Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Jessica K. Simonds

Seafarers engage in various security practices while transiting the Straits of Hormuz, Bab Al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the broader Indian Ocean. How have these practices developed to identify and communicate emerging maritime threats based on how seafarer feedback has been incorporated within strategies that counter piracy? These developments will be understood by drawing on original interview material from the author’s PhD thesis, which featured interactions with seafarers from all ranks of the merchant navy bridge team as well as senior representatives from the protection and indemnity and traditional maritime insurance world.

Maritime governance is a fluid and dynamic process and is open to active development when responding to threats, new and old,  that are prominent hinderances to merchant shipping. The reorientation of this process, from a regime that was constructed to deter Somali-based piracy, is evident in the mechanisms of information sharing and the related dissemination platforms. New threats such as the Houthi rebel insurgency as well as the shift toward identifying unidentified attackers are embedded within literature that  has been developed by the conglomerate of industry actors (such as the Best Management Practice series), as well as the experiences of seafarers who have transited the aptly named High Risk Area (HRA) within the last two years.

Attempting to define an approach to the topic of ocean governance is as broad as addressing the web of interactions that underpin terrestrial global governance. The seas are providing a dynamic and volumetric geography featuring many layers, such as the liquidity of the sea with its own natural resources and politics. The ocean landscape also hosts micro-societies, constituting communities of seafarers aboard vessels that represent mobile beacons of sovereignty. Although this seemingly leaves nothing more than tracks in the sea, through the translation of laws and norms ships are where politics happens as global maritime regimes are legitimized through practice.

The shore-based construction of maritime governance encompasses the formal and informal, structured and temporary, state, non-state, industrial, research, and military interactions. International political regimes have been constructed to preserve these layers. Drawing on the seas as a resource that furthers the goals of land-based civilizations, regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides maritime territory as corresponsive to these layers. These include access to the seabed, exclusive rights to marine resources such as fishing stocks and oil, and the implementation of structures such as wind turbines, to name a few.

Normative approaches to ocean governance are important because it sets a frame of reference for shore-based entities to consolidate maritime crimes into a recognizable and translatable legal and policy framework. Yet, it also informs daily practice onboard merchant vessels through structures of routine as set out by frameworks such as the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. In the effort to counter Somali-based piracy and armed robbery from 2009 to the present day, the Head of Marine Underwriting at Lloyd’s Market Association – Neil Roberts – asserts that it involves the construction of a three-legged stool consistent of “naval missions, communication structures …and vessel-based security strategies.”

This framework has been credited with the successful decline in successful hijackings. Naval missions such as the EU’s Naval Force’s (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atlanta  and the  U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) have patrolled the area since late 2008 (NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield was terminated in December 2016) and have contributed to the deterrence and disruption of piracy, forming one of these legs. Yet the Nautical Institute asserts that it would require “83 helicopter-equipped vessels to provide an effective one-hour response, when most vessels are only able to request help with a 10-minute warning,” reflecting the interdependence of the three-legged approach. Therefore, the practical performance of working with the sea and making critical decisions at the frontline of deterring piracy becomes the responsibility of the seafarers and sailors themselves, who must transform their vessels into a site of defense. This is embedded into practice through implementing practices into the Ship’s Security Plan (SSP) and resonate through seafarer experiences of crossing the “imagined line in the sea” where danger may lie ahead.

Transforming the vessel into a counter-piracy asset is based on the master’s engagement and translation of best management practices (BMP) as well as vessel-specific guidance; working with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASPS) as well as engaging with live information through mechanisms such as email, VHF radio, and MARSAT. Both traditional and mutual P&I insurers consider engagement with BMP as the “very minimum” (Kendall-Marsden, Personal Correspondence, 2018) that they expect seafarers and shipowners to exercise in demonstrating that they have acted with due diligence and prudence in the event of a successful hijacking. Therefore, reflection of how practices have been undertaken is an important element of a claim investigation that can then be used to revise prescribed advice and is one method of feeding back from land to sea.

Methods in which seafarers are given awareness of BMP and the practices it prescribes is through their translation by the master. This reflects the space of transformation for the social as well as physical preparation of a vessel in transit of the HRA. Enhanced watch schedules, re-purposing sub-deck enclaves into citadels, locking doors to ensure single points of entry ,as well as behavioural advice in several stages of a hijacking are just a small representation of the practices that seafarers engage with in complying with BMP. These guidelines have become more specific in both their operational requirements as each edition is released.

Two cadets (who wish to remain anonymous) who trained with Maersk, experienced transit through the HRA in late 2018 and reflected on their experiences of performing BMP. Through participating in multiple drills with the private security team that was deployed on their vessel,  as well as through being tasked with the dressing of the deck with razor wire – each cadet was offered the opportunity to reflect on their performance to officers of a higher rank. These opportunities to engage arise from formal platforms such as meetings as well as informal interactions such as passing comments on shifts and small talk. These opportunities also included platforms for suggesting additional measures they have identified while carrying out the drill that may enhance the vessels robustness against a piratical boarding. One cadet explains that a fellow cadet “suggested greasing poles around the deck” which was then included in their task schedule for the following day. The second cadet explains that he “overheard a naval vessel request information from another vessel as to whether they were carrying private security on VHF Channel 16.” VHF Channel 16 is accessible for anyone with the equipment to pick up a VHF signal, including pirates who could render a vessel vulnerable once they are aware of its security detail. The cadet mentioned this to the master of the vessel who then made contact with MSCHOA to request that naval missions do not request such information via such a public forum.

Drawing expertise from crews is not a process that happens exclusively at sea and confined to the sociology of the vessel, nor is it a formally structured process. The experiences of both master mariners and P&I representatives reflects the dynamism of formal and informal structures of communication from sea to land. As one example of how seafarer knowledge is incorporated in developing best practices and developing the emergence of a broader security regime. This again characterizes ocean governance as a dynamic and rhythmic process that is in a constant state of development open to reorientation and new directions.

