This week CIMSEC will be featuring short stories submitted in response to our Call for Fiction.
These thoughtful stories examine the future of maritime security and war at sea. Authors creatively envision emerging threats and technologies through novel scenarios and narratives. These stories can help us gaze into the future and flesh out the possibilities of future conflict.
Below are the authors and stories that will feature during this edition of CIMSEC’s annual fiction week.
Larry Bond, the creator of the naval wargame Harpoon and coauthor of Red Storm Rising, joins the program. Larry discusses how he got into wargaming and his experience running wargames in the U.S. Navy.
Chinese Coast Guard vessels are ramming Philippine Coast Guard ships at an alarming rate in the South China Sea. Chinese military planes are increasing dangerous intercepts with U.S., Allied and partner planes over the international waters of East Asia. While the high-profile use of military ships and planes is concerning, China is building and training a joint military force designed with one overarching objective in mind—to seize land areas from its neighbors.
U.S. naval and air forces have been contesting China’s maritime and air threats for years. But they alone cannot deny China the ends of its military strategy either through gray zone tactics or use of force. With significant U.S. Army investments in long range fires systems, and lessons of harsh ground combat in the war in Ukraine, the role of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more apparent. To deter China from seizing terrain as part of the long-term strategic competition, while assuring our regional allies, U.S. Army Pacific is complementing maritime and air forces by improving the ability to defend key terrain, including the sovereign territory of the United States and its Allies. This can be accomplished by increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities forward in the region involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and capitalizing on favorable policy developments.
U.S. Army Pacific is strengthening its multi-domain capabilities to support joint operations in the Indo-Pacific region. By increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities, namely regional exercises that involve long-range fires systems, the Army aims to bolster Allies’ and the joint force’s abilities to counter maritime and air threats. This approach, developed through the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and implemented by newly formed Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), integrates land-based offensive and defensive capabilities with space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations.
Recently a Multi-Domain Task Force deployed its new Typhon Mid-Range Capability to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Typhon is a mobile land-based anti-ship missile system capable of launching the Navy’s SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Typhon offers complementary capability to the Philippines’ BrahMos antiship missile batteries coming online. The deployment demonstrated U.S. commitment to a mutual defense treaty ally faced with escalating threats. This is particularly important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts its focus from counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao to a new strategy of comprehensive archipelagic defense. MDTFs are also employing terrestrial sensors, high-altitude balloons, and deep-sensing platforms in the Indo-Pacific.
A Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Launcher from Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Long Range Fires Battalion, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on Northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Ryan DeBooy)
This new formation is applying lessons from recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to drive experimentation with advanced technologies. This strategy enhances U.S. military effectiveness and empowers Allied nations with capacity to develop their own land-based long-range fires capabilities—critical for defending their sovereign areas—contributing to a more robust regional defense posture against potential adversaries like China.
U.S. Army Pacific is positioning critical sustainment equipment and supplies in Allied nations so that the U.S. is ready to meet its mutual defense treaty obligations and support U.S. joint forces. The tyranny of distance from the Continental United States to the “First Island Chain” of Japan – Taiwan – Philippines requires positioning essential equipment and supplies before any fast-moving crisis. For contingency purposes, the Army has pre-prepositioned stocks across the globe in locations such as the Middle East, Poland, Japan and Korea. These pre-positioned stocks provide a unique set of sustainment capabilities to the joint force to include Common User Land Transport (CULT), ship-to-shore fueling capability, bulk water purification and storage, vertical and horizontal engineering, field feeding, maintenance services, contracting and large-scale medical capabilities across a host of disciplines.
