There are two key areas that, if addressed strategically, can enhance the effectiveness of our Navy – empowerment of division officers and stability for our sailors.
The empowerment of division officers is critical yet undervalued in the U.S. Navy. In other branches of the military, officers at similar levels are given a broader scope of authority and responsibility, which fosters a more efficient chain of command and enhances leadership development. Division officers in the Navy should be afforded the same level of trust and autonomy. This can be achieved by reducing micromanagement, promoting a culture of calculated risk-taking and innovation, and providing clear guidelines on the extent and limits of their authority.
An empowered division officer can make quicker decisions, reduce red tape, and foster a more responsive and agile team. Most importantly, it enhances the leadership growth of these officers, preparing them for higher roles and responsibilities. It is crucial that we create an environment where our officers are trusted to lead and are given useful mandates for developing their leadership skills.
Secondly, we should address the issue of sailor stability. The frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves can disrupt the personal lives of sailors and their families, affecting their morale and overall effectiveness. While we understand the operational need for such moves, a more strategic approach can mitigate the negative impacts.
Possible strategies include extending tour lengths where feasible, providing more predictable rotation schedules, and exploring options for geo-batching. This would allow sailors to achieve a better work-life balance, thereby enhancing their commitment and productivity. It is time the Navy gives more careful consideration to the human element of our operations, ensuring our sailors are not just effective, but also content and stable.
These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.
As we move into this new era of naval operations, we must ensure that our leadership structures and policies respect the realities of our personnel’s lives and the operational environment. By addressing these areas, we can foster a Navy that is not only effective in its operations, but also a more rewarding place to serve.
Lieutenant Upton Wallace is a division officer at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FRS (HSM-40) based in Mayport, Florida. Originally hailing from St. Andrew, Jamaica, Wallace began his Navy career in 2003, enlisting as an aviation structural mechanic, and advanced to the rank of aviation structural mechanic chief. In 2017, Wallace earned a commission through the Limited Duty Officer program. He has participated in Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Sixth Fleet operations responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 28, 2020) Chief Fire Controlman Reynard McNeil Jr., from San Diego, communicates with the combat information center prior to a close-in weapons system live-fire exercise aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)
The Navy is the nation’s primary source of strategic thinking and advice on the role of the ocean in U.S. security. When the unity of the world ocean becomes a factor in U.S. security strategy, the Navy must “advise up” beyond its specific Title X responsibilities. It did this in the 1980s with the Maritime Strategy and again in 2007 with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Both efforts were successful in solving the problems that prompted their development, but both adhered to the structure of the Unified Command Plan that was established to provide command and control of power projection into Eurasia, which consisted of deterrence, influence, and actual use of military force when needed. This was consistent with the concept of containment in the Cold War and countering strategic instability in the post-Cold War world. Navy fleet design was oriented on power projection capability, both in the specific weapons carried by ships – primarily tactical aircraft and Tomahawk missiles – and in the number and types of ships in the battle force.
The rise of China as a contender for global leadership presents a different kind of great power threat than the Soviet Union. China explicitly seeks global leadership with which it can restructure the existing order, which was established by Allied statesmen at the end of World War II to avert another world war. To support its goals, China is creating a navy that it hopes can directly challenge the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the world ocean, something the USSR never aspired to do. The combination of China’s economic and industrial power, and its sweeping global objectives, presents the U.S. with a new and more difficult challenge that previous approaches to security will not properly address.
The U.S. must adopt a new approach to defending the global order, one that is heavily based on maintaining and exercising global command of the sea. The current security strategy happens to be based on this superiority, but American command of the sea has been so complete for so long that it has become a background tacit assumption rather than explicit goal. That has to change, especially if the Navy is to develop a feasible and effective fleet design going forward.
Command of the sea is a strategic condition in which the weaker navy either cannot or will not directly challenge the stronger, a power balance that is relevant in both war and peace. In war it allows the nation to use the sea as necessary for operations, and in peace allows the nation to adopt policies on the use of the sea that are consistent with its national interests and values. If China succeeds in displacing the U.S. Navy as the preeminent naval power, it will likely impose a more authoritarian set of norms on the oceans, and trigger far-reaching consequences. Numerous elements of U.S. national security, economic relations, and foreign policy would be compromised.
