NATO Naval Power Week

By Steinar Torset and Ian Bowers

Despite significant and ongoing losses suffered as a result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia remains a significant threat to NATO members. As NATO restructures to address this new reality, NATO’s naval forces must also restructure to both exploit NATO’s enlargement and better address simultaneous threats in NATO’s waters.

The accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO, two states with highly capable navies, has fundamentally changed the alliance’s military maritime geography. The Baltic Sea is now an operational area dominated by NATO members. Nevertheless, it is not yet a NATO lake with Russia, operating out of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, capable of creating a range of below-the-threshold and wartime operational effects. At the same time, Russia’s Northern Fleet has largely avoided the force degradation experienced by Russian land forces and continues to pose a challenge in the High North and the North Atlantic.

NATO should create a third Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) dedicated to operations in the Baltic. This would fully exploit the operational benefits of Finland and Sweden joining NATO and take advantage of ongoing force developments in other Baltic NATO navies, including Poland and Germany.

Not only would the new SNMG-3 be drawn largely from Baltic states, but it would also leverage their somewhat bespoke capabilities and regional knowledge. It would also be designed to work closely with regional NATO land and air components, a necessity given the littoral nature of the operating theatre. Furthermore, it would allow SNMG-1 to concentrate fully on its primary area of operations in the North Atlantic without being pulled out of area to manage contingencies and demonstrate presence in the Baltic. NATO will have access to sufficient forces to maintain an extra SNMG and should therefore take advantage of this opportunity.

The Russian Threat in the North Atlantic and the Baltic

At sea, Russia poses a range of threats across the competition continuum to NATO and its members. According to multiple intelligence agencies, Russia’s Northern Fleet, based on the Kola Peninsula, remains fully operational. While doubts persist over the quality of the fleet’s surface assets, particularly for high-intensity combat and sustained operations, there is consensus that Russia’s undersea platforms pose a significant threat to the alliance. Not only do they have potent warfighting capabilities, but they enable and conduct hybrid operations such as disrupting undersea infrastructure.

At the same time in the Baltic, Russia’s Baltic Fleet and civil maritime presence poses if not an equal but still potent threat to NATO interests. Although Russia is isolated, with every other littoral state a member of NATO, this does not mean the Baltic is a so-called NATO lake. The Baltic fleet and Russian civil and shadow maritime presence have a range of hybrid and traditional warfighting capabilities. The numerous cases of disruption to undersea cables are likely examples of this capability.

The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad presents a significant if not insurmountable challenge to NATO forces. In particular, Russian aircraft, anti-ship, and anti-air missiles deployed at Kaliningrad present an ever-present risk to NATO maritime and air forces. NATO’s solution to this problem is likely a joint approach where a combination of the maritime, land, and air components allow NATO to establish and maintain an advantage.

NATO’s Current Maritime Posture

NATO’s primary warfighting force at sea in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea is SNMG-1. SNMG-1’s overarching wartime mission is to secure transatlantic SLOCs and conduct operations on NATO’s northern flank to establish limited sea control or conduct sea denial activities in areas vital to NATO’s reinforcement. In competition and crisis phase operations, SNMG-1 is tasked with participating in exercises, contingency response, and monitoring Russian activities in the High North, including Russian submarines deployments from the Kola Peninsula. The presence of a robust maritime group in the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, and even as far north as the Barents Sea is assessed to be one of the deterrence mechanisms NATO uses in peacetime.

Vitally, NATO relies on SNMG-1 not only to operate in the North Atlantic but also in the Baltic. This divides the group’s operational focus and leaves occasional gaps in NATO’s maritime presence in both vital strategic areas. For example, SNMG-1 regularly participates in the large, annual U.S.-led BALTOPS exercise. SNMG-1 also lent its operational support to the NATO Operation Baltic Sentry which is designed to increase NATO’s maritime presence and domain awareness to protect critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic.

This situation was acceptable when NATO members restructured their forces in the post-Cold War world and the perceived threat from Russia was diminished. Indeed, in that period the SNMG’s operational priorities moved away from high-end deterrence and toward a set of constabulary-type operations including peace enforcement, counterpiracy and counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, due to strategic inertia within NATO and shrinking fleet sizes, all NATO SNMGs struggled to maintain required force levels with often only two or three vessels assigned to each group, which would be temporarily reinforced during exercises.

Although national contributions to the four NATO standing maritime groups have increased since 2022, the current strategic and operational situation requires a new solution, one that would provide NATO with standing maritime forces in all key operational areas.

