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Human Factors Week

Weaponize PME to Improve the Force

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Human Factors Week

By Bobby Holmes

If the sea services and the defense community are to improve and sustain human capital to accomplish the missions of the future, they must create a more educated workforce by incentivizing nontraditional and self-study Professional Military Education opportunities. War is a human endeavor. This fact applies universally to all conflicts, regardless of when they are fought, where there are fought, or what weapons are used to fight them. The human factors of war dominated Napoleonic Europe and the trenches of World War I, just as they did in Al Anbar for the last two decades and in Kharkiv today. Any future conflict, particularly between great powers with technologically exquisite platforms, will be built on a human foundation. The United States Department of Defense and the sea services must invest in their people as much or more than they invest in their things.

Professional Military Education (PME) is a key vessel for this human investment, but the sea services are not doing enough to compel their top performers to seek out valuable PME as a career enhancing opportunity. Put more emphatically, there is not enough incentive for Sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen to pursue self-study education programs, either concurrently to their primary MOS duties or as part of a dedicated PME tour. This lack of incentive is best reflected in the risk one assumes to their chances of O-5 promotion and command tours should they embark on a nontraditional PME program. This causes an exodus of the sea services’ top performers before their talents can be fully utilized. Adding additional PME opportunities reserved for top performers and decoupling nonstandard PME and decreased promotion and command opportunity will go far in developing a more intelligent naval workforce that is well prepared for the future’s challenges.

The Problem

The personnel evaluation systems of the sea services do not create incentives for well-meaning servicemembers to pursue nontraditional or self-study PME. In any fleet unit, the axiom that “learning is good, but doing is better” reigns supreme.1 The command climates throughout the naval workforce implicitly communicate this through evaluation methods that are abstractly comparative and do not adequately reflect the gains to be had from a more educated and intelligent workforce. The metrics used to compare servicemembers against each other are largely the same across each service’s force and do not appropriately weight self-study PME against basic MOS proficiency. Any time spent studying and learning beyond typical MOS training and standard “roadmap” PME courses is viewed as time that could be better spent in the office or in the field. While this article does not argue in the least against putting the time in when it is needed, the most driven servicemembers should have more and better opportunities to self-educate. 

Moreover, it is nearly impossible to communicate to one’s chain of command when gains in technical competence or tactical proficiency are earned through individual PME. While these gains may be lauded for what they are, the return on investment for the individual servicemember does not hold. This feedback loop then creates a self-fulfilling prophecy at the institutional level: the sea services’ top performers writ large do not pursue self-study PME because this is time they must spend outperforming their peers in basic tasks and duties, and connecting this outperformance to additional PME is not feasible in most command climates. Note that this argument does not mean that a poorly performing Marine should be able to just read a book to compensate for their shortcoming; it means that an imminently qualified Marine should not be penalized for pursuing a nontraditional education program that is concurrent to their professional duties, assuming their performance is already above reproach. If the sea services can modify their evaluation practices, the best members will take advantage of it, and the services will collectively benefit from a more educated force. 

The final deterrent to many servicemembers’ aspirations towards PME and career progression comes in the form of increased risk to O-5 promotion and command opportunities. Simply put, the sea services do not value increased education as much as they do increased experience. Promotion boards expect to see a standard conveyor belt of “key billets” that culminates in a selection to O-5 command. While certain levels of experience are necessary to ensure successful and effective command, this model creates institutional groupthink amongst its leaders and stifles the creativity of its most imaginative service members.

Promotion boards reinforce this trend through the people and career paths they prioritize for promotion and command. This reinforcement then trickles down and compels resultant career decisions amongst the company grade officers and junior staff noncommissioned officers throughout the individual services. Even those who would prefer a nontraditional PME approach do not seek it out simply because they cannot assume the risk to their career. This hesitancy is amplified by the services’ manpower management practices, which are designed to check requisite career progression boxes that collectively make members competitive for O-5 command.

This requirement to maintain competitiveness for O-5 command is present whether a particular servicemember wants the opportunity or not. The sea services are missing a valuable opportunity and bypassing a valuable talent pool strictly through the use of a short sighted and outdated promotion model. Everyone is treated like they are a future ship’s captain or infantry battalion commander – regardless of personal aspirations – and this is a mistake.

A Proposed Solution

This article now proposes two potential answers to the aforementioned problem. Both are designed to increase the incentive for servicemembers to pursue self-study PME, with one approach creating the opportunity to do so and the other removing any potential negative side-effects to one’s career progression.

1) Choose Your Own (PME) Adventure: If the sea services want to truly revamp and weaponize their approach to PME, this is one of the most nontraditional opportunities to do so. PME selection boards – be they for company grade, field grade, or top level school allocations – can set aside a small portion of their allocations for only the highest performing servicemembers on the board and allow them the chance to design their own PME program. Prospective students would get to pick the school (a traditional university, PME institution, trade school, or other options), the field of study, and the recommended utilization tour upon completion of the program.

There are two methods to solicit these programs. The first is to field said programs from individuals seeking to embark on them before a given PME selection board convenes. Boards will then convene and determine, much like they do for every PME program, if the requested program fits the needs of the service and the servicemember is of sufficient quality and talent to warrant approval to the program. The second method is to select those servicemembers for this self-designed PME option, then instruct them to build and submit their program for approval. Either approach is feasible, however the first approach of solicitation then allocation most likely nests better within the current timelines of PME selection and rotation dates.

Note that this option is in no way a “free ride” or “vacation” for the servicemember. Potential self-designed programs should nest within a member’s professional duties and fit the general needs the member fulfills for the service. The servicemember, who will most likely spend a considerable amount of time away from traditional military installations and communities, should also uphold basic tenets of military life (physical fitness, military appearance, off duty conduct, etc.) throughout the program. Moreover, these programs would also warrant substantial utilization tours and service obligations once completed, so the services will benefit from continued retention of their best performers in fields these members actually want to be in. The author is not naïve to personnel requirements of the sea services and this option is not meant erode the potential pool of ships’ captains, department heads, or battalion commanders. It is merely an entrepreneurial recommendation for the services to better utilize their top performers, with effects that will ripple down throughout the entire force.

