Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Ian Birdwell

Introduction 

This June has been unsettling for the Arctic. Russia experienced three events the Arctic Council has been dreading for years: an oil spill, an outbreak of wildfires, and the hottest Arctic temperature record being set with a 100-degree Fahrenheit day in Siberia. However, Russia is not alone in addressing these events. The Arctic Council, the Arctic’s premier multilateral organization, has sought to prepare the region and the globe for the eventuality of a warmer Arctic.

These recent events bring into focus both the work the Council has done to promote regional governmental frameworks and the long road that remains ahead for fulfilling its mission of monitoring the Arctic environment. The Council has not been idle since its founding in 1996 and is continually promoting active measures to ensure the Arctic environment is protected as the region warms and opens to increased economic activity, with a host of working groups, agreements, and policy recommendations coming forward to address concerns like oil spills and sea ice retreat. This summer represents a major test of the Arctic Council as these crises come at a time when the Arctic Council is being pulled in directions it would rather avoid. Tensions are rising between the two most powerful states on the Council, the United States and Russia, and calls to direct the Council to address rising Arctic militarization have grown from prominent leadership.

Historically, the Council has tempered its focus on issues it can resolve and gain regional coordination on, ranging from environmental research to new regional agreements, with each state of the Council doing their part to empower the institution to meet those communal goals through the acknowledgement of the Council’s limitations. With consideration of those limitations weakening as the region experiences its worst June yet, the Arctic Council finds itself in newly tense territory.

It becomes critical to examine this June from the perspective of improving Arctic Ocean governance to tackle these emerging environmental issues. Given the track record of the Arctic Council in developing regional frameworks, the solution lies with it and its member states. Particularly, acknowledging the Council’s limitations and its adopted role would enable the Council to do the job it has been designed to do in terms of providing coordination on scientific research, regulations, and indigenous representation instead of becoming another institutional battleground for international competition. Thus enabled, the Council would be able to further the quiet lead it has maintained on Arctic issues for more than 20 years in creating mutually acknowledged regulations for the Arctic’s waterways and in strengthening the overall international maritime regime.

Regional Facilitator and Forum

The Arctic Council began from efforts to preserve the Arctic environment in 1996, and today research coordination across all members and observers of the Arctic Council remains paramount. This marks the first area where members could assist in developing governmental frameworks for the Arctic region by empowering the Council through reaffirming its mission to coordinate regional scientific research. Scientific research coordinated by the Council enables member states to address emerging issues, act on new opportunities, and protect their communities.

The clearest example of such information dissemination is linked to the publication of the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment which renewed global interest in the potential of a warm Arctic and the plight of the unique environment of the polar region. This research is not glamorous and does not yield immediate results, yet it is fundamental to the establishment of effective regional policies for all member states in response to the increasing changes of the Arctic. Particularly, coordinating research enables a broader understanding of the regional transformation, a sharing of ideas and perspectives, and has stood the test of tensions in maintaining relationships in spite of broader international disagreements. In effect, the Council’s push toward scientific research has enabled states mostly concerned with the broader global environment to maintain Arctic policy flexibility without radically shifting their own domestic policies. This stability of research coordination could be disrupted by continued calls for the Council to address regional militarization, which in turn could negatively impact the collection and coordination of research within the Council’s network. Thus, recognizing the limitations of the Council in addressing emerging issues regarding militarization enables the continued functioning of scientific coordination and diplomacy in the high north and preserves domestic policymaking for Council members.

One of the most recognizable aspects of the Arctic Council is the inclusion of a variety of indigenous people’s organizations from throughout the Arctic region. This marks the second area where the Arctic Council could assist in furthering Arctic maritime governance as it has been critical in engaging the local indigenous communities. Climate change is ravaging the Arctic landscape in different ways, so the Arctic Council has been dedicated to ensuring the ways of life of the regional indigenous communities are preserved as best as possible and their voices are heard through the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participant organizations and the Indigenous People’s Secretariat. This engagement with the indigenous community has played a large part in the overall regional engagement of the Arctic Council, with the Council supporting critical issues like health, economic, and education initiatives alongside cultural preservation programs. In turn, these communities provide member states with experts offering deep knowledge of the local environment, climate conditions, and real-time impacts of climate change throughout the region, giving the Council critical on-the-ground information regarding how regional warming is impacting the Arctic.

