Category Archives: Strategic Outlook

Predictions and forecasting.

Strategic Outlook

What NATO Must Do After ISAF

1 Comment
While some question NATO’s relevance, and even its need to exist after Afghanistan, there are, in fact, many jobs left to be done.

Deterrence and Defense 

In Germany, few people understand that defense and deterrence are still tasks for NATO. We are surrounded by friends. But talk to our allies from Norway, Eastern Europe, and Turkey and you find their feelings are quite different. Norwegians and Eastern Europeans fear Russia. The Turks have worried about Iran and are now concerned about Syria. NATO’s Patriot deployment to the Turkish-Syrian border proves wrong all who argued that the era of collective defense and deterrence is over.

In addition, “nuclear sharing” is still appropriate, even if Germans with their excessive desire for disarmament do not like it. If some of our allies sleep better due to U.S. tactical nukes based on our soil this is a price we have to pay. In an alliance based on the all-for-one principle, nuclear sharing is necessary as long as a single ally considers it important for his security.

 Range of Saudi CSS 2 missiles (Source)

Deterrence by denial will provide NATO more workload. The latter means to prevent an adversary from acting aggressive by making his means useless through one’s own capabilities. In particular, this applies to missile defense, but not only with regard to Iran. Saudi Arabia also has sophisticated medium-range missiles. If Saudi Arabia falls apart and “turns Egypt,” it can hardly be guaranteed that Saudi MRBMs will not fall into a bad guy’s hands. Moreover, Russia’s fears about missile defense are nonsense. U.S. missile defense’s final phase in Europe has just been cancelled. In addition, the U.S. is almost broke, and it is unclear how much new government revenue the “Shale Gas revolution” actually brings. It is therefore very unlikely that Congress would approve a new budgetary disaster.

Nordic Air Policing

The Baltic countries lack their own air forces. Thus, NATO is providing security for their airspaces. Moreover, Russia is increasing its number of assertive air patrols in the Baltic and the Arctic, while all NATO/EU countries in the High North have budgetary problems to sustain numbers and operational readiness of their fighter aircraft.

Hence, it would make sense for operational and for strategic reasons to establish a Nordic Air Policing mission from the Baltic over Denmark, Norway, and Iceland to Greenland, maybe even including the UK as lead nation. Non-NATO-members Sweden and Finland should receive an offer to join. Moreover, the positive side effect would be the outward-drifting UK could be linked to European security.

Special Operations Forces

Due to the political hazard of Iraq and Afghanistan, along with austerity, the era of major NATO land campaigns is over. Syria tells us that Western decision makers will try to avoid at any cost sending combat troops to foreign ground. Training and support missions, as the EU is doing in Mali and Somalia, will be the West’s approach, at least until the end of the decade. While the EU is doing well with training missions, it lacks experience with special operation forces (SOF). However, NATO’s SOF headquarter is running very well. Therefore, there is considerable potential for NATO-EU work-sharing. The Union could do basic military training, while the Alliance focuses on SOF training including partnerships with Non-NATO-countries.

Future Western land campaigns – if ever given a go by decision-makers – will follow a “light footprint” approach, which perfectly suits SOF. They will mainly carry the operational burdens. It is in all member states’ interest that NATO provides the framework for interoperable SOF.

Maritime Security and Naval Operations

The Standing NATO Maritime Groups are an unparalleled, but unnoticed success story. Since their creation beginning with SNMG 1 in 1968, the two SNMGs and two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMGs) have done their job without causing any political tensions. Instead, they were ready to go when called, like the 1999 Allied Harvest mine-clearance effort in the Adriatic Sea after the Yugoslav bombing campaign, or in front of Libya during Operation Unified Protector in 2011.