2) “Learn More and Do Better”: The sea services must eschew the notion that “learning is good but doing is better.” This is a false dichotomy that assumes a zero sum game between personal development and professional competence, where one comes at the expense of the other. This is ridiculous, yet promotion boards implicitly communicate this at every convening. Myopic rules about what constitutes a “key billet in grade” should be discarded in favor of a more wholistic look at the entire person up for promotion or command. Is the Marine Corps really assuming increased risk by promoting an already high performing and self-educated Major to Lieutenant Colonel without a traditional Executive Officer or Operations Officer tour? This article submits that there is minimal risk in this decision. Is there a proper combination of education and experience that can allow a potential ship’s captain to bypass a department head tour in favor of a nontraditional education program? This article again posits that there is indeed a combination of learning and doing that can compensate for the standard cookie cutter approach of career progression.

What this requires is a massive shift in the mindset of the services and their leaders. Once promotions and command allocations better account for self-driven PME, trust will rise amongst the naval workforce to pursue individual improvement opportunities. The relationship between personal development and professional competence is not zero sum but complimentary. By learning more, servicemembers will do better.

Conclusion

The sea services will need people – not equipment – to do the hard things that are sure to come in the next conflict. The wars of the future will transcend current known quantities such as weaponeering and single domain warfare. This future war will be cognitively rigorous, and the leaders who can think effectively first will be the ones who attack effectively first. An educated and intelligent naval workforce is a requirement if the sea services are to succeed in these future wars. Professional Military Education, long an area of investment in our human capital, needs to be revamped and better weaponized to attract and retain the brightest minds in the naval force. Leaders at all levels must provide incentives for self-study PME, not judging it against time spent in the office but more so as a compliment to this time. Leaders must also realize when individual increases in proficiency arise from entrepreneurial PME initiatives and laud them.

Institutionally, the sea services should allow for the best and brightest servicemembers to design their own PME program, provided that it nests within their professional duties and the needs of the service. The services’ highest leaders must champion the notion that education does not equal a degradation of experience but more so an increase in potential performance. Promotions should reflect this shift in mindset, effectively communicating to the workforce that there is minimal risk to one’s career if they seek out education. Combining these grassroots and institutional-level efforts will increase the intelligence and commensurate performance of the naval workforce, provide apparent levels of career satisfaction for all involved, and allow the sea services to better fight and win the next war.

Captain Robert Holmes, USMC, is a graduate student of Eurasian regional security studies and a Eurasian Foreign Area Officer at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Endnotes

1. James Wirtz, “The Reluctant Theorist: Colin Gray and the Theory of Strategy,” Infinity Journal (March, 2014): 14.

Featured Image: Students with the Marine Corps University (MCU) participate in the MCU Commencement ceremony at Little Hall, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 8, 2022. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Huynh)

Human Factors Week

Shifting the Role of Leader and Led: Using Year Group Cohorts to Accelerate Marine Corps Force Design

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Human Factors Week

By Travis Reese 

“The United States has a perfect record in modern times of predicting when and where future outbreaks of war will occur—it always gets it wrong.”–Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

During the first three years of the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 effort, there has been a lively discussion over the intended goal of the transformation coupled with intense criticism over how the debate for change has been conducted. Critics have decried a lack of openness and transparency including a debate over the degree to which individuals feel empowered to contribute to the creation of the next iteration of the force. Force Design 2030 has been unique compared to prior design efforts in another regard; not only has there been the debate among serving Marines at every stratum of rank and experience, but there has been an intergenerational challenge from retired Marines who shaped the legacy organization of the Corps upon which these changes are being measured.

This intergenerational tension in force design, even within the active-duty force, can be improved by re-arranging the relationship between senior and subordinate and creating a process that receives input from multiple generations of Marines. This can be done by passing earlier responsibility for designing the next iteration of the Marine Corps on to successive generations of the Corps from early in a Marine’s career. The Marine Corps can achieve this change in force design methodology by establishing generational cohorts organized in 10-year increments, that are tasked with forecasting force design requirements 30 years out from the present.

These cohorts can interact and transition ideas via a process of inter-generational and cross-functional dialogue captured through an electronic learning platform and knowledge exchange portal. The concepts developed on the platform can be augmented by live conferences and standing committees led by senior Marine Corps leaders actively listening to, and coordinating with cohort members to manage recommendations for force design for further development among responsible Marine Corps agencies and commands. The role of seniors will be to guide, mentor, and resource the testing of ideas generated by successor generations in continuous campaigns of learning (plural not singular) and not simply initiate or direct change through specialized efforts in ad-hoc cycles that have an uneven track record of capability adoption and meeting timely demand. This cross-generational knowledge management will also serve as a means for talent management. A Marine’s involvement in the force design process could lead to future assignments based on demonstrated interest and relevant contributions to the force design process.

Most importantly, passing some of the responsibility for force design onto younger cohorts of Marines is a way for the Marine Corps to harvest the reservoir of ideas already in the service and turn them into actionable designs for concepts and testing solutions. This will enable the service to stay ahead of adversaries and prepare generations to lead fully resourced forces for each era with a knowledge of what will come next. These cohorts would be the basis for, and creators of, force development and design solutions impacting their generation via a “crowd sourced” but “leader-managed” methodology that would inform institutional choices and force design focus.

This methodology would overcome institutional capacity limits that force the Marine Corps to plan in a sequential era-by-era fashion that potentially misses innovative opportunities that would benefit from earlier investment under a clear conception of their potential. There is ample evidence that talented futurists reside within the ranks who can contribute to force design beyond the current effort.

The Case for an Internal Forum

The Corps prides itself on the inherited legacy of those who came before, but history shows that the challenges the Marine Corps has faced are decidedly generational. Each generation of the Marine Corps needs to develop tactics, techniques, and means that fit the circumstances of their time. How soon should that start in a generation of Marines? Marines are rarely afforded an officially sanctioned opportunity during their career to formally influence the design of the force they will eventually lead. Without a well-managed forum to harvest ideas on force design, the Marine Corps is missing out on the ability to gain and maintain momentum on future concepts and develop means conceived by steady study, debate, analysis, and investment. Thus, the service is effectively decelerating its preparation for future conflict by limiting the number of Marines who can contribute to address future problems and by not having a common platform to proactively consider timely solutions.

