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Operation Indigo Spear and the Second Tanker War of 2022

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Read Part One on the Battle of Locust Point. Read Part Two on the Nanxun Jiao Crisis. Read Part Three on Operation Eminent Shield.

By David R. Strachan

TOP SECRET/NOFORN

The following classified interview is being conducted per the joint NHHC/USNI Oral History Project on Autonomous Warfare.

Admiral Jeremy B. Lacy, USN (Ret.)

December 4, 2033

Annapolis, Maryland

Interviewer: Lt. Cmdr. Hailey J. Dowd, USN

Good morning.

We are joined again today by Admiral Jeremy B. Lacy, widely considered the father of autonomous undersea conflict, or what has come to be known as micronaval warfare. Admiral Lacy spearheaded the Atom-class microsubmarine program, eventually going on to establish Strikepod Group 1 (COMPODGRU 1), and serving as Commander, Strikepod Forces, Atlantic (COMPODLANT), and Commander, Strikepod Command (PODCOM). He is currently the Corbin A. McNeill Endowed Chair in Naval Engineering at the U.S. Naval Academy.

This is the fourth installment of a planned eight-part classified oral history focusing on Admiral Lacy’s distinguished naval career and his profound impact on modern naval warfare. In Part I we learned about the genesis of the Atom-class microsubmarine and its operational construct, the Strikepod, and the series of events leading up to the first combat engagement of the micronaval era, the Battle of Locust Point. In Part II, we learned of how continued Russian micronaval advances led to the development of AUDENs, Autonomous Undersea Denial Networks. We also learned of CYAN, a walk-in CIA agent who revealed Chinese penetration of the AUDEN program, and the resulting emplacement of numerous AUDEN-like Shāyú microsubmarine turrets throughout the South China Sea. In Part III, we learned of Operation Eminent Shield, an unmanned distributed maritime operation where Strikepods and squadrons of Esquire-class unmanned surface vehicles squared off against China’s maritime militia in the South China Sea.

Today we turn to the Persian Gulf, and the employment of Strikepods and Esquires in countering the IRGCN during Operation Indigo Spear, the U.S. response to the so-called Second Tanker War, wherein Iran, lashing out after years of crippling sanctions and perceived bullying by the West, utilized an indigenous, weaponized UUV to wreak havoc on regional stability and the global economy.

We joined Admiral Lacy again at his home in Annapolis, Maryland.

Let’s begin today with Operation Indigo Cloak, the deployment of unmanned maritime systems to the Persian Gulf. Can you tell us how it came about, and what role PODCOM played?

Beginning in mid 2019, Iran engaged in an increasingly belligerent campaign of economic warfare against the United States and the West, lashing out against crushing sanctions, and the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, and looking to drive a wedge between Washington and those EU nations still abiding by the JCPOA. Needless to say, CENTCOM was keeping pretty busy, and once they got wind of what we’d achieved in the South China Sea with Eminent Shield, they were more than a little interested in what we could do for them. So, late in 2018, we shipped two 12-ship Strikepods and a squadron of Esquires down to NAS Bahrain to help monitor IRIN and IRGCN operations.

CENTCOM was also becoming concerned about Iranian UUVs and USVs, and specifically, the Navy’s ability to counter them.

Yes, the Iranians were taking an increasingly keen interest in unmanned maritime systems, so while our main objective was augmenting ISR and providing MCM if needed, we were also monitoring for any developments in that space, especially in the undersea domain where things seemed to be heating up.

What kind of intelligence were you receiving on Iranian UUVs?

For several years we’d been monitoring Iranian efforts to acquire a viable unmanned undersea capability. Front companies with ties to the IRIN [Islamic Republic of Iran Navy] and Iranian defense ministry were attempting to buy COTS inertial navigation systems, accelerometers, and various other components, and sometimes even entire vehicles. Tehran’s unmanned fetish was legendary. UAVs and USVs had served Iran and its proxies well, and so it was entirely reasonable to assume that they’d eventually pursue UUVs. But unlike air or surface drones, the technological barriers to entry for the undersea are pretty high, and appeared too great for Iran to overcome on its own. There’d been one attempt back in 2012, the Phoenix, that went nowhere, and became more of an instrument of propaganda. After that baby failed to thrive, their efforts appeared to stall, but in actuality they’d simply gone underground.

To a renewed relationship with North Korea?

One that would bear significant fruit, as it had with the Yono [Iranian Ghadir-class] boats.

Iran’s first UUV – the Qom?

Correct. The Qom was a rebranded version of the DPRK’s indigenous UUV, the Gwisin, or “Ghost.” The Gwisin was small, about a meter in length, and outfitted with a bunch of smuggled-in COTS technologies. It was kind of a cross between the Chung Sang Eo “Blue Shark” torpedo and a Riptide, with its intended role being ISR or possibly some ASW. But the Iranians literally wanted more bang for their buck. So from the outset the vision for the Qom wasn’t merely to keep an eye on us, but to harass us, or even hold us at risk.

Which the USS Higgins encountered in April of 2018?

We’d received some reports that the IRGCN had been experimenting with Qoms, trying to configure them as undersea armor-piercing EFPs [Explosively Formed Penetrators] and employing them in swarming attacks against surface and subsurface targets. Intelligence indicated that they were capable of around 20 knots, so even without a warhead, the kinetic energy alone might be enough to disable a UUV, SDV, or even a small surface combatant if properly aimed and concentrated.

So, yes, it was during TLAM ops against Syrian chemical weapons sites that we experienced what the IRGCN had managed to achieve. Tehran was not happy with a U.S. missile strike originating in the Gulf, so they decided to send us a message by slamming a swarm of a dozen or so Qoms into the Higgins hull. There was little damage, but it was a wakeup call – Iran’s unmanned ambitions now extended well into the undersea domain.

Were there indications at that time that Iran was developing an indigenous UUV?

