Notes to the New CNO Series

By LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley

China’s Navy has now eclipsed the U.S. Navy in size, and the gap continues to grow. For this reason, as well as for the benefits that uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) bring to the fight, the U.S. Navy’s Force Design 2045 envisions a future Navy of 350 crewed hulls and 150 uncrewed surface vessels. Like their air and ground counterparts, these unmanned systems are valued because of their ability to reduce the risk to human life in high threat areas, to deliver persistent surveillance, and to provide options to warfighters that derive from the inherent advantages of uncrewed technologies.

However, so far the Navy has only committed to developing and acquiring large uncrewed surface vessels (LUSVs), ranging in length from 200 to 300 feet. These vessels are envisioned to have two roles – as uncrewed ships that can carry missiles or other weapons, or as motherships that can carry medium (MUSVs) and small USVs to the fight. Anticipating that medium USVs will be the workhorses for missions such as ISR, mine countermeasures, and combat logistics, MUSVs have been evaluated by the Navy and the Marine Corps in a large number of exercises, experiments and demonstrations in recent years.

However, after almost a decade of demonstrating the capabilities of MUSVs, the Navy has been slow to establish programs of record to populate the fleet with these workhorses. The Navy should now shift its efforts from prototyping to serial production, given how these vessels have demonstrated their potential to perform the abovementioned missions. These vessels are affordable enough that they can be constructed in large numbers for the cost of a single conventional surface combatant, and allow the Navy to rapidly increase its fleet size to meet burgeoning operational demand signals. Otherwise, the Navy will not be able to confidently keep up with China’s historic naval expansion and offset the pressures that are threatening to shrink the fleet until it makes a firm commitment to serial production of unmanned vessels.

While there are a number of MUSVs that can potentially meet the Navy’s needs, there are three that appear to be furthest along in the evaluation cycle and which have been featured most prominently in numerous Navy and Marine Corps events. They cover a range of sizes, hull types and capabilities, including:

• • The Vigor Industrial Sea Hunter, a 132-foot-long trimaran. 
  • The Textron monohull Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel (CUSV) featuring a modular, open architecture design.
  • The MARTAC family of catamaran hull USVs that include the Devil Ray T24 and T38 craft. 

The CNO can accelerate the Navy’s journey to achieve a robust hybrid fleet by directing a down-select of MUSV candidates and establishing programs of record. The U.S. Navy can diversify its capabilities and make itself more competitive for great power challenges by accelerating its adoption of unmanned vessels.

LCDR U.H. (Jack) Rowley (USN-Ret) is a career Surface Warfare and Engineering Duty Officer whose 22 years of active duty included nine years of enlisted service before commissioning. Since his retirement he has continued to work, as a Naval Architect and Ocean Engineer, with the marine ship design and construction areas in both government and commercial sectors. He has had extensive experience with unmanned surface vehicles including serving as the SAIC Lead Engineer in the early stages of the development of the DARPA/ONR Sea Hunter USV Trimaran now operating with the Navy in the Port of San Diego. He currently serves as the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for Maritime Tactical Systems, Inc. (MARTAC).

Featured Image: An Expeditionary Warfare Unmanned Surface Vessel autonomously navigates a predetermined course through the water during Advanced Naval Technology Exercise 2019 at Camp Lejeune, N.C., July 12. (Lance Cpl. Nicholas Guevara/Marine Corps)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Artem Sherbinin and Daniel Stefanus

The Core Issue 

The U.S. Navy’s human resources (HR) policies are failing, and not because the policies themselves are ineffective, but because of their poor digital implementation. Our 21^st century workforce – mostly Gen-Z and Millennial Sailors – expects a fast, accessible, and intuitive HR software experience. Instead, they are left feeling unsupported while wasting millions of workhours annually in the battle against websites, performance evaluation tools, and knowledge management software from the 1990s. Consistent errors in their HR experience, often driven by these unreliable digital HR tools, push many Sailors out of the service. Sailors’ digital HR experience is not a quality of service or quality of life issue. Getting HR digital implementation right is a warfighting and readiness imperative.

Telltale signs of the Navy’s HR woes abound. The Navy has not met its officer recruitment or retention targets for the past two fiscal years, and enlisted end strength has been sustained only by extravagant bonuses and waiving requirements that are otherwise part of maintaining a capable military workforce such as test score minimums, high-year tenure restrictions, and PRT scores. These trends must be placed within the broader context of a population that largely cannot serve or is uninterested in serving. However, ensuring that Sailors have the digital HR tools necessary to successfully navigate and manage their careers will yield more satisfied, high-performing warfighters, driving the higher retention and recruitment we need to offset our macro headwinds.

See the World Through Gen Z Sailors’ Eyes 

The suite of HR products Sailors use today are largely unchanged since the late 1990s. From the Netscape-era BUPERS Online to the hyperlink carnival that is the My Navy Portal, the user interface/user experience (UI/UX) of the majority of Sailors’ HR systems look like retro throwbacks to a generation raised on smartphones. Antiquated UI/UXs are complimented by fragile backend systems that cannot be trusted for needs as fundamental as on-time pay, permanent change of station moves, and assignments without manual intervention and offline Microsoft Excel files.

