of Senators and roughly two-thirds of Representatives have companies involved in carrier construction or maintenance in their district, meaning they have a very good reason (constituent jobs) to maintain the fleet’s structure. It will be impossible to evolve the fleet without earning buy-in from across the Department of Defense, defense industry, and Congress, a difficult task to say the least.

There are lots of organizations that can resist such a move if they choose to, but I believe only one has the knowledge, experience, and vision to lead it—OPNAV. The change is simply too large, too complex, and will take too many years to successfully accomplish without the Navy’s uniformed leadership driving it. As Admiral Sandy Winnefeld said, for the U.S. Navy to transform its fleet structure, “The real leader has to be a noisy, impatient, creative, courageous, and insistent military leadership.”

Fortunately, the Navy has faced similar challenges in the past and overcome them to improve itself. There is the story of obstructionist battleship admirals stuck in the past leading up to World War II, but that is a myth. In reality, the Navy made great progress developing naval aviation in the interwar period because of leaders like Admirals Joseph Reeves, William Moffett, and William Sims. They innovated with aircraft and ship designs, changed the personnel and training systems, and developed a new way of fighting. When a mission came along that required carrier aviation—the Pacific theater in World War II—the Navy was ready because of their pioneering work.

OPNAV continues that tradition of innovative and bold leadership today. Whenever they decide it is time to evolve the fleet, they will surely face a daunting challenge. However, whether or not we think we can transition away from the carrier-centric fleet, I believe the evidence is increasingly clear that we need to.

CDR Jeff Vandenengel is a naval officer with tours on three fast-attack submarines. Winner of the 2019 Admiral Willis Lent Award for tactical excellence at sea, he deployed to the Western Pacific three times and to the Atlantic at the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These views are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. government.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (March 26, 2022) The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) transits the Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jackson Adkins)

The Evolution of Soviet Views on Fleet Air Defense, Pt. 1

The following originally appeared in the summer 1985 edition of the Naval War College Review and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Floyd D. Kennedy Jr

“Air Defense of Naval Forces: a set of organizational measures and combat operations to repel the attack of an airborne enemy and protect groupings of naval forces at sea and in bases, and also to protect shore installations against air strikes. Naval air defense helps gain and keep air supremacy in certain regions of a theater of operations. Air defense is used in all types of combat and operations, during a sea crossing (of formations or independent ships), and in the daily combat activity of naval forces…” —Rear Admiral S.P. Teglev, Chief of Naval Air Defense, Soviet Military Encyclopedia, 1978.

The Soviet Navy is constantly changing, evolving from a coastal defense force to a blue water fleet able to show the red flag in the far reaches of the globe. This evolution is evident in Soviet shipbuilding programs and peacetime operations. But nowhere is it more evident than in Soviet naval literature. This literature, more than any other indicator, reflects the attitudes and concerns of high-ranking Soviet naval officers. In the 1980s one of the prime concerns of the Soviet Navy’s leadership appears to be the air defense (protivovozdushnaya oborona, or PVO) of naval forces. This phenomenon is a relatively recent one in the literature. The change portends a new Soviet intention to operate naval forces outside the protective umbrella of shore-based air defense forces and, perhaps, to use those forces more aggressively in areas distant from Russian shores outside the context of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war.

Air defense issues of particular importance to Soviet authors appear to center on the threat posed by antiship missiles (ASMs) and the best method of countering that threat. Among the leading ASM defensive measures discussed are electronic warfare (EW) systems, missiles, guns, directed energy weapons, and, the most controversial of all, carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and long-range interceptors. These Soviet views on fleet air defense require close examination if the West is to gain insight into the Soviet Navy of the late 1990s.

Early Views on Fleet PVO

One indicator of the attention a particular issue is receiving, or has recently received, at the higher levels of the Soviet naval command structure is the frequency with which it is discussed in the military literature. In the 1960s PVO at sea was a prime subject in only four articles from the available literature, and only two of those articles were devoted exclusively to fleet air defense.1 All four articles generally agreed that air defense could be broken down into two elements: combat against missiles and combat against missile launch platforms. Action against missiles was the responsibility of the antiaircraft guns, missiles, and electronic countermeasures on board surface ships. Action against launch platforms appeared to be the responsibility of the land-based interceptor aircraft of PVO Strany, the Soviets’ air defense force. The Soviet authors considered this division necessary because missiles could be fired from beyond the range of shipboard defenses. An unspoken but obvious corollary to this argument was that the Soviets did not then plan to employ their surface warships beyond the protective umbrella of land-based interceptors in wartime.

