Forging the Apex Predator:­­­ Unmanned Systems and SSN(X)

By LCDR James Landreth, USN, and LT Andrew Pfau, USN

2041: USS Fluckey (SSN 812) Somewhere West of the Luzon Strait

Like wolves stalking in the night, the pack of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) silently swam from USS Fluckey’s open torpedo tubes. In honor of its namesake, “The Galloping Ghost of the China Coast,” Fluckey silently hunted its prey. With the ability to command and control an integrated UUV swarm via underwater wireless communication systems, Fluckey could triangulate any contact in the 160-mile gap between Luzon and Taiwan while maintaining the mothership in a passive sonar posture. Its magazine of 50 weapon stows brimmed with MK-48 Mod 8 Torpedoes. 28 Maritime Strike Tomahawks glowed in the vertical launch system’s belly like dragon’s fire. With just one hull, the Galloping Ghost sealed the widest exit from the South China Sea. Any ship seeking passage would have to pass through the jaws of the Apex Predator of the undersea.

Introduction

The Navy has its eyes set on the future of submarine warfare with the Next Generation Attack Submarine (SSN(X)), the follow-on to the Virginia-class attack submarine. Though SSN(X) has yet to be named, the Navy began funding requirements, development, and design in 2020. Vice Admiral Houston, Commander of Naval Submarine Forces, described SSN(X) in July 2021 as, “[T]he ultimate Apex Predator for the maritime domain.”1 In order to become the “Apex Predator” of the 21st century, SSN(X) will need to be armed not only with advanced torpedoes, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, but also with an array of unmanned systems. While SSN(X) will carry both unmanned aircraft and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV), it is assumed that UUV optimization will lead the unmanned priority list. Acting as a mothership, SSN(X) will be able to deploy these UUVs to perform a variety of tasks, including gaining a greater awareness of the battlespace, targeting, active deception and other classified missions. To fulfill its destiny, UUV employment must be a consideration in every frame of SSN(X) and subjected to rigorous analysis.

SSN(X) must be capable of the deployment, recovery, and command and control of UUVs. To fulfill this mission, every aspect of contemporary submarine-launched UUV operations will need to scale dramatically. Submarine designers and undersea warriors need to understand the trade space available in order to gain an enhanced understanding of potential SSN(X) UUV employment. A detailed study of the trade space must include all relevant aspects of the deployment lifecycle including UUV acquisition, operation, sustainment and maintenance. The following analysis provides a first approximation of the undersea trade space where the Apex Predator’s ultimate form will take shape.

UUV Concept of Operations

Effective solution design of SSN(X) and UUVs can only come from a mature concept of operations (CONOPS). These CONOPS will center around the use cases for submarine launched UUVs. UUVs will provide SSN(X) the ability to monitor greater portions of the battlespace by going out beyond the range of the SSN(X)’s organic sensors to search or monitor for adversary assets. The ability to search the environment, both passively and actively, will be key to fulfilling the CONOPS. Additionally, active sonar scanning of the seabed, a current UUV mission, will continue to be a key UUV mission. These are by no means the only missions that UUVs could or will perform, rather they examples of relevant missions that enhance the combat power of SSN(X).

It is critical that CONOPS developers and acquisition planners consider the SSN(X) and its UUV as an integrated system. That integrated system includes the SSN(X) mothership as well as the UUV bodies, crew members required to support UUV operations and the materiel support strategy for deployed UUVs. Other categories are necessary for consideration, but each of these provides a measurable constraint on SSN(X) CONOPS development. While the acquisition of UUV and SSN(X) may ultimately fall under separate Program Executive Offices, the Navy must heed the lessons of Littoral Combat Ship’s (LCS) inconsistent funding of mission modules.2 One of LCS’s early woes related to the failure to develop mission modules concurrently with LCS construction. Absent the mission modules, early LCS units bore criticism for lacking combat capability. Instead, the Navy should draw on the success of iterative capability developments like the Virginia Payload Module (VPM).3 In the same way Virginia-class introduced incremental capability improvements across its Block III through Block V via VPM, the Navy must prioritize continuous UUV development just as urgently as it pursues its next submarine building initiative. Table 1 lists some priority considerations:

Category Elements for Consideration
UUV Size of the UUVs carried inboard
Quantity of embarked UUVs
Deployment methods of UUV
Communications between SSN(X) and UUV
UUV Crew UUV Support Crew Size
Training requirements for UUV Sailors
Materiel Support Strategy Charging and recharging UUVs inboard
Maintenance strategy for UUV
UUV load and unload facilities