There were rumors, and some circumstantial evidence that something else was in the works. It was a source of some pretty … lively debate within the IC. We were all in agreement that some kind of program did exist, but the nature of it, how advanced, or how far along it was – we really had no idea. We definitely had no evidence that the Iranians had an operational prototype, or that they intended to deploy it against ships in the Gulf. One thing we did know – while the Qom may have provided a boost to Iranian ISR, it wasn’t a particularly useful weapon against high-value targets, and that’s what the Iranians really wanted.

Then in early 2019, Cyber Command managed a successful penetration of the IRIN, and they uncovered some files related to a project called AZHDAR – “dragon” in Farsi. From what we could piece together, it appeared that at some point during Iran’s search for an offensive UUV capability engineers hit upon the idea of repurposing something already in the IRIN inventory – specifically, an e-Ghavasi SDV. Being a “human torpedo” type of SDV, the e-Ghavasi was well suited to the task, and it was already capable of carrying a 600 pound multi-influence mine, so all that was needed was sensor integration, a COTS navigation system, coms capability, some ballasting, and a central processor – something as simple as a Raspberry Pi.

But the really intriguing part? The schematics depicted the vehicle’s diving planes and bilge keel recessing into the hull, and the rear stabilizers folding like a Tomahawk’s.

Which suggested that the Azhdar was a sub-launched weapon?

Yes, but it wasn’t until Fujairah that our suspicions were confirmed.

Can you tell us about that day?

It was a warm, brilliant spring evening, and I was enjoying a “Mother’s Day Eve” cookout with my family. I got the call around 1715, and half an hour later I was at my desk at PODCOM, getting briefings every fifteen minutes. We had Strikepods strung from the Gulf of Oman through the Strait and up to Kuwait monitoring IRGCN operations, but there’d been no reports of anything unusual. But then at around 2100 I get an “urgent,” and so I head to the vault for a call with an analyst from NAVCENT. Turns out a Strikepod patrolling off the east coast of the UAE had phoned in four contacts around 0530 local, about half an hour prior to the attacks. It was active sonar, so the hits were reasonably solid, moving west/northwest at around six knots until they disappeared approximately seven miles off Fujairah. Falken [the Atom/Esquire integrated AI] had classified them as probable biologics – dugongs, these manatee-like things common in those waters. The AI was learning fast, but was still prone to misclassification about 20 percent of the time, so this analyst, she took it upon herself to double-check its work, and proceeds to make a pretty compelling case against dugongs, but stopped short of calling them torpedoes. They were too slow and quiet.

Was that the first indication that you might be dealing with something new?

That, and given that in the days leading up to the attacks a Virginia had phoned in intermittent contact with a Kilo operating about 20 nautical miles to the southeast. Yes, you could say my hackle was up. It was definitely the first indication that we might be dealing with something other than fast boats and limpet mines. And it was enough to convince CENTCOM that we should probably take a closer look.

Within twelve hours we carved out two six-ship Strikepods and sent them into the blast zones, and it wasn’t long before we had some hits. Side scanning sonar identified one large debris field to the east of Fujairah where Al Mazrzoqah, A. Michel, and Andrea Victory had been anchored, and a smaller one to the northeast where the Amjad was hit. Follow-up hi-def footage captured several irregularly shaped, metallic objects scattered along the seabed, but we needed to be absolutely sure. So, we got on the phone with COMSUBPAC, and about four days later, Jimmy Carter rolls in for Retract Stripe.

Were you directly involved in Operation Retract Stripe?

With PODCOM providing ISR and ESM support – yes, I was involved. And then once the recovery phase was underway I got called to the vault and was able to watch in real-time via [Strikepod] Relay as Carter’s ROVs recovered the debris and brought it aboard.

And what did it reveal?

For the most part the debris was unrecognizable –  just twisted and mangled chunks of metal. But two large pieces were still intact – what looked like the stern section of a torpedo, and a nose section that contained an acoustic sensor of some kind, possibly from a Valfajr or EM-52.

What was your reaction?

I was impressed, to be sure, but hardly surprised. The Iranians had proven themselves quite resourceful with unmanned systems. They’re cheap, expendable, effective, and provide the plausible deniability they want. That is, unless the debris is successfully recovered, and the vehicle is constructed from something easily identifiable and already in the inventory.

So you were confident then that it was an Azhdar?

Confidence was high, but we weren’t one hundred-percent certain. There was also the possibility, however remote, that we were looking at actual e-Ghavasis, that the IRGCN had actually used the vehicles for their intended purpose – to insert special forces who then attached limpet mines to the tankers. Maybe they’d run into trouble and for whatever reason decided to scuttle them? But within hours a thorough analysis of the debris uncovered evidence of guidance systems, sensors, and processors, so between that, the nature of the blast damage, as well as the intelligence we’d been receiving, it all fell into place, and we concluded that Azhdars had been used in the Fujairah attacks.

Armed now with that information, were there any discussions in Washington of going public with it? To build a diplomatic case against Tehran?

 I wasn’t really privy to the policy considerations, but if you start talking about a rogue state introducing what is essentially a stealthy, mobile, semi-autonomous mine into one of the most hotly contested bodies of water in the world – well it isn’t too hard to imagine our Gulf allies wanting to avoid the destabilizing effect that such a revelation might have, one that could easily mushroom into a full-blown regional crisis. And sure enough, it wasn’t long before official word came down from Dubai: the attacks were carried out by an unnamed state actor using divers attaching limpet mines. There was no finger pointing at Iran, and there was no mention of a weaponized UUV.

What about the report issued by the Norwegian Shipowners’ Mutual War Risks Insurance Association – the DNK? They concluded that it was in fact an Iranian “undersea drone” that had been used in the attacks. How did they know?

 I’m not sure they actually did know. I have no idea what information they had, or where they got it, but it seemed more like speculation, or an analytic leap of faith. It did get picked up by Reuters, but the story fizzled pretty quickly, and pretty soon it faded from the news cycle entirely.

Meanwhile your job had become more urgent?