Captain Joshi, an experienced master mariner, states that there is enormous value in holding meetings with the crew prior to entering the HRA. Explaining that the rationale for this is not only based on educating them on their roles and responsibilities in transforming the vessel, but in “gathering ideas to feed back to the shipping company – of which his previous company [that he wishes not to be mentioned] offered incentives and competitions for innovative ideas.” The next stage in this chain of communication is supported by Timothy Howse, Vice President for Industry Liaison at Gard P&I Club. Howse explains that best practices as well as accidents are fed back to shipping companies and then to P&I Clubs based on their relevance to diminishing the liability of the shipowner in a particular event. He uses the example of a chef cutting their finger on a knife, where methods pertaining to safety of knife handling or storage may be sought through circulars that can then be fed back to other shipowners and safety can therefore develop based on collective knowledge and sharing of best practices. The same method of communication can be said for developing P&I expertise on the effectiveness of counter-piracy practices, whilst also considering how they relate to how safe they are for  crew to implement.

The value of gathering seafarer expertise pertaining to the operational aspect of maritime governance, especially in security governance, is evident in both the release of the latest edition of the Best Management Practices (BMP5) and the experiences of the two cadets and a second officer in late 2018. BMP5 was released in 2018, seven years following the release of BMP4, and where BMP4 is credited as the most successful version of the series due to the large decline in successful piratical hijackings in the period it covered. The release of BMP5 reflects a turning point in how the seafarer is reimagined in a post-piratical reconfiguration of governance. Firstly, the change in title to generally “Enhance Maritime Security” alongside  the deterrence of piracy signals a broader security remit. Secondly, the content of BMP5 includes a multitude of interwoven additional security measures to address additional risks such as that from “water borne improvised explosive devices (WBEID’s), sea mines and anti-ship missiles,” and within the practices that were developed for the purposes of counterpiracy.

These measures draw on the seafarer as a surveillance agent in capturing information of new measures that are emerging. In their consideration of new measures was the Houthi rebel threat off the coast of Yemen and the Bab al-Mandeb. This is evidenced through including explicit instruction in the reporting of suspicious behaviours to the UKMTO in annexes C&D. These annexes draw on the seafarers’ expertise in recognizing behaviors that are not necessarily normal seafaring practice and therefore allows shore-based actors to learn and respond to new threats that they may have not yet have identified based on a communication structure that has evolved beyond piracy. Thirdly, the language in BMP5 has purposely moved beyond piracy and focuses more on “attackers” and “potential attackers.” Supported by a senior executive at the International Group of P&I (IGP&I) Clubs, the vision for BMP5 is to develop to include broader threats and may evolve to include “cyber threats and migration,” amongst anything else that may become relevant. The purpose for seeking new areas to address is to seek a new purpose for the actors who have constructed the practices, many of which “have built livelihoods around the business of counter piracy,” and is evident in the experiences of seafarers who have performed BMP5.

Officer Wolckzo is a second officer who works onboard tramp vessels, and her role primarily surrounds the planning of the vessel’s passage. This involves deep engagement with navigational instruments and technologies. With little warning as to the determination of her route, engagement with BMP and the HRA can often come last minute. Whilst in transit in late 2018, she was navigating east from the south coast of Sri Lanka and had to rely on a “luckily” solid internet connection to download charts such as the Q6099 Maritime Security Chart depicting the HRA as well as engage with MARSAT to learn of the security environment they would be transiting. At the last minute her vessel took on a security team of four Greek PCASPs and underwent drills and training in performing BMP. Yet – in her experience, the performance of BMP was to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, to meet company and insurance requirements pertaining to protecting the vessel against piracy, but secondly, and practically, to protect the vessel against the use of “Houthi drone vessels in the Bab-Al-Mandeb.” This experience is mirrored by one of the two cadets previously discussed, who claimed that the performance of BMP for piracy seemed very monotonous and rehearsed, whereas the  threat of the “rebels and rockets” was perceived as far more of a threat based on the “sporadic and  indiscriminate nature” and is what motivated adherence to BMP on board his vessel.

Conclusion

In summary, the role of the seafarer in contributing to counter-piracy practice is evident in the gathering of specialized and technical expertise from the merchant vessel. The production of new documents, practices, and procedures that encompass a broader and open direction for managing security reflects that this aspect of maritime governance is rhythmic and dynamic, and where vessel-based knowledge is translated to shore and then translated back again in the form of prescribed best practices. The result of which is an evolution in the role of the seafarer based on the recognized value of their experience in the development of counter-piracy resources such as BMP. The seafarer is now considered both a surveillance agent in the identification of new practices whilst simultaneously retaining the role as an agent in the performance and transformation of a vessel in countering piracy. Based on this argument, the release of BMP6, whenever that may be, promises the inclusion of information and expertise gathered from seafarers. Drawing on the formal and informal platforms seafarers have encountered in the author’s research, this may be through engagement with the annexes C&D in BMP5, as well as informal and momentary engagements with shore-based actors to identify not only new threats, but novel methods of deterrence that will enhance ocean governance.

Jessica Simonds is a third-year International Studies PhD candidate at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland. She holds an M.A. in Violence, Terrorism and Security and a B.A. in International Politics and Conflict Studies. This work draws on original fieldwork for her PhD thesis as well as part of the concluding arguments regarding the reorientation of maritime security in the Indian Ocean and going beyond piracy. Previously accepted opportunities to present this fieldwork have included conferences with the British International Studies Association (BISA) workshop on the sea (2018), the European International Studies Association workshops and annual conference (2019) and the annual conference of the International Studies Association (2020 – cancelled).

