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Beans Boots Bullets, Strategic Outlook

Top 10 Maritime Assistance/ Disaster Needs and Best US Platforms

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With a rush of wind and the deafening sound of rotor blades cutting through the humid Philippine air, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps helicopter and V-22 crews are delivering lifesaving aid to remote villages in the Philippines following the devastating Typhoon Haiyan.  This does not happen by accident.  The U.S. ability to project humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) efforts across the globe is a direct result of investments in capabilities and platforms as well as in personnel and forward posture.  So what are material capabilities are most useful in disaster response, what are the “X” factors, and which U.S. surface ships platforms deliver those capabilities best (for the best cost)?

The 10 Material Capabilities Essential to Conduct HA/DR:

USS MIDWAY helo ops for the Saigon evacuation.
USS MIDWAY helo ops for the Saigon evacuation.

1 – Helicopter/Vertical Lift Capacity:   Operating from naval forces stationed off the coast, a helicopter’s low footprint and vertical take-off and landing makes it a palatable option for delivering aid and conducting search and rescue in almost any circumstance, especially where infrastructure has been negatively affected and disaster damage extends into the interior of the country.  Helicopters/vertical lift assets enable relief organizations to centralize relief supply stockpiles in airports capable of landing larger cargo planes, and the Navy and Marine Corps helicopters and V-22s are then able to ferry those supplies to remote and inaccessible areas.   Likewise, helicopters can transfer needed supplies (including water) directly off ships stationed off the coast to areas on land.

2 – Small Boats/Landing Craft:  Particularly useful in HA/DR situations where port facilities have been damaged (or nonexistent), with the majority of the damage on the coast. Landing craft (LCACs, LCUs) can transfer heavy supplies and equipment (bulldozers, trucks, etc.) quickly and without requiring port facilities.

3 – Medical Facilities:  Onboard ship facilities or the ability to provide medical personnel and treatment ashore becomes critical in the initial response for traumatic injuries as well as in subsequent days when infections and diseases spread by unsanitary conditions in the wake of the disaster.

4 – Cargo Handling:  Ships capable of quickly loading and offloading supplies play an important role.  Several ships have unique capabilities (cranes, roll-on/roll-off, etc.) to load and offload supplies in port, provided port facilities are still functioning in the disaster area.

5 – Humanitarian Supplies:  Supplies provided a lifeline in the initial and follow-on phases of the HA/DR response.  Tents, plastic tarps, portable RO units, food, blankets, etc. can be stored on ships or loaded in port for transfer to the HA/DR area.

6 – Shipboard Potable Water (H2O):  Ships make fresh, potable water from seawater using a variety of methods including reverse osmosis (RO) and evaporation.  Producing fresh water at sea is important to relief efforts as access to safe drinking water is always one of the biggest issues facing the disaster struck population ashore.  Bottled water is expensive to store and transport into the area, so being able to bottle the ship’s potable water and transfer it to shore via air or landing craft saves time, money, and often showcases the ingenuity and innovation within a ship’s crew.

100709-N-6003P-164
vroom vroom

7 – Speed to Station:  All the supplies, personnel, and equipment are useless unless the Navy can get them on station quickly.  Natural disasters can occur with little advance notice and cause extensive damage quickly over a broad area.  Quick response times prove critical as the first few days of a disaster are crucial to locate survivors (search and rescue), treat the seriously wounded, and provide critical supplies to isolated populations before infrastructure is restored.

8 – Command and Control (C2):  Communications enable ships to relay information to the Joint Task Force Commander (should one be appointed), Combatant Commander, relief organizations (USAID and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)), other ships, aircraft, and diplomats ashore in order to de-conflict potential issues and efficiently distribute aid.

9 – Surge Berthing:  The ability to house additional people onboard a surface ship certainly to support HA/DR efforts.  In some cases this might mean hosting non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or other U.S. government organizations like USAID.  Berthing can also be useful to house host nation and coalition liaisons, rescued locals, and joint task force personnel should a joint force be set up.

