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India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multipolar System During Development

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Note: Original title of essay: “Rising in the Storm: India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multi-Polar System During Development.”

NAFAC Week

By Corey Bolyard

India is the most populous democracy in the world with 1.2 billion people and potential for intense economic growth.1 India seeks to protect its regional interests and become more involved in global power politics while balancing the needs of its economy and people. India must engage in economic reform to stimulate development and support an increasingly assertive foreign policy. By engaging in economic reform, India will have the opportunity to develop and exploit its large population and economic opportunity to become a global power in an increasingly multi-polar system, thereby allowing for an ambitious foreign policy permitting India to protect its interests in South Asia and act as the preeminent power in the region.

Economic development is key to India’s global status. Without a strong economy, India cannot provide for its citizens, much less engage in global affairs and find its place in a multi-polar system. India has a GDP of 2.2 trillion USD, but 30 percent of the population lives in poverty, hindering India’s continued growth.2 India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, promised substantial economic reform and introduced the “Make in India,” program in 2014, but the democratic process is slow. “Make in India,” is a nationalistic program that would boost India’s growth from within and improve the manufacturing sector.3 Manufacturing would provide a low-education alternative to India’s waning agricultural industry, but current labor laws stunt this sector, leaving few options for this segment of the population.4 Internal manufacturing would advance domestic development, but requires foreign investment to propel economic growth to a competitive global rate. Part of Modi’s proposed reforms would allow increased foreign investment in sectors such as coal, construction, railways, and multi- and single-brand retail, which would allow India to boost development.5 Many promised reforms are either in progress or incomplete. A demonetization reform took high currency bills out of circulation in late 2016 to curb the black market economy.6 India is in the process of digitization, moving toward a cashless economy, which would help reform tax administration and enhance government revenue.7 Modi’s government has showed a willingness to engage in economic reform despite the difficult process, and must continue to push for economic development driven by external aid and internal growth to elevate India to global leadership in an increasingly competitive global political stage.

India’s vivid democracy plays a key role in its economic advance. India’s citizens are engaged in democracy, with a voter turnout of 66.4 percent in the 2014 parliamentary elections.8 Freedom House, a prominent NGO, denotes India as “Free,” with press and net freedoms as “partially free.”9 Transparency International ranked India 79 in the world in its 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a final score of 40 that tied India with Brazil, Belarus, and China.10 However, there are some concerns for democracy in India. The Human Rights Watch World Report 2017 identifies a lack of accountability for police violence, treatment of religious and ethnic minorities, and the government’s use of sedition and defamation laws to persecute citizens.11 There is growing economic disparity in the country and a history of corruption, perceived and real. India is experiencing major demographic change, and the government’s ability to exploit this positively will determine future capabilities. India is ending a demographic transition and is almost at replacement-level fertility, which can become a great opportunity for India’s pursuit of global status. India’s working class will continue to grow over the next half-century, as the adult population will comprise 68 percent of India’s population in 2035.12 The demographic dividend is an opportunity for India, but does not guarantee growth, as economic opportunities must be available for this large population.13 Several factors India’s government must resolve include educational deficits, high unemployment, and a policy environment conducive to promoting competitive economic development globally.14 Due to India’s complex democracy at the state and federal level, reform and change is slow to proceed. India’s leadership must find a sustainable way to manage its population and economic goals regardless of their form. Through careful management, India’s democracy can succeed in implementing its domestic and economic policies, which will make it possible for India to focus on its foreign policy concerns.