Resources and References

Anon A (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (11 December 2018)

Anon B (2019) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (8 January 2019)

Anon C (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (28 September 2018)

BMP5. (2018). BMP5 – Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. (5th ed.). Edinburgh: Witherby Publishing Group.https://doi.org/https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Intercargo-Best-Management-Practices-to-Deter-Piracy-and-Enhance-Maritime-Security-in-the-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-Indian-Ocean-and-Arabian-Sea-2018_06.pdf

Benton, L. (2014). A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

Elden, S. (2013). The Birth of Territory (1st ed.). London: The University of Chicago Press.

Howse, T (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (24 September 2018)

Jones, S. (2013). Maritime Security Handbook: Coping With Piracy (1st ed.). London: The Nautical Institute.

Joshi, R (2019) Interviewed by Simonds J.K (4 February 2019)

Kendall-Marsden, S (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (24 September 2018)

Lefebvre, H. (2017). Rhythmanalysis : space, time, and everyday life. London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, An Imprint Of Bloomsbury Publishing Pic.

Lefebvre, H. and Nicholson-Smith, D. (2009). The production of space. Malden, Ma ; Oxford: Blackwell.

Roberts, N (2020) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (2 April 2020)

Ryan, B.J. (2015). Security spheres: A phenomenology of maritime spatial practices. Security Dialogue, 46(6), pp.568–584.

Steinberg, P., & Peters, K. (2015). Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(2), 247–264.

Wolckzo, M (2019) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (9 March 2019)

Featured Image: Maersk Londrina container ship (Wikimedia commons)

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Michael van Ginkel

Introduction

Sprawling archipelagos and limited government resources make comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) challenging in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. To improve their information gathering capabilities, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have invested in advanced geospatial data acquisition technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellites. Integrating the resulting datasets into existing databases for an aggregate analysis greatly enhances regional MDA. Incorporating geospatial information provides authorities with a deeper understanding of the Sulu and Celebes Seas’ physical environment and how maleficent actors like insurgent groups, human smugglers, and arms traffickers threaten security. These information assets assist law enforcement agencies in prioritizing the deployment of their limited maritime assets and are some of the more critical capabilities in the regional toolkit for ocean governance.

The Sulu and Celebes Seas

The Sulu and Celebes seas are an important geographical area within Southeast Asia. From an international perspective, a significant amount of all commerce traded between Australia and East Asia is shipped through the area. Locally, the seas form a tri-border area heavily used by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia for littoral trade. The biodiverse marine environment, combined with a significant reliance on fisheries production by littoral countries, also elevates the area’s importance. As pointed out in the Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas maritime security report, however, the complex political and geographic environment creates substantial difficulties for law enforcement agencies attempting to monitor the Sulu and Celebes Seas for maritime crime. Faced with kidnapping operations of armed militant groups like Abu Sayaff and illegal, unreported, and unregistered fishing violations by both local fishermen and foreign fishing companies, the three littoral countries have begun relying more on advanced geospatial technologies to enhance their maritime domain awareness. The multi-pronged approach to intelligence gathering allows for more informed responses to the wide range of maritime threats present in the region.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAVs offer a flexible and cost-effective method of gathering geospatial data. Flying at an altitude of around 400 feet creates high-resolution orthophotography and aerial mapping. Law enforcement agencies also find the UAVs’ ability to provide real-time information and track moving objects highly useful in dealing with dynamic security environments. The countries in this region began developing early versions of UAVs for maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in the early 2000s. Indonesia, for instance, began a government-funded program for UAV development in 2004 in order to monitor nontraditional threats like illegal, unregistered, and unreported fishing, as well as trafficking and smuggling.

As technological advances made it easier to access high-quality UAVs, demand rose accordingly. Most recently, the United States Department of Defense provided Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia with a total of 34 Insitu ScanEagle drones to improve their MDA. Their growing popularity is reflected in the global market for UAVs, which Acumen Research and Consulting estimates will achieve a worth of roughly $48.8 billion by 2026. Collecting geospatial data through UAVs has created the opportunity for agencies to expand surveillance coverage of specific areas of interest indicated in intelligence reporting. Increased geospatial surveillance of the Sulu archipelago, for instance, could corroborate reports of Abu Sayyaf insurgent activity on the islands before troops are mobilized for a ground search. 

Satellites 

Satellites provide comprehensive coverage of extensive areas on a consistent basis. Satellites have proven to be an asset through their ability to pierce cloud cover and provide regular region-wide updates across the complex terrain of the Sulu and Celebes Seas. The tropical climate and atmospheric conditions of the tri-border area make satellites all the more useful for regional geospatial data collection.

In September 2018, the Philippines signed an agreement for access to data from the NovaSAR-1 satellite. Equipped with a synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), the NovaSAR-1 can systematically identify vessels and aquaculture systems in Philippine waters. SAR datasets have increasingly been used to identify the location of ships based on their outline, which has proven advantageous in tracking vessels that have turned off their Automatic Identification System transponders. Similarly, Indonesia built its indigenous satellite capabilities through the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN). After collaboratively launching the LAPAN-A1 microsatellite with India, Indonesia created and launched the LAPAN-A2 and LAPAN-A3. The earth observation satellites expand the country’s MDA by incorporating AIS and providing video surveillance. The successful use of microsatellites in Indonesia convinced the government to invest in creating an orbital rocket with the capacity to launch a satellite into low Earth orbit by 2040.

Dataset Integration

Systems designed to integrate geospatial datasets into existing databanks allow experts to conduct a holistic analysis. Overlapping means of ship identification through a combination of AIS and low Earth orbit satellites like SAR provides a system of checks and balances. Merging geospatial data with non-sensor data like human and open-source intelligence means all available information can be comprehensively analyzed for threats. Algorithms tapping into artificial intelligence can then predict imminent illegal or illicit maritime activity by observing real-time data trends.