10 – Draft:  Disasters typically negatively affect port facilities and transit capabilities on land, so ships with the ability of getting closer to land cut down transit time (and turnaround time) for helicopters, small boats, and landing craft coming from sea-to-shore and vice versa.  A shallow draft typically enables ships to operate closer to shore.

*One important note on capabilities, local politics, and sensitivities must always factor into decisions on the extent and types of capabilities to use.  For example, in some cases, the Navy might have a fantastic ship-to-shore supply transfer capability using LCAC’s and landing craft, but the optics of the U.S. “assaulting” the beach might not play well in certain circumstances – so commanders must be cognizant of the cultural conditions and public perception.

The “X” Factors: 

Of course, all that material capability to do HA/DR would be fairly useless without the U.S. Navy’s advantages of forward deployment, extensive training, and skilled personnel.

Being there counts.  Forward deployments and overseas stationing has meant the difference in many HA/DR missions because the U.S. has been able to respond quickly and with a credible capability shortly after a disaster strikes.

Being trained counts.  An around the clock operations tempo (optempo) for most major HA/DR missions stresses a crew’s training to the limit – this where the “readiness” that the Navy’s expensive yet effective training pipeline and the Navy’s considerable operations and maintenance budget expenditures shine through.

Being motivated counts.  Sailors and Marines have demonstrated a remarkable operational agility, creativity, and mission dedication in HA/DR events.  Perhaps this has been the ultimate “X” factor in HA/DR events.  Their ability to respond quickly, act cooperatively and professionally, and demonstrate a genuine humanity and kindness for those in need – you just can’t create that in a Navy and Marine Corps overnight.

The Best Platforms:

So, given the Top 10 Material Capabilities and the “X” factors, which platforms give commanders the best “bang” and “bang for the buck” in HA/DR operations?

SOLID SHIELD '85
To the rescue!

1 – Big Deck Amphib (LHD/LHA):  Several factors make the LHD the best platform – large organic helicopter/vertical-lift capacity (with deck space enabling simultaneous refueling and reloading for multiple aircraft), surge berthing, medical facilities, and a shallower draft.  However, the big difference between the LHD and the #2 (the aircraft carrier) is the well deck with associated landing craft, LCACs/LCUs, and embarked Marines and Marine equipment.  These factors enable LHDs to perform heavy lifts from ship-to-shore and vice-versa that the carrier simply cannot deliver.  Essentially, LHDs were designed to support amphibious/expeditionary operations so supporting HA/DR ashore is embedded in the platform’s DNA.  LHDs bring capabilities to deliver supplies and aid, much like it delivers Marines ashore.  When you factor in cost of the platform (~$3B a ship), the LHD also provides the most “bang for the buck” for a HA/DR situation.

2 – The Aircraft Carrier (CVN).  A close second, the carrier has significant capabilities to support HA/DR, especially if it embarks a full complement of helicopters and flies off most of the fixed-wing jets.  Its large deck space, speed to station, medical facilities, fresh water generation, C2 suite, and berthing space make it a formidable HA/DR asset.  From a public outreach/optics perspective, one cannot deny the soft/smart power appeal of sending an “aircraft carrier.”  The public perceives that CVN’s have become the symbol of U.S. seriousness in many cases.  The generally more capable (and less expensive) “helicopter carriers”/LHDs just do not carry the same cachet in international media and political circles.  From a cost perspective, however, the CVN costs about $5B to buy and the new Ford-class costs well over $10B.  Unlike the LHD, the CVN was designed for strike aircraft sorties and projecting power with fixed wing aircraft – not expeditionary missions.  It is a testament to the CVN crews how well they have adjusted on the fly to a helicopter/vertical lift mission during a HA/DR operation. In the end, the carrier is an incredibly valuable asset to use for HA/DR from a public relations and capability standpoint.