No forum within the service exists to place those ideas where they can be received, tracked, harvested, and tested for application at the time-horizon in which they will be likely suitable or useful. Instead, Marines have relied on participation in ad-hoc dialogue through informal professional societies to contribute ideas and in professional writing. As for professional writing, there is little correlation between contributing to a public discourse and impact on the direction of the service. Marines interested in force design but kept outside of the formal combat development process are forced to play a waiting game until they are senior enough to introduce their ideas as commanders or are otherwise touched by a campaign of learning effort to support experimentation. Simply put, young Marines do not have a way to contribute their ideas into the force design process. Rather their ideas merely float in the ether of abstract conversation and vigorous, but indifferent, debate. Additionally, the Marine Corps’ force design process is not optimized to incubate ideas over multiple time frames and for extended periods.

Unfortunately, future force planning in Department of Defense frequently falls into two habits that create static logic: first, fixation on the current security challenge which becomes an anchor to perceptions of the future. This results in the military using the current state of global affairs as the model for all future conditions or second, establishing a single point in the future and then using that point alone to design a future force with more or less a constant interpretation of the threat. The latter occurs due to the institutional inertia that builds up around an adversary model as agencies work to align their programs and efforts to an accepted framework. Each change in the model often generates a halting effect on force development or design as organizations take years or better to adjust to a new conception of the future or threat. Yet, knowing this pattern of thought and activity, the Marine Corps and Department of Defense have never really considered a method to make transitions between force design efforts more fluid. Rather, every new era of challenge is “jump started” by some national security directive with large institutional transitions surrounding the effort. The Marine Corps is currently caught in this trap as it has adopted the departmental focus on 2030 as a target date and has not begun to consider the next, but inevitable, planning horizon. This is despite the fact that a new Marine today may serve until the year 2055 and could possibly face the next design effort having to change a force conceived in 2019, realized in 2030, and sustained until 2045 or 2050.

Marine Corps lore is rife with stories of determined innovators or mavericks who forced their way in the system to “save the day” with the just in time solution that, by luck, gained the attention of a senior sponsor. Trying to cross the valley of ex-officio debate and gain the notice of senior leaders to influence change may involve uncertain, and possibly unnecessary, career-risking approaches. Personal favor, institutional connections and chance notice by a senior leader are not the ways to harvest ideas for the future of the Corps. The refrain of “send us your ideas” from senior leaders is insufficient if no one is sure who is listening and there is no place to “post the letter” for a willing leader to receive and consider.

What To Do About It? Setting Up Year Group Cohorts

The Marine Corps needs to improve the relationship between leadership and successor generations to proactively shape the inevitable transition from current to future. This can be done by dividing the force into 10-year cohorts that participate in a managed service-wide mass participation learning framework incremented into 10, 20, and 30-year horizons. Why 30 years? First, it often takes 30 years to conceive and design capabilities and doctrine and put them into practice. Most of that time is focused on building an institutionally agreed-upon problem frame and discovering potential solutions. Secondly, if one assumes that the career of most senior leaders (officer and enlisted) may be sustained out to 35 years it makes sense that cohorts should cover that outcome. Third, a 10-year cohort would include groups with diversity in rank and experience to prevent myopia in terms of outlook and experience but remain close enough that near-contemporary relationships facilitate ease of dialogue and frankness of critique. Lastly, taking a longer-range look provides institutional freedom of action to explore options and alternatives free from the constraints of contemporary pressures (although informed by them) and in a more risk accepting posture.

How would this work? At the beginning of his or her career an officer or SNCO (who is now on a career-focused path) is assigned to a cohort focused on a specific time frame. Each cohort will consider how their generation will be defined in terms of security challenges and solutions. A cohort will remain in its assigned year and transition to become the 20- or 10-year group as a new cohort is created behind them to deal with the next 30-year horizon. The oldest cohort becomes the “current” year and/or begins to retire and transition from service. Groupings would be developed based on recommendations from Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC M&RA). Cohorts would be organized as a large learning entity under a supervised management collaboration with Training and Education Command (TECOM) and Capabilities Development and Integration (DC CD&I). TECOM would be responsible to furnish access to qualified educational mentors. Professionally qualified mentors will be hired to manage the inputs, encourage research, and stimulate dialogue among the respondents. Combat developers from CD&I would be able to observe and harvest the ideas produced by the cohorts. Management of cohort contributions would be enabled via a web-based platform residing on unclassified and classified networks developed by Deputy Commandant for Information (DC I). The platform will facilitate discovery, search, and visualization of the various ideas produced by the cohorts. Problems or issues for a specific year group would be sponsored by the Deputy Commandants.

Annually, a Force Design conference would be led, structured as an activity for a regular three or four-star executive offsite. Cohort managers and mentors would provide a report back to the Commandant and deputy commandant sponsors on a cohort’s responses to a design question or specific challenge. Further, cohort managers could introduce new initiatives or concepts spawned by the cohort for consideration by the senior leaders. Select cohort members could be called in to brief their recommendations or future operating environment insights to the senior leaders. From these recommendations, debate would ensue on proposed investments, experiments, research, manpower adjustments, or concept development activities to conduct in support of each time-frame’s force development or design requirements. Nothing about this effort would disrupt standing institutional processes of capability development, acquisition, or budget planning. If anything, it would generate a faster-paced, iterative, institutionally understood, and data-informed pedigree to many force design initiatives under a participant-led and leader-managed effort. 