Naval operations are a niche where NATO is preeminent, due to operational experience and U.S. assets as a backup. However, the EU could try to seek a way into this niche by playing on the lessons learned from Operation Atalanta. Plagued by failures in security policy (e.g. Mali and its battlegroups), some EU fans may conclude that naval operations are a sector where the EU could better play of its success. But the EU does not have such operational experience in maritime affairs as NATO does, nor has it any access to U.S. assets. If things go wrong, NATO would receive a U.S. military bailout, the EU would not. Thus, naval operations should be left to NATO, while the EU focuses on the civilian side. In times of austerity, we do not need two organizations competing in the same field. Operation Unified Protector showed the enduring worth of the capability for rapid maritime crisis response. With a look on the instability in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, scenarios for new maritime operations in front of North African shores cannot be ruled out. Hence, SNMGs and SNMCGs should be excluded from defense spending cuts. Beside the Strait of Gibraltar, the focus of NATO’s maritime presence should be the Eastern Mediterranean. Trouble is likely due to the civil war in Syria and tensions between Turkey, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel about offshore gas. Russia is seeking to implement an anti-access/area-denial strategy by its largest naval expeditionary operation since the USSR’s collapse. Thus, a show of force and demonstration of political will by NATO is a necessity. After 2014, the Eastern Mediterranean is going to be the operational area for NATO’s seaborne missile defense on U.S. Aegis-destroyers.

We are right at the beginning of an Indo-Pacific-Century. Thus, when it comes to maritime security – I am explicitly not talking about air and ground forces – NATO should look more East-of-Suez. The Alliance has been present at the Horn of Africa since 2008 to protect the World Food program’s vessels and to fight piracy. NATO outreach to Asian navies, in particular China, has already begun. It would not make sense to cut these tiny, but very important strategic ties by ending NATO’s navel presence at the Horn of Africa.

British warships East of Suez in 2012 (Source)

Right now, Britain and France are pursuing their own track in the Indo-Pacific, while the EU is not taken seriously there in terms of security issues. However, as NATO’s present Maritime Groups will busier in the Mediterranean, a considerable option is to base a new third SNMG in Djibouti. The strategic values would be; permanent protection of vital sea-lanes; ability of rapid power projection and crisis response towards the Persian Gulf; quickly available means for disaster relief; mutual trust building by naval diplomacy with emerging maritime powers like China or India; a virtual capacity to reach out east of Malacca.

Of course, in many member states, especially Germany, such ideas about new NATO forward presence would be extremely out-of-favor. Thus, a more realistic approach is just to never end Ocean Shield. Open discussions about the operation should be avoided. While little attention is given, the mission can evolve in the ways mentioned and, hence, create irreversible facts.

The Arctic, however, should not be subject to military considerations other than Air Policing. Engaging Russia and new Asian stakeholders in the High North is a political question. The worst possible mistake would be to militarize and thereby to complicate Arctic politics.

Export and Guarantee Stability in Europe

After the Cold War’s end, the export of stability to Eastern Europe and the Balkans has been an outstanding success. While the Nobel Peace Prize has been given to the EU for incomprehensible reasons, it was NATO that connected past adversaries into its framework of peace, stability, and security. Macedonia and Montenegro should join NATO, once all membership criteria are met. In the medium term, the door should also be open to Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo. The more Balkan countries in NATO, the better, because it significantly decreases the likelihood of conflict in the region.

Georgia and Ukraine are not yet close to NATO membership, but the door should not be closed. The Georgians have a pretty tough road ahead. They will never join NATO as long as there are Russian troops on Georgian territory. Thus, either they find a way for the Russians to leave (which Moscow will not do) or they have to give up Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a prize for their way into NATO and EU (which Tibilisi will reject).

With regard to Russia’s resurgence and emerging assertiveness, Sweden and Finland should be offered closer partnerships or full memberships, if they so choose. To prevent Cyprus from becoming a Russian proxy, it would be a great idea to bring them into NATO. Unfortunately, Turkey would not let that happen. If they really go for independence, membership for Greenland, Scotland and Catalonia in NATO should be granted. (Although the Spanish stance on Catalan NATO/EU-membership after a succession would be quite interesting to watch).

EU youth unemployment 2013 (Source)

Europe’s crisis has been managed, but is far from being solved. In 2009/10 – surprise, surprise – the trouble in Greece occurred a few weeks after the German elections. We will see what happens after Merkel has been re-elected on September 22 or after the elections to the European Parliament in May 2014. It is an open secret in Berlin that Greece needs a second haircut. New bailouts for Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, and Italy are still on the table, but before September 22 nobody wants to talk about such issues. The fatal consequences of the huge youth unemployment have not occurred much yet, but they will eventually. Last but not least, when the United States is back on track with an economy running “full steam ahead,” France will still be discussing retirement in the age of 62. After ISAF’s end, one of NATO’s main missions is to be a backup for stability in Europe, if turmoil in the Euro Zone or even EU takes charge.