The Army also provides watercraft and causeways that the joint force relies upon for intra-theater sealift as well as ship-to-shore movements. U.S. Army Pacific is equipped with purpose-designed, theater-enabling commands to run these functions in support of the joint force, Allies and partners. For exercises and deployments, pre-positioned equipment and supplies in critical locations reduce commercial vessel movement costs and support the economies of vital U.S. Allies. Pre-positioning equipment and supply in the Philippines and Australia, for example, rather than on ships at sea, also enables the U.S. joint force to respond faster and more effectively to their international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs during natural events such as cyclones, typhoons, floods and landslides. Investment in pre-positioned equipment and supplies on our Allies’ soil allows the U.S. military to provide a range of options to protect and safeguard our friends in the region.
The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have matured existing policy agreements with many countries allowing the Army to tangibly improve the joint force’s ability to meet Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. The new reality of China’s land seizure capability combined with their increasing ties with Russia have informed our diplomatic and military support to allies and partners. Current agreements provide sufficient authority to increase exercise scope and duration as well as storage of military equipment and supplies, but often nations choose to support agreements based on their political will.
Persistent engagement, collaboration, and routine communication are critical to earning and maintaining our allied and partner militaries’ trust. From information sharing with the Philippines on maritime threats to their economic exclusion zones, to network development with the Japanese in command post exercises and missile defense, the U.S. Army is building trusting relationships. In stark contrast to China’s bullying tactics, the U.S. Army works with local populations and governments to gain and retain freedom of action in the competitive space, giving joint and combined forces an edge should they have to transition to crisis or conflict.
Members of the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) conduct operations. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Philip Velez)
Critics will question why allies and partners would be willing to grant access and basing short of a crisis. Because they will seek support when we least expect it – and we must be strategically vigilant in positioning forces and equipment ahead of a crisis. In competition short of war, land forces translate political legitimacy into military advantage through campaigning: the logical and sequential arrangement of operations, activities, and investments. These recommendations position U.S. Army forces to support Allies in anticipation of their requests for assistance, and at the invitation of the host nation under existing agreements. These simple actions strengthen our critical alliances – a value that China fails to bring into any of its transactional relationships.
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (retired) Mark Milley believed that “preparing for war is expensive,” but “there is nothing more expensive than fighting a war.” The forementioned costs would be far less than U.S. blood and treasure spilled in conflict with China. General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, often reiterates that “our goal is no war.” To protect our allies and prevent another future conflict, U.S. land forces must complement maritime and air forces by increasing the scale and frequency of exercises involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment, and capitalizing on policy developments. U.S. air and sea power alone will not deter. Controlling physical land areas and nonphysical areas (e.g., human and information dimensions) directly supports freedom of the seas, in times of competition, or command of the sea in wartime. Alongside Marine Corps stand-in forces and U.S. special operations forces, Army forces can help secure key terrain in maritime Asia. Land force integration is essential to preventing war and winning the long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Major General James B. Bartholomees III currently serves as the Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Pacific. He previously served as the Operations Officer of U.S. Army Pacific and his previous commands include the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. MG Bartholomees holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the United States Military Academy and a Masters in National Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.
References
ADM Samuel J. Paparo, USN, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command speech, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (May 3, 2024).
Chris Panella, “The US Army put on a sudden show of force out on the far edge of Alaska to send the message it can as Russia and China partner in the Pacific,” Business Insider, (September 14, 2024).
Featured Image: Soldiers observe a live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/Army)
Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country, relying heavily on a resource-exporting economy, with the main route to international markets going through Russian territory.1 For many years, Kazakhstan did not experience any interruptions while exporting its resources, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s economic and security stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station in the Black Sea port to draw Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring different routes for its resource exports. The Caspian Sea offers a promising option but will require sea lines of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being” to protect its lines of communication, guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea.2
80 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gas exports.3 90 percent of those oil exports go to European markets through Russian territory via pipelines.4 Kazakhstan’s reliance on energy exports places the country in a vulnerable position that is now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation several times in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen foreign policy. On March 20, 2022, high seas in the Black Sea allegedly damaged the oil pumping station, but under nefarious circumstances. During the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan lost up to 300 million dollars in revenues.5 Before this event, reports surfaced that Kazakhstan chose not to send troops to Ukraine to fight alongside Russian forces.6 On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station in the Black Sea a second time due to discovered malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.7 The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian local court halted exports under the guise of an oil spill.8
In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the development of alternative routes for oil export. He directed a study to examine the construction of an underwater pipeline and the use of an oil tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea.9 Similar proposals for an underwater pipeline took place in the 1990s but remained blueprints and mockups. In the 1990’s U.S. companies undertook the Transcaspian gas pipeline project, which was aimed to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a new position in the State Department for Caspian gas and oil projects. In turn, Russia appointed two high-level government representatives to address the Caspian issues. Moscow also agreed with Iran for strategic energy cooperation in the region, meant to block any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not under Russia’s control or influence.10 Both countries used the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea to impede any further development of energy transfer options.