As the Council is pushed to address issues like militarization and other dicey political issues, the indigenous communities of the Arctic could be pushed into the background as political capital is expended to address narrower national interests. This could inhibit the ability of the Council to address rising maritime issues like the endangerment of marine environments due to increased human activity or climate change, issues where indigenous communities are the most vulnerable and most aware of in the changing climate. Thus, there is the risk of the Council being unable to address problems noticed by indigenous populations if it focuses on addressing militarization or other issues heavily tied to the competing national interests of member states.

One of the crowning achievements of the Arctic Council in the past decade has been the establishment of a series of maritime shipping reports and regulations which were adopted by the International Maritime Organization as the Polar Code in 2017. This is another area where the Arctic Council could further Arctic maritime governance. The Arctic Council’s history of getting members to come together to address communal issues related to environmental management and the prevention of major disasters has been predicated upon putting cooperation above national interest, and this has served as the foundation of the current Arctic regulatory regime, with several agreements and working groups focused on those concerns.

Still, the urge to promote national interests has not been dispelled, as evident with the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, but it has been tempered within the confines of the Council throughout the history of the organization. Unfortunately, several high-profile declarations of concern regarding Arctic militarization within the structures of the Council serve to push out conversations regarding the preparedness of states in dealing with Arctic climate calamities and the preparedness of the Council to provide necessary assistance to states in need. This overconcern with national interests distracts from the central tenets of the Arctic Council and makes it significantly more difficult for the Council to maintain cooperative avenues for assistance with surging issues like sea ice retreat, migration, oil spills, and forest fires as some nations struggle to establish a vague dominance of the Council. Reducing pressure on the Council as the body to address issues like militarization would assist in maintaining its role as a body providing regulatory guidance to member states experiencing the most rapid transformation.

Conclusion

The Arctic Council is the best international body to begin addressing the complex issues surrounding maritime governance in the waterways of the Arctic region by developing and codifying communal responses to regional issues. In order for the Council to pursue such policies effectively it must have a community of members willing to work together and acknowledge the limitations imposed on the Council which have so far enabled its effectiveness for more than 20 years.

Ian Birdwell is a Ph.D. Student at Old Dominion University’s Graduate Program in International Studies. His research focuses on the exploration of the motivations behind the pursuit of Arctic security, how identity factors into the cultivation of regional habits, and the impacts of emerging trade routes on global power dynamics.

Featured Image: “North Pole” by Christopher Michael via Wikimedia Commons

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Matthew Ader

Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing costs Asia billions of dollars a year and constitutes a third of the entire regional catch. It has strong links with sea slavery and unregulated migration – the Thai fishing fleet employs 50,000 foreigners annually, often criminally underpaid and held in poor conditions – along with other criminal enterprises, such as underage prostitution. Moreover, it leads to dramatic overfishing, damaging local economies and causing serious environmental damage. All countries in the region acknowledge it is a major issue with cross-cutting impacts, yet generally lack the capabilities to manage it.

It is typically conceptualized as a developmental or ocean governance challenge. But in fact it represents a remarkable strategic opportunity for the United States. The U.S. has struggled to contest China’s growing maritime insurgency in the South China Sea because its presence is relatively transient and China’s is not. The U.S. could make itself far more competitive in the region by contributing substantial resources to a multilateral maritime policing effort aimed at IUU fishing.

Such action would go a long way toward embedding the U.S. deeper into the region and supporting its strategy of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Instead of relatively short security cooperation exercises, U.S. personnel and assets would work shoulder-to-shoulder with regional partners for long periods of time, and make progress on an issue that readily impacts the quality of life of regional populations.

