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Chiseled in Space: Temporary, Non-Geographic Chokepoints in the Battle of the Atlantic

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Heather Venable

Foreign Policy’s list of the “five top global choke points” includes the well-known maritime chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Suez Canal, in addition to two-land based resource bottlenecks: the Abqaiq Oil Processing Facility and the Druzhba Pipeline.1 These chokepoints “potentially could play an outsized role in strategic competition.”2

Ultimately, the intent of identifying a chokepoint is to find an efficient shortcut to victory. As such, at times it can function as a kind of intellectual “silver bullet.” As one naval officer recently insisted regarding the importance of a Bering Strait chokepoint in an Arctic conflict, for example, it is the “operational imperative that will win any future Arctic conflicts.”3 But securing victory tends to be far more complex and challenging, and controlling chokepoints provides no guarantee of winning, although it certainly may make the process easier.

Institutional proclivities and culture, moreover, may prevent the right chokepoint from being identified, as can be seen in the Battle of the Atlantic. The longest-lasting operations of World War II occurred in the Atlantic Ocean, as German U-boats squared off against a vast array of Allied sea and, increasingly, air power. The Battle of the Atlantic also manifested itself as a war of ideas, with many naval officers and airmen advocating offensive action against U-boats in a manner that threatened to take away from the air and sea power that was being used to defend convoys and escort merchant shipping.

In seeking to defeat the U-boats through offensive tactics, some leaders focused on what they considered to be the key chokepoint: the alluring Bay of Biscay, the area that almost all U-boats transited on their way to the Atlantic’s hunting grounds before returning back to their ports for refitting and resupplying. Commander of the Royal Air Force’s Coastal Command John Slessor, for example, sought to “fell the tree by cutting through its trunk.”4

These offensive operations did pay dividends, forcing the U-boats to travel through the bay underwater, which cut significantly into the time they could spend at sea.5 But it is important to determine, as much as is possible, how efficiently and effectively the Coastal Command and others used these assets in comparison to assets doing convoy duty. 

Despite his reputation for offensive action, Alfred Thayer Mahan had explained in the nineteenth century that convoys provided greater success “than hunting for individual marauders—a process which, even when most thoroughly planned, still resembles looking for a needle in a haystack.”7 Technological changes in the intervening years had not upended this claim’s validity. The Royal Navy and others, however, tended to disagree. During the interwar period, the Royal Navy insisted that ASDIC, or an underwater detection device, had made antisubmarine warfare relatively easy.8

Military culture, moreover, tended to favor aggressive approaches. 9 Finding, much less killing U-boats, in even the relatively restricted Bay of Biscay proved challenging to say the least. From June to December of 1941, an offensive in the bay sank one submarine after thirty-one submarine sightings.10 Even as technology improved, those flying in the bay from June to September 1942 saw one U-boat per 164 flying hours. The anti-submarine warfare crews of October 1942 to February 1943 suffered even more boredom, spotting one U-boat for every 312 tedious hours of flying. During Operation Gondola, which lasted from February 6 to 15 of 1943, the Allies sought to destroy the 78 U-boats that sailed through the area in that timeframe. Aircraft, though, only saw 18 U-boats. And, of the seven attacked, only one did the Allies the favor of sinking.11

January 1944, Atlantic Ocean: Spotted on the surface a few yards from another German U-Boat, this U-boat became the target of  depth bombs and strafing from an American fighter and torpedo bomber off an escort carrier in the mid-Atlantic. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

It did not help that almost 70 percent of the time, U-boats spotted planes first, giving them time to dive to safety.12 Meanwhile, the number of U-boats in the Atlantic rose from 358 in August of 1942 to 420 by May of 1943 as German factories continued to churn them out and huge concrete ports continued to protect them. Yet Coastal Command’s patrols in the Bay of Biscay only killed about 42 submarines during an even longer timeframe from July 1942 to December 1943.13 New trees shot up faster than Slessor could make dents in the trunk.

Figure 1 below demonstrates the U-boat kills by aircraft providing convoy escort in the Atlantic versus those flying air patrols over the Bay of Biscay during sixteen months from March 1942 to July 1943. During this timeframe, aircraft escorting convoys sank 59 U-boats while aircraft flying patrols in the bay sank 32. Aircraft on convoy duty sunk more U-boats every month except for two, one in which aircraft in the Bay of Biscay sunk two U-boats and aircraft on escort duty sank none (July 1942), and another month in which they tied (August 1942).

Moreover, merchant ships’ safe arrival served as a better measure of effectiveness than the number of U-boats killed, as long as U-boats could be kept to a manageable number and shipping could be replaced, which it could. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic, the real chokepoint was not a single geographical area, but wherever the convoys were.14 Slessor got it wrong, in part because the war was too complicated to be reduced to simple solutions, however tempting or seemingly logical.

These numbers are generous toward the Bay of Biscay patrols, including one unknown cause of sinking in March of 1943, one unknown cause of an Italian U-boat sunk in August of 1942, and another “possible” sinking of an Italian U-boat in May of 1943. Numbers from 1942 to May 1943 are drawn from S.W. Roksill, Appendix J, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, II: The Period of Balance, https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-J.html. The other numbers for the summer of 1943 can be found in S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, III: The Offensive, Part I (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1960), pp. 355-356.