It is not enough for the U.S. Navy to focus on projecting power ashore at specific times and places, supported by sea control. The Navy, in conjunction with allies, must create a capability to command the sea that China dares not challenge. This calls for capabilities and methods that are much more than just iterations upon current trends and legacy systems. The U.S. Navy must conduct urgent investigations and research into what novel capabilities and warfighting concepts can offer enduring command of the sea, and develop both a global maritime strategy and derivative fleet design based on the most promising approaches.
Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus of the Naval War College. He served on active duty in the Navy as a light attack/strike fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser, chairman of the Wargaming Department, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He retired in 2014, but on occasion continues to serve as a special adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations. He has published over thirty journal articles and several book chapters.
Featured Image: Sailors aboard the Chinese Navy guided-missile destroyer Dalian (Hull 105) line the deck at attention during a far-sea joint training drill in early April, 2023. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Yang Yunxiang)
Despite enlistment bonuses, recruiter rodeos, a renewed focus on influencers, and modest policy changes from PERS, the U.S. Navy continuously fails to keep Sailors from walking out the door and to convince would-be recruits from stepping in. This problem has gotten so severe that the Navy is on target to miss recruiting goals by over 7,000 personnel for FY23, and gapped billets at-sea continue to exceed 9,000.1, 2* This shortage will continue as overworked enlisted Sailors leave, refusing the possibility of being sent TAD on additional deployments, and officers resign, rejecting uncertain billet assignments.
Reports – both internal and external to the DoD – point fingers at societal health, youth hesitancy, and a declining perspective of the military as causal explanations for this phenomenon. But they fail to realize that current socio-economic conditions have the potential for the greatest boon to military enlistment and retention since the 2008 financial crash and the attacks on 9/11.3, 4 Why then are we failing to meet our numbers?
To many in the fleet, the Navy is a job just like any other. In an economy that promotes career-jumping from ladder to ladder, it is no surprise that Sailors forego internal promotions for a chance to climb, all without the burdens of weekend duty, mid-watches, and extended deployments. The traditional benefits of naval service – adventure, camaraderie, leadership experience, stable pay, and robust benefits – no longer match the costs associated with a sea-going career. While this may not be the case for every Sailor, personnel numbers indicate a strong correlation. So what do we do?
We need to make the Navy a better place to work. Luckily for us, many of the levers to do this are within our control.
To offer a historical lesson, Admiral Zumwalt faced a similar struggle as he assumed the office of CNO amidst a monumental shift from a conscript to all-volunteer force, a force that was wracked by social divisions and readiness issues. His approach then, as ours should be now, was to dismantle the immediate barriers to Sailor happiness and success – increasing Quality of Life, most often by decreasing administrative requirements.5 These changes typically arrived in messages known as “Z-Grams,” personal communiqués from Zumwalt to the fleet.
With this in mind, we should reestablish Retention Study Groups (RSGs) and the associated Z-Grams. To paraphrase Z-Gram #2, RSGs are “…Representative groups of junior officers and enlisted (Sailors) from the major surface, aviation and submarine communities…to surface those current views and recommendations from the fleet which appear to represent consensus.” These groups formed the foundation of CNO Zumwalt’s efforts to boost retention and spawned many of the benefits we enjoy today, including standard Leave and Earning Statements, Ombudsmen, Holiday Routine at sea, as well as equal opportunity for all Sailors regardless of sex, race, or creed.6 The true power of the RSGs and Z-Grams derived from their ability to focus the Navy on what mattered most – its people and their ability to win at sea – by removing deckplate-level friction points from Sailors’ lives. In other words, these efforts rebalanced the cost-benefit analysis to new or continued naval service.
Admiral Zumwalt speaks with the Human Relations Council, at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan, July 2, 1971. (Photographed by PH2 Edward C. Mucma. Official U.S. Navy photo, from the collections of Naval History and Heritage Command)
We must make similar efforts now by transforming or sunsetting the programmatic barriers to Sailor success, for example, post-9/11 ATFP watches, redundant OFRP training requirements, and an antiquated 3M program. Revamping these policies will bring the Navy in line with Sailor consensus, shifting complaints from, “Why are we doing the same certification for MOB-S, SAR, and MOB-N?” to “Why aren’t we making GQ drills even more challenging?” The latter is what we need to promote crew morale and warfighting readiness, and to attract and retain the best.