On a broader level, this policy could reshape perceptions of the U.S. and present China with difficult strategic decisions regarding maritime provocation. First, trust in U.S. foreign policy has declined precipitously under President Trump. Regional powers are concerned about the potential for America’s China policy to spark conflict and are dubious about the strength of Washington’s security guarantees. On the other hand, China has been making a bid for regional leadership, and while few countries see its actions as friendly, it is perceived as more influential and consistently present than a mercurial America. By deeply engaging in a multilateral, local-led mission against a systemic regional problem, the U.S. can substantiate its claims that it supports a free and open Indo-Pacific rather than be seen as destabilizing and high-handed. Moreover, as Chinese vessels are major contributors to IUU fishing, strong U.S. action against the practice would highlight the U.S. as upholding beneficial norms in sharp contrast to an aggressively self-interested China.

It would also cause China tactical heartburn. Chinese vessels routinely ram and dangerously approach ships from other countries but are more circumspect around U.S. ships for fear of escalation. If U.S. service personnel were routinely embedded on coast guard and naval ships from other nations, this level of circumspection would likely expand. In turn, this would provide regional navies more space to maneuver and assert their legitimate claims – evening out the maritime playing field and positioning the U.S. to be more responsive to the competition occurring below the threshold of open conflict.

However, the U.S. Navy must confront the reality of stagnating defense budgets and growing operational demands. Chronic overwork has already led to disaster in the 7^th Fleet, and adding more taskings without substantial additional resources is not viable. Luckily, this program could be achieved at relatively low cost by utilizing assets not traditionally employed for national security. For example, IUU fishing is highly dependent on immigrant labor, with recruiters often trapping poor farmers in debt bondage. The State Department could assist international NGOs in targeting this practice. Experts from the U.S. Treasury Department and USAID could work with host nations on countering corruption in port authorities. Satellite radar data is becoming more affordable and proven to be effective in finding fishing vessels that turn off their transponders. There are some specialized capabilities which would certainly require additional investment. Sustainable training and embedding with partner navies could only realistically be done by the U.S. military. But innovative approaches that leverage the interagency can cut costs.

This policy is not without risks. Three clear issues would require action. First, it would expose U.S. personnel to greater threats. While embedding U.S. personnel on regional vessels might spur caution in Beijing, it is all too plausible to imagine a Chinese maritime militia or coast guard ship ramming a Vietnamese or Filipino vessel – only to inadvertently injure or even kill an embedded U.S. servicemember. Finding the right balance between earning the desired deterrent effect and having adequate force protection would be a challenge.

Second, it could feed into perceptions of U.S. hypocrisy or imperialism. IUU fishing is a major problem, but few countries appreciate meddling. The mission would require effective strategic communications and operating methods to emphasize a local-led, partnered approach. A particular wrinkle would be Japan, which is a major destination market for illegally caught fish. Challenging Japan on this issue might create tensions with a key ally, but failing to do so would invite accusations of hypocrisy. Designing the policy from the start with consultation from partners like Japan would be key to mitigating such challenges.

Third, while China is the biggest perpetrator of IUU fishing, it is far from being the only one. Many disputes over fishing grounds and regulation are between U.S. partners. That adds diplomatic nuance to assistance programs and would demand major efforts to resolve. Drawing on experience and trust earned through existing partnered operations would be vital. If the U.S. can leverage diplomacy to help resolve fishing disputes amongst its partners then it would make further progress on the issue and draw a sharper contrast with China’s behavior.

Another diplomatic wrinkle is the fate of boats and fishermen engaged in IUU fishing across international lines. Those arrested are often without papers, which makes deportation difficult, but governments are leery about detaining large numbers of foreigners for long periods of time. Aside from the humanitarian implications, it is a trigger point for international disputes. The U.S. could use its convening power to propose international courts and institutions to address such concerns, and perhaps draw inspiration from the Courts of Mixed Commission which helped suppress the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

Conclusion

IUU fishing is an ongoing humanitarian, economic, and environmental disaster. Working to stop it will be relatively affordable and advantageous for the U.S. if it leverages regional partnerships and interagency assets. More work should be done to explore the possibilities it offers as a matter of urgency.