3 – The Other Amphibs (LPD/LSD):   With reduced helicopter capability due to smaller deck space and housing, the LPD comes in lower than the flattops in overall HA/DR capability, but still provides a powerful asset to any HA/DR mission.  The LPDs ability to load and off load supplies in port easily enables it to gather critical supplies before getting underway to a disaster response.  Like the LHDs, LPDs also have large well decks from which to sortie LCACs and LCUs for ship to shore transfers of heavy equipment.  LPDs also have a shallow draft, medical capabilities, and ability to store humanitarian supplies.  However, its speed to station factors negatively against the platform.  Yet, LPDs provide considerable HA/DR capability for relatively low cost (a little under $2B).

4 – JHSV:  Speed, low draft, loads of berthing, and supplies-storage capability make JHSV a contender in HA/DR response.  With a few modifications to the new platforms, JHSV could be a very low cost (only $200-300M a copy), and high capability asset for use in future HA/DR situations.  If you combined several JHSVs together in a HA/DR “wolf pack” you could perhaps take care of the majority of disaster response events without having to call on the larger, capital ships.

Born for this kind of work.
Born for this kind of work.

5 – Hospital Ships:  Like the carrier, the media attention the U.S. gets for deploying one of its two USNS hospital ships is considerable.  The medical facilities and ability to be a game changer in HA/DR situations is unquestioned, but they are hampered by slow speed to station, deep draft, and lower helicopter capacity.  However, their slow speed to station is the ship’s largest hindrance, meaning by the time they arrive on station for a natural disaster outside of the Western Hemisphere, their most unique function (high end trauma operating rooms) are not as in demand. The symbolism, however, can be a powerful signal and make hospital ships a key element in HA/DR events, especially in regions with limited health infrastructure.

6 – Supply Ships:  The backbone of any HA/DR operation, USNS ships provide massive stores, supplies, fuel, and water to sustain the HA/DR response, as well as an ability to support the effort using the USNS’s organic boats and helicopters.  They are essential to establishing and sustaining the sea base of operations during the HA/DR response, yet usually do not provide support without another surface platform working in concert.

IMCMEX 13
Last place? At least the DDG’s got mentioned!

7 – Cruisers/Destroyers (CG, DDG) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs):  The least capable platforms (material-wise), they score lowest in the top 10 HA/DR capabilities and are relatively costly to acquire.  Yet, they serve a valuable presence function, and can act as a “lily pad” for refueling helicopters operating off the larger surface platforms (or their own organic helicopters) – serving as a range extender for those invaluable relief and search and rescue flights.

Key Takeaways

The most cost-effective (as far as platform procurement goes) and highest capability HA/DR response group would be a LHD and LPD in combination with a USNS supply ship.  However, time counts and perceptions matter, so one can bet on continued use of CVNs and cruisers/destroyers as the “first responders” by Combatant Commands if they are available and closer to the scene.  Certainly one sees this in the latest Typhoon Haiyan response where the initial George Washington battle group sortied first, subsequently followed by amphib deployments from Japan.

The future is in the JHSV, Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB), and Mobile Landing Platform (MLP).  This group of lower cost platforms can cover most of the stability and disaster response missions.  From Theatre Security Cooperation to HA/DR, having these platforms forward deployed with significant humanitarian supplies, surge berthing capacity, and ability to surge helicopter and land craft dets aboard will enable the United States to potentially contribute to HA/DR missions without pulling capital ships off station.

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the HA/DR Mission.  Over the last two years, with the increased budget uncertainty, HA/DR was not mentioned as much in naval circles in favor of more “warfighting-centric” missions.  Yet, the Navy still holds HA/DR as a “Core Capability” in their 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and in the Naval Operations Concept 2010.  While HA/DR has had its share of detractors, the reality remains that naval forces will continue to perform HA/DR missions. The positive public perception of the Navy’s role in HA/DR, civilian leadership’s desire to “do something” in the face of suffering, and the very real potential geopolitical gains will continually translate into HA/DR missions for Navy. In fact, from the Indonesian tsunami in 2004 to the Japanese tsunami response in 2011, the U.S. Navy averaged over 1.5 major “reactive HA/DR” missions per year.  Perhaps, not coincidentally, the Navy’s slogan became “A Global Force for Good” during that same time period. The Navy bought into HA/DR by being good at it, and the demand signal from home and abroad will continue to spike when disaster strikes; simply  put, the international community and American public now assume the U.S. Navy will be en route shortly. Perhaps more importantly these days, the Navy’s timely and very public involvement in HA/DR missions can help bolster the Navy Department’s case to secure funding within the Pentagon as the nation’s forward deployed, ready response force.

