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Illegal Fishing in the South Pacific: What Can the Chilean Navy Do?

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By Francisco Martinez

The Chilean Navy is more than just a national warfighting force aimed at conventional deterrence. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, fires, and tsunamis are all examples of natural disasters that Chile faces in which the Navy is one of the first to provide support. Along with disaster relief and safeguarding life at sea, countering Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is one of the most economically important duties of the Chilean Navy. IUU fishing is not only a matter of protecting the economy, but it is also a matter of the sustainability of natural resources in the Chilean Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). To tackle IUU, Chile requires creativity, and resourcefulness. The key to accomplishing the task, like for many small- to medium-sized navies, is regional cooperation.   

 A 21st Century Chilean Navy

The current Chilean Navy motto — “Vencer o morir,” translated “to vanquish or die” — seems like a heroic and forged-in-war motto, fit for a Navy that has existed for over 200 years. The Chilean Navy saw its roots in the independence wars against the Spanish Empire in the early 18th century and has been ready to stand up to protect the country ever since.

This motto seems to highlight a conventional navy, focused solely on warfighting. However, in the 21st century, small- to medium-sized navies must be able to adapt to survive. Constrained budgets, peaceful geographic neighborhoods, and a need for resources elsewhere in the country — like hospitals, schools, or fighting the current pandemic — are the main threats facing navies like Chile’s today. 

Located in the southernmost part of the South American continent, Chile’s reality is complicated. With an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 1,063,741 square nautical miles, Chile has the world’s 10th largest sea area. Its primary ocean frontiers are the Pacific and Antarctic Oceans. Its search and rescue area of responsibility is roughly a quarter of the Pacific Ocean (7,726,163 nm2). And with this enormous area of responsibility, there are also myriad unconventional threats . Some of these include IUU fishing, drugs and person trafficking, sea pollution, natural disasters, and protecting the Antarctic environment.

Chile is also a maritime state. More than 95 percent of its exports and 90 percent of its imports come and go through the sea. Chile is a signatory of the Antarctic treaty, which comprises significant responsibilities like safeguarding life at sea in that area, and takes special precautions enforcing the Antarctic system to protect natural resources and the environment.

As a door to the Antarctic, Chile’s position in the southernmost part of the world makes it a natural bridge to launch expeditions (tourist, research, or supplying Antarctic bases) and serves as a logistical platform for search and rescue operations. It is in Punta Arenas where ships from different parts of South America, like Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay, establish their main supply port before starting their Antarctic patrols to resupply their bases.

To tackle the threats and responsibilities described, the White Book of Defense 2017 shifted the tasks assigned to the Navy to a more non-traditional military role, like humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. It also states the importance of conserving the ocean and its resources, keeping the Chilean oceanic territory safe and lines of communication open, to interact and cooperate with other countries that share a common interest to protect natural resources, and to increase the governance of ports and secure their logistics.

It should not be surprising that the number of assets required to accomplish all these tasks and keep patrolling the seas is far more than the eight blue-water warships, four offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), and eight Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) the Chilean Navy has today.

The Threat of Distant Waters Fishing ships and IUU Fishing

The importance of fishing is made clear by the enormous fleet built by China. In the last few years, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reported that China owns roughly 17,000 distant waters fishing (DWF) boats, becoming the largest fleet in the world (ODI defines DWF as vessels in fishing activities outside a nation’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone). As early as this month, Ecuador announced that more than 300 fishing ships were operating close to its EEZ near Galapagos Island. In 2016, an Argentinian Coast Guard ship sank a Chinese fishing vessel, the Lu Yan Yuan Yu, which was believed to be part of a bigger fleet fishing in Argentinian’s EEZ. 

As Claude Berube reminded us on CIMSEC, navies and policymakers must be aware of the numbers. The People’s Republic of China owns 30 percent of fishing fleets and 20 percent of the fish is caught illegally. In Chile, the numbers paint a bleak future. $300 million worth of IUU fish were believed to be caught in the Chilean EEZ during 2017. IUU fishing is not only a threat to the economy, but it is also depleting the oceans. In the long run, it is a major threat to the sustainability of the maritime commons. In this vein, how can the Chilean Navy patrol its enormous ocean area of responsibility with a limited number of assets?

Pacific Ocean (Aug. 26, 2006) A Chilean Naval Coast Guard’s Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS) team conducts training aboard the Chilean M-class frigate Blanco Encalada (FF 15), during exercise PANAMAX 2006. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Christopher Perez)

The answer is ingenuity. Unlike other countries that separate the duties of conventional warfighting from those of policing the seas, e.g., the United States or Argentina, Chile has a single agency (the Navy) to patrol and enforce the law at sea, with the Chilean Naval Coast Guard subsumed under the Navy. Whenever naval ships sail or aircraft fly, they patrol Chile’s ocean territory to defend against both military and criminal threats.

The threats of distant waters fishing fleets and tight budgets are combining to push Chile and other like-minded regional navies to cooperate and share the burden. International exercises that emulate real-world challenges are a clear example of international cooperation in South America. Panamax, an exercise that focuses on security and stability in the Panama Canal, comprises 20 nations’ participation, including Chile, Peru, and the U.S. Other exercises include Teamwork South and Unitas. In both, more than five nationalities are represented. RIMPAC is another example of Chilean international presence through exercises. In 2018 Chile commanded the exercise’s maritime component, showing to the rest of the participants that the Chilean Navy is ready to assume more significant and complex challenges.

What Else Can Be Done?

It is difficult to overstate the Chilean Navy’s need for additional resources and better options to accomplish fuller patrolling of its oceans while keeping warfighting capabilities to deter possible adversaries. Crews onboard warships would prefer to exercise more warfighting capabilities and do more live firings, for example, than patrolling the EEZ. However, the Navy has to double its efforts to do more of both with limited assets.

As mentioned earlier, combined patrols seem to be one option to share the burden. In the Antarctic, Chile and Argentina currently run the Antarctic Combined Naval Patrol to safeguard life at sea while rationing assets. But this patrol is a short-term answer. As a more sustainable solution, Chile started building its Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) to cover long distances of the EEZ, but even with these platforms much more could be done.