India sees itself as the preeminent power in South Asia, but is dependent on economic growth for global success. India’s foreign policy focuses on improving relationships among South Asian countries with a “neighborhood first” policy through increased trade and aid.15 Economic integration in the neighborhood is low, as interregional trade makes up only five percent of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’s (SAARC) economic activity.16 With higher integration there is less tension and increased trade, giving India more opportunities to enhance its global position. India and China both see South Asia as a sphere of influence, and India is investing in its neighbors as part of a counterbalancing strategy to China, increasing the Ministry of External Affairs 2017 budget by 200 million USD.17 India sees China’s ‘One Belt, One Road,’ initiative as a threat to its economic and political dominance in the region, particularly the creation of a Chinese-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).18 Tension between Pakistan and India has great potential for conflict. India is the status quo power of the two nations, since it controls most of the disputed territories, has a stronger military, and has greater diplomatic standing, but both nations possess nuclear weapons and high tensions lead to an elevated risk of conflict.19 India is expanding its military capabilities and is the largest defense importer in the world, buying 15 percent of total world exports of weapons in the past five years.20 India has always followed a strategy of non-alignment and openly eschews cooperative alliances, preferring cooperative or bilateral relations for security. India must balance China and Pakistan, as open conflict would be disastrous and Chinese investment can help the Indian economy grow. In the interest of protecting interests and finding a place in a multi-polar system, India must decide if non-alignment is a viable path going forward or if closer relations with nations such as the United States, Japan, and Australia are worth the risk. Reviving quadrilateral dialogue among these four nations may be the logical next step for India’s foreign policy. A “democratic quad” increases India’s soft and hard power capabilities, but could alienate other countries in the region.21 

India’s decisions on economic reform and foreign policy will determine if it remains a developing country or rises to a key place in global politics. The government must find a way to implement economic reform to benefit its demographic dividend. Attracting foreign investment, implementing economic reform, and providing opportunities for its growing population will give India the economic strength to engage in an assertive foreign policy that will help define India’s role as a global leader among competitive powers. India must engage in economic development to support an assertive foreign policy as India navigates changing global power balances to give its people a path forward.

Corey Bolyard attends University of Mary Washington in Fredericksburg, VA where she is majoring in Political Science with a focus in Asian Policy and Regional Security. She is currently working on a thesis concerning China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative.  Upon graduation, she hopes to work in national security analysis. Her round table paper “Rising in the Storm: India’s Bid for Global Power in a Multi-Polar System During Development“ argues that by engaging in economic reform, India will be able to emerge as a global power, thereby allowing for an ambitious foreign policy to defend and develop its interests in the South Asia Region.

Endnotes

1. “South Asia: India,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, Dec. 12, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.

2. “South Asia: India,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook.

3. About Us,” Make In India, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.makeinindia.com/about.

4. “The Difficulties of Retooling the Indian Economy,” Stratfor, 2016, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/difficulties-retooling-indian-economy.

5. “The Modi Government’s Reform Program: A Scorecard,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, accessed March 28, 2017, http://indiareforms.csis.org/.

6. Mukesh Butani, “State election results: Strong mandate for bold economic reforms,” Forbes India, March 18, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/state-election-results-strong-mandate-for-bold-economic-reforms/46329/1.

7. Wade Shepard, “A Cashless Future Is The Real Goal Of India’s Demonetization Move,” Forbes, December 14, 2016, accessed March 30, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/14/inside-indias-cashless-revolution/.

8. “India Voter Turnout,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/146/40.

9. “India,” Freedom House, accessed March 27, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/india.

10. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,” Transparency International, January 25, 2017, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2016. Of all the countries listed in TI’s Corruption Perception’s Index, India is listed in the upper half by rank. With a perfect score of 100, India’s score of 40 is lower than its rank.    

11. “Human Rights Watch World Report 2016: India,” Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2017, accessed March 27, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/india.

12. KS James, “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges,” Science 333, no. 6042 (July 29, 2011):578, accessed March 29, 2017, doi:10.1126/science.1207969.

13. KS James, “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges,” Science, 578.

14. Ibid., 578-579.

15. “A Defining Rivalry in South Asia,” Stratfor, February 24, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/defining-rivalry-south-asia.

16. “A Defining Rivalry in South Asia,” Stratfor.

17. Monish Gulati, “What India’s Finance Budget Means For Its Foreign Policy – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, March 03, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.eurasiareview.com/04032017-what-indias-finance-budget-means-for-its-foreign-policy-analysis/.

18. Ananth Krishnan, “India cannot stop Silk Road plan, warns Chinese media,” India Today, March 20, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-warns-india-cannot-stop-silk-road-plan/1/908010.html.

19. “In India, a Military Strategy Guided by Precision,” Stratfor, October 6, 2016, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india-military-strategy-guided-precision.

20. “How Losing India’s Business Could Ruin Russia’s Defense Industry,” Stratfor, January 27, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-losing-indias-business-could-ruin-russias-defense-industry.

