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Grassroots AI: Driving Change in the Royal Navy with Workflow

By Francis Heritage

Introduction

In September 2023, the Royal Navy (RN) advertised the launch of the Naval AI Cell (NAIC), designed to identify and advance AI capability across the RN. NAIC will act as a ‘transformation office’, supporting adoption of AI across RN use cases, until it becomes part of Business as Usual (BaU). NAIC aims to overcome a key issue with current deployment approaches. These usually deploy AI as one-off transformation projects, normally via innovation funding, and often result in project failure. The nature of an ‘Innovation Budget’ means that when the budget is spent, there is no ability to further develop, or deploy, any successful Proof of Concept (PoC) system that emerged.

AI is no longer an abstract innovation; it is fast becoming BaU, and it is right that the RN’s internal processes reflect this. Culturally, it embeds the idea that any AI deployment must be both value-adding and enduring. It forces any would-be AI purchaser to focus on Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) solutions, significantly reducing the risk of project failure, and leveraging the significant investment already made by AI providers.

Nevertheless, NAIC’s sponsored projects still lack follow-on budgets and are limited in scope to just RN-focused issues. The danger still exists that NAIC’s AI projects fail to achieve widespread adoption, despite initial funding; a common technology-related barrier, known as the ‘Valley of Death.’ In theory, there is significant cross-Top Line Budget (TLB) support to ensure the ‘Valley’ can be bridged. The Defense AI and Autonomy Unit within MOD Main Building is mandated to provide policy and ethical guidance for AI projects, while the Defense Digital/Dstl Defense AI Centre (DAIC) acts as a repository for cross-MOD AI development and deployment advice. Defense Digital also provides most of the underlying infrastructure required for AI to deploy successfully. Known by Dstl as ‘AI Building Blocks’, this includes secure cloud compute and storage in the shape of MODCloud (in both Amazon Web Service and Microsoft Azure) and the Defense Data Analytics Portal (DDAP), a remote desktop of data analytics tools that lets contractors and uniformed teams collaborate at OFFICIAL SENSITIVE, and accessible via MODNet.

The NAIC therefore needs to combine its BaU approach with other interventions, if AI and data analytics deployment is to prove successful, namely:

  • Create cross-TLB teams of individuals around a particular workflow, thus ensuring a larger budget can be brought to bear against common issues.
  • Staff these teams from junior ranks and rates, and delegate them development and budget responsibilities.
  • Ensure these teams prioritize learning from experience and failing fast; predominantly by quickly and cheaply deploying existing COTS, or Crown-owned AI and data tools. Writing ‘Discovery Reports’ should be discouraged.
  • Enable reverse-mentoring, whereby these teams share their learnings with Flag Officer (one-star and above) sponsors.
  • Provide these teams with the means to seamlessly move their projects into Business as Usual (BaU) capabilities.

In theory this should greatly improve the odds of successful AI delivery. Cross-TLB teams should have approximately three times the budget to solve the same problem, when compared to an RN-only team. Furthermore, as the users of any developed solution, teams are more likely to buy and/or develop systems that work and deliver value for money. With hands-on experience and ever easier to deploy COTS AI and data tools, teams will be able to fail fast and cheaply, and usually at a lower cost than employing consultants. Flag Officers providing overarching sponsorship will receive valuable reverse-mentoring; specifically understanding first-hand the disruptive potential of AI systems, the effort involved in understanding use-cases and the need for underlying data and infrastructure. Finally, as projects will already be proven and part of BaU, projects may be cheaper and less likely to fail than current efforts.

Naval AI Cell: Initial Projects

The first four tenders from the NAIC were released via the Home Office Accelerated Capability Environment (ACE) procurement framework in March 2024. Each tender aims to deliver a ‘Discovery’ phase, exploring how AI could be used to mitigate different RN-related problems.1 However, the nature of the work, the very short amount of time for contractors to respond, and relatively low funding available raises concern about the value for money they will deliver. Industry was given four days to provide responses to the tender, about a fifth of the usual time, perhaps a reflection of the need to complete projects before the end of the financial year. Additionally, the budget for each task was set at approximately a third of the level for equivalent Discovery work across the rest of Government.2 The tenders reflect a wide range of AI use-cases, including investigating JPA personnel records, monitoring pictures of rotary wing oil filter papers, and underwater sound datasets, each of which requires a completely different Machine Learning approach.

Figure 1: An example self-service AI Workflow, made by a frontline civilian team to automatically detect workers not wearing PPE. The team itself has labelled relevant data, trained and then deployed the model using COTS user interface. Source: V7 Labs.

Take the NAIC’s aircraft maintenance problem-set as an example. The exact problem (automating the examination of oil filter papers of rotary wing aircraft) is faced by all three Single Services. First, by joining forces with the RAF to solve this same problem, the Discovery budget could have been doubled, resulting in a higher likelihood of project success and ongoing savings. Second, by licensing a pre-existing, easy-to-use commercial system that already solves this problem, NAIC could have replaced a Discovery report, written by a contractor, with cheaper, live, hands-on experience of how useful AI was in solving the problem.3 This would have resulted in more money being available, and a cheaper approach being taken.

Had the experiment failed, uniformed personnel would have learnt significantly more from their hands-on experience than by reading a Discovery report, and at a fraction of the price. Had it succeeded, the lessons would have been shared across all three Services and improved the chance of success of any follow-on AI deployment across wider MOD. An example of a COTS system that achieves this is V7’s data labeling and model deployment system, available with a simple user interface; it is free for up to 3 people, or £722/month for more complex requirements.4 A low-level user experiment using this kind of platform is unlikely to have developed sufficient sensitive data to have gone beyond OFFICIAL.

Introducing ‘Workflow Automation Guilds’

Focusing on painful, AI-solvable problems, shared across Defense, is a good driver to overcome these stovepipes. Identification of these workflows has been completed by the DAIC and listed in the Defence AI Playbook.5 It lists 15 areas where AI has potential to deliver a step-change capability. Removing the problems that are likely to be solved by Large Language Models (where a separate Defence Digital procurement is already underway), leaves 10 workflows (e.g. Spare Parts Failure Prediction, Optimizing Helicopter Training etc) where AI automation could be valuably deployed.

However, up to four different organizations are deploying AI to automate these 10 workflows, resulting in budgets that are too small to result in impactful, recurring work; or at least, preventing this work from happening quickly. Cross-Front Line Command (FLC) teams could be created, enabling budgets to be combined to solve the same work problem they collectively face. In the AI industry, these teams are known as ‘Guilds’; and given the aim is to automate Workflows, the term Workflow Automation Guilds (WAGs) neatly sums up the role of these potential x-FLC teams.

Focus on Junior Personnel

The best way to populate these Guilds is to follow the lead of the US Navy (USN) and US Air Force (USAF), who independently decided the best way to make progress with AI and data is to empower their most junior people, giving them responsibility for deploying this technology to solve difficult problems. In exactly the same way that the RN would not allow a Warfare Officer to take Sea Command if they are unable to draw a propulsion shaft-line diagram, so an AI or data deployment program should not be the responsibility of someone senior who does not know or understand the basics of Kubernetes or Docker.6 For example, when the USAF created their ‘Platform One’ AI development platform, roles were disproportionately populated by lower ranks and rates. As Nic Chaillan, then USAF Chief Software Officer, noted:

“When we started picking people for Platform One, you know who we picked? A lot of Enlisted, Majors, Captains… people who get the job done. The leadership was not used to that… but they couldn’t say anything when they started seeing the results.”7

The USN takes the same approach with regards to Task Force Hopper and Task Group 59.1.8 TF Hopper exists within the US Surface Fleet to enable rapid AI/ML adoption. This includes enabling access to clean, labeled data and providing the underpinning infrastructure and standards required for generating and hosting AI models. TG 59.1 focuses on the operational deployment of uncrewed systems, teamed with human operators, to bolster maritime security across the Middle East. Unusually, both are led by USN Lieutenants, who the the USN Chief of Naval Operations called ‘…leaders who are ready to take the initiative and to be bold; we’re experimenting with new concepts and tactics.’9

Delegation of Budget Spend and Reverse Mentoring

Across the Single Services, relatively junior individuals, from OR4 to OF3, could be formed on a cross-FLC basis to solve the Defence AI Playbook issues they collectively face, and free to choose which elements of their Workflow to focus on. Importantly, they should deploy Systems Thinking (i.e. an holistic, big picture approach that takes into account the relationship between otherwise discrete elements) to develop a deep understanding of the Workflow in question and prioritize deployment of the fastest, cheapest data analytics method; this will not always be an AI solution. These Guilds would need budgetary approval to spend funds, collected into a single pot from up to three separate UINs from across the Single Services; this could potentially be overseen by an OF5 or one-star. The one-star’s role would be less about providing oversight, and more to do with ensuring funds were released and, vitally, receiving reverse mentoring from the WAG members themselves about the viability and value of deploying AI for that use case.

The RN’s traditional approach to digital and cultural transformation – namely a top-down, directed approach – has benefits, but these are increasingly being rendered ineffective as the pace of technological change increases. Only those working with this technology day-to-day, and using it to solve real-world challenges, will be able to drive the cultural change the RN requires. Currently, much of this work is completed by contractors who take the experience with them when projects close. By deploying this reverse-mentoring approach, WAG’s not only cheaply create a cadre of uniformed, experienced AI practitioners, but also a senior team of Flag Officers who have seen first-hand where AI does (or does not) work and have an understanding of the infrastructure needed to make it happen.

Remote working and collaboration tools mean that teams need not be working from the same bases, vital if different FLCs are to collaborate. These individuals should be empowered to spend multi-year budgets of up to circa. £125k. As of 2024, this is sufficient to allow meaningful Discovery, Alpha, Beta and Live AI project phases to be undertaken; allow the use of COTS products; and small enough to not result in a huge loss if the project (which is spread among all three Services to mitigate risk) fails.

Figure 2: An example AI Figure 2: An example AI Opportunity Mapping exercise, where multiple AI capabilities (represented by colored cards) are mapped onto different stages of an existing workflow, to understand where, if anywhere, use of AI could enable or improve workflow automation. Source: 33A AI.