A map depicting energy infrastructure and deposits in the Caspian Sea. (Graphic via U.S. Energy Information Administration)
In 2018, the Caspian Convention regional countries signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.11 This new legal status for the Caspian Sea allows Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit options. This project’s completion remains uncertain due to Russia’s opposition. Another option for Kazakhstan is to build a tanker fleet and expand port capabilities. In the future, a Caspian oil tanker fleet could move up to 30 percent of oil exports through the Caspian Sea.12 However, oil tankers in the Caspian remain vulnerable to adversaries’ provocations without appropriate protection offered by the Corbettian concept of a “Fleet in Being,” providing security to a friendly fleet, and defending against unwarranted attacks.
The military balance of power in the Caspian Sea is shared between five countries: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “local command” of the Caspian Sea with its relatively significant fleet for this isolated body of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, including two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, four patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six landing craft, and a gunboat.13 Iran’s fleet comprises one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, four submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet comprises two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.
Kazakhstan’s present naval fleet remains inferior compared to the top threat. Russian and Iranian cooperation further compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious position. Kazakhstan’s fleet only patrols the littorals and provides security for offshore oil extraction.
In the face of new challenges, namely developing new export routes through the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in Being” to ensure the denial of adversaries. The main task of Kazakhstan’s fleet should be focused on quick reaction to any provocation on its SLOCs, which are approximately 300 kilometers in length. This could be resolved by three to five corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with effective firepower, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. More significantly however, a naval buildup might stimulate further militarization and an arms race in the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these risks surface ships numbers should be enough to present a credible threat, but appear defensive.
The missile boat Mangystau of Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces arrives in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan)
To ensure that any adversary’s action in the sea would be defeated, Kazakhstan might acquire ISR systems and loitering munitions. This capability combination proved effective in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War.14 ISR systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would be able to provide locations of ships and targeting information, while loitering munitions could deliver precision strikes, similar to current operations in Ukraine. The main requirements for such platforms can include UAVs that are able to operate beyond an adversary’s effective range while being able to relay the target’s location. Loitering munitions should feature enough explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. For instance, the Harop drone could be used as a loitering munition designed to locate and strike with 23 kg of high explosive. It also can be safely landed and relaunched.15
The combination of UAVs and loitering munitions can avoid an unnecessary arms race in the Caspian Sea. It is also cheaper to acquire and maintain them. Another advantage of this combination is that they can be used in other tasks in different locations. Loitering munitions can be operated in low altitudes above the sea surface, making them highly survivable. They can an effective range of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.16Units that operate this system could train in any location in the vast steppe of Kazakhstan. In concert with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they can also provide a credible deterrent.
Conclusion
In the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports through the Caspian Sea. However, the country’s naval power might not be able to provide secure lines of communication since it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil production, more like the functions of a coast guard. To ensure SLOC security, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being.” That capability could consist of additional corvettes armed with cruise missiles, as well as ISR systems and loitering munitions. This combination promises to be an effective deterrent while not provoking an arms race in the Caspian Sea.
Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a military officer of a Central Asian nation.
2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is meant by this term, a force than can “dispute” command of the sea.
10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.
11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Commission, Energy Security Program Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO association of Canada).