Navy leadership should embrace HA/DR and use it as a real way to explain the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ “value proposition” to DoD and to the American public in the looming sequestration budget battles.  The public does not necessarily understand what Navy ships do at sea and/or even understand why they are at sea in the first place, but the American public does understand when they see Navy ships, Marines, and helicopters delivering aid to those in need – that makes sense – and it manifests the utility of the U.S. Navy’s investment in presence and forward deployment.  Additionally, HA/DR is relatively inexpensive to conduct, and it can provide a sizable return on investment.  Jonah Blank of RAND recently estimated that the massive U.S. response to the Indonesian “tsunami of 2004, is estimated to have cost $857 million. That’s roughly the price of three days’ operations in Afghanistan last year.” Using HA/DR to advance U.S. strategic and geopolitical goals in critical areas of the world, is a prudent use of “Smart Power” and provides “returns” on par or better than most other military operations in the public perception arena.  Furthermore, the relief missions provide real world operations tempos for Navy crews, and generally provides Sailors and Marines with an immense sense of gratification by contributing tangibly to those in need – “A Global Force for Good” indeed.

Louis P. Bergeron serves in the U.S. Navy Reserve supporting the Maritime Partnership Program and works in his civilian career as a strategy consultant in the national security sector.  He obtained a M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University in 2011 with a thesis entitled “The U.S. Navy Surface Force’s Necessary Capabilities and Force Structure for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations” where he expounds on many of the capabilities, case studies, and platforms mentioned in this post. 

Beans Boots Bullets

Sacred Cow: Military Pay and Benefits By the Numbers

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This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

Commissary Special: 2-for-1 Children.
                 Commissary Special: 2-for-1 Children.

Cost of the all-volunteer force in its current form is unsustainable.  In the FY 2013 budget, the DoD cost of “taking care of people” consumes more than $250 billion or over 50 percent of the total DoD budget. An additional $200 billion is spent by organizations outside of DoD for programs within the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Labor, Education, and Treasury. [1]

In its July 2012 Study: Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence-Based Approach , the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment concluded:  “Over the past decade, the cost per person in the active-duty force increased by 46 percent, excluding war funding and adjusting for inflation. If personnel costs continue growing at that rate and the overall defense budget remains flat with inflation, military personnel costs will consume the entire defense budget by 2039.[2]

Modifications to the pay and benefits will have to be made; however, the all-volunteer force is not going away.  Military Pay and Benefits and will remain a major factor in cost to the Federal Government and the Department of Defense, increasingly impacting resources available for force structure and weapon systems modernization.  The Reserve Policy Review Board (footnote 1 below) reported that in FY 13, the fully burdened total cost to the US government for an active component military person is $384,622 per year.  The total life cycle cost to the US government for an active component member is $10.3 million.

The 2013 DoD Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR) review developed compensation savings options such as: changing military health care for retirement; changing how the basic allowance for housing is calculated; reducing the overseas cost-of-living adjustments; and, limiting military and civilian pay increases.  The SecDef did not recommend specific SCMR compensation changes but tasked the Chairman JCS to lead the development of compensation proposals that save almost $50 billion over the next decade.  Implementation would begin in the FY 2015 budget.  The SCMR identified more sweeping changes to meet sequester funding level targets to include eliminating civilian pensions for retired military personnel serving in civilian government service; ending subsidies for defense commissaries; and, restricting the availability of unemployment benefits.  These changes would save almost $100 billion over the next decade, but they would significantly impact the DoD workforce.

In addition to the aforementioned changes in DoD military and civilian pay and benefits being considered, two changes in DoD acquisition policy may offer savings to offset at least some of the more painful pay and benefit changes.