The U-boats’ limitations, more so than fixed geographical chokepoints, shaped the Battle of the Atlantic’s nature. As mentioned, U-boats had to sink merchant shipping to have any strategic effect. To sink shipping, U-boats had to reveal themselves around the convoys. And as soon as they revealed themselves, they became highly vulnerable. The primary responsibility of Allied aircraft and ships, by contrast, was to provide enough prosaic protection to get the required amount of resources safely across the Atlantic.

Viewed from the other side, the Germans did not have a strategic chokepoint defined by geography in the Battle of the Atlantic. Instead, their strategic chokepoint was found in the area that Allied aircraft could not reach until the spring of 1943 known as the “gap.” U-boats took advantage of the outsized effect in the “gap” because they could attack shipping safe from aircraft. Once the Allies devoted the less than 50 very-long-range aircraft needed to patrol this area, the Germans’ strategic chokepoint simply disappeared, a stretch of ocean about six hundred miles from north to south by three hundred from east to west now no longer a viable hunting ground (see Figure 2 below).15

A map depicting the mid-Atlantic Gap (Royal Air Force)

In light of this case study, it is worth thinking about the world’s far better known geographic and resource chokepoints, especially in light of how technological changes over the next thirty years might result in the oceans becoming “transparent” enough that even submarines can be detected relatively easily. Making matters worse, given the current Western advantage in submarine technology, some researchers also believe that developing counter-detection technology capable of hiding submarines will be unlikely.17 As such, they conclude the “strategic importance of geographic chokepoints in the ocean is likely to decline.”18

Much can be gained, then, by conceptualizing chokepoints more broadly as areas of temporary advantage that may be created or destroyed through the application of either new capabilities or existing ones in ingenuous ways to create an outsized advantage. In the case of the Battle of the Atlantic, these types of chokepoints resulted in the greatest strategic effect. Ultimately, chokepoints might have the most outsized effect when leaders, as Clausewitz instructs us, can interact within the “play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.”19

Heather Venable is an associate professor of military and security studies in the Department of Airpower at the United States Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College. As a visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, she taught naval and Marine Corps history. She received her Ph.D. in military history from Duke University. She is also a member of the Marine Corps University’s Krulak Center Non-Resident Fellows Program. The views here are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Air Force, the Command and Staff College, or the U.S. Department of Defense. You can follow her on Twitter @Heather_at_ACTS and Linkedin

References

1. “The List: The Five Top Global Choke Points,” Foreign Policy, 8 May 2006; https://foreignpolicy.com/2006/05/08/the-list-the-five-top-global-choke-points/. I am grateful to Ryan Wadle, Josh Howard, and Tyler Morton for reading and commenting on this article.

2. Valerie Jackson, “Chokepoints and Littorals Week,” https://cimsec.org/chokepoints-and-littorals-week.

3. LCdr Tod O’Connell, “The Bering Strait—Strategic Choke Point,” Naval War College thesis, 2016; https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/Education/jpme_papers/oconnell_t.pdf?ver=2017-12-29-142153-567.

4. Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell and Company Limited, 1956),, pp. 511-512.

5. Brian McCue, U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. 17.

6. Duncan Redford, “Full Spectrum Anti-Submarine Warfare—The Historical Evidence from a British Perspective,” Journal of Strategic Studies, p. 26, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1623029.

7. Mahan, Influence upon French Revolution, 2:217 quoted in R.A. Bowling, “Mahan’s Principles and the Battle of the Atlantic” in To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic, eds. Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes, eds. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 233.

8. Christina J.M. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940-1945. New York: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 38-39.

9. See, for example, Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1918).

10. Duncan, “Full Spectrum,” p. 13.

11. Max Schoenfeld, Stalking the U-Boat: USAAF Offensive Antisubmarine Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), pp. 45-46.

12. Schoenfeld, Stalking the U-Boat, p. 8.

13. Duncan, “Full Spectrum,” p. 14; Tim Benbow, “Brothers in Arms: The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Battle of the Atlantic, 1940–1943″” in Decision in the Atlantic: The Allies and the Longest Campaign of the Second World War, eds. Marcus Faulkner and Christopher M. Bell (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019): pp. 78-124: p. 86.   

14. Marc Milner, “The Battle of the Atlantic” in Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, ed. John Gooch (London: Frank Cass, 1990), p. 58 and p. 46; Buckley, “Coastal Command,” p. 183; also see Redford, “Full Spectrum,” pp. 7-8..

15. Richard Goette, “Britain and the Delay in Closing the Mid-Atlantic” Air Gap” During the Battle of the Atlantic.” Northern Mariner 15, no. 4 (2005): 19-41; Christopher M. Bell, “Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic: Very Long Range Aircraft and the Delay in Closing the Atlantic “Air Gap” in Journal of Military History 79, no. 3 (2015).