Algorithm parameters and situational context provided by human experts ensure the analysis is issue-specific and generates actionable results. Within the Sulu and Celebes region, for example, traditional migration patterns between Mindanao in the Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia can confound AI attempts to reliably identify human trafficking and drug smuggling without human guidance.

Conclusion

Innovative means of collecting geospatial datasets allow maritime law enforcement agencies to more comprehensively monitor the maritime domain. When integrated with non-sensor forms of intelligence, geospatial information obtained by UAVs and radar can greatly expand regional coverage. The resulting data analysis conducted through artificial intelligence and system experts then informs governments on illicit and illegal activity. Within the Sulu and Celebes seas, geospatial coverage has reduced the strain placed on limited maritime resources. The bird’s-eye view of open waters, archipelagos, and coastlines means Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines can appropriately allocate law enforcement assets to best counter illicit activity. Given the complex security environment of the Sulu and Celebes seas, the ability to make decisions based on reliable intelligence will significantly impact the success rate of law enforcement operations. 

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Bem Ibrahim Garba 

Introduction

The world’s oceans occupy over 70 percent of the earth’s surface, playing a significant role in the support of the socio-economic growth and development of nations. These oceans provide a source of livelihood for many people through fishing, shipping and logistics, exploration of hydrocarbons and petroleum resources, exploitation of mineral resources, as well as leisure.

For some time now, these repositories of valuable natural resources have endured great degradation due to man’s activities.  In order to continuously utilize and benefit from them now and in the future, the oceans need to be efficiently managed and sustained with guidelines and policies for effective governance.

This implies that ocean governance is not only obligatory but also compulsory on nations that are contiguous to the oceans and other major water bodies around the world. 

Ocean Governance

Ocean governance refers to actionable policies, strategies and activities embarked upon by governments and non-governmental agencies for influencing and managing the affairs of the world’s oceans. The world’s ocean systems are complex, as such matters concerning ocean governance are multi-pronged and multi-faceted. The challenges associated with climate change, green-house pollution, biodiversity loss, offshore extraction, and overfishing also continue to be a burden, posing various kinds of threat to marine life and humankind as well.  

These challenges are too complex to be tackled by a single group, region, or nation-state, hence keeping the world’s oceans healthy and safe requires a broad coalition of actors coming together under international guidelines and protocols. This becomes even more imperative as the global population is estimated to hit 10 billion by 2050 and 11 billion by the year 2100.

Governance in general involves interactions between formal institutions, civil society groups and organizations within areas of interest (sometimes geographic) aimed at exercising authority and influence, which leads to the enactment of policies and decisions, in the management of the economic and social resources of an area.

Ocean governance involves making sure that those who operate and trade on the oceans do so with safe and reasonable caution. They need to be guided by the requisite laws and order. As an example, in line with its Global Strategy and specific regional policies for the Gulf of Guinea, the European Union plays a key role as a global maritime security provider. It has mobilized resources to protect the region against maritime threats like piracy and human trafficking, reduced maritime accidents, and prevented environmental disasters. Satellite data from its Copernicus programme have been used by the European Maritime Safety Agency for international search-and-rescue operations at the request of the UN.

Since the inception of seaborne trade, ocean coastlines have been valuable gateways for global trade, however today, with ongoing pollution, human degradation, piracy, armed banditry, kidnapping of seafarers and illegal bunkering on the seas on the rise, there is a noteworthy decline in the economic value derived from seaborne trade within areas that border oceans notorious for criminality at sea.

Some of the threats to life and assets at sea include terrorism, vandalization, robberies, piracy, gun running, bunkering, and other acts of economic sabotage, stealing, pollution (from oil spillage), war and civil unrest, etc. These acts of criminality are especially common on the African coastline known as the Gulf of Guinea. 

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG)

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) represents the continental coastline that borders the Atlantic Ocean and is more than 6,000 kilometers in length. This coastline spans the border of Africa from Central and West Africa, and borders more than a dozen countries.

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) provides an economic theater to both coastal and landlocked African countries and is of strategic importance to the global business community and international shipping. The safe passage of goods and services to ports in this region, plus the required security within its waters is a critical factor to global energy production and transportation. This is more so as Nigeria and Angola, two countries within this zone, are amongst the world’s top ten crude oil exporters.

The Gulf of Guinea is also important to West Africa’s fishing industry, as it provides employment and a means of sustenance for a large percentage of the indigenous population. It offers vast mineral resources and commercially valuable marine life, as well as providing strategic maritime transport routes for international shipping. Its natural resources are integral to global trade networks. This justifies the need for maritime security and safety at all times.

The socio-economic and political environment within this area has changed over the years. Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has taken a different dimension. Piracy and other criminal activities have been on the rise, and constitutes a serious threat to life and commercial activity within the area.

Within Nigeria’s Niger Delta, there has been a spike in maritime piracy, armed robbery, and youth militancy. In 2007, over 100 attacks against shipping vessels were recorded. A study by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2013 identified the threats in the Gulf as acts of violence at sea, organized transnational crime, trafficking in drugs and illegal substances, illegal and unrecorded fishing, and other ecological risks. The report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) records the Gulf of Guinea as the most dangerous sea in 2016.

The IMB also reported that in 2017 the Gulf of Guinea had the highest number of reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the world. It was noted in the same report that 102 crew members were kidnapped in 2018, compared to 63 kidnap incidents in 2017.

However, it is worthy to note that piracy is not the only cause of maritime instability and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Other challenges related to weak governance include organized crime such as illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and corruption. The region is known as a major transit corridor for drug trafficking from South America to Europe and other parts of the world.

Close analysis suggests that weak ocean governance is the major factor enabling insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Other factors would include poverty within coastal communities, corruption of government officials, growing unemployment, youth militancy, terrorism, and the lure of quick money provided by criminal enterprise.

