All posts by Dmitry Filipoff

Flotilla SITREP: Red Sea Combat and Information Warfare Shortfalls

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be hosting sessions focused on the Red Sea combat operations, and potential shortfalls in the Navy’s information warfare enterprise. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record February discussions. The full listings for these upcoming discussions are featured down below.

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

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Upcoming February Sessions

Red Sea Combat Lessons

The Navy has been engaged in combat operations in the Red Sea for several months now. These operations have featured air defense against salvos of missiles and drones, as well as a strike campaign against Houthi targets. How is the Navy performing in these operations, and what are the possible lessons learned? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider recent combat events in the Red Sea.

Read ahead: What the Navy is learning from its fight in the Red Sea,” by Geoff Ziezulewicz
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Navy Information Warfare Shortfalls

The Navy is heavily dependent on effective information warfare capabilities to be effective. Yet this warfare area may be evolving at a pace that outstrips the Navy’s ability to adapt. What are the Navy’s shortfalls in building its information warfare community? Do fleet commands and afloat formations effectively wield information warfare capabilities and authorities? Join us to consider the Navy’s potential information warfare shortfalls.

Read ahead: The Navy Is Not Ready for the Information War of 2026,” by Vice Admiral T. J. White and Rear Admiral Danelle Barrett, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Commander Jake Bebber, U.S. Navy
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

RDML Wilson Marks on Sharpening the Surface Force

By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC recently engaged with the commander of the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), RDML Wilson Marks, to discuss the latest developments and priorities of the command. In this discussion, RDML Marks discusses the new Surface Requirements Group, how SMWDC is working to better measure warfighting skill, and how the WTI program is influencing the Surface Warfare Officer career path.

SMWDC will soon be completing its restructuring and the development of the Surface Advanced Warfighting School (SAWS). What is the value of this restructuring and how will it change how SMWDC and the Warfare Tactics Instructors (WTIs) operate?

SMWDC’s restructuring promotes productivity, collaboration, and integration across all warfighting domains. Ultimately, this will enable WTIs to be more effective and efficient in their missions due to ease of information sharing and capitalization on the diversity within our organization. Similarly, in consolidating the schoolhouse at SAWS, each warfare specialty area, colloquially known as patch type, is able to gain additional feedback from every course iteration and share lessons learned at a more rapid pace. It promotes standardization of class structure, rigor in class performance requirements, and camaraderie within the cadre as we transition to subject matter experts teaching their specialty across all warfare tactics courses of instructions regardless of patch type.

How is SMWDC developing frameworks and criteria for measuring the tactical skill and watchstanding experience of warfighters? What kind of data is being collected and how may that data be used? 

The team at SMWDC serves as the executive agent for Commander, Naval Surface Force’s Surface Warfare Combat Training Continuum (SWCTC) program. SWCTC is a data-driven approach to simultaneously deepen, broaden, and synergize training across the Surface Force. We are currently developing the Maritime Warfare Proficiency Model (MWP) to establish and standardize watchstanding skills using advanced data analytics to generate a numerical score for a watchstander’s level of knowledge, skill, experience, aptitude, and currency as a means of objective performance evaluation. This ultimately gives us the analytical tools necessary to continually improve individual watchstanding skills, make warfighters more lethal, and ensure our Surface Force is able to consistently demonstrate the proficiency and capability to fight and win at sea. 

Within the last year, SMWDC launched the inaugural cycle of the new Surface Requirements Group (SURFRG), and also participated in a pilot program that sought to fill billets at program offices and warfare centers with WTIs. How can WTI involvement in these staffs and the SURFRG add value to the requirements and acquisition process? What can we expect from the next SURFRG cycle? 

The Surface Requirements Group’s (SURFRG) primary function is to align fleet, program office, and resource sponsor (OPNAV N95/N96) efforts throughout the systems development process. It enables our WTIs to represent the challenges facing our fleet today and the challenges we are likely to face in the future. We do this by providing technical and tactical solution recommendations and divestment opportunities on near-term and future weapons, sensors, and combat system capabilities on behalf of the Surface Force.