Iran had just upped the gray zone ante, so yes, very much so. Having confirmed that Iran was in possession of an operational, weaponized UUV, it was critical that we find out as much as we could – its true capabilities, warhead yield, current inventory, production rate. And from there, anticipate how it might be employed in the future.

Let’s fast forward a bit. There’s a lull in activity as the world, particularly Iran, grapples with COVID-19. Then things start heating up again in early 2021.

The sanctions put in place by the Trump administration were taking a real, measurable toll on everyday Iranians. And after Soleimani, and the struggles with COVID-19 – which apparently was “engineered” by the United States using Iranian DNA – there was mounting pressure on [Iranian President Hassan] Rouhani to stand up to Washington. Closing the Strait [of Hormuz] had always been viewed as the nuclear option, but conditions were quickly reaching a point where such a move might be seen as the only recourse.

So, in late 2020 and early 2021, the attacks on Gulf shipping resumed in force, and well beyond the pinprick operations of the recent past. A broader campaign appeared to be underway, with several tankers attacked every week, some with limpet mines, a handful seized by special forces, but most seemed to be the result of conventional mines, which was all at once frustrating and puzzling. Fifth Fleet under Operation Sentinel had been working overtime providing escorts and minesweepers, and we’d been providing Strikepods for MCM since the beginning of Indigo Cloak. There was no surface activity indicating that an IRGCN minelaying operation was underway. We were taking a lot of heat at PODCOM, but everything checked out – technologically, operationally.

You believed it was something else?

Our intelligence on the e-Ghavasi SDV suggested that it was only capable of around 6 knots, or less when loaded down with a warhead. With the convoys running at anywhere from 15 to 20 knots, we expected that, should Tehran ever make good on its threat, the Strait would be seeded with conventional mines – anything from floating and moored, to EM-52s and MDM-3s – with any Azhdar attacks reserved for targets at anchor, like Fujairah, or while entering or leaving port. So we concentrated Remora-heavy Strikepods in those areas and prepared for CUUV [Counter-UUV] operations, but when the convoys were being hit after months of persistent, intensive minesweeping, and without any acoustic evidence indicating torpedoes or rising mines, it suggested – at least to me – that something else was at play, that Iranian engineers had found a way to boost the Azhdar’s power output, enabling it to track and strike targets traveling at cruising speed.

An improved Azhdar? In eighteen months?

Yes. And not only in terms of power and propulsion. We later learned that after the success of the Fujairah operation, the Azhdar benefitted from the Valfajr and Hoot torpedo programs. It had clearly become a priority for Tehran.

How was the IRGCN deploying them?

That was the million-dollar question, one that was the cause of many a sleepless night. We had a lot of information from disparate sources, but we needed to connect the dots. 

We knew that the Fujairah Azdhars were based on an e-Ghavasi, which was compatible with a standard 21 inch (533 mm) torpedo tube, and we also had intelligence that the vehicle’s control surfaces were designed to recess into the hull and spring open upon launch. This suggested that the Azhdar was intended to be deployed from a submarine for maximum stealth, which could have meant any one of four different classes, but most likely Kilo or Ghadir. IRIN Kilos, when they were actually working, typically operated in the deeper waters of the Gulf of Oman, and so a Kilo was likely the platform of choice for the Fujairah attacks. But they could also have conceivably been launched over the side of a ship, or even from the side of a pier.

We also knew that Ghadir operations had undergone a pretty fundamental shift in recent months. The Ghadir is a midget sub, with a range of only about 500 nautical miles surfaced, and about 50 submerged, so typically their deployments were quick, out-and-back junkets that only lasted a few days. But in late 2020, we began to notice that they were gradually increasing in duration. A week, then a few weeks or more. And they were random and staggered, seemingly without rhyme or reason. You might have four boats sail, with three of them returning a few days later, two of which would then sail again within hours of tying up and then be gone for like two weeks. The OPTEMPO was all over the place, and in hindsight it was clearly an attempt to confuse and deceive us, because pretty soon three quarters of the Ghadir fleet – ten boats – were on seemingly extended deployment.

But what finally sealed it was the uptick in IRGCN night-time surface operations. We thought they were exercises, and of course we had Strikepods and Esquires keeping a close watch. And one night, there it was – in the moonlight, a Gasthi [fast boat] moored alongside the unmistakable silhouette of a conning tower.

They were rendezvousing with the subs?

Yes, ma’am.

From the outset of Indigo Cloak we’d had Strikepods positioned outside Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, and Jask, keeping tabs of the Ghadirs, and since there were only a handful deployed at any given time, we could usually provide man-to-man coverage. But we failed to anticipate a slow-motion surge, so we had to scramble and switch to zone, and inevitably they’d slip through and disappear. They’d sprint and drift, and – unbeknownst to us at the time – settle on the bottom, somewhere in the shallows flanking the shipping lanes.

Operating on minimum power, the Ghadirs could lie there on the seabed for days, waiting patiently until targets appeared overhead and then quietly release their Azhdars. At a prearranged time and place, they’d head to the surface, rendezvous with a reload crew, snorkel while taking on food and ordnance, and perhaps there would be a change in personnel. Then they’d head back to the bottom to await more prey. In this way the Ghadirs could remain on station almost indefinitely, like stealthy, semi-permanent undersea missile batteries.

The Navy had actually anticipated something like this. We’d gamed it several times, but always with the expectation that they’d be shooting torpedoes – essentially martyrdom operations, since we’d follow the acoustic trail right back to their front door. But releasing an Azhdar generated very little sound, and what little there was would be masked by the ambient noise. The Ghadirs were already quiet and hard to detect, but if they sat on the seabed, it would be virtually impossible to find them.

So, an organized Iranian anti-shipping campaign was underway. What was the reaction in Washington? 