A second option, offered by Claude Berube, could be to hire NGOs like Sea Shepherd and embark government personnel to enforce the law at sea at a relatively small cost (since NGOs use volunteers to man the ships). Another option, given by Peter Roberts from the Royal United Services Institute, could be joint efforts with private companies to increase Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). For example, nowadays and amid the pandemic, there is a surplus of commercial aircraft that could be used to patrol the EEZ instead of the navy’s P3Cs. Commercial aircraft are not expensive to hire and would be available whenever the navy’s MPA needs to attend to maintenance or warfighting exercises.

Intelligence fusion centers are an excellent third option to help stop IUU. The significance of MDA is invaluable when it comes to sending ships or MPA to investigate possible criminal activities at sea. In the Chilean case, a national task force must be stood up before seeking to expand its reach via neighboring liaison officers. With the data gathered and processed in the fusion center, whether using satellite images or other agencies’ databases, Chile can more efficiently deploy assets to investigate IUU fishing instead of sending MPA without any leads.

Conclusion

Of the three options given, the first two seem cost-effective for small-to-medium navies, but may not be feasible in the eyes of the public opinion. If the Navy outsources patrolling the seas, then why does Chile need a navy in the first place? And with this way of thinking, resources could be allocated to other areas of the national budget. The last option, the IFC, seems a sustainable option that would do well for countering IUU fishing while strengthening bonds with like-minded countries. At first, this international effort could start by sharing only information, and as trust grows, it could go as far as patrolling the EEZ together with combined assets.

IUU fishing is a threat that no coastal country is free from. The numbers of long-range fishing fleets are growing, and natural resources are at risk of being depleted. However, the Chilean Navy must be prepared for the threat coming to its waters. International cooperation is critical to regional navies in South America, but it must start with us. Small- to medium-sized navies must act together to prevail.

Francisco Martinez is a Lieutenant Commander in the Chilean Navy. He holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University and is currently stationed at Chile’s Naval Polytechnic Academy. The views expressed are his and not necessarily those of the Chilean Academy or the Chilean Navy.

References

Berube, C. (2020, July 21). Stand Up A Joint Interagency Task Force to Fight Illegal Fishing. Center for International Maritime Security. https://cimsec.org/stand-up-a-joint-interagency-task-force-to-fight-illegal-fishing/44708

Chapter Eight: Latin America and the Caribbean. (2020). The Military Balance, 120(1), 388–443. https://doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2020.1707970

Crowley, E. (2018). La pesca ilegal en Chile, un problema más allá de nuestras fronteras. Aqua. https://www.aqua.cl/columnas/la-pesca-ilegal-chile-problema-mas-alla-nuestras-fronteras/

Defensa, M. de. (2017). Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile 2017—Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (MDN). https://www.defensa.cl/temas-de-estado/libro-de-la-defensa-nacional-de-chile-2017/

Gutierrez, M., Daniels, A., Jobbins, G., Gutierrez, G., & Montenegro, C. (2020). China’s distant-water fishing fleet: Scale, impact and governance. ODI. https://www.odi.org/publications/16958-china-s-distant-water-fishing-fleet-scale-impact-and-governance

Roberts, P. (2020, August 25). Maritime domain awareness: Multidimensional problem or opportunity? https://innovapolinav.cl/noticia_roberts.html

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 1, 2011) The Chilean Navy frigate Almirante Lynch (FF 07) participates in a live-fire exercise with ships from Chile, Colombia, Peru and the U.S. navies during the Pacific phase of UNITAS 52. UNITAS is a multinational exercise as part of Southern Seas 2011. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Stuart Phillips/Released) 110701-N-NL541-062

China’s Aircraft Carriers and Southeast Asia: Testing Coercive Naval Diplomacy?

Regional Strategies Topic Week

By Shang-su Wu 

Introduction

Since the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its second aircraft carrier, the possibility of utilizing these capital ships for coercive diplomacy is becoming more real. In China’s surrounding areas, Southeast Asia would be most suitable for “carrier diplomacy” regarding the proximity, the relatively weak defenses of the regional countries, and the major territorial disputes in the South China Sea. However, Southeast Asian countries, with their military modernizations and geopolitical circumstances, would not be merely hopeless either.

Chinese Carrier Group Capabilities

The main challenges coming from China’s aircraft carrier fleet come in the form of airpower and multi-domain survivability. The former refers to the shipboard J-15 fighters, but the number would be slightly lower than the maximal capacity of 24 and 32, respectively, for the Liaoning and Shandong, with several retained for self-defense.1 The matter of multi-domain survivability is derived from the major surface combatants escorting the aircraft carrier, particularly Type 055 cruisers, and how they could deny anti-ship threats, namely submarines, other surface ships, and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).2 As such, the kinetic countermeasures of Southeast Asian countries can be measured to an extent in whether their airpower or air defense capability can contest the J-15 fleet, and whether their sea denial capability can considerably threaten the carrier group itself.

Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong berthed at a naval port in Sanya in December 2019. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn, photo by Feng Kaixuan)

The Philippines

Geostrategically, the four Southeast Asian claimants bordering the South China Sea along with Indonesia would be the most likely targets for naval coercion due to their conflicting interests with China. Among them, the Philippines with its relative lack of anti-ship missiles and robust air defenses would be an ideal target, if the United States does not effectively support its ally.3 Although Manila recapitalized some of its fighter fleet from 2015 with a dozen Korean FA-50s and will introduce another dozen in the future, they are quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, inferior to the Chinese shipboard J-15 fighters.4 Although its two newly delivered frigates are armed with Korean C-STAR ASCMs, the platforms could be large targets for PLAN anti-ship firepower, and their subsonic anti-ship missiles may not penetrate the layered defenses of the Chinese aircraft carrier group.5 The only game-changer would be the upcoming BrahMos supersonic ASCMs arriving from India because their superior speed may allow for the penetration of carrier group air defenses.6 The BrahMos missiles will nevertheless be constrained with their limited numbers and over-the-horizon targeting capabilities of the Philippines, and where their kill chain could be preemptively attacked by the PLAN with precision-guided munitions or sabotage.