The overall benefits of an institutionally integrated knowledge and professional exchange framework would be vast. Rather than random discoverability of talent or ideas spread across informal learning societies, intra- and intergenerational dialogue would exist across the Marine Corps with the express purpose of developing actionable ideas on future concepts directly. Participants, without disruption to necessary career progression, can engage in early strategic thinking about the future. This would have an impact on the quality of professional military education since instruction on strategy and strategic thinking would be amplifying to an embedded institutional activity. The knowledge portal would enable the service to discovery solutions to current and future challenges on a persistent basis rather than by exception through the ad-hoc use of events like challenge days or military “shark tanks” whose outcomes on capability development are uncertain and still require interest for adoption. Iterative doctrine development and deliberation would begin sooner rather than constrained to small writing venues or billet-specific offices. Force design as a process would shift to participant-driven and leader-managed generating large-scale buy-in and removing the variable of personality-focused initiatives. Lastly, every participant would have common appreciation of each 10-year framework guiding force development and design activities which they can articulate to external stakeholders in positions to support USMC discovery or resource solutions.

The Role of Mentors

Effective mentorship is essential to this proposal and would necessarily vary from cohort to cohort. Younger Marines focused on the 30-year horizon likely need very little encouragement to conceive of the next innovations that can be applied in the future. At this phase in their careers, they would likely need more guidance on how to research appropriately, create a sound argument, understand the implications of history and where to harvest those lessons. They need mentorship in the tools that make it possible to form a testable hypothesis for their intuitive vision. The 20-year horizon group is a mid-tier professional who needs insights regarding the institutional processes that will govern force design and development. They need mentors who will advise on institutional memory and help them navigate the gates of the system that will make it possible to shift from ideation to action.

The 10-year horizon group is in the nexus of decision between realizing their concepts that have been matured and challenged over 15-20 years and managing the acquisition risk of replacing the current force. They need executive-level mentorship in decision making and risk management at this stage of force design. The same mentors should not remain with a cohort as they are specialists in certain skills with biases and conceptions that should be minimized by exposure to other schools of thought.

Overall, it is important for the Marine Corps to not select mentors based on perceived authority bias or reputational history alone. Rather, cohorts may consist of iconoclasts and relative unknowns whose talents and skills are familiar to a small group but whose history of institutional challenge and change far exceeds their reputation.

Preventing Silos and Creating Institution-wide Cross-functional Dialogue

A risk of cohorts is that they can become silos of competition and become protective or adversarial against their counterpart cohorts. This can be prevented by incentivizing cross-functional exchange among the cohorts. A simple example: the 20-year cohort is depending on a particular technology to realize their proposed capabilities. It is discovered that the technology is viable, yet unachievable in that timeframe. Rather than abandon the investment, a decision is made for the 30-year cohort to inherit consideration of this option. Likewise, the 30-year group was considering a particular advancement and it is realized that the technology will be available in 10 years.

A decision could be made to transfer development to the 10-year cohort accelerating outcomes for them, potentially generating an unexpected overmatch for a range of adversaries, but also forcing a change to manpower requirements and doctrine development. To sustain this exchange, it would be necessary to conduct an annual conference, likely geared around the budget cycle, led by the Commandant. Cross-functional discussion of cohort discoveries sponsored by the Deputy Commandant for CD&I or a cohort manager can be led and investments in various force design options can be considered under unique scenarios for each year group. This process would help shape the transition of force design efforts to a participant-led and senior-leader managed process and enable the capacity to manage investments over a longer horizon with a better transition between current and future forces.

Conclusion

Members of the military live and work in two timeframes: present and future. The present is all about competency with current tools and techniques to be ready for today’s challenges. It is achieved through training, practiced in exercises, and measured in inspections and evaluations. The future is about preparedness for tomorrow’s challenges and requires the planning, preparation and imagination necessary to avoid strategic surprise. It is achieved through considering future scenarios, practiced in wargames, realized through investment in doctrine and technology, and measured in live and virtual experimentation.

If anything, the efforts of FD2030 should make the Marine Corps realize that current and future live in a symbiotic relationship and although everyone is required to master the threats of today, it is equally important to think about and prepare for tomorrow. Adversaries are always preparing to develop countermeasures to our well-developed structures and means.

Rather than simply leveraging industry or academia as sources of alternatives and solutions, the same level of alternative thinking (coupled with a greater sense of the implications) can occur inside of the Marine Corps. Modern technology and information exchange has made it possible to overcome the limits of happenstance discovery and the need for patronage of reformers and thinkers that formally infused the system.

Every Marine can become a force designer. The Marine Corps can harvest those ideas into action vice merely be observers/encouragers of the dialogue. Marines can level their interest in the future training, design, and development of the force into career-making choices supported by an institution that not only cares about what they think but acts on it.

The institutional conflict around FD2030 shows that the Marine Corps must improve how it leverages each generation of the Corps in preparing for future challenges. Those decisions must be informed by relevant institutional experience, but not be mired in the preferences and predilections of prior generations. The role of responsible generations to solve the problems they will face in the future must be given a commensurate opportunity and appropriate authority earlier if force design is to become a fluid, timely, inclusive, and less disruptive in the future.

Travis Reese retired from the Marine Corps as Lieutenant Colonel after nearly 21 years of service While on active duty he served as an artillery office and in a variety of billets inclusive of tours in capabilities development, future scenario design, and institutional strategy. Since his retirement in 2016 he was one of the co-developers of the Joint Force Operating Scenario process. Mr. Reese is now the Director of Wargaming and Net Assessment for Troika Solutions in Reston, VA.

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Human Factors Week

Groton as a Case Study for Building Naval Capital Towns

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Human Factors Week

By Ryan C. Walker

On June 14, 1952, President Harry S. Truman visited the small town of Groton, CT, to commission the USS Nautilus (SSN-571), the first nuclear submarine. Truman, noting the pride present in the community gathered before him, began his speech with a joking comparison to his hometown of Independence, Missouri:

“I am very glad to be here today in Groton, Connecticut. You see, I got the right town this time. Somebody told me last week that this ceremony was going to be held in New London, over on the other side of the river. I referred to it in the speech I made Saturday out in Missouri. Very shortly thereafter I was set right in no uncertain terms. I am glad to see the people of Groton are proud of their hometown. I know how they feel. I sometimes get pretty tired of Kansas City taking all the credit for things that happen in Independence, Missouri. I can understand why the people of Groton should be proud of what is happening here today.”1