Keep the Russians and Chinese Out

There are these debates about Chinese bases in the Atlantic – which the author has been part of – and a new Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean including a base in Cyprus. There are reasonable arguments for the position that these debates are not kind of close to reality. However, the fact that such debates are now possible, which they would never have been ten years ago, should raise one’s attention.

Except the Soviet/Russian Westgroup from 1990-94 in Germany, a Non-NATO/EU-country has never had a permanent military presence in a NATO/EU-country. If Russia, China or someone else finds a way to set up a permanent military presence in a NATO or EU country, it would a dramatic signal for Western decline. NATO’s decision makers and strategists are tasked to prevent that from happening at any cost.

Felix Seidler is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Security Policy, University of Kiel, Germany, and a German security affairs writer. This article appeared in original form at his website, Seidlers Sicherheitspolitik.

 

Strategic Outlook

Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick When Dealing With Future North Korean and Iranian Threats

Leave a comment

iran_2586247b

In the wake of Hassan Rowhani’s landslide victory as Iran’s new president, some foreign policy mavens now believe that Rowhani’s presidency may augur a positive shift in Iran’s hitherto hostile policy towards the West. However, despite a glimmer of hope that Rowhani’s election may translate into moderate policies towards the West, others have “adopted a cautious ‘wait-and-see’ posture,” citing Rowhani’s past affiliation with the Ayatollah.

For East Asian experts, Rowhani’s election warrants attention because it remains to be seen whether Iran will retain its current alliance with Kim Jŏng-ŭn even if it chooses to reconcile with the West. After all, some have alleged that Iran has played a major role in the DPRK’s successful testing of its Ŭnha-3 rocket last December. More importantly, Rowhani’s future stance towards the West deserves attention because it may determine whether or not the United States must revise its strategy to adapt to new geostrategic realities. Indeed, it can be argued that the aforementioned factors are not mutually exclusive but intricately intertwined.

Some foreign policy mavens have construed recent events in the Korean peninsula and Iran as encouraging “game-changers.” After all, both Koreas have begun talks to ratchet down the ongoing tension. Furthermore, experts on Iran agree that Rowhani’s victory was prompted by a universal desire for positive change after years of economic hardships and political repression under Ahmedinejad.

However, geostrategic realities on the Korean peninsula and in the Persian Gulf might be more complex than they appear. On the peninsula, the two Korean states evinced deep-seated rancor and mutual distrust in their latest talk held at P’anmunjŏm despite having reached an agreement to reopen the Kaesŏng Industrial Complex. As Miha Hribernik and I wrote previously, “Should miscommunication problems and distrust persist, the consequences for the Korean Peninsula and the regional security environment may be dire.” As for Iran, it recently claimed to have improved the accuracy of its anti-ship ballistic missile, the Khalij-e Fars (Persian Gulf). Further, Rowhani’s election may have little effect on Iran’s existing nuclear policy because ultimately, “it is Khamenei who will make the final decision on the nuclear program.” In other words, both the DPRK and Iran may continue their existing partnership, or even lash out against the United States, if they believe that their collective interests are threatened.

So how can the United States successfully recalibrate its existing strategy in ways that reflect current geostrategic realities in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula? Dealing with the DPRK and Iran may require a flexible combination of deft diplomacy on one hand, and a show of strength on the other. In simple terms, the United States should “speak softly and carry a big stick” when dealing with future threats posed by the DPRK-Iran alliance.

theodore-roosevelt-cartoon

Diplomacy may be the best option that the Obama Administration has to proactively deter the two “outlier” states from coalescing. Indeed, Vali Nasr recommends offering sanctions relief to Iran so as “to break the logjam over nuclear negotiations.” Even better, the United States can thaw relations with Iran and the DPRK by granting diplomatic recognition to both countries. In addition to “reducing dangers” stemming from miscalculations and enabling the United States to gather intelligence on both countries, normalization may prevent the outbreak of a fratricidal war on the Korean peninsula and may hold Rowhani and Kim Jŏng-ŭn accountable to international norms.

