All posts by Dmitry Filipoff

Dying to Learn: Michael Hunzeker on Wartime Learning and Force Development

By Dmitry Filipoff

As Michael Hunzeker aptly points out in his new book, “War is a classroom, but not all armies are ready to learn. In Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front, Hunzeker investigates the wartime adaptation and force development of the armies of WWI. As armed forces entered great power conflict, their doctrine, tactics, and learning mechanisms were put to the ultimate test in a furious race to see who could first master new ways of war.

In this discussion, Hunzeker outlines how these armies improved their wartime learning, why the process was so challenging and bloody, and what the consequences are for militaries who don’t invest enough thought into how they will learn in war.

You structured your analysis with an assessment, command, and training framework. This was complemented by learning phases focused on exploration, selection, and action. You applied this framework to several militaries on the western front of WWI with respect to how they evolved their warfighting doctrines and force development functions. How would you describe the structure of your analysis and why did you decide on this structure?

I should start out by warning that I adopt an unapologetically social scientific approach to how I look at wartime learning. Some readers prefer historical narratives (heck, I’m one of them), yet I think it is an important distinction to make at the outset, in part so that potential readers know what they are getting themselves into. I want to be clear that I was deliberate about avoiding a more traditional, linear, storytelling approach.

The fact is that I did not think the world needed another history book that described the evolution of combat tactics on the Western Front. That task has already been more than capably handled by generations of superb scholarship by historians like Brian Bond, Timothy Lupfer, Bruce Gudmundsson, Paddy Griffith, Aimeé Fox, Jonathan Boff, Gary Sheffield, MA Ramsay, Williamson Murray, Michel Goya, and many others. I also had a different goal. I wanted to use a combination of theory and structured comparison so that I could get at the question of causation.

Historians have already shown us how British, French, and German tactics evolved over the course of the First World War, and that all three armies were engaged in an epic race to see who could master this new form of warfare first. But I wanted to know why it was that the German Army seemed to have learned faster than the others—and why it nevertheless still lost the war. As both a political scientist and a combat veteran of the Iraq war, I thought a rigorously tested answer to these questions might be useful for today’s military planners as they think about the learning challenge on tomorrow’s battlefields.

At the same time, I’ll be the first to admit that social science writing is a lot less “fun” to read than history writing. Reviewing existing work on wartime learning, adaptation, and innovation; theorizing about the generic learning process that all organizations must go through; generating a novel explanation to predict why some armies are better at learning than others—one that we can apply to more than just the First World War—and then systematically testing it against evidence drawn from the existing historiography is, well, abstract and dry. Red Storm Rising my book is not! At the same time, I feel like the rigor is worth the tradeoff. I provide readers with a transparent, detailed, and systematic analysis of both my theoretical predictions, and the evidence I draw from the historical record. As a result, I think I put them in the best position possible to judge my explanation for themselves. I’m also confident this approach is the best way to convince readers to take seriously the parallels between today and the period leading up to the First World War; and what the First World War can teach us about wartime learning in an all-out, no holds bar, great power conflict of the sort many of us worry is looming.  

Many of the critical takeaways focused on how to best apply centralization, decentralization, and independence to core force development functions. Why were these traits so critical and what combinations proved most effective? 

I’m glad you raise this point about the tradeoff between centralization and decentralization, because it is an important theme in the book. When reviewing explanations for organizational change early on in my research, I started to notice a disconnect between the way academic scholars and military practitioners talk about centralization and decentralization.

Practitioners in general—and American military officers in particular—seemed to instinctively treat decentralization as a good thing, especially when trying to foster change. The intuitive logic seemed to be that decentralization allows for independence, initiative, and debate. In contrast, the academics who studied military change tended to think about centralization and decentralization in terms of tradeoffs. In other words, scholars like Harvey Sapolsky and James Q. Wilson theorized that although decentralization supports autonomy, freedom, and creative problem solving, it also complicates implementation by empowering subordinates to resist changes with which they did not agree. Centralization, on the other hand, allows for faster implementation at broader scale and/or directional shifts, but it also stifles discussion, debate, and dissent, which is essential for generating new ideas and testing proposed changes to make sure they will actually work.

At the same time, academics also tended to take a rather simplistic—if not dim—view of military organizations. By this I mean a lot of existing research either automatically assumed that all military organizations were conservative, tradition bound, and backward looking; or placed the entire organization into a single, crude categorical box by treating a given military as either entirely centralized or entirely decentralized.