16. Hilary St. George Saunders, The Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. III: The Fight is Won, online at https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-2.html.

17. However, Claire Chennault insisted before radar was developed that the bomber would not be “the first exception to the ancient principle that for every weapon there is a new and effective counter weapon.” The principle remains possible for counter-detection efforts.

18. Roger Bradbury, Scott Bainbridge, Katherine Daniell, Anne-Marine Grisogono, Ehsan Nabavi, Andrew Stuchbery, Thomas Vacca, Scott Vella, and Elizabeth Williams, “Transparent Oceans: The Coming SSBN Counter-Detection Task May be Insuperable,” May 2020, https://t.co/xwRtITPyOU?amp=1.

19. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds., Carl von Clausewitz on War (Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89.

Featured Image: National Archives, colorized by Paul Reynolds)

The Strategic Littoral Geography of Southeast Asia

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Pete McPhail, Arthur Speyer, Bret Rodgers, Steve Ostrosky, Jesse Burns, and Dan Marquis

Military decision-makers instinctively think in geographic terms. Southeast Asia’s complex economic, military, political, legal, and environmental layers are best portrayed visually. By spatially portraying information, troops can work their way through geography to comprehend the interaction of these complex layers.  

The INDOPACOM AOR continues to be a primary focus of U.S. naval forces, and the area is of central importance to China. The strategic chokepoints and littorals of the region, such as the Malacca Strait, have major military and economic significance. Each chokepoint has different environmental factors, from size, location, and depth. Additional regional factors, such as piracy, are also strongly related to geography. 

This map describes the strategic importance of Southeast Asian littoral geography to China’s interests. By studying the map the user sees correlations between China’s diplomatic and economic investments and chokepoint geography. This map may be used as a starting point for wargames and discussing policy options.

Click on the map below to view it more closely and hone in on the strategic chokepoints of the region.

The research team is an inter-disciplinary team of civilian Marine Corps regional analysts and geographers affiliated with the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

Featured Image: TANDUO BEACH, Malaysia (Nov. 11, 2015) U.S. Marine 1st Lt. Erik Glynn discusses troop movements with a Malaysian army platoon commander prior to rehearsing amphibious operations during Malaysia-United States Amphibious Exercise 2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Emmanuel Ramos/Released)

An Emerging Strategic Geometry – Thawing Chokepoints and Littorals in the Arctic

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Robert C. Rasmussen

“There are two types of Arctic problems – the imaginary and the real. Of the two, the imaginary are the most real.” –Vilhjalmur Stefansson

 This century will be a transformative one, where rules taken for granted in the international system have begun to rapidly evolve. One of the most fundamental evolutions that is occurring is the transformation of physical geography from climate change and the resulting geopolitical implications. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the thawing Arctic. The ongoing transformation of the Arctic from an inaccessible frozen wasteland to an accessible and untapped reserve creates not only a new contested space, but will create new strategic chokepoints and littoral operating environments. The United States, in concert with its allies, will need to invest in the ability to access and secure this environment in order to maintain sovereignty and security in this new world.

The Changing Arctic

The emerging Arctic will be radically different than the one that has permeated human history. Historically, the Arctic is a frozen ocean surrounded by continental landmasses that have tundra and polar desert biomes along the coastal plains and islands.1 What keeps the Arctic frozen has been partially attributed to the planetary climate patterns that keeps cold air and weather at the poles, the season-long polar night,2 and the fact that snow and ice frozen for multiple years has an extremely high albedo – it reflects sunlight and heat.3 

The difference now is that the planet is warming, and those changes are the most dramatic at the poles. This affects the Arctic Ocean and its littorals in many ways. The first notable effect is on sea ice. Sea ice expands and contracts seasonally, with a core of permanent sea ice, or multi-year ice, being augmented by younger ice, which is less than two years old. The multi-year sea ice is thicker and reflects more sunlight which makes it harder to melt. The younger sea ice is less thick and darker, making it easier to melt. The average extent of the permanent sea ice has been contracting continuously since 1978,4 and according to the International Panel on Climate Change, the Arctic will be ice-free or at least navigable in the summer season between the 2030s and the 2050s.5 

The New Arctic Geography – Trade Routes, Chokepoints, and Inland Waterways

 The reality of this environment is that it is increasingly warming and accessible. This produces rapid change which encourages various actors to compete for control of new sea lanes, prospecting for new resource reserves, and inevitably settlement of the Arctic by populations pushed to the north by climate change. These emerging issues will create the potential for conflicting sovereignty claims and access rights, as well as the assurance of those rights through the exercise of national power. There are four distinct geopolitical regions where fresh access, opportunity, and potential for conflict will occur. They are the Open Arctic Ocean, the North American Arctic Littoral environment, the Eurasian Arctic Littoral Environment, and the Arctic Seafloor.