Brunei

Brunei has only four corvettes equipped with the French MM-40 ASCM, and without any fighters, would also be militarily suitable for coercion, but its geographic environment may not be suitable for naval coercion.7 Located between Malaysian territories, a Chinese naval deployment aimed at the kingdom will also draw close scrutiny from Malaysia and even Indonesia on the other side of Borneo. Based on their support for Southeast Asian regionalism and the rather neutral positions in the international community, it is unlikely for either Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta to welcome any coercion in their neighborhood. Unless Beijing is planning to take on or infuriate several countries simaultaneously, trying to coerce Brunei and other nearby Southeast Asian nations would be diplomatically unwise.

Malaysia

In the face of the Chinese aircraft carrier group, Malaysia is certainly inferior. Kuala Lumpur has purchased several modern fighters which would be equivalent to J-15s, but the MiG-29 squadrons are on their way to obsolescence and the serviceable numbers of other fighters are uncertain for the limited procurements of eight F-18Ds and 18 Su-30MKKs and the associated maintenance challenges.8 Malaysia also falls short in area air defense systems, as most surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are portable for only point defense.9 Hence, the Chinese J-15s could likely achieve regional air superiority.

Kuala Lumpur has better potential in sea denial. The two French/Spanish Scorpene-class submarines are equipped with sub-launched French SM-39 Exocet ASCMs and Italian Black Shark torpedoes, and the F-18D and Su-30MKM aircraft are respectively armed with American AGM-84A Harpoons and Russian Kh-31A ASCMs, along with a range of surface vessels being platforms for MM-40 ASCMs.10 The submarine base bordering the South China Sea in Sabah would be convenient for deploying assets, and the combined platforms fielding ASCMs offer tactical potential for multi-axis salvo attacks which may overwhelm the PLAN’s layered defenses for its aircraft carrier.11 However, the uncertain serviceability and the challenge of joint operations between Malaysian naval vessels and air force fighters could inhibit options. A gambit between the Malaysian submarines and the Chinese aircraft carrier group is also unpredictable. The PLAN has improved its capability for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) for Type 052D destroyers and Type 055 cruisers which feature towed sonar arrays and new Z-18F ASW helicopters featuring larger capacity than the Z-9Cs helos.12 Due to the flotilla of only two submarines, there may be only one Malaysian submarine available, but the familiar operational environment and sub-launched ASCM offer advantages.

Indonesia

Despite not being a claimant in the South China Sea, the maritime disputes around the Natuna Islands make Indonesia a potential target for China to coercively deploy an aircraft carrier group.13 Jakarta’s airpower of 11 F-16A/Bs, 24 F-16C/Ds, five Su-27SK/SKMs, 11 SU-30MK/MK2 fighters, in addition to the likely deal of F-16Vs, would be more than the shipboard Chinese J-15s. But Indonesia’s logistical challenges, as reflected by frequent accidents, may undermine quantitative superiority.14

Indonesia’s sea denial is composed of five German and Korean Type-209 submarines armed with Black Shark torpedoes, and numerous surface platforms fielding various ASCMs, including MM-40s, Russian 3M55s, and Chinese C-705s and C-802s.15 Since a Chinese aircraft carrier group would likely not get too proximate to the archipelago in a tense situation (let alone pass through it) these Indonesian platforms may not be able conduct littoral ambushes using island cover. But they can operate in open seas. Jakarta may further face another challenge from a lack of military infrastructure nationwide, as Beijing may choose a location to pressure other than the Natuna Islands in the widely stretched archipelago, such as a future location near the new capital in East Kalimantan.16 However, Indonesia’s sizeable and expanding submarine fleet may constitute an independent and formidable underwater force for deterrence.17

SOUTH CHINA SEA (May 21, 2018) Indonesian Navy frigate KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata (FFG-331) prepares to receive fuel from the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO-204) during an underway replenishment in the South China Sea. (U.S. Navy photo/Released)

Vietnam

Vietnam is a mixed case for China to apply pressure via aircraft carrier. The adjacency allows the PLA and PLAN Air Forces to project airpower to almost the whole of Vietnam from various airbases in Guangxi, Hainan island, and even artificial islands in the South China Sea.18 As such, a Chinese aircraft carrier with its airpower could put additional pressure on Vietnam, but it may also be more exposed to the latter’s firepower.

Hanoi has procured a collection of Russian sea denial weapon systems, such as P-800 supersonic ASCMs onshore, six project-636 submarines with 3M-54 ASCMs, 53-65KEs, and TEST-71 torpedoes, P-15s and 3M24E ASCMs from several frigates and fast attack craft, in addition to airborne Kh-31A ASCMs launched by Su-30 MK2 aircraft.19 Those assets and munitions could put a Chinese aircraft carrier in a dilemma: too close to be exposed to attack and a significant risk of damaging or losing their national pride, or too far so that shipboard J-15s can hardly contribute much beyond land-based Chinese airpower. The risk of losing these icons of national pride may make Beijing cautious in aggressively deploying its aircraft carriers against Hanoi.

Cambodia

Beyond these five Southeast Asian countries, the rest represent distinct scenarios. Without ASCMs, fighters, or other considerable sea denial capabilities, Cambodia would be a militarily attractive target for naval coercion.20 The location in the Gulf of Thailand away from the South China Sea, nevertheless, suggests the low geopolitical value of Cambodia to sea lines of communication (SLOCs). At the two ends of the entrance to the Gulf of Thailand are Vietnam and Thailand, and sending an aircraft carrier group into the gulf would affect relations with these states more than with Cambodia. Finally, Phnom Penh’s friendship with Beijing, especially the former’s dependence on the latter’s investment, would make it the least likely nation in the region for the PLAN to coerce compared to the economic pressures available.

Thailand

Thailand’s coastlines, either on the Gulf or the Indian Ocean, may not be suitable for the Chinese aircraft carrier group to operate in. As previously mentioned, the Gulf is rather irrelevant to China’s maritime interest in the SLOCs, and the force presence near the Thai coastline on the Indian Ocean is too remote to Bangkok. As for air defense, the two Swedish Saab-340 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft would help fighter fleets of 11 JAS-39C/D and 53 F-16A/B fighters, together with some older but upgraded F-5E/F fighters, contest the Chinese J-15s.