1990 – A port bow view of the Soviet Slava-class guided missile cruiser Chernova Ukraina underway en route to the Pacific Ocean from the Black Sea. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

The literature of the early 1970s contained virtually no mention of fleet air defense. In an otherwise extremely comprehensive article entitled, “Some Trends in the Development of Naval Tactics,” Captain First Rank N. V’yunenko did not once mention PVO at sea, although he touched on almost every other naval subject imaginable.2 Because V’yunenko enjoyed then (1975) – as he does now – a close relationship with the Soviet Navy’s highest decision makers, his omission of PVO from his otherwise comprehensive article appears significant, reflecting either a lack of high-level concern about the subject or, more likely, a division of official opinion on the matter.

The ASM Threat

In the early 1970s the Soviet press began to discuss a significant new airborne threat, the ASM. The first article on this subject in their navy’s professional journal, Morskoy sbornik, was entitled “The First Combat Use of Ship-to-Ship Missiles and Their Development.” The author, a civilian named Shaskol’skiy, discussed the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in October 1967 and the Western reaction to that event in the form of ASM development and countermeasures. The magazine gave no prominence to the article – it was buried in the back pages, the author was a virtual unknown, and the events he was discussing were almost three years old.3 Yet the difficulties Shaskol’skiy described as bedeviling Western engineers in the development of ASM defense (ASMD) systems presaged similar Soviet problems.

In the mid-1970s Morskoy sbornik followed Western ASM developments fairly closely and reported their developmental milestones in the magazine’s section on “Foreign Navies: Reports and Facts,” a compilation of brief, newsworthy vignettes on foreign naval developments. The first complete article devoted exclusively to a single ASM appeared in the July 1977 Morskoy sbornik and inaugurated a spate of writing on the ASM and the problems of defending against it that has continued to the present day. This initial article was written by Captain First Rank B. Rodionov and Engineer N. Novichkov, who have become prolific writers on the problems of fleet air defense. Entitled simply, “The Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” it contained a basic description of the land attack and anti-ship variants of the missile, along with a mild polemic on their arms control implications.4

The following year Rodionov and Novichkov published a more analytical article entitled, “Is the Missile Defense Problem Solvable?” Crediting ”foreign military specialists” with most of the analysis, the two authors recommended recruiting helicopters into the ASMD role to improve a ship’s detection range against missiles and their launch platforms. In addition, the helicopters were to be equipped with electronic countermeasures (ECM) to foil the missiles’ seekers and air-to-air missiles to knock down the ASMs. The authors suggested other improvements, including the automation of information collection, processing, and weapons control on board ship to compensate for the short warning time afforded by sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. With regard to the question posed by the title of their article the authors concluded that there “is no unequivocal answer . . . at present,” adding “Many foreign specialists are far from optimistic when evaluating the capabilities of combating anti-ship cruise missiles.” The two Soviet writers reached this conclusion despite the fact that they had just finished describing the unqualified success of Israeli ASMD against Soviet-made anti-ship missiles in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.5 It would appear that their pessimism over ASMD capabilities was their own and not of Western origin.

Kuz’min also had described the 1973 Israeli successes in the previous edition of Morskoy sbornik, as out of 50 ASMs fired by the Egyptians not a single one hit an Israeli target. Kuz’min had a more important point to make, however,

“Reconnaissance support of the combat employment of anti-ship cruise missiles is linked directly with reconnaissance directed at combating cruise missiles. This fact has caused foreign military specialists to express grave concern about the difficulties of detecting missiles. . . . It might turn out that the warning about incoming missiles will be their detection on radar screens, which could already be too late for the employment of air defense missiles for their destruction.”

Like Rodionov and Novichkov, Kuz’min recommended, through his “foreign military specialist” surrogates, the employment of helicopters for detecting incoming ASMs and the automation of intelligence processing and distribution.6

The sixth volume of the authoritative Soviet military encyclopedia Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya was published at approximately the same time as the above two articles. This volume contained an entry by Rear Admiral S. P. Teglev, Chief of Naval Air Defense, on “Air Defense of Naval Forces,” the first two sentences of which are quoted at the head of this article. Teglev continued his entry by describing the forces committed to naval air defense:

“This [defense] is accomplished with the antiaircraft weapons of ships and naval bases and naval fighter aviation in coordination with the National Air Defense Forces and the ground forces. Outside the reach of the weapons of the National Air Defense and the air defense forces of the ground forces, only a ship’s own antiaircraft missile complexes, small and medium-caliber antiaircraft guns, ship-based fighter aircraft, and equipment for naval reconnaissance and electronic warfare are used.”7

Later, Teglev specifically described how capitalist countries conducted naval air defense, implying that the above quotation described the Soviet method of PVO. This point is curious, because the entry was sent to press almost five years before the only Soviet ship-based fighter, the vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) Forger, demonstrated an antiair warfare capability. This encyclopedia entry probably reflected Soviet naval planning, or even desire, rather than capabilities.

1986 – A Yak-36 Forger aircraft parked aboard the flight deck of the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

ASM Defense

The Soviets published no major Soviet articles in 1979 on either fleet air defense or ASMs, although the ”Foreign Navies: Reports and Facts” section of Morskoy sbomik continued reporting on Western programs in both these fields. But the following year more than compensated for the lapse in 1979 with five major articles, four in Morskoy sbornik and one in Voyenno-storicheskiy zhurnal.

In February 1980 Captain First Rank Vasil’yev examined PVO at sea from the historical perspective. Vasil’yev asserted that in World War II fighter aircraft were “the most effective force in repelling an air attack,” but by the 1960s surface-to-air missiles had assumed “the first place among other air defense weapons.” At present and in the near future “aircraft and. . . winged missiles, which fly at very low altitudes, will effectively overcome the air defenses of ship formations.” The way to counter these systems, according to Vasil’yev, was with a deeply echeloned defense in four zones: “self-defense (up to 20 km), close-in (20-70 km), medium-range (70-180 km), and distant (more than 180 km).8 Probably not coincidentally, new Soviet SAM systems neatly fall into three of these zones: the SAM carried by the DDG Udaloy for self-defense, the SA-N-7 for close-in, and the SA-N-6 for medium range.9 All that remains is the distant zone, for which Vasil’yev implied – but never directly stated – ship-based fighter aviation would be the most suitable.

1987 – A port beam view of a Soviet Udaloy-class guided missile destroyer underway. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

In the April 1980 Morskoy sbomik Captain First Rank-Engineer V. Grisenko published a detailed description of the American AN/ALQ-32 ECM system that was designed, according to the author, after a careful analysis of more than 50 variants of naval combat. The system ”embodies completely the basic views of the US Navy’s leadership with respect to the role of ECM equipment in the defense of surface ships against missiles, especially anti-ship missiles with radar homing systems.”10

In a general discussion of air supremacy in the July 1980 issue of the journal of military history, Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhumal, Major General of Aviation I. Tomokhovich included two paragraphs on air supremacy in sea and ocean theaters of operations, He made two points, the first being that carrier-based aircraft had played the chief role in World War II naval battles. This first point was tempered by his second,

“The great importance of carriers as floating airfields and, on the other hand, their vulnerability from the air, forced the command elements of the warring sides continuously to reinforce the air defense of carrier forces with fighter aircraft and air defense weapons. This fact is why the operations of carrier forces usually were accompanied by fierce air battles and engagements.”11

Thus, according to Tomokhovich, although carrier aircraft were essential to victory at sea in World War II, the ships on which they were based were extremely vulnerable to enemy action and needed enormous resources devoted to their protection. By inference the same logic could be applied to proposed Soviet carriers.

1985 – An aerial starboard bow view of the Soviet Kiev-class aircraft carrier Novorossiysk. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Rodionov and Novichkov appeared again in the August 1980 issue of Morskoy sbornik with a treatise on the employment of airships (dirigibles) as airborne early warning (AEW) platforms for naval formations. Ascribing support for such a concept to “US Navy specialists,” the authors presented a convincing argument for developing airships to provide non-carrier naval groupings’ early detection of anti-ship missiles and their launch platforms. They cited the tremendous endurance of airships, their ability to handle all the functions of E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, including control of interceptors, and their ability to provide over-the-horizon targeting support to ship-based ASMs. Again paraphrasing their unspecified American source, the authors provided the following scenario. ”Dirigibles perform surveillance and issue target designations; surface combatants serve as platforms for helicopters and as means of support, including fuel for the dirigibles; and coastal patrol aircraft and ship-based helicopters deliver attacks against targets detected by the dirigibles and lay sonobuoy fields over a large area.”12 This scenario seems more attuned to Soviet naval equipment and operational concepts than to American ones.

The final 1980 article on the subject of anti-ship missiles and anti-ship missile defense seemed to be an attempt to put the ASM threat in perspective and allay what may have been growing fears about those missiles within the Soviet Navy. Subtitled “‘Anti-ship Missiles: Strengths and Weaknesses,” the article by Captain First Rank A. Strokin described the warheads, performance, flight profiles, and platforms of Western ASMs. It then outlined their weaknesses, concentrating on their subsonic speed, vulnerability to shipboard fire, inadequate target selectivity, and susceptibility to ECM. He concluded with steps suggested by “NATO naval specialists” for improving ASMD. “Increase the range of detection of the missiles; reduce time required to convert all means of fire to full combat readiness; improve the performance characteristics of means of observation and destruction to the point of complete automation of all processes from detection to opening fire.13 Automation seems to be a key concept espoused by many Soviet authors for solving the ASMD problem.

1983 – An underside view of a U.S. Navy A-6A Intruder aircraft armed with four AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

In 1981 Soviet authors produced one article in Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye (Poreign Military Review) on NATO ASMD capabilities,14 one in Morskoy sbornik on the operation of attack aircraft and fighters from carrier decks,15 and another in the same periodical on the general theory of the navy. This last is significant for the subject of this paper because of one comment by its author, Rear Admiral G. Kostev, “The winning of sea supremacy practically is not conceived without the winning of air superiority.”16 Although obvious to most Western naval analysts, this concept of sea supremacy and the attendant necessity for air superiority had not previously been mentioned in the available Soviet literature and its articulation by Kostev implied a Soviet recognition of the requirement for deck-based interceptors and fighter aviation.

In the May 1982 issue of Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal Chief of Naval Air Defense Rear Admiral S. Teglev traced the history of fleet PVO in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). While Teglev did not attempt to relate the specific PVO lessons of that war directly to the present day, he did keep returning to the theme that fighter aviation was an invaluable component of fleet air defense. He concluded the article by saying, “The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that fleet air defense is an important factor that exerts considerable influence on the success of combat operations of warships and units.”17

Colonel I. Inozemtsev expanded on Teglev’s theme in the August issue of the same journal. In his article, subtitled “Airborne Defense for the Northern Naval Lines of Communication,” Inozemtsev was less reticent than Teglev about advocating the use of naval fighter aviation for future conflicts. His basic point was that air defense of the SLOCs would be a naval responsibility in any future war just as it had been in World War II, and that naval fighter aviation, with assistance from other services, was necessary to fulfill that responsibility.18 Because Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) in 1982 had in its inventory only a few obsolescent Su-17 Fitter attack aircraft and the Forger, considerable additions of fighter aircraft to the SNA would be necessary to implement Inozemtsev’s recommendations. Inozemtsev carried the argument still further by repeating Fleet Admiral Gorshkov’s claim that all other services operating in maritime theaters should be subordinated to naval control for better coordination.19

Rear Admiral N. V’yunenko, supposedly one of Fleet Admiral Gorshkov’s  ghost writers, turned to an entirely new topic in the August 1982 Morskoy sbornik and examined American development of directed energy weapons. After describing the technical characteristics of such weaponry, V’yunenko discussed its possible application to naval warfare, especially against anti-ship missiles. Key to the potential of directed energy weapons against ASMs was the speed at which they could strike the target: ‘”While a conventional missile closes with the target at a speed commensurate with a Mach number, the destructive energy of a particle beam moves at the speed oflight.” V’yunenko stopped short of recommending – or having foreign military surrogates recommend – general adoption of directed energy weapons for anti-ship missile defense, but his generally positive treatment of the subject suggested that such a course was being taken by the Soviet Navy.20

Read Part Two.

Commander Kennedy is a professional staff member of the Center for Naval Analyses and maritime editor for National Defense. He publishes widely on US and Soviet naval and aeronautical affairs.

Notes

1. V.S. Sysoyev and V.D. Smirnov, “Antiaircraft Defense for a Force of Surface Combatant Ships,” Morskoy sbornik, March 1966, pp. 32-38; I, Lyubimov, “Coordination of National Air Defense Troops with the Navy,” Voyennaya myst, March 1969.

2. N. V’yunenko, “Some Trends in the Development ofNaval Tactics,”‘ Morskoy sbomik, October 1975, pp. 21-26.

3. N.V. Shaskol’skiy, “The First Combat Use of Ship-co-Ship Missiles and Their Development,” Morskoy sbornik, May 1970, pp. 94-99.

4. B. Rodionov and N. Novichkov, “The rTomahawk Cruise Missile,” Morskoy sbornik, July 1977, pp. 86-91.

5. B. Rodionov and N. Novichkov, “Is the Missile Defense Problem Solvable?” Morskoy sbornik, May 1978, pp. 96-103.

6. I. Kuz’min, “Reconnaissance in Support of Cruise Missile Firings,” Morskoy sbornik, April 1978, pp. 96-101.

7. S.P. Teglev, “Air Defense of Naval Forces” Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978}, vol. 6, pp. 587-588.

8. V. Vasil’yev, “Developing the Antiaircraft Defense of Large Formations of Surface Ships,” Morskoy sbornik, February 1980, pp. 26-31.

9. See Jean Labayle-Couhat, ed., Combat Fleets of the World, 1984/85 (Aunapolis, Md.: Naval Insticute Press, 1984), p. 675 for unclassified descriptions of these systems.

10. V. Grisenko, “Shipboard ECM Equipment in the U.S. Navy,” Morskoy sbornik, April 1980, pp. 78-82.

11. [. Tomokhovich, “World War IT and the Postwar Period: The Character and Methods of the Struggle for Air Supremacy,”‘ Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, July 1980, pp. 26-34, trans. inJoint Publications Research Service (JPRS) 76824 (Washington: 14 November 1980).

12. B. Rodionov and N. Novichkov, “Dirigibles in the Defensive System of Task Forces,” Morskoy sbornik, August 1980, pp. 82-87.

13. A. Strokin, “Antiship Missiles: Strengths and Weaknesses, Morskoy ssbornik, November 1980, pp. 84-87,

14. V. Vostrov, “NATO Capabilities Against Antiship Missiles,”‘ Zarubezhnoye voyernoye obozreniye, January 1981, pp. 72-74, trans. in JPRS 78054 (Washington: 12 May 1981).

15. I. Beriyev and N. Naskanov, “Operating Tactics of Deck-Based Attack Aircraft and Fighters,” Morskoy sbornik, August 1981, pp. 80-89.

16. G. Kostev, “On Fundamentals of the Theory of the Navy,” Morskey sborrik, November 1981, p. 25.

17. S. Teglev, “Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War: Operational Art: Covering Fleets from Air Attacks,” Vopenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, May 1982, pp. 27-33, trans. inJPRS 82628 (Washington: 12 January 1983}.

18. I. Inozentsev, “Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War: Airborne Defense for the Northern Naval Lines of Communication,” Voyentto-istoricheskiy zhurnal, August 1982, pp. 13-19, trans. In JPRS 82549 (Washington: 28 December 1982).

19. See Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., “Soviet Doctrine for Mutual Cooperation: The Naval/Air Force Context,” Naval Intelligence Quarterly, December 1981.

20. N. Y’yunenko, “‘The U.S. Beam Weapon,” Morskoy sbornik, August 1982, pp. 81-85.

Featured Image: 1988 – An aerial port quarter view of the Soviet Kiev class VSTOL aircraft carrier BAKU (CVHG 103) underway. (Photo by LT P.J. Azzolina, via U.S. National Archives)

Sea Control 495 – Cocaine Codfish with Aaron Delano-Johnson

By Walker Mills

Aaron Delano-Johnson joins the program to discuss how to apply lessons from counternarcotics operations to combating IUU fishing. Aaron is a Captain in the U.S. Coast Guard.

Download Sea Control 495 – Cocaine Codfish with Aaron Delano-Johnson

Links

1. “Cocaine Codfish: How the War on Drugs Can Inform the Fight Against Illegal Fishing,” by Aaron Delano-Johnson, War on the Rocks, October 16, 2023.

2. “A Plan to Push Back Against China’s Fishing Practices,” by Aaron Delano-Johnson and Chris Bernotavicus, War on the Rocks, December 2, 2022. 

3. Sea Control 219: USCG Commandant Admiral Karl Schultz, by Walker Mills, CIMSEC, December 27, 2020. 

4. Sea Control 256: Reporting From the Sea With Ian Urbina, by Walker Mills, CIMSEC, June 6, 2021. 

5. The Outlaw Ocean Project.

6. “Memorandum on Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses,” The White House, June 27, 2022. 

7. “Future IUU Fishing Trends in a Warming World: A global Horizon Scan,” by Lauren Young, Cathy Haenlein and Grace Evans, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), March 1, 2023.

8. “Move the IUU Fight Up the Food Chain,” by Conor Sullivan, USNI Proceedings, November 2023.

Walker Mills is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast and a Senior Editor for CIMSEC. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Addison Pellerano.

Sea Control 494 – Global Force for Good with Dr. John Sherwood

By Anna McNiel

Dr. John Sherwood joins the program to discuss his latest book, A Global Force for Good: Sea Services Humanitarian Operations in the Twenty-First Century, about the sea services’ response to various humanitarian operations in the 21st century. John has served as a historian at Naval History and Heritage Command since 1997.

Download Sea Control 494 – Global Force for Good with Dr. John Sherwood

Links

1. A Global Force for Good: Sea Services Humanitarian Operations in the Twenty-First Century, by John Sherwood, Naval History and Heritage Command, September 2023.

Anna McNiel is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by Jonathan Selling.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.