Matthew Ader is a student in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He is an associate editor at the Wavell Room, and tweets infrequently from @AderMatthew.

Featured Image: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Aug. 17, 2009) Yu Feng, a Taiwanese-flagged fishing vessel suspected of illegal fishing activity, moves through the water before being boarded by crewmembers from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Legare (WMEC 912) and representatives from Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces Maritime Wing, Fisheries Ministry and Office of National Security. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Public Affairs Specialist 2nd Class Shawn Eggert/Released)

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Drake Long

Countries are beginning to pay more attention to their dependence on rare earth metals. Rare metals like cobalt and nickel are sought out for their applications in smart phones, electric car batteries, and countless other gadgets, but come from an exceedingly small number of places,  – virtually all of which are within the borders of the People’s Republic of China or under the control of its state-owned enterprises. This sets up a worrying imbalance in an extremely crucial supply chain that any advanced economy relies on.

There is one potential solution that has come up time and time again: mining the seabed. Unbeknownst to many, the bottom of the ocean holds deposits of rare metals that could scratch the tech-hungry world’s itch, and most of these resources are finally becoming accessible for the first time. These deposits usually take the form of polymetallic nodes sitting on certain parts of the seabed, or as crusts surrounding hydrothermal vents.

There is some wisdom in wanting to decrease one’s reliance on China for something as critical as the components that power almost every electronic device, given China’s history of economic coercion. There is also an understandable fascination with tapping a mostly untouched area like the seabed.

One way to think of the deepest, darkest parts of the world’s oceans is as a new frontier, similar to the thawing Arctic or the yawning abyss of space. There is a shortage of scientific and strategic understanding of the seabed’s value, even as humankind eagerly throws itself into the water to develop blue economies based on marine resources.

The deep sea is rapidly approaching an era reminiscent of the gold rush period of the American West, when pioneers could potentially strike it big solely by venturing out to where few others wanted to go. The risk is high, but the rewards are potentially massive – if one could get seabed mining to scale.

The problem is that nobody should be mining the seabed anytime soon. The looming environmental cost is monumental, and the race for seabed resources could reinvigorate any number of maritime disputes. Is seabed mining really worth the trouble?

A Steep Environmental Cost

Currently, seabed mining is limited to some massive state-backed projects in China and India, and to some Australian or Canadian start-ups with less-than-impressive records. There is also a major regulatory gap when it comes to seabed mining practices, which is meant to be filled by the International Seabed Authority (ISA).

The ISA was mandated to handle seabed issues by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS, at the time of its drafting, was ill-equipped to codify an equitable way to handle seabed mining, especially since the technology at the time didn’t enable any country to have a full sense of seabed resources or how to extract them.

UNCLOS passed responsibility to the ISA, which has the uncanny mission of handing out licenses and devising an entire regulatory framework for all seabed mining in international waters. That is a tall order for what is, by any stretch of the imagination, a very small UN agency.

The ISA has been plugging away at one comprehensive seabed mining framework for years now – the Mining Code. The Mining Code will set out how and when countries and companies can prospect for seabed minerals and eventually commercially extract them.

The ISA is working under a stressful deadline to get the Mining Code finalized later this year and allow companies to begin plowing the seabed. By its own estimates, the ISA believes larger-scale commercial extraction of seabed minerals will start around 2027.

That leaves little time to write out a comprehensive and widely accepted environmental standard for seabed mining, especially given what is at stake. Nonetheless, the ISA seems up to the task, explicitly crafting the Mining Code to show how one can plausibly mine the seabed in an environmentally sustainable way.

However, the Mining Code will instead give a green light to companies to damage the ocean floor beyond all repair.

The concept that there is an environmentally responsible way to mine the seabed is highly dubious. A test that attempted to shed light on this dilemma ended up permanently scarring seabed ecosystems for years. The 1989 DISCOL test used an eight-meter-wide plough harrow to rake the center of an 11-square-kilometer plot in the Pacific Ocean, and is still considered to be the most advanced seabed mining trial to date. But ecosystems in the area haven’t recovered more than 30 years later. According to ecologist Hjalmar Thiel, who organized the DISCOL test, “The disturbance is much stronger and lasting much longer than we ever would have thought.”