My theory of wartime learning tries to synthesize these views. I think scholars are right to point out that decentralization and centralization are neither purely ‘good’ nor entirely ‘bad.’ Instead, it is more useful to think of each approach as helpful when handling some types of tasks, but problematic when dealing with others. I also think practitioners are right to point out that modern militaries are diverse, complex organizations. Some resist change, while others embrace it. Moreover, because all militaries must juggle multiple competing tasks, including warfighting, logistics, training, maintenance, and intelligence, they have the ability to centralize control over how they perform some of these tasks at the same time they decentralize control over other ones.

As a result, my explanation for ideal wartime learning—which I refer to as Assessment, Command, and Training (ACT) theory—predicts that militaries that delegate moderate amounts of authority over command and control on the battlefield; maintain tight centralized control over training; and that possess a unit of rigorously trained analysts with access to the highest levels of command, but empowered to do independent analysis (i.e. take unfavorable positions); will learn faster than militaries that organize these tasks in any other way. I think my case study chapters on the evolution of the British, French, and German armies on the Western Front bear this prediction out. But of course, I try to present my evidence in the most transparent and systematic way possible so that readers can decide for themselves.

How well did pre-war doctrines and force development functions fare in the early years of the conflict? Why did some elements continue to persist despite the heavy losses?

It is important to distinguish between the war’s first few months, when maneuver was still possible on the Western Front, and later on when the front bogged down into a stalemate. As for that first period, the appalling casualties made clear that neither side went into the war with a doctrine that adequately prepared them for a full scale, great power clash with existential stakes. We of course have the benefit of a century of hindsight, but it is now rather obvious that no army was really ready for the ‘storm of steel’ that modern weapons created when employed at scale. No army spent enough time working on artillery-infantry coordination, or put enough effort into developing defensive tactics, or acquired enough heavy artillery. Some of this neglect was due to overarching political constraints (e.g. the British Army had to juggle multiple competing missions, including far-flung imperial policing) and strategic concepts (e.g. German and French war plans emphasized speed). Some of it was because hundreds of thousands of green troops were racing into action for the first time and ignored (or forgot) their training in the process. For example, infantry units on both sides tended to go into the assault without waiting for artillery support.

That said, it is important to remember that despite these many failings, it is not that the British, French, and German armies were unusually ignorant, lazy, or lackadaisical when it came to thinking about the future of warfare prior to 1914. Nor were they blissfully unaware of the technological innovations that were transforming the battlefield. The officer corps in all three armies recognized that firepower was changing the battlefield. They paid attention and tried to learn from the Second Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War. Officers in all three armies fiercely debated the best way to evolve in response. Some of the tactics and concepts tested (and sometimes even adopted) in the pre-war period even bore a striking resemblance to the tactics and concepts employed at the war’s end.

So the losses suffered early in the war were not the result of a lack of effort. Rather, both sides got the future ‘wrong’ to some degree. This point serves as an important reminder for us as we think about tomorrow’s wars. We can (and should) try as hard as we can to ensure our fighting forces go to war with the best doctrine, training, and associated equipment possible. Nevertheless, it is more likely than not that we will also get it wrong to some degree. And the distance between the doctrine our fighting forces have and the doctrine they will need will be measured in lives.

Which brings us to the point in the conflict when maneuver gave way to stalemate. All too often we think of 1915 and 1916 as the epitome of insanity, with generals on both sides callously wasting millions of lives as they hit repeat on the same bad ideas over and over again. But this standard narrative is misleading. Gary Sheffield is right when he points out that once deadlock set in, the two sides “did not simply gape at the trenches with incomprehension.” Instead, both sides almost immediately started to search for a solution. That solution was not immediately forthcoming—and took millions of lives to uncover—in part because of the intractable nature of the underlying problem (too many men in too small a space with too many bullets and not enough trucks and radios); and in part because the defenses evolved alongside the offensive concepts designed to penetrate them. Moreover, the fact is that no army gave enough thought to doctrinal learning before the war. It started out as a largely ad hoc process on both sides of the trench line, but the army that was first to develop a better way of learning was also the first to arrive at the right solution.

And that’s the entire point of my book: to argue that because we could very easily find ourselves in a situation similar to the ones our predecessors witnessed on the Western Front (as in our existing doctrines and concepts are inadequate in the face of the wartime challenge we actually face) it would be useful to have spent enough time thinking about how we are going to learn, and learn faster than the other side.