Bangkok also maintains a range of platforms fielding ASCMs in the air and surface, such as Swedish RBS-15F from the JAS-39 fighters, RGM-84s and C-802s from different frigates and corvettes, in addition to its DTI-1G artillery rockets which could also conduct sea denial missions, particularly at the entrance of the Gulf.21 Furthermore, an imminent S-26T submarine from China with C-708 ASCMs and Yu-7 torpedoes would strengthen Thailand’s deterrence as well.22

Thailand’s diverse anti-ship firepower in the Gulf may lend itself to deterrence against PLAN carrier groups because of multi-directional threats that could be made real with rather short warning times. If Beijing chooses to deploy the aircraft carrier out of the Gulf, the coercive pressure placed on Bangkok would be lower due to distance and shift toward other nations.

Singapore 

Surrounded by Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore would also be geopolitically unsuitable for targeted naval coercion, and the disruption of the Singapore Strait will create consequences going far beyond the region. Militarily, the city-state’s fighter fleets of 60 F-16C/Ds and 40 F-15SGs backed by four G-550 AEW aircraft are stronger than the J-15s from either the Liaoning, Shandong, or even both combined. Singapore has also invested in sea denial capabilities, comprised of four ex-Swedish submarines, two Sjoormen and two Västergötland with air-independent propulsion, the RGM-84 and AGM-84 from surface vessels, and Fokker-50 maritime patrol aircraft, AGM-158s from fighters, plus HIMARS guided rockets onshore.23 The four submarines will soon be replaced with four, more modern Type-218s from Germany.24 Although PLAN major surface combatants could intercept subsonic Harpoon missiles, the Singaporean fighters supported by four A-330 aerial refueling aircraft could pose a formidable threat to the J-15 squadrons and contest coercion or outright attack.

PACIFIC OCEAN (July 24, 2012) The Republic of Singapore frigate RSS Formidable (68) is alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) for a photo exercise during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2012. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eva-Marie Ramsaran/Released)

Myanmar

The long bilateral borders and the endless isurgency present a range of alternatives for China to sending an aircraft carrier group to coerce Myanmar, not to mention their economic ties. If Beijing still chooses the naval option, Naypyidaw is not completely inferior. Although Myanmar only has the sea denial capability of subsonic Chinese ASCMs on surface vessels which could likely not penetrate the PLAN’s layered defenses, its fleet of 32 MiG-29B/SM fighters along with 30+ inferior J-7s and some JF-17s, plus several Russian S-125, 2K12, and Chinese KS-1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, could make for a match with the J-15s.25 Geostrategically, a Chinese aircraft carrier group sailing into the Indian Ocean would also alarm India, and the Andaman and Nicobar tri-service command can facilitate Indian military deployments near Myanmar.26 The PLAN would not operate freely in the Andaman Sea.

Conclusion

In terms of military and geostrategy alone, Beijing already faces some constraints and countervailing forces on applying coercive aircraft carrier diplomacy to Southeast Asia. The most appropriate target would be the Philippines, followed by Malaysia and Indonesia, due to their territorial disputes with China and their relatively inferior military capabilities, but they still have some means to deter a PLAN aircraft carrier group. These aircraft carriers do indeed contribute to Beijing’s image of a rising military superpower, but their operational applications may not be as overwhelming as the propaganda describes.

It must be noted that all Southeast Asian countries carefully handle their relations with China and strenuously work to prevent any occasion for the latter to pursue military options. However, if the strong choose to do as they please, the weak will not merely suffer what they must.

Shang-su Wu is a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

References

1. Sebastien Roblin, “Here’s Everything We Know About China’s Domestically Built Shandong Aircraft Carrier,” the National Interest, 27 FEBRUARY 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/heres-everything-we-know-about-chinas-domestically-built-shandong-aircraft-carrier-127607

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2020 (London: IISS, 2020), 262.

3. IISS, Military Balance 2020, 305.

4. Francis Wakefield, “PH to acquire 12 more FA-50 light fighter jets,” Manila Bulletin, 9 JUNE 2018, https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/06/07/ph-to-acquire-12-more-fa-50-light-fighter-jets/

5. Martin Manaranche, “Future Philippine Navy Frigate BRP ‘Jose Rizal’ Sails Home for Commissioning,” Naval News, 18 MAY 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/05/future-philippine-navy-frigate-brp-jose-rizal-sails-home-for-commissioning/

6. Masao Dahlgren, “Philippines to Order BrahMos Missile,” Missile Threat, 20 DECEMBER 2019, https://missilethreat.csis.org/philippines-to-order-brahmos-missile/

7. IISS, Military Balance 2020, 256-257.

8. IISS, 293; “Malaysia air force says low maintenance rate of fighter jets partly due to lack of operating funds,” the Strait Times, 3 AUGUST 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-air-force-says-low-maintenance-rate-of-fighter-jets-partly-due-to-lack-of

9. IISS, 292-293

10. IISS, 293.

11. IISS, 293; “Malaysia Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 16 OCTOBER 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/malaysia-submarine-capabilities/

12. IISS, 236; “Z-18 Medium transport helicopter,” Military Today, http://www.military-today.com/helicopters/z18.htm

13. Fransiska Nangoy, Wilda Asmarini, Stanley Widianto, and Gabriel Crossley, “Indonesia’s president visits island in waters disputed by China,” Reuters, 8 JANUARY 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea-idUSKBN1Z710N

14. Yulius Yoma, “C-130 crashes in Indonesia, 6th similar accident in 2016,” Aerotime, 20 DECEMBER 2016, https://www.aerotime.aero/yulius.yoma/16039-c-130-crashes-in-indonesia-6th-similar-accident-in-2016; IISS, 278; “F-16 Indonesia,” Lockheed Martin, 2020, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/f-16/f-16-indonesia.html; Heru Andriyanto and Yeremia Sukoyo, “Indonesia’s Defense Modernization Gains Momentum After Two Air Crashes in Nine Days,” Jakarta Globe, 15 JUNE 2020, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesias-defense-modernization-gains-momentum-after-two-air-crashes-in-nine-days

15. IISS, 277; “Indonesia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, 17 OCTOBER 2019, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/indonesia-submarine-capabilities/

16. Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, “’Indonesia’s new capital city will be very special,’ Tony Blair says,” the Jakarta Post, 29 FEBRUARY 2020, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2020/02/29/indonesias-new-capital-city-will-be-very-special-tony-blair-says.html; Evan Laksmana, “The military and strategic implications of Indonesia’s new capital,” the Strategist, 6 NOVEMBER 2019, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-military-and-strategic-implications-of-indonesias-new-capital/; Beritasatu, “Indonesia Set to Have Four New Military Bases,” Jakarta Globe, 5 OCTOBER 2019, https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-set-to-have-four-new-military-bases/

17. “Indonesia Submarine Capabilities,” NTI.