Most of the world’s seabed hasn’t even been mapped, and countless deep sea environments on the bottom of the ocean lay waiting to be discovered. What is known to an extent is that the organisms living in these areas constitute some of the most fragile ecosystems on the planet, making any minor change in their environment potentially catastrophic.

https://gfycat.com/celebratedhomelydodo

Remotely operated vehicle Deep Discoverer examines deep sea ecosystems (Video via National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

Case in point – the scaly-foot snail only lives at three very specific underwater hydrothermal vents on Earth. The snail had barely been discovered before its home was dug up for potential metal deposits, forcing the fascinating, rare creature onto the endangered species list.

The snail is one example of a near-extinction we knew happened. If seabed mining were to scale up to the commercial stage and plows began dragging back and forth over a seafloor that is poorly understood, then there would be countless other creatures and ecosystems that could be endangered or even thrown into extinction. And humankind likely wouldn’t even be aware of it until it is too late.

Aside from the environmental impacts, there is the question of how seabed mining will progress within national borders, where the ISA has no authority beyond setting an example. For a cautionary look at how this race for new resources can progress, it is best to look at the country poised to start seabed mining before anyone else – China.

China’s Maritime Dreams

China has made it eminently clear it takes the resource potential of the seabed seriously, and frequently seems to flaunt its topographical knowledge of the ocean floor to its neighbors and other claimants surrounding the South China Sea. 

For example, in April China released a list of Chinese-language names and locations for some 55 new undersea features – seamounts, underwater canyons, and others – in the South China Sea. China seems to treat the naming and placement of undersea features as a specious way to supplement its ambiguous historic rights argument, which China insists entitles it to nearly all of the rocks, waters, and seabed in the South China Sea. That line of reasoning was decisively struck down in a 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, but China has never backed down from trying to justify its maximalist claims. 

Maritime features recently named and listed by China [Click to expand] (Gif via RadioFreeAsia/Google Earth)

This cluster of undersea features listed in April closely tracks with a provocative survey China conducted last year within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone.

 That survey roped in a flotilla of coast guard ships and maritime militia, employed by both Vietnam and China, and sparked a tense stand-off between the two countries. China has regularly used survey vessels for its pressure campaigns against other claimant states in Southeast Asia. The aim of this harassment is to keep other Southeast Asian nations from exploring and exploiting resources within their waters. But in an area like the South China Sea, where the vast majority of the seabed is unmapped, the use of survey vessels and the curious publishing of lists of undersea features sitting on other countries’ continental shelves conveys another message – China knows what’s out there, and other countries in the region do not.

China’s information advantage on the ocean floor comes from investing heavily in deep sea research in recent years, and from employing the world’s largest fleet of survey vessels. The capability gap between it and its neighbors is wide and unlikely to be closed anytime soon.

China views the deep sea environment as a critical part of the marine economy, which encompasses virtually everything from fishing to submarine cables to genetic material used in state-of-the-art biomedicine. At the same time, the ostensibly civilian mission of deep sea research vessels allows China to send ships well-within the economic zones of other countries without potentially provoking a naval skirmish – thus making research vessels another element of China’s maritime insurgency against other claimants in the South China Sea, similar to the notoriously muscular China Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).

There are military applications as well, such as how topographical knowledge of the seabed makes it easier to chart paths for submarines and to ensure those submarines move around undetected.

Seabed mining is a logical priority if China wants to maintain its dominance over rare earths, as metals like cobalt and nickel are critical components for electric vehicles and smartphones, and are found on the ocean floor and in very few other places.

 The issue seabed mining enthusiasts should first consider is that these ventures can serve as yet another arena for confrontational behavior in already tense waters.

Seabed mining is not cheap – the kinds of investments necessary to make it commercially profitable by 2027 will necessitate massive subsidies and state support. China is ahead of the curve on seabed mining solely because its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in seabed prospecting are so heavily subsidized they can afford to get involved in such a risky and speculative industry. Michael Lodge, general secretary of the ISA, stated that “I do believe that China could easily be among the first (to start exploitation).”