First, savings could be realized if the DoD acquisition process required the services to reflect the total cost to the federal government of manpower in their computations of total life cycle costs for alternative weapons system designs such as Navy combatants.  As an example, a DDG-1000 is to have a size crew of 142 sailors compared to approximately 300 on a DDG 51.  This DDG crew size reduction of 158 military personnel translates to approximately $1.6 billion life cycle cost avoidance per ship in military pay and benefits to the US government, and the Navy.

Second, savings could be realized by severely reducing the detailed requirements in the fifty-eight page Chairman JCS Instruction CJCSI 6212.01F, subject: Net Ready Key Performance Parameter.[3]  These requirements levied on all Defense acquisition programs add significant cost to each program; add workload for service, OSD and Joint Staff review; and, require contractors to support the OSD and Joint Staff processes.  Interoperability among service and agency systems is essential for effective military operations.  That said, the requirements in CJCSI 6212.01 are overwhelming in detail, adding significant cost but resulting in limited improvements in interoperability.  Interoperability can be achieved at dramatically lower cost to the department.

Richard Mosier is a former Naval aviator (VQ/VP).  He served as a career civil servant working for the Director of Naval Intelligence in the 1970s and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff (OASD(C3I)), retiring from the government in 1997 as an SES.  From 1997 to 2010 worked as an engineer for a defense contractor.


[1] Reserve Forces Policy Board, Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should be Mandated by Policy, (RFPB Report FY13-02) dated January 7, 2013.

http://ra.defense.gov/rfpb/_documents/RFPB_Cost_Methodology_Final_Report_7Jan13.pdf

 

[2] Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence-Based Approach, July 12, 2012, by Todd Harrison

http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/07/rebalancing-military-compensation-an-evidence-based-approach/

 

Beans Boots Bullets, Current Operations

Ain’t Ready for Marines Yet? The Sacred Cow of British Army Organization

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This article is part of our Sacred Cows Week.

ttcfaint
Don’t laugh, that hat is REALLY heavy.

I’d like to rustle a few feathers and take a swing at the sacred cows that are the British Army’s system of dividing its Infantry along regimental lines and of training its officers and men separately. When it comes to writing about sacred cows in the British military, it is my humble opinion that none are more sacred (and more bovine!) than the regimental system that is still displayed in the British Army today.

So what relevance does this have with maritime security? In comparison with their land based brethren, the Royal Navy and their infantry component the Corps of Royal Marines, have long seen the failings of such a system and are significantly less bound to what I will argue is an outdated and stifling system. This, I argue, makes them significantly more mobile and adaptable without unduly sacrificing tradition and history. I will dare to go a step further and argue that the RM training model and organisation should be more widely implemented, primarily in the Infantry element of the Army. I hasten to add I write this more as devils advocacy and food for thought than devoutly held belief, and would welcome the thoughts and comments of others on the issue.

By the RM model of training, I refer to what goes on at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, located in Lympstone, just outside of a sleepy fishing village in Devon, in the South West of England. It is here that officers and men alike are taken from civilian life and put through training (32 weeks for enlisted Marines, 64 weeks for officers – widely acknowledged to be the longest of any NATO force) as young officer trainees (YOs). This is unique in the British Armed Forces, where enlisted personnel and officers undergo initial training separately – primarily, I argue, for traditional reasons. Forged anew in the fires of the dark days during the Second World War from Royal Marines and Army Commandos, the Corps today contributes to Britain’s premiere maritime rapid reaction force, the Response Force Task Group. With the increasing importance of the littoral zone, it has more reach and is arguably more suited to modern operations than the Army’s equivalent expeditionary force, 16 Air Assault Brigade, which, as the name suggests, concentrates on air assault and air manoeuvre ops.

