Category Archives: Indo-Asia-Pacific

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Mind the Gap: German Security Policy in the Indo-Pacific Between Aspiration and Reality

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By Michael Paul and Göran Swistek

Introduction

With the Indo-Pacific Guidelines published in August 2020, the German government has taken a clear position for a geographical area that is characterized by the multidimensional competition between the West, led by the United States, and China. The Indo-Pacific region is rightly perceived as the trade and economic engine of a globally interconnected and mutually interdependent market. In particular, the security policy aspects outlined in these recent guidelines, along with Germany’s interests in the region and some prospective measures to support these interests have fueled high expectations amongst partners and Indo-Pacific Rim nations for a visible and strong German commitment.

Individual German government representatives have presented the deployment of the frigate BAYERN in the second half of 2021 as a first performance test of Germany’s positioning. As the planning for the frigate’s deployment gains concrete shape, the high degree of caution exercised by the German government in implementing the guidelines is becoming manifest. The German government is trying to avoid taking a clear position in the security policy competition with China. Irrespective of the claims formulated in the Guidelines, Berlin also seems to play its foreign policy feel-good role as mediator and balancer of the most diverse poles in the Indo-Pacific rather than advocate a rules-based international order. German partners in the region increasingly perceive this gap with justifiable criticism.

The Security Policy aspirations of the German Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific

The publication of the Indo-Pacific Guidelines by the German Federal Government in August 2020 has generated a great deal of attention among many partners in the Asian and South-East Asian region. For some, this is associated with the perception and hope that Germany will show more presence in line with its economic importance as a ‘global player,’ and will make a greater contribution to maintain the regional order and stabilize the region.1 The Indo-Pacific – as an area of profound geostrategic, political, and economic interests – has become the focus of public debate and political strategy papers, especially within the last decade.

The multidimensional competition between China and Indo-Pacific Rim nations has spurred this interest. The competition has an economic, technological, systemic and, not to be neglected, a security policy dimension. Owing to the region’s numerous security challenges, Germany has proceeded with great caution over the recent years. Individual measures have mainly been directed at supporting and training local police forces and other civilian security organizations, or contributing to reconstruction after humanitarian and environmental disasters. Apart from providing humanitarian aid after the tsunami in Banda Aceh (2004/2005) and, most recently, individual contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, the German armed forces have not been present in the region for the last two decades. Yet, this Indo-Pacific region, with all its challenges, is of particular geostrategic importance for many nations – including for Germany.

This predominantly maritime region is one of the largest economic hubs and is home to the largest share of global maritime trade by far. The South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait sit at the center of the Indo-Pacific geography – both cartographically and economically – at the transition from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Almost one third of the international trade in goods is shipped2 through these straits every year. These trade flows are not only indispensable prerequisites for a functioning and flourishing global economy, but they can also pose a threat to the maritime environment, the security of coasts as well as port cities and their populations in the event of a disruption or disaster at sea. Moreover, access to the sea and its resources – including fossil deposits (oil and gas), minerals, and fish – is increasingly contested. Finally, there is a causal relationship between trade and prosperity; trade requires secure and stable trade routes to be fully developed. Prosperity is hence directly dependent on security. Germany’s way of life and economic prosperity are largely dependent on secure sea routes, and this is particularly true of the Indo-Pacific. The share of Germany’s trade in goods with the countries of the Indo-Pacific, measured in terms of total volume, amounts to about 20 per cent.3

The potential threats in the region are multi-layered: In addition to the often overarching strategic, economic, and systemic rivalry between the US and China, there are three nuclear powers in the Indo-Pacific (China, India, Pakistan) plus North Korea as a de-facto nuclear power whose intentions are especially difficult to calculate. This fragile constellation is made even more precarious by unresolved border disputes, internal and interstate conflicts, regionally and globally active terrorist organizations, piracy, organized crime, and the effects of natural disasters and migration movements. The latter aspects in particular, which tend to be summed up as non-traditional security threats, are high on the security policy agenda of the Indo-Pacific Rim nations.

The broad spectrum of security threats is in obvious contradiction with the importance of the Indo-Pacific for global flows of goods. In response to this security situation and as a perceptible implementation of the guidelines, the Federal Government intends to expand German engagement with the region in the future. It intends to intensify security and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, depending on the context, with individual states or organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and with actors who also have interests in the region. This can take place both unilaterally and within the framework of the EU, NATO, or the United Nations (UN).

In terms of content, Germany wants to be engaged in the following areas: Arms control, non-proliferation, cyber security, humanitarian and disaster relief, combating piracy and terrorism, conflict management and prevention, including the preservation of the rule-based order and the enforcement of international legal norms such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The instruments that the German government would like to use to these ends range from expanding and deepening cooperation in the region, to civilian and military diplomacy, to military presence in the context of exercises or other forms of on-site presence.

The BAYERN frigate as a symbol of the operationalization of the guidelines

For almost two years now, the German Navy has been planning to send a ship into the Indo-Pacific region. The deployment of the frigate HAMBURG planned for 2020 had to be cancelled at short notice in favor of the German contribution to the EU-led Operation IRINI off the coast of Libya. In her first policy guideline speech as Minister of Defense on November 7, 2019, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer formulated the associated intent that the Federal Republic would like to set an example vis-à-vis its partners, Germany cannot simply stand at the sidelines and watch but rather intends to contribute to the protection of the international order4. At the same time, the participation of German forces and units in the EU’s Operation Atalanta off of the Horn of Africa was only sporadically exercised by maritime patrols due to their maintenance availability. The navy has now temporarily suspended this deployment with units in the operation and will also withdraw its supporting logistical presence from Djibouti as of May 2021. The mandate for this operation has been extended by the German Parliament for the time being, but the navy has no units available for a permanent presence. Despite Djibouti’s pivotal geostrategic location, situated between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, at the gateway to Africa, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Arabian Peninsula, the location no longer be available for use as a possible logistics and base in support of regional developments. A temporary participation remains possible when German warships pass through this maritime region.

In her second policy guideline speech a year later, on 17 November 2020, the Defense Minister held out the prospect of sending a frigate in 2021 and linked its deployment directly to the requirements of the recently issued Indo-Pacific Guidelines: “We will fly the flag for our values, interests and partners.”5 At the beginning of March 2021, the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defense then published concrete details on the upcoming tour of the frigate BAYERN. Starting in August, the frigate is scheduled to embark on a six-month journey, conducting more than a dozen official port visits between the Horn of Africa, Australia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. In line with the guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, the task for the ship is initially to show presence in the region and deepen diplomatic relations, including official receptions on board. The German Defense Minister therefore formulates the mission of the frigate BAYERN primarily as a symbol that will show the German solidarity and interest in the region6. In addition, various exercises and drills with naval units of the host states, e.g. in Japan, as well as a short-term participation in Operation Atalanta are planned. The functional cause of the German deployment is to highlight the cooperation with the democracies in the region and to prove the German engagement in the security dialogues on the ground.7 The operational culmination of the tour is a three-week participation in the UN sanctions measures against North Korea. In this respect, the deployment of the frigate fulfils a mission that can be directly derived from the guidelines.