Healthy global trade demands a concerted global effort to combat criminal activities and the racketeering that have become synonymous with this region. To create a safer more secure economic region, there must be adequate information, human capacity development, the development and transfer of technical knowledge, sound and practical institutional policies and technological resources to manage the adverse human impact and natural hazards inherent within this marine environment and its ecosystem. This is impossible without integrated governance and a trans-regional ocean policy that will balance the use of this coastline with the sustainable development of its abundant resources.

Rising up to this challenge, many maritime organizations, especially the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have followed the security issues in the Gulf of Guinea for many years with a strong commitment to understanding and resolving the underlying challenges. This started after an appeal was made to the United Nations by the then-President of Benin Republic Thomas Boni Yayi for assistance in combating crimes in the region. In response to this, amongst many other pleas from other stakeholders, the UN Security Council in February 2012 came up with Resolution 2039 which urged states within the region to develop counter-piracy policies at regional and national levels.

Bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) also convened joint meetings and strategic sessions to draft regional strategies. Documents drafted at the above meetings were endorsed at a summit of heads of states and governments of Central and West Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in June 2013.

2015 saw the creation of the Inter-regional Coordination Center (ICC) under the auspices of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Many other bodies have also been created to deal with the issue of insecurity and facilitate development in the area. These bodies include CRESMAO in 2014 and CRESMAC in 2015, under ECOWAS.

On the global scene, the UN Security Council Resolution 2039 invited international partners to provide support for regional efforts and bilateral relations and partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea. Developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Spain are to be part of the bilateral partnerships. The EU has also released its strategy for the Gulf of Guinea, and INTERPOL and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have included Gulf of Guinea piracy in their analyses and reports concerning organized crime in West and Central Africa.

This international attention acknowledges that maritime insecurity in West Africa, like Somali piracy, exists as a component of transnational crime and can have an impact far beyond the immediate region.

The IMO Council, in its Resolution 1069 of 2003, resolved to monitor the situation in relation to acts and attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, illicit maritime activity, and threats to ships sailing in the Gulf of Guinea. The council resolved to initiate any actions which it may deem necessary, including coordinating the work of competent committees of the organization to ensure the protection of seafarers and ships sailing in those waters and to ensure appropriate cooperation with other organizations and entities tasked with relevant activities.

Notwithstanding the efforts listed above, piracy and armed banditry still remain a critical challenge in the Gulf of Guinea, and this challenge continues to rise. Many factors have been adduced for the inability of these regional bodies to eliminate the incessant insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. One of the key factors listed include the structure of the regional bodies responsible for this work. Most of them have duplicated functions and are poorly coordinated.

Another factor is the competition for scarce resources (mostly financial) by regional heads, organizations, committees, and donor bodies. This implies that most of these organizations are unable to operate efficiently, making them ineffective in tackling and combating criminal activity within the region.

There is no verifiable record of any criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within this region, hence the absence of any legal deterrents. This has, in turn, further led to an international outcry among the littoral states and maritime operators for increased surveillance, better restructuring, and greater funding for the management of the Gulf of Guinea.

To develop a workable blueprint for the sustainable development of renewable and non-renewable resources within the region, the conservation and protection of this marine domain, and to address the interrelated problems of the ocean space as a whole, there are key questions and challenges that are likely to confront the policymakers responsible for ocean governance.

When viewed holistically, there are four major areas or perspectives that ocean governance needs to be addressed from. They include environmental problems and population pressures; institutional responses to these problems and pressures; modern technology; and the adoption of the principles of responsible governance. A combination of these environmental, institutional, technological, and societal perspectives will have a significant bearing on ocean governance and, by extension, on the security and development of the Gulf of Guinea. 

Major Environmental Problems

Perhaps the most significant pressures on the marine environment over the coming decades will be exerted by the ever-increasing human population. This is currently at around 7.5 billion and is estimated to reach 11 billion by 2100.

Significant reforms and adjustments are needed if humanity will be guided away from the present yet obsolete socio-economic systems, while entering into a future blue economy that is directed and guided by sustainable ecological principles.

As millions of people live in and around coastal cities and islands, the ability to recognize the threats and benefits of the ocean in relation to economic and public health issues will become a major imperative for marine environmental protection. In order to achieve this, studies in nautical sciences, oceanography, ocean technology, navigation, and fishery technology (all interrelated), will be needed for the effective practice of ocean governance of the Gulf of Guinea and its coastal communities. 

Institutional Arrangements and Principles

In order to achieve the far-reaching security for people and cargo within the Gulf of Guinea and along its coasts, the governments of stakeholder states need to develop and adopt a grand security architecture in their approach to ocean governance. This will require inter-sectoral cooperation amongst the governing bodies.

Modern management principles and an integrated governance framework will be needed to improve enforcement and compliance in this ecological belt. Responsible ocean governance goes beyond legal and institutional arrangements and policies, even though these remain fundamental and key determinants. Other key factors worthy of consideration would include ethics and shared values; the use of the best scientific knowledge, shared information from indigenous knowledge systems; human capacity development; enhanced public awareness systems; technological advancements and innovation. All these are essential to enhancing cooperation amongst the stakeholders in order to strengthen institutional arrangements for ocean governance and to broaden participation amongst governing institutions at all levels in the Gulf region. 

Technological Challenges and Opportunities

The use of science and technology is increasing within many maritime domains. Some of the areas that have seen these developments include improved internet connectivity, marine information forecasts, transport efficiency, navigation, ocean floor profiling, and marine resource exploitation capabilities.

These developments in technology offer great opportunities for capacity development and wealth creation in the sector. In the future, access to cost-effective, timely data will be critical to enhancing ocean governance within the Gulf of Guinea. Information gathering and sharing via geospatial data systems and infrastructures will be essential for maritime domain awareness, observation, reporting, and more detailed exploration of the ocean’s floor. This will ensure the safety and security of marine operators while at the same time improving the management of commercial fishing practices.

Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance and Maritime Safety in the Gulf of Guinea

To achieve the above, institutional frameworks built on a multi-layered approach are required.

African nations within the littoral and landlocked zones of the Gulf of Guinea need to be more committed to formulating strategic maritime policies that engage with key ocean players to build bilateral partnerships. There is a need for an integrated fisheries management policy at the regional level through Regional Conventions and Fisheries Management Boards (RFMBs). This will improve regional ocean fishery regulation.

Finally, there is a need to build the capacity of partner states and organizations to monitor the oceans, conserve marine biodiversity and eliminate illegal, underreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. 

National governments can, through determined political will, take up the mantle of leadership needed to formulate national policies and regulations for their respective states. The regional bodies, on their part, can integrate the policies developed by individual states and fashion them into actionable goals to be achieved within specific time periods. At the global level, international agreements and protocols can be strengthened and implemented with support and advocacy from the diverse coastal communities.

All the above, if well-coordinated, will draw support from the coastal communities. Through social networking, capacity-building, and effective communication, coastal communities will lead the effort and support participatory governance. This will promote shared values and enhance the rule of law.

The Future of the Gulf of Guinea 

Looking into the future, the European Commission, in 2019, established the International Ocean Governance Stakeholders Forum which brought together maritime experts, civil society representatives, academics, and policymakers dedicated to ocean and maritime issues worldwide.

Their terms of reference were to establish new protocols, discuss current challenges that hinder international ocean governance, and recommend future actions to resolve them. African nations dotting the Gulf of Guinea need to borrow from this effort. They need to become more proactive, transcending from being ordinary policy formulators, to implementors of agreed-upon goals for the development of oceans and coastlines in Africa.

Addressing the Gulf of Guinea’s challenges is a significant task, while ocean governance is a daunting issue which demands an interdisciplinary approach and innovative solutions. It remains a known fact that this maritime domain has a community of likeminded peoples with the passion and commitment to tackle these challenges. Their reasons are very simple. The economic and historic importance of the area is beyond reproach.

Much can be achieved through the collective efforts of these coastal communities when they come together as progressive stakeholders for the governance of the Gulf of Guinea. Effective ocean governance within the Gulf of Guinea will require their collective identification of common goals and the implementation of collectively agreed upon effective strategies for managing the region. These must all be built on enduring institutional structures.

It is by doing this, and by carrying out the shared recommendations, that the laudable objective of ocean governance and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea will be achieved.

Bem is the Chief Executive Officer of GOG Marine Limited, a shipowner and management company established to provide high quality product shipping services to end users doing business within the West African sub-region. From 2011 to 2017, Bem through his company BNTI Limited, was actively involved in defense equipment manufacturing projects (through strategic relationships) in India, South America, Europe and the U.S. For many years, he provided technical support and services to Nigerian law enforcement and military end users, supplying them with various hardware requirements. Bem is currently a Certified Management Consultant (CMC), and a Fellow of the Institute of Management Consultants (FIMC).

Featured Image: LIBREVILLE, Gabon (March 21, 2018) Participating African forces and international partners attend the exercise Obangame Express 2018 opening ceremony in Libreville, Gabon, March 21, 2018. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Justin Stumberg)

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Dr. Ian Ralby, I.R. Consilium; Lt. Col. Michael Jones, The Caribbean Community’s Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS); and Capt. (N) Errington Shurland (ret.), Regional Security System (RSS)

While life on land for most people has been unusually sedentary in 2020 with significant travel restrictions and stay-at-home orders, the maritime space has remained remarkably active. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic the Caribbean’s maritime domain has garnered widespread attention on three fronts: cruise ships stuck at sea, both with Covid-19 patients onboard and crew unable to be disembarked; a major increase in U.S. naval presence focused on countering narcotics trafficking, particularly via semi-submersible vessels; and shipments of sanctioned fuel and goods from Iran to Venezuela.

Though the region is being pulled into these issues to some degree, all three of these matters are primarily of an international nature. In examining the issues that are not merely occurring in the Caribbean but are of direct concern to the security, governance, and development of the region, the pandemic provides an opportunity for taking new approaches. By compiling comparative data from before and during the pandemic using maritime domain awareness technology and working collaboratively between states, regional bodies, and independent experts, we can bring to light previously overlooked activities and new criminal trends in the region. This new insight provides vital leads on how to reinvigorate maritime security and ensure that the waters of the Caribbean—among the most economically valuable in the world—are governed by states and not transnational criminal networks.

Caribbean Maritime Activity During the Pandemic

Between March and July 2020, the Caribbean saw an unprecedented decline in travel owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. In terms of air travel, over those four months the member countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) saw only 4.7 percent of the arrivals and 9 percent of the departures they had seen the four months prior to the declaration of the pandemic.[4] Given such a dramatic drop in travel and tourism, combined with the well-publicized issues surrounding the health security of cruise ships, it would make some sense if the Caribbean also saw a dramatic decrease in maritime activity between mid-March and mid-July. Indeed, records indicate that from March to July 2020, the region saw 48 percent of the port arrivals of the November 2019-March 2020 timeframe.[5] Given this decrease in maritime activity, it would stand to reason that there was a comparable decrease in illicit maritime activity as well. That, however, does not appear to be the case.  