One of the main factors that draws many, including myself, to seek a commission in the Corps over that of the Army is the relationship between officers and men. While there is no doubt, both from my own extremely limited experience as an enlisted Infantry reservist, and from anecdotal and literary evidence, that young officers of any branch and service often form a unique and close bond with their troops, there is a particular bond between Royal Marines Commandos thanks to shared hardships. At Lympstone, YOs are not only pushed harder and expected to excel in every arena – physical, martial and academic – but also held to higher standards in physical tests, especially in the famous four Commando tests, which confer the right to wear the coveted green beret. The enlisted Marine recruits see their would-be officers working harder, longer and faster, mitigating any doubt they might have about their capabilities. This is in stark contrast to the famed Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, where Army officers are trained en-masse, regardless of branch, and far from the exacting eye of the enlisted man or woman.

The arguments against implementing such a system are many, some of which are relevant in the modern era, many of which aren’t (and I would love to explore these further in the comments section). To those who would point to the rich and proud tradition of officer training at Sandhurst, and shout down any calls for change, I would argue that radical changes to the way the Army trains officers are nothing new. Although an entire blog post – or two – would struggle to narrate the history of officer training in the British Army, Sandhurst as a unified institution for all initial officer training has only existed in its current form since 1992 – coincidentally as long as my former regiment, but more on that later. Another, more relevant argument is the simple logistics – the British Army was, before recent defence cuts, roughly 108,000 personnel strong – containing 36 Infantry battalions (approximately 650 men, so around 23,400 men). The Royal Marines stand at about 7,500 strong, or around a third of the size. This however, need not be an insurmountable issue – Infantry soldiers undergo 26 weeks basic training at the Infantry Training Centre in Catterick, in the North of England, and I would argue there is little to prevent it following the Lympstone model and encompassing Infantry officer training, leaving Sandhurst for non-Infantry roles. As the Army prepares itself to face the post-Afghanistan challenges, it is clear from recent defence reviews (culminating in ‘Army 2020’, the organisational change up for the next decade) that it will be doing so as a smaller force – steps must be taken to ensure that as the Army shrinks, efforts are made to ensure our military can still punch its weight and above on the world stage. It is not good enough to merely reduce troop numbers (limited to 82,000 by 2018, to include a loss of 4 Infantry battalions) – otherwise it will be a simple, and unconscionable, money saving exercise.

Since its inception, the regimental system has been a necessary, vital and driving factor in British military success, but I will attempt to argue that due to the combination of a natural post 1945 draw down in troop numbers, and more recent swingeing defence cuts, the regimental system has evolved into a beast that is not only dangerously divisive, but actively retards growth and progress – in short, it has outgrown its usefulness. This is not a rare argument, but faces stiff opposition from the serried ranks of retired officers who rustle their newspapers in their Gentlemens clubs and hark back to an era of drill square spit and polish and gleaming uniforms. For some light amusement, it is always worth reading the letters to the editor pages of Soldier Magazine, the Army’s monthly publication, as not a month goes by without some retired warrant officer or senior officer writing in to complain that uniform standards are slipping. I have it on good authority that prescriptions for blood pressure medication sharply increased in the month that the Army decided it was making the switch from black boots to brown, and as we all know, the ability to iron creases into your combat trousers directly correlates with your ability to react to effective enemy fire…