18. Ben Werner, “New Air Bases, Baby Cabbage Key to Chinese Long-Term Claims in South China Sea,” USNI News, 3 JUNE 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/06/03/new-air-bases-baby-cabbage-key-to-chinese-long-term-claims-on-south-china-sea

19. IISS, 319-320.

20. IISS, 258.

21. IISS, 315-316.

22. SIPRI.

23. IISS, 307-308.

24. Lim Min Zhang, “Invincible, first of Singapore’s biggest and most advanced submarines, launches in Germany,” the Straits Times, 18 FEBRUERY 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapores-first-type-218sg-submarine-launched-in-germany-named-invincible

25. IISS, 296-297.

26. Rahul Singh, “Andaman defence commander gets power over all three services,” Hindustan Times, 12 MAY 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/andaman-defence-commander-gets-power-over-all-three-services/story-LLhvEAs1CSF9nO2sVrTmBK.html

Featured Image: Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong berthed at a naval port in Sanya in December 2019. (Photo via eng.chinamil.com.cn, photo by Feng Kaixuan)

Preventing the Collapse: Fighting Friction after First Contact at the National Training Center, Pt. 1

The following article appeared in the March-April 2020 edition of Military Review and is republished with permission. It will be republished in two parts. Read it in its original form here.

By Lt. Col. Brian P. Schoellhorn, U.S. Army

The commander stepped outside the stuffy command post tent and breathed in the night air as he tried to contain his growing frustration. His staff had just finished an update, painting a grim and incomplete picture of the brigade combat team’s (BCT) current state. The commander struggled to understand what had gone so wrong. The fight had started successfully with air insertions of deep observation posts, seizure of key terrain, and the successful prosecution of enemy targets with indirect fire, attack aviation, and fixed-wing aircraft. In short, the BCT had seized the initiative from the enemy.

That was over thirty-six hours ago. Since then, reporting had ceased, communications had collapsed, and units had repeatedly failed to attain their designated objectives. The cavalry squadron had not yet achieved its planned reconnaissance and security objectives, resulting in repeated surprise attacks and costly penetrations of the BCT’s zone. It had gained only two to three kilometers since its initial deployment. The field artillery battalion, which had started so well, had since fired only a few ineffective missions after the initial targets planned for the operation’s opening phase. Close air support (CAS) and attack aviation had ceased inflicting the devastating effects of the first day. Combined arms battalions had either stumbled into contact with significant losses for no appreciable gain or had been repeatedly surprised by the enemy in their attack positions. To make matters worse, the brigade support battalion commander had complained to him earlier in the day that every unit was clamoring for “emergency resupply” of all commodities. He had no idea how many casualties the BCT had taken in the recent contacts. Finally, the brigade engineer battalion operated in a constant state of crisis as insurgents and special purpose forces wreaked havoc across the BCT rear area with asymmetrical attacks and deadly accurate indirect fire that seemed to materialize out of nowhere and everywhere.

The BCT tactical operations center (TOC) was faring no better. Although everyone was working frenetically trying to resolve the friction that had ground the BCT to a halt, these efforts had resulted in no greater understanding of the BCT’s situation nor had they provided any realistic means to get it moving again. Some staff officers had started pointing to failures at the subordinate level, while others had exceeded their ability to process the multiple simultaneous issues that bombarded the BCT on an hourly basis. Few had slept more than a few fitful hours slumped over at their stations or in their vehicles. This included the BCT commander himself.

The attempted “two-minute” update had taken forty-five minutes but made clear that staff running estimates remained wildly inaccurate and incomplete. To make matters worse, the BCT executive officer (XO) had just completed a scratchy and decidedly one-way telephone call with the division operations officer, who demanded that the BCT regain the offensive as soon as possible. The commander was supposed to receive a staff planning update for the operation to seize the provincial capital, but he thought it would merely waste time given the TOC’s current state. The commander was unsure how to restore order and resume offensive action akin to that of the first day. It was frustrating and bewildering. What to do?

Introduction

The situation described above happens nearly every month at the National Training Center (NTC). Most BCTs come to the NTC with a solid baseline of training and preparedness for the first day of the fight. They routinely attack the contested reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) process with alacrity. Many BCT leaders think that their unit is ready to go on the offense as soon as the fourth day of RSOI. No matter how far geographically or fast physically the BCT gets on the first day, however, the initial mission invariably devolves into twenty-four to forty-eight hours of what can be described as a BCT-wide collapse of offensive action.1 The BCT’s subunits and staff make contact with the enemy and are hampered by the terrain, which in turn produces a deleterious effect on time available to continue planning. These inputs compound, producing a level of friction that most units have not experienced in training. Units and staffs enter survival mode, trying desperately to work through the pressing problems in front of them to the detriment of the larger mission. In this situation, reporting, sustainment, communication, and planning break down, leaving battalion and BCT staffs in the dark as to the state of units and their adherence to orders. Any enemy contact reverberates throughout the BCT, causing further confusion. The net result of friction at every level causes a collapse in tempo and offensive action, resulting in paralysis across command posts and attack positions. Why does this happen?

As a reasonable approximation of combat, the NTC induces a level of friction not re-created anywhere else. Home-station training cannot replicate the space, terrain, time, enemy, and stress that the NTC produces at the tactical level. The first forty-eight hours probably represent the first simultaneous deployment of every BCT element at doctrinal distances under combat conditions against an enemy capable of dominating all forms of contact.2 In this light, the general collapse of tempo and offensive action is understandable and part of the training process. The first few days also expose the BCT’s systems to friction in a way that no other training event short of combat can. In many ways, the most powerful drivers of friction are BCT- and battalion-level staff organization, processes, and procedures. Most staffs are not adequately organized according to plans, current operations (CUOPs), and mobile command group sections. Even if they are, staff functions rarely remain clearly defined as the BCT makes contact, and everyone tries to understand the current problem to resolve the immediate threat. The BCT often outruns the plan; the staff does not continue planning, and consequently fails to prepare to transition the BCT from one operation to another. In this situation, battalions and companies stumble into unplanned contact with the enemy, unsupported by BCT-level enablers. These independent and desynchronized actions rarely result in BCT-wide offensive action and increased tempo.