The German frigate Bayern (EUNAVOR photo)

In contrast, the German government and the Armed Forces are much more attentive in their relations with China. Beijing’s behavior towards regional neighbors is not in line with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing is making disputed territorial claims to the Japanese-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and, beyond that, to most of the South China Sea – with the claimed territory also including the sovereign Republic of Taiwan. The International Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on 12 July 2016 that Beijing’s claims did not comply with the Law of the Sea Convention and were therefore invalid.8

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defense avoids conflict-prone sea areas when planning the details and route of the German warship. The frigate BAYERN will therefore not sail through the Taiwan Strait, but will bypass Taiwan on a longer route to the east. Similarly, in the South and East China Seas, the territories claimed by the People’s Republic of China will be bypassed and the frigate will move along the main international traffic and trade routes. Based on the time and distance factors for the tour of the German Warship, there will also be no interaction with the UK led carrier strike group assembled around the HMS Queen Elizabeth. The carrier strike group will start its deployment to the Indo-Pacific in May 2021 and intends to sail as far as to the Japanese Islands as well. Like the German frigate, it will bypass the Taiwan Strait. But unlike the German plans for its warship, the carrier strike group with its Dutch, US, and temporary Australian participating9 units is planning to conduct a Freedom of Navigation transit through the South Chinese Sea.10

Conclusion: Disappointed expectations

The presence of the BAYERN frigate is a first visible symbol of German interests in the Indo-Pacific, but it does not support the freedom of navigation called for in the Indo-Pacific Guidelines and its underpinning in international law through appropriate navigation in these free and open international sea lanes. It was precisely this contribution to international law and regional order that some Pacific Rim nations states had hoped for from Germany as a prominent representative of the EU canon of values.11 This made governments in the region all the more surprised about Germany’s announcement that it would also conduct a port call in China as part of the tour. On completion of its participation at the UN sanctions measures against North Korea the frigate BAYERN will sail through the East China Sea and conduct an official diplomatic port visit to Shanghai.

Since the initial announcement of the details for the deployment of the frigate BAYERN in March 2021, the German Minister of Defense repeatedly stated that the Freedom of Navigation aspect and the embedding in multilateral cooperation are key elements of this journey.12 The lack of cooperation with the UK-led carrier strike group invites speculation: Was it ignored or neglected for a certain reason, or simply missed in the planning process? Based on the publicly available information and announcements of the official German government agencies, the details of the tour have never been purposely altered since its publication to avoid any interaction with ships around the HMS Queen Elizabeth, as recently stated by some analysts.13 The more likely possibility is that the German Ministry of Defense never even considered any cooperation with the carrier strike group from the beginning, as such a combined naval force would send too strong signal for the German appearance in the Indo-Pacific.

Germany likes to present itself as a global player in foreign economic policy, but in foreign and security policy it hides behind limited capabilities as a middle power. This neither helps its partners in the Indo-Pacific, nor does it correspond to the often declared willingness to assume more responsibility. The BAYERN deployment plots a steady and cautious course to continued German reluctance.

Dr. Michael Paul is a Senior Fellow and Commander Goeran Swistek is a Visiting Fellow in the International Security Division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Endnotes

1. The Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi expressed his expectations during the virtual Asia tour of the German Defense Minister in autumn and winter 2020 in a round of talks on 17 December 2020, hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. See, among others, Ryall, Julian, Japan calls on Germany to send warship to East Asia, Deutsche Welle, 18 December 2020, on the Internet at: https://www.dw.com/en/japan-germany-china-defense-challenges/a-55985940, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

2. The data was taken from the publications of the China Power Project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On the Internet at: https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. Last viewed: 03.05.2021.

3. The Federal Government/Foreign Office: Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific. Available online at https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380500/33f978a9d4f511942c241eb4602086c1/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien–1–data.pdf, last viewed: 13.01.2021.

4. Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, First Policy Address by the Minister of Defense: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/rede-der-ministerin-an-der-universitaet-der-bundeswehr-muenchen-146670, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

5. Kramp-Karrenbauer, Annegret, Second Policy Address by the Minister of Defense, Translation into English by the Authors, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/zweite-grundsatzrede-verteidigungsministerin-akk-4482110, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

6. Internationale Politik, Interview with Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Das Deutschland führen soll, macht viele Angst, in: Internationale Politik, 28 April 2021, on the Internet: https://internationalepolitik.de/de/dass-deutschland-fuehren-soll-macht-vielen-angst, last viewed: 03.05.2021.

7. Ibid.

8. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), PCA Case Nº 2013-19 in the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between The Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. Award, 12.7.2016.

9. Tillett, Andrew, Australian navy to join UK carrier in regional show of strength, in: Australian Financial Review, 11. Feb 2021, in the internet: https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/australian-navy-to-join-uk-carrier-in-regional-show-of-strength-20210210-p57150, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

10. UK Defence Journal, British Carrier Strike Group to sail through South China Sea, in the internet: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-carrier-strike-group-to-sail-through-south-china-sea/, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

11. Cf. Michael Paul, “Europe and the South China Sea: challenges, constraints and options”, in: Sebastian Biba and Reinhard Wolf (eds.), Europe in an Era of Growing Sino-American Competition. Coping with an Unstable Triangle, London and New York: Routledge, 2021, pp. 92-106.

12. See also Interview with the German Minister of Defense, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, in the internet: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/verteidigungsministerin-akk-interview-multilateralismus-5049504, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

13. Kundnani, Hans & Tsuruoka, Michito, Germany’s Indo-Pacific frigate may send unclear message, in the internet: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/germanys-indo-pacific-frigate-may-send-unclear-message, last viewed: 06.05.2021.

Featured Image: The German naval ship BAYERN sets course for the Horn of Africa in 2011. The BAYERN led the European task force for the anti-pirate operation “Atalanta” for four months. Photo: Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) 07/18/2011

Indo-Asia-Pacific

No Ordinary Boats: Cracking the Code on China’s Spratly Maritime Militias

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By Ryan Martinson

A Chinese fishing vessel appears in a sensitive location—near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, a South China Sea reef, or just offshore from a U.S. military base. Is it an “ordinary” fishing boat, or is it maritime militia?