Table 1. UUV Considerations

Designing SSN(X) for UUVs

Organic UUV operations are the desired end state, but several gaps exist between the Navy’s current UUV operational model and the Navy’s stated plans for SSN(X). At present, submarines deploy UUVs for specific exercises, test and evaluations, or carefully planned operations.4 Additionally, UUV missions require specially trained personnel or contractors to join the submarine’s crew to operate and employ the UUV system, limiting operational flexibility. To their credit, today’s SSNs can deploy UUV from a number of ocean interfaces according to the size of the UUV including: 3” launcher, the trash disposal unit, torpedo tubes, lock-in/lock-out chamber, missile tubes, large ocean interfaces or dry-deck shelters.5 However, the ability to perform UUV-enabled missions depends heavily on the legacy submarine’s mission configuration. Two decades ago, the Virginia-class was designed to dominate in the littorals and deploy Special Forces with a built-in lock-in, lock-out chamber. Just as every Virginia-class submarine is capable of deploying Special Forces and divers, every SSN(X) must be UUV ready.

In order to fully define the requirements of the Apex Predator, requirements officers and engineers within the undersea enterprise must understand the trade space associated with UUV operations. SSN(X) must exceed the UUV capabilities of today’s SSNs and should use resources organic to the ship, such as torpedo tubes, to employ them. Also, given that Navy requirements need SSN(X) to transit at maximum speed, these UUVs will need to present low appendage drag or stay within the skin of the submarine until deployed.6 Similar to the internal bomb bay configuration of Fifth Generation F-35 Stealth Fighters, internally-housed UUVs, most likely with the form-factor of a torpedo, will likely yield the greatest capacity while preserving acoustic superiority at high transit speeds.

With so many variables in play and potential configurations, requirements officers need the benefit of iterative modeling and simulation to illuminate the possible. Optimization for UUV design is not merely a problem of multiplication or geometric fit. Rather, an informed UUV model reveals a series of constraining equations that govern the potential for each capability configuration. The following analysis examined over 300 potential UUV force packages by varying the number UUVs carried, the size of the UUV crew complement, and UUV re-charging characteristics in-hull, while holding the form-factor of the UUV constant. Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of the first order analysis, focused on mission-effectiveness, seeking to maximize the distance that a UUV compliment could cover in a 24-hour period. Notably, the UUV sustainment resources inside the submarine matter just as much as the number of UUVs onboard. Such resources include maintenance areas, charging bays, weight handling equipment and spare parts inventory.

Given that SSN(X) and its unmanned systems will likely be fielded in a resource constrained environment, including both obvious fiscal constraints and physical resource constraints within the hull, a second order analysis scored each force package on maximum utilization. After all, rarely-utilized niche systems are often hard to justify. While more UUVs generally resulted in a potential for more miles of UUV operations per 24-hour period, smaller numbers of UUVs in less resource-intensive configurations (that is, requiring less space, less operational support, etc.) achieved up to 5x higher utilization scores. Given the multi-mission nature of SSN(X) and the foreseeable need to show high utilization in the future budgetary environment, requirements officers have a wide margin of trade space to navigate because many different types and configurations of UUVs could achieve high utilization rates as they performed various missions.

What should be Considered

SSN(X) will be enabled by advanced technologies, but its battle efficiency will rely just as much on qualified personnel and maintenance as on any number of advanced sensors or high endurance power systems. In order to identify the limiting factor in each capability configuration, the study varied the following parameters according to defined constraint equations to determine the maximum number of miles that could be scanned per 24-hours: number of UUVs, size of the UUV support crew, the UUV support crew operational tempo, the number of UUV charging bays, and the numbers or charges per day required per UUV. As a secondary measure, the UUV utilization rate for each capability configuration was determined as a means of assessing investment value. The constraint equations are provided in full detail in Appendix 1: Analysis Constraint Equations.