Soldiers position vehicles to simulate taking over an enemy town during an exercise at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif., June 7, 2019. (Photo by Army Sgt. Mason Cutrer)

Communications difficulties due to range, terrain, load, training deficiencies, and mistakes cause difficulties even understanding what is happening, much less directing actions of subordinate units.3 To resolve this, BCT commanders often resort to understanding and directing the BCT by talking directly to battalion commanders on tactical radios. Although this can prompt action, it often results in plans developed in isolation from staffs and lacking BCT-level enablers. These radio conversations can also generate additional friction as battalion commanders often “talk their way out of” directed tasks because they lack assets, need more time, or their situation (combat power, casualties, sustainment, and communication) prevents continued offensive action.

How to shorten this inevitable loss in tempo is a topic of much discussion at the NTC, and its answer is existential in nature given the enemies and situations we are likely to face throughout the world. The following discussion is meant to spark thought, but it is not a prescriptive guide to resolving the friction inherent in combat.

Know the Collapse Is Coming

One of the main causes of the collapse is physiological. Units, leaders, and soldiers spend RSOI in a heightened state of alert and activity that cuts into sleep and interrupts the normal rhythms of garrison. RSOI at the NTC is designed to help a unit “see itself” in a way not possible in garrison. While enormously beneficial, this process can stress a unit and its leaders as unforeseen problems emerge and must be dealt with quickly, often at the expense of planning, eating, and rest. The planning and preparation for combat, as well as the unit’s exposure to the NTC, Operations Group, and its observer, coach, trainers (OC/Ts), only add to task and time demands, causing further stress. RSOI also introduces the unit to NTC’s contested environment, wherein it faces insurgent attacks, rocket strikes, and drone swarms, to name only a few forms of contact with which leaders must contend while building combat power. Finally, nervousness, anxiety, adrenaline, and a desire to prove oneself are intermingled to the point that the first twelve to twenty-four hours of action are a release from RSOI and the logistics support area. These emotional and physical conditions closely replicate those of precombat, and if harnessed effectively, can be a positive impetus for aggressive action.4 The costs of this heightened state, however, often remain hidden until manifesting themselves across the force in the subsequent twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the first operation.

BCT-level planning for the first attack is regularly the most complete and detailed of the rotation despite some initial unfamiliarity with the environment. OC/T coaching is also the least impactful at this stage since OC/T suggestions are largely theoretical for the unit until after it makes contact. As a result, plans are frequently overly ambitious in their geographical objectives and rarely take the enemy, terrain, and time into full account. Units also invariably fail to consider the amount of friction that their own systems and processes will encounter after first contact. Units deploy, have some success, and gain some ground but inevitably encounter the enemy at a time or place in an unplanned manner. The friction and shock of this first surprise encounter rapidly ripples up from the lowest unit and across the BCT, causing confusion, and routinely, the end of offensive action. Unit leaders look inward to solve their immediate problems, reporting breaks down, and the BCT ceases to act in concert as reacting to contact consumes its constituent parts. The hyperactivity of the preceding days rapidly turns into fatigue as the stress of initial contact combines with a lack of rest. Sustainment problems swiftly develop in these conditions due to deficiencies in reporting and planning. Additionally, training, equipment, and maintenance deficiencies accumulate to cause BCT-wide failures in communications, control, and sustainment.

Countless historical descriptions of first contact, from the phalanx to conflicts today, point to the commonality of this situation in combat.5 The adrenaline of preparation, the frenetic activity prior to the mission, followed by the shock of first contact create an unprecedented level of what Carl von Clausewitz described as friction, or the fabled “fog of war” experienced by every commander in conflict and training throughout military history.6 The fog of war is often thought of as a lack of information that leads to inaction. However, it is also the multiplication of inputs to the BCT after contact leading to a state of confusion that often results in paralysis and inaction. The NTC can inflict a BCT with every form of contact, stressor, and inducer of friction simultaneously, which compounds the fog of war in the first days. In fact, this is part of its mandate: to replicate the stress of combat in a way that causes the BCT and its soldiers “to have their hardest day in the desert so that they do not go untrained into combat.”7

While the fog and friction of the first days of combat cannot be completely eliminated, their time and effect can be reduced. Knowing they are coming and preparing the BCT’s leaders for the physical, mental, and emotional rigors of the first hours and days of the fight is the first step. Physical fitness that results in combat endurance is critical. Training the mind through historical examples in a leader professional development/self-development program will give leaders some context as they think about the trials likely facing them in the first fight. Tactical decision games that focus on actions after the breakdown of the plan and absence of further orders will train junior leaders to think through the fog of war.8 Leaders must develop and enforce rest plans throughout RSOI and especially during the first few days of contact, as the body and mind acclimate to the shock and rigors of combat, simulated or otherwise. Finally, leaders must share this understanding with their soldiers, from the most junior to senior levels, through discussion, and more importantly, training.

Lethality is a Necessary but Insufficient Condition for Success

It is a truism that lethal squads, crews, platoons, and companies form the building blocks of victory at NTC and in combat. Although this is undoubtedly the case, lethality at the small-unit level is necessary but not sufficient to fight through the fog of war. Too often, even the most lethal formations are surprised by the enemy, make contact at an unexpected place and time, and are forced to fight on the enemy’s terms to shore up the situation. Win, lose, or draw, these small-unit actions inescapably result in combat losses that slow the tempo of the company, the battalion, and the BCT, if not immediately followed by a combined arms fight that reinforces success. Observations at NTC also indicate that deficiencies in the science and art of terrain and enemy analysis, and the inability to execute actions on contact at the platoon level contribute to combat losses, even with favorable system-to-system kill ratios.