This straightforward question seldom yields straightforward answers. China does not publish a roster of maritime militia boats. That would undermine the militia’s key advantages—secrecy and deniability. Nor is it common for Chinese sources to recognize the militia affiliations of individual boats. Analysts can gather clues and make a case that a vessel is likely maritime militia, or not. That process requires painstaking effort, and the results are rarely definitive.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have made that process much easier, at least in the most contested parts of the South China Sea—the Spratly Islands. Since 2014, the PRC has built hundreds of large Spratly fishing vessels, collectively called the “Spratly backbone fleet” (南沙骨干船队). As I recently suggested at War on the Rocks, most if not all of these vessels are maritime militia affiliated. This insight can help overcome the perennial challenge of differentiating wayward Chinese fishermen from covert elements of China’s armed forces.

Backbone Boats are Militia Boats

In late 2012, PRC leaders decided to invest heavily in the modernization of China’s marine fishing fleet. Prompted by a proposal made by 27 scholars at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, they implemented a series of policies to help fishing boat owners replace their small, old wooden vessels with larger, steel-hulled craft. These programs provided subsidies to large segments of the Chinese fishing industry. But the most generous support was reserved for a specific class of fisherman: i.e., those licensed to operate in the “Spratly waters,” the 820,000 square kilometers of Chinese-claimed land and sea south of 12 degrees latitude.

The Chinese government, both at the central and local levels, allocated large sums of money to reimburse fishing boat owners willing to build new Spratly boats. Hundreds of Chinese fishing boat owners took them up on this offer. The new boats constituted the “Spratly backbone fleet.”

The PRC was very particular about what kinds of boats it wanted in the new fleet. In a January 2018 interview, the Party Secretary of a Guangxi-based firm named Qiaogang Jianhua Fisheries Company (桥港镇建华渔业公司) acknowledged that while the subsidies were quite large, the new boats had to meet very exacting standards. According to the Secretary, surnamed Zhong, the vessels must be quite large, have powerful engines, and be equipped with advanced refrigeration units, among “many, many” other stipulations. Zhong declared, “The document listing these requirements (批文) is very thick. If you don’t adhere to these stipulations, then there’s no subsidy.”

Aside from controlling what types of boats got built, Beijing likely desired some control over how the new boats got used. If deployed effectively, their actions could, like at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, enable new territorial acquisitions. Conversely, if misused, they could damage China’s reputation and even precipitate a violent clash. When the program began, China already had in place a system for controlling the activities of its fishing boats in contested waters: the maritime militia.

April 27, 2021 – Philippine Coast Guard personnel survey several ships believed to be Chinese militia vessels in Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. (Philippine Coast Guard photo)

The “maritime militia” (海上民兵) is the saltwater element of China’s national militia. Like the People’s Armed Police and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), it is a component of the country’s armed forces. Most members of the maritime militia have day jobs, often as fishermen. However, their affiliation with the militia means that their vessels can be “requisitioned” (征用) to participate in training activities and conduct missions (service for which they are compensated). Militia members are trained and managed by PLA officers assigned to People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs) in the city, county, or town in which the militiamen reside.

Subsidies for construction of the Spratly backbone fleet have been channeled both to existing members of the maritime militia and unaffiliated fishing boat owners that were willing to take the oath as a condition for the money. Among the first to receive the new boats, members of the Tanmen maritime militia benefited from the first approach. Spratly backbone boats registered to Hainan’s Yangpu Economic Development Zone offer an example of the second.

The Spratly backbone fleet appears to be managed by the coordinated efforts of provincial fisheries authorities and the provincial military system (of which PAFDs are a part). The most compelling support for this thesis comes from a 2017 report by the Guangzhou-based MP Consulting Group, which was hired to audit Guangdong’s Marine and Fisheries Bureau. The resulting 96-page document was subsequently posted on the website of the Guangdong Department of Finance.

In their report, MP consultants assessed the Bureau’s success at achieving the seven goals established for 2016. Most were domestic regulatory functions, irrelevant to this story. However, the Bureau’s seventh goal set out the organization’s mission to help protect China’s “rights” in disputed maritime space in the South China Sea. MP consultants generally gave favorable marks on this account, listing eight noteworthy achievements. These included the Bureau’s role in “promoting the construction of maritime militia forces.” Specifically, the Bureau spent 2016 clarifying the division of responsibilities between it and the provincial military district with respect to the “construction, daily operation, combat readiness training, and other relevant tasks” of the Spratly backbone fleet. This statement indicates that the Guangdong elements of the Spratly backbone fleet—and, by extension, those backbone vessels based in Guangxi and Hainan provinces—are organized into militia units jointly managed by the provincial military district and the provincial Marine and Fisheries Bureau.

Other evidence supports the hypothesis that “backbone” boats are militia boats. In August 2020, for instance, the Jiangmen City branch of the Bank of Guangzhou released a summary of its contributions to the local economy. Among these, the branch cited a 97 million RMB loan it provided to an unnamed “top tier fishing company” to build 11 Spratly backbone boats. The bank unwittingly revealed that these new fishing vessels also had “militia functions” (民兵用船功能).

A generic employment contract for crew members embarking on Spratly backbone boats offers additional evidence. The contract—which was uploaded to a Baidu document sharing platform in February 2019—outlines terms for employment at the Shanwei City Cheng District Haibao Fisheries Professional Cooperative (汕尾市城区海宝渔业专业合作社). While little is known about this cooperative, its members are clearly active in the Spratlys. Indeed, its operations manager, Mr. Zhang Jiancheng (张建成), serves as the General Secretary of the Shanwei Spratly Fishing Association (汕尾市南沙捕捞协会).

The Haibao Fisheries contract makes clear that its backbone boats are militia boats, without actually using the words “maritime militia.” It contains a section on “rights protection requisitioning” (维权征用), i.e., removing the boat from production so that it can serve state functions in disputed maritime space. According to Article 2 in that section, if required for “national defense,” the fishing vessel and its crew must “participate in training activities and rights protection tasks, and support military operations.” Article 2 also indicates that crew members must comply with arrangements made by the fishing cooperative and “obey the command of the military” and other government authorities. Article 4 states that if and when the fishing vessel is requisitioned, the boat and its crew must “obey the command of the state,” operating in the manner required, mooring in the determined location, and “completing the operational tasks according to the specific requirements.”

March 23, 2021 – This satellite image by Maxar Technologies shows Chinese vessels in the Whitsun Reef located in the disputed South China Sea. (Maxar Technologies)

Section 6 outlines the rules governing crew behavior, both ashore and at sea. For example, crew members must not gamble, solicit prostitutes, or visit strip clubs while in port (Article 6). The rules also include content specific to the vessel’s militia functions. Article 7 proscribes taking photos and “divulging the secrets of the boat.” Without the permission of the captain, crew members cannot bring outsiders aboard the boat to view its “design structure and internal setup” (设计构造和内部设置).