WAG Workflow Example

An example of how WAGs could work is as follows, using the oil sample contamination example. Members of the RN and RAF Wildcat and Merlin maintenance teams collectively identify the amount of manpower effort that could be saved if the physical checking of lube oil samples could be automated. With an outline knowledge of AI and Systems Thinking already held, WAG members know that full automation of this workflow is not possible; but they have identified one key step in the workflow that could be improved, speeding up the entire workflow of regular helicopter maintenance. The fact that a human still needs to manually check oil samples is not necessarily an issue, as they identify that the ability to quickly prioritize and categorize samples will not cause bottlenecks elsewhere in the workflow and thus provides a return on investment.

Members of the WAG would create a set of User Stories, an informal, general description of the AI benefits and features, written from a users’ perspective. With the advice from the DAIC, NAIC, RAF Rapid Capability Office (RCO) / RAF Digital or Army AI Centre, other members of the team would ensure that data is in a fit state for AI model training. In this use-case, this would involve labeling overall images of contamination, or the individual contaminants within an image, depending on the AI approach to be used (image recognition or object detection, respectively). Again, the use of the Defence Data Analytics Portal (DDAP), or a cheap, third-party licensed product, provides remote access to the tools that enable this. The team now holds a number of advantages over traditional, contractor-led approaches to AI deployment, potentially sufficient to cross the Valley of Death:

  • They are likely to know colleagues across the three Services facing the same problem, so can check that a solution has not already been developed elsewhere.10
  • With success metrics, labelled data and user requirements all held, the team has already overcome the key blockers to success, reducing the risk that expensive contractors, if subsequently used, will begin project delivery without these key building blocks in place.
  • They have a key understanding of how much value will be generated by a successful project, and so can quickly ‘pull the plug’ if insufficient benefits arise. There is also no financial incentive to push on if the approach clearly isn’t working.
  • Alternatively, they have the best understanding of how much value is derived if the project is successful.
  • As junior Front-Line operators, they benefit directly from any service improvement, so are not only invested in the project’s success, but can sponsor the need for BaU funding to be released to sustain the project in the long term, if required.
  • If working with contractors, they can provide immediate user feedback, speeding up development time and enabling a true Agile process to take place. Currently, contractors struggle to access users to close this feedback loop when working with MOD.

Again, Flag Officer sponsorship of such an endeavor is vital. This individual can ensure that proper recognition is awarded to individuals and make deeper connections across FLCs, as required.

Figure 3: Defense Digital’s Defense Data Analytics Portal (DDAP) is tailor-made for small, Front-Line teams to clean and label their data and deploy AI services and products, either standalone or via existing, call-off contract contractor support.

Prioritizing Quick, Hands-on Problem Solving

WAGs provide an incentive for more entrepreneurial, digitally minded individuals to remain in Service, as it creates an outlet for those who wish to learn to code and solve problems quickly, especially if the problems faced are ones they wrestle with daily. A good example of where the RN has successfully harnessed this energy is with Project KRAKEN, the RN’s in-house deployment of the Palantir Foundry platform. Foundry is a low-code way of collecting disparate data from multiple areas, allowing it to be cleaned and presented in a format that speeds up analytical tasks. It also contains a low-level AI capability. Multiple users across the RN have taken it upon themselves to learn Foundry and deploy it to solve their own workflow problems, often in their spare time, with the result that they can get more done, faster than before. With AI tools becoming equally straightforward to use and deploy, the same is possible for a far broader range of applications, provided that cross-TLB resources can be concentrated at a junior level to enable meaningful projects to start.

Figure 4: Pre-existing Data/AI products or APIs, bought from commercial providers, or shared from elsewhere in Government, are likely to provide the fastest, cheapest route to improving workflows.11

Deploying COTS Products Over Tailored Services

Figure 4 shows the two main options available for WAGs when deploying AI or data science capabilities: Products or Services. Products are standalone capabilities created by industry to solve particular problems, usually made available relatively cheaply. Typically, COTS, they are sold on a per-use, or time-period basis, but cannot be easily tailored or refined if the user has a different requirement.

By contrast, Services are akin to a consulting model where a team of AI and Machine Learning engineers build an entirely new, bespoke system. This is much more expensive and slower than deploying a Product but means users should get exactly what they want. Occasionally, once a Service has been created, other users realize they have similar requirements as the original user. At this point, the Service evolves to become a Product. New users can take advantage of the fact that software is essentially free to either replicate or connect with and gain vast economies of scale from the initial Service investment.

WAGs aim to enable these economies of scale; either by leveraging the investment and speed benefits inherent in pre-existing Products or ensuring that the benefits of any home-made Services are replicated across the whole of the MOD, rather than remaining stove-piped or siloed within Single Services.

Commercial/HMG Off the Shelf Product. The most straightforward approach is for WAGs to deploy a pre-existing product, licensed either from a commercial provider, or from another part of the Government that has already built a Product in-house. Examples include the RAF’s in-house Project Drake, which has developed complex Bayesian Hierarchical models to assist with identifying and removing training pipeline bottlenecks; these are Crown IP, presumably available to the RN at little-to-no cost, and their capabilities have been briefed to DAIC (and presumably briefed onwards to the NAIC).

Although straightforward to procure, it may not be possible to deploy COTS products on MOD or Government systems, and so may be restricted up to OFFICIAL or OFFICIAL SENSITIVE only. Clearly, products developed or deployed by other parts of MOD or National Security may go to higher classifications and be accessible from MODNet or higher systems. COTS products are usually available on a pay-as-you-go, monthly, or user basis, usually in the realm of circa £200 per user, per month, providing a fast, risk-free way to understand whether they are valuable enough to keep using longer-term.

Contractor-supported Product. In this scenario, deployment is more complex; for example, the product needs to deploy onto MOD infrastructure to allow sensitive data to be accessed. In this case, some expense is required, but as pre-existing COTS, the product should be relatively cheap to deploy as most of the investment has already been made by the supplier. This option should allow use up to SECRET but, again, users are limited to those use-cases offered by the commercial market. These are likely to be focused on improving maintenance and the analysis of written or financial information. The DAIC’s upcoming ‘LLMs for MOD’ project is likely to be an example of a Contractor-supported Product; MOD users will be able to apply for API access to different Large Language Model (LLM) products, hosted on MOD infrastructure, to solve their use-cases. Contractors will process underlying data to allow LLMs to access it, create the API, and provide ongoing API connectivity support.

Service built in-house. If no product exists, then there is an opportunity to build a low-code solution in DDAP or MODCloud and make it accessible through an internal app. Some contractor support may be required, particularly to provide unique expertise the team cannot provide themselves (noting that all three Services may have Digital expertise available via upcoming specialist Reserve branches, with specialist individuals available at a fraction of the cost of their civilian equivalent day rates).12 Defense Digital’s ‘Enhanced Data Teams’ service provides a call-off option for contractors to do precisely this for a short period of time. It is likely that these will not, initially, deploy sophisticated data analysis or AI techniques, but sufficient value may be created with basic data analytics. In any event, the lessons learnt from building a small, relatively unsophisticated in-house service will provide sufficient evidence to ascertain whether a full, contractor-built AI service will provide value for money, if built. Project Kraken is a good example of this; while Foundry is itself a product and bought under license, it is hosted in MOD systems and allows RN personnel to build their own data services within it.

Service built by contractors. These problems are so complex, or unique to Defense, that no COTS product exists. Additionally, the degree of work is so demanding that Service Personnel could not undertake this work themselves. In this case, WAGs should not be deployed. Instead, these £100k+ programs should remain the purview of Defense Digital or the DAIC and aim to instead provide AI Building Blocks that empower WAGs to do AI work. In many cases, these large service programs provide cheap, reproducible products that the rest of Defense can leverage. For example, the ‘LLMs for MOD’ Service will result in relatively cheap API Products, as explained above. Additionally, the British Army is currently tendering for an AI-enabled system that can read the multiple hand-and-type-written text within the Army archives. This negates the need for human researchers to spend days searching for legally required records that can now be found in seconds. Once complete, this system could offer itself as a Product that can ingest complex documents from the rest of the MOD at relatively low cost. This should negate the need for the RN to pay their own 7-figure sums to create standalone archive scanning services. To enable this kind of economy of scale, NAIC could act as a liaison with these wider organizations. Equipped with a ‘shopping list’ of RN use cases, it could quickly deploy tools purchased by the Army, RAF or Defense Digital across the RN.

Finding the Time

How can WAG members find the time to do the above? By delegating budget control down to the lowest level, and focusing predominantly on buying COTS products, the amount of time required should be relatively minimal; in essence, it should take the same amount of time as buying something online. Some work will be required to understand user stories and workflow design, but much of this will already be in the heads of WAG members. Imminent widespread MOD LLM adoption should, in theory, imminently reduce the amount of time spent across Defense on complex, routine written work (reviewing reports, personnel appraisals, post-exercise or deployment reports or other regular reporting).13 This time could be used to enable WAGs to do their work. Indeed, identifying where best to deploy LLMs across workflows are likely to be the first roles of WAGs, as soon as the ‘LLMs for MOD’ program reaches IOC. Counter-intuitively, by restricting the amount of time available to do this work, it automatically focuses attention on solutions that are clearly valuable; solutions that save no time are, by default, less likely to be worked on, or have money spent on them.

Conclusions

The RN runs the risk of spreading the NAIC’s budget too thinly, in its attempt to ‘jumpstart’ use of AI across Business as Usual disciplines. By contrast, users should be encouraged to form Workflow Automation Guilds across FLCs. Supported by a senior sponsor, knowledgeable members of the Reserves, the NAIC and one-on-one time with the DAIC, WAGs could instead focus on the COTS solution, or pre-existing Crown IP, that will best solve their problem. Budget responsibilities should be delegated down too, thereby enabling access to existing, centralized pools of support, such as the Enhanced Data Teams program, DDAP, or the upcoming ‘LLMs for MOD’ API Service. In this way, projects are more likely to succeed, as they will have demonstrated value from the very start and will have been co-developed by the very users that deploy them. The speed at which AI and data services are becoming easier to use is reflected by the RN’s Kraken team, while the need to trust low-level officers and junior rates is borne out by the success currently being enjoyed by both the USAF and USN with their own complex AI deployments.

Prior to leaving full-time service, Lieutenant Commander Francis Heritage, Royal Navy Reserve, was a Principal Warfare Officer and Fighter Controller. Currently an RNR GW officer, he works at the Defence arm of Faculty, the UK’s largest independent AI company. LtCdr Francis is now deployed augmenting Commander United Kingdom Strike Force (CSF).