Baltic Naval Forces and SNMG-3

During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea fell under Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe, then based at Kolsås in Norway. The maritime component of the command, NAVBALTAP, had the primary mission of denying the Soviet Baltic Fleet entry to the North Sea through the Baltic approaches while also disrupting Warsaw Pact operations in the Baltic itself. By sealing off the Baltic Sea, this ensured that ports vital to NATO resupply were secure and that the Soviet Baltic Fleet could not support the Northern Fleet for operations in the Norwegian Sea.

The situation has now changed. Whereas previously the only Baltic NATO states were Denmark and West Germany, now Russia is surrounded by NATO members. This changes NATO’s operational priorities for the Baltic, where NATO no longer has to deny the Soviet Union the free use of the Baltic. Instead, it must now attain sea control to ensure that the vital SLOCs and undersea infrastructure that sustain many Baltic states are protected, as is the territorial sovereignty of all member states. In addition, NATO can fully exploit its naval superiority in the Baltic Sea and deliver a variety of offensive effects across and through the Baltic theatre should war break out.   

Before Finland and Sweden joined NATO, it could be argued that Baltic Sea NATO members did not have sufficient capabilities to maintain an SNMG dedicated to their waters. The situation has now changed. Not only do Sweden and Finland bring new capabilities to NATO’s force structure, they also join other NATO Baltic states – Poland, Germany, and Denmark – that are currently investing in new naval platforms. Combined, these new ships will provide NATO with sufficient surface capabilities around which to form a new SNMG, which as with other SNMGs, would have one commander and flagship that would rotate from country to country.

Finland is currently in the process of strengthening their navy with four new Pohjanmaa-class corvettes. The first of these 4,300-ton vessels is scheduled to be commissioned in 2027. Armed with anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-air capabilities, these vessels represent a significant enhancement in Finnish naval capabilities. Alongside the four Hamina-class fast attack craft, these new corvettes will provide NATO with a potent set of naval platforms for operations in the Baltic.  

Sweden’s navy is also undergoing substantial change. In 2020 the Swedish government decided to add an additional four surface combatants to the Swedish fleet. Initially, this was going to be a second generation of the already existing and highly capable Visby-class corvette. The ambition for this second generation was to make it more suited for NATO operations, equipped with modern anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-submarine torpedoes. However, in 2023 Sweden cancelled these plans and decided to procure four new Luleå-class corvettes instead. With a length of over 120 meters, initial reports suggest the new corvettes will have an anti-air warfare focus. The first of these new vessels will be commissioned by 2030. Alongside the Visby-class ships, they will provide Sweden with a total of nine powerful vessels suited to littoral Baltic operations.

Poland is building the first of three new 7,000-ton Miecznik-class frigates. The class is based on the British Arrowhead 140 design that is also being used as the basis for the new Type 31 frigate of the Royal Navy. The first ship, ORP Wicher, is due to be launched in 2026. Poland also has an option for an additional five ships. This new surface fleet marks a sea change in capability for the Polish Navy and will contribute significant maritime capacities in the Baltic Sea.

While the German Navy is one of the more powerful in NATO, the ships assigned to the Baltic are based in Kiel as part of Einsatzflotille 1. These include five K130 ocean-going corvettes with another five planned to be commissioned in the next few years. Germany regularly contributes with ships to SNMG-1 and for many years has provided the group with an at-sea replenishment ship. With funding in place to purchase four new F-127 class frigates, Germany will be able to maintain its commitments to SNMG-1 while also operating in a new SNMG-3.

Denmark is one of the largest shipping nations in the world and has since 2007 contributed regularly to maritime operations in NATO and coalition frameworks. It has also regularly committed vessels to SNMG-1. Although situated on the mouth of the Baltic, Denmark is also an Arctic nation with responsibilities related to maintaining good order at sea and defending the waters around Greenland. This gives the Danish Navy a broad array of roles, particularly given the arguably worsening strategic situation in the Arctic. Partly to mitigate this dilemma, in March 2025 Denmark awarded contracts to build three new Arctic patrol vessels, replacing the old and under-gunned Thetis-class. Denmark also operates two 2 Absalon-class and 3 Iver Huitfeldt-class frigates which, together with a future new class of frigate, will allow them to remain a reliable contributor to SNMG-1 while also providing vessels to a new Baltic SNMG.

It should be noted that the three remaining Baltic NATO members, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all possess patrol and mine warfare vessels. This would limit their role in SNMG-3 but the navies of these nations already contribute to one of NATO’s standing mine countermeasure groups.

The Benefits of SNMG-3

The primary benefit of creating an SNMG-3 would be, as described above, the permanent presence of NATO naval groups in two areas of strategic importance. There would be little need for SNMG-1 to spend several months at a time outside its primary area of concern. The maritime groups from both areas could also be expected to regularly meet and conduct exercises as part of building interoperability and shows of force.