Implications

In this article, I have argued that most if not all Spratly backbone boats are militia boats. They may actually catch fish, but their militia affiliation makes them available for state and military tasking. If this conclusion is correct, it offers useful new ways to identify Chinese maritime militia forces operating in the Spratly waters. While the PRC does not publish lists of active maritime militia boats, it does share information about which boats belong to the Spratly backbone fishing fleet. This can serve as an indicator of militia status.

How might this work in practice? At the time of this writing, a team of four Chinese fishing boats is operating illegally within 200 nautical miles of Vietnam’s coast, i.e., within the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The four vessels are named Qionglinyu 60017, 60018, 60019, and 60020, respectively, indicating they are registered to Hainan’s Lingao county (临高县). Vietnamese maritime law enforcement authorities could evict them, but before doing so they might ask, are they maritime militia?

My answer: “very likely.” A quick sifting of open-source materials reveals they are all backbone boats. This information appears in a March 2020 open letter posted on the website “Message Board for Leaders” (领导留言板). In it, the boat owners entreat PRC officials to restore fuel subsidies and other rewards for operating in “specially-designated waters” in 2018. Likely amounting to hundreds of thousands of RMB, the subsidies were withheld as punishment for operating in the Spratlys without the required licenses. To elicit special consideration, they emphasized that their four vessels were Spratly backbone boats. (Their ploy ultimately failed, as the Lingao County Bureau of Agriculture responded to their letter with a firm but polite refusal to change their decision.)

Qionglinyu 60017, 60018, 60019, and 60020, May 2021. (Via www.marinetraffic.com)

Southeast Asian countries can and should compile lists of known Spratly backbone boats. They can start with local newspapers, which are a great source for such information. In December 2016, for example, Zhanjiang Daily published an article about the launching of the city’s first Spratly backbone trawlers: the 48-meter (577 ton) Yuemayu 60222 and 60333. Registered to the city’s Mazhang District, the craft are owned by Zhanjiang Xixiang Fisheries (湛江喜翔渔业有限公司). With these clues in hand, one can then try to learn the identities of the company’s two other Spratly backbone boats, then still under construction.

Yuemayu 60333 (Via NHJD.net)

The websites of Chinese shipbuilding companies are another useful source of information. Those with contracts to build backbone boats often issue news releases when these vessels are launched or delivered. In October 2017, for instance, the Fujian-based Lixin Ship Engineering Company launched five very large Spratly backbone trawlers built for a Guangdong fishing company, Maoming City Desheng Fisheries Limited. The five boats were delivered two months later. They included Yuedianyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886. The boats were 63.6 meters in length and had the large (1244kW) engines typical of the backbone fleet. Of note, Desheng Fisheries is the same company that owns Yuemaobinyu 42881, 42882, 42883, 42885, and 42886, all spotted moored at Whitsun Reef in March. Indeed, they may be the very same boats (their names having been slightly altered in the years since they were built).

Yuedianyu 42882, December 2017 (Photo via Fujian Lixin Ship Engineering)

Provincial and municipal governments may be the most valuable sources of all. In November 2020, the Guangdong Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Affairs released information about the province’s Spratly (“NS,” for nansha) fishing license quota for 2021. The document indicated that 255 Guangdong boats would receive Spratly fishing licenses this year, among which 185 would go to backbone boats and 70 would go to “ordinary boats” (普通渔船). The Bureau attached an Excel spreadsheet listing the chosen vessels. The document omitted Table 1, containing the list of backbone boats. But it did include Table 2, listing the 70 “ordinary” fishing boats. Since only two types of Guangdong boats operate in the Spratlys—i.e., ordinary and backbone—any Guangdong boat there and not found in Table 2 must be a backbone bone, and therefore presumed militia.

These data help shed light on recent events. In March and April 2021, the Philippine Coast Guard released photos of Chinese fishing boats loitering at Whitsun Reef. Thanks to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), we know the identities of 23 of them.

Both AMTI and the Philippines Coast Guard classified them as “militia.” They are right. All are from Guangdong. All are absent from Table 2. And that makes them no “ordinary” boats.

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.

Featured Image: In this photo provided by the National Task Force-West Philippine Sea, Chinese vessels are moored at Whitsun Reef, South China Sea on March 27, 2021. (Philippine government photo)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Envisioning a Dystopian Future in the South China Sea

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By Capt. Tuan N. Pham, USN

The setting is the South China Sea (SCS) in 2035. On the Chinese island of Mischief Reef, Senior Captain Chen, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Spratly Islands Commander, considers a Philippines Navy request to conduct a quarterly search and rescue drill in the vicinity of the Chinese island of Scarborough Shoal. At the Philippines Navy HQ in Manila, Captain Arroyo goes over the details of the naval drill and approves its execution pending authorization from the PLAN. Near the Chinese island of San Cay in the middle of the SCS, a lone Vietnamese fishing boat evades a China’s Coast Guard (CCG) patrol craft. The fishing boat captain knows full well the penalties for illegal fishing in Chinese waters – arrest, confiscation, fine, and imprisonment. At the Petronas Corporate HQ in Kuala Lumpur, a Malaysian vice president negotiates a proposed joint development project in the vicinity of the Chinese islands of Natuna with a Chinese counterpart from China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation. Inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat Building in Jakarta, the staff reworks next month’s meeting agenda based on guidance from Beijing.

While conjectural now, the SCS as China’s de facto home waters may become a reality in a few years. If so, the dystopian future represents a blatant contravention of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and another blow to the weakening rules-based liberal international order that has provided global prosperity and security for over 70 years. The risk is too high to defer action or do nothing on the wishful hope of Chinese benevolence. The time to act is now. It is much easier to slow or stop a large boulder rolling down a steep hill near the top than wait until it gains speed and momentum near the bottom. Inaction, or worse yet, retrenchment further reinforces the ingrained Chinese belief that it is an unstoppable rising power, and the United States is an irreversible waning power.

Beijing’s Gambit

Under the cover of the coronavirus (COVID) pandemic, China took advantage of the outbreak to expand and strengthen its administrative control and jurisdictional authority over the disputed and contested waters and intimidate regional neighbors to acquiesce to its national will. But Beijing misread the geopolitical landscape in 2020 and miscalculated its response. Chinese leaders wrongly assumed that the region and the international community would be distracted with and weakened by COVID, and that they could advance their national interests in the SCS with acceptable political and military risks and costs.