Combat training reform is a major emphasis of the analysis. How did combat training have to be organized to most effectively transmit lessons learned and new doctrines at scale? What combat training structures performed suboptimally and what were the consequences for tactics and operations at the front?

My theory predicts that the more a military centralizes control over training (which I define in terms of oversight, enforcement, and geography) the faster and more effective it will be at transmitting new practices across the relevant parts of the organization. In essence, centralization allows for consistency while also helping the organization overcome various forms of resistance and foot dragging by instructors and commanders who might disagree with a given new method or tactic (and in a large organization, someone always disagrees with change). In contrast, decentralized training—which can involve letting multiple schools or centers teach the same thing; or pushing responsibility for initial training onto frontline operational units—increases the odds that new ideas will be poorly taught (sort of how making a photocopy of a photocopy yields a hard-to-read document) or that instructors might choose to continue teaching old methods. In fact, at least theoretically speaking, my theory suggests it would be ideal to train the entire organization at one time and in one place! Since this approach is obviously impossible for a range of practical reasons, I simply predict that consolidating training sites and creating dedicated training commands is better than trying to perform training all over the place and/or delegating the task to operational units.

I find strong support for this prediction when I look at the relationship between learning and training in the British, French, and German armies. The German Army centralized training to a greater degree than its opponents before the war (although even the Germans delegated more authority over training than is the case in the U.S. military today). The German Army also sought to centralize its training programs even further as the war went on, which helped it disseminate its new assault, artillery coordination, and defensive concepts faster than was the case in the British and French armies. The British Army, which had a strong tradition of letting units handle their own training as a result of its longstanding colonial mission, did not fully centralize control over training until the middle of 1918. Meanwhile, the French Army never really made the transition, particularly among its infantry units. As a result, both organizations struggled with uniform implementation of new tactical concepts to a greater degree than was the case in the German Army.

Throughout the book, certain commanders-in-chief took a greater interest in these force development functions than others. Certain unit-level leaders were critical for frontline experimentation and capturing lessons learned in writing, which was sometimes read and disseminated by the highest levels of leadership. How would you describe the relationship between structure and individual leadership for the effectiveness of learning and adapting to warfighting?

I prioritize structure in Dying to Learn. Not because I think leaders are irrelevant or unimportant! Instead, I decided to focus on structure’s role, because I think it is a useful and important way to balance against our instinctive desire to always explain change in terms of individual leadership. The fact is that explanations that focus on individual leaders run into all sorts of problems. First, modern military organizations are massive and complex. No single leader can influence—let alone control—all of the various tasks that go into the wartime learning process. Second, in many cases, organizational learning transcends any single leader’s tenure. For example, although Eric Ludendorff often gets credit as the mastermind behind so-called storm troop tactics, the fact is that much of the important conceptual work behind this approach was accomplished under his oft-maligned predecessor, Erich von Falkenhayn. (And it is not like Falkenhayn was out on the battlefield personally directing the early experiments with storm troop units). Third, leaders are random. In other words, despite our best efforts, neither historians nor social scientists have a convincing, systematic way to explain why some leaders advocate for the “right” kinds of changes (e.g. Falkenhayn); while others resist change (e.g. Haig); while others advocate for the “wrong” kinds of change (e.g. Nivelle). Yet we know that some organizations seem to be systematically better at learning than others. Which means that an important part of the explanation has to lay somewhere other than on a given leader’s individual shoulders.

At the same time, I’m not trying to take leaders out of the story. Individual decisions mattered. Ludendorff clearly did not come up with storm troop tactics. Yet without his support the German Army would not have adopted them wholesale. Haig’s resistance to change made it harder for lower-level experiments within the British Army to gain wider traction earlier on in the conflict. My goal is to simply offer us a better and more systematic way of thinking about the relationship between leaders and structure when it comes to learning, and to pay a bit more attention to the variable that is harder to observe.

A recurring theme was that many of the highest-level commands were mostly overtaken by the demands of day-to-day operations to the detriment of analyzing doctrine and frontline lessons. Some critical force development functions floundered due to lack of high-level interest and access. How can warfighting organizations manage this challenge?

I’m glad you noticed this theme. In doing the research for Dying to Learn, it quickly became apparent that no one had a deliberate plan or mechanism for learning and adapting once the fighting started. Although I have no proof one way or another (likely because they did not think about it!), my guess is that all three armies took learning for granted and assumed that frontline units and high commands alike would instinctively adjust to wartime realities. This assumption seems rather akin to the wishful thinking that sometimes infects military planning. I worry we may not be in a much better position today.