Nevertheless, in order for diplomatic endeavors to be sustainable in the long-run, they must be backed up by a credible threat of coercion. While many defense analysts and strategists remain fixated on countering Iran and China’s A2/AD tactics, the U.S. military can no longer afford to operate alone in the face of drastic sequestration cuts. It can, however, exercise firmness by “leading from behind” in working with allies and proxies. One such example is that of a “proxy strategy” implemented by General James Mattis, whereby Iran’s Sunni neighbors would supposedly vie for influence in the Persian Gulf region to deter, if not contain, Iran’s rise as a regional power. Another option, as I’ve proposed earlier, would be to form a combined fleet composed of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), the ROK Navy, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to proactively deter future DPRK provocations. Third, given that the United States still faces aggression from afar in the face of improved missile capabilities possessed by Iran and the DPRK, the United States must be prepared to defend itself at home by bolstering its missile defense systems. Last, and perhaps most important,  since the world has converged into a smaller community by way of globalization, we must take the fight to our adversaries by “recogniz[ing] that it takes a network to confront another network…[and, therefore, must] follow the money [to upend] threat financing” internationally and at home.

LCDR B. J. Armstrong wrote that there “would be changes to tactics, and the requisite adjustments to operational planning” when dealing with adversaries who threaten America’s strategic dominance abroad. To this, one should add that flexible strategic responses, whereby the United States readily wields a combination of carrots and sticks to deal with refractory pariah states, may be needed to guarantee America’s continued strategic dominance and peace in the Persian Gulf and in East Asia.

(This article was republished by permission of the United States Naval Institute Blog and appeared in its original form on July 18th here.)

Strategic Outlook

Cyprus: The Mediterranean Pivot

1 Comment

CyprusBy Chiara Proietti Silvestri

In recent years the Eastern Mediterranean has increased its international strategic importance following significant discoveries of hydrocarbons. In this region the recent offshore findings of natural gas are radically changing its geostrategic and economic status. But before achieving the ambitious objective of becoming a net exporter of energy, the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus in particular, must confront regional challenges and interests of the major powers in the area – be they economic, politico-strategic, or due to the required energy infrastructure.

Two years after the great discoveries of the Leviathan and Tamar fields off the Israeli coast in 2009, it was, in December 2011, Cyprus’ turn. The U.S. company Noble Energy reported an initial discovery of offshore gas in block 12 of Aphrodite, with an energy potential estimated at between 5-8 trillion cubic feet (140-230 billion cubic meters). Evidence suggests that this area is an extension of the Levant basin: it is still the subject of an initial exploratory phase, and these initial estimates are considered conservative, with the prospect of rising in the coming years. There is therefore a potential wealth for the island of enormous proportions. According to some experts, Cyprus could potentially be sitting on a goldmine of at least 60 trillion cubic feet (1.7 trillion cubic meters) of gas. Not considering the possibility of petroleum it could generate revenues of up to $400 billion once commercially exploited.

The declared objective of the government of Nicosia is to use the geo-strategic position of Cyprus, between Europe and the Middle East, to make the country a true energy hub, with a central role in commercial transit and in the provision of European energy. This is a perspective, however, that does not consider the tensions and several unresolved questions that could hinder the energy development of the island, essential in reviving an economy itself in deep crisis.

Cyprus oil concessionsFirst, the strong political destabilization resulting from the 1974 Turkish military invasion, which produced a de facto division of the island between the Turkish-Cypriot north and the Greek-Cypriot south. The discovery of energy resources in the southern part of Cyprus, as well as an absence of results from research conducted thus far into the offshore areas of the north, have added a new and relevant source of friction in relations between Nicosia and Ankara. The island’s peculiar political situation could therefore constitute a brake on the development of the country’s economy, capable of affecting decisions regarding investment by foreign companies, especially those who have strong interests in Turkey. The latter, in fact, threatened repercussions for those companies that intend to enter into agreements to exploit resources with the Cypriot government. Such is the case for Eni S.p.A. which has seen the suspension of all projects undertaken with Turkey, due to its exploration agreement signed with Nicosia in January. Ankara, in fact, maintains that such energy resources are located in international waters and that they should benefit all of the island’s inhabitants, and not only Greek-Cypriots. Turkish interests, profoundly connected to energy, therefore emerge. Furthermore, relations between Cyprus and Israel, in particular those relating to a possible project for the liquefaction of gas for export, feed the prospect of an energy partnership. This could provide an alternate route for transporting gas to Europe and Asia, obstructing the great Turkish mission to become a regional energy hub. According to several analysts, this prospect was one of the reasons behind the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel, which enabled the former to maintain its centrality as the country of transit, and the latter to optimize conditions for its gas exports. While in the long-term the economic advantages of cooperation between Nicosia, Tel Aviv, Athens, and Ankara might be more convincing, in the short-term, energy pressures feed tensions in an already established hot spot.