The views expressed in this paper are the author’s, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the MOD, the Royal Navy, RNSSC, or any other institution.

References

1. Discovery’ is the first of 5 stages in the UK Government Agile Project Delivery framework, and is followed by Alpha, Beta, Live and Retirement. Each stage is designed to allow the overall program to ‘fail fast’ if it is discovered that benefits will not deliver sufficient value.

2. Author’s observations.

3. Volvo and the US commodities group Bureau Veritas both have Commercial off the Shelf products available for solving this particular problem.

4. Source: https://www.v7labs.com/pricing accessed 10 Apr 2024.

5. Source: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/65bb75fa21f73f0014e0ba51/Defence_AI_Playbook.pdf

6. AI systems rely on machine learning frameworks and libraries; Docker packages these components together into reproducible ‘containers’, simplifying deployment. Kubernetes builds on Docker, providing an orchestration layer for automating deployment and management of containers over many machines.

7. Defence Unicorns podcast, 5 Mar 2024.

8. Source: Navy’s new ‘Project OpenShip’ aims to swiftly apply AI to data captured by vessels at sea | DefenseScoop.

9. https://www.afcea.org/signal-media/navys-junior-officers-lead-way-innovation.

10. The author knows of at least 3 AI projects across MOD aimed at automating operational planning and another 3 aiming to automate satellite imagery analysis.

11. API stands for Application Programming Interface, a documented way for software to communicate with other software. By purchasing access to an API (usually on a ‘per call’ or unlimited basis) a user can take information delivered by an API and combine it with other information before presenting it to a user. Examples include open-source intelligence, commercial satellite imagery, meteorological data, etc. 

12. Army Reserve Special Group Information Service, RNR Information Exploitation Branch and RAF Digital Reserves Consultancy. RNR IX and RAFDRC are both TBC.

13. Worldwide, Oliver Wyman estimates Generative AI will save an average of 2 hours per person per week; likely to be higher for office-based roles: https://www.oliverwymanforum.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/ow-forum/gcs/2023/AI-Report-2024-Davos.pdf p.17.

Featured Image: The Operations Room of the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth during an exercise in 2018. (Royal Navy photo)

Building Resilient Killchains for the Stand-In Force

By Aaron Barlow, Patrick Reilly, and Sean Harper

Introduction

As the Marine Corps prepares to contest the regional superiority of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific alongside the Navy and the joint force, the service must strengthen its organic killchains and ensure that each new capability acquisition aligns to the concepts that the service must execute. While joint integration will rightfully remain critical to successful campaigns, the Marine Corps – as the isolatable forward edge of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific – must ensure that its presence adds credible theater combat capability even when joint sensing, communication, and fires cannot support the stand-in force. The Marine Corps should therefore focus on acquiring platforms that present a different risk profile than the joint force; prioritize organic ownership of all components of certain killchains from sensor to shooter; value resilient, risk-worthy platforms over the highly capable but expensive; and focus on diversity and depth in the types of munitions it brings to the fight.

 Strategic Context

Over the past five years, the Marine Corps has confidently and rapidly altered its force structure to meet changing national strategic priorities. As articulated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and echoed in its 2022 sequel, the United States must meet the 2020s as a “decisive decade” and defend U.S. national security interests by effectively deterring its adversaries, using the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a benchmark to measure the pace of advancement. In an August 2024 report, the Commission on the 2022 NDS charted the Marine Corps’ modernization progress to date, stating “The service deserves high marks for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves.” The report further lauded the Marine Corps’ Force Design efforts as a “coherent way for the Marine Corps to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.”

However, the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance recently reinforced that modernization remains a “righteous” but incomplete journey. Using the service’s Concept for Stand-in Forces as a yardstick, recent acquisitions overestimate and over-rely on the availability of joint and national capabilities in the highly contested environment in which they must perform. Equally, other acquisition and force design decisions seem fundamentally misaligned to stand-in force imperatives like footprint, signature, and risk minimization.

The value proposition of stand-in forces best manifests in the context of a hypothetical PRC campaign to achieve reunification with Taiwan by force, in which the PLA will leverage its significant regional firepower advantage to assert all-domain superiority well East of the first island chain. Confronted by an adversary capable of devastating maritime precision strikes, the joint force will likely withdraw the preponderance of its high-end capabilities beyond the range of PRC threats. Further, Chinese capabilities will be focused on disrupting the long-range communications networks necessary for these high-end capabilities to close killchains from safer distances.

Nonetheless, the joint force will still require the ability to contest Chinese all-domain control in the first island chain. Enter the stand-in force, positioned on forward locations throughout the battlespace. Fighting as an extension of the fleet and joint force, the stand-in force will leverage disaggregation to create reconnaissance and targeting dilemmas for adversaries reliant on precision strike regimes. Stand-in forces will employ asymmetric capabilities and tactics to hold adversaries at risk in multiple domains, ultimately preventing the accumulation of regional superiority.

The Marine Corps’ perspective on how to execute A Concept for Stand-in Forces has evolved since the project began in 2020. The services Force Design annual updates allow us to trace this evolution. Foundational Force Design guidance initially prioritized the development of “smaller but better-connected formations that organically possess a complete killchain appropriate to echelon.” However, the 2022 Force Design Annual Update walked back this vision “from an initial focus on generating organic lethal capabilities…to a more balanced focus that includes persisting forward in a contested area to win the [reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance] battle and complete joint kill webs.” The 2022 annual update also raises unresolved questions about what this balance might look like, reiterating that “certain capabilities must be organic to our Stand-in Forces, such as organic sensors and long-range precision fires to close kill webs when external capabilities are not present or available.”

Based on this guidance, the stand-in force’s risk of isolation from the joint force clearly persists. How intensely should the Marine Corps hedge against this risk, and how should the service define the balance it seeks? Recent service acquisitions suggest that the Marine Corps has overinvested in capabilities that are inappropriate for a stand-in force, at the expense of building robust organic killchains that provide a guaranteed capability baseline in the event of isolation.

The Value Proposition of Organic Killchains

The disaggregated nature of stand-in force formations and the tyranny of distance imposed by the littoral operating environment combine with the nature of the PRC threat to illustrate the value proposition of organic killchains. For example, consider the dependence of the combined joint all-domain command and control (CJADC2) concept on the resilience and availability of joint information networks. Under CJADC2, the joint force and partners seek to project all-domain effects by seamlessly closing killchains comprised of national and joint sensors, processors, and shooters. CJADC2 represents a legitimate integration challenge, and to date the services have been inching towards minimum viable capabilities.

The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance articulates how the Marine Corps sees its contributions to CJADC2: “Marines will act as the ‘JTAC of the Joint Force’ – sensing, making sense, and communicating to the rest of the Joint Force with an ‘any sensor, any shooter’ mindset.” Until recently the Marine Corps has followed in the wake of other services’ initiatives through participation in the Navy’s Project Overmatch and the Army’s Project Convergence, both of which have sought to develop and exercise the interconnectedness and interoperability required for the joint services to share information and close killchains. The Marine Corps has successfully exercised acquiring and maintaining custody of targets with organic sensors while passing this information to joint command-and-control applications, recently at Exercise Valiant Shield, which included an Indo-Pacific Command-level exercise of its Joint Fires Network. These initiatives and exercises represent obvious technical progress, but as demonstrations of concepts, they risk overestimating the reliability and availability of joint information networks in a way that unbalances the Stand-in Force in favor of brittle kill webs.

This imbalance becomes especially evident in the context of how the PLA plans to prosecute future conflicts. The PLA believes that modern warfare is not “a contest of annihilation between opposing military forces, but rather a clash between opposing operational systems.” The PLA’s derived concept – Systems Destruction Warfare – prioritizes attacking “the flow of information within the adversary’s operational system.” Under this paradigm, if the joint force envisions CJADC2 as a fundamental center of gravity that enables hard-hitting joint killchains, the PLA must view the same system as the joint force’s critical vulnerability and deploy proportional operational resources to target and disrupt it. What is the value proposition of the stand-in force if joint information networks must be available to unlock its contribution to potent joint capabilities?

A U.S. Marine Corps AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar is deployed during exercise Resolute Dragon 24 in Okinawa, Japan, July 31, 2024. The radar was deployed to support training with enhanced sensing and targeting data between the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment and the JSDF during RD 24. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Matthew Morales)

To deliver on its value proposition, the stand-in force must retain the capability to hold the adversary at risk with credible killchains in contested environments when the rest of the joint force cannot. When CJADC2 is uncontested and operating at its peak it will make extensive use of C2 platforms in the air and space domains. However, the questionable survivability and persistence of these platforms is in part the impetus of the stand-in force concept. Thus, reliance on these high-end joint networks introduces a contradiction in the stand-in force’s conceptual framework.

A potential overestimation of the resilience of emerging commercial, proliferated low-earth orbit constellations also underpins the Marine Corps’ conceptual reasoning. Systems such as SpaceX’s Starlink may indeed enable a more robust space-based command and control architecture compared to legacy systems. However, these constellations have increasingly been touted as a communications panacea, especially after Starlink’s success in Ukraine. Meanwhile, adversaries are rigorously searching for effective counters, hunting for exploitation opportunities, or developing options to remove the space layer altogether. Though a credible 21st-century force cannot ignore emerging space layer technologies, the Marine Corps should not overestimate the resilience of commercial P-LEO solutions at the expense of organic spectrum-diverse information networks.

Earlier this year, the Marine Corps initiated Project Dynamis as a service bid to gain initiative in shaping contributions to CJADC2. The Marine Corps should leverage this opportunity to refocus command and control modernization to better align the service’s balance of information capabilities with the stand-in-force concept. The service should specifically refine robust, diverse information capabilities that enable the stand-in force to contest adversary all-domain control in ways that multiply combat power through the availability of joint networks, but crucially do not require them. Further, the end-to-end organic ownership of certain critical killchains by the stand-in force has the dual benefit of providing a credible means of contesting all-domain control when the joint force cannot be present and providing an alternative information path for the joint force inside contested areas.