The Open Arctic Ocean has one critical potential sea lane and two major chokepoints. The major sea lane, which will not be open until the Arctic is at least seasonally ice free, is the Polar Sea Lane. This route spans from Europe to Asia and bisects the Arctic passing over the North Pole. The two major chokepoints here are the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap – long famous as a planned line of defense against the Soviet Northern Fleet’s access to the Atlantic Ocean during the Cold War,6 and along the Bering Strait and Sea between Alaska (United States) and the Chukotka Peninsula (Russian Federation).7 The GIUK Gap sees a line cast between the islands of Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, the Faroe Islands (Denmark) and the Shetland and Orkney Islands (Scotland, United Kingdom),8 the Norway-Svalbard Gap, and the Svalbard-Greenland Gap serving as strategic chokepoints.9 Within the Bering Sea, both the Bering Strait and the Aleutian Islands can serve as chokepoints that can control access between the Arctic and the Pacific.10

Arctic maritime shipping routes (Susie Harder, “Arctic Council- Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment 2009,” United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration)

The North American Littoral Environment has two distinct regions. The first is in the eastern portion, characterized by a large number of islands and seaways, which consist of the island of Greenland – an autonomous territory of Denmark, and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, largely contained in the federal territory of Nunavut, but also the Northwest Territories. The second, western portion, is one where coastal plains meet open ocean along Canada’s Yukon Territory, and the U.S. state of Alaska. The strategic trade route in this operating environment is the fabled Northwest Passage, which is rapidly becoming a reality with a seasonally ice-free or low-ice environment. The strategic chokepoints for this route start with the Labrador Sea and Barton Bay between the western coast of Greenland and the eastern/northern coast of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago’s largest island, Baffin Island.

The Eurasian Arctic Littoral is categorized as being largely coastal with the Eurasian mainland, but with a handful of Arctic Ocean islands which can serve as chokepoints, which are largely controlled by the Russian Federation, the exception being Svalbard – an archipelago controlled by Norway.

How the new Northern Sea route compares to the Suez Canal route for shipping from Rotterdam, Netherlands, to Dalian, China. (Wall Street Journal)

The strategic trade route in this region is the Northern Sea Route, which hugs the northern coast of Eurasia and provides a connection between Europe and Asia, and which is shorter than travel through the Suez Canal and Strait of Malacca. Chokepoints along this route include the Barents Sea gap between Norway and Svalbard, with Bear Island at the midpoint, and multiple chokepoints between Russian islands and archipelagos.

The Northern Sea Route is largely in operation already. A portion is open year-round to support domestic Russian commerce, and a remainder is open during the summer season which allows for trade between Europe and Asia. This route is open due to open waters and additional support from the Russian Federation’s fleet of 14 nuclear-powered icebreakers. China has also invested heavily into what they refer to as their Polar Silk Road, as part of their larger Belt and Road Initiative, including the construction of two more icebreakers. As the Arctic melts, this corridor will be able to accommodate significantly larger traffic flows. Such a shift will be fundamentally transformative to the Russian economy, allowing for Russia to achieve its centuries-old dream of holding blue water ports and subsequent access to global commerce.

An additional transformation to the Russian economy will be with inland waterways. The major inland waterways leading to the Arctic are the Ob’ River, the Yeinsei, and the Lena.                            

Fig. 16- The Lena River Drainage Basin (Source: Wikimedia Commons)

Access to blue water ports and commercial routes for these rivers will be fundamentally transformative to the Russian economy. Siberia is the most resource rich region within the Russian Federation, but extraction is oftentimes cost prohibitive, as the physical geography makes the construction of lengthy transportation corridors over land extremely difficult. Conversely, the implementation of large scale river transports moving from the heart of Russia to Arctic ports would dramatically lower the cost and risk of resource extraction, which will open up this traditional backwater to global commerce.11 With increasing commerce and infrastructure, this region will likely also see a population boom. Additionally, landlocked, but also resource-rich Kazakhstan and Mongolia will also have access to these inland waterways and Arctic ports, where this type of access would otherwise not exist.

The last region in the Arctic will be the seafloor itself, with potential fishing rights, crude oil, and other mineral resources at stake. Fundamental to this region is that it has never properly been mapped, and mapping the seabed is instrumental for states with Arctic coastlines to be able to claim sovereignty and exclusive access to these resources. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters are limited to 12 nautical miles (nm), except for archipelagoes which are considered internal waterways, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are limited to 200 nm for exploiting resources in the water such as seafood, and lastly rights to access mineral resources are limited by the continental shelf or the 200 nm EEZ, whichever is further.12 A lack of internationally recognized mapping of the Arctic seafloor has in the past and will in the future lead to conflicting claims, and possibly armed conflict itself.

One example for potentially conflicting claims was when the Russian Federation claimed sovereignty over the North Pole for mineral rights access in 2007. This claim was made based on the Russian assertion that the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, which runs across the Arctic seafloor between the East Siberian Shelf off the coast of the Russian Federation and the Lincoln Shelf off the coast of Greenland, was actually an extension of the East Siberian Shelf and thus subject to Russian sovereignty. Once this region is more accessible it will become a race to stake claims.