Fundamentally, Sailors do not want to work in an environment where it takes an hour to log in to a computer or monthly paychecks that do not arrive on time, a basic function of any organization. Most worrying is the overall trend: these issues have been discussed for nearly a decade without significant improvements to Sailors’ ability to self-resolve their HR needs, especially at sea in low-bandwidth environments.

How We Got Here 

For context, in 2015 then-Chief of Naval Personnel Admiral Bill Moran launched a series of initiatives to modernize the Navy’s platforms, policies, and procedures that would become the “MyNavyHR Transformation.” In 2023, it is apparent that due to a confluence of challenges like COVID-19, intra-Navy and inter-branch IT bureaucratic gridlock, and underperforming contractors, the $1.6B transformation has failed to accomplish its objectives. This is despite mighty efforts by successive Chiefs of Naval Personnel.

The root cause of this can be traced to four key issues: the underutilization of civilian and uniformed digital talent, a lack of technical understanding and program management skills – largely at the O-6 level (knowing how to lead does not necessarily mean you can lead digital transformation), an archaic and conservative data regime, and above all else – a failure to understand end-user (Sailor) needs due to a lack of effective user feedback. Combined, these issues ran the MyNavyHR Transformation aground before it left the slip.

Charting a New Course 

The CNPs of our era – Admirals Moran, Burke, Nowell, and Cheeseman – have pushed Navy HR on all fronts to transform for our Sailors. But the problem is bigger than one DCNO and their team. Delivering the modern digital HR tools Sailors need will require significant course corrections to understand our past and steer towards our future. The Navy should first execute a top-to-bottom hot wash on what has been learned from these transformation efforts and what the Navy has not been able to overcome in fielding these tools at scale. From there, it can identify ways to better leverage and “make secure” commercial HR tools, secure additional HR IT investment in future budget cycles, have clear Get Real Get Better metrics to solve the issues stymying progress, and establish a consistent, honest feedback loop with the waterfront. If the Navy’s people are its biggest advantage over China’s military, it must prioritize empowering the HR tools that enable their careers.

Artem Sherbinin is an active-duty Surface Warfare Officer currently leading TASK FORCE HOPPER – U.S. Naval Surface Forces’ digital transformation team. He previously deployed three times to the Western Pacific onboard cruisers and destroyers. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds an M.A. from Georgetown University.

Daniel Stefanus is a Surface Warfare Officer reservist who worked for the Chief of Naval Personnel from 2018-2020 following three deployments to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He currently works in corporate strategy and holds an MBA from Harvard Business School, an M.A. from the Naval War College, and a B.S. from Duke University. He was the President of CIMSEC from 2019 to 2020.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (April 3, 2020) U.S. Navy Gunner’s Mate 1st Class Courtney Mauldin, from Tallahassee, Fla., loads a dummy round into a Mk 45 5-in. gun aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Jason Isaacs)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers

In the U.S. Navy, maritime superiority and the readiness of its warfighters have always been paramount. Admiral Franchetti acknowledges the importance of a culture of innovation and improvement to maintain our warfighting edge in an ever-evolving threat environment. However, it is imperative that the U.S. Navy extends these principles to enlisted Sailors by reinforcing and expanding their educational opportunities. Enlisted Sailors play a critical role in achieving and maintaining maritime superiority, and they must be empowered to become full, active, and informed participants in the U.S. Navy’s mission.

While the U.S. Navy rightly focuses on leadership and problem-solving, enlisted Sailors often feel left behind. Many struggle to complete even a few college classes a year due to underfunded tuition assistance and overworked scheduling. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that officers frequently pursue numerous advanced degrees, only to leave the U.S. Navy and take their knowledge with them. This discrepancy in educational opportunities between officers and enlisted Sailors hinders the overall readiness of the U.S. Navy and diminishes the potential for enlisted personnel to contribute more effectively to the mission.

Education is not just a personal endeavor, it is vital for the U.S. Navy’s success. Enlisted Sailors are on the front lines, operating and maintaining complex equipment, and executing mission-critical tasks. To excel in these roles, they require a deeper understanding of their responsibilities, technical skills, and the broader context in which they operate. Furthermore, they must be able to adapt to new challenges and technologies as the U.S. Navy evolves. Educational opportunities can equip them with the knowledge and critical thinking skills necessary to do so. To reinforce and expand educational opportunities for enlisted Sailors, the U.S. Navy should consider several key steps.

Increase tuition assistance funding. The U.S. Navy should allocate more resources to tuition assistance programs, ensuring that enlisted Sailors have access to affordable education. By removing financial barriers, the U.S. Navy can encourage more personnel to pursue higher education.

Incorporate more flexible scheduling. Enlisted Sailors often face demanding schedules that make it difficult to attend traditional classes. The U.S. Navy should explore flexible scheduling options, such as online courses or partnerships with local educational institutions, to accommodate the availability of its personnel.