21. Rohan Mukherjee, “A democratic quadrilateral in Asia?,” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, March 27, 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, http://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-democratic-quadrilateral-in-asia/. “Democratic Quad” is a colloquial term for quadrilateral dialogue between the United States, Australia, Japan, and India, since all four nations are democracies and share similar security interests in Asia. 

Bibliography

“About Us.” Make In India. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.makeinindia.com/about.

“A Defining Rivalry in South Asia.” Stratfor. February 24, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017.  https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/defining-rivalry-south-asia.

Butani, Mukesh. “State election results: Strong mandate for bold economic reforms.” Forbes India. March 18, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/state-election-results-strong-mandate-for-bold-economic-reforms/46329/1.

“Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.” Transparency International. January 25, 2017. Accessed March 27, http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table.

“Ease of Doing Business in India.” Doing Business in India – World Bank Group. Accessed March 28, http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/india.

Gulati, Monish. “What India’s Finance Budget Means For Its Foreign Policy – Analysis.” Eurasia Review. March 03, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.eurasiareview.com/04032017-what-indias-finance-budget-means-for-its-foreign-policy-analysis/.

“How Losing India’s Business Could Ruin Russia’s Defense Industry.” Stratfor. January 27, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/how-losing-indias-business-could-ruin-russias-defense-industry.

“Human Rights Watch World Report 2016: India.” Human Rights Watch. January 12, 2017. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/india.

“India.” Freedom House. Accessed March 27, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/india.

“India Voter Turnout.” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Accessed March 27, 2017. http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/146/40.

“In India, a Military Strategy Guided by Precision.” Stratfor. October 6, 2016. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/india-military-strategy-guided-precision.

James, KS. “India’s Demographic Change: Opportunities and Challenges.” Science 333, no. 6042 (July 29, 2011): 576-80. Accessed March 29, 2017. doi:10.1126/science.1207969.

Krishnan, Ananth. “India cannot stop Silk Road plan, warns Chinese media.” India Today. March 20, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-warns-india-cannot-stop-silk-road-plan/1/908010.html.

Mukherjee, Rohan. “A democratic quadrilateral in Asia?” Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. March 27, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://www.gatewayhouse.in/a-democratic-quadrilateral-in-asia/.

Shepard, Wade. “A Cashless Future Is The Real Goal Of India’s Demonetization Move.” Forbes. December 14, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/14/inside-indias-cashless-revolution/.

“South Asia: India.” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, Dec. 12, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.

“The Difficulties of Retooling the Indian Economy.” Stratfor. 2016. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/difficulties-retooling-indian-economy.

“The Modi Government’s Reform Program: A Scorecard.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. Accessed March 28, 2017. http://indiareforms.csis.org/.

Featured Image: School children arrive to watch the proceedings of Indian parliament in New Delhi December 7, 2012. (Reuters/Stringer)

Europe

Great Power Cooperation and the Role of International Organizations

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Note: Original title of essay: “Great Power Cooperation and the Role of International Organizations and Agreements.”

NAFAC Week

By Emil Krauch

Europe after World War II: cities, towns, and villages completely destroyed, millions displaced and homeless, a silent air of terror and desperation still palpable. Never before had a war been so bloody and gruesome. Everyone suffered, victor and vanquished alike. The results were bleak — civilian deaths outnumbered combatant deaths by a factor of two.1 Those lucky to survive faced a grim post-conflict situation that almost surpassed the war in its direness. Many countries had serious supply issues of food, fuel, clothing, and other necessary items. Never again. Another conflict had to be avoided at all cost.

The atrocities of World War II have led to the creation of a union of countries that is unprecedented in its cooperation and interdependence. I intend to explore the European Union as an international collaboration of great powers, and to make the case for its importance and success.