An Organic and Asymmetric Munitions Mix

If spectrum-diverse information networks provide the connective linkages for an end-to-end organic killchain, a deep and varied arsenal of service-owned munitions must provide the kinetic edge. Though the Marine Corps has long constructed capabilities around a variety of indirect fire munitions, the 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance prioritized the service’s first ever acquisition of a ground based medium-range anti-ship missile. The service’s portfolio has since grown to include Naval Strike Missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles, each in different phases of acquisition and with varying concepts of employment. While these munitions will provide the stand-in force with the capability to hold high-value targets at risk, they also represent relatively high-cost, low-density investments. Deriving estimates from total program acquisition costs published in the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request, the Naval Strike Missile (90 units), Tomahawk (34 units), and long range anti-ship missile (91 units) carry units costs of $2.32M, $3.09M, and $7.02M respectively.1

The per-shot expense of these munitions raises questions about whether the Marine Corps will have the magazine depth to necessary to sustain a protracted sea denial campaign. Additionally, the many lower-tier maritime targets that the stand-in force could easily hold at risk may not rise to the threshold of significance necessary for engagement with low density munitions; if the stand-in force cannot engage these targets it forgoes opportunities for credible sea denial contributions. The acquisition of exquisite medium-range munitions should not be abandoned, but greater diversity and depth in the Marine Corps portfolio of munitions could enable the service to operate more effectively as a stand-in force. 

For example, a large arsenal of relatively low-cost loitering munitions will provide the stand-in force with an asymmetric advantage against littoral targets, since a single operator can control multiple munitions that cooperatively overwhelm adversary air defenses. Practical munitions trade-offs could also reduce the volume of information exchange necessary to execute killchains. For example, capabilities imbued with a layer of autonomy, such as kamikaze drones and suicide surface and sub-surface vehicles may reduce the required frequency and fidelity of sensor and operator inputs compared to traditional munitions, unburdening limited network resources. The Marine Corps should therefore intentionally balance its high-cost fires systems with deep magazines of effective yet relatively inexpensive loitering and one-way attack munitions.

Matching Capabilities to Concepts

As the Marine Corps considers the appropriate balance of organic and joint investments, the service should also consider how well its future platforms align to the concepts the service must execute. The 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance clearly defined the types of platforms appropriate to future amphibious and stand-in forces: “We must continue to seek the affordable and plentiful at the expense of the exquisite and few when conceiving of the future amphibious portion of the fleet.” Equally, stand-in forces must “confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low signature, affordable, and risk-worthy platforms and payloads.” The latest 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance suggests that the service has not wholly altered this philosophy, reiterating that the service must “not design our own exquisite low volume platforms.” However, considerations of affordability and riskworthiness do not receive explicit mention.

The Marine Corps should not compromise on cost and risk here. As the service constructs killchains, it should avoid the pattern of investing in expensive, exquisite, and excessively overengineered platforms that directly mirror or present the same risk profile as existing joint capabilities. The service should instead focus acquisitions on platforms that diversify the risks faced by the joint force. Marine Corps platform attributes should closely resemble the original value proposition for Force Design and A Concept for Stand-in Forces: highly expeditionary, risk-worthy, operationally and logistically supportable in protracted conflict, and respectful of the fiscal realities faced by the service.

As an illustrative example, consider the Marine Corps’ recent acquisition of the MQ-9A Reaper platform, part of a service unmanned aerial system strategy that actually preceded Force Design. Now integrated into air combat element formations, the MQ-9A provides the service with a credible organic long-endurance airborne surveillance and command-and-control capability in competition. However, recent battlefield evidence suggests that the Reaper may not be survivable when targeted in conflict without additional supporting capabilities. Iranian proxy groups, most notably Yemen’s Houthi rebels, appear to have downed at least four MQ-9s since October 7, 2023 (and possibly far more, with acknowledged numbers increasing frequently). If affected today, these losses would halve the Marine Corps’ current fleet of MQ-9A platforms, or quarter the projected fleet in 2025. Unmanned aerial system operations in Ukraine also offer insights into the utility and survivability of large, loitering unmanned platforms in peer conflict. Though used to great effect at the outset of the war, recent reports have suggested that Ukraine has significantly curtailed the sorties flown by their Turkish Group 5-equivalent Bayraktar TB2 drones, due in part to the deployment of a more sophisticated Russian integrated air defense network along the front. Further, a platform with a 3000-foot runway requirement and a unique maintainer MOS arguably does not conform to Force Design and stand-in force principles like footprint and signature minimization. Finally, though not a novel and exquisite platform, the service’s MQ-9s do not seem fiscally risk-worthy at the current rate of acquisition, especially considering recent shoot-down rates. In FY2024, the Marine Corps paid an effective unit cost of $37.5M each for five MQ-9A platforms, which would provide a Houthi-equivalent adversary with several months of target practice. The PLA is likely another story, and the MQ-9A will almost certainly be a priority target based on the platforms’ potential value as killchain enabler.

General Atomics, perhaps sensing that the service lacks compelling alternatives, appears ready to upsell the Marine Corps on the more capable but likely far more expensive MQ-9B in the near future. At present, while the MQ-9A may serve as an invaluable enabler in competition, the platform appears too rare, too capable, and too imminently targetable to persist and survive as the stand-in force transitions to conflict.

U.S. Marine Corps Captain Joshua Brooks, an unmanned aircraft system representative, and Master Sergeant Willie Cheeseboro Jr., an enlisted aircrew coordinator with Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1, prepare to launch and operate the first Marine Corps owned MQ-9A Reaper on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

Consider instead the application of a different solution paradigm to the same problem: the acquisition of high numbers of comparatively low-cost medium-size semi-autonomous unmanned aerial systems (UAS) like Shield AI’s V-BAT or the Platform Aerospace Vanilla UAS to support surveillance, command and control, and targeting missions. Distributed throughout contested areas, launched from austere locations under vertical/short takeoff and landing regimes, and operated in swarms with a different payload on each airframe, these platforms could support or heavily augment large, low-density systems like MQ-9A in conflict. In one-to-one comparisons, medium UAS clearly cannot match the capability of larger systems like MQ-9A. However, when operated at scale and especially when integrated with other long-range littoral sensors, medium UAS platforms can provide an acceptable solution to the stand-in force’s surveillance and command and control requirements while presenting an asymmetric cost and targeting dilemma to adversaries.

While we have focused on the MQ-9, the Marine Corps portfolio is replete with platforms that carry similar contradictions when examined through the Force Design and stand-in force lens. Instead of replicating the acquisitions of the past, Marine Corps should specifically develop capabilities around diverse, risk-worthy, high-density, and relatively low-cost platforms and consider reducing investments in highly capable but overly precious and concentrated capabilities that mirror those in the joint force. 

The Future of Force Design

The 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance reiterates that “Force Design remains our strategic priority and we cannot slow down.” Force Design provides the Marine Corps a unique opportunity to differentiate itself from past operating concepts and acquisition decisions while building an asymmetric value proposition in the joint fight against peer adversaries. The Marine Corps cannot afford to own every node of every kill web, but selective end-to-end ownership of specific killchains will enable relevant and credible service contributions to the joint force in competition and at the onset of a protracted conflict. Moreover, a Marine Corps with enhanced magazine depths and a plethora of affordable, risk-worthy platforms operating forward in first island chain will challenge adversary all-domain control and set conditions for US domination in the later stages of any maritime campaign. Likewise, any improvements that the Marine Corps makes in the alignment of its expeditionary capabilities to threat-informed concepts will concurrently prepare the service to effectively fulfill its role as a crisis response force, primed for contingencies in support of national mission objectives in accordance with the shifting realities of modern war.

Major Aaron Barlow, Captain Patrick Reilly, and Major Sean Harper are currently serving as operations research analysts assigned to the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration in Quantico, Virginia.

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official views of any U.S. government entity. 

Notes

1. Data reported for USN. USMC specific data not available for FY2024.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Terrell Chandler, left, and U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Melvin Monet, both low-altitude-air defense gunners with 3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, set security with an FIM-92 Stinger during Marine Littoral Regiment Training Exercise (MLR-TE) at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Jan. 28, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Israel Chincio)

Seven Reflections of a Red Commander: What I’ve Learned from Playing the Adversary

The following article originally featured in the September 2024 edition of Military Review under the title, “Seven Reflections of a ‘Red Commander’ What I’ve Learned from Playing the Adversary in Department of Defense Wargames,” and is republished with permission. Read it in its original form here.

By Ian M. Sullivan

It is the spring of 20XX, and the U.S. joint force is engaged in a major war against a peer competitor. Earlier in the conflict, the enemy seized a critical piece of terrain, and the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) ordered the joint force to take it back. This required a massive joint force entry operation (JFEO), arguably the most difficult of joint operations to complete. But the joint force was game. It assembled the largest maritime assault force—both amphibious assault ships loaded with Marines and transports carrying Army formations—since the U.S. invasion of Okinawa in April 1945. It required deft planning to organize, mass, and eventually converge the force over the great expanse of the ocean. Yet the joint force, or “Blue Force,” did so and was ready to strike.

As the Blue plan unfolded, all seemed on track. Forces were moving, and joint and combined combat power was ready to support the JFEO. But it was at this time that an old, often ignored military maxim came into play—the enemy gets a vote. And their vote mattered.

Taking advantage of their own sophisticated capabilities and an approach to war that was designed with Blue in mind, the enemy “Red” Force quickly engaged elements of the invasion force at range, well before the joint force could bring its full combat power to bear. Focusing largely on the amphibious assault ships, which have a critical “over the beach” capability, the Red antiaccess/area denial forces came into play. Shore-based ballistic and cruise missiles—some hypersonic—air-launched systems, and maritime strike assets converged in a massive, multidomain blow, which caused critical damage to the amphibious fleet. The amphibious ships never made it to the invasion beaches. This left the transport ships carrying the Army formations to carry on to the target; however, lacking the over-the-beach capabilities of the amphibious ships, they needed to land in a functioning port to unload the Army forces.

Capt. William McCarty-Little
Capt. William McCarty-Little was a U.S. Navy officer who introduced wargaming to the Naval War College in the 1880s. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Naval War College Museum)

Thankfully, this whole story is notional, and it played out not on the frontlines of a faraway war zone but in a simulations center on an Army base. This world of wargaming is becoming an increasingly essential tool for the Army and joint force as they grapple with what it means to conduct large-scale combat operations against peer competitors in areas far removed from the continental United States. In the words of Ed McGrady, one of the Nation’s leading experts in the field, wargaming is the “one tool that enables defense professionals to break out of the stories we have locked ourselves into.”1 He notes that “wargames are about understanding, not knowledge,” and about the stories we tell ourselves. In this case, Blue was forced to contend with an uncomfortable story; namely, a peer competitor can prevail if it plays its cards right. Blue then had to contend with an understanding of the implications of what transpired.