The residents of Groton were proud not just from the Nautilus, but for supporting both the Naval Submarine Base New London (SUBASE NLON) and General Dynamics Electric Boat Shipyard (EB). The people living within and commuting to Groton were responsible for building and maintaining a sizeable portion of the American submarine fleet, both past and present. Groton evolved from a sleepy community of 5,600 persons with few businesses, a defunct naval base, and underutilized shipbuilding infrastructure at the beginning of the twentieth century into the self-proclaimed “Submarine Capital of the World.”2 In 2020, at least 64.8 percent of the total workforce is directly associated with the submarine community, 10,350 persons worked at SUBASE NLON, and 8,092 work at GDEB, lending credence to this continued claim.3 Groton is, as described by local historians, “first and foremost, a maritime community.”4

USS Nautilus at the Submarine Force Library & Museum, Groton, Connecticut. United States, Connecticut, Groton, September 17, 2022. (Photo by Brittney R. Hedges)

Despite these impressive numbers, significant maritime workforce challenges have emerged. EB President Kevin Graney has embarked upon an aggressive hiring campaign both to fight attrition and support the boom in submarine construction, including by planning on hiring 3,000 more workers after already hiring 2,500 in 2021.5 Why so many? The issues stem primarily from a slowdown in naval activity in the region from 1989-2017 as submarines were decommissioned or moved away from the East Coast and submarine construction slowed. While 8,092 workers seem an impressive figure, 15,000 were employed previously at the EB shipyard in Groton in 1990.6 It is unlikely those local or stationed in the area saw EB or SUBASE NLON’s future as promising in the near or distant future. EB retained the workforce it had, while many of the younger, more junior employees were laid off or sought greener pastures.

There are two sets of issues, short-term and long-term, that EB and many other shipyards ramping up production face. The long-term issues are evolutionary in nature since it takes generations of investment and multiple avenues of funding to develop naval capital towns (NCTs) from scratch. These NCTs provide a critical foundation for naval industry to grow and flourish, making their development a naval priority. An upcoming edited chapter by the author describes this process and offers insights into developing NCTs, which can ensure the United States retains the naval industrial base it currently has and effectively support these communities.7 Groton’s development deserves closer consideration and sets the stage for two potential issues and recommendations for improving NCTs: finding recently separated or retired veterans by revamping rating-to job-conversions and changing perceptions of shipyard work environments and labor forces.

Groton from 1868-1940

The foundations of Groton becoming an NCT lay in EB and SUBASE NLON’s concurrent development through 1868-1940. While SUBASE NLON finds its origins in the predecessor Thames Naval Yard, alternatively known at the New London Navy Yard, it remained stagnant and underutilized throughout much of its life. Questions of purpose and cost would define the New London Navy Yard’s existence, and reasonably so. It was not being used for its incipient recommended purposes— the construction of naval vessels.8 Some ships were put “in ordinary,” but few active ships were in the region.9 One proposition for greater use came from a committee in 1883, who suggested the site was only suitable for building a “naval asylum.” This was met with immediate resistance, with the local newspaper The Day proclaiming in a front-page headline, “Thames Yard Must Go!”10 As can be seen in these early interactions, the federal government was only one interested party among many in the nineteenth century, and was often overridden by state and local interests.11

The Naval Yard was employed for two purposes in the first decade of the twentieth century – as a coal facility in 1900 and Marine Corps officer training station in 1907.12 The Marine Corps school moved to League Island in 1910 and the coaling station appeared to be underutilized, leaving an almost completely abandoned naval base.13 This did not change until EB determined that the current construction facilities in Quincy were insufficient in 1910. The company sent engineer Frank Cable to scout new locations to produce diesel engines. Upon his recommendation, the company selected Groton as the site for future expansion of the New London Ship and Engine Company (NELSECO), purchasing (initially leasing) the abandoned infrastructure from the Electric Shipbuilding Company. His rationale seems to be primarily business driven, since much of the initial infrastructure was already there, waiting for purpose.14 Furthermore, Groton was a shipbuilding town lacking a major employer, the harbor was dredged, the state paid for much of the new roads, railways accessing major cities such as New York and Boston were available, water and transportation costs were low, and it was likely cheaper than using developed facilities in New Jersey or New York.15 

The forgotten Thames Naval Yard was likely not a consideration initially, but a promising 1915 visit by President Wilson’s Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, signaled the beginning of change. Daniels’ administration found an issue with how the U.S. Navy had managed its submarines and submarine sailors at the beginning of his tenure and his vision transformed the Thames Navy Yard into the naval base that it is known as today. At the time Sailors were housed in motherships that were manning intensive and expensive, so land bases were explored. Proximity to NELSECO and Lake Torpedo Boat were cited as reasons for the expansion, as both would create a feedback loop of feeding off the other’s success.16 The 1920s were a difficult decade for private yards. But by 1930, critical practices and interconnections had become firmly embedded between government and the local community, which typically characterizes stable defense industry sectors.17 Groton became a NCT in this period, one of the few that has been preserved relatively intact.

Aerial view of the U.S. Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton, Connecticut, on 21 July 1941. (U.S. Navy photo)

Naval Labor Transitions to Maritime Shipyard Labor

The bonds between the two major employers have become a major part of the identity of Groton as evidenced by the Submarine Force Library and Museum (which also houses the permanently moored USS Nautilus), SUBVETS WWII National Memorial East, and numerous streets and neighborhoods named after submarines. For many submariners, Groton became a home at some point of their careers, and many continue to offer their service in employment developing technology, building submarines or working on base, often drawing from competencies developed from submarine service. This community is the product of a century of commitment and cultivation, developing naval infrastructure, and promoting cross-state migration drawn by the allure of well-paying jobs in the region. Eastern Connecticut has proven uniquely suited to submarine construction because of the long-term investment in the region by all layers of private, public, labor, and military interests and its connection to other NCTs.

SUBVETS WWII National Memorial East in Groton, Connecticut, June 27, 2022. (Photo by Brittney R. Hedges)

Efforts to attract sailors who are recently separated or retired, particularly from the submarine community, should be actively pursued and redoubled. The major hurdles are convincing sailors to not return to their hometown or state and rating-to-job skill training. The former issue is a difficult sell, there are many who are dead set on leaving Connecticut. Yet a qualified enlisted submariner who has completed more than five years of experience is an incredibly versatile person worth pursuing. Their daily duties included not only their rate, but also armed security watchstanding, quality assurance, damage control, supervisory roles, voluntary positions, and more. The skillsets are extensive. These individuals are among the most precious resource to maritime workforces in Groton, yet many leave the areas they served in for a variety of reasons. Finding a place for them, ideally that utilizes their acumen, is key to unlocking the full potential of the bonds between the shipyard, the naval base, and the local community. A submariner has learned quite a bit in their time, learning a trade in the right environment is not out of the question.

Issues with Perception: Who wants to work in a yard?

Part of the reason junior sailors are so important is the relatively insular nature of maritime industry. It is a relatively unknown niche industry that only directly or indirectly employs 393,390 people in the United States, of which 83.1 percent of the directly employed are concentrated in ten states.18 Of these ten states, the highest per capita of ship construction and repair workers belongs to Maine, at only 1.6 percent of the total employment, with Connecticut at 1.2 percent, meaning even in these states there is a high likelihood some may have never considered employment in shipyards.19 Further complicating this are some stigmas associated with shipyard work and workers, the so-called “shipyard bubbas.”

Part of these negative perceptions stems from some societal attitudes that do not effectively value “blue-collar” work or more accurately, “skilled tradesworkers.”20 Dispelling the negative perception of the bubba is necessary moving forward to attract labor. Asking why this perception problem exists, and identifying the root cause, will be paramount to resolving this issue. The answer may come down to management and administration practices. Are leaders willing to adapt and rebrand to attract a younger workforce?

Wall of Honor at SUBVETS WWII National Memorial East in Groton, Connecticut, June 27, 2022. (Photo by Brittney R. Hedges)

Conclusion

The process to build an NCT is incredibly difficult and requires decades of patience. The main issue for Groton has been funding. The end of the Cold War made a downturn in defense spending inevitable, with significant impacts on the submarine shipbuilding industry and the communities that support the industry. Reversing declining trends in labor over the past three decades will be an uphill battle for naval capital towns like Groton. Rebuilding the feedback loop of success between the EB and SUBASE NLON is necessary to translate retiring naval labor into local maritime labor, all while fighting negative perceptions associated with shipyard work. Expanding work outside of current NCTs may not be feasible in the short term and may be difficult to maintain in the long term. It is much better to focus on the established NCTs, rebuild connections between industry and the Navy, and improve labor management and administration practices.

Ryan C. Walker served in the USN from 2014-2019, as an enlisted Fire Control Technician aboard the USS Springfield(SSN-761). Honorably discharged in December of 2019; he graduated Summa Cum Laude from Southern New Hampshire University with a BA in History. He is currently a MA Candidate at the University of Portsmouth, where he studies Naval History and hopes to pursue further studies after graduation. His current research focus is on early submarine culture (1900-1940), Naval-Capital Towns in the U.S., and British private men-of-war in the North Atlantic. The research for this article came from his upcoming chapter in Seapower By Other Means, (ed. J. Overton), where he explores the process of building Groton CT as a Naval Capital town from 1868-1940. He currently resides in lovely Groton, CT.

Endnotes

1. Harry S. Truman, Address in Groton, Conn., at the Keel Laying of the first Atomic Energy Submarine. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230973

2. Mary E. Denison. “Historic Heights, or the Borough of Groton.” In Historic Groton: Comprising Historic and Descriptive Sketches Pertaining to Groton Heights, Center Groton, Poquonnoc Bridge, Noank, Mystic and Old Mystic, Connecticut, ed. Charles Burgess. (Moosup, CT: Charles F. Burgess), 1909. 18; State of Connecticut. “Population of Connecticut Towns 1900-1960.” Accessed December 27, 2021. https://portal.ct.gov/SOTS/Register-Manual/Section-VII/Population-1900-1960

3. Town of Groton Finance Department. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Town of Groton: Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2020. (Town of Groton: Finance Department, 2020). 140. This is a minimum and does not include other significant defense employers in the Groton and the surrounding areas such as Progeny, SEACORP LLC, and Sonalysts to name a few.

4. Carol W. Kimball, James L. Streeter, & Marilyn J. Comrie, Images of America: Groton Revisited, (Portsmouth: Arcadia, 2007). 7

5. Brian Hallenbeck, “Electric Boat president can’t stress it enough: ‘We’re hiring!’” The Day,  

6. Robert Weisman, “Layoffs at EB Were Expected, but Still Painful,” Hartford Courant, April 14, 1992, Hartford, CT, https://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-xpm-1992-04-14-0000203265-story.html

7. Ryan C. Walker, “The Development of Groton as a Naval Capital Town: 1868-1940,” in Seapower by Other Means: Naval Contributions to National Objectives Beyond Sea Control and Power Projection, ed. J Overton, ISPK Seapower Series: Kiel, 2023). Upcoming publication.

8. New London Navy Yard Committee. Review of the Minority Report on the Navy Yard Question. (New London: Starr and Farnham Printers, 1864). 35-36

9. Brian Hallenbeck, “Electric Boat president can’t stress it enough: ‘We’re hiring!’” The Day, January 20, 2022, accessed October 3, 2022, https://www.theday.com/local-news/20220121/electric-boat-president-cant-stress-it-enough-were-hiring/.

10. “Thames Yard Must Go!” The Day, No. 772, New London, CT, December 31, 1883. In Google News Archive: The Day, Alphabet Inc. Accessed January 1, 2022. https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=SrsqWtBqNIQC

11. Often forgotten was how weak Federal power was until the Great Depression, while the State preoccupied itself creating a welcoming environment for business. Local political power played a major role, alongside private and business interests in much of the United States.

12. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives: On Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy 1906-1907. (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1907). 215

13. David J. Bishop Images of America: Naval Submarine Base New London. (Portsmouth: Arcadia, 2006), 5-18. Bishop has picture of ships at the pier but gives the decline of coal as a maritime fuel as the reason. Coal was still a major part of the USN, so this reason does not capture the full scope of possibilities.