We completed our first SURFRG cycle in August 2023 with the signing of the Technical Solution Recommendation Letter, and then in September when we briefed 15 tactical priorities to key industry partners in conjunction with the SNA West Coast Symposium. In this year’s cycle we are looking to build upon the lessons learned and successes of the inaugural cycle. We are specifically looking at streamlining the cycle while also adding more touchpoints for senior leaders and industry partners earlier in the process. We also have three WTIs working at Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) who are working alongside the project managers to bring their high level of tactical expertise to enhance our future warfare systems. At the same time, they gain acquisition and project management expertise from some of the best personnel in our Navy. It is a true win-win arrangement. 

The war in Ukraine has featured high-profile naval combat operations, including the sinking of the cruiser Moskva, exploding unmanned surface vessels attacking warships, and naval mining and blockades. How is SMWDC processing lessons learned from the conflict’s naval operations, and what are some key takeaways? 

We work closely with the fleet commanders to capitalize on any information they receive and compare that against our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for possible improvements or needs to write new ones. For example, our team at the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division (MCMTD) is using the information we receive to think through the ways we need to approach any mine clearance effort. While we are taking a look at the details we have available to us now, the nature and extent of the mining efforts employed by both sides will only be clearly understood when the conflict is complete. However, what we can learn from this conflict is that naval mines are still relevant. We are working hard to ensure that our Navy is better informed about this low cost, asymmetric weapon in the maritime domain and about the types of mine countermeasures capabilities and technologies that we need to invest in to be able to conduct mine countermeasures in the future. 

The navies of other great powers possess considerable capability and their own unique doctrine and tactics, especially the Chinese Navy. How is SMWDC enhancing the surface fleet’s literacy in “Red” capabilities and doctrine? Does SMWDC have plans for assigning WTIs to dedicated adversary roles, such as red cells, OPFOR units, or aggressor staffs? 

SMWDC is working closely with both the Navy’s and national intelligence communities to improve the Surface Force’s understanding of current maritime threats. SMWDC provides “Red” threat presentations through a series of in-port training sessions for prospective commanding officers, plans and tactics officers, and future WTIs. We have also enhanced the threat presentation offered underway during Surface Warfare Advanced Tactical Training (SWATT) events to align to the current pacing maritime threats units can expect to encounter on deployment. While we do not assign WTIs to dedicated adversary roles, we do have “communities of focus” based on mission areas to allow a greater depth of understanding and competency. This provides us the ability to create tactical and operational advantages in our TTPs to enable victory in any conflict. 

Concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and joint fires are deeply cross-cutting and combined arms methods of warfighting. How is SMWDC partnering with the Navy’s other warfighting development centers, and entities from the other services, to refine these methods?

SMWDC maintains close and consistent contact with the other Warfighting Development Centers (WDCs). In October, we hosted the semi-annual Warfighting Development Center Leadership Huddle and Advanced Warfighting Seminar on behalf of the Navy Warfare Development Center, allowing each WDC commander to educate their peers on the unique capabilities and challenges each center has in operationalizing Distributed Maritime Operations. In addition to those command-level engagements, the WDCs have touchpoints for mutually supporting joint exercise and wargame planning.

At SMWDC, we have created a Surface Warfare Integration Office (SWIO) staffed by talented WTIs who support these events. The SWIO team works with other services to enhance our interoperability during SWATT, preparing Surface Forces for the joint and high-end fight. Additionally, our Mine Countermeasures Coordination Group enjoys consistent and valuable participation from our Marine Corps partners and the Undersea Warfighting Development Center. The future fight will be enormously complex, and the DMO framework requires the capabilities of all the services at the right time and place to deliver the necessary effects. Partnering and planning with all of the WDCs and other services is a normal part of our daily practice to make the fleet more lethal in an all-domain, joint fight.

After becoming a WTI and completing a production tour, what are the possible downstream effects on a SWO’s career? How is the WTI program influencing the incentives and milestones of the SWO career path? 