Cooperation began in 1951 with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).2 It set forth a free trade agreement of certain goods between Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. To organize and enforce this agreement, the ECSC also created a set of supranational institutions that served as models to later institutions of the EU. In 1957 the ECSC members signed the two Treaties of Rome that went further to not just expand the existing to a comprehensive free trade agreement, but to a real common market. This European Economic Community (EEC) allowed the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people, inhibited internal market advantages, and — most notably — created a common unified ‘foreign’ trade policy. The following Single European Act (1987) and Maastricht Treaty (1993) significantly increased the scope of the Union to non-economic affairs and increased the power of the European institutions. Critically, the power of the directly elected European Parliament was increased. It was also at this time that the small village of Schengen in Luxembourg became known for the named-after agreement that gradually let people travel between EU countries without checkpoints. By the early 2000s more and more countries had joined the Union and many introduced the Euro as their single currency. The last 10 years of EU history can be described as its ‘decade of crisis’ with the failing of the Greek economy, a rise in Euroscepticism, the migration crisis, and the exit of Britain weakening the strength of the Union.

It has left a mark. A recent study coordinated by the European Commission found that only 36 percent of EU citizens “trust the European Union.”3 Many political commentators and the general public appear to agree that the EU “suffers from a severe democratic deficit.”4 Is this really justified?

The EU has has two channels of democratic legitimacy. The first is the European Parliament (EP), elected every 5 years by the population of the member states. The elections are very national affairs, lacking high public participation, where votes on existing national parties are cast, with these parties mostly judged on their performance on national issues. This creates a feeling of disconnect in the general population, the delegates’ successes and failures generally don’t sway the voters when ballots are cast. Stemming from the fact that campaigning in 28 countries of different cultures and languages is very difficult, these problems nonetheless need to be rectified. The second channel is the Council of the European Union which is made up of 10 different configurations of 28 national ministers, depending on subject matter. For example, finance ministers will form the Council when debating economic policy. To pass any proposal, both the Council and the EP have to pass it. Earlier criticisms of a lack of transparency in the Council were remedied in 2007 (through the Lisbon Treaty) by making all legislative votes and discussions of the Council public.5 Laws themselves are drafted by the European Commission (EC). The President of the Commission is selected by the EU heads of state, the 27 other Commissioners are selected by the Council and then either are accepted or not accepted, as a team, by a vote of the Parliament. The members of the Commission have often come under fire by critics, e.g. Nigel Farage in 2014: “ [The EU] is being governed by unelected bureaucrats.”6 In reality the Commission is more of a civil servant, than a government. It does not have the power to pass laws, or act outside the boundaries set by the EP and the Council. Other criticism (e.g it’s role as the sole initiator of legislation) is very credible. On what grounds Mr. Farage calls the Commissioners “unelected” though, can’t be quite comprehended.

Together with the other institutions (mainly Court and Central Bank), the EU therefore represents a group of supranational institutions that have a very democratic, but unique structure due to a cooperation of many culturally different nations; critics have to acknowledge this.

The question that has come up many times during the Union’s existence remains: “What has the EU ever done for us?” For one, it has created seven free trade agreement between the countries of Europe which, most economists would agree, is beneficial to all members of the EU. A recently published paper constructed counterfactual models of European nation’s economic performance, simulating them never having joined the EU.8 The results show substantially better actual performance over the counterfactual models for all member countries, except Greece. The Greek underperformance can’t be explained solely due to the economic crisis of the current era. Greece actually has had a growth rate above the EU average during its time in the single currency, a hasty opening of the uncompetitive domestic market when it joined in 1981, and a lack of structural reform has led to the deficit. Next to the often-noted other benefits of the EU, such as the ability to work and study abroad, the unified action really makes it possible to tackle issues with the necessary vigor that they demand – economic reform, security issues, consumer protection, climate change, justice, and so forth. The problems that exist in the EU today (e.g. migration crisis), wouldn’t disappear if the Union would be dissolved tomorrow. Tackling these problems as a block makes the solutions more transparent, more efficient, and more effective. Criticism of EU red tape must take into account the opposing situation of standalone bilateral agreements between 28 countries.

All of this is not the most remarkable achievement of the EU. One must go back to its origins: great nations with limited resources, at close proximity. The necessity of fighting and winning a war against the evil of Nazi Germany was clear. What arguments of morality did earlier conflicts have? Often there were none. Power struggles between the elites of European countries have plagued the continent for millennia.9 Germany and France have fought four major wars in the last 200 years. Could World War One be initiated as easily in today’s landscape of democratic European countries? Perhaps not. It does show, however, the susceptibility of the European continent to unsustainable nationalistic and expansionist ideas.