Additionally, it is important to note that none of this understanding or learning can occur if Blue does not have an effective opponent. And that is the role that I often get asked to play, that of “Red commander.” Over the past five years, I have played in twelve separate wargames for the Army, the Navy, combatant commands, and the joint staff; in nine of them, I was the Red commander. This means I led the enemy effort, supported by teams of experts from both military and civilian intelligence agencies. The “Red Team” truly is where “understanding” comes home to roost, as Red players must not only understand the intelligence record, but we must also understand how to mesh what we know into an operationalized campaign that effectively challenges Blue.

Red also must understand Blue, sometimes as well as Blue understands itself. Red provides Blue with a thinking enemy who understands Red’s real-world capabilities, warfighting doctrine, and national security imperatives (what we know). Red then operationalizes this understanding, along with an understanding of contemporary and near-future warfare, into a fight in the style the adversary would undertake (applying what we know). Dale Rielage, a brilliant Red Team expert, argues that the “value of wargaming hinges in large part of the quality of the opposition force—the ‘Red.’”2 To further his point, Rielage cites Capt. William McCarty-Little, the officer who first introduced wargaming to the Naval War College in the 1880s, who noted that the key to a successful wargame was “a live, vigorous enemy in the next room waiting feverishly to take advantage of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any visionary scheme, to haul us down to earth.”3

Playing Red is a difficult task, and the Red commander treads a narrow path. On the one hand, the Red commander must have an excellent working understanding of how potential adversaries fight. It is both art and science. It is not just a technical exercise in understanding Red orders of battle or the capabilities of their systems but really is about being able to apply that knowledge in what amounts to planning and then executing a campaign plan and leading the adversary’s war fight. This means the Red commander needs to understand a potential enemy’s approach to warfare, their doctrine, and how they have employed their forces in regional contingencies and in training.

But at the same time, the Red commander plays a key role for Blue by helping them understand what Red is thinking. A good Red commander finds a way to keep Blue on its toes, all the while helping them comprehend the events of the game as they unfold and then working to explain the reasons and logic that underpin Red actions. A Red commander who cannot do this professionally, tactfully, and with good humor can completely scuttle the game. To truly help this understanding stick, a Red commander needs to convince Blue that the Red Team is more than a mere sparring partner but a broader partner in learning and thinking about what could happen in a potential conflict.

Wargames should be about Blue’s learning, not Red’s. However, one of the main benefits for Red in these events is that we learn too. In fact, our learning may actually be more acute because we often get many more “reps and sets” playing through countless permutations of possible regional conflicts when compared to our Blue counterparts. Red players become very knowledgeable and thoughtful on a range of issues, many of which relate to Blue as much as they do Red. We end up thinking a great deal about what warfare between peer competitors would look like. I like to tell my Red Team players that we should be able to close our eyes and visualize the conflict unfolding over time and space, which allows us to understand what key events will need to occur over what key pieces of terrain and in what time frames. Because we fight these wars time and again, we develop a unique understanding of both Red and Blue, their strengths and weaknesses, the vulnerabilities they present, and the opportunities they may be able to exploit.

U.S. Air Force Gen. John Hyten, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in describing how new joint warfighting concepts performed in a different wargame, noted that “without overstating the issue, it [the concept] failed miserably. An aggressive red team that had been studying the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. They knew exactly what we’re going to do before we did it.”4 This is an advantage that a good Red commander will always have, which makes these games such important learning opportunities. But it also shows what it means to be a good Red commander—we must always try to further our own understanding of Red, Blue, and “Green” partner forces; the operational environment; and contemporary warfare so that we can give Blue the fight it needs at these wargames to advance its own understanding.

So, what are the key things I have learned in playing the role of Red commander over the last few years? Well, there is a great deal more than I could possibly put into words here. But there are some important, big-picture ideas, thoughts, lessons, and observations that I have derived from my gameplay. Without further ado, these are my seven reflections of a Red commander.

Lesson 1: Everything Starts with Understanding the Enemy

Simple, right? But it’s not as simple as you would think. The Army and the joint force are massive machines, and sometimes the process of understanding the enemy becomes inexorable. This can mean that the mechanisms simply move without reflection or thought—never truly internalizing an understanding of the adversary, who, as noted in the starting vignette, always gets a vote. The threat must not be allowed to get lost in this machine. It must be front and center to everything the Army does. It must drive operations and the integration of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). Furthermore, the National Defense Strategy calls on the U.S. joint force to be “threat based,” and focuses on its pacing, acute, and persistent threats.5 

If we do not base what we intend to do in a conflict against a peer competitor on an understanding of that peer competitor, then we will be at a massive disadvantage in a conflict. We need to avoid future “lobster traps,” and a working knowledge of the adversary is our best hedge against a failure of imagination. This notion is at the core of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s latest operational environment assessment, The Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations, which states plainly, “to achieve victory, the U.S. Army must know the enemy.”6 We need experts with a deep understanding of the adversary, but we also need those who will devise war plans and then execute them to maintain a strong working knowledge of Red. This was standard Army procedure during the Cold War, but it became a lost art in the years following. Wargaming can help restore that art. For example, in its after action report for the Unified Pacific 22 wargame, U.S. Army Pacific’s first highlighted insight was the requirement to address two key advantages held by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—mass and interior lines.7 This key conclusion from Unified Pacific 22 demonstrates how wargaming can specifically help war planners and operators learn about the adversary and then develop an understanding of the challenges it would need to overcome in an actual conflict.

Lesson 2: Warfare Remains a Human Endeavor

Wargames spend a great deal of time, effort, and focus on capabilities, both Red and Blue. Wargaming provides a unique laboratory to see how critical capabilities—such as hypersonic missiles; unmanned systems; counterspace weapons; new and visionary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; or counter-unmanned aircraft systems—fit into a conflict.

But it is not the performance of these systems that are central to these games. It is the human factor, namely how these pieces are put together and employed by people, the strategies they adopt, and how they react to the unexpected, that truly makes wargaming unique. The Center for Army Analysis, the Army’s leading provider of wargames, notes that wargaming highlights the “complex, subjective, and sometimes illogical and irrational decision of humans.”8 One of the most telling examples of this comes from the Cold War, Exercise Ivy League ’82. The game simulated a rapid Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and gave the U.S. NCA mere minutes to react. The game was played twice; once with a stand-in president, and once with President Ronald Reagan playing his role as commander in chief. The game essentially demonstrated the human nature of existential conflict. It demonstrated that panic or emotion could very well be real and palpable, and that the best-laid plans are hostage to human actions. One issue that came up in Ivy League ’82, for example, was that President Reagan refused to board the National Emergency Airborne Command Post when a notional Soviet nuclear strike was inbound. He wanted to manage the crisis from the White House and not in the skies aboard the “Kneecap,” thereby placing himself at grave risk and overturning the best-laid continuity of government plans.

It is becoming rapidly apparent that competition, crisis, and conflict between great powers and peer competitors will be joint, combined, interagency, and whole-of-nation. The Department of Defense (DOD) wargaming community has started to understand this and does everything it can to invite experts from outside their typical echo chamber to participate in a game. This is important, as it shows the DOD that it is but part of a broader nation that would be engaged in a conflict. It shows that other entities, whether an intelligence agency, an ally, or perhaps even a private industry entity, might have an ability to help solve a military problem.

It also means that even though the DOD leads most wargames, military leaders must understand that they will not make many of the critical strategic calls during the run-up to a crisis or conflict. I recently played in a game where a senior political appointee from within the DOD played the NCA for a game in which the United States was engaged in a conflict with a nuclear-armed, peer competitor. The Blue Team, in responding to Red aggression, wished to quickly target and destroy a number of Red assets and installations. They were nonplussed to learn that the authorities for their desired strike were withheld as the NCA thought through his decision. During the hotwash, when Blue planners brought the delay up, the individual playing the NCA told them that he was being asked to make the most consequential decision any U.S. president would ever have to make—to initiate combat operations against a nuclear-armed enemy who had the capability to cause critical damage to the United States. He then, tongue-in-cheek, asked them to forgive him for taking some extra time to contemplate such a momentous call.

This is an extreme example, but wargaming needs to incorporate not only the capabilities but also the decision-making processes of a range of actors, both across the U.S. government and among our allies and partners. Getting experts from across this spectrum to participate in wargames will become increasingly essential.

Brig. Gen. Rose King New Zealand Army deputy chief of staff and Army Maj. Gen. Chris Smith U.S. Army Pacific deputy commanding general–strategy and plans
Brig. Gen. Rose King (center), New Zealand Army deputy chief of staff, and Australian Army Maj. Gen. Chris Smith (right), U.S. Army Pacific deputy commanding general–strategy and plans, listen to a brief during Unified Pacific’s intelligence-focused “Pacific Winds” on 26 January 2023 at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. (Photo by Sgt. Jennifer Delaney U.S. Army)

Lesson 4: Warfare Will Be Multidomain, and Wargames Allow Us to Master Multidomain Skillsets

What makes contemporary and near-future warfare so different when compared to what we have experienced since the end of the Cold War is that our key potential adversaries can match the U.S. joint force and its allies across all domains. They can converge capabilities, deny us the ability to operate in certain domains, and then achieve their campaign objectives if they play their cards right. In wargames, Red players generally have more experience and practice at employing multidomain capabilities than the typical Blue players, often providing a wake-up call to the Blue Team. Our pacing threat is designing a force capable of operating and converging across domains, with capabilities and an approach to war that denies Blue the ability to maneuver or operate jointly across warfare domains.10 If handled well in a wargame, Red can prevail. Conversely, Blue must use wargames as ability to test its own multidomain theories. Wargames offer a unique venue where the services can see how things come together in the joint fight. Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet noted, “There are experts of land, sea, and air warfare. Yet there are no experts of warfare. And warfare is a single entity, having a common purpose.”11 Wargaming can help develop those experts and particularly develop the multidomain skills, knowledge, and understanding that the joint force will require to take on an adversary who also can operate across domains.12

Lesson 5: The Army Likes to Live in the Tactical World; Great Power Warfare Is Won and Lost at the Operational Level

The era of counterinsurgency shifted the Army’s focus to the tactical level. After the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Army changed its unit of action to the brigade level, and most of the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan was done at the battalion and company levels. The whole Army structure of that era—how we trained, how we thought about warfare, and how we organized—focused on the tactical fight. Wargaming against peer competitors, however, demonstrates that such conflicts likely will be won or lost at the operational level, and that operational art is a skill set that must be understood throughout the joint force. If the tactical level focuses on battles, engagements, and small-unit actions, it is the operational level that will provide the critical linkages in terms of campaigns and major operations that ensure tactical success eventually translates to the strategic level, where theater strategy and national policy reside.13 It is the operational art that allows the commander to translate strategic-level goals into tasks that subordinates can accomplish.14 

An example of this can be found in Unified Pacific 23, which focused on contested logistics. The game’s final report notes the criticality of improving joint combined command and control. For sustainment, the necessity to maximize operational-level, intratheater movement is then controlled by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s emerging Pacific Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which takes in requirements from service components and then issues orders to subordinate commands to execute. The Army’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command then evaluated best practices and techniques to carry out sustainment down to the tactical formations in the fight.15 These types of issues routinely dominate wargaming and are clearly operational rather than tactical. This vignette demonstrates how practicing operational art is a crucial advantage of wargaming.