Integrate education with career paths. Educational opportunities should be integrated with the specializations and career progressions of enlisted Sailors. Enlisted Sailors should have clear pathways to earn degrees or certifications that align with their roles and responsibilities, helping them grow professionally and contribute more effectively to the U.S. Navy’s mission.

Improve knowledge retention and exchange. To address the issue of officers leaving the U.S. Navy with advanced degrees, the U.S. Navy could incentivize officers to share their knowledge and mentor enlisted personnel. This can be done through structured mentorship programs and knowledge transfer initiatives.

Reward and recognize educational initiative. The U.S. Navy should recognize and reward enlisted Sailors who invest in their education and demonstrate a commitment to self-improvement. This can include promotions, bonuses, and other incentives to encourage continuous learning.

In the pursuit of maritime superiority, the U.S. Navy must prioritize the education and empowerment of its enlisted Sailors. These dedicated individuals are the backbone of the U.S. Navy, and their success directly contributes to the U.S. Navy’s overall readiness and effectiveness. By reinforcing and expanding educational opportunities for enlisted Sailors, the U.S. Navy can ensure that they become full, active, and informed participants in the mission. This investment in education will not only benefit the enlisted Sailors themselves, but will also strengthen the U.S. Navy as a whole, ensuring its readiness for the challenges of the future.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Richard Rodgers is a mass communication specialist in the U.S. Navy. He is currently stationed at Navy Public Affairs Support Element, the Navy’s premiere expeditionary public affairs command, where he has served as the Creative Director. He previously served as the Communications Director for Carrier Strike Group 10 Public Affairs and as a content developer at Defense Media Activity.

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 24, 2020) Seaman Robert Wilmoth, from Cincinnati, handles the shot line aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42) as the ship conducts a replenishment-at-sea.(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By John Hanley

I was fortunate to work directly for CNOs Tom Hayward through Jay Johnson during my 17 years with the CNO Strategic Studies Group, where the CNOs tasked us to study challenges that were keeping them up at night or where they saw opportunities to advance the Navy and national security. Three challenges stand out for the current generation of Navy leadership.

First, getting real is a matter of integrity. Striving to do one’s best is imperative. However, it is essential to get real about what resources, including time, are available to accomplish tasks. Tasking more than can be accomplished results in fudging and corrupting the character of individuals and the soul of the Navy.

Second, getting better requires appreciating the complexity of the Navy and its place in the national security ecosystem. Sources of complexity within the Navy and in the ecosystem derive in part from individuals and organizations having incongruent motivations. As Admiral Bill Owens once said as the N8, there must be a god because no one is in control. Accepting limits of control is the beginning of wisdom. Although leaders cannot direct the winds, they can adjust the sails.

Adjusting the sails to stay on course requires campaigns of learning in readiness, engagement, and equipping strategies. Actions should derive from more than just routine checklists. They require deliberate reflection on what is to be learned. Whether it is maintenance and administration, training and education, at-sea exercises, engagement with adversaries and partners (e.g., FONOPS), or creating antifragile naval architectures, if the participants are simply box-checking rather than learning, the effort is falling short. The Navy must be more deliberate about being a learning organization and how it structures its campaigns of learning.

Dealing with complexity requires careful reflection on how strategies are framed, and considering uncomfortable alternatives. It requires balancing theoretical constructs with practical intuition and experience, and a willingness to challenge theory. Rather than OODA loops, complexity requires Act-Sense-Decide-Adapt loops. Passive observation does not reveal what needs to be known without stimulating the system to learn, and change requires adaptation. It requires using strategies to achieve increasing returns, such as where small investments are made in specific high-risk ventures to learn a lot while still protecting core capabilities.

Finally, it requires rethinking the defense analysis paradigms that have constrained Navy thinking and development since McNamara instituted them in 1962. N81’s focus on campaign modeling rather than Navy wholeness, as formulated by CNO Admiral Jon Greenert, is a misdirected approach. Campaign models are wholly theoretical and produce only conjecture regarding system performance at sea. Similarly, wargames produce only conjecture about decisions and outcomes. But when used well, the experience of conducting critical analysis in anticipated scenarios helps prepare future commanders for real contingencies, as wargames and exercises did before WWII.

The way ahead involves campaigns of learning focused on pressing operational problems. These campaigns would be orchestrated by a General Board-type entity, involving close interactions among OPNAV, the Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Systems Commands, and the fleet. These campaigns would focus the attention of the fleet, and enhance its competitive advantage by virtue of being a superior learning organization.

Dr. Hanley served with the first eighteen Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Groups as an analyst, program director, and deputy director. He earned his doctorate in operations research and management science at Yale University. A former U.S. Navy nuclear submarine officer and fleet exercise analyst, and author of The US Navy and the National Security Establishment: A Critical Assessment.

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (Aug. 26, 2023) An F/A-18F Super Hornet from the “Fighting Redcocks” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 22 prepares to launch from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class David Rowe)