Traditional Metrics

Even by traditional metrics of quantities seized, the decline in criminal activity between March and July 2020 did not parallel the decline in port calls. In that period since the onset of the pandemic, the region seized roughly 60 percent the amount of cocaine, marijuana, and illegal migrants that it did between November 2019 and March 2020.[6]  Importantly, since early April, the increased presence of the United States Navy and Coast Guard in the region has accounted for more than $1 billion in drug seizures, potentially skewing the seizure figures for the regional states as well. The region, however, has not seen the sort of decline in traditional criminal activities that might be expected under the circumstances. In fact, there were 27 recorded incidents of maritime interdictions between March 12 and July 8, 2020, versus 23 in the longer period between 1 November 2019 and 11 March 2020.[7]  Furthermore, seizures in the last few months of birds, goats, cash, and fuel (for some examples), indicate the diversity of smuggling operations running through the Caribbean. Economic hardship may in fact be a growing driver for illicit activity. But these recorded figures are not the only means by which to determine whether criminality has declined in parallel with legitimate maritime activity.

New Approaches

Using Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, a variety of other datasets, augmented intelligence, and machine learning, increasingly advanced maritime domain awareness (MDA) technology can help examine different maritime activities to identify anomalies and instances of suspicious behavior. Whereas maritime law enforcement in the Caribbean has traditionally focused on small vessels—go-fast speedboats, fishing vessels, and pleasure craft that are generally too small to use AIS—high-volume drug interdictions in other regions in the Caribbean have indicated that traffickers are increasingly using larger vessels for larger drug shipments. By using MDA technology that allows for queries on different activities, a variety of indicators can help shine a light on what has been transpiring in the region during the pandemic and in the time leading up to it.

Focusing on a few factors of potentially suspicious activity can help indicate whether the maritime space of the Caribbean has seen any significant change since travel restrictions began in March 2020. By honing in on vessels that either can be deemed “high risk” or “significant risk” based on algorithmic analysis of their movements, or that have corporate ownership and management structures that exhibit risk patterns, analysts can quickly concentrate on vessels that, based on their activities, are likely to have engaged in or currently are engaged in illicit behavior. Focusing on such vessels, and comparing incidents of dark activity, including drifting, sailing below three knots, changes in Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, meetings, and course deviations, helps paint a relative picture over time.

Each of these factors is tied to known criminal activities at sea. Dark activity, which is not limited merely to AIS signal loss, but intentionally turning off the AIS transponder, is prohibited under Chapter V of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. There are some circumstances, even in the Caribbean, where as long as this was logged by the master of the vessel, such activity could be deemed acceptable for the safety of the vessel. But it often is an indicator of illicit activity.

Ships that intend to engage in illicit activity—like meeting with another vessel to embark drugs, transship illegally-caught fish or violate sanctions—may turn off their AIS transponder to help obscure that behavior. Similarly, drifting and sailing below three nautical miles per hour are uneconomic behaviors for ships engaged in legitimate maritime commerce. While these indicators are not in and of themselves indicative of anything specific, they can suggest a vessel may not be acting legally, particularly if there are other risk factors present. Sailing below three knots may also be an indicator of either dropping off or seeking to pick up packages, often drugs, left in the water for collection. There may even be several days between the dropoff and pickup.

MMSI changes can be routine, but particularly when paired with other activities, can also indicate attempts to obscure either past or future activities. Furthermore, they can indicate changes in ownership and control of a vessel, and when such a change also includes a change in flag, there may be cause for concern as to the intentions of the new owners. Meetings could involve anything from bunkering or legitimate resupplying, to key transfers in a criminal supply chain. And finally, odd course deviations may also be indicators of uneconomic behavior that is tied to illegitimate activities—such as looking for geolocated drug packages left on the water for collection.

In looking at the Caribbean, the above chart—which excludes tankers on account of their unusual challenges caused by the decline in the global oil market—is quite telling as to changes in suspicious activity during the pandemic. Using the same periods from the traditional analysis mentioned earlier (November 1, 2019 to March 11, 2020 and March 12 to July 8, 2020), both from 2019 into 2020 and from 2018 into 2019, shows that there is not a significant decrease in suspicious behavior during the pandemic.

On the contrary, there is actually an increase in dark activity, including drifting, sailing below three nautical miles, MMSI changes, and course deviations in comparison to the same periods in 2019. The only decreases were a slight drop in the number of vessels and a significant decline in the activity in which no one is supposed to engage in during a pandemic: meetings. Compared to the four months prior to the onset of Covid-19 restrictions, there were actually more dark activities and slow sailings during the pandemic than there were before.

Comparing the pandemic period to the period immediately prior is most instructive when considering the traditional datasets above. If the volume of legitimate maritime activity dropped by more than 50 percent and the volume of movement by air dropped more than 90 percent, it would seem that the volume of suspicious maritime activities should have dropped a significant amount as well. Instead, the pandemic saw a 38 percent decrease in the total number of suspicious vessels, a 26 percent increase in dark activity, a 77 percent decrease in drifting, an 18 percent increase in sailing below three nautical miles per hour, a 50 percent decrease in MMSI changes, an 88 percent decrease in meetings, and a 39 percent decrease in course deviations compared to the period from November 1, 2019 to March 11, 2020.

One convenient narrative to explain the increase could involve more ships being stuck at sea, but only if drifting rather than dark activity had risen. While this data is not conclusive, it does indicate that suspicious maritime activity does not operate in correlation with changes in legitimate maritime commerce. As has been noted regarding drug flows, “criminals don’t waste a good crisis,” meaning that maritime criminality is relatively unimpeded by the restrictions that have curtailed legal activities during the pandemic, and criminals may actually be taking advantage of the new status quo. This is new insight and new visibility for the region and digging deeper exposes a number of trends.

Vessel Families

While there has been a push in recent years for maritime interdictions to trigger financial investigations in the Caribbean, perhaps more attention needs to be paid to vessel ownership investigations, either at the national or at the regional levels. If a vessel is arrested either within the region or after having been through the region with drugs onboard, it is possible the vessel’s owners and operators may have been involved. Therefore, one approach to identifying suspicious vessels deserving of scrutiny is to examine any sibling and related vessels, including vessels of associated companies. Doing so in the Caribbean would require the identification of a list of vessels of interest whose activities immediately raise suspicion.