At the onset of COVID, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Xi Jinping may have thought something along these lines:

“As the regional countries, the United States, and the international community look inward to deal with the global pandemic and the force readiness of the U.S. Navy (USN) and its allies in the Pacific appears impacted by COVID, now may be an opportune time to advance China’s interests in the SCS. I anticipate a serious backlash from the world as our COVID misinformation campaign fails, so better to have something to bargain with later. I may also have to remind the people that only the CCP and PLA under my leadership can defend Chinese national interests, particularly when it comes to national unity [territorial integrity] and rejuvenation [Chinese Dream].”

Pursue Cumulative Strategy

Although the U.S.-led regional and international response temporarily checked the increased Chinese aggression in the SCS, it will not alter China’s long-term revanchist design for the international waterway or influence its revisionist global ambitions. To do that, the United States should heed Sun Tzu and pursue an enduring cumulative strategy – a series of connected actions that, when taken together, asymmetrically attacks China’s strategy, undermines China’s developing regional partnerships, and prompts China to overreact and overreach. Firstly, the United States should help the other claimants expand and strengthen their footprints in the SCS and advance resource exploration and development in collaboration with multinational corporations and other state actors. Secondly, the United States should promote and support more legal challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims and ratify UNCLOS to better pursue that avenue. Thirdly, the United States should make more investments in maritime domain awareness (MDA) and law enforcement (LE) capabilities for the other claimants and ASEAN countries bordering the SCS. Lastly, the United States should increase and enhance persistent and collective maritime presence in the SCS to include holding the next biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in the strategic waterway.

Why Act

In the context of the SCS, Chinese overreach is any action that empowers Beijing to dictate who can occupy territories, exploit resources, and conduct commercial and military activities in the disputed and contested waters (as illustrated in the dystopian vignette), undermining the rule of law and necessitating a strong response from the United States and the international community. These overreactions include but are not limited to declaring and enforcing an air defense identification zone; requiring notification of (and perhaps permission for) transits and operations; demanding consultation with (and perhaps approval from) Beijing for any hydrocarbon exploration and development; regulating fishing throughout the SCS; policing the SCS as territorial waters; seizing and militarizing the Natuna Islands, militarizing Scarborough Shoal, and further militarizing the Paracel and Spratly Islands (strategic control points within the SCS); demilitarizing the other SCS claimants; and barring ASEAN countries from military activities outside of ASEAN.

The Chinese overreach, or overreactions, may further push the SCS claimants, other ASEAN countries (though not ASEAN as a whole), and the international community to take a more assertive stance against Beijing. The nature, scope, and extent of the pushback may buy more time for Washington to reverse the erosion of U.S. military advantages and unfavorable trends in the SCS, and for the enduring Chinese domestic problems to further weaken the fragile Chinese economy that underpins its maritime activities locally in the SCS and its coercion globally. These potential effects overlap in time, space, force, and value. From a regional perspective, a strengthened America with confident allies and partners advances a maturing Free and Open Indo-Pacific. From a global perspective, actions that uphold global rules and norms reinforce the weakening rules-based liberal international order.

What and How to Act

While some of the following proposed actions have been discussed individually before, both by myself and others, they have not been wholly framed in this targeted, synchronized, and integrated purpose and manner. They span the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power and are consistent with the U.S. National Defense and National Military Strategies to counter malign influence: “Compete, deter, and win below the level of armed conflict; and be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable, and strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.” They asymmetrically attack China’s strategy and undermine its developing partnerships in the SCS by imposing more costs (economic), winning the narratives (information), encouraging greater restraints (diplomatic), and denying the benefits or objectives thereof (military).

As Sun Tzu said: “The supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy, next best is to disrupt his alliances, next best is to attack his army, the worst policy is to attack his cities.” It makes more strategic sense to counter Beijing by undercutting its strategy and undermining its regional relations: Operate and compete in the gray zone. Challenge China just below the threshold of armed conflict, but avoid conflict altogether. It is more advantageous and less costly to take risks and deter a conflict than to pay the price of actually fighting one.

Impose More Costs

The most effective and enduring way to dissuade and deter Beijing in the SCS is to impact its economy (pocketbook). This can be done by helping the other claimants expand and strengthen their military, basing, and infrastructure footprints and advance their resource exploration and development in the strategic waterway, thereby raising China’s operating costs in the SCS. China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan occupy nearly 70 disputed reefs and islets spread across the SCS. China far exceeds them in terms of reclaimed land, built infrastructures, and fielded intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) and power projection capabilities, but these local advantages come at substantial economic and political costs. To level the playing field, the U.S. should assist the other claimants to reclaim more land and improve infrastructures on their internationally recognized maritime claims. By focusing on the recognized geographic features within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), the other claimants would steer clear of any inconsistency with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) fourth ruling that “China aggravated and extended the disputes through its dredging, artificial island-building, and construction activities.”

Another “escalate to de-escalate” strategy option is to promote more oil and gas exploration and development with multinational corporations and other state actors like Russia’s Rosneft and Gazprom, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Japan’s Idemitsu Kosan and Teikoku Oil, and Exxon Mobil. By internationalizing and diversifying the SCS issue, Beijing could be compelled to compromise and cooperate with the other claimants for peaceful and equitable sharing of the vast oil and gas resources under the SCS. While there is no specific provision in UNCLOS requiring state-to-state cooperation to manage oil and gas resources, certain UNCLOS articles offer mechanisms to encourage compromise and cooperation in resource development. This development could be done equitably and consistently with international laws and the domestic laws of all involved claimants. 

Win the Narratives

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and the other ASEAN countries are pushing back in the SCS and pressuring China on the long-stalled SCS Code of Conduct which is set to finalize this year. They were encouraged by Vietnam as the 2020 ASEAN Chair, Vietnam’s strong response to Chinese encroachments into its EEZ in 2020, Hanoi’s consideration to take Beijing to the PCA, and the release of Vietnam’s 2019 Defense White Paper. The fleeting geostrategic conditions present yet another opportunity for America to actively promote and support more legal challenges to China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS. Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur, and the other SCS claimants could leverage the legal precedent set by the 2016 PCA ruling in favor of Manila and submit their challenges to the PCA for arbitration. Washington should encourage these legal challenges, but to be more effective, America must first ratify UNCLOS if its support is to have international legitimacy and be taken seriously by the other claimants. Washington should also encourage a multilateral “grand bargain” for the other claimants to settle their disputes with each other, and thereby providing a united front to China’s excessive maritime claims.

Encourage Greater Restraints

An integral part of the diplomatic initiatives surrounding the SCS is shared situational awareness of the destabilizing Chinese activities therein. It is in the interest of the SCS claimants and ASEAN countries at large to “maintain MDA of their national maritime boundaries as well as of the adjacent international waterways.” They would largely welcome the transparency. Transparency promotes consensus, enables individual and collective responses, mitigates Chinese information operations against them and within ASEAN itself, and strengthens deterrence against Chinese activities below the threshold of armed conflict. Persistent ISR may also give pause to Beijing if it knows that it is being monitored and that its actions are attributable. Put simply, the other claimants and ASEAN countries cannot act collectively without first knowing what, how, where, and when to act.