Oil prices were skyrocketing. People were paying close to four dollars a gallon at the pump. Insurers were running scared, and shipping traffic was slowing. We’d been here before, of course, in 1988, and also in 1984 in the Red Sea, but the economy always found a way to adjust to the risk. This time things seemed different, though, especially when the media got to publishing rumors of Iranian “killer robot submarines” roaming the Gulf.

The U.S. had to respond, but the question was how given the risk of escalation. Iran could answer with shore-based ASCMs, or even turn the Azhdars against U.S. warships, a particularly problematic scenario. There were also concerns that they would go scorched earth and order proxies to attack Saudi Arabia or Israel.

And to further complicate matters, this was the first national security test of a newly elected president who was bound and determined to demonstrate U.S. resolve. 

Something had to be done. So the president tasks the Joint Chiefs, who then turn to WARCOM, and one day I get a call from Coronado pitching me on this crazy counter-gray zone operation to disrupt the Azhdar attacks.

Seizing the Ghadirs? 

A daring plan, to be sure, but since PODCOM had some recent experience in this area, I was sure we could help pull it off.

And so Indigo Cloak becomes Indigo Spear.

Yes, a WARCOM/PODCOM joint operation, with Esquires and Strikepods providing support for what was essentially a large-scale, covert interdiction campaign. In a nutshell, teams of SEALs – Rapid Interdiction Platoon (RIPs) – would be assigned to three LPDs and three DDGs which would be fanned out along the shipping lanes, from the Strait to Farsi Island. PODCOM would be charged with hunting submarines, detecting and tracking replenishment operations, and pinning down the boats until the RIPs arrived to grab them.

Can you explain a typical Indigo Spear operation? 

The Ghadirs were careful to stay within Iranian territorial waters. Without a declaration of war, this made Esquire and RIP ops tricky, so they would occur only under cover of darkness. Strikepods, of course, had been operating well inside twelve miles for months. 

The first task was finding the subs, and we had two methods of doing that. First, through a kind of large scale MCM operation, we deployed Strikepods fitted with ultra high resolution side scanning sonar to comb the seabed. If they found something interesting, they’d establish a kill box by forming a wide-area passive sonar array to listen for transients, or a torpedo door opening. If an Azhdar was detected, the Strikepod would vector a Remora, and on at least three occasions we achieved good kills and traced it back to the source.

The second method was by monitoring the replenishment tenders operating out of Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island. An IRGCN replenishment team would head out between 0100 and 0300 local, usually in two Gasthis with a crew of three – one pilot, and two divers – with each towing an Azhdar behind. For EMCON purposes, the rendezvous would have been arranged prior to deployment, or during the previous replenishment evolution, and at the predetermined time, the Ghadir would come to periscope depth, take a peek, surface, and connect with the tender.

The actual reload operation would be fairly straightforward. The Gasthis would maneuver alongside the Ghadir and deploy their divers, who would then submerge the Azhdars and guide them into the empty torpedo tubes. Meanwhile, the sub would snorkel, take on food and supplies, and occasionally there’d be a change of personnel. And then back down it would go. The whole process would take less than thirty minutes.

So, our job was to detect the Gasthis as they left port, and if something looked interesting, we’d order the closest Esquire to launch a Sybil [quadrotor UAV] and we’d be eyes-on with infrared video in a matter of moments. We’d watch the evolution, and as they headed back to port, we’d vector a nearby Strikepod, or deploy one from the Esquire to mark it. Meanwhile, the Sybil would have alerted the task force and a RIP would be deployed.

And what then? 

The Strikepod would have the sub pinned down with active sonar, so they’d know we had a fix. We knew from the Fujairah debris that the Azhdar was equipped with an undersea modem, and intelligence suggested that the Ghadirs were similarly equipped, so the RIP would send them a few chirps via DUMO [Dipping Undersea Modem] ordering them to surface. There’d be no response, of course, so we’d raise our voice and start detonating Remoras, one every minute or so. Nothing to cause any damage, but enough to get their attention, and by the third or fourth one we’d usually hear them blowing ballast. The Iranians were aware of our ROE, and so could be reasonably sure we wouldn’t attack unless provoked. Nevertheless, even for the most confident sailor, there are few things more terrifying than being depth charged, and eventually the fear and uncertainty won out and they’d head for the surface where our guys would be waiting. They’d offload the crew and the weapons, and then use the combined thousand-plus horsepower of their two RHIBs to drag the boat out to a waiting LPD where it would be maneuvered into the well deck for … safe keeping.

How were you able to sustain the operation for so long without alerting the Iranians?

When a sub surfaced, there was always an orbiting Sybil to jam any outbound traffic, and of course we took the crew into custody. But mostly it was just skilled exploitation of what theoretically should have been their strength – minimal C2. The Ghadirs were expected to maintain strict EMCON, coming shallow at a prearranged time and wait for a visual on the inbound tender. Since it was seven days between evolutions, it gave us a window to operate without raising suspicion. And when a sub was a no show, the tender assumed it was a miscue and headed home. But if a sub surfaced and the tender was a no-show, the skipper was expected to return to port.

So that’s how the Iranians caught on?

Exactly. When the subs were no-shows and weren’t eventually defaulting back to base, they realized something was up. The night-time excursions came to an immediate halt, and the Iranians were so desperate to avoid additional losses they cobbled together a flotilla of Boghammars equipped with DUMOs to fan out and broadcast a kind of acoustic kill switch ordering the remaining Ghadirs home. Our rules of engagement were quite clear, and unless fired upon, we could not engage, so we could only watch and liste as they headed home to fight another day.

How many Ghadirs made it back?

Of the ten boats deployed, a total of four made it home. So, with four in the bull pen, they walked away with eight.

And what was Tehran’s reaction? 

Outrage. We were pirates, and the submarines were in territorial waters engaged in training exercises, and we’d engaged in an act of war. But their protests were fairly short-lived, since we now had Azhdars in our possession, as well as forensic evidence from numerous blast sights, and the testimony of several IRGCN sailors. Washington was able to skillfully control the narrative, and once the news media seized upon the Azhdar, Iran’s denials increasingly fell on deaf ears, while the United States was often praised for showing restraint in the face of what was a brazen provocation on the part of Iran.