This is the greatest achievement of the EU. It has maintained peace between the large and small countries that it envelopes, on a continent that was plagued by war for thousands of years.

Originally from Heidelberg, Germany, Emil Krauch is a second year mechanical engineering student at the ETH in Zurich, Switzerland. He is actively involved in the school’s Model United Nations and Debate Clubs, and will start work as a University teacher’s assistant this upcoming semester. After receiving his Bachelor’s degree, Emil plans to pursue a graduate education in both engineering and business. 

1. Yahya Sadowski, “The Myth of Global Chaos,” (1998) p. 134.

2. European Union, “Overview Council of the European Union,” https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en (accessed 28.03.2017).

3. TNS Opinion, “Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Autumn 2016,” (2016) doi:10.2775/196906 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4493_en.htm (accessed 29.03.2017).

4. Andrew Moravcsik, “In defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union*,” JCMS 2002 volume 40, number 4, (2002) pp. 603-24 https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/deficit.pdf (accessed 27.03.2017).

5. European Union, “Overview Council of the European Union,” https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en (accessed 28.03.2017).

6. Nigel Farage.,“Unelected Commission is the Government of Europe – Nigel Farage on Finnish TV,” MTV3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1rfNlJMsFw (accessed 28.03.2017).

7. Kayleigh Lewis, “What has the European Union ever done for us?,” Independent (24.05.2016) http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-what-has-european-union-done-for-us-david-cameron-brexit-a6850626.html (accessed on 29.03.2017).

8. Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti, “Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating the Benefits from Membership in the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method.”

9. Sandra Halperin, “War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited,” (2003) p. 235-236.

Bibliography

Arnold-Foster, Mark. “The World at War” (1974).

Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti. “Economic Growth and Political Integration: Estimating the Benefits from Membership in the European Union Using the Synthetic Counterfactuals Method.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8162 (April 2014) http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp8162.pdf (accessed 29.03.2017).

Encyclopaedia Britannica. “European Union.” https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union (accessed 27.-29.03.2017).

European Union. “Overview Council of the European Union.” https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en (accessed 28.03.2017).

Farage, Nigel. “Unelected Commission is the Government of Europe – Nigel Farage on Finnish TV.” MTV3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1rfNlJMsFw (accessed 28.03.2017).

Halperin, Sandra. “War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great Transformation Revisited.” (2003) p. 235-236.

Lewis, Kayleigh. “What has the European Union ever done for us?.” Independent (24.05.2016) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-what-has-europeanunion-done-for-us-david-cameron-brexit-a6850626.html (accessed on 29.03.2017).

Moravcsik, Andrew. “In defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union*.” JCMS 2002 volume 40, number 4, (2002) pp. 603-24 https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/deficit.pdf (accessed 27.03.2017).

Sadowski, Yahya M. “The Myth of Global Chaos.” (1998) p. 134.

Schneider, Christian. “The Role of Dysfunctional International Organizations in World Politics.” http://www.news.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-d4e5-28e2-0000-000000b8fd0e/Dissertation_ChristianSchneider.pdf (accessed 27.03.2017).

Terry, Chris. “Close the Gap. Tackling Europe’s democratic deficit.” Electoral Reform Society(2014) https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/sites/default/files/Tackling-Europesdemocratic-deficit.pdf (accessed 27.03.2017).

TNS Opinion. “Standard Eurobarometer 86 – Autumn 2016.” (2016) doi:10.2775/196906 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4493_en.htm (accessed 29.03.2017).

Featured Image: European Union member states’ flags flying in front of the building of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, April 21, 2004. (Reuters/Vincent Kessler)

Arctic

Science Diplomacy in the Arctic

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NAFAC Week

By Jackie Faselt

As icecaps melt and access to natural gas and oil reserves increase, the Arctic rises in importance on the geopolitical stage. In addition to the various groups of indigenous people who reside in the Arctic, eight countries Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Canada, and the United States have claimed interest in the Arctic. Diplomacy between the different groups is required for cooperation and organization in the complicated region. Due to its importance in environmental security, sizable natural resource reserves, and remote location, the Arctic incentivizes cooperation through science diplomacy.