The creation of SNMG-3 would also allow for the development of a more bespoke command relationship that matches NATO’s new regional plans and the integration of new headquarters. Currently, all NATO SNMGs fall under the peacetime control of NATO MARCOM based in Northwood in the United Kingdom. A permanent NATO naval group in the Baltic would possess the added benefit of being able to establish and maintain C2 relationships with a range of NATO commands. SNMG-3 would allow for the development of a permanent C2 relationship between the group at sea and the newly formed Commander Task Force Baltic (CTF Baltic). One of NATO’s structural problems with the Baltic Sea is the arguably competing roles of JFC Norfolk (a predominantly maritime command) and JFC Brunssum. SNMG-3 would most likely have to establish a command relationship with both JFCs.

In addition to representing a permanent and available force for the two JFCs, a standing maritime group in the Baltic Sea would also allow commanders in the existing NATO MNCNE, based in Poland and the future NATO MCLCC, in Finland to develop joint warfighting plans for the Baltic Sea Region based on the assumption of immediately available ships.

A SNMG-3 would provide a rotating tactical-level command at sea held by one of the Baltic States. Not only would this provide NATO Baltic members with combined command experience, something that the Danes and Germans have the most experience with, but it would also develop a cadre of officers and crews across the Baltic with experience in working together in operational groups. This would build upon the recent experience of both Sweden and Finland which in January 2025 formally joined SNMG-1 when they participated in surveillance operations under the framework of NATO’s Baltic Sentry maritime surveillance activity in the Baltic Sea.

A Baltic SNMG would also facilitate operations with other allies and force structures, such as periodic US. Navy involvement with SNMG-1 and SNMG-2. When it comes to SNMG-1, the U.S. has only contributed a ship under the command of NATO when they have command of the group. The last time this occurred was in 2019. This does not mean however that the U.S. Navy does not operate alongside NATO SNMG as U.S. vessels regularly participate in exercises that include SNMG.

The U.S. Navy has traditionally deployed ships to the region. During the Cold War and even afterward, this was designed to demonstrate to Eastern European navies that they could not dominate the Baltic Sea. One example of this is the BALTOPS exercise. BALTOPS is not a NATO-led exercise, but an annual U.S.-led exercise arranged by NAVEUR since 1971. In regards to U.S. participation in a new SNMG-3, we assess that it is not likely that ships from the U.S. Navy will participate under NATO command in a permanent new SNMG-3. But with regular deployments of U.S. ships into the Baltic Sea it can be expected that warships from the U.S. Navy will participate in activities and exercises alongside SNMG-3.

Conclusion

NATO’s return to its core mission of deterrence and the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area has been made only more necessary by Russia’s continued aggressive actions both above and below the threshold of war. Ongoing restructuring of the operational components of the alliance is focusing on regional clusters of mutually supporting states. It is time for the maritime component to evolve in the same way the air and land components are. An SNMG-3 focused on the Baltic would not only allow SNMG-1 to concentrate on its core operational area in the North Atlantic, but it would also send a powerful signal of NATO’s intent to undermine and deter Russian malign actions in the region.

Steinar Torset is a Captain in the Royal Norwegian Navy and is the Head of Section for Military Strategy at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College.

Ian Bowers is a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norwegian Defence University College.

Featured Image: The Royal Swedish Navy corvette HMS Nyköping (K34) underway in Trondheim Fjord, Norway, on October 30, 2018, as part of NATO exercise Trident Juncture 2018. (U.S. Navy photo)

NATO Naval Power Week

By Gonzalo Vázquez

Introduction

With the return of great power competition and the prospects for a highly-contested maritime space in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO will be called to play a more active role at sea to preserve stability and freedom of navigation. The protection of maritime commerce and critical undersea infrastructure, key drivers of the global economy, are now coupled with the need to strengthen naval deterrence and high-end warfighting capabilities. Balancing both ends of the spectrum, however, is likely to be very demanding under current fiscal constraints in allied defense spending. Allied governments and their navies will have to maximize their available resources and put them to use in the most efficient way possible, especially with maritime security-related missions and operations.

Unlike many of its NATO allies, Spain does not currently have a Coast Guard service to protect its waters. Rather, it has a number of different services with different competencies which are under the responsibility of six different national ministries. While these services provide a constant presence across Spanish maritime territories, they lack a unified command and are often ill-equipped to perform their duties effectively. Last year’s tragic episode in Barbate, Cadiz, which saw the death of two Guardia Civil officers who were rammed by a drug contraband craft while attempting to intercept it, is a case in point.

Following the example of many of its European and American allies in NATO, it is worth exploring the potential establishment of a Spanish Coast Guard that merges all these existing services under a single, professional service with a unified and clearly defined command structure. While the process would undoubtedly face considerable bureaucratic and economic obstacles in the short to medium term, it would be highly beneficial in the long-term, providing NATO’s southern flank with a stronger constabulary presence – particularly around the busy approaches of the strategic Strait of Gibraltar.

NATO’s Maritime Southern Flank

After decades of a predominantly continental orientation of the Alliance’s strategic calculus and the war in Ukraine still keeping most of the Alliance’s attention on its eastern flank, the return of great power competition has brought about old and new threats to maritime stability around NATO’s maritime flanks. The Baltic Sea has seen a series of attacks against critical undersea infrastructure which have prompted an increase in maritime vigilance assets. Despite receiving less attention, the security landscape in the Mediterranean region is also undergoing a significant transformation.

As asserted by Jeremy Stöhs and Sebastian Bruns, “with the return of great-power competition and the corresponding activities of revisionist actors in the wider Mediterranean region, the Mediterranean has come roaring back as a contested body of water.” As a consequence of this, “Western decision-makers should revisit their approaches to the use of naval power in the region.” From among the main naval powers in the region, Italy has shown a commendable commitment to strengthen its naval power and maritime presence all across its “enlarged Mediterranean,” as proven by the ambitious plans announced for the Marina Militare and its successful deployments to protect merchant shipping in the Red Sea.

Among the most pressing security challenges for Spanish and NATO’s maritime security are the well-known and much-needed protection of critical undersea infrastructure, and especially in the south, the prevention of irregular migration flows, and drugs and weapons smuggling. There is also the relatively recent threat posed by the so-called Russian Dark Fleet. These “vessels engaged in illegal operations to avoid sanctions by seeking to skirt various aspects of maritime regulation and provisions for insurance,” and operate in a way that “the complexity of both the ownership and operator structures is meant deliberately to obscure and confuse.” Spain is highly vulnerable to environmental disasters given the high traffic of dark fleet vessels along its coasts, as several Spanish analysts have been warning about for years.

The need for a regeneration of allied naval power in its southern backyard demands a careful assessment of existing structures and bodies in charge of providing the necessary constabulary services and deterrent posture. One such example is the case of Spain, who is one of the main naval powers in the Mediterranean and an active contributor to the Alliance’s Standing Maritime Groups. Beyond the challenges that the Armada faces today, including the need for a bigger submarine fleet, the organization of Spain’s highly decentralized constabulary presence remains an enduring headache for many within its maritime community.

Spain’s Maritime Constabulary Conundrum

A quick glance at Spain’s position on the global map reveals its strong geographic inclination to the sea. Extensive coasts both in the Mediterranean (including the Balearic Islands), the Cantabric Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean (including the Canary Islands), as well as its position as the guardian of the Gibraltar Strait make it one of the most maritime nations in all of Europe. Yet as history reveals, Spanish political elites have traditionally neglected such predisposition in favor of a highly contradictory continental mindset, thus preventing them from embracing all the opportunities the sea could provide to their national prosperity. Simply put, Madrid has failed to fulfill one of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s core constituents of sea power – the character of government.

One of the main aspects in which such neglect manifests itself in the present day is the convoluted organization of its many maritime services. Spain’s constabulary presence around its territorial waters and EEZ comprises a variety of actors and institutions, with overlapping and decentralized tasks and functions. This leads to a waste of valuable efforts and resources which could otherwise be managed in a much more efficient and effective way – particularly at a time when the maritime services all across Europe are especially demanded to defend their existence and need for funding vis à vis a continentally-minded political leadership.

Up until 1986, maritime security responsibilities had been undertaken by the Customs Surveillance Service (Servicio de Vigilancia Aduanera), focusing on maritime interdiction operations, and the Armada fulfilling both its military responsibilities as well as any other necessary tasks as demanded by any of the Government’s Ministries. In 1986, the Government passed the State’s Security Forces and Corps Bill (Ley de Cuerpos y Fuerzas de Seguridad del Estado), which resulted in the establishment of additional institutions involved in maritime constabulary operations. The first two of those were the Maritime Service (SEMAR) of the Guardia Civil, and the Maritime Security and Rescue Service (SASEMAR), followed by others that include the Spanish Oceanography Institute (IEO), the Marine Social Institute (ISM), or the Marine Fisheries General Secretariat (SEGEPESCA).

As of today, the Navy is in charge of surveillance and security over all maritime spaces of Spanish sovereignty, from the coast to the limit of the EEZ, from a national security perspective. The Customs Surveillance Service retains responsibilities exclusively for customs and fiscal matters within the territorial seas, while the Guardia Civil Maritime Service does the same with judicial, fiscal, and administrative matters also within the territorial seas.

Thus, these and several other bodies with similar tasks and responsibilities – all equipped with their own small fleets of vessels, aircraft ,and independent command and control systems – has gradually led to the establishment of a hydra-like maritime constabulary presence. It is inefficient and uneconomical given their overlapping responsibilities.

Altogether, as argued by LCDR (ret.) Fernando Novoa, each body having its own competences, culture, responsibilities, training, and procedures leads to a true amalgam of types of vessels and aircraft models, adding to the overwhelming lack of standardization. This results in expensive and unnecessary maintenance, logistical, and operational costs.

A Spanish Coast Guard

In light of these problems, and building on the existing debate within Spanish maritime and naval circles, Spain should explore the creation of a Coast Guard with a similar model to that of the United States, Norway or Italy. There is a need for a professional service that works with the Navy while assuming all civil and constabulary functions. It would remove the existing conundrum and solve the existing duplicities among so many different institutions.

The idea is not new by any means. On the contrary, it has been raised on many occasions within Spanish maritime debates. But the argument needs to be expanded to include a discussion of the benefits that the establishment of such an institution could have for NATO’s constabulary presence on its southern flank.

Captain (ret.) Francisco Romero has been another defender of the need for “a Coast Guard entirely responsible for all surveillance and national security tasks, judicial, fiscal, administrative, customs and contraband surveillance all across Spanish territorial seas.” In his view, such an institution should be placed under the operational command of the Navy, looking to the U.S. Coast Guard as a model to imitate, while also coordinating its activities with the Air Force’s Maritime Patrol assets and the Navy’s own offshore patrol vessels and associated platforms.

The establishment of a Spanish Coast Guard would ideally have to merge into a single service all (or most of) the existing services, with their assets and functions under the unified command of a single institution independent from the Navy and answerable to the Defense Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defense (as proposed by LCDR Novoa). Others have even considered the establishment of a single maritime border constabulary force under the Ministry of Interior. As can be logically inferred, in case of conflict, the smaller the number of services that need to be coordinated to support the Navy, the better.

The successful establishment of such service, however, would face significant administrative and bureaucratic boundaries given the variety of ministries and actors involved in the process. The first and perhaps most important conundrum is which government actor should be ultimately responsible for it. As mentioned, both the Ministries of Defense and Interior are the most likely candidates. The second question is which assets should be pooled together to constitute the new service. The different proposals made over the years range from merging only a few of the existing institutions while leaving others with limited competencies, to merging all of them into one single service that works with the Navy (either under its command or separately). In case of the latter, the Navy could potentially provide the manpower to help build the expertise of personnel. Perhaps the first step to take could involve a reassessment of the current services to eliminate their overlapping responsibilities before merging them into a new, single service.

As lengthy and costly the process may be, establishing a Spanish Coast Guard would allow for higher interoperability among allied coast guard services on the NATO’s southern flank. This, in turn, would benefit the alliance by supporting constabulary operations such as Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). Since its establishment in 2016 as the successor of Operation Sea Guardian, OAE has provided a significant presence along the Alliance’s Southern Flank. Its main missions include supporting maritime situational awareness, upholding freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction tasks, maritime counter-terrorism, contributing to capacity building, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and protecting critical infrastructure. The operation relies on the support of Allied navies, which provide it with surface and submarine units, maritime patrol aircraft, and airborne early warning aircraft.

In light of the pressing demand for additional naval capabilities and the need to devote larger warships (frigates and destroyers) to high-end operations rather than purely maritime security operations, southern NATO coast guards could be potentially involved in supporting operations such as OAE to free up military units for high-end tasking. Even if not integrated with these operations, the sole presence of European coast guards across the Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Gibraltar would still provide additional maritime presence, and a more structured one. Most of the existing challenges at sea today can be mitigated to some extent by means of stronger maritime domain awareness, something for which coast guards are more than adequately suited.

Altogether, NATO’s maritime threats and challenges have showcased the need for increase awareness and naval presence, while assuming that budgetary constraints will remain a major hurdle in the quest to expand the size of navies – both in terms of assets and manpower. Allied governments and military staffs should strive the find the most effective ways to maximize the employment of their available assets.

Conclusion

While the case of Spanish constabulary presence at sea is a very concrete one when framed within the broader NATO context, it remains a telling example for the complex challenges the Alliance faces today. At a time when European nations are being called to play a bigger and more relevant role in the protection of Europe’s maritime flanks, in the midst of significant budgetary constraints, allies must strive to maximize the efficacy and efficiency of their maritime institutions and avoid any unnecessary duplication of effort.

The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a wide plethora of asymmetric threats within their waters, including the continuous attacks against critical undersea infrastructure, the ongoing irregular human and drug trafficking from the African continent, or the looming risk of an environmental disaster posed by Russia’s dark fleet. These threats overlap with the enduring need for high-end naval capabilities as showcased by the Red Sea crisis.

Altogether, European maritime and naval services will have to step up and take on a larger responsibility as the United States continues shifting its priorities toward the other side of the world. Spain and its need for a single Coast Guard service that undertakes the responsibility for constabulary operations closer to home is a case in point for the necessary changes that allies will be forced to consider to succeed in this new age of great power competition at sea. The case for a Spanish Coast Guard is just an example among many others of the debates that European nations in NATO will have to face in order to make the most out of their limited resources, and find the most efficient ways to do so.

Gonzalo Vázquez is an associate researcher at the Spanish Naval War College’s Center for Naval Thought.

The author is thankful to LCDR Novoa for his comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

The views voiced here are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views of any government institution.

Featured Image: Don Inda-class offshore tugboat Clara Campoamor of the Spanish Maritime and Rescue Service (SASEMAR). (Photo by Santiago Mena)

NATO Naval Power Week

By CDR Paul Viscovich, USN (Ret.)

In this era of increasing danger, great power competition, and uncertain loyalties, the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to declare its independence. As at the time of its founding, NATO’s strategic adversary is Russia. But unlike during the Cold War, the Alliance can no longer count on the military and industrial might of the United States in confronting the threat.

America has become an unreliable ally. With the threat of a general war in Europe now greater than it has been since 1939, the American president is imposing crippling economic tariffs on allies while unilaterally bargaining with Moscow on matters affecting European security. Western intelligence officers believe a Russian attack on a NATO ally by 2030 is, “a distinct possibility.” Whether the U.S. outright withdraws from the Alliance or simply reneges on its obligations, the Europeans and Canada must accept full responsibility for their own defense and embrace the challenges this will demand.

One of these responsibilities is developing a NATO naval and maritime strategy that is independent of American participation and priorities. To be effective, this strategy must address clear objectives, plan for developing the naval forces required to achieve those objectives, establish and practice a concept of operations, take immediate measures to prepare the battlespace, and implement supporting diplomatic and economic strategies.

NATO Naval Force Structure

Shipbuilding plans in support of the naval strategy must emphasize speed and economy. To avoid costly duplication of effort, it makes sense to assign responsibility for different platform and warfare missions to specific nations to guide their acquisition programs. Of necessity, the initial order of battle will be those ships and aircraft in each nation’s inventory. Over time, each maritime member would sacrifice having a balanced national fleet in favor of providing specialized pieces to create a more powerful and balanced continental fleet, one capable of simultaneously defending both the North Atlantic, the High North, and the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Responsibility for providing large deck aircraft carriers would go to France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Strategic ballistic missile submarines would logically remain with France and the UK. France, Germany, Norway, and the UK could provide attack submarines, both nuclear and conventional. Future construction of attack boats should focus on conventional propulsion since these are less expensive to build, quicker to complete, and they are lethally quiet when submerged.

The potential need for amphibious ships in both the Mediterranean and North Atlantic argues in favor of France and Spain specializing in this platform area. These two nations have major ports on both seas and extensive expertise in amphibious operations.

No fleet is complete without combat logistics support ships. France, Italy, and the UK each possess two such ships capable of providing fuel, refrigerated stores, and ammunition through underway replenishment. Germany and The Netherlands could pitch in with the units they possess, then take an increasing share of the future responsibility for this function with new construction. Logistical capabilities deserve to be a critical focus area if a continental fleet is to sustain peacetime patrols and wartime operations without U.S. support.

The smaller maritime nations could complete this combined fleet by providing the destroyers and corvettes to escort the aircraft carriers and amphibious assault groups, and for anti-submarine patrols in the North Atlantic. Belgium, The Netherlands, Turkey, and the Scandinavians are good choices to supply mine-countermeasures assets.

Due to its relative isolation, Canada is a special case. It has responsibility to maintain a balanced fleet guarding its coastlines on three oceans. But anticipating that Europe at war might rely on Canadian energy, foodstuffs, and munitions, Canada could help by building up its merchant fleet and convoy escorts.

A Concept of Operations 

NATO’s naval strategy should encompass three objectives: deny Russia’s European fleets from gaining access to the high seas, blockade Russian ports against all commerce, and protect Europe’s seaborne commerce and coastal flanks from attack. The Black Sea is one of these coastal flanks and within the context of overall NATO strategy, Ukraine’s survival and victory over the invader must be assured.