We can and should invest in thinking about what the next war will look like, and in developing the sorts of concepts and weapons we will need to prevail in it. But we also need to invest time and energy into thinking about how we plan to learn under fire once the fighting starts and (in all likelihood) proves some of our assumptions, plans, doctrines, and capabilities wrong.

I don’t think I’m going out on a limb when I say that our learning process was not particularly agile in Iraq or Afghanistan. As one veteran aptly put it: our system for lessons learned should really be called a system for lessons collected and disseminated. And let’s be honest, many of the mechanisms essential to rapid and effective learning that I highlight in Dying to Learn are neither sexy nor glamorous. Today’s officers are not exactly clamoring to be assigned to training commands or doctrine writing staffs. Analytic career pathways are often a dead end. But if my research is on to anything, it suggests that these are precisely the sorts of personnel and capabilities we could wind up needing the most.

Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: British Vickers machine gun crew near Ovillers during the Battle of the Somme, July 1916. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Flotilla SITREP: Fitz and McCain Collisions 5 Years Later; Naval Strike Fighter Skillsets

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will discuss force development concerns for the naval strike fighter community and will continue the conversation on difficult events that afflicted the Navy’s surface warfare community several years ago. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record July sessions.

Down below is a look at the invites for our upcoming July discussions. The Flotilla will discuss the warfighting skillsets of the naval strike fighter community and whether to make adjustments for great power competition. The Flotilla will also be holding a discussion on the lessons from the 2017 collisions that roiled the surface warfare community and what has changed since.

Last month the Flotilla held discussions on unmanned aviation, offensive mine warfare, and Marine stand-in forces. These productive discussions illuminated various challenges and opportunities in each of these areas and helped inform thinking on the way forward.

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

Upcoming July Sessions

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Learning from Fitz and McCain 5 Years Later

Five years after the fatal collisions involving USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald, what has the Navy learned? Numerous recommendations were put forth by the investigations and reviews. How well have changes been realized? Do deckplate Sailors see a difference, and are operational demands being more carefully managed? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider what was learned from these events.

Read Aheads: Five years later: Inside the Navy’s data-driven quest to avert a future Fitzgerald or McCain collision,” by Megan Eckstein

Surface warfare officers cautiously optimistic about changes since Fitz and McCain disasters,” by Geoff Ziezulewicz and Diana Stancy Correll

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Naval Strike Fighter Skillsets

The strike fighter community is spread thin across many skillsets and the global war on terror has heavily shaped the operational experience of naval aviators. As the Navy focuses on great power competition, should the strike fighter community reconfigure its focus? Should strike fighters specialize in certain areas or is a more generalist approach required? Join us to discuss these questions as we examine how the strike fighter community could evolve.

Read Ahead: The Strike Fighter Time Management Problem,” by Stephen Walsh

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Completed June Sessions

USMC Transformation and Stand-In Forces vs. A2/AD

Debates continue apace about the merits of Force Design 2030 and whether it can effectively meet modern high-end threats. Can Marine stand-in forces effectively hold their own against A2/AD systems and enable the joint force? What may it take to effectively transition Marine units into combat credible stand-in forces? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we continue the conversation on Force Design 2030.

Read Ahead: “Stand-In Forces: Disrupting Anti-Access Systems,” by Joseph Mozzi
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Naval Aviation and Fielding Unmanned Systems

Highly capable unmanned aviation is on the horizon and threatens to disrupt traditional concepts of naval aviation. What are the merits of carrier-based unmanned aviation and what will it take to field these systems? What sorts of obstacles exist to their introduction, including tactical, political, and cultural? Join us to discuss the disruptive potential of unmanned naval aviation and more.

Read Ahead: “Winged Luddites: Aviators are the Biggest Threat to Carrier Aviation,” by Noah Spataro, Trevor Phillips-Levine, and Andrew Tenbusch
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Offensive Mine Warfare Against China

Mine warfare is a traditionally underappreciated element of naval capability for the U.S. Navy, but could reap significant dividends in a contingency against China. How could offensive mine warfare be employed in western Pacific contingencies, and what capability gaps deserve closer scrutiny? Join us to discuss mine warfare in the Pacific and what opportunities or shortfalls may exist.

Read Ahead: “Disputing Chinese Sea Control Through Offensive Sea Mining,” by Victor Duenow
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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at [email protected].

Transforming the Marine Corps Topic Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past two weeks, CIMSEC featured pieces submitted in response to our call for articles on transforming the Marine Corps.

As high-end warfighting capabilities proliferate and become ever more powerful, especially in the Indo-Pacific, the Marine Corps is challenged to evolve and pace threats. Robust debate on transformation is a timeless feature of the profession of arms, and especially when meaningful, far-reaching change is underway. In our topic week, authors analyzed various elements of the ongoing transformation of the Marine Corps, including warfighting concepts, air defense, change management, and more. As the Marine Corps changes to meet modern threats, these efforts will continue to spark challenging debates that can help sharpen transformation.

Below are the authors who featured during CIMSEC’s topic week on transforming the Marine Corps. We thank them for their excellent contributions.

Stand-In Forces: Disrupting Anti-Access Systems,” by Joseph Mozzi

“If competition escalates to conflict, the stand-in force already occupies a position of advantage. The stand-in force concept challenges the Marine Corps to create an adaptable system that can persist and sustain itself in a contested space, adapting its theory of warfighting to present challenges.”

Locate, Close With, Destroy,” by Ian Brown

“General Ricci, poster child of the old guard, wanted his refurbished tanks and artillery tubes to have a public knife fight upon which he could slap the bumper sticker of “locate, close with, and destroy,” because that’s what the old guard wanted. Her “influencers”—linguistic trend analysis among their skills, not that Ricci cared—were screaming that this conflict would unfold another way.”

EABO Beyond the Indo-Pacific: Reimagining the “Battle of the Aegean,” by Capt. Ross W. Gilchriest, USMC

“The following analysis seeks to illustrate how U.S. Marine Corps stand-in forces and EABO could be leveraged to support a naval campaign in littoral environments beyond the Indo-Pacific region.”

Preparing for Change is as Important as Change Itself: Change Management and Force Design 2030,” by Carl Forsling

“Preparing for the change itself is a process. Just as with introducing a new electronic tool, some will be early adopters on the cutting edge, while others will trail the prevailing crowd as fast followers, and others will be dead-enders that fail to stay relevant. All of these mindsets exist within organizations, and leaders must find ways to bring all of these people onboard to execute change.”

Antisubmarine Warfare for the Amphibious Warfare Team,” by The Good Sailor Svejk

“Without changes to ARG-Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) composition, hostile submarines continue to hold the ARG-MEU at risk which is why the Navy and Marine Corps must design a new ASW concept for ARG protection. An integrated Navy and Marine Corps team could develop a composite ASW element for the ARG.”

The First Stand-in Forces: The Role of International Affairs Marines in Force Design 2030,” by Majors Zach Ota and Eric Hovey, USMC

“Simply put, any USMC effort to deter and defeat China within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility requires Marines to have access to the air, land, and territorial seas of a foreign partner, but the Marine Corps currently lacks an international affairs operating concept to ensure that this access is granted.”

Marine Corps Metamorphosis: Legal Considerations,” by Brent Stricker

“Despite the breadth of conversation surrounding EABO, operational law has been largely ignored in the discussions, by both critics and proponents of the new concept. As the U.S. Marine Corps develops and transforms its doctrine for EABO, it must consider what impacts international law will have on future operations.”

The Importance of Unmanned Logistics Support For a Transforming Marine Corps,” by George Galdorisi

“Advanced base operations could involve Marines being cut off from sustainment, whether as forces that have been blockaded or forces that have been bypassed by opposing naval forces. Marines will require robust pre-positioned stocks to have enough self-sufficiency to continue the fight in the absence of sustainment, and sustainment assets must be more distributed and risk-worthy than legacy platforms. Unmanned systems can fill this gap.”

When Only a Chisel Will Do: Marine Corps Force Design for the Modern Era,” by Capt. Jesse Schmitt

“Incremental change fails to achieve the objective of the change. The purpose of the Marine Corps’ evolution is to frustrate the adversary’s plans to mitigate Marine capabilities. Strategic competitors have observed the Department of Defense’s actions over the last two decades of operations and structured themselves accordingly.”

Missing: Expeditionary Air Defense,” by Ben DiDonato

“In the many discussions on the Marine Corps’ new Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, the subject of air defense seems to have largely fallen through the cracks and threatened a critical capability gap. More analysis must be focused on how these forces can be defended against various aerial threats and identify key capability gaps.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – Marines with 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, arrive at one of their launch positions with the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System at the Air Combat Element landing strip as a part of Integrated Training Exercise 3-18 aboard the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., May 21, 2018. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. William Chockey)

Flotilla Sitrep: USMC Transformation, Offensive Mining, Winged Luddites

By Dmitry Filipoff

This month the CIMSEC Warfighting Flotilla will continue the conversation on especially controversial naval force development topics as well as certain offensive concepts for Pacific conflict.

Down below is a look at the invites for our upcoming June discussions. The Flotilla will be holding discussions on Force Design 2030 and Marine stand-in forces, the challenges and opportunities of introducing unmanned systems to naval aviation, and the utility of offensive mine warfare against China. If you haven’t already, sign up through the form below to become a Flotilla member and receive the invites to our upcoming off-the-record June sessions.

Last month the Flotilla held discussions on naval combat in the Russia-Ukraine War, the viability of lightning carrier platforms and concepts of operation, and the usefulness of wargaming as a unit-level combat training method. These conversations helped shed light on ongoing combat operations abroad and force development initiatives under consideration. 

Feel free to visit the Flotilla homepage to learn more about this community, its activities, and what drives it.

Upcoming June Sessions

USMC Transformation and Stand-In Forces vs. A2/AD

Debates continue apace about the merits of Force Design 2030 and whether it can effectively meet modern high-end threats. Can Marine stand-in forces effectively hold their own against A2/AD systems and enable the joint force? What may it take to effectively transition Marine units into combat credible stand-in forces? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we continue the conversation on Force Design 2030.

Read Ahead: “Stand-In Forces: Disrupting Anti-Access Systems,” by Joseph Mozzi
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Naval Aviation and Fielding Unmanned Systems

Highly capable unmanned aviation is on the horizon and threatens to disrupt traditional concepts of naval aviation. What are the merits of carrier-based unmanned aviation and what will it take to field these systems? What sorts of obstacles exist to their introduction, including tactical, political, and cultural? Join us to discuss the disruptive potential of unmanned naval aviation and more.

Read Ahead: “Winged Luddites: Aviators are the Biggest Threat to Carrier Aviation,” by Noah Spataro, Trevor Phillips-Levine, and Andrew Tenbusch
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Offensive Mine Warfare Against China

Mine warfare is a traditionally underappreciated element of naval capability for the U.S. Navy, but could reap significant dividends in a contingency against China. How could offensive mine warfare be employed in western Pacific contingencies, and what capability gaps deserve closer scrutiny? Join us to discuss mine warfare in the Pacific and what opportunities or shortfalls may exist.

Read Ahead: “Disputing Chinese Sea Control Through Offensive Sea Mining,” by Victor Duenow
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Completed May Sessions

Russia-Ukraine War at Sea

The Russia-Ukraine war has featured significant naval combat, even as the conflict has predominantly taken place over land. From the sinking of the Moskva and the Orsk, to amphibious landings and submarine-launched missile strikes, the maritime domain remains active and contested. How do we make sense of the maritime domain and its role thus far in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and what are the lessons learned for force development and force employment? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the maritime dimensions of this ongoing conflict.

Read ahead: “The Russo-Ukraine War at Sea: Retrospect and Prospect,” by B.J. Armstrong

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The Viability and Roles of Lightning Carriers

Flattops ranging from LHDs to allied platform such as the Izumo are offering carrier air wing capabilities, although at smaller proportions. How could these “Lightning” carriers help in conflict and steady-state competition? Are they a viable compliment to modern naval force structure, or do they divert resources from larger-scale carrier capabilities that are much more effective? Join us to debate the effectiveness of lightning carriers and their potential roles.

Read aheads: “Marines Load Record 16 F-35Bs Aboard USS Tripoli Test of ‘Lightning Carrier’ Concept,” by Gidget Fuentes

“Whither the Lightning Carrier in an Asia-Pacific War?” by Ben Ho

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Bringing Wargaming to Wardrooms

Wargaming is a versatile teaching tool, but what value can it have as a training device at the unit-level? Can wargaming be broadly adopted in wardrooms and ready rooms across the fleet to enhance readiness and warfighter understanding? Join us to discuss these questions and more as we consider the merits of wargaming as a training method at the unit level.

Read ahead: “Introduce Wargaming to Wardrooms,” by Commander Thomas T. Dixon

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Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content and Community Manager of the Warfighting Flotilla. Contact him at [email protected].