A shot from a video shows the view out of the porthole of a Russian miniature submarine as its robotic arm plants the Russian flag on the seabed 14,000 feet below the North Pole on August 2, 2007. (Reuters)

Policy Recommendations

The United States should continue with its longstanding policy of promoting clear international norms and standards when it comes to the emerging Arctic. The current risk is that peer competitors such as Russia and China will seek to exploit ambiguous norms, standards, or situations in order to make gains in economic or political power in the region. Bearing that in mind, the United States needs to be ready to leverage all tools of national power to protect U.S. interests. Part of that is building on and leveraging existing strengths.

The first most important policy the United States can pursue is by increasing funding for scientific research in the Arctic region, with a specific focus on international cooperation and recognition of results. Scientific research should focus on understanding the bathymetry (seafloor mapping) of the region that can be utilized as a diplomatic tool for international recognition of sovereignty claims as well as use of international waters. Promoting consensus prevents room for conflict.

The second policy the United States should pursue with its allies is full investment in the economic development of the Northwest Passage, bringing it into competition with the Northern Sea Route. This economic development would entail the economic development of ports in the Canadian arctic archipelago and development along the MacKenzie and Yukon River corridors. There would also be a need to invest in the construction of both a merchant and military icebreaker fleet, in order to facilitate and secure strategic trade routes. This development would provide an attractive alternative to the Northern Sea Route for the global shipping industry as the Arctic thaws.

The third policy the United States should pursue with its allies under the aegis of NATO is ensuring military superiority over the major strategic chokepoints in the Arctic. The primary focus would be on the GIUK Gap and the Aleutian Islands in particular, as routes that peer competitors Russia and China would have to rely upon converge at those two points. The GIUK, Norway-Svalbard, and Svalbard-Greenland Gaps being mostly open ocean would require a substantial naval blockade and air support to shut down traffic, similar to planning that defensive line during the Cold War, while the Aleutian Islands can rely on a chain of small outposts of anti-ship missiles with patrols preventing passage between the islands. The threat of force from NATO territory could serve as a deterrent from conflict, and as leverage in diplomatic negotiations in future conflicts that may arise. In this same vein, the United States should advocate for the establishment of a NATO Joint Forces Command – Arctic focused on consolidating NATO’s collective military power in the Arctic, coordinating the security of the Northwest Passage, and serving as a deterrent to conflict in the region.

Conclusion

The Arctic is evolving as the climate changes, and it is a change that will result in new opportunities for states to develop, as well as opportunities for regional conflict. Other actors have already taken action in the region, and the United States along with its allies cannot afford to be late to the game. The United States needs to rise to the challenge by promoting peaceful development through the promotion of international norms and standards, as well as ensuring the security of strategic trade and national sovereignty in coordination with allies.

Robert C. Rasmussen is a Foreign Affairs Specialist with the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and holds an MA in International Relations from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, as well as a BA in International Relations and Geography from the SUNY College at Geneseo. He actively served in the New York Guard (State Defense Force) from 2010-2016, including participation in the response to Superstorm Sandy in 2012. He has long had an interest in the Arctic stemming from his childhood experiences while his family was posted to Fort Wainwright in Fairbanks, Alaska. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Nuclear Security Administration or the U.S. Department of Energy.

References

1. UC Museum of Planetology, “The World’s Biomes,” University of California, Berkeley,

https://ucmp.berkeley.edu/exhibits/biomes/index.php, Acc: 3 May 2020.

2. Leibowitz, Kari, “The Norwegian Town Where the Sun Doesn’t Rise,” The Atlantic, 1 July 2015,

https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/07/the-norwegian-town-where-the-sun-doesnt-rise/396746/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

3. National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Thermodynamics: Albedo,” University of Colorado- Boulder,” 3 April 2020, https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/processes/albedo.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.

4. National Snow & Ice Data Center, “Arctic Sea Ice News & Analysis,” University of Colorado- Boulder, 3 May 2020, http://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

5. American Geophysical Union, “Ice-Free Arctic Summers Could Happen on the Earlier Side of Predictions,” 27 February 2019, https://phys.org/news/2019-02-ice-free-arctic-summers-earlier-side.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.

6. Alison, George, “What are Norwegian F-35s Doing in Iceland?”  UK Defence Journal, 3 March 2020, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/what-are-norwegian-f-35s-doing-in-iceland/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

7. Alaska Seas and Watersheds K-12 Program, SeaGrant Alaska, “Map of Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea,” University of Alaska, Fairbanks,

http://aswc.seagrant.uaf.edu/grade-4/investigation-1/map-of-aleutians.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.

8. Alison, George, “What are Norwegian F-35s Doing in Iceland?”  UK Defence Journal, 3 March 2020, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/what-are-norwegian-f-35s-doing-in-iceland/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

9. National Geographic Society, National Geographic World Atlas- 7th Edition, Washington: National Geographic Society, 2000.

10. Alaska Seas and Watersheds K-12 Program, SeaGrant Alaska, “Map of Aleutian Islands and Bering Sea,” University of Alaska, Fairbanks,

http://aswc.seagrant.uaf.edu/grade-4/investigation-1/map-of-aleutians.html, Acc: 3 May 2020.