Another key diplomatic component to stymie Beijing’s efforts to exert increasing administrative control and jurisdictional authority over the SCS is to build up regional LE capabilities and capacities in terms of people (training), processes (tactics), and things (equipment) and prevent China from dominating the LE domain – as the recently passed CCG law might portend. The new Chinese law authorizes the CCG to demolish foreign constructions on Chinese-claimed maritime features (which implies all such Chinese-claimed maritime features within the SCS) and allows the use of weapons against foreign vessels in carrying out these sovereignty operations. The CCG also has been given the authority to board, search, detain, and expel foreign vessels, and arrest individuals suspected of violating Chinese maritime laws (which implies greater authority over international maritime laws) in the waters under Chinese jurisdiction (which means the whole SCS).

Deny the Benefits or Objectives

The U.S. should deny Beijing’s objectives in the SCS, or at least diminish the benefits of its actions therein. There is still much value in continuing to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims through a deliberate and calibrated campaign of persistent presence operations – transits and overflights, exercises, and freedom of navigation operations (FONOP). In 2019, the USN conducted nine FONOPs, an inaugural U.S.-ASEAN maritime exercise, annual Cooperation Afloat and Readiness and Training drills, and several combined and multinational naval operations. In 2020, the USN conducted 11 FONOPs, a dual-carrier strike group operation, and a trilateral maritime exercise with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Royal Australian Navy (RAN). To date in 2021, the USN has conducted two FONOPs, a dual-carrier strike group operation, an expeditionary strike group operation, and a bilateral maritime exercise with the RAN. The number of FONOPs in 2019 and 2020 is a dramatic turnaround from the previous years (2015 – two, 2016 – three, 2017 – six, 2018 – five) in terms of operational tempo – despite the COVID impact in 2020.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has also oriented itself toward China by deploying more cutters and personnel to the region to help train their coast guards. With its developing “regional partnerships and extensive experience strengthening maritime LE regimes,” the USCG is well suited and postured to address the growing need for greater maritime governance in the disputed and contested waters. The United States’ allies and partners have likewise stepped up their presence and operations in the SCS in support of freedom of navigation (FON) – most notably Japan, Australia, India, United Kingdom, and France. Failing to conduct these lawful and routine operations in the aftermath of the landmark 2016 PCA ruling sends the wrong strategic signals to Beijing. The right strategic signals moving forward are more combined and multinational operations and exercises that underscore the universal maritime right of all nations to “fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits.”

The United States should hold the next RIMPAC exercise in the SCS. The exercise would push back against China’s unilateral militarization of the strategic waterway, reinforce the legal standing of the PCA ruling that invalidated Beijing’s excessive maritime claims, underscore the universal importance of the rule of law and compliance with global norms, and demonstrate that the United States and like-minded nations are willing to collectively stand up for their national interests and shared values. The nature and scope of the exercise could be calibrated to achieve the desired objective. That objective may only require a portion of the exercise to be held in the SCS.

Too Little or Too Much

 For those who view the actions as too little, Washington has more options to dissuade and deter Beijing in the SCS: Build an enduring framework of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements with ASEAN countries to bind the United States to the regional economies and keep them from moving more toward economic alternatives like the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Belt and Road Initiative, and Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership. Lay the groundwork for a regionally-sponsored and -led independent environmental assessment detailing the impact of the damaging Chinese dredging, artificial-island building, and over-fishing to the fragile marine ecosystems. Upgrade the bilateral relationships with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia to strategic partnerships, and advance and accelerate the development of the Quadrilateral Security Framework. Lastly, draw a sharp comparison between Chinese divergent sovereignty positions on and convergent “gray zone” activities in the SCS and the Arctic Ocean to heighten the growing Russian and Nordic concerns of the latter. Then triangulate and bring Russia into the SCS fray to further internationalize and diversify the strategic waterway and asymmetrically check China’s growing Arctic ambitions. These options were not explored for brevity but should be considered in future strategy re-assessment on how best to influence and deter Beijing in the SCS.

Some view these actions as too much, fearing that the recommendations risk pushing Xi (and the CCP) over an invisible red line drawn by “fear, honor, and interest.” The key to the cumulative strategy is for Washington to retain escalation dominance, freedom of movement, and strategic initiative to impose its will on Beijing. As Sun Tzu said, “the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.” Washington should seek to impose costs, deny benefits (objectives), encourage restraints, and win the narratives so that the only acceptable strategic calculus for Beijing is to curb or abandon its ambitious and expansive enterprise in the SCS. Like a rheostat, this diversified approach can adjust the “how” to achieve the desired “what.” The strategy must also offer off-ramps throughout the continuum of competition so that Xi (and the CCP) can spin the domestic narratives and save face with the Chinese people. The strategic objective is deterrence, not regime change. The desired end state is to negotiate terms from a position of advantage like during the U.S.-China trade war. China respects resoluteness (strength) and disrespects vacillation (weakness).

Act Now

It is clear that the status quo or retrenchment will have negative consequences for the United States, the region, and the world. It is equally clear that Washington must act now to turn the tides in the SCS and avert a dystopian future when Beijing exerts administrative control and jurisdictional authority of the strategic waterway. The outlined proposals provide a range of DIME options to prompt overreach by Beijing. Such overreaction may cause regional countries, and the greater global community, to view China’s destabilizing actions for what they truly are – a threat to the rules-based liberal international order.

Captain Tuan Pham is a maritime strategist, strategic planner, naval researcher, and China Hand with 20 years of experience in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the U.S. Government or U.S. Navy.

Feature Photo: The Philippine Coast Guard reported that despite repeated demands by Manila that Chinese ships leave Whitsun Reef, at least 240 Chinese vessels remained in the area and surrounding waters. Photo credit: Philippine Coast Guard, 16 Apr 2021.

Indo-Asia-Pacific

Conventional Deterrence and the U.S. Navy: Why the Future Needs to Happen Now, Pt. II

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Read Part One here.

By Adam Taylor

The challenges posed by China’s offensive deterrence paradigm require a new and innovative future force design for the US Navy. China’s deterrence model prizes confrontation and escalation in order to stop its neighbors from pursuing an unwelcome course of action, and, ultimately, force the target of its deterrent behavior to favor Beijing’s interests. This operating environment requires the US Navy to move from a fleet better suited for conventional war to an architecture that can succeed in a traditional great power conflict and countering Chinese deterrent behavior in the grey zone. A closer exploration of the US Navy’s response and involvement in deterring general war and Chinese aggression short of war in a Taiwan scenario demonstrates both the challenges confronting the current fleet and a possible force design roadmap the service can follow moving forward.