Will implementing this approach be met with pushback from status quo leaders throughout the fleet? Of course, but that simply reinforces the necessity for unrelenting advocacy and professional engagement. We cannot let entrenched interests or pride stop us from getting better. Our “standard” Navy approach of sending decisions through committee for neutering and pacification cannot make the serious changes needed to affect the minds of Sailors that are considering leaving the service. Only direct action and real authority from the CNO’s office have the force to dismantle many of the obstacles to productivity, performance, and morale.7 “Getting Real” with these issues requires outspoken action, a renewed focus on what our Sailors need, and a keen ear for what they want.
It will take thought and care to get this right, but the Navy’s history offers a valuable example on how to achieve success. It is time to restart RSGs and end the retention crisis. Time for the F-Gram!
Lt. Sam Straus is a Surface Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy. His views are his own and do not reflect the official position or policy of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.
*Correction, the number of gapped at-sea billets is 9,000, not 750 as originally stated.
References
1. Correll, D. S. (2023, September 14). Navy will miss recruiting goals by 7,000 sailors this year. Retrieved from Navy Times: https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2023/09/14/navy-will-miss-recruiting-goals-by-7000-sailors-this-year/
2. Mongilio, H. (2023, February 1). Navy Exceeding FY 2023 Sailor Retention Goals, Says Q1 Data. Retrieved from USNI News: https://news.usni.org/2023/02/01/navy-exceeding-fy-2023-sailor-retention-goals-says-q1-data
3. Magnuson, S. (2023, January 18). Annual Poll Shows Low Confidence in Military. Retrieved from National Defense Magazine: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/1/18/annual-poll-shows-low-confidence-in-military
4. Garamone, J. (2023, April 20). Vice Chiefs Talks Recruiting Shortfalls, Readiness Issues. Retrieved from U.S. Department of Defense: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3369472/vice-chiefs-talk-recruiting-shortfalls-readiness-issues/
5. Zumwalt, E. R. (2017, August 11). List of Z-grams. Retrieved from Naval History and Heritage Command: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/z/list-z-grams.html
6. Ibid.
7. Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997). Formal and Real Authority in Organizations. Journal of Political Economy. Retrieved from https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/262063
Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (May 1, 2020) Sailors aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) tie line to a span wire during a replenishment as sea with the dry cargo and ammunition Ship USNS Alan Shepard (T-AKE 3). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cody Beam)
Navy leadership should scrutinize the somewhat disjointed approach the military writ large and the Navy in particular have adopted towards AI. As a statistician, it is clear that success in large inference machines – to include AI – requires three things: technology, people, and culture. Technology is the easiest and paradoxically the least important component. Because of the hierarchical nature of military career paths, the people currently serving are poised to be the leaders of this revolution. There is ample talent in the ranks, provided it is effectively cultivated and employed.
Focus on culture. Successful AI culture is a departure from Navy norms. Military culture is based around assured success, but compared to aviation or weaponeering, AI requires far more failure before reaching success. It is estimated that upwards of 85 percent of AI projects fail. Resist the temptation to think better performers, technology, or business processes will change this number. Instead, accept that this failure rate is a fundamental feature of developing AI. With this in mind, what should the Navy do to create this culture?
First and foremost, understand the difference between technical failure and management failure. Technical failures are, if not good, at a minimum necessary. They are a precondition to success, and some even use the phrase ‘fail forward.’ Second, resist the temptation to want to create one AI tool to solve them all. Start small and on issues that have relatively low risk. Safety data is a perfect opportunityfor this type of small start.
Finally, ensure that Sailors – those who are currently wearing the uniform – are exposed to the process and shortcomings of AI in the course of their duties. Formal education programs – such as NPS – are necessary, but not sufficient. The CO of the first AI-enabled warship is someone who is currently serving, not someone we will assess later in the future. Should this CO find themselves in the midst of a shooting conflict where AI is an enabling tool, they will be commanding from the CIC. The engineers and technicians who developed the technology will not. Warfighters will ultimately be responsible for the operational outcomes of these tools – both positive and negative.
The ability to harness and use AI is critical, but Navy culture must change to realize its potential. Military members must remain the masters – never the servants – of technology.
Harrison Schramm is a retired Navy commander and a professional statistician. During his time in the Navy, he flew the H-46 and MH-60S. Ashore he worked in Operations Research, teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School and working at OPNAV N81. He is the immediate past President of the Analytics Society of INFORMS.
Featured Image: A Fire Controlman monitors a radar console for air and surface contacts in the combat information center aboard the forward-deployed Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG-75). (U.S. Navy photo)