Nevertheless, Tehran did manage to achieve some marginal gains.

They’d managed to sow plenty of instability, and inflict significant albeit largely short-term economic damage on the global economy, and left unchecked, the psychological effect of Azhdar operations alone could have effectively closed the Strait. So, from that perspective, Iran had asserted itself and demonstrated its power to influence events in the region. But they’d forfeited six submarines in the process, and largely obliterated any chance of consolidating power or strengthening their economic security.

Would you consider Indigo Spear a victory for the United States? 

Yes and no. We’d helped avert a global economic meltdown, but ultimately it was yet another stalemate in what was an intractable regional quagmire. Yes, Iranian naval power had suffered a blow, but one from which they would quickly recover. On the plus side, we’d demonstrated our resolve, and our willingness to use force. We’d also proven, once again, that adversary gray zone tactics could be countered effectively by leveraging advanced unmanned systems. But nevertheless, one thing was pretty clear: if there was going to be stability in the Gulf region, it wasn’t going to happen by force. We couldn’t bend Iran to our will without a full-scale operation that destroyed their capability to wage war. And that wasn’t going to happen absent a truly compelling reason to risk so many lives.

Yet Tehran’s game of incremental belligerence, of gray zone brinkmanship, was becoming increasingly untenable. And in the absence of strategic clarity or competent statecraft on either side, Tehran and Washington were fumbling their way toward yet another protracted regional war that neither could afford to lose.

[End Part IV]

David R. Strachan is a naval analyst and writer focusing on autonomous undersea conflict. He can be reached at [email protected].

Featured Image: “Keyframe 2: The Descent” by Robin Thomasson via Artstation

Capability Analysis, Global Analysis

Clausewitz, Corbett, and Corvettes

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This article originally appeared in edition 2/2020 of the German-language publication SIRIUS: The Journal for Strategic Analyses and is republished with permission. SIRIUS is edited by the foundation Stiftung Wissenschaft und Demoktrie based in Kiel, Germany. The article will be available online in its original German in the May-June timeframe. You can follow SIRIUS on Twitter (@JE_SIRIUS) and Facebook. You can find the most recent issues of SIRIUS online here: https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/sirius/sirius-overview.xml. 

By Captain Sascha H. Rackwitz, German Navy

Introduction

Whether we like it or not, we live in an era of a fundamental reorientation of the international system. It doesn’t matter if you follow the American paradigm of “Great Power Competition”1 or the Chinese2 and Russian3 interpretation of a “multipolar world order.”  Global stability is being threatened by hegemonic tendencies of power. The perceptions of the United States, China, and Russia are principally the same, but are viewed from very different vantage points. After the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War and a short time of American unipolarity, the international system has entered a new phase that will be defined by the inter-relations of these three actors.

In public discussions in Germany, and even amongst German “defense professionals,” this understanding does not seem to have been established very well. Russian aggression against Ukraine, and particularly the annexation of Crimea in 2014, was a watershed moment in German security and defense politics. However, Russia’s confrontational politics toward the West is still seen as a specific transatlantic and isolated phenomenon that can be reduced to questions of defense and deterrence at the northeastern borders of the NATO alliance, the “Northflank.”  

No one in Germany will deny that China is posing a strategic challenge. This, however, is perceived to have above all economical relevance for Germany. And it is mostly seen as something totally unrelated to security issues on this side of the globe and more as an intensifying bilateral American-Chinese tussle. Illegal Chinese claims in the South China Sea will be met with open critique by German officials and diplomatic demarches. But China’s behavior is predominantly perceived as an economic threat to the freedom of navigation the German trade-oriented economy is dependent upon.

However, a self-centered perspective will not answer the challenges Germany is facing. For Germany, unlike most other countries, strengthening a rules-based order and the international organizations and structures that support it is not only – in the “end, ways, means” understanding of strategy – a way to achieve national interests. Derived from its geographic location, painful history, and ethical conviction, it is an end in itself. To safeguard this interest, political decision-makers rely on a military-strategic analysis that takes in the intensifying global rivalry in its entirety. Otherwise, Germany – and with it Europe – will face the Melian’s fate that Thucydides described over 2000 years ago, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”4 The lines of conflict of this great power struggle run, with little to no exception, through the maritime domain, including the Indo-Pacific, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. It is therefore particularly important for maritime professionals to take an active part in this strategy discussion and provide a maritime perspective. The following theses are intended to contribute to this debate and attempt to sketch practical conclusions from maritime strategic analysis.      

Thesis 1: Nuclear Weapons Continue to determine Military and Naval Strategy

Nuclear strategy issues have increasingly become a matter of and for specialists, far removed from the political sphere, and this seems even more dangerous in military strategic thinking.5 In Germany it is conventional wisdom that there is nothing to be won by discussing nuclear strategy, not for politicians, not for journalists, not even for political scientists. Even within the German armed forces, the discussion of the subject is often subsumed exclusively under Germany’s role in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, as if military thinking is suspended with the threat of using nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons remain a necessary starting point for a strategic analysis. They set the framework for the use of conventional military means in a confrontation between the great powers and, not only for their own (maritime) strategic derivations. The roles prescribed for nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia, and China are all the more relevant since their declaratory policies differ substantially.

The Chinese no-first-use policy, usually a position repeatedly demanded by anti-nuclear activists and, for western nuclear weapon states as well, particularly by German anti-nuclear weapons activists, is no reason for consolation. In the context of escalating antagonism with the United States, it has a rather destabilizing effect, since the declared waiver of initial use or use against a non-nuclear weapon state feeds the illusion that a major military conflict can be limited. Read this way, the effect of the Chinese nuclear weapons policy is not to prevent any armed conflict through deterrence; to the contrary, it instead is making a conventional armed conflict more possible.