14. Frank Cable. “The Story of Our Plant,” 3-4 The Association Mirror, (May 1935). Submarine Archives, Electric Boat Collection, Submarine Force Library and Museum, Groton, CT. 2-3

15. Benjamin Tinkham Marshall, ed. A Modern History of New London County, Connecticut: Vol. 1, (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1922), 227, 237.

16. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, HR 5949, day two, Sixty-Fifth Congress, 1sr sess, September 20, 1917. 88

17. Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval- Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center Department of the Navy, 1993).

18. Maritime Administration (MARAD), The Economic Importance of the U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, Report, March 30, 2021. https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/2021-06/Economic%20Contributions%20of%20U.S.%20Shipbuilding%20and%20Repairing%20Industry.pdf 1, 8

19. MARAD, U.S. Private Shipbuilding and Repairing Industry, 20

20. Dana Wilkie, “The Blue-Collar Drought: Why jobs that were once the backbone of the U.S. economy have grown increasingly hard to fill.” SHRM, February 2, 2019, https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/the-blue-collar-drought.aspx

Featured Image: Snow covers the hull of the fast attack submarine USS Virginia (SSN 774) as it sits moored to the pier at Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton, Conn., on Feb. 2, 2007. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Human Factors Week

The Defense Department’s Unfinished DEI Business: A 10-Point Plan

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Human Factors Week

By Captain John Cordle, (ret.), and LCDR Reuben Keith Green, (ret.)

Human Capital; Humane Capitulation

“Most Americans associate the strength of the Navy with grey-hulled ships at sea, but the true sources of our naval power are the people and the loved ones who support them.” These are the words of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday, speaking to lawmakers on Capitol Hill at his nomination hearing. As today’s military looks toward possible future conflicts with peer competitors, one thing we will need more than anything else is the best people. With recruiting challenges driving unprecedented measures such as significant signing bonuses, the Department of Defense needs to look to existing policies and practices that act as barriers to recruiting and retaining the right mix of servicemembers – irrespective of race or gender.

There is a major battle underway between those who support Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives and those who see them as divisive. The irony is that true DEI does not mean “more minorities,” but a diverse force that creates a culture where everyone has an equal chance of success. It is a fantasy to believe that a meritocracy is purely objective and devoid of bias, both explicit and subconscious. After attending a series of DEI symposia over the past year, we have built a series of recommendations, some of which would cost little to nothing, but each of which would very likely attract and keep more of the critical human capital needed to keep our nation safe.

People Issues, Policy Issues

Following the shocking murder of George Floyd and the lynching of Ahmaud Arbery, there were world-wide condemnations, soul-searching, introspection, and acknowledgement of shortcomings, as well as commitments to change. Those reactions occurred within the Department of Defense as well. Military personnel shared their experiences with discrimination and racism, including the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force, a retired four-star Navy admiral, and numerous mid-level active duty and retired officers from multiple services. Military personnel involved in focus group discussions yelled at each other from different sides of the racial divides, and the Air Force received 27,000 single-spaced pages of data after requesting stories of discrimination from their members. Symposiums were held, reports were commissioned and completed, programs were put in place, and accountability was fixed for progress.

But as with each period of progress toward true equity and inclusion, there was resistance, denial, and indecision as to how far to go. For the average servicemember, the most visible change was the banishment of offensive symbology from military bases, and name changes for nine Army bases named for Confederate figures (but oddly, no similar changes for two ships – more on this later). These changes were not without pushback and resistance, including from the then-Commander-in-Chief, but they are happening now. While the demise of Camp Nathan Bedford Forrest and USS Josephus Daniels occurred organically, the other more recent changes did not. Forrest fought for the Confederacy and was a feared slave trader and breaker, and is credited with founding the Ku Klux Klan, a terrorist group. Daniels was a newspaperman who masterminded the infamous 1898 Wilmington North Carolina Insurrection, and also served as Secretary of the Navy 20 years later.

These entities are long gone, passed to history, but other problematic names adorn two aircraft carriers – the USS John S. Stennis, a segregationist (read: racist) who led the Southern “Dixiecrats” as a Mississippi senator, and who called his senate office conference table “The Flagship of the Confederacy.” The USS Carl Vinson is named after another representative cut from a similar cloth. While many have forgotten the behavior and policies that made these men soldiers of segregation, the minority Sailors serving on these ships must feel a bit uneasy as they walk across the quarterdeck, if they know the history. Those individuals may have been helpful to the Navy in certain respects, but they are relics of a past that we can address, not erase – and send a clear and powerful message of inclusion.

Emblem of the USS John C. Stennis CVN-74 (Via Wikimedia Commons)

Two years hence, it is time to look at what low-hanging fruit remains, based upon the reported experiences of servicemembers currently serving our nation. According to a DOD survey, fully one third of our minority servicemembers have reported racist, extremist, and harassing behavior having been directed at them, and no specific new guidance has been provided to them or increase in accountability for the offenders announced or codified. Numerous reports have been published about the ongoing issues of racism and discrimination in the military, as reported in stories by the Associated Press, Reuters, and other organizations. Congressional studies and research from the Center for Naval Analyses have shown increases in violent extremism, even while some call for the DOD to cease talking about it. Those reports have largely gone unanswered by cognizant authorities. Conversely, the Department of Defense removed the statistics regarding formal discrimination complaints from the historical Annual Defense Reports, and that data is now difficult to obtain and assess. Despite having been outlawed in 1948 by executive order, racist actions and behavior do not have a separate offense category under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, resulting in (according to a 2021 Center for Naval Analyses study on the topic), a quandary in that “the data quality is too poor to make a true assessment.” But that does not mean there is nothing to assess.

Some discriminatory polices remain, if nuanced and unintended. Male servicemembers suffering from Pseudofolliculitis Barbae (PFB) in all branches of the service have repeatedly faced harassment, disrespect, delayed promotions, and other adverse impact because of a permanent, genetic condition beyond their control. PFB is a skin condition that results in inflammation caused by ingrown hairs, typically around the face and beard areas, making it challenging and painful for individuals with PFB to consistently maintain a close shave. It afflicts 50 to 75 percent of blacks and 3 to 5 percent of whites who shave. Studies have shown individuals with PFB suffer a negative impact on promotion and advancement opportunities that negatively impact their careers, not to mention the psychological impact on individuals being singled out and disrespected on account of an approved treatment for a medical condition which can easily be rectified by growing a short beard, something that has occurred in the Navy and in the Army in the past.

A servicemember suffering from PFB (Photo via Military Medicine, the International Journal of AMSUS)

Other than “tradition,” there is little justifiable reason to allow this situation and its discriminatory impact on a significant portion of the military to continue. The recruiting woes facing all the services can be addressed in a positive manner by making it less painful and difficult to serve. Would the policy change if a majority of white men were affected by this painful condition?

Retired Fleet Master Chief Raymond Kemp had a no-shave chit for much of his career due to PFB. But as he advanced, a senior told him he would need to shave if he wanted to prove he was a “company man.” Kemp is shown here at his retirement ceremony in 2019. (U.S. Navy photo)

A recurring complaint expressed by many servicemembers is the lack of respect shown them in their daily lives while serving in uniform. A recent Joint Women’s Leadership Symposium featured discussions of sexual harassment; a female servicemember has a one in three change of being sexually harassed within the next year, and an 85 percent chance in her career. Sexual assaults at the service academies are up again for the past year.

Many of the problems mentioned here are reflections of a society that still struggles with concepts like racism, sexism, prejudice, or their opposites. To many, the implication of institutional bias, even when supported by data and facts, is seen as a personal affront. The institution is a reflection of its members – unlike larger society, which is stuck with some portion of biased or criminal members, the military can impact its own composition by seeking out and separating them. We cannot easily change minds – but we can change behavior. A good parallel can be drawn between the culture change that has resulted in better definition and understanding of the spectrum of harm associated with sexual harassment to sexual assault, and that of racism or discrimination to violent extremism. The former has outpaced the latter, but also laid a solid foundation upon which to build.

Recommendations 

What specific actions do we recommend? Stop addressing the issues one service at a time and create a coherent DOD strategy to include multiple steps that address challenges in a multi-faceted way.

1. The department should review and synthesize the plethora of past studies and reports and assess what has changed and what has not. The USFF Comprehensive Review of Surface Collisions provided an excellent template for this process, looking back over two decades of reports and studies as part of its assessment.

2. Reinstate the requirement to report and release the formal military discrimination complaint statistics on an annual basis and provide the historical reports that have been hidden thus far from public view. Include the number of reports, and how many were found to be substantiated and unsubstantiated, to facilitate trend analysis and eliminate poor data quality which has existed for decades.

3. Publish diversity studies and research in a readable, data-based format for public and servicemember understanding, rather than bury studies in a limited academic forum or format with no context.

4. Continue to provide education and review policies that present barriers to reporting sexual and racial discrimination, such as SECNAV’s recent policy to not prosecute minor infractions (such as underage drinking or UA) on the part of victims that report an assault, and assigning investigators outside the chain of command. Make these DOD policy.

5. Add “Respect” to the core values of each service, and to the Department of Defense. Accompany this with education on what it means to respect your peers, subordinates, and your service with concrete behavior. Start the conversation, spread best practices, and send a signal.

6. Rename the USS John C. Stennis and USS Carl Vinson, so that not one more generation of Black sailors has to face the prospect of serving on a ship named for individuals who focused on ensuring they were held to second class status as citizens and servicemembers. There are plenty of deserving heroes of all races that could serve as more fitting names for the U.S. Navy’s warships.

7. Revise the policies regarding facial hair to reflect a more equitable treatment of servicemembers afflicted with PFB. Allow short, well-trimmed beards for all servicemembers.

8. Create a DOD Women’s Policy Board, comprised of officer, enlisted, and civilian members, to provide DOD leadership with recommendations regarding issues relating to females serving within the department, and as a clearing house for problems to be addressed once identified.

9. Add a Uniform Code of Military Justice offense of “racist actions and behavior” so that each individual understands that they can be held accountable for such behavior. A database can be developed on recorded offenses and inform desired change. Publish the results to show accountability at work.

10. Establish a permanent DOD and GAO review process similar to Task Force One Navy, not as a one-time reaction with a singular focus, but as an enduring process that provides an annual report on diversity, equity, and inclusion policies and action items. It should note progress, or lack thereof.

Conclusion

The most frequent DOD response to most of these items in the past has been “no comment.” This must change. These 10 actions would require education, learning, and – most importantly – empathy, on the part of both junior and senior leaders. But they can all be completed in short order, with little relative cost, and will pay huge dividends. If taken, each of them will improve not just diversity, equity, and inclusion, but will have a lasting impact on retention, morale, unit cohesion, and advancement of all servicemembers. Just as importantly, by investing in our human capital – our people – the long term impacts will be seen where it really counts – a tangible boost in operational readiness and national security.

Captain John Cordle retired from the Navy in 2013 after 30 years of service. He commanded the USS Oscar Austin (DDG-79) and USS San Jacinto (CG-56), retiring as Chief of Staff for Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic. He received the U.S. Navy League’s Captain John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership in 2010, the Surface Navy Literary Award, and Naval Institute Proceedings Author of the Year Award in 2019. Recently, he has teamed with his co-author, LCDR Green, in an effort to promote diversity and inclusion in the military, authoring several articles and featured as speakers on the topic at various Navy and affinity group DEI symposia over the past two years. 

Lieutenant Commander Keith Green retired in 1997  after serving 22 years in the Navy. He served four department head tours, including as Executive Officer in USS Gemini (PHM-6). He is a former Legal Yeoman, Equal Opportunity Program Specialist, and leadership Instructor, and was commissioned in 1984 via Officer Candidate School. He has an MS degree in Human Resources Development. His memoir Black Officer,White Navy was acquired by a University Press and a revised edition will be republished in 2023.

Featured Image: Rear Adm. Alvin Holsey (left) speaks with Ensign Dimitri Foster in the pilothouse aboard guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain in 2018. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Craig Rodarte/U.S. Navy)