Science diplomacy is defined by the Royal Society and American Association for the Advancement of Science as threefold: “Informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice, facilitating international science cooperation, [and] using science cooperation to improve international relations between countries.”1 Science diplomacy has accomplished much in the past, both between allied nations, and in situations when traditional lines of cooperation were fraught. For example, the warming of relations with China during the Nixon administration and cooperation in the International Space Station both resulted, or were sustained in part due to science diplomacy.2 It should be noted, however, that there are barriers to science diplomacy. Policymakers and scientists alike can be confused about how this type of diplomacy is different from general scientific cooperation and additionally, “after generations of colonialism and geopolitical maneuvering, developing nations may be wary of science engagement with the North.”3 The Arctic region has existing channels of successful science diplomacy, which hopefully can be sustained into the future.

In 1909 Robert Peary, and American explorer, reached the North Pole and claimed it for the President of the United States. Since then, Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Canada have all made claims or asserted influence in the region.4 The first international agreement regarding the Arctic came from the United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was signed in 1958 and allowed for coastal states to explore resources on their continental shelf.5 It was superseded by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which “grants coastal states a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone and allows them to assert control over territory beyond that limit if they can prove, geologically, that the seabed is an extension of their continental shelf.”6 However, it is notable that the United States did not sign the agreement until 2013 and still has yet to ratify it.

International agreements and organizations in the Arctic specific to the scientific community began gaining ground over 30 years ago. In 1990, the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was created, and the following year the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy agreement was adopted by the eight arctic states as well as some indigenous communities.7 These international organizations and agreements provide a base not only for scientific cooperation, but also science diplomacy. For example, the mission statement of the IASC contains all three components of science diplomacy as stated by the American Association for the Advancement of Science: informing policy, promoting cooperation, and using that cooperation to progress international relations. The mission statement includes the following objectives:

  • “Provides objective and independent scientific advice on issues of science in the Arctic and communicates scientific information to the public;
  • Initiates, coordinates and promotes scientific activities at a circumarctic or international level;
  • Promotes international access to all geographic areas and the sharing of knowledge, logistics and other resources;”8

The Arctic Council was formed in 1996 with all the arctic states, as well as six groups of indigenous peoples, serving as members. It houses six scientific working groups: Arctic Contaminants Action Program, The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, and the Sustainable Development Working Group.9 As the Arctic becomes increasingly more important for environmental security, these institutions can act as the foundation for increased science diplomacy.

Global climate change has brought the Arctic closer to the forefront of the international stage. The Arctic Ocean is currently warming at double the rate of any other place on our planet.10 As ice caps melt, the region has become more accessible to both countries and private corporations to drill for oil and gas in large, untouched reserves.11 Both the environmental and the resource importance of the region requires the involvement of scientists and technologists at the Arctic. Due to the remoteness of the region and the harshness of the environment, cooperation has been incentivized for cost sharing of logistic and facility resources.12 There are enough common interests among the Arctic states to incentivize cooperation. These de-facto partnerships can be used as a foundation on which to build further collaboration, through traditional and science diplomacy channels.

While there are existing structures to promote science diplomacy in the Arctic, improvements can be made. Recommendations for improved science diplomacy include increasing partnerships between the government, the private sector, universities, and NGOs, as well as involving youth in scientific diplomacy efforts.13 There has also been efforts to promote, “greater scientific expertise within the Foreign Service and the State Departments,” in order to institutionalize scientific diplomacy channels.14  The countries that have created official positions of Science & Technology Advisors to Foreign Ministers are New Zealand, Oman, Poland, Senegal, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.15 If more Arctic states follow suit, science diplomacy can continue to grow in the Arctic.

The foundation of science diplomacy has been established in the Arctic and can be sustained and expanded if the Arctic states decide to follow the incentives of cooperation that is inherent in the unique region. The Arctic states should capitalize on this opportunity and push for expanded science diplomacy efforts. 

Jackie Faselt is a senior at Tufts University interested in international security and technology policy. On campus, she is involved in Alliance Linking Leaders in Education and the Services (ALLIES), a civil-military relations club. She has interned at the National Defense University in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, as well as at the Consortium for Gender, Security, and Human Rights.

Bibliography 

“About Us – Arctic Council.” Arctic Council, May 23, 2016. http://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us.