An opposing force soldier from Killer Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
An opposing force soldier from Killer Troop, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, fires a simulated tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile from atop a visually modified vehicle at an M1A1 Abrams main battle tank from 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, 3 August 2016 at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. (Photo by Pvt. Austin Anyzeski, U.S. Army)

The enemy inevitably exploits these opportunities and weaknesses. Consequently, a spoiling attack can surprise a unit in a key location, penetrate its position, and wreak havoc throughout the BCT. Platoons and companies do not report in enough detail, eventually leaving the BCT ignorant as to the enemy and friendly situation. Orders are then given without regard or knowledge of the true situation, causing further confusion and disorder. A lack of discipline in field maintenance and during logistic package resupply also causes BCT-wide effects, as units utilize limited assets for “emergency” resupply and maintenance.10 The wear and tear on sustainment units, systems, and soldiers ultimately contribute to a collapse of tempo.

Preventing the accumulation of small-unit deficiencies that result in BCT-wide problems requires the discipline born of repetitive training. Leaders at the BCT level should never have to order a platoon or company to report, secure, and sustain themselves. The current live-fire-centric model of unit training requires a great deal of crew, squad, and platoon gunnery proficiency.11 This has yielded positive results for units at NTC. Live fire alone, however, will not ingrain the skills of automatic reporting, security, and sustainment without ruthless enforcement during training. Leaders should not assume that their small-unit leaders know how to perform these tasks to standard. They may need to start with a white board or a Micro-Armor (miniature model) explanation followed by a walk-through.

A review of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and reports may also prove necessary to ensure standardization across the BCT. Finally, training that requires small units to establish security, report, and sustain themselves for long durations under combat conditions—repeatedly—best builds the muscle memory required to perform these tasks in combat or at NTC. Each repetition should be executed and evaluated under increasingly more difficult conditions (day, night, chemical attack, degraded communication, drone observation, etc.) and for longer duration. Units must be evaluated on these tasks using training and evaluation outlines, be given an after action review, and be required to do it again. This kind of training can be done at a gunnery or at low cost in local training areas.12

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 163rd Cavalry Regiment, position their Bradley Fighting Vehicle during a defensive attack training exercise at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, Calif., June 1, 2019. A month-long NTC Rotation provides more than 4,000 service members from 31 states, including units from 13 National Guard states and territories, with realistic training to enhance their combat, support and sustainment capabilities. (Photo by Cpl. Alisha Grezlik, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Mission Command Requires Discipline and Accountability

Leaders routinely misunderstand the concept of mission command regarding planning and execution of operations at NTC. There is often a sense that orders, timing, requirements, reports, and battle-rhythm events are in some ways negotiable if they interfere with or do not conform to lower-unit actions or expectations. Missed suspenses and tardy reporting, unperformed requirements, and a lack of communication add to the general collapse as the BCT tries to understand why subordinate units have not accomplished their assigned missions. A reluctance persists to enforce these requirements either through direct or general admonishment. This disinclination to require compliance is frequently coupled with planning mistakenly deliberate in its lack of details, which the staff hopes will enable commanders to exercise initiative. These conceptual plans usually lack adequate graphic control measures, timing, tasks, and triggers, subsequently hindering the BCT’s ability to control the fight or combine arms effectively. These two factors—a lack of adherence to the plan and conceptual planning—often lead to problems of land management, coordination, synchronization, sustainment, and combining arms, as each unit fights its own war according to its perceived needs. Doing so does not result in a BCT fight that restores offensive action. Instead, it often leads to defeat in detail and fratricide.

Decisive action requires a revitalization of command and control as the foundational pillars of mission command.13 Units and leaders must understand that fighting necessitates adherence to the plan, tasks, timing, and reporting. Many problems start with a lack of communication that extends for hours and even days without resolution. Leaders must realize that the subordinate units must gain and maintain communication with their higher headquarters. They then must report according to the battle rhythm; primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan; and SOP accurately and on time. There can be no exceptions or excuses for not doing so. Leaders must also understand that every subordinate action happens in time and space in conjunction and coordination with other units, assets, and activities. This makes actions such as making a designated start point and a line of departure times, as well as the requirements to establish support by fire (SBF) positions, target prosecution, and logistics release points nonnegotiable.

We are no longer in a situation in which subordinate leaders can decide that “the conditions are not set” or that it really does not matter if units operate independently from one another, as in a counterinsurgency fight where units were battlespace owners. This starts with BCTs adhering to division requirements and ends with soldiers executing their given tasks on time and on target. Noncompliance under a misconceived notion of mission command risks mission failure.

Controlling the BCT fight also necessitates detailed planning of actions, triggers, and timing. This staff work constitutes the science of combat and cannot be neglected if the BCT expects to combine arms effectively.14 NTC requires BCTs to conduct the meticulous work necessary to use indirect fire, attack aviation, CAS, special munitions, and other assets in the way they would have to in combat. Applying assets for a BCT fight requires detailed graphic control measures and synchronization of actions in time and space. Therefore, leaders must adhere to the plan if the conditions that the BCT sets remain in effect in order to accomplish their given tasks as part of the overall fight. If an internal condition prevents battalion adherence to the plan, it is a subordinate commander’s responsibility to report and have a discussion early enough for the BCT and the staff to mitigate risks and modify the plan.

Although control limits a leader’s scope of action in a theoretical sense, it actually provides the framework for exercise of initiative because it tells a commander what to do where and when, not how to do it.15 Ample room remains for a commander to exercise initiative and creativity in task organization, sequence, application of internal assets, etc. Good graphic control measures and the applied science of control also lend clarity to the situation, delineate boundaries, and allow for the effective use of combined arms. Control does not negate the art of command.16 Adhering to the plan, understanding the intent, and being accountable to the BCT reflect the tenants of mission command. It is the discipline in disciplined initiative.17

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 1ST Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright, Alaska, send a round downrange from an M777 Howitzer while conducting calibration during Decisive Action Rotation 19-04 at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, Calif., Feb 7, 2019. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Kimberly Riley, Operations Group, National Training Center)

The commander’s intent is also a powerful guide for action, especially when the plan breaks down due to the friction inherent in any fight. The key tasks in the intent statement not only have to be accomplished but also have to be done in time and space to be effective. Units will have to fight through the enemy and friction to accomplish these tasks that set the conditions for victory. None of these considerations preclude a commander or subordinate leader from assessing the situation, applying the commander’s intent, and then acting to exploit an opportunity that not only achieves the intent but also places the unit in a position of advantage vis-à-vis the enemy. For example, a battalion or company tasked to establish an SBF position could surprise the enemy and continue to maneuver around or behind a position to achieve a more decisive effect than a straightforward SBF. Doing so achieves the required result while also exploiting an opportunity inherent in mission-type orders. Conversely, the commander and staff retain responsibility to communicate intent clearly and to design straightforward, yet flexible plans, which allow for command, control, the exercise of initiative, and the assumption of risk.