China presents the U.S. with a dilemma. On one hand, the onus of exceeding the nuclear threshold is assigned solely to the U.S., while at the same time the prospective costs for conventional intervention are increased to forbidding levels. As a consequence, China presents the United States with a stark choice: admit that your reassurances to allies and partners in the western Pacific are worthless; accept that you will suffer a prohibitively high price in blood and treasure trying to meet your obligations conventionally; or risk an all-out nuclear war as a nuclear aggressor. The South China Sea is the cordon sanitaire prerequisite for this narrative. Only by attaining indisputable influence over the East and South China Seas can China hope to create the strategic depth necessary to prevent the United States from defending its own possessions or allies in the Western Pacific. As a result, the Western Pacific is strategically isolated, the U.S. loses its escalation dominance, and military conflict becomes an option for China to resolve disputes in its near-abroad without fear of American interference.

Russia’s “de-escalating nuclear strike” strategy pursues the same purpose on the opposite tack.6 It is based on the assumption that even though Russian conventional forces cannot match NATO’s military potential, Russia can achieve a locally and timely limited conventional superiority sufficient to create a fait accompli. This superior position is then protected by threatening the use of small yield, short-range nuclear weapons. The first-use of nuclear weapons is, therefore, not excluded. On the contrary, the first use policy is openly announced and, as part of major Russian exercises, is also regularly emphasized to the West as the potential opponent. The purpose of threatening to use nuclear weapons in this limited fashion is to strategically separate the east of the alliance area, especially the Baltic States, from the rest of the alliance. A strategic dilemma is presented to the nuclear weapon states of the west, in particular the United States, of either giving in to Russian aggression and consequently allowing the collapse of the alliance or, conversely, to risk an uncontrollable nuclear escalation. The strategic value of the medium-range weapons stationed by Russia in violation of the INF Treaty is precisely that these weapons can reach Poland and possibly Germany, but not the Alliance’s nuclear weapon states. Whether Russia would consider such a nuclear strike only if defeat in a conventional war loomed or early on in a conflict to pre-empt a conventional NATO reaction is beside the point. The strategic isolation of the eastern alliance area by limited nuclear strikes is the basis to shield a war with “limited object”7 and thus to use military force below the threshold of a global nuclear war.

The fact that both China and Russia, while confronted with comparable problems, assign such different roles to their nuclear arsenal is also due to the fact that China acts confidently from a position of strength. Russia, on the other hand, from the assumption that it was only possible to gain conventional superiority vis-à-vis NATO locally, and for a short period of time, plays a weaker hand.

Both approaches share the aim to gain freedom of action in the near-abroad, to be able to use conventional military means to pursue limited purposes, if necessary, and to reduce the risk of an escalation to an unlimited nuclear war. The control of maritime areas is of central importance for both China and Russia in these respects.

Thesis 2: “Anti-Access/Area Denial” has little to do with “Sea Denial” and a lot to do with “Sea Control”8

Undisputed sea control, or maritime supremacy as the U.S. Navy would call it, in the South and East China Seas is what China needs to keep conventional American armed forces at a distance from mainland China, to gain the freedom of movement for its own forces to threaten American forces in the Pacific, and eventually the continental United States with escalation. As a result, the United States will face the dilemma of either accepting high losses, nuclear escalation, or moral defeat – and all this for what amounts to an American perspective as only “limited political aims” – the commitments made to partners in the Western Pacific. China’s illegal land reclamation in the South China Sea9 has less to do with access to marine resources, but much more to do with the development of the military infrastructure to push its own sensor and weapons range so far into the Pacific that it becomes impossible for American forces to touch Chinese positions without risk to its fleet. Having gained freedom of action in order to build a credible military position to assert its own interests in its immediate neighborhood, particularly against Taiwan, China could theoretically reign supreme in the Western Pacific. The only contingency would then be a “distant blockade,”10  which China could attempt to counter by increasing self-reliance or the careful establishment of a string of strategic positions in peacetime. Both are already core elements of current Chinese policy, namely “China 2049” and the “Belt and Road Initiative.”

Compared to China, Russia has a similarly complex strategic position on its doorsteps. This position is aggravated by the fact that American partnerships in Europe are institutionalized in NATO. Particularly interesting is the situation in the Baltic Sea with respect to the Kaliningrad exclave. On one hand, Kaliningrad offers a strategic maritime position from which large parts of the eastern and central Baltic Sea can be affected. At the same time, Kaliningrad threatens the land lines of communication from Poland to the Baltic States through the so-called Suwalki Gap. However, Kaliningrad is dependent on supplies from the sea, and a possible Baltic area of ​​operations is entirely within the range of regional allied naval forces. Moreover, maintaining superiority long enough for Russia to secure territorial gains depends on neutralizing the only two ways by which NATO could reinforce its members in the east in a timely fashion – by air or by sea.

In case of conflict, simply preventing western naval forces’ access to the central and eastern Baltic Sea would not meet Russian requirements. Russia must be able to positively control this sea area. In short, Russia must exercise sea control in order to obtain freedom of action to contribute to joint operations in the Baltic States, protect sea lines of communication to defend the Kaliningrad exclave, and cut off the Baltic States from their western allies. Even if the term “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) at first glance suggests otherwise, A2/AD is not just a question of denying the use of a maritime area. Rather, A2/AD is a concept for obtaining sea control in coastal and confined waters, which is primarily characterized by the use of land-based capabilities.

A map of Eastern Europe denoting the Kaliningrad exclave (Wall Street Journal)

The U.S. Marine Corps has taken this understanding as their point of departure for the most fundamental realignment of the force since World War II. The Corps no longer sees its primary warfighting role in the Western Pacific as operating from the sea under the conditions of sea control won by the U.S. Navy. Rather, the Corps sees itself as an integral part of the naval force contributing to the fight for sea control with its specific capabilities, and thus to maintain escalation dominance.11 The Marine Corps no longer desires a dependence on Navy-won access for amphibious operations, but seeks to use its forward amphibious abilities to open access for the navy to project power. It is all about “contested sea control.”