It is probable that Turkey’s firm stance on the Cyprus question is one of the reasons behind the Russian decision not to accept the bailout plan hastily proposed by Nicosia in exchange for licenses for the exploitation of gas fields. To this must be added, among others, the European position and the special relationship between Berlin and Moscow, sealed by the agreement on the Nord Stream gas line, which might have suffered setbacks if Putin had decided to approve a bailout plan for a member country within the EU. Moscow’s position, then, is understandable when considering the multiplicity of interests that the country shares with other regional players, such as Germany, Greece, and Turkey: these can be safeguarded only by a strategy of ambiguous realpolitik. Although the issue of the Cypriot bailout has put pressure on the relationship between Nicosia and Moscow, it is difficult to imagine a rupture of relations between the two countries, instead of a redefinition in the interests that still bind them. Moscow, in fact, has long-standing ties with the island of Aphrodite, ranging from banking and finance to real estate and military strategy. There are strong suspicions, for example, regarding the role played by Cyprus in the trafficking of weapons from Russia to Damascus.

Brussels, for its part, seems determined to impose comprehensive change on the Cypriot business model and on its banking system, thus affecting its status as a tax haven for the offshore investments of Russian magnates. Discoveries of gas in the Cypriot Sea represent a great opportunity for Europe to diversify energy supplies, with respect to Russia’s dominant role. Cyprus’s economic problems, however, which have led to the forced levy on bank deposits, also herald strong domestic discontent: the EU should not exacerbate the economic situation because, as the multiple demonstrations on the island show, anti-European sentiment is particularly widespread among the population and could become a source of political instability. This could obstruct a possible solution to the conflict with Turkey, a central obstacle in Ankara’s access to Brussels.

The framework outlined above seems far from optimistic given that, at least in the short- to medium-term, the European controls on bank accounts, the withdrawal of Russian support, and Turkish pressure all clamp the island in a vice that will only increase internal malaise and aggravate the downturn in the national economy. A situation which seems as if it will not improve until exploitation of the energy resources of the Aphrodite gas field is at full capacity, something that might require several years.

On the contrary, within an extended timescale the need for cooperation between the main players involved only increases due to pressures deriving from the stabilization of the Cypriot economy and the gradual exploitation of the rich intra-European gas fields. Turkey has already signaled to this effect: conscious of its role as transit towards international markets, Ankara has proposed to Nicosia its help in the development of gas, as long as the benefits of such discoveries should, as noted previously, be shared by all the inhabitants of the island. In conclusion, one aspect is more certain than others: without a resolution of the dispute over sovereignty of the island, an issue that has dragged on for 40 years now, eventual regional cooperation seems difficult to envisage.

Chiara holds the position of Junior Analyst in the energy consulting firm RIE (Industrial Research and Energy) of Bologna and collaborates with Energy Magazine. She holds a degree in International and Diplomatic Sciences from the University of Bologna (Forlì campus). Her interests mainly relate to energy issues, including energy policies in the Middle East, nuclear energy, and the processes of public debate and consensus. You can follow her on LinkedIn and Twitter (@ orienta_giovani).

This article was cross-posted by permission and appeared in its original form at TheRiskyShift.com.

Drones, Future War

Video Game AI and the Future UCAV Top Gun

2 Comments
My brother in flight school should be glad we played so much Ace Combat 4.
Alright, Roomba, now start sweeping for enemy units.

A Roomba is useful because it can sweep up regular messes without constant intervention, not because it can exit and enter its docking station independently. Although the Navy’s new X-47B Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) has, by landing on a carrier, executed an astounding feat even for humans, this ability only means our weapons have matured past their typical one-way trips. The real challenge will be getting a UCAV to defend units while sweeping up the enemy without remote guidance (i.e. autonomously). The answer is as close as the games running on your Xbox console.

 

 

Player One: Insert Coin

ace-combat-5-the-unsung-war-20041024114416859
Simulated fighters are UCAVs having an out-of body experience.