Becoming a WTI is one of the most career-enhancing choices a young officer can make. Our WTIs screen for department head at 100 percent and exceed the selection rates of non-WTIs for commander command and major command. The team at PERS is working closely with SMWDC to ensure we are applying the subject matter expertise where it makes sense across the fleet and in line with the needs of the officer. We have also added the additional qualification designator (AQD) of KWC to a WTI’s record at the completion of a production tour. Having the KWC designator indicates a level of knowledge of not just the WTI course of instruction, but also continued professional development and experience gained in their associated WTI production tour. This allows us to fill billets at commands looking for this level of expertise within an integrated warfighting environment in places like SMWDC, the Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems, and other tactical commands as availability allows. None of this is limiting to a SWO’s career choices, and we continue to provide flexible, challenging, and career-enhancing opportunities to our WTIs. Our top priority is to make the fleet more lethal and our WTIs are the key to our success.

Rear Admiral Wilson Marks graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994 with a Bachelor of Science in History. He has also earned a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs in Strategic Studies from the Naval War College and a Master of Science in National Strategic Studies from the National War College. Marks commanded USS Mason (DDG 87), USS Robert Smalls (CG 62) formerly named USS Chancellorsville, Provincial Reconstruction Team Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, and Naval Surface Group Western Pacific. Ashore, he served as a Placement Officer and Assistant Captain Detailer at Naval Personnel Command, Executive Assistant to the commander of Naval Surface Force Atlantic, the Deputy for Combat System and Warfighting Integration at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and as the Executive Assistant to the commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet. Marks assumed the role of Commander, Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center in May 2023.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) and Center for Surface Combat Systems (CSCS) host advanced Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer (ASWO) students for hands-on training inside of CSCS’s Combined Integrated Air & Missile Defense/ Anti-Submarine Warfare Trainer (CIAT). (U.S. Navy photo by Clinton Beaird/released.)

Flotilla SITREP: SWO Tactical Qualifications and Surface Warfare Aggressor Squadrons

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will be hosting sessions focused on the surface force, including sessions on updating SWO qualifications and the value of standing up dedicated aggressor units for the surface force. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record January discussions. The full listings for these upcoming discussions are featured down below.

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

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Upcoming January Sessions

Updating Surface Warfare Qualifications

Surface Warfare Officers can attain numerous qualifications to bolster their skills and enhance their careers. How can the SWO community update its qualifications and how they are weighed to better emphasize tactical warfighting skill? How can the detailing process better incentivize and reward qualifications that are specifically geared toward tactical skillsets? Join us to discuss these questions as we consider possible updates to SWO qualifications.

Read Ahead: Changing Surface Warfare Qualifications: Better Incentives Make Deadlier Officers,” by LTJG Chris Rielage and LCDR JR Dinglasan
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Creating a Surface Warfare Aggressor Squadron

Aggressor units are a critical asset for forging warfighting skill and cultivating in-depth understanding of competitor forces. Yet the surface warfare community appears to lack dedicated aggressor units and staffs. How can an aggressor squadron sharpen the skills of the surface force and the broader Navy? How can the surface force stand up an aggressor staff, or even a dedicated aggressor squadron? Join us to discuss the merits of creating dedicated opposition force units and staffs for the surface force.

Read Aheads:

Surface Warfare Needs Aggressor Squadrons,” by Captain Henry Kim

Undersea Red: Captain Eric Sager on the Submarine Force’s New Aggressor Squadron,” by Dmitry Filipoff
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

CIMSEC’s Top 10 Articles of 2023

By Dmitry Filipoff

CIMSEC had an outstanding year in 2023. Numerous authors took to CIMSEC to offer compelling insights and analysis on a broad range of maritime security topics and naval affairs. We are continually grateful to our readership for following and contributing to the conversation on our pages. To close out the year, we are highlighting the top 10 CIMSEC articles of 2023, listed below in order of most viewed.

On behalf of the CIMSEC team, we hope you enjoy the holidays, and we look forward to continuing the conversation in an exciting new year.

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1. “An Allied Coast Guard Approach to Countering CCP Maritime Gray Zone Coercion,” by Jada Fraser

“An analysis of recent reforms to Japan’s coast guard presents several models that the USCG can build off. Such an approach recognizes current U.S. resource limitations and accounts for how an important U.S. ally at the forefront of countering CCG gray zone activities has pursued its own reforms, even while under similar and additional constraints.”