11. Vorotkinov, Vladislav, “Dredging Will Connect Siberia with the Northern Sea Route,” Dredging & Port Construction, 12 February 2019,

 https://dredgingandports.com/news/2019/dredging-will-connect-siberia-with-the-northern-sea-route/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

12. Kumar, Abishek, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Mariner Desk, 10 September 2018, https://www.marinerdesk.com/united-nations-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-unclos/, Acc: 3 May 2020.

Featured Image: Coast Guard members assigned to the U.S. Coast Guard Station Valdez head back to station after recovering hazardous radioactive material from a civilian vessel in the Port of Valdez, Alaska, during exercise Arctic Eagle 2018, Feb. 24, 2018. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by 2nd Lt. Marisa Lindsay)

There Are No Strategic Chokepoints

Chokepoints and Littorals Topic Week

By Captain Jamie McGrath, USN (ret.)

Keys to the World

Naval theorist Milan Vego opens a chapter on chokepoint control with a quote from British Admiral Sir John Fisher, who stated that there are “five keys to the world. The Strait of Dover, the Straits of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Malacca, and the Cape of Good Hope. And every one one of these keys we hold.”1 Fisher spoke from an Anglo-centric view, but his point is evident that control of key chokepoints equated to control of national strategic interests. But a century later, with the technological advances in weapons and sensors, and the interconnectedness of the global economy, can such a claim be made today?

There are over 100 straits where international interest in the free flow of trade transcends the interests of the nearby littoral states. Not all of these maritime chokepoints are of equal importance. Military strategists often speak as Fisher did of strategic chokepoints, believing them to have significant geopolitical value and act as epicenters for maritime strategy, where the control of which is considered vital for success in maritime conflict. But are these chokepoints truly strategic? Does the success of a nation’s maritime strategy actually hinge on the control or loss of control of these narrow seas?

Perhaps the strategic value of any given chokepoint is overstated because the ability to truly “control” these chokepoints is significantly degraded in the current maritime threat environment. The focus should instead be placed on strategic seas, and not the connectors between them.

Strategic Versus Operational Significance

Before scuttling the idea of strategic straits, there should be a common understanding of the difference between the strategic and operational importance of maritime geography. Maritime strategy is the science and art of using all naval and non-naval sources of power at sea in support of the national military strategy, with military strategy being “the art and science of using or threatening to use military power to accomplish the political interests of a nation…”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy calls for:

“A more lethal, resilient, and rapidly innovating Joint Force, combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners, will sustain American influence and ensure favorable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order. Collectively, our force posture, alliance, and partnership architecture, and Department modernization will provide the capabilities and agility required to prevail in conflict and preserve peace through strength.”3

The focus on lethality, resilience, and lethality within an alliance and partnership architecture, combined with “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment,”4 and “a global strategic environment [which] demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action,”5 indicate that fixed geographic positions like chokepoints have reduced strategic relevance in U.S. strategy.

Naval operations are defined as the “theory and practice of planning, preparing, and executing major naval operations aimed at accomplishing operational objectives.”6 While operational objectives are chosen to achieve strategic ends, there often are multiple operational options to a support strategy. The operational value of a chokepoint tends to be temporal and depends on the other operational factors of time, space, and force of the particular operation. A chokepoint with high operational value may have limited or no strategic value if other options exist to achieve the national political objectives.

Traditional Methods of Sea Control

The control of chokepoints has long been a primary way to control access to a given body of water. Revisiting Fisher’s assertion that there were five keys to the world, control of key straits meant control of the flow of global maritime traffic and, therefore, the strategic interest of most maritime nations. Warships and merchantmen during the age of sail depended on the prevailing winds for reliable propulsion and shore bases for routine resupply. These trade winds and shore bases funneled ships through specific shipping lanes, many of which transited the key chokepoints Fisher identified. Since transit of these chokepoints was essential, controlling them guaranteed control of merchant shipping and warship movement.

The emergence of steam propulsion removed reliance on the trade winds, but increased dependence on the shore bases that had been established in the age of sail, which were starting to serve as coaling stations. Thus, in Admiral Fisher’s time, his assertion was correct. But since World War II, dependence on shore basing for resupply has diminished. The U.S. Navy perfected at-sea replenishment during World War II, and merchantmen have significantly increased their unrefueled range, both of which reduced the reliance on shore stations and subsequent dependence on specific shipping lanes.

Chokepoints simplify several operational and tactical aspects of naval warfare by concentrating forces. This, in turn, limits the challenges of scouting and screening, because less sea space must be scouted and screened. The avenues of approach to the chokepoint are limited, so the party that controls the chokepoint can concentrate forces or make better use of limited forces available.

Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō’s defeat of Russia’s Second Pacific Squadron at the Tsushima Strait demonstrates how chokepoints simplify scouting. Togo did not know when the Russian fleet would arrive, nor did he wish to search for it in the open ocean. But he did know that the Russian fleet had to pass through the Tsushima Strait to reach its base at Vladivostok. This allowed Togo to concentrate his scouting force of cruisers in the strait and consolidate his battle line inside the Sea of Japan. But what if the Russians had entered the Sea of Japan through the La Pérouse Strait, Tsugaru Strait, or Strait of Tartary? In the 1890s, the limitations of coal-fired steam plants meant that traveling the extra 1000 or more miles without a coaling station made the Tsushima Strait the only choice. Today, however, at-sea logistics provide naval forces greater flexibility in entering strategic seas.