Any assessment of this question requires understanding Beijing’s interests in Taiwan and the range of behavior China might pursue to achieve its desired outcomes. In turn, this clarifies both the range of Chinese military behavior American forces must be prepared to deter and defend against, and whether current US force posture in the region meets those demands. Beijing’s most recent defense white paper makes clear that its overwhelming interest in Taiwan remains the islands reunification and incorporation into the PRC polity. China maintains numerous other interests in the island, however, and could employ a variety of deterrent stratagems to prevent Taiwan from pursuing various political ends at odds with Beijing’s preferences. Examples of China’s other interests could include deterring or reversing a “declaration of independence;” preventing Taiwan from developing nuclear weapons; compelling the abandonment of a military access agreement to US forces; deterring Taiwan’s electorate from pursuing an “independence-minded” course or influencing its electorate not to support candidates favoring such a course; compelling Taiwan to abandon sovereignty claims in the East China Sea (ECS); and forcing Taiwan to accept reunification.

Past examples of Chinese military action provide context for when the PRC will employ deterrent measures in response to developments within Taiwan and the form of force it will use.

Notable Security Events in Cross-Strait Relationship

Historical Event Year(s) Circumstances US Response Notes
First Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954 PRC bombs Taiwan’s islands of Quemoy, Dachen, and Mazu. The US signs mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Taiwan maintains Quemoy and Mazu islands. China gains Dachen island.
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 1958 PRC bombs Quemoy and Mazu and establishes blockade around Quemoy to compel Taiwan to abandon claim to Quemoy. US Navy escorts Taiwan’s resupply ships to Quemoy, breaking PRC blockade of island. US publicly commits to defense of Quemoy. Taiwan renounces use of force to retake Chinese mainland. China frames crisis as an “internal affair,” and uses the conflict to exacerbate relations between US and Taiwan.
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-1996 PRC conducts show of force exercises and missile tests near Taiwan in response to US policy toward Taiwan and public support in Taiwan for pro-independence regime. The US deploys two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait. The US publicly and explicitly states it does not support Taiwan’s independence. US’ conventional deterrent response assured throughout region.
ECS ADIZ Establishment 2013 China establishes ADIZ outside accepted international legal norms. ADIZ contests Japan and Taiwan’s sovereignty claims to same airspace and islands in ECS. America labels ADIZ establishment as “unilateral change to the status quo.” US continues flight operations through China’s ADIZ in ECS.
Island Encirclement Drills 2016 PRC begins regular PLAN and PLAAF exercises around Taiwan to “protect China’s sovereignty.” Exercises occur following election of pro-independence president, Tsai Ing-wen. US officials condemn exercises. American forces support Taiwan defense force freedom of navigation operations. Encirclement drills ongoing.

Both the Second and Third Taiwan Strait Crises demonstrate that Beijing would resort to abnormal levels of conventional hostility and force to compel Taiwan to abandon its ECS territorial claims or to express its displeasure with political developments that threaten the prospective reunification of Taiwan with China. Beijing’s ADIZ establishment and encirclement drills illustrate that it also relies on related, albeit less pronounced, compellent measures to further its sovereignty claims over Taiwan. These security developments demonstrate the expanding depth of China’s conventional deterrent policy tool kit and the range of scenarios US forces must be equipped to deter.

The PRC’s growing military capabilities also complicate any response to Chinese belligerence towards Taiwan. China now possesses the largest navy in the world, and, per the most recent Department of Defense report on Chinese military power, maintains the largest number of aviation forces in the Asia-Pacific as well as a growing inventory of conventional missiles. While force size alone does not determine the military balance, these developments suggest Beijing now has access to a broader range of tools to advance its goals in the cross-strait relationship.

Given available knowledge about China’s deterrence practices and its forces’ composition and disposition, it becomes possible to create a spectrum of behavior that the joint force must be able to effectively deter in a Taiwan scenario. The figure below highlights this spectrum. The top half of the spectrum illustrates a range of events in Taiwan that the Chinese would utilize varying levels of force to deter. These events are extrapolated from understanding China’s general interests in Taiwan. Each event ranges from least to most threatening Beijing’s interests in Taiwan. The bottom half highlights possible compellent behavior China can pursue to deter events on the top half of the spectrum. The compellent force arrow demonstrates that left to right movement across the spectrum will lead to increasing levels of Chinese deterrent force against Taiwan. While there remains a correlation between Taiwan’s escalatory behavior and increasing Chinese deterrent force as one moves across the spectrum, this does not mean Beijing would not utilize lower levels of compellent force in response to an escalatory event along the spectrum. More important, however, the spectrum illustrates those scenarios when the Navy’s contributions to the joint force’s conventional deterrence posture would be tested. A closer look at the Navy’s ability to support operations aimed at stopping China from deterring Taiwan from policies that lead to de facto independence demonstrate the challenges confronting the service now and in the future.

China’s Spectrum of Conventional Deterrence Measures (Click to Expand)

China Deters Taiwan from Policies that Lead to de-facto Independence

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis highlights Beijing’s use of military exercises and shows of force that target domestic developments within Taiwan or compel the US to change its policy towards the island. One can see similar circumstances unfold again should the people of Taiwan continue to elect pro-independence minded politicians or publicly support policies that Beijing might consider measures of de-facto independence, such as signing an access agreement for US forces or codifying policy that contradicts the “one China, two systems” policy. The spectrum of behavior suggests that China would resort to intense forms of hostility short of war. America would also likely pressure Taiwan’s leadership to stop such pronouncements for fear of conventional Chinese escalation. It may therefore seem misguided to only examine the utility of America’s current force composition and disposition to deter China’s use of military exercises, considering the seeming mismatch between the implications of outlined provocative domestic political behavior in Taiwan and the range of Chinese behavior. This question remains important, however, given the ability of China to use similar methods against other states in the region pursuing policies at odds with Beijing’s political goals.

In the last Taiwan Strait Crisis, America sailed two aircraft carriers through the strait to communicate America’s resolve to protect Taiwan. Would the threat of a similar response today meaningfully curtail Chinese military exercises or shows of force? Can the threat of sending US warships to signal resolve with Taiwan communicate to Beijing it should reconsider its course of action? Not anymore. Chinese forces today are both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to their forebears, and while they continue to be qualitatively inferior to their American counterparts, they now have the means to effectively engage US vessels. The declining capability gap found between American and Chinese platforms means the deterrent threat posed by current US forces has decreased. Furthermore, it remains a serious logistic, maintenance, and human endeavor to keep America’s highly capable ships at sea consistently and long enough. These conditions make America’s assortment of large platforms not always suited for the passive everyday presence necessary to reassure Taiwan and needed to communicate to the PRC the ability to impose costs should conflict arise.

This dilemma speaks to the issues confronting the composition of the current USN fleet. While aircraft carriers and other large surface combatants possess incredible capabilities and maintain deterrent utility, their size and relative paucity in number make them susceptible to a variety of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats and difficult to replace should conflict occur. In the words of one US naval professional, “our fleet is too small, and our capabilities are stacked on too few ships that are too big.” Beijing recognizes the operational problem this poses for US military leaders. In turn, this likely informs how China would view the presence of American aircraft carriers or other large platforms in the Taiwan Straits in response to a military show of force exercise. Chinese leaders may view the presence of such platforms as provocative and an important reminder of the force America can bring to bear in a general conflict, but not necessarily an incentive to stop its aggressive behavior. This represents an important consideration for leaders in Washington as they consider the many requests from allies and combatant commanders for the presence of carriers and America’s larger surface combatants in their respective territory or area of operations.  

This scenario raises important questions about the utility of the Navy’s current fleet architecture and the service’s future force design goals. These issues led Department of Defense (DoD) leaders to commission a series of force design studies from the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Hudson Institute, and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to inform their future force design proposal. Together, these studies influenced the Navy’s Battle Force 2045 future force design proposal. While details surrounding the CAPE study remain unavailable to the public, both the Hudson Institute and Battle Force 2045 proposals highlight the direction DoD will take the future fleet.

Unfortunately, Battle Force 2045 falls short of the service’s actual needs because it makes a series of unrealistic assumptions about DoD’s future financial resources and Congress. While this proposal has received much time and attention elsewhere, its shortcomings deserve brief consideration. Two notable issues include the costs associated with a 500-ship fleet and the politics associated with platform divestment decisions. Despite a historically high budget in fiscal year (FY)20, the navy’s current fleet of 300 ships accounts for roughly half its size in FY85. This suggests that maintaining the current force is increasingly expensive relative to previous years and will limit any increase in fleet size. Many legislators will also resist stopping procurement of existing platforms built in their districts and naval leadership would also need to engage in a parochial struggle over which platforms to cut. These and many other issues will limit the ability of the Navy, Congress, and defense enterprise from quickly achieving the consensus needed to build the future fleet the Navy needs.

A Better Fleet

 Navy and DoD leaders can take important steps now, however,  to ensure the service will succeed as a conventional deterrent in both the near and long term. Some of these steps include:

Reduce the advantage of China’s local balance of forces. China’s quantitative force advantage in the region means it will likely maintain and increase its ability to field a larger force in any future contingency within the first island chain. This balance of forces allows it to quickly mass its forces and complicate any US or combined response to conventional Chinese aggression. States who remain possible objects of Beijing’s aggression like Taiwan, the Philippines, or Vietnam will likely need to confront Chinese forces in response to malign conventional behavior short of war or in the initial stages of any deterrent action with limited US support. These states can mitigate the Beijing’s balance of forces advantage by increasing the deterrent utility of their security forces. America can support this goal by both increasing its arms sales to these nations and facilitating greater training opportunities designed to qualitatively improve partners’ capabilities. Although the China will likely view such a strategy as antagonistic, it provides a cost-effective way for the US to increase the deterrent capability of its partners.

Incorporate cheaper and more expendable platforms. America’s high end warfighting platforms do not always provide the best deterrent response options because they remain expensive to employ, costly to replace, and potentially vulnerable to the threats posed by China’s well developed A2/AD capabilities. Beijing can use these considerations to pursue courses of action that advance its interests while reducing the passive threat posed by US forces in the Asia-Pacific. America could respond to this dilemma by trying to increase the number of high-end ships in its fleet, but this approach remains unsustainable. Both the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Service recently concluded that the cost of maintaining a 355-ship fleet (let alone 500 ships) over 30 years would exceed the cost of purchasing new ships. This crowding out effect could prove disastrous for future US defense planners who want to field new generations of technology across the feet or build newer ships. While the Biden administration’s recently released “skinny budget” and comments from the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest a future naval shipbuilding boon, it remains difficult to assess if this thinking maintains long-term political support if it leads to cuts from the other services’ toplines.

The Navy can mitigate this issue by divesting from legacy platforms today and reinvesting those savings into research and development projects that increase the capability of platforms currently in service and into cheaper and more expendable platforms. Although this modernization window may provide Beijing an opportunity to act, it would provide the service with the investment needed to ensure long-term success.

While these cheaper ships would likely not have the individual capability of other platforms found throughout the fleet, they could provide the means to place a limited suite of capabilities on highly survivable platforms. These platforms, in turn, would be able to operate in A2/AD environments within zones of contention for longer periods of time and would be more easily replaced. Such ships would provide a credible denial deterrence capability by reducing China’s quantitative balance of forces advantage and increasing the qualitative ability of the deterrent response from the US and its partners.

Reconsider offset strategies to bridge the gap between the present and future. The Third Offset Strategy first introduced under the Obama administration provides a possible near term solution that can meet this goal. This initiative prioritized investments in projects like laser weapons that could shoot down enemy missiles at a fraction of the cost of current missile defense systems; modifying traditional cannon to fire guided hyper velocity projectiles; and investment in increasing the range of the navy’s Tomahawk missiles or the payloads of its submarines by decreasing procurement of more ships. While this would sacrifice procurement and acquisition of some platforms in the near term, it could lead to savings the Department of Defense needs to invest in cutting-edge technologies. These investments would also mitigate vulnerabilities associated with any modernization window. Many of these technologies would increase the operational reach and efficacy of existing platforms, which, in turn, may increase the deterrent utility of the fleet in the near-term and better posture the service to field more deterrent and defense credible ships in the future.

Beijing’s competitive deterrence model has led it to fashion a force that targets the vulnerabilities found within the Navy’s existing fleet, which is why the Navy cannot afford to double down on a losing force design like Battle Force 2045. Instead, service leadership must be willing to make difficult decisions today that prioritize divestment from legacy platforms and investment into future platforms and technologies that ensure America can field qualitatively superior platforms at scale that are able to deter China across the spectrum of competition.

Adam Taylor recently separated from the Marine Corps where he served four years as an air support control officer and is now in the Individual Ready Reserve. He currently works as a fellow in Congress and received his M.A. in international relations from American University’s School of International Service. The opinions expressed here are his own and do not reflect any institutional position of the Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or Member of Congress.

Featured Image: China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, leaves after wrapping up a five-day visit to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), south China, July 11, 2017. A departure ceremony was held at the Ngong Shuen Chau Barracks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Hong Kong Garrison by the HKSAR government. (Photo via Xinhua/Zeng Tao)