Of course, all of these considerations are solely derived from the declaratory policies of China and Russia, a cursory analysis of the maritime areas in question, and the respective maritime military potentials fielded. Fortunately, it seems unlikely that Russia, for example, will raid one of the Baltic States as long as the Putin system remains stable. Indeed, the intensity of the actors’ motivation is a key factor in assessing the threat and, in turn, the required deterrent.12

The insinuated Russian stratagem is based on two assumptions. First, Russia gains conventional superiority for a short time. Second, and more importantly, that the motivation of western allies, and particularly the United States, does not suffice to risk a nuclear escalation in defense of their eastern allies. But Russian motivation to seek a systemic change in Europe by armed confrontation is perceived to be low, and justifies merely a “tripwire force” in Poland and the Baltic States – NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP).13 Their multinational composition addresses the danger of a split of the alliance and the force creates a limited position of deterrence by denial.14 The small motivation of Russia is thus met by a small but sufficient tripwire, and is thus deterred. The message to Moscow is that invading the Baltic States would mean not only meeting with the Balts, but all major allies, and though NATO could be easily outnumbered, it would not be a walk in the park – so think twice.

What is the maritime dimension of this tripwire? Which specific opportunities does the maritime domain offer to strengthen and enhance the credibility of NATO’s deterrent position?

Thesis 3: Our most pressing operational problem in the Baltic Sea is not maintaining the sea lines of communication to Baltic States for reinforcing and supplying NATO forces

Following Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO and Germany refocused on the ability to conduct a symmetrical war in Europe. By regaining and strengthening NATO’s ability to wage a symmetrical war on Europe’s eastern border, the conventional complement to nuclear deterrence is strengthened. For the German Army, this means above all returning to maneuver warfare and combined arms operations, strengthening armored units, and empowering them to quickly deploy heavy formations to the alliance’s eastern border. For the Navy, this means maintaining the sea lines of communication between the east coast of the United States to ports in Germany, Poland, and the Baltic States.

Of course, conflict between NATO and Russia would not happen out of thin air. There would most probably be times of heightening tensions and grey zone or hybrid activities. Arguably, Russia has for some time tested NATO’s preparedness and resolve, not only in the cyber domain,15 but also by incursions into the Baltic States.16 However, should tensions escalate to a level that would call for a decision of the North Atlantic Council to move larger formations from North America to Europe, deterrence would have already failed. Arguably, in such a situation, Russia would have stopped perceiving the price for taking on NATO in the east as still too high compared with the possible gains. To put it bluntly, if we are compelled to organize convoy operations across the Atlantic and through the Baltic Sea, NATO has already failed with its most important task – to send a message to Russia that the potential costs of aggression are always greater than the prospects of success.

A deterrence posture that basically rests on a tripwire activating over-the-horizon forces is opening a gap to an opposing strategy that is based on quick results and strategic isolation of the theatre of operations. Naval forces, however, in the Baltic Sea could provide an additional deterrent element that counteracts the Russian stratagem at a stage before a distant deployment of NATO formations to the Baltic States becomes necessary and must be protected on its journey. The double exclaves of Kaliningrad and the Baltic States provide the key to do just this. Understandably, due to the exposed location of the Baltic States, western observers perceive the theatre geometry in the Baltic Sea first and foremost as a vulnerability. However, Kaliningrad is even more exposed, lacking even the narrow and hard-to-defend land corridor that the Suwalki Gap is providing between Poland and Lithuania. The Russian position in the Baltic Sea is nowhere near as advantageous as the skillful Russian propaganda makes us believe. Kaliningrad’s geographical position is more tenuous given several considerations. Kaliningrad is essential for the enforcement of Russian sea control in the middle to eastern Baltic Sea and all of Kaliningrad is within weapon range from the sea. Access to Baltysk can easily be blocked, and sea lines of communication from Kaliningrad through the Gulf of Finland to St. Petersburg can easily be disrupted.

While the “Tripwire Forces” of the Enhanced Forward Presence represent an element of “Deterrence by Denial,” the maritime domain offers the possibility of adding an element of “Deterrence by Punishment” without the risk of escalation. As an aggressor, Russia would also have to lose something immediately before the NATO machinery starts up properly, adding a critical psychological effect.17 In the Baltic Sea, the role of naval forces is not merely the defensive protection of sea lines of communication to the Baltic States. In Corbett’s18 terms, already in peacetime and in order to contribute to a balanced deterrent posture and prevent a “limited war,” the role of naval forces in the Baltic Sea can be the “tactical offensive” as part of an overall “defensive strategy.”19 Like the Enhanced Forward Presence, this deterrence posture does not necessarily require great numbers of maritime forces. Those deployed, however, must be able to question the Russian claim to sea control and the sanctuary of the Kaliningrad exclave through land-attack and anti-ship-cruise missiles launched from small surface combatants, corvettes, submarines, and aircraft, as well as through mine-laying capabilities. Not all these forces have to be provided by one nation alone. In parallel to the Enhanced Forward Presence, multi-nationality would be an essential factor in preventing the strategic isolation of the eastern flank. And this is the second major advantage of the maritime domain – only at sea can Sweden and Finland be included in a credible deterrent posture without upsetting the complex balance of power by a motion for formal integration into NATO.

Conclusion

Russian appetite for serious mischief-making in the north is, thankfully, considered to be low. But it should prompt us to widen our peripheral vision – to the Mediterranean, the near east, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific, where we do in fact see a lot more maritime activity. Maritime forces deployed to the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean in constabulary force missions might actually be just as close to the mission set of “deterrence and defense” as those forces up in the north. Parallels and deviations in the approaches of Russia and China point to the fact that in a struggle involving nuclear-armed great powers there are no easily defined geographic limitations – and in fact, it is in our better interest as the Melians in the room not to allow any power to willfully separate strategic spaces. After all, we have to realize that the autocratic players in “Great Power Competition” try to widen and exploit geographic and political fault lines in the west. Let us not widen them intellectually ourselves.