Berkman, Paul. “Stability and Peace in the Arctic Ocean through Science Diplomacy.” Science & Diplomacy 3, no. 2 (June 2014). http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/stability-and-peace-in-arctic-ocean-through-science-diplomacy.

McCormick, TY. “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History.” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/.

National Research Council (U.S.), and National Research Council (U.S.), eds. U.S. and International Perspectives on Global Science Policy and Science Diplomacy: Report of a Workshop. Washington, D.C: National Academies Press, 2012.

“New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance of Power.” The Royal Society, January 2010. https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/New_Frontiers.pdf.

“Science & Technology Advisors to Foreign Ministers Panel Dialogue.” Tufts Fletcher School, February 19, 2017. http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Calendar/2017/02/19/Science-Technology-Advisors-to-Foreign-Ministers-Panel-Dialogue-.aspx.

The International Arctic Science Committee. “About IASC – International Arctic Science Committee.” Accessed March 17, 2017. http://iasc.info/iasc/about-iasc.

“The Power of Science Diplomacy: A View from the South.” NEWSLETTER A PUBLICATION OF THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2014.

“United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf.” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed March 17, 2017. http://www.cfr.org/world/united-nations-convention-continental-shelf/p21071.

1. National Research Council (U.S.), eds., U.S. and International Perspectives on Global Science Policy and Science Diplomacy: Report of a Workshop (Washington, D.C: National Academies Press, 2012), 27.

2. “The Power of Science Diplomacy: A View from the South,” NEWSLETTER A PUBLICATION OF THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2014, 2.

3. “The Power of Science Diplomacy: A View from the South”, 7.

4. TY McCormick, “Arctic Sovereignty: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/07/arctic-sovereignty-a-short-history/.

5. “United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.cfr.org/world/united-nations-convention-continental-shelf/p21071.

6. TY McCormick

7. Paul Berkman, “Stability and Peace in the Arctic Ocean through Science Diplomacy,” Science & Diplomacy 3, no. 2 (June 2014), http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/stability-and-peace-in-arctic-ocean-through-science-diplomacy.

8. The International Arctic Science Committee, “About IASC – International Arctic Science Committee,” accessed March 17, 2017, http://iasc.info/iasc/about-iasc.

9. “About Us – Arctic Council,” Arctic Council, May 23, 2016, http://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us.

10. Paul Berkman

11. ibid

12. “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance of Power” (The Royal Society, January 2010), https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/New_Frontiers.pdf., 25

13. National Research Council (U.S.), eds., U.S. and International Perspectives on Global Science Policy and Science Diplomacy: Report of a Workshop, 38-39.

14. ibid

15. “Science & Technology Advisors to Foreign Ministers Panel Dialogue,” Tufts Fletcher School, February 19, 2017, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Calendar/2017/02/19/Science-Technology-Advisors-to-Foreign-Ministers-Panel-Dialogue-.aspx.

Featured Image: ICESCAPE scientist and Clark geography Professor Karen Frey takes optical measurements in a melt pond, with the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy in the background. (NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center/Kathryn Hansen)

Europe, Podcast

Sea Control 131 – Stefan Lundqvist on the Baltic Sea

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Join the latest episode of Sea Control for an interview with Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist of the Swedish Defence University. Hosted by Adrian Neumann of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, the conversation examines the growing tensions in the Baltic Sea between Russia and Western countries.

Download Sea Control 131 – The Baltic Sea

LtCdr Stefan Lundqvist is a PhD Candidate in Political Science at Åbo Akademi University, Finland, studying the post-Cold War Maritime Security changes among Western states. He is a teacher of Joint and Naval Operations at the Swedish Defence University, specialised in Operations Assessment. He joined the Royal Swedish Navy in 1987 and has served in various staff positions since 1998. His latest publications are “Why teaching comprehensive operations planning requires transformational learning” (2015), Defence Studies, 15(2): 175–201; “Cultivating Regional Maritime Security: Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea” (IOS-Press, 2015) (co-authored with J. J. Widen), in Chapsos I. and Kitchen C. (eds.) Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation; “From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and National Economies: Current Changes in Maritime Security” (2013), Journal of Defence Studies, 7(3): 57–80.