Changing Military Value of Chokepoints

Historically, chokepoints held strategic military value partly because they forced ships to transit within range of the weapons and sensors posted there, and made movements more predictable. Into the second decade of the twentieth century, optical sensors and coastal guns limited that range to or just beyond the horizon. Technological advances over the intervening century expanded that range immensely. First, aircraft extended scouting range, then, as aircraft improved, expanded the striking range of weapons well beyond the chokepoint’s horizon. The introduction of radar further enhanced scouting and early-warning capabilities, and space-based surveillance now allows for the searching of vast ocean areas independent of geographic chokepoints. The missile age added over-the-horizon, ship-killing weapons, with anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) marking the ultimate long-range strike capability.

Holding a chokepoint serves two fundamental purposes, one rooted in sea control and the other in sea denial. The sea denial case, often a strategy of the weaker navy, holds that by controlling the chokepoint, an adversary cannot access the seas on its opposite side. As Vego points out, this is often part of a larger, major defensive joint/combined operation and maybe one of several elements of a national defensive strategy to either bottle up an opponent’s naval force in its own narrow seas, or prevent an opponent’s naval force from entering a narrow sea where it could threaten the defending nation’s territory.7 In the sea control case, control of the chokepoint theoretically allows one to use their naval forces at the time and manner of their choosing within the chokepoint and in the seas controlled by the strait. That is to say, if a nation controls a chokepoint, naval forces and maritime trade can pass through that chokepoint freely at the discretion of the nation that controls it.8

In the current maritime threat environment, controlling the land and water in the vicinity of the chokepoint no longer represents the exclusive manner to control it. The focus on strategic chokepoints may have held when the range of weapons was barely over the horizon, but today an adversary no longer has to control the geographic entrance to strategically important seas to deny their use. Space-based sensors and long-range missile firepower allow an adversary to effectively close, or at least threaten closure of, geographic chokepoints without the traditional need to hold the immediate surrounding land or seas. “Holding” a geographic chokepoint no longer guarantees the use of the seas on either side, nor does it ensure safe passage through the chokepoint itself. Therefore, the U.S. Navy would be better served to focus more broadly on its ability to control or deny strategic seas than the strategic chokepoints of ages past.

Changing Economic Value of Chokepoints

Another element that gives a chokepoint strategic value is the volume of trade transiting the strait. Traditionally, blockades and maritime trade warfare have used control of chokepoints to great strategic effect. Britain’s control of the Dover Straits, combined with the North Sea Mine Barrage, closed all maritime trade to Germany during World War I and contributed to the fall of the Kaiser’s government in 1918. During World War II, the failure of the Axis powers to seize the Suez allowed Great Britain to continue using the canal for resupply of its empire. Would such action have the same strategic effects today?

Vertical and horizontal charts showing locations and densities of mine fields of the North Sea Mine barrage, issued in November and December 1918, after the fields were completed. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

Today, high trade volume certainly gives a strait economic value because these chokepoints often represent the shortest route from manufacturer to market and thus the cheapest transportation cost. But is controlling trade through a strait a viable strategic goal? Chris McMahon argues that maritime trade warfare is ineffective in today’s global economy. Among the many reasons he presents, he notes that the closing of chokepoints has no real impact on global trade.9 One of the most-often mentioned strategic chokepoints is the Strait of Malacca because it handles so much of the world’s maritime traffic. But how would closing the Strait of Malacca affect global trade? It would impact Singapore’s role in the global shipping market, certainly. But would the global shipping network be severely burdened by having to transit the Sunda Strait or the Lombok Strait? Would there be a cost increase, yes, but once the market adjusts for the increased cost, shipping will find a way to make it work. 

Consider the wave of piracy off the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s, an area often discussed as a strategic chokepoint because of the volume of trade passing through the Arabian Sea. Shipping companies dealt with the insecurity of that maritime region in one of three ways – accept the risk and charge accordingly, arm themselves against pirates, or re-route ships around the Cape of Good Hope at increased cost and charge accordingly. In each case, maritime trade continued. Lord Fisher mentioned the Suez Canal as one of the keys to the world, but it has been closed on five occasions since it opened in 1869, including for eight years between 1967 and 1975. During that most recent closure, the cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope was markedly higher than the Suez route but presented no serious economic hardship to global consumers. Rerouting Pacific trade for a closed Strait of Malacca would have a similar minimal effect on the cost of global trade.10

Chokepoints Can Be Superseded

The demise of the strategic value of chokepoints is revealed by looking at some traditional strategic chokepoints of the past. One of Fisher’s keys to the world, British control of the Straits of Dover, seemingly kept Hilter’s Kriegsmarine bottled-up in the North Sea, much as it had the Kaiserliche Marine three decades before. But Germany negated the British advantage by conquering France and establishing bases in Brittany, unfettered by the Straits of Dover. To be sure, the straits still impeded access to merchant shipping and warship transit to the German homeland, but control of the strategic strait did not mean control of the German U-boats. Chokepoints can be bypassed.