Captain Sascha H. Rackwitz joined the German Navy in 1991. A submariner by background, he was captain of a submarine and commanding officer of the German Navy’s submarine squadron. After tours in the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he until recently taught naval strategy and operational art at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College before assuming his current responsibilities as deputy commander and chief of staff of Flotilla 1 of the German Navy, home to the German Navy’s corvettes, submarines, mine countermeasure forces, special operations, and naval infantry forces. The views expressed here are presented in a personal capacity. and do not necessarily reflect the views of any government or agency. 

References

1. United States of America (2017): National Security Strategy of the United States of America.

2. Peoples Republic of China, State Council Information Office (2019): China’s Defence in the New Era.

3. Russian Federation (2015): National Security Strategy.

4. Thucydides, History of the Peleponnesian War, Chapter XVII, Melian Dialogue.

5. Gray, Colin S. (2018): Theory of Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 121f.

6. Gray, Colin S. (2018): Theory of Strategy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 98.

7. Clausewitz, Carl (1832): On War, Berlin, Book VIII, Chapter V.                   

8. “Sea Control” is more of a process than a condition in which by constant effort freedom of action in a maritime area is obtained. Sea Control is regularly understood to be a prerequisite for protecting sea lines of communication and projecting power from the sea. „Sea Denial” on the other hand is the denial of the unhindered operational use of a maritime area to an opponent. Both sea control and sea denial have to be fought for, are therefore principally only applicable in times of conflict. They will only be achieved temporarily and locally to a certain extent depending on the effort invested – uncontested sea control is only theoretically possible.

9. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Philippines vs. China, 2016.

10. Corbett, Julian (1911): Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, p. 97.

11. United States Marine Corps (2019): Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

12. Morgan, Patrick (1983): Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, p. 164f.

13. NATO Factsheet on eFP, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_04/20190402_1904-factsheet_efp_en.pdf

14. Mazarr, Michael J./Chan, Arthur et al. (2018): What Deters and Why. Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression, Santa Monica: RAND, p. 17ff.

15. Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (2019) International Security and Estonia.

16. Republic of Estonia, Ministry of the Interior, Press about the kidnapping of an Estonian Internal Security Service officer, last updated 28 September 2015: https://www.siseministeerium.ee/en/eston-kohver

17. Snyder, Glen (1961): Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security. Westport: Greenwood Press.

18. Sir Julian Corbett, 1854-1922, British naval historian and strategic theorist is considered to be one of the most influential theorists of naval power next to the American Alfred Thayer Mahan.

19. Corbett, Julian (1911): Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, London, p. 73.

Featured Image: Russian Navy Baltic Fleet ships on parade. (ITAR-TASS/ Elena Nagornykh)

Project Trident

The Brute Krulak Center Wants Your Ideas on Strategic Chokepoints and Littorals

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By Valerie Jackson

Submissions Due: May 25, 2020
Week Dates: June 1-5, 2020
Article Length: 1000-3000 words
Submit to: [email protected]

The U.S. Marine Corps University’s Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity is partnering with CIMSEC to launch the first Call for Articles of Project Trident and solicit writing on the impact of strategic chokepoints and littorals on future international maritime security. The Krulak Center facilitates and encourages novel solutions to current and future warfighting challenges to expand the Corps’ competitive edge, and serves as a research support center and incubator of academic innovation.

The importance of the world’s vast oceans is magnified in the littorals and several strategic chokepoints. There are many critical chokepoints around the world that potentially could play an outsized role in strategic competition between world powers or in actual wartime. Littorals are an increasingly important zone of potential competition or conflict due to advanced technology being available to more and more states, and even non-state actors. Piracy and terrorism combine with technological proliferation to complicate commercial enterprise and defense planning for every nation as the littorals become more crowded and ships become more vulnerable.

Considering the evolving global economy, technological proliferation, and the re-emergence of great power competition, how may states and non-state actors operate within strategic chokepoints and littorals to protect their interests or impose their will against rivals and potential aggressors? How may conflict and coercion within strategic chokepoints and littorals affect the global maritime commons and impact freedom of navigation? How may regional and global actors take action to shape outcomes in these crucial spaces?

Authors are invited to answer these questions and more as we ponder the evolving nature of security within strategic chokepoints and littorals across the globe. Send all submissions to [email protected].

Valerie Jackson is the Director of the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, and has more than 26 years in federal service, principally as a United States Marine. Before coming to the Krulak Center in July 2019, she was an arbitrator in Dallas, Texas. Her areas of expertise include conflict management and resolution, civil-military operations, international relations, and strategic studies. She has led and commanded Marine units throughout her career, and has spent time as an instructor at the Marine Corps Civil Military Operations School and as the senior editor and field historian for the Marine Corps History Division.

Featured Image: September 19, 2016. A night view from the International Space Station of the southern Persian Gulf, centered on Dubai and Abu Dhabi. (NASA)

Announcements

Announcing The New Chicago CIMSEC Chapter

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By LT Akshat Patel

We are extremely excited to announce the founding of a CIMSEC chapter in the hometown of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover – the “Father of the American Nuclear Navy.” In keeping with Admiral Rickover’s legacy, the founder and first president of the Chicago chapter is also a nuclear submariner!

If you are in the Chicago area, get in touch!

President: LT Akshat Patel

Contact: [email protected]

To learn more about CIMSEC’s membership activities reach us at [email protected]. Not a CIMSEC member? Sign up here for free!

LT Akshat Patel is a Submarine Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy. He attended Boston University on a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps scholarship and earned a B.A. in Economics. He is currently an instructor at the U.S. Navy’s only boot camp and previously served aboard the USS HAWAII for three years. His primary interests are undersea warfare, geopolitics, and management consulting. 

Featured Image: Chicago skyline (Wikimedia Commons)