Lesson 6: Wargaming “Reps and Sets” Guard Against Strategic Surprise and Failure of Imagination

Red experts spend most of their time thinking about our adversaries and what conflict with them could entail, and most have played Red in many wargames. The next game is not summary learning for Red—it is just another permutation of a fight they’ve fought numerous other times. Blue generally does not get the luxury to do this in the daily press of normal operations, and when the Blue Team assembles for a wargame, it likely is the first time many of them have confronted the operationalizing of their war plans. Armies and soldiers often learn best through experience of battle, and wargaming is one of the best ways to at least approximate some of the challenges that could be faced when a conflict begins. In his excellent work on wargaming the unfought battles of the Cold War, Jim Storr notes, “Things that might be blindingly obvious to someone who gamed dozens of battles might well be nonsensical or, at best, counterintuitive to commanders who served for years but never fought [them].”16 Having the opportunity to fight the fights that could occur means that leaders will have the opportunity to confront the challenges they might encounter and not be faced with surprise or suffer a failure of imagination.

A pertinent historical example involves Gen. Douglas MacArthur during the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941. Throughout the interwar years, U.S. defense planners struggled with the notion of how to defend the Philippines from a potential Japanese assault. The result was the well-known War Plan Orange (WPO), which understood, even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the difficulties that the United States would have in reinforcing the Philippines across the expanse of the Pacific and in the face of Japanese air and maritime power. WPO-3, the variant in effect in 1941, called for the U.S. forces in the Philippines to withdraw to the defensible Bataan Peninsula on Luzon, where, with pre-positioned sustainment stocks in place, they would hold as long as possible to give forces marshaling on the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii time to defeat the Japanese Navy and relieve the defenders. Despite the years of work in devising WPO—and countless wargames supporting it—MacArthur completely revised the plan on the eve of the actual Japanese attack. Instead of consolidating on the defense on favorable terrain, he would attempt to defeat the Japanese on the beaches of Luzon, wherever they landed. When the Japanese landed, MacArthur’s forces were completely out of position and out of time.17 In this case, MacArthur disregarded the “reps and sets” that went into devising WPO-3 and suffered due to his overconfidence. However, when leaders get the chance to learn from their participation in wargames, the experiential learning process generally becomes visceral and unforgettable, and hopefully will prevent future cases like the Philippines in 1941.

Lesson 7: Blue Buy-In Is What Makes Wargaming Useful

Red’s job in wargaming is difficult, as it often must relay uncomfortable truths to Blue. For wargaming to have value, Blue must understand and accept the notion that the scenario Red is presenting is valid. Red teaming expert Micah Zenko writes that there are three elements of buy-in that Blue must adopt. First, Blue must accept that there is a potential vulnerability within its sphere of interest/action that Red can help uncover and address. In military terms, this represents capabilities, approaches to war, and plans that can potentially defeat Blue. Second, Blue must be willing to assemble the best Red players it can possibly find. And third, Blue must allow Red to be absolutely truthful about its findings.18 This is not always easy, and wargames are replete with stories about Blue discounting Red actions based on the cliché that a Red action “would never happen” or, even worse, that Red “cheated.”

The story of Millenium Challenge 2002, a concept development wargame that was designed to validate a whole new joint approach to war, still resonates as a warning of what can happen when this buy-in does not exist. A strong Red Team led by retired U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper created controversy by demonstrating the flaws in Blue’s concept. Instead of accepting the flaws, joint forces command leadership instead fell line with the “this could never happen” school of thought and reset the game, adding massive constraints on Red. This led to a public relations disaster that remains a case study of how not to use wargaming.19

However, failing to get Blue buy-in to Zenko’s three elements have, in practice, had much more devastating effects than merely damaged reputations. On 27 August 1941, a group of graduate students from Japan’s Total War Research Institute, an institution that brought together the elite young leaders of the Japanese military and civilian government, presented a report to Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on Japan’s prospects for winning a war against the United States and its allies. The report, which was backed by extensive research and wargaming, asserted that Japan might prevail in a few initial battles but concluded that it would be drawn into a protracted conflict where its resources would dwindle and eventually expire, leading to inevitable defeat. As a result, the Japanese played another wargame designed to test their conclusion, and most of the ministers who participated came to the same conclusion regarding a war with the United States.20 Yet Japanese decision-makers—political and military—ignored the findings.

A healthier and more useful example of Blue buy-in can be found with Unified Pacific. The outcomes from Unified Pacific 23, for example, have been incorporated into U.S. Army Pacific’s operational campaign—Operation Pathways—and into real-world exercises, like the joint U.S.-Australian Talisman Sabre 23. Many of the outcomes also were included in the U.S. Navy’s Global game.21

Conclusion

There are many more things I have learned from playing Red in these wargames, and they range across a variety of issues. Simple things, like understanding the military implications of geography, to the very complex, such as what it means to engage in open conflict with a nuclear-armed peer adversary or understanding how we end wars. Playing in games certainly has made me a better intelligence analyst as the practical, experiential side of gaming has revealed implications and insights that intelligence reporting alone could never have given me. Most of all, it has driven home for me the necessity to develop a strong working relationship with Blue decision-makers, operators, and staff officers. These relationships are built on trust, which develops over time. When Red can demonstrate that it is indeed on the same team as Blue, a remarkable kind of learning occurs, and we are able to get to the type of competency required to prevail in global wars against peer competitors.

I have learned that we do not wargame enough, and that we should find ways to incorporate wargaming more deeply across all our various disciplines, and not just in large, command-sponsored, multiweek games. In addition to the time I have spent supporting these games, I am also an avid hobby wargamer, and I have learned a great deal from playing “for fun.” Namely, I sometimes get to play Blue, which is remarkably fun and interesting to me. When done right, a Red commander can provide a significant force multiplier to Blue. On his first day as the Pacific commander in chief, Adm. Chester Nimitz famously met with his staff intelligence chief, then Lt. Cmdr. Edwin Layton, and told him,

“I want you to be the Admiral Nagumo of my staff. I want your every thought, every instinct as you believe Admiral Nagumo might have them. You are to see the war, their operations, their aims, from the Japanese viewpoint and keep me advised what you are thinking about, what you are doing, and what purpose, what strategy motivates your operations. If you can do this, you will give me the kind of information needed to win the war.”22

If Red is played well in a wargame, the Red commander can do what Nimitz charged of Layton but hopefully prior to a disaster of strategic surprise and failure of imagination of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor.

Interestingly, our pacing threat has adopted this very approach. The PLA has enthusiastically adopted wargaming as a means of testing its own ideas about warfare and to help overcome its lack of real-world combat experience. The PLA Navy has led the way in this regard, and it recognizes the need to effectively replicate its adversary—the United States—in these games. To do so, the PLA Navy created the Blue Team Center (in PLA parlance, the Blue Team are the adversaries) at the Naval Command College at Nanjing. The college’s one-time commander, then Rear Adm. Shen Jinlong, who was later promoted and served as the PLA Navy commander, noted that the PLA Navy’s wargaming faced a major problem—namely, that “Red (China) and Blue (the United States) were like twins. Not only were Blue’s organization, equipment, and combat style the same as Red—they even had the same operational thinking.”23 The Blue Team is designed to rectify this mirror imaging so that PLA Navy wargames are more useful and effective. A profile of the Blue Team director, Gong Jia, indicates that his goal is to understand the minds of Blue at the campaign level (operational level in Chinese terminology) and above.24

Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson visits the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) Command College on 15 January 2019 for a roundtable discussion where he underscored the importance of lawful and safe operations around the globe
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson visits the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) Command College on 15 January 2019 for a roundtable discussion where he underscored the importance of lawful and safe operations around the globe. The PLA has adopted wargaming to test its own ideas about warfare and overcome its lack of real-world combat experience. The PLA Navy created the Blue Team Center at the its command college in Nanjing to effectively replicate its adversary—the United States. (Photo by Chief Mass Communication Spc. Elliott Fabrizio, U.S. Navy)

In one game where I played Red commander, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sent an observer team to assess if Red was being played effectively. As I was Red commander, the observers pulled me aside to interview me and ask me questions about how the game was going and how I was playing Red. One of the questions they asked me was among the best questions I’d ever heard because it gets to the gist of what it means to be an effective Red commander. They asked me, “How much better are you than Red would be in a real fight?” After thinking about it for a minute, I said our team probably was better because we understand Blue as much as we do Red. I told them if they asked me to, I could immediately take over as Blue commander and essentially run their fight because I had seen it and experienced it so much in so many other games. The observer team seemed happy with this answer and moved on.

But the question has stuck with me ever since. If Red does its job well, it provides Blue with the chance to try new things, to fail, to learn, and to hopefully redefine the stories that we tell ourselves, and to devise new thoughts and ideas that will lead to victory in a future conflict. In referring to the work done by the joint board in the 1930s and early 1940s at developing the “Rainbow” war plans (such as the aforementioned WPO), which included a great deal of research and wargaming, Blaine Pardoe writes, “Without the skills earned working in the darkness … the United States would have struggled to attempt to develop this competency in its general staff.”25 This “work in the darkness” requires a capable, knowledgeable, flexible, and adaptive Red that will enable Blue learning.