By nature of being so expensive, there is an incentive to protect seabed mining projects through extensive means. As a country securitizes the ocean around state-backed seabed mining platforms, those same state-backed companies are emboldened to operate further and further afield. They then become wrapped up in the push to assert maritime claims over the objections of neighboring countries. China’s approach to seabed mining may thus begin to look very much like its approach to oil and gas in the South China Sea, which has not been conducive to regional stability.

Couple all this with how the exact boundaries of many countries’ continental shelves are in dispute, and how those Pacific countries with a high probability of holding seabed minerals in their borders also have virtually no regulatory frameworks to handle a nascent industry like seabed mining. The end result is that many latent maritime disputes may suddenly burst back into prominence, and at a time when the region needs far less, not more, imbroglios over maritime resources and borders.

Solutions Are Needed

Seabed resources have a dangerous potential to become conflict resources, fueling disagreements over maritime boundaries across the ocean at a time when many overlapping continental shelf claims are unresolved.

There is a straightforward solution to get ahead of the problem – ban seabed mining. The international community and regional forums should promulgate a series of regional and international moratoriums on seabed mining within countries’ maritime borders immediately, and the ISA should stop issuing licenses for seabed prospecting in waters outside of any national jurisdictions. However, that outcome, while undoubtedly the best for the undersea environment and their marine ecosystems, is probably unrealistic.

One alternative is for the ISA to craft a strict environmental standard that denies any seabed mining company the use of plowing machinery on the ocean floor. If the upcoming Mining Code were to require all seabed mining to only happen through the individual collection of one polymetallic nodule at a time, then seabed prospecting and extraction will lose much of its commercial viability and revert back to being employed mostly for research purposes and perhaps the extraction of biological material necessary for pioneering new medicines.

The ISA could also demand the most stringent environmental impact assessments necessary before any seabed mining or prospecting takes place, reducing the speed of the commercialization of seabed mining to a snail’s pace and postponing exploitation by perhaps another 10-20 years.

Ultimately the ISA cannot be expected to do everything. The international community, and most especially those civil society groups most attuned to the dire environmental stakes facing the ocean in the coming years, should proactively shine a light on seabed mining wherever it takes place.

Every project and license should be documented, followed, and vigorously examined, so that when deep sea environments are irreversibly damaged and coastal communities are inadvertently affected, pressure can be exerted on those companies or countries responsible. That requires, most dauntingly, forging ties with environmentalist groups in those countries most rapacious for deep sea resources, wherever they may be.

Seabed mining cannot be allowed to take place without stringent environmental safeguards and enforcement mechanisms. At best, seafloor ecosystems will be irreparably ruined and only some species and ecosystems will go extinct. This is not an acceptable trade-off for an industry that, as of yet, has not proved itself to actually be commercially viable, and is mostly sustained by the largesse and subsidies of certain countries.

Conclusion: A Common Heritage for Mankind

Seabed governance is going to be one of the thornier issues for a humankind more dependent on the oceans and coasts in the future, and the foundation needs to be laid now for an approach that does not imperil the seabed’s ecosystem for a very dubious profit. National governments may be too indecisive to come to consensus, and international organizations like the ISA are ill-equipped to enforce anything even if they do have a change of heart or code. The process of better seabed governance begins with increased scrutiny, and will largely depend upon an alliance of marine environmentalist non-governmental organizations and the scientific research community.

The deep sea has always been and remains one of the most fascinating new frontiers on the planet, only accessible in the modern day because of incredible advances in technology. Let’s keep it how humanity found it – unspoiled.

Drake Long (@DRM_Long) is a 2020 Asia-Pacific Fellow for Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. He is a contractor for RadioFreeAsia, covering the South China Sea and other maritime issues in Southeast Asia.

Featured Image: Remotely Operated Vehicle Deep Discoverer passing over a rock outcropping. (NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research, Exploration of the Gulf of Mexico 2014)