The Navy currently fields a variety of UUVs that vary in both size and mission. The opening vignette of this essay discusses UUVs that can be launched and recovered from submarine torpedo tubes while submerged, which the Navy’s lexicon classifies as medium UUVs (MUUV) and which this study uses as the basic unit of analysis. The current inventory of MUUVs include the Razorback and Mk-18 systems, but this analysis used the open-source specifications of the REMUS 600 UUV (the parent design of these platforms) to allow releasability. These specifications are listed in Table 2, and Table 3 assigns additional values to relevant parameters related to UUV maintainability based on informed estimates. While the first SSN(X) will not reach initial operating capability for more than a decade, the study assumed UUV propulsion system endurance would only experience incremental improvements from today’s fielded systems.7

Remus 600 Characteristics
Mission Speed 5 knots
Mission Endurance between Recharges 72 hours
Number of Sensors (active or passive) 3

Table 2. Remus 600 Characteristics

Informed Estimates on Maintainability
Maintenance Duty Cycle 0.02
Sensor Refit Duty Cycle 0.09
Duty Cycle Turnaround 0.23

Table 3. Informed Estimates on Maintainability

Model Results and Analysis

The Navy’s forecasted requirements for SSN(X) weapons payload capacity mirrors the largest torpedo rooms in the Fleet today found on Seawolf-class submarines. Seawolf boasts eight torpedo tubes and carries up to 50 weapons.8 Assuming SSN(X)’s torpedo room holds an equivalent number of weapons stows, some of these stows may be needed for UUVs and UUV support.

Trial values from the trade study for specific UUV, crew, and operational tempo (OPTEMPO) capability configurations are shown in Table 4:

Parameter Values
Number of UUVs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Number of UUV Crew Watch Teams 2, 3, 4
Crew OPTEMPO 0.33, 0.5
Number of UUV Charging Bays 2, 4, 6, 8
Daily Charges per UUV 0.33, 0.5

Table 4. Study Parameters

The number of crew watch teams could represent a multiple based on the ultimate number of personnel required to sustain UUV operations. Crew OPTEMPO represents the time that UUV operations and maintenance personnel are on duty during a 24-hour period. A value of 0.33 represents three 8-hour duty sections per day. 0.5 represents two 12-hour duty sections per day.

The results in Table 5 represent seven of the highest scoring capability configurations from among the 336 trials in the trade study.9 The most significant variable driving UUV miles scanned was the number of UUV Crew Watch Teams, and the second most significant variable was the UUV Crew OPTEMPO. UUV configurations with 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 UUVs all achieved the maximum score on scan rate of 240 miles scanned per 24 hours, though utilization rates were much higher for the configurations with fewer UUVs. The 3 UUV configuration was able to achieve 240 miles with the fewest number of UUVs and yielded the second highest utilization score. The 2 UUV configuration earned a slightly higher utilization score (+2%), but the scan rate was 42% less than the 3 UUV configuration. 

# UUV # Crew Crew OPTEMPO UUV Charging Bays Charges per Day Miles Scanned per 24 hrs Utilization Notes
8 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.25 Big footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
7 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.29 Big footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
6 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.33 Medium footprint; High scan rate; Low utilization
5 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.4 Medium footprint; High scan rate; Medium utilization
4 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.5 Medium footprint; High scan rate; High utilization
3 4 0.5 2 0.33 240 0.67 Small footprint; High scan rate; High utilization
2 3 0.5 2 0.33 165 0.69 Smallest footprint, Medium scan rate; Highest utilization

Table 5. Sample Analysis Results 

This study shows that in order to scan more miles, loading more UUVs is not likely to be the first or best option. Understanding of this calculus is critically important since each additional UUV would replace a weapon needed for combat or increase the overall length, displacement and cost of the submarine. Instead, crew configurations and watch rotations play a major factor in UUV operations.

Conclusion

The implications for an organic UUV capability on SSN(X) go far beyond simply loading a UUV instead of an extra torpedo. The designers of SSN(X) will have to consider personnel required to operate and maintain these systems. The spaces and equipment necessary to repair, recharge, and maintain UUVs will have to be designed from the keel up.

The Apex Predator must be more than just the number and capability of weapons carried. SSN(X)’s lethality will come from the ability of sailors to man and operate its systems and maintain the equipment needed to perform in combat. The provided trade study sheds light on the significant technical challenges that still remain in the areas of UUV communications, power supply and endurance, and sensor suites. By resourcing requirements officers, technical experts and acquisition professionals with a meaningful optimization study, early identifications of UUV requirements for SSN(X) can enable the funding allocations necessary to solve these difficult problems.

Lieutenant Commander James Landreth, P.E., is a submarine officer in the Navy Reserves and a civilian acquisition professional for the Department of the Navy. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.) and the University of South Carolina (M.Eng.). The views and opinions expressed here are his own.

Lieutenant Andrew Pfau, USN, is a submariner serving as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School and the U. S. Naval Academy. The views and opinions expressed here are his own.

Appendix 1: Analysis Constraint Equations

The following equations were used to develop a reusable parametric model. The model was developed in Cameo Systems Modeler version 19.0 Service Pack 3 with ParaMagic 18.0 using the Systems Modeling Language (SysML). The model was coupled with Matlab 2021a via the Symbolic Math Toolkit plug-in. This model is available to share with interested U.S. Government parties via any XMI compatible modeling environment.

Number of Miles Scanned per 24 hours=Number of Available Systems*Speed*24

Equation 1. Scanning Equation

Number of Available Systems= min⁡(Number of Available UUV,UUV Crew,Number of Available Charges)

Equation 2. System Availability Equation

Number of Available UUV=((Number of Available UUVs by Day+Number of Available UUVs by Night)*UUV Duty Cycle)/2

Equation 3. UUV Availability Equation

Number of Available UUV=((Number of Available UUVs by Day+Number of Available UUVs by Night)*UUV Duty Cycle)/2

Equation 4. UUV Duty Cycle Equation

Number of Available UUVs by Day=min⁡(number of day sensors,number of UUVs)

Equation 5. Day Sensor Availability Equation

Number of Available UUVs by Night=min⁡(number of night sensors,number of UUVs)

Equation 6. Night Sensor Availability Equation

Number of Available Crews=Number of Crews*Crew Time On Duty

Equation 7. Crew Availability Equation

Number of Available Charges=(Charges per Day)/(Daily Charges per UUV)

Equation 8. Charge Availability Equation

Utilization= (Number of Miles Scanned per 24 hours)/((Number of UUVs*Patrol Speed*24 hours))

Equation 9. Utilization Score 

Endnotes

1. Justin Katz, “SSN(X) Will Be ‘Ultimate Apex Predator,’” BreakingDefense, July 21, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/07/ssnx-will-be-ultimate-apex-predator/

2. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Updated December 17, 2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf

3. Virginia Payload Module, July 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf

4. Megan Eckstein, “PEO Subs: Navy’s Future Attack Sub Will Need Stealthy Advanced Propulsion, Controls for Multiple UUVs,” USNI News, March 9, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/03/09/peo-subs-navys-future-attack-sub-will-need-stealthy-electric-drive-controls-for-multiple-uuvs

5. Chief of Naval Operations Undersea Warfare Directorate, “Report to Congress: Autonomous Undersea Vehicle Requirement for 2025,” p. 5-6, February 2016, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=791491

6. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” May 10, 2021, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20705392/navy-next-generation-attack-submarine-ssnx-may-10-2021.pdf

7. Robert Button, John Kamp, Thomas Curtin, James Dryden, “A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea Vehicles,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, , 2009, p. 50, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG808.pdf

8. U.S. Navy Fact Files, “Attack Submarines – SSN,” Updated May 25, 2021, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169558/attack-submarines-ssn/

9. The results of all 336 capability configurations are available in .xlsx format upon request.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN – USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) joins Collins Class Submarines, HMAS Collins, HMAS Farncomb, HMAS Dechaineux and HMAS Sheean in formation while transiting through Cockburn Sound, Western Australia.

Battlespace Awareness Tools Are Central to Fleet Readiness

By Michael Tiefel and Andrew Orchard

In his book Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Capt.(ret) Wayne Hughes states: “At sea the essence of tactical success has been the first application of effective offensive force.”1 Capt. Hughes’ warfighting axiom – applying offensive force first – is the distinct advantage information warfare (IW) intends to deliver, and it is predicated on sound battlespace awareness (BSA). Given the advances in the speed, precision, and destructive power of modern naval weapons, finding and fixing the adversary remains indispensable.

A powerful suite of BSA tools exists now, and they hold the key to making sense of an increasingly complex environment for Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) IW Teams. Incorporating BSA tool familiarization and training in IW schoolhouses while exercising their use in the Fleet Response Training Program (FRTP) cycle is an opportunity the IW community must seize to maintain an edge over potential adversaries.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) integration will drive future conflicts. In 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) published its Artificial Intelligence Strategy and established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in recognition of this fact.2 The AI Strategy directs the military to accelerate research, development, and adoption of AI/ML into a range of defense activities. The JAIC, meanwhile, manages the DoD investment in the application of AI/ML in activities ranging from logistics management to BSA. It serves as the executive agent for the military’s adoption of AI Strategy and seeks opportunities to move the military from traditional “Handcrafted Knowledge Systems” towards the development and incorporation of AI/ML.3 JAIC’s efforts portend exciting changes and will fundamentally transform how the Navy approaches the BSA mission.

However, none of these AI/ML efforts have resulted in tools the force can use now. Fortunately, there are BSA tools available to make Information Warfare teams effective in today’s maritime fight and that of the near future until AI/ML capabilities mature. Potential adversaries also recognize the criticality of winning the BSA battle and the possibilities of AI/ML in the long term. To remain ahead of these challengers and prevent them from gaining “the potential for decision by technological surprise,” the US Navy must expand its advantages in understanding the operational environment, and that starts with the effective use of currently available BSA tools.4

The Future Is Now: A Powerful Suite of Tools Exists

There is a pervasive belief both within and outside the Information Warfare community that BSA watch standers cannot successfully compete in a data- saturated world without AI/ML to help them understand the tactical picture. Action officers have spent many hours writing urgent operational needs statements to argue for rapid development and fielding of analytical tools to do the work usually placed on junior officers and Sailors. This panacea AI solution probably will not materialize in the near term, even though the JAIC continues to work to this end. The tools currently available may be the ones with which the next maritime conflict will be fought, and the fact is they work! Information Warfare officers must make an earnest effort to train their Sailors to complement traditional analysis tools with multi-intelligence fusion applications. CSG and ESG Staff Intelligence Officers play a significant role in cultivating a culture within their watch and analysis teams to push the envelope of available BSA capabilities in order to build the most accurate maritime picture from which commanders make tactical decisions even under stressful conditions.

 Afloat intelligence teams are now prioritizing training in Intelligence Community-wide tools as a standard operating practice for BSA watches.5 Not only does this train personnel on “buttonology,” but it also ensures watch teams understand the data sources from which they derive information, identify alternative sources if available, and appreciate data that is not available and what that means to their analysis. Officers and Sailors must understand the fundamentals of BSA tools and the sources that feed them; they must know other search mechanisms when missing information and explain their analytical process to other ship watches, aviators performing pre-flight walkthroughs, or even the strike group commander.

Afloat intelligence teams are also employing these BSA tools for analysis across all work centers from the air wing to shipboard cryptology. It is our experience that core BSA tools including the Fusion Analytic Development Effort (FADE) tool suite, Thresher data fusion tool, and Defense Intelligence Agency’s Think, Analyze, Connect (TAC) are integral to understanding the threat and operational situation in today’s dynamic maritime environment.6 Watch standers and analysts more quickly and accurately cross-reference information, build greater confidence in their use of traditional program of record systems, such as generic area limitation environment (GALE), and make higher confidence intelligence assessments through their continued utilization of these and other BSA tools.

How to Make the Connection: Cross-functional Training

Cross-functional training is the natural complement to BSA tools implementation; Sailors require a functional understanding of how each discipline provides value to the organization to use these tools most effectively. This is not a novel concept. Many papers have been written on the need for cross-pollination within  intelligence and cryptologic communities to better operationalize information warfare.7 However, there is no better environment to push the boundaries of integration than in SUPPLOT or EXPLOT. 

A common understanding of the various intelligence and cryptology specializations enables efficiency both on the watch floor and in the other intelligence work centers. An Intelligence Specialist (IS) with an ELINT background can leverage a Cryptologic Technician Technical’s (CTT) skill to find uncooperative contacts while he or she resourcefully locates cooperative contacts. Similarly, a CTT able to correlate imagery with ELINT can identify a vessel of interest without assistance and allow for more economical use of time for those high demand positions such as the Red Database Manager or the Force Intelligence Watch Assistant. 

This cross-functional approach does not demand in-depth expertise, but instead requires a basic, working understanding of the IS and CT disciplines. Watch standers benefit from cross-functional working knowledge that breaks down knowledge silos and enables collaboration using a common language and BSA tool set.  A shared background fosters the free flow of analytical ideas by unifying the team. Ultimately, a unified and self-aware team will remain one step ahead, thereby creating a distinctive capability.8 At the Strike Group level, our distinctive capability begins with training personnel on Intelligence fields, data sources, BSA tools, and fleet operations.9 The goal is to familiarize, which precedes, or at least tightly accompanies, analytic skills development.

Watch standing qualification now requires a combination of fundamental and practical lessons to create a cross-functional foundation. The fundamentals portion provides a basic understanding of the “how” behind each facet. Much like Surface Warfare Officers must understand how a warship’s systems acquire and track targets; information warfare professionals need to understand the sources and methods behind the data. Such lessons also concentrate on improving technology literacy and operational knowledge. Both are critical to effectively using advanced analytics and associated technologies during the practical training. The practical segment seeks to build the technical skills an intelligence professional requires to turn data and information into intelligence. The best way to become an intelligence professional is to work through as many practical examples as possible. Initial practical training emphasizes the development of personnel skills, patterns of life, and technology familiarization. Once mastered, practical applications focus on cross-functional communication and team building to meet strike group intelligence demands.

Battlespace Awareness Tool Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Build BSA tools and cross-functional training into routine watch practices. Two years ago, Carrier Strike Group Five (CSG-5) introduced substantive changes to the SUPPLOT training syllabus. We recognized the need for cross-functional training on the various BSA tools currently available. All watch standers, whether they are direct support personnel assigned from a Navy Information Operations Command (NIOC), the USS Ronald Reagan, or Carrier Air Wing 5 complete both common and specialized job qualification requirements (JQR) that includes proficiency in a BSA toolkit (i.e., Thresher, MIST, TAC). At sea, our ability to train personnel relies upon knowledge gained through informal online training, on-the-job training and through active interest by the various IS, CT, and officer users. Additionally, CSG-5 frequently coordinates with CACI, NRO, ONI and the USAF to schedule training opportunities for watch standers as these courses are available.10 We recommend all deploying CSGs/ESGs build BSA tool competency and a cross-functional approach into their watch standing JQRs.

Recommendation 2: Ensure Information Warfare students receive BSA tool training early. The Center for Information Training (CIWT) must integrate modern Battlespace Awareness tools into its curricula across the basic Intelligence Officer, basic Cryptologic Officer, Cryptologic Resources Coordinator (CRC), and various IS, CTT and CTR “A” school training curricula. This aligns with Admiral Gilday’s charge in his NAVPLAN 2021 that the Navy reforms its education programs to win in day-to-day operations and in combat.11 We are confident our Information Warfare schools can find space within the margins of Training Requirements Reviews to incorporate initial training on FADE MIST, A2, Thresher, and TAC. This change will also address a training deficiency in the OPINTEL toolkit identified by LT William Murray in 2019.12 However, training in BSA tools cannot end at the accession level training commands.

Recommendation 3: Reinforce early training with sustained training events during the FRTP. Fleet training commands must begin to integrate follow-on training and OPINTEL tool utilization during all phases of the CSG/ESG work up cycle. For example, some Information Warfare Training Commands must invest in a second iteration of BSA tool training as part of the Supplementary Plot (SUPPLOT) and Expeditionary Plot (EXPLOT) Team Trainer (SETT) events. Fleet training commands, such as our Naval Information Warfare Training Groups, should then put the SETT classroom instruction into practice as part of the Fusion Analysis Team Trainer (FATT) and Afloat Information Warfare Team Trainer (AIWTT). Deploying CSGs and ESGs should have the confidence to explore these tools during Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) and Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) graded events. There remains an important role for NRO, CACI, ONI or USAF training opportunities beyond the introduction to these tools at the basic schools and into the FRTP process. We envision these organizations moving beyond teaching the basic application of these tools to more sophisticated training events that allow for mastery of these capabilities. Furthermore, repetitive training opportunities allow these organizations to refine their curriculums to address basic and advanced training requirements as well as update their tools through fleet feedback.

Recommendation 4: Engage IW WTIs to be our BSA tool experts. Finally, we must ensure our WTIs are well versed in the variety of BSA tools currently at our disposal and able to implement rigorous training programs for our junior officers and Sailors. Several WTI candidates communicated with CSG-5 during our 2020 deployment to discuss thesis topics and request reviews of their final projects. Looking back, we should have pressed them to write projects on the training and application of current BSA tools for deploying naval forces. Naval Information Warfare Development Center (NIWDC) must include robust training in BSA tools as part of their standing WTI curriculum to make our future training officers successful in the fleet. The fleet deserves NIWDC-trained instructors well versed in existing tools and energized to help nurture their use from the tactical level up through the operational level at Maritime Intelligence Operations Centers .

Battlespace Awareness Tools Allow the Navy to Act Decisively First

Potential adversaries will continue to develop the requisite technology and weaponry to amass an effective offensive force. In response, the Navy is introducing new hardware, more demanding pre-deployment training and exploring AI/ML to address these challenges. Information warfare will enable the success of these efforts by maintaining the Navy’s advantage in BSA using existing analytical tools, building commonalities across the IS and CT force to encourage collaboration and communication, and modifying officer and enlisted training syllabi to allow for early and continuous integration of BSA resources. Moreover, broad use of current BSA tools across both  intelligence and cryptologic communities and supported by our WTIs engenders feedback from multiple perspectives. This feedback continues to be critical to tool developers as they refine many of these analytical tools even as we move away from handcrafted knowledge systems towards contextual adaptation and beyond. 

To achieve battlespace awareness to the satisfaction of any commander is the intelligence community’s highest objective. Intelligence personnel must be best prepared to provide confident analytical assessments of the tactical situation so that commanders and naval forces can make informed tactical decisions with greater confidence and speed than their adversaries. As CAPT Hughes wrote, “winners have out-scouted [battlespace awareness] the enemy in detection, in tracking, and in targeting.”13 A growing appreciation for BSA tools accompanied by a robust training program tailored toward fast recognition and quick integration of all available data ensures information warfare professionals remain at the leading edge of this mission critical requirement to out-scout the adversary, even in the information realm. This will allow the Fleet to be the one “who would attack decisively first.”14 

Michael Tiefel is a U.S. Navy intelligence officer and currently serves as the Executive Officer at the Center for Information Warfare Training, Pensacola, FL.

Andrew Orchard is a U.S. Navy intelligence officer and currently the officer in charge of the Joint Reserve Intelligence Center New Orleans.

The authors thank Capt. James Pendergast, USN, commanding officer of the Hopper Information Services Center at the Office of Naval Intelligence, for his review and inputs into the final version of this paper.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Endnotes

1 Hughes, Wayne P. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. Naval Institute Press., 2018, 206.

2 Department of Defense. “SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity.” https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF, 5.

3 Allen, Greg. Understanding AI Technology: A concise, practical, and readable overview of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning technology designed for non-technical managers, officers, and executives. Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC), April 2020, 3.

4 Hughes, 229.

5 Although we reference SUPPLOT throughout this article; our methodology and tools have equal practical application in Expeditionary Plot (EXPLOT) as well.

6 The National Reconnaissance Office maintains a suite of tools under their FADE program that contribute to the BSA toolkit used afloat.

7 Schwille, Michael, et al. “Improving Intelligence Support for Operations in the Information Environment.” RAND Corporation, 2020, doi:10.7249/rb10134.

8 Barney, Jay, and William Hesterly. “Strategic Management and Competitive Advantage.” Competitive Strategy, 2011, doi:10.7551/mitpress/8956.003.000, 149-153.

9 We recognize an appreciation for blue force capabilities is important. In fact, the CSG-5 Battlespace Awareness team works with surface, air, MISR (which resides within the N2 Department) and Information Warfare WTIs on a daily basis to ensure an understanding of blue force tasks and capabilities, allowing the SUPPLOT team to focus on N2’s Intelligence priorities. See Nelson, Christopher, and Eric Peterson. “Naval Intelligence Must Relearn Its Own Navy.” Proceedings, 13 Feb. 2020, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/february/naval-intelligence-must-relearn-its-own-navy.

10 Individuals with SIPRNET accounts are welcome to review the SUPPLOT JQR on the CTF-70 Collaboration at Sea (CAS) webpage.

11 Gilday, Michael ADM. “CNO NAVPLAN 2021,” https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/11/2002562551/-1/-1/1/CNO%20NAVPLAN%202021%20-%20FINAL.PDF, 6.

12 Murray, William N. “Reimagine Intelligence Officer Training.” Proceedings, 21 Feb. 2019, www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/january/reimagine-intelligence-officer-training

13 Hughes, 212.

14 Hughes, 212.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 17, 2020) Lt. Louis Petro, from Weeki Wachee, Fla., stands watch as the tactical action officer in the combat information center aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Fiction Contest Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC ran the top 10 stories submitted to the USNI-CIMSEC Fiction Contest.  The top finishers were ultimately selected by our esteemed panel of judges, which included August Cole, David Weber, Larry Bond, Kathleen McGinnis, Peter Singer, and Ward Carroll.

Authors explored future hypotheticals of maritime security and naval conflict through narrative storytelling. Unconventional outcomes and methods were often the result of modern concepts and capabilities that seem familiar. Through these fictional short stories, we may gain insight into how the future of maritime security may evolve, or go awry.

Below are the top finishers and stories featured during CIMSEC’s Fiction Contest Week. We thank the judges, our partners at USNI, and all submitting authors for their excellent contributions.

1st Place: Security by Obsolescence,” by Captain James Schmitt, USAF

“Sleazy laughed. The Reaper was many things, but it wasn’t intimidating. A low pass over the ships wasn’t going to scare off the China Coast Guard. If the MQ-9 was going to scare the Chinese, it wasn’t going to be with its speed.”

2nd Place: Bone Daddy,” by Michael Barretta 

“DF-26B ballistic missiles split the sky with their hypersonic screams. Guam Killers rained down and Andersen Air Force Base burned. Greasy, black smoke, illuminated by bright flashes of primary detonations, billowed violently into the sky. War was loud, very loud, thought Lieutenant Andrew Cohen as he strapped into the right seat of Bone Daddy, a B-1B Sea Control Bomber. He was first to the aircraft and had hit the alert button at the base of nose gear to start the engines before climbing up to the cockpit.”

3rd Place: Reality Hack,” by Robert Williscroft

“The seafloor was a hundred feet below, and the water was crystal clear. A thousand feet above, the sun shined brightly over the South China Sea, but not a single ray penetrated to where we were, on the seafloor, some forty nautical miles southwest of the Hainan Island coast. We were in international waters but very much inside the Chicoms’ exclusive economic zone. Somewhere below, yet nearby, was a Chicom acoustic array that allowed their intelligence people to identify and track every American submarine in the South China Sea outside the continental break. Our job was to take it out.”

#CancelMolly,” by Major Brian Kerg, USMC

“‘Thank you, Senator,’ Molly said. ‘If you will, allow me to step to the past to help understand the future. I joined the Corps just as Force Design 2030 was reaching maturation, and I saw firsthand what the fight was like under that model. And a lot of Marines died because we still had to ‘fight to get to the fight.’” She let that hang, giving the comment extra time by taking a sip from her glass of water.”

First Move,” by Dylan Phillips-Levine and Trevor Phillips-Levine

“I remembered the HMS Defender’s ‘innocent passage’ last year; I flew as the aircraft commander. The situation escalated to the point where my SU-24 dropped 4 x OFAB 250kg bombs in its path after repeated warnings from violating Russia’s sovereign territorial waters. However, despite the bombs, she refused to alter course. Since then, the West brazenly increased their FONOPs and ‘innocent passage’ transits.”

Task Force Foo Fighter,” by Jon Paris

“The missiles glided to their targets at supersonic speeds and lanced into the waiting enemy. Explosions washed out Burner’s screen. She peered outside and saw several orbs remained. They bolted in the direction of the cruiser. Burner put her jet on its wingtip and yanked into a body-crushing turn to follow, but they were too fast and sped out of view.”

The Baffin Bay Turkey Shoot,” by Mike Matson

“Lt. Larsen, taking local command of the swarm, sent a burst transmission, and the formation seamlessly shifted in the dark. ISR and jammers climbed to 5,000 meters. The HARMs moved to the tips on the flanks, and the two heavy weapon Raiders moved to the center. The swarm formed a crescent, with the tips farthest forward, HARMs waiting for the first electronic signs of its prey.”

Fishbowl in a Barrel,” by Keith Nordquist

“In an SCS, a crew of two could handle an entire New Panamax container ship on their own. From pinpointing a micro-mechanical problem in the turbine assembly to coordinating the additive manufacturing of repair parts at the next port-of-call, the system could do it all. Such impressive technology led Damocles Logistics’ CEO to call the SCS ‘a revolutionary tool for seamless and global logistics.’ The small cadre of SCS mission commanders and mission engineers preferred instead to call their little revolution a scuzz-bucket. Semantics aside, the system made autonomous, large container ship movements possible. Until it didn’t.”

The Dream of Russia: The Events of September 23rd, 2024,” by Billy Bunn

“Aboard the Kolpino, Kastonov and his crew had already moved on to their next mission: proceed west towards Crete, positioning outside of Souda Bay, Greece, and wait for further orders. As the largest NATO naval base in the Mediterranean, he prayed those orders didn’t include engaging hostile American ships. But Russia had just unleashed a surprise attack on a NATO member, and he knew that Article 5 impelled a response. Hopefully, his superiors had crafted a plan that would keep the U.S. and her allies from fulfilling this commitment.”

Any Clime and Place,” by Karl Flynn

“First Lieutenant Liu, USMC, looked north out to sea toward the Luzon Strait. The sky was turning amber and orange as the sun sank toward the horizon. He knew Taiwan lay beyond the horizon 200 kilometers away. As he often did, he began to wonder what was happening there. As a platoon commander, he was not privy to strategic level actions. Even if he had had internet access, it would have been impossible to discern the truth from news sources, much less social media. Both sides were pushing as much deception as possible. Liu knew he probably wouldn’t find out until well after the war concluded, which, as far as he knew, could last for a very, very long time.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: “J-15 Flying Shark (with J-15S),” by Jeffbearholy via Artstation

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.