A wargame will not predict the future for Blue, but if Red does its job correctly, it will allow Blue to experience what a potential fight could look like. It becomes the work in the darkness that allows Blue to learn, and hopefully leads to the light of victory in the next war. So perhaps the most important lesson of all gets back to the beginning—we have to get Red right so that Blue gets the opportunity to learn and to get it right on a future battlefield.

Ian M. Sullivan is the deputy chief of staff, G-2, for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). He holds a BA from Canisius University in Buffalo, New York, and an MA from Georgetown University’s BMW Center for German and European Studies in Washington, D.C., and he was a Fulbright Fellow at the Universität Potsdam in Potsdam, Germany. A career civilian intelligence officer, Sullivan has served with the Office of Naval Intelligence; Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) at the National Counterterrorism Center; the Central Intelligence Agency; and TRADOC. He is a member of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service and was first promoted to the senior civilian ranks in 2013 as a member of the ODNI’s Senior National Intelligence Service.

The author would like to thank Maj. Gen. Jay Bartholomees, U.S. Army, and Charlie Raymond (TRADOC G-2) for their thoughtful reviews and edits of this article.

Notes

1. Ed McGrady, “Getting the Story Right About Wargaming,” War on the Rocks, 8 November 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-story-right-about-wargaming/.

2. Dale C. Rielage, “War Gaming Must Get Red Right: An Expert In-House Adversary is a Powerful Tool for the Fleet,” Proceedings 143, no. 1 (January 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017/january/war-gaming-must-get-red-right/.

3. Ibid.

4. Tara Copp, “‘It Failed Miserably’: After Wargaming Loss, Joint Chiefs Are Overhauling How the US Military Will Fight,” Defense One, 26 July 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/07/it-failed-miserably-after-wargaming-loss-joint-chiefs-are-overhauling-how-us-military-will-fight/184050/.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2022). https://www.defense.gov/National-Defense-Strategy/.

6. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment 2024–2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 1 August 2024), 31, https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2024/07/31/the-operational-environment-2024-2034-large-scale-combat-operations/.

7. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), Unified Pacific Wargame Series 2022: Unclassified Overview (Fort Shafter, HI: USARPAC, September 2022), 4, https://www.usarpac.army.mil/Portals/113/PDF%20Files/Unclassified%20UPWS%20Report%20Final.pdf.

8. Government Accounting Office (GAO), Defense Analysis: Additional Actions Could Enhance DOD’s Wargaming Efforts, GAO-23-105351 (Washington, DC: GAO, April 2023), https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105351.pdf.

9. Marc Ambinder, The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1982 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018), 82–89.

10. Ian M. Sullivan, “Three Dates, Three Windows, and All of DOTMLPF-P: How the People’s Liberation Army Poses an All-of-Army Challenge,” Military Review 104, no. 1 (January-February 2024): 14–25, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2024/Sullivan/.

11. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Sheila Fischer (1921; Rome: Rivista Aeronautica, 1958).

12. Robert P. Haffa Jr. and James H. Patton Jr., “Wargames, Winning and Losing,” Parameters 31, no. 1 (Spring 2001): Article 9, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol31/iss1/9/.

13. Chad Buckel, “A New Look at Operational Art: How We View War Dictates How We Fight It,” Joint Force Quarterly 100 (1st Quarter, January 2021): 94–100, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2498208/.

14. Wilson Blythe, “A History of Operational Art,” Military Review 98, no. 6 (November-December 2018): 37–49, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2018/Blythe-Operational-Art/.

15. USARPAC, Unified Pacific Wargame Series 2023: Unclassified Overview (Fort Shafter, HI: USARPAC, September 2023), 8.

16. Jim Storr, Battlegroup! The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War (Warwick, UK: Helion, 2021), 74–75.

17. John C. McManus, Fire and Fortitude: The U.S. Army in the Pacific War, 1941–1943 (New York: Caliber, 2019), 63–64.

18. Micah Zenko, Red Team: How to Succeed by Thinking Like the Enemy (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 2–5.

19. Ibid., 52–61; Micah Zenko, “Millenium Challenge: The Real Story of a Corrupted Military Exercise and Its Legacy,” War on the Rocks, 5 November 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/11/millenium-challenge-the-real-story-of-a-corrupted-military-exercise-and-its-legacy/.

20. Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy (New York: Vintage Books, 2014), 164–65.

21. USARPAC, Unified Pacific Wargame Series 2023, 11.

22. Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 307; Rielage, “War Gaming Must Get Red Right.”

23. Ryan D. Martinson, “The PLA Navy’s Blue Team Center Games for War,” Proceedings 150, no. 5 (May 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/pla-navys-blue-team-center-games-war.

24. Ibid.

25. Blaine L. Pardoe, Never Wars: The US War Plans to Invade the World (London: Fonthill, 2014), 28.

Featured Image: Students move pieces around the board on 21 December 2023 during a wargame based on Pacific conflict while attending the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. (Photo by Billy Blankenship, U.S. Air Force)

The Decisiveness of French Entry into the American War for Independence

By Alex Crosby

The 1778 French entry into the American War for Independence imposed several strategic conundrums for the British that fatally impaired chances of victory. First, French entry initiated a pattern of European opportunism to challenge British global hegemony, specifically with the cooperative involvement of France and Spain. Second, peripheral theaters in the West Indies, India, and Europe diffused British naval forces and strained limited manpower, devastating the British capability to conduct land warfare successfully. Finally, French entry bolstered American international legitimacy and domestic determination, which prevented Britain from regaining the strategic initiative. Ultimately, these combined challenges had adverse effects that made any remaining chance of British victory impossible.

European Opportunism

In the years leading up to its entry into the war, France aligned strategic resources to capitalize on opportunities that challenged British hegemony, particularly in the maritime domain. The French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Vergennes, spearheaded ambitions to restore France to its perceived rightful dominant place in Europe by attacking British influence abroad instead of the historical strategy of targeting Britain itself.1 Additionally, both the French Director-General of Finance and Secretary of State for the Navy, Jacques Necker and Gabriel de Sartine, respectively, established policy decisions from 1774-1780 that supported France’s ability to pay for domestic war support, including the robust reformation of its naval forces.2 This preparation allowed France to be generally well suited to confront British naval forces, a physical representation of British hegemony, and directly contributed to British defeats in the maritime domain.

Following the commencement of the war, France identified the unique opportunity this far-off conflict presented for restoring order and balance to European power dynamics, which would also weaken British military successes. Specifically, the strained state that British forces were in following the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns provided the ideal timing for the French to enter the war. While Britain was considering negotiations to cease hostilities after these two campaign failures, France sought to prolong the war for its own benefit.3 France had long desired a revengeful opportunity to damage Britain in a manner that would increase maritime and political superiority in France’s favor.4 The tyranny of distance associated with European conflict in North America was capitalized on by France and continued to be a monumental struggle for Britain.

France’s entry into the war placed it in the unique position of being able to leverage American Revolutionary aims for independence as the catalyst for its grand strategy to challenge British hegemony and defeat it when opportunities presented themselves. Although France had expressed genuine interest in the American colonies seeking independence, this disturbance ultimately served France as a lever to restore global colonial balance and French influence.5 France embodied its role as a catalyst for challenging British hegemony and, in doing so, spurred Spain and Holland into later cooperation to ensure British victory in the American War for Independence would be impossible.

Motivated by decades of simmering retaliation and individual self-identification as the rightful European hegemon, France’s entry into the war forced Britain into a defensive maritime fight that prevented victory after 1778. Since 1763, the French-led House of Bourbon had been conducting robust shipbuilding efforts with the anticipation of likely conflict with Britain’s notoriously strong naval fleet. Unburdened by any land warfare entanglements in Europe, the House of Bourbon majorly oriented its resources towards increasing its combined maritime power.6 By 1775, France and Spain’s relative combined naval power exceeded Britain by approximately 25 percent and continued to grow throughout the remainder of the war.7 This prioritization of the maritime domain forced Britain into a strategic defensive posture, with alternating concerns between the North American land campaigns and countering Bourbon maritime threats across the globe.8

Peripheral Theaters

French entry into the American War for Independence created pervasive and politically deadly dilemmas for British control of its far-flung naval bases and ports across the globe.9 Except for the Spanish-controlled naval shipbuilding port of Havana, overseas locations for European countries were typically resource deficient and required significant garrison forces to maintain order.10 The vast distances and garrison requirements complicated British efforts to counter French attempts at harassment, isolation, or invasion. Due to French threats to British colonial garrison forces and the maritime sea lines of communication between them, Britain reoriented its forces and resources towards France and decreased allocations to combating the American colonialists.11 Britain eventually further ensured its strategic defeat with its declaration of hostilities on Holland. France capitalized on the resulting Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and gained a critical extension of control into the Indian Ocean and West Indies.12 This unification of European powers, led by France, signaled a shift in global British control and turned the weight of Britain’s colonial possessions won during the Seven Year’s War in 1763 into an overwhelmingly taxing drain that prevented the British from bringing its full combat potential to bear at the locations of its choosing.13

France’s entry also led to the defense of Britain becoming the primary strategic objective when threats of attack from the House of Bourbon culminated between 1778-1780.14 In particular, the British Admiralty tended to be riveted by fears of potential invasion and over-insured home waters with British naval forces that could have proved decisive elsewhere.15 This fear was further flamed as Britain entered hostilities without any continental allies.16 Despite focusing maritime forces in its home waters, the British navy would have had no legitimate chance against a combined Franco-Spanish naval fleet if they had pursued a determined invasion of Britain. Britain’s shift from offensive operations in the American colonies, King George’s original strategic objective, to defensive operations displayed the genuinely destructive nature of French entry into the war.

Due to this refocusing towards Europe, Britain overly fixated on French naval dockyards in their misguided pursuit of a decisive naval engagement.17 The First Lord of the Admiralty, John Montagu, preferred concentration of the British naval fleet in Europe to force the House of Bourbon alliance to reallocate their respective naval forces from North America and the West Indies. However, the British navy lacked proper military intelligence on the intentions of enemy fleet movements.18 This intelligence gap resulted in the British fleet predominately failing to locate and engage the House of Bourbon naval forces. Additionally, France exploited its geographical position to facilitate an increasing operation focusing on guerre de course to harass British shipping.19 This missed opportunity of British naval forces countering France at sea allowed the French to operate with general freedom of action and inflict terminally damaging economic and military costs on Britain.