Preventing the Russian Navy’s ability to sortie from its ports and cutting its maritime commerce in Europe can both be addressed through control of chokepoints in the Barents and Baltic Seas, as well as the Bosporus Straits. Due to the great distance between Europe and Russia’s far eastern ports, blockading these is impractical and would require deployment of forces critical to defending NATO’s home theater.

The Barents Sea presents the greatest challenge due to its size and distance from the traditional centers of NATO naval strength. Transits through the Baltic and Black Seas are more easily controlled. An effective blockade of the Baltic Sea can be readily accomplished by German, Scandinavian, and Baltic state warships, attack aircraft, and anti-ship shore batteries. Due to the 85-foot mean depth of the Kattegat channel between Denmark and Sweden, submarines must transit on or near the surface. The Bosporus Straits into the Black Sea are also relatively shallow and are controlled and heavily defended by NATO ally Turkey.

A blockade of the Barents Sea would require an intensive deployment of maritime patrol aircraft, attack submarines, and destroyers, ideally under the protection of carrier-based aircraft. This force could be supplemented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV). Drones are potent, relatively inexpensive, and can be manufactured en masse. The Ukrainians used these to great effect in neutralizing the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Allies would be well-advised to study Ukrainian tactics while rushing these weapons to suitable sites along the Black Sea and in Norway for operational trials, especially under the harsh conditions of the Arctic winter.

Despite these precautions, the Russian Northern Fleet might still break out to challenge the NATO combined fleet and attack convoys from Canada. If a major fleet action fails to destroy this force or if the Allied fleet is itself destroyed, “Plan B” must cut the logistics lifeline between the deployed Northern Fleet and its White Sea homeport in Arkhangelsk. The Allies can take advantage of their interior lines of communication and proximity to resupply points to attack, re-arm, and re-attack. Simultaneously, Allied air and submarine forces’ piecemeal destruction of Russian logistic support ships shuttling through the Norwegian Sea would render the Russian attack unsustainable.

A more probable threat is posed by the Northern Fleet’s attack submarines whose operational forces can be conservatively estimated to number five guided missile nuclear submarines (SSGNs) of the Oscar II and Yasen Classes, and six nuclear attack boats (SSNs) of the Akula, Sierra II, and Victor III classes. If the United States declares neutrality, an additional five SSN/SSGNs might be detached from Russia’s Pacific Fleet for a transit beneath the polar ice cap to reinforce Northern Fleet assets in the Atlantic. Combined, these submarine forces could mount a serious threat to trans-Atlantic shipping and NATO’s coastal flanks.

NATO should anticipate loss of access to acoustic intelligence from America’s Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays. This will seriously complicate the Alliance’s ability to detect and target Russian submarines operating in the North Atlantic. To offset this handicap, NATO will have to dedicate a significant number of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air and surface units to patrolling the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. It can also consider deploying its own undersea sensor network to offer some relief to standing patrols and provide additional sources of intelligence. Maritime patrol aircraft can be deployed to suitable air stations along the GIUK Gap. Airfields in Keflavik, Iceland, and Nuuk, Greenland should be immediately equipped and provisioned to support these operations.

A permanent force of surface ASW assets will be needed in the Denmark Straits between Greenland and Iceland, and in the waters between Iceland and the UK to locate and attack Russian subs attempting to penetrate the North Atlantic. Along the relatively shallow (600-650-ft) Greenland-Iceland Rise, the most efficient use of assets would employ continuous active sonar searches above and below the thermal layer. USV equipped with variable depth sonar would be ideal in this capacity, especially as they are relatively expendable in the event of torpedo attack. French and Royal Navy SSNs should be employed in deeper waters, where their lengthy time on station and low acoustic signatures make them particularly effective at detecting and attacking adversary submarines. Canada can greatly support these efforts by building up the logistic support capabilities of its naval and air stations in Halifax to allow units in the Denmark Straits and western Atlantic to refuel and rearm with less time off station.

In addition to blockading Russian ports, the Allies might consider a commerce raiding strategy in the Arctic Ocean and Norwegian Sea. Where the threat of Russian anti-ship and tactical air strikes are low, maritime patrol aircraft could perform reconnaissance on behalf of surface ships and coast guard vessels and cue them to intercept potential blockade runners. Challenging merchant traffic transiting Russia’s Arctic Ocean littoral is probably too dangerous for manned Allied ships and aircraft. In this region, use of remotely piloted UAVs could locate suspect ships, warn the crews to turn back or abandon ship, and relay targeting data to attack submarines. 

Shape the Battlespace

There are tactical measures that can be taken now even before the creation of a combined NATO fleet. As far as possible, Alliance naval and military units deployed to Africa, the Indian Ocean, and east Asia should be recalled. As the Americans continue their pivot toward Asia, NATO should wish them well and concentrate its own forces to defend Europe.

Individual NATO members could schedule port visits to Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkish ports on the Black Sea and perhaps conduct combined exercises to exhibit resolve and practice international interoperability. Turkey could support this by relaxing provisions of the Montreux Convention that limit peacetime transits of the Bosporus Straits by warships.

An unannounced international naval exercise should be surged into the Barents Sea. This will serve two purposes. First, to demonstrate the Allies are capable of mobilizing such a show of force on the doorstep of Russia’s only European fleet that is not effectively land-locked, and to be able to do so without American assistance. Second, this should lead to permanent anti-submarine and anti-surface patrols by Allied destroyers, submarines, USVs, and UAVs working in mutual support.

A tactic that adds an element of warning to these patrols could be surprise surfacings of Allied attack submarines near the Northern Fleet’s base in Arkhangelsk. Even an occasional nighttime visit to pop a red flare from just outside the territorial limit would inject an ingredient of caution into Kremlin strategic calculations.

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, there has been a disturbing increase of sabotage in western European shipyards, military facilities, and strategic industries. Counterintelligence, physical security, and cybersecurity efforts must be ramped up and coordinated across national boundaries in anticipation of fifth-column type offensives in the lead-up to general war. National security agencies and the NATO Counter Intelligence Center of Excellence should coordinate efforts to protect high ranking government, military, and diplomatic personnel against assassination. These efforts should be intensified at naval facilities to ensure clandestine Russian activity does not hamper the projection of NATO naval power in crisis.

Diplomacy

A naval strategy cannot stand alone, it will require supporting diplomatic and economic strategies. Diplomatically, the Alliance must shore up all members’ support for its new responsibilities. Part of NATO’s historic success has been its reliance on building consensus before taking any major action. But this also takes time, a commodity of increasingly limited supply. The potential for recalcitrant member nations attempting to obstruct a unified strategy should be anticipated and neutralized. The North Atlantic Council might even break with long-standing tradition and ask some nation other than the United States to nominate the next officer to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

An unfortunate but necessary step will require imposing strict limits on sharing intelligence with the United States. The careless attitude of senior American political leadership toward protecting highly sensitive information is a catastrophic operational security failure waiting to happen. The Alliance should also plan for how it will respond if the U.S. seizes Greenland by force, which could potentially trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Planning should begin now for incorporating Ukraine into the Alliance and working with that nation’s General Staff to identify where and which NATO forces can be deployed to best effect in the event Russia provokes war with the Alliance. Naval planning should investigate the feasibility of mounting a riverine campaign up the Dnipro River and into Russia. One possibility might employ disguised USVs carrying attack drones deeper into Russian territory to extend their tactical range and for possible use against supply lines supporting forces attacking the Baltic states. In order to buy themselves time, Europe, Canada, and other democracies threatened by the Kremlin’s expansionist designs must do everything possible to keep Ukraine in the fight. A consolidated naval and maritime strategy that supports this by threatening to restrict Russia’s wartime use of the seas will help.

Economically, the Alliance must insulate itself against the tariffs and embargoes threatened by the United States. Europe and Canada can reduce their dependence on American imports by finding new suppliers, such as by increasing energy purchases from OPEC and buying armaments from continental manufacturers. Western European arms manufacturers recorded about $146 billion in 2023 sales of military arms and equipment. Though this does not match the United States’ sales of $319 billion in 2024, it easily surpasses Russian production of $32 billion. And if the U.S. continues applying import duties to Canadian agricultural products, that nation will find a lucrative and strategically secure market for these products in Europe.

Conclusion

Dividing the U.S. from Europe is one of the Kremlin’s key strategies for reestablishing the hegemony that was once exercised by the Soviet Union. The European Allies and Canada missed the opportunity to work toward strategic independence from the United States by ignoring the now-obvious warning signs during President Trump’s first term. Yet in disengaging from American participation in the Alliance, NATO should still leave the door open to eventual reconciliation. Developing an effective continental navy in support of an untested naval strategy will take time and there will be missteps along the way. But it should be viewed as a core effort to secure Europe, one that will provide confidence regardless of the state of American reliability.

Paul Viscovich is a retired U.S. Navy commander and Surface Warfare Officer with 20 years of service. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 and earned a Master of Sciences degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1987.

Featured Image: Royal Navy Nuclear submarine HMS Vanguard arrives back at HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane, Scotland following a patrol. (Ministry of Defence photo by CPOA(Phot) Tam McDonald)