The concepts of command, control, discipline, and accountability as they relate to mission command need to be explained and trained at home station in order to prevent misunderstanding and confusion for leaders throughout the formation. Taking the time to discuss the requirements of decisive action as they relate to mission command through conversation and reading can go a long way to building a shared approach to command and control prior to the rotation. Additionally, trainers should design scenarios that require leaders to exercise initiative and assume risk to meet their stated objectives in time and space according to the plan and the commander’s intent. This can be done through tactical decision games, training exercises without troops, and simulations.

Training leaders to think and adapt is the commander’s responsibility and will achieve the shared understanding and mutual trust required of mission command. Discipline and accountability, however, must be ruthlessly enforced in garrison, training, at NTC, and in combat. Leaders should attempt to find ways to match battle-rhythm events and reporting formats and requirements in garrison to those that they will use in combat. There can be no excuses for late or inaccurate reports. A climate of accountability will help to dissipate the fog of war quickly and allow the BCT to act in concert to achieve its mission.

Lt. Col. Brian Schoellhorn, U.S. Army, is the operations officer for 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. He previously served as the brigade combat team senior trainer at the National Training Center. A career armor officer, he has served in command and staff positions in Germany, Kosovo, Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Alaska, and Fort Carson, Colorado. He commanded 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

Notes

1. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. (2003), s.v. “collapse.” The term collapse is used throughout this article to describe the unexpected and widespread results of the friction the brigade combat team (BCT) experiences after first contact. According to Merriam-Webster, to collapse is “to suddenly lose force, significance, and effectiveness,” which best describes what happens to a BCT. The use of the term is not meant to imply that this takes place because of neglect or poor planning but to suggest that the consequences of friction are so sudden and its scope so unexpected that responding to it effectively is extremely difficult.

2. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], January 2016), 2-13. The eight forms of contact are direct; indirect; nonhostile; obstacles; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear; aerial; visual; and electronic warfare.

3. Communications difficulties typically include issues with retransmission system positioning and functionality, establishment of Army Battle Command Systems using upper tactical internet, and the consistent ability to communicate using Blue Force Tracker or the Joint Capabilities Release systems. Many other issues are the result of incomplete precombat checks and inspections, a lack of critical equipment or not-mission-capable systems that are unreported, or a lack of proper training and supervision. The accumulation of these soldier-level tasks lead to BCT-wide friction.

4. Robert L. Maginnis, “Battle Stress: Are We Prepared?,” Armor 93, no. 6 (November-December 1984): 35–40; Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen, On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War (Millstadt, IL: Warrior Science Publications, 2008).

5. There are countless historical examples and references that can inform personal professional reading and leader development in helping understand the conditions, toll, and consequences of preparation for combat and the first fight. Some examples include Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989); John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1979); S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947); T. R. Ferhrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
For engaging descriptions of training at the National Training Center (NTC), see Daniel P. Bolger, Dragons at War: 2-34th Infantry in the Mojave (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1986); James R. McDonough, The Defense of Hill 781: An Allegory of Modern Mechanized Combat (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988); Anne W. Chapman, The Origins and Developments of the National Training Center, 1976-1984 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 1992), 85–90, 106–9; Anne W. Chapman, The National Training Center Matures, 1985-1993 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1997), 107–36, 281–305.
For fictional accounts of mechanized combat, see Harold Coyle, Team Yankee: A Novel of World War III (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2016); Ralph Peter, Red Army: A Novel of Tomorrow’s War (New York: Pocket Books, 1989).

6. Carl von Clausewitz, “Friction in War,” in On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 65–68, 88. Clausewitz’s explanation of friction is undoubtedly amongst his greatest contribution to the theory of war since, in his words, “friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” His equally famous dictum that “everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult” elucidates the straightforward, but profound, truth that governs and limits every action in combat. As he further explains, “We should bear in mind that none of its [the unit’s] components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential friction.” The entire chapter seven is required reading and gives context to the friction, difficulties, and state of collapse that units struggle with at the NTC; Clausewitz, “Third Property: Uncertainty of All Information,” in Howard and Paret, On War, 88–89. Although Clausewitz does not specifically use the term “fog of war,” his description of the components of friction: physical exertion, intelligence (or lack thereof), and danger combined with the complex nature of moving, maneuvering, and leading a military organization filled with individuals suggest that all actions in war take place under a fog or haze of uncertainty. For a contrary interpretation of Clausewitz’s notion of “fog and friction,” see Eugenia C. Kiesling, “On War: Without the Fog,” Military Review 81, no. 5 (September-October 2001): 85–87.

7. Brig. Gen. Christopher R. Norrie, then commander, Operations Group, author’s personal notes from Senior Trainer In-Brief, July 2018.

8. For resources for using and developing tactical decision games (TDGs), see John F. Schmidt, Mastering Tactics: A Tactical Decision Game Workbook (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1994); see also “Tactical Decision Games: Your Index for TGDs,” The Company Leader, accessed 12 September 2019, http://companyleader.themilitaryleader.com/tdg. TDGs are an easy and cost-effective way for battalion and brigade combat team commanders to not only train subordinate leaders but also to see how they think about tactical problems. Giving an officer or a noncommissioned officer a TDG to solve during staff duty or professional development sessions is a relatively simple way to build tactical competence, provide repetitions, and convey intent through feedback.

9. ATP 3-20.15, Tank Platoon (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2012), 6-1–6-5, 6-12–6-15.

10. Ibid., 9-1–9-14.

11. See Leader’s Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 29 September 2017), accessed 12 September 2019, https://atn.army.mil/unit-training-management-(utm)/standards-for-training-proficiency-(stp) (CAC required).

12. For discussions of small-unit training, see Arthur Collins, Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1978); Dandridge A. Malone, Small Unit Leadership: A Common Sense Approach (Novoto, CA: Presidio Press, 1983); Training