2. “A Fleet Adrift: The Mounting Risks of the U.S. Navy’s Force Development,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“Overall, the Navy’s major exercises often took a scripted character, where the outcomes were generally known beforehand and the opposition was usually made to lose. Training only one thing at a time against opposition that never wins barely scratches the surface of war, but for the most part this was the best the Navy could do to train its strike groups for years.”

3. “Fighting DMO, Pt. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower and Mass Firing Schemes,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“As both great powers build up and evolve their anti-ship firepower, it is critical to assess their respective schemes of massing fires, and how these schemes may compete and interact in a specific operational context, such as a war sparked by a Taiwan contingency. Whichever side wields the superior combination of tools and methods for massing fires may earn a major advantage in deterrence and in conflict.”

4. “Tankers For The Pacific Fight: A Crisis in Capability,” by Stephen M. Carmel

“Not only does the U.S. lack the tonnage required to support a major conflict in the Pacific, it has no identifiable roadmap to obtain it. Without enough fuel, the most advanced capabilities and ships – even nuclear-powered aircraft carriers – will hardly be available for use. This is a crisis in capability that requires urgent and effective action.”

5. “Winning High-End War at Sea: Insights into the PLA Navy’s New Strategic Concept,” by Ryan D. Martinson

“Perhaps no one source of information is more valuable than Chinese media coverage of an important—but largely unknown—conference of PLAN admirals held at the end of 2022, in the wake of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress. The available reporting on the conference sheds light on how to better understand how the PLAN sees its strategic priorities.”

6. “Fighting DMO, Pt. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and the Future of Naval Warfare,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“Distributed Maritime Operations can provide a framework for understanding modern naval warfare and illuminate its future. While plenty of unknowns remain, the DMO concept offers an important opportunity to foster debate on how to adapt naval warfighting and translate theory into practice.”

7. “Fighting DMO, Pt. 2: Anti-Ship Firepower and the Major Limits of the American Naval Arsenal,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“The ability to mass fires is fundamentally enabled by fielding a large number of long-range missiles across a wide variety of platforms. In terms of numbers, range, and variety, the U.S. military falls woefully short. The U.S. military cannot execute the tactic of distributed massed fires against warships today because it simply does not have the weapons to make it possible. Its current anti-ship missile firepower is extremely concentrated in aircraft carriers and tightly stretched thin everywhere else.”

8. “Island Blitz: A Campaign Analysis of a Taiwan Takeover by the PLA,” by Max Stewart

“This campaign analysis seeks to determine how long U.S. decision-makers can realistically have those debates before the PLA seizes Taipei and the window for effective intervention with military force has closed. It does so by employing analytical modeling, informed by historical data, to determine how long the Taiwanese can resist a Chinese invasion absent direct U.S. military intervention given best-case-scenario timelines for the PLA.”

9. “Fighting DMO, Pt. 7: The Future of the Aircraft Carrier in Distributed Warfighting,” by Dmitry Filipoff

“For distributed warfighting at sea, there is a clear argument to be made for the vital role of naval aviation, whether it must come from aircraft carriers or somewhere else. Some of these arguments are couched in the fact that many of the premier weapons of modern naval warfare are themselves fast airborne payloads, that warships are mostly blind to spaces of enormous tactical consequence, and that air superiority is a powerful enabler of information superiority.”

10. “Cuban Missile Crisis: Soviet Submarines Attack?” by LtCol Brent Stricker

“Vague orders on the use of nuclear tipped torpedoes and the heat and confusion might have caused a local commander to launch these weapons, dragging two nuclear powers into an escalating exchange both desperately wanted to avoid. This potentially escalatory exchange at a pivotal moment in the Cuban Missile Crisis offers a cautionary tale for the continuing conflict in Ukraine.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) transits the South China Sea on June 18, 2021, with the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Halsey (DDG 97) and the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Shiloh (CG 67). (MC1 Rawad Madanat/Navy)