Reverse Routes

The news has been full of stories about Iranian vessels heading for Venezuela, especially owing to international sanctions. However, in examining the movement of vessels leaving the Caribbean after engaging in suspicious activity, some actually proceed onward to sanctioned countries.[8] At the same time, new routes are emerging, bringing drugs and other contraband from other parts of the world to the Caribbean. This deserves significant attention from the region.

Unexpected Vessels

A traditional narrative that has been contradicted is the notion that illicit goods are moved only in certain types of vessels. The 2019 arrest of the M/V NIKA in Indonesia should serve as a cautionary tale. The NIKA is a cargo vessel that was engaged in illegal fishing, operating almost invisibly on account of its vessel type. No law enforcement agency was looking for cargo vessels conducting illegal fishing. Similarly, for the Caribbean, only searching for container ships may obscure possible suspicious patterns of activity which are also being exhibited by cement carriers, livestock carriers, or reefers which may be engaging in smuggling and trafficking.

Next Steps

The pandemic has forced a revision of how Caribbean entities approach their analysis of illicit maritime activity. The present collaboration has allowed for increased insight into suspicious activities in the region that have otherwise gone unnoticed. The question, however, is how does the region act on this insight? The Regional Security System (RSS) —a sub-regional treaty-based security cooperation organization comprising seven states (all of which are also CARICOM member states)—is able to use a mixture of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, small boats, and patrol vessels to monitor and interdict maritime crime. But even with these capabilities and extensive cooperation among the states, identifying these trends in such a way as to analyze and respond to them quickly enough to prompt on-the-water interdictions will be a challenge. Furthermore, the current concept of operations in the RSS and those of CARICOM member states are based on traditional understandings of trafficking routes and criminal modalities. As new insights enter the picture, new approaches need to be considered—both in terms of how to maintain such enhanced maritime domain awareness and in terms of how to respond to it.

What has become clear is that even while much of the world has been stuck at home during the pandemic, criminals have continued to operate in the maritime space of the Caribbean with virtually no detectable decline in overall activity. Just as criminals continue to adapt and innovate amid changing circumstances, so too must law enforcement. Since the pandemic has destroyed the familiar status quo, the states and regional entities of the Caribbean need to proactively reevaluate the range of assets and approaches that can be deployed to identify, understand, and effectively disrupt maritime criminal activity.

To keep pace with and ultimately get ahead of the criminals, CARICOM member states will need to explore a range of tools for addressing the full spectrum of illicit maritime activities. This includes using new technology such as maritime domain awareness platforms, enhancing operational cooperation through CARICOM IMPACS and the RSS, and both adopting and implementing legal instruments such as the Treaty of San José. While the pandemic has curtailed and thwarted many good things around the world, it somewhat ironically has helped catalyze this process in the Caribbean.

Dr. Ian Ralby is a recognized expert in maritime law and security and serves as CEO of I.R. Consilium. He has worked on maritime security issues around the world, and has spent considerable time focused on and was previously based in the Caribbean. He spent four years as Adjunct Professor of Maritime Law and Security at the United States Department of Defense’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and three years as a Maritime Crime Expert for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. I.R. Consilium is a family firm that specializes in maritime and resource security and focuses on problem-solving around the world. I.R. Consilium has extensive experience in the Caribbean, having worked in the region for almost a decade. Dr. David Soud and Rohini Ralby of I.R. Consilium also contributed to this article.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jones is the Executive Director (Ag) of the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). He has an extensive career in project management and has been leading a number of border security initiatives since starting at the agency in 2011. He has also been a part-time lecturer in information systems and computer applications at the University of the West Indies, Cavehill. He has a Master’s in project management and evaluation from the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, and a Master’s of research, University of Liverpool. CARICOM IMPACS is the legal entity within the Caribbean Community, with direct responsibility for research, monitoring and evaluation, analysis and preparation of background documents and reports, as well as project development and implementation of the Caribbean regional crime and security agenda. Tonya Ayow, Callixtus Joseph, and Chesley Olliverre of CARICOM IMPACS also contributed to this article.

Captain (N) Errington Ricardo Shurland (ret.) is the Executive Director of the Regional Security System (RSS). Prior to this, he served in the Barbados Defence Force for 33 years. He served in several operational and administrative posts, including as an advisor to the Barbados delegations, and negotiating the Maritime Boundaries and Fisheries Agreements with Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. He holds a Master’s degree in Maritime Administration from the World Maritime University in Malmo, Sweden. The Regional Security System (RSS) is a seven-country, treaty-based cooperative security mechanism that focuses on maritime, air, and land security across its member states. Rolerick Sobers and Jeffery Forde of the RSS also contributed to this article.

Endnotes

[1] I.R. Consilium is a family firm that specializes in maritime and resource security and focuses on problem solving around the world. I.R. Consilium has extensive experience in the Caribbean, having worked in the region for almost a decade.

[2] CARICOM IMPACS is the legal entity within the Caribbean Community, with direct responsibility for research, monitoring and evaluation, analysis and preparation of background documents and reports, as well as project development and implementation of the Caribbean regional Crime and Security agenda.

[3] The Regional Security System is a treaty-based seven country cooperative security mechanism that focuses on maritime, air and land security across its member states.

[4] Data compiled by the Joint Regional Communications Center of CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS).

[5] Data compiled by the Joint Regional Communications Center of CARICOM IMPACS.

[6] Data compiled by the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center of CARICOM IMPACS.

[7] Data compiled by the Regional Intelligence Fusion Center of CARICOM IMPACS.

[8] Information gleaned from tracking vessels on Windward.

Featured Image: The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Heriberto Hernandez (WPC-1114) offloaded 55 bales of cocaine weighing 1,375 kilograms at Sector San Juan July 22, 2020. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Ricardo Castrodad)