Considering the challenge of how an air-to-air UCAV might be programmed, recall that multiple generations of America’s youth have already fought untold legions of advanced UCAV’s. Developers have created artificial “intelligences” designed to combat a human opponent in operational and tactical scenarios with imperfect information; video games have paved the way for unmanned tactical computers.

A loose application of video game intelligence (VGI) would work because VGI is designed to operate in the constrained informational environment in which a real-life UCAV platform would operate. Good (i.e. fun) video game AI exists in the same fog of war constraints as their human opponents; the same radar, visual queues, and alerts are provided to the computer and human players. The tools to lift that veil for computer and human are the same. Often, difficulty levels in video games are not just based on the durability and damage of an enemy, but on the governors installed by programmers on a VGI to make competition fair with a human opponent. This is especially evident in Real Time Strategy (RTS), where the light-speed all-encompassing force management and resource calculations of a VGI can more often than not overwhelm the subtler, but slower, finesse of the human mind within the confines of the game. Those who wonder when humans will go to war using autonomous computers fail to see the virtual test-bed in which we already have, billions of times.

This Ain’t Galaga

No extra lives, and forget about memorizing the level's flight patterns.
No extra lives, and forget about memorizing the level’s flight patterns.

Those uninitiated must understand how VGI has progressed by leaps and bounds from the pre-programmed paths of games such as the early 1980’s arcade shooter Galaga; computer opponents hunt, take cover, maneuver evasively, and change tactics based on opportunities or a sudden states of peril. The 2000’s Half-Life and HALO game series were especially lauded for their revolutions in AI – creating opponents that seemed rational, adapting to a player’s tactics. For the particular case of UCAV air-to-air engagements, since the number of flight combat simulators is innumerable, from Fighter Pilot on the Commodore 64 in 1984 to the Ace Combat series. Computers have been executing pursuit curves, displacement rolls, and defensive spirals against their human opponents since before I was born.

However, despite its utility, VGI is still augmented with many “illusions” of intelligence, mere pre-planned responses (PPR); the real prize is a true problem-solving VGI to drive a UCAV. That requires special programming and far more processing power. In a real UCAV, these VGI would be installed into a suite far more advanced than a single Pentium i7 or an Xbox. To initiate a learning and adapting problem-solving tactical computer, the DARPA SyNAPSE program offers new possibilities, especially when short-term analog reasoning is coordinated with messier evolutionary algorithms. Eventually, as different programs learn and succeed, they can be downloaded and replace the lesser adaptations on other UCAVs.

I’ve Got the Need, The Need For Speed

Unlike Maverick, drones will never have to go through motorcycle safety training.
Unlike Maverick, drones will never have to go through motorcycle safety training.

When pilots assert that they are more intuitive than computer programs, they are right; this is, however, like saying the amateur huntsman with an AR-15 is lesser trained than an Austrian Arabesquer. The advantage is not in the quality of tactical thought, but in the problem solving rate-of-fire and speed of physical action. A VGI executing air-to-air tactics in a UCAV can execute the OODA loop encompassing the whole of inputs much faster than the human mind, where humans may be faster or more intuitive in solving particular, focused problems due to creativity and intuition. Even with the new advanced HUD system in their helmets, a human being cannot integrate input from all sensors at an instant in time (let alone control other drones). Human pilots are also limited in their physical ability to maneuver. G-suits exist because our 4th and 5th generation fighters have abilities far in excess of what the human body is capable. This artificially lowers aircraft tactical performance to prevent the death or severe damage of the pilot inside.

Pinball Wizard: I Can’t See!

VGI doesn’t have a problem with the how, it’s the who that will be the greatest challenge when the lessons of VGI are integrated into a UCAV. In a video-game, the VGI is blessed with instant recognition; its enemy is automatically identified when units are revealed, their typology is provided instantly to both human and VGI. A UCAV unable to differentiate between different radar contacts or identify units via its sensors is at a disadvantage to its human comrades or enemies. Humans still dominate the field of integrating immediate quality analysis with ISR within the skull’s OODA loop. Even during the landing sequence, the UCAV cheated in a way by being fed certain amounts of positional data from the carrier.

We’ve passed the tutorial level of unmanned warfare; we’ve created the unmanned platforms capable of navigating the skies and a vast array of programs designed to drive tactical problems against human opponents. Before we pat ourselves on the back, we need to effectively integrate those capabilities into an independent platform.

Matt Hipple is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy.  The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity.  They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.