We currently live in a society where a regiment will live or die – or amalgamate/disband – not on the sodden red sand of a desert, but in the corridors of Whitehall and Parliament. This is where the ugly side of the regimental family tradition kicks in – retired officers and men writing letters and protesting in the streets about why another, lesser regiment should get the chop (as seen recently when it was announced that the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers were to lose their 2nd Battalion). No such bitter infighting and backstabbing is seen in the Royal Navy or Royal Marines, where men and women may have a brief loyalty to ship or unit, but this is transient and their greatest loyalty lies to service or Corps. I was recently privileged to spend a few days with 40 Commando, based in Taunton. Both the Commanding Officer and Regimental Sergeant Major (senior enlisted Marine) were recent transfers to the unit from other Commandos, but clearly held the respect of their subordinates. Transfers between Army battalions are relatively uncommon, and between individual Infantry regiments almost unheard of. The primary loyalty of the individual soldier, above that of his immediate brothers in arms, is to that of his regiment – something enforced from the very beginning in basic training, to day to day life, and reinforced by regimental and family associations after service. This is something I can fully understand – I am immeasurably proud to have served in a regiment which had as one of its ancestors the regiment in which two of my own ancestors served in during the Great War – a ‘County’ regiment which itself was an amalgam of several others. Yet still today, many of the men who served in the two regiments that combined to form it in 1992 bitterly resent the fact they were joined to what, in their eyes, were lesser regiments unable to attract recruits. It is this elitist culture that needs to be challenged, and I can think of no better way of instilling humility than by creating a Corps of Infantry (as seen in Australia). While idiosyncrasies unique to individual regiments are valuable, in an age where are in danger of lacking the funds for a sizeable, effective Armed Forces, to have uniforms, accoutrements, traditions, routines and behaviours unique to 36 different Infantry battalions seems rather obtuse. Men may fight long and hard for a bit of coloured ribbon, but I’d rather see them receive proper health care and decent pensions. I believe a generation of senior officers and enlisted men trained alongside each other and without regimental affiliations or ties would encourage innovation and unconventional thinking – two things which are not only displayed in great amounts by Royal Marines, but will also ensure Britain’s Infantry is up to facing the challenges of the post-Afghanistan world head on. Sacred cows? I’ll take mine medium rare, thanks.

Alex Blackford is a former war-dodging Infantry reservist with no tours under his belt, and therefore expects his opinions to be judged accordingly. He holds a BA (Hons) in Arabic, Middle Eastern Studies and Persian and is currently juggling Royal Marines Reserve training while applying for the regular Corps.

Beans Boots Bullets

Holy Bovine, Batman! Sacred Sailors!

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This article is part of our “Sacred Cows Week.”

"COLA? Sure I'll take a cola."
“COLA? Sure I’ll take a cola.”

After asking for military discounts my entire adult life, and usually getting them, I feel confident in calling Americans fans of the Armed Forces. “Support the troops” was a major catchphrase in the months and years following 9/11, and while that that has died down some, the sentiment remains.

Servicemembers have benefited in a multitude of ways, but most notably in their wallets. While historic military pay usually lagged behind the civilian economy, in the last decade and a half it has rocketed well above prevailing wages when adjusted for age and education levels (full report and summary).

That made some sense when military recruiters had to compete in a superheated job market, with one unnamed service (rhymes with “smarmy”) vastly extending waivers and reducing minimum enlistment periods. But recently, the situation has been different. Waivers are rare. Recruiters are in a target-rich environment, and retention is at all-time highs.

And even in this environment, servicemembers are still getting a raise next year.

In these times of both fiscal constraint and high retention, does this really make sense?

Let us make a mandatory disclaimer: the inherent risks of military service certainly justify fair and equitable compensation, and no pay or benefit can truly compensate servicemembers for combat, time away from home, injury or other sacrifices. But too often, that disclaimer is allowed to substitute for policy, and benefits just keep growing… and growing… and growing.

This raises two questions.

First, at what point do personnel costs (already the biggest part of the DoD budget) crowd out procurement, operations, maintenance, R&D and all the pointy-end-of-the-spear things the military does that make the job worthwhile? It doesn’t do much good to have well-trained, highly-paid troops if they’re killed while riding in inferior equipment.

Second, at what point do the taxpaying civilians grow to resent the privileges of the troops, especially as we leave Afghanistan and end the long combat deployments that engender sympathy for the military? That mission’s end will bring lack of clarity on what exactly the Armed Forces do. Watch the yellow ribbons disappear if the public decides the “Pacific pivot” is nothing more than paid military vacations in Australia and Singapore.

There is a world of reasons to deeply value the institution of the military; however, these critical questions will never be satisfactorily addressed if servicemembers are placed on some kind of super-citizen pedestal.

We have seen the sacred cow, and it is us.

Matt McLaughlin is a Navy Reserve lieutenant and strategic communications consultant whose pay lags far behind guys who play Navy lieutenants on TV. His opinions do not represent the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense or his employer.