During the Cold War, the water between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK Gap – was a strategic chokepoint because Soviet ballistic-missile submarines had to pass through that gap to threaten the United States. The later development of longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles meant the submarines could remain in the Arctic to launch these weapons, thus limiting the strategic value of the GIUK Gap as a chokepoint. Chokepoints can be outranged.

The GIUK gap and major regional military bases. (Heritage Foundation)

Today, a resurgent China lays claim to the South China Sea (SCS) as its own internal waters. As discussed above, the Strait of Malacca has traditionally been a key to control of the SCS and, therefore, strategically important for trade between Europe and Asia. But the Strait of Malacca is not the only access route to the SCS, which can also be accessed through the much larger Luzon Strait and numerous passages through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. The PRC recognizes this and has adopted control mechanisms that do not depend on control of the chokepoints, but instead focuses on long-range anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and redundant fortified islands within the SCS.11

China’s A2/AD strategy in the SCS is important for two reasons. First, the assumption that physical control of a chokepoint guarantees use of the chokepoint is invalid in the face of PRC A2/AD weapons and sensors. Although the United States and its partner states may possess the land on either side of the Strait of Malacca, and have sufficient naval forces to patrol the strait, the PRC could nonetheless prevent free transit of the Strait of Malacca using ASBM and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Furthermore, these long-range weapons based on the Chinese mainland or in the central SCS can contest the other straits leading into the SCS. Conversely, the reduced reliance of predictable trade routes for maritime traffic – both merchant and military – means they can easily bypass the Strait of Malacca if it were to be “controlled” by an opposing power.12 Chokepoints can be replaced.

Conclusion

The question then should not be “what are today’s strategic chokepoints?” but instead, “what are today’s strategic seas?” Control of chokepoints is only one of the ways to control a sea. Vego writes that there are two primary arenas of naval conflict: open ocean and narrow seas. While many characteristics differentiate the open ocean from the narrow sea, the predominant one is proximity to land.13 In narrow seas, the land influences many aspects of naval warfare, from the ability of naval vessels to maneuver to the threat from land-based weapons. As one moves further out to sea, maneuver space opens up and land-based threats dissipate, or so it would stand to reason.

The ability of naval forces to operate freely on the open ocean outside the threat of land-based weapons, whether missiles or aircraft, is greatly diminishing in the current threat environment. This, in turn, means an expansion of the areas previously considered narrow seas – even if not in all aspects. If the narrow seas have now broadened to cover a much higher portion of the world’s oceans, then the restrictive chokepoints once seen as strategic lose much of their relevance. 

There may be operationally compelling reasons to control a chokepoint, but their strategic value is greatly diminished in an era of space-based sensors and proliferating long-range missiles. Control of a chokepoint no longer means the “keys to the world” as it did in Admiral Fisher’s day. Expending the time and force to control a chokepoint will likely not result in the strategic advantage sought, and worse, could fix forces to a geographic location when mobility is operationally necessary. The U.S. would be better served exercising more agile and dynamic mechanisms of strategic sea control and sea denial rather than focusing on the obsolete idea of strategic chokepoints.

Captain Jamie McGrath (ret.), retired from the U.S. Navy after 29 years as a nuclear-trained surface warfare officer. He now serves as a Deputy Commandant of Cadets at Virginia Tech and as an adjunct professor in the U.S. Naval War College’s College of Distance Education. Passionate about using history to inform today, his area of focus is U.S. naval history, 1919 to 1945, with emphasis on the interwar period. He holds a Bachelor’s in History from Virginia Tech, a Master’s in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and a Master’s in Military History from Norwich University.

References

1. Quoted in Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 188.

2. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2016), 2.

3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Military Strategy of the United States of America (US Department of Defense: Washington, DC, 2018), 1.

4. Ibid., 7.

5. Ibid.

6. Milan Vego, Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice (Rutledge: London, 2017), 1.

7. Vego, Sea Denial, 301.

8. Vego, Sea Control, 188-9.

9. Christopher J. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 70: No. 3 (Summer 2017), 29-34.

10. Ibid., 29-30.

11. Naval War College Professor James Holmes argues that considering PRC sea power, their entire military must be considered and not just the PLAN, see James Holmes, “Visualize Chinese Sea Power,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (June 2018). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june/visualize-chinese-sea-power

12. McMahon, “Maritime Trade Warfare,” 29-30.

13. Vego, Sea Control, 18-20.

Featured Image: August 6, 1988, Egypt: An aerial port bow view of the aircraft carrier USS FORRESTAL (CV 59) transiting the Suez canal. A formation of crewmen spells out”108″on the bow to signify that the ship has been at sea for 108 consecutive days. (Photo by PH2 Buckner, USN/U.S. National Archives)