Bolstered Americanism

American Revolution leaders had framed their political narrative as a legitimate protest movement with traditional values grounded in English law and classical political philosophy to protect against British accusations and attract powerful European political and intellectual elites’ support.20 This political narrative would result in an increasing European acknowledgment of American Revolution legitimacy in the international system, albeit initially limited. Additionally, the radical changes in principles, opinion, sentiments, and affections of people from the republican ideals in the Declaration of Independence improved American legitimacy and furthered domestic determination. The American Revolution leadership hoped that a potential French recognition of an established United States of America would pave the way for other European nations to join the war and understand the long-term economic benefits of a British defeat.21 By incorporating principles of English society into their cause, the American revolutionaries had created a brilliant situation where British resentment fueled a growing fire of emboldened Americanism. Having been satisfactorily impressed by the intricate efforts of the American Revolution leadership like Benjamin Franklin, France became the spark that lit the eternal fire of American determination to defeat Britain.22

American leadership had long depended on France’s entry into the war and recognized the significance it would have on inhibiting Britain’s chance of victory. Even in the darkest moments after conflict initiation, George Washington remained faithfully committed that a French entry would inevitably occur. Specifically, Washington understood that the strategic complication of Britain fighting a land battle in the American colonies and contending with French naval forces across the globe would ensure a British defeat.23 American leadership hoped that the British failure during the Saratoga Campaign would be a turning point for French war support, which proved valid with France’s entry shortly afterward.24 Further hopes of a more meaningful alliance and a long-awaited desire to decisively defeat the British would come to fruition in August 1781 at the Battle of Yorktown with a sixteen thousand man-strong combined force of French and American troops.25

France’s entry also brought tangible aid to the American colonists that ensured war efforts could continue and drain Britain’s overseas land combat potential. French military leaders identified that the American colonists organically possessed relatively proficient skills with handling weapons and that they maintained the ability to fight in the near-limitless space across the American colonies. Additionally, France perceived the American colonists as being fearless of losing cities as they had no legitimate political, moral, or industrial foundation for military efforts, unlike the cities of Europe.26 This unique degree of American colonial resolve to reach war termination in their favor spurred on French, Spanish, and Dutch military aid in the forms of gunpowder, loans, and various equipment.27 Specific to the French, the first shipment crossed the Atlantic Ocean just after conflict initiation in 1776 clandestinely through a fabricated commercial entity and continued until war termination.28 The tangible aid that came with French entry, combined with the character of American warfighting, sapped British land forces of necessary combat potential.

In addition to tangible military aid, France provided a maritime-based capability to project power shore and inflict military costs on the British. While the American colonists focused almost exclusively on land warfare to drain British military resources, France focused its military efforts at sea.29 This French naval strategy ideally supported land operations and had been doctrinally implemented with the anticipation of a potential war with Britain in the American colonies.30 The September 1779 French fleet bombardment of Savannah displayed this ability against British land targets, and although limited in tactical success, contributed to furthering American determination against Britain.31 Following French entry, British naval and land combat potential in North America would never recover to 1776 levels.32

Although traditional American naval action was limited during the American War for Independence, French entry bolstered American privateering against British shipping and the land pressuring of naval bases, providing morale boosts that kept American colonial determination strong. Before there was a French naval presence on the Atlantic Coast, British sea control was locally uncontested and prevented consistent privateering near the coastal waters.33 American privateering increased and challenged British maritime security efforts once French naval forces provided limited sea control.34 The presence of Comte d’Estaing’s ships forced Britain to abandon blockade efforts, which dramatically increased opportunities for privateering and the flow of European goods shipments.35 This privateering went practically uncontested by the British for the remainder of the war and highlighted the general decrease in British maritime superiority upon French war entry.36 Additionally, French entry spurred American determination to put pressure on and control the naval hubs of Boston, Narraganset Bay, and New York.37 The threat of privateering and loss of strategically important naval bases in North America, enabled by the French, directly contributed to overall British defeat in the American War for Independence.

Contrarian Viewpoint

Some might argue that the House of Bourbon alliance was fragmented between drastically different political objectives, leading to opportunities for Britain’s exploitation and regaining the initiative towards achieving favorable war termination. This fragmentation is supported by French awareness of the necessity for Spain to provide resources for a combined naval force to place the British naval fleet at risk. Likewise, Spain was exceptionally aware that France depended on their involvement and actively leveraged this to steer the House of Bourbon alliance to achieve its land seizure objectives. Spain had specific war objectives of seizing Minorca, Gibraltar, and Jamaica from British control but was generally less committed to holistically orienting strategic resources towards successful operational execution.38 Additionally, Spain contrasted France in that it had no intentions of supporting the Americans or recognizing their moves towards independence.39 Finally, Spanish political resolve for conflict was limited and nearly led to withdrawal from the war following Spanish failure at Gibraltar.40 This vulnerable situation required France to direct resources to maintain a particular strategic objective of preventing Spanish capitulation from hindering French benefit or enabling a British victory.41

Despite these contrary views, these opposing objectives were overcome by an overall common unity to challenge British hegemony and cause culminating burdens. Neither France nor Spain were aggressively opposed to each other’s objectives and successfully found compromise to leverage each other’s military advantages. In particular, Spanish renewed efforts to pressure Britain in the West Indies allowed France to increase maritime and power projection operations in North America.42 France and Spain were deeply bound by desires for reprisal against British actions several decades prior and held sentiments of European rightfulness to supersede British hegemony.43

Additionally, others might argue that British naval forces were doctrinally and capability superior to their French equivalents, which could have led to a British victory. In general, British naval forces were able to maintain a degree of local sea control around their sea lines of communication, thus ensuring the strategic sustainment of its North American land forces. Likewise, the British were confident in their naval superiority and assessed that one or two decisive maritime engagements would have terminally altered the threat of the Franco-Spanish naval fleet and regained the complete strategic initiative in British favor.44

While this perspective holds some merit, British strategic decisions like those made by George Germaine, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, had severely limited British maritime strategy.45 British fears of upsetting France and British taxpayers that response to the American rebellion was a prelude to invading the French West Indies led to limited naval mobilization in 1775. These limitations were also coupled with broad navy funding cuts and rules of engagement additions that dictated there be no interception of French ships carrying munitions and supplies to the American colonies. These measures ultimately negated any possibility of a successful blockade on the Atlantic Coast being effectively implemented.46

Additionally, the French recognized the immense risks of becoming involved in a decisive naval battle with the British and instead focused efforts on attacking seaborne trade, launching land assaults against colonial possessions, enhancing French overseas control, and escorting French trade.47 Compounding the problem of France not being a cooperative target set, the British failed to internally coordinate intelligence of French and Spanish naval dockyards, which led to the House of Bourbon operating with near impunity across the Atlantic Ocean.48 With French entry pressing Britain into an overly defensive posture, British naval forces became too burdened by global mission tasking to guarantee local sea control of its Atlantic Ocean sea lines of communications.49

Finally, the British would have ultimately had to prioritize the North American theater over its other colonies to mitigate the risk posed by the combined French-Spanish naval forces. This prioritization would have suicidally sacrificed British economic priorities in other colonies, such as the West Indies, which had become a focal point of French maritime operations.50 Likewise, British naval focus on protecting the homeland was predicated on poor strategic assumptions that France intended to conduct an amphibious landing. Although there were discussions within the House of Bourbon to conduct such an invasion, this strategy was smartly abandoned for a more appropriate increase in maritime trade interdiction that would place Britain at greater strategic risk. Additionally, the British land forces in North America contended with unparalleled exterior lines of communication that measured more than three thousand miles across the Atlantic Ocean.51 This vast distance required overseas locations, with corresponding garrison forces, that Britain could not maintain after French entry.52 Ultimately, French entry into the American War for Independence in 1778 negated any possibility of Britain achieving victory. 

Lieutenant Commander Alex Crosby, an active duty naval intelligence officer, began his career as a surface warfare officer. His assignments have included the USS Lassen (DDG-82), USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, with multiple deployments supporting naval expeditionary and special warfare commands. He is a Maritime Advanced Warfighting School–qualified maritime operational planner and an intelligence operations warfare tactics instructor. He holds master’s degrees from the American Military University and the Naval War College.

Endnotes

[1] Pritchard, James. “French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal.” Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 86-87.

[2] Ibid., 85.

[3] Ferling, John. Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015: 207.

[4] Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890: 510-513

[5] “French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal.” 88.

[6] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 505.

[7] O’Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013: 343.

[8] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 508.

[9] Ibid., 511.

[10] Ibid., 520.

[11] Ibid., 520.

[12] Ibid., 521.

[13] Jasanoff, Maya. Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. New York: Knopf, 2011: 24.

[14] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[15] Mackesy, Piers. “British Strategy in the War of American Independence.” Yale Review, vol. 52 (1963): 555.

[16] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 334.

[17] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 526.

[18] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 333-334.

[19] Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Introductory” and “Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.” In Mahan on Naval Strategy. John B. Hattendorf, ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015: 33

[20] Genest, Marc. “The Message Heard ‘Round the World.” In Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates about War and Revolution. Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, S.C.M. Paine, eds. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019: 10.

[21] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[22] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 114.

[23] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[24] Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. 40.

[25] Ibid., 52.

[26] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 541.

[27] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[28] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 205-206.

[29] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 508.

[30] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 91.

[31] Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. 44.

[32] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 14.

[33] Ibid., 333-334.

[34] Ibid., 343.

[35] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 93.

[36] Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It. 209.

[37] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 520.

[38] Ibid., 510.

[39] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 87.

[40] Ibid., 94.

[41] Ibid., 96-97.

[42] Ibid., 99.

[43] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 509.

[44] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 554.

[45] Ibid., 548.

[46] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 13-14.

[47] French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal. 92.

[48] The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire. 346-347.

[49] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 541.

[50] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 513.

[51] British Strategy in the War of American Independence. 543.

[52] The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 515.

Featured Image: Battle of the Virginia Capes, 5 September 1781. Oil on canvas by v. Zveg, 1962, depicting the French fleet (at left), commanded by Vice Admiral the Comte de Grasse, engaging the British fleet (at right) under Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Graves off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. (Courtesy of the U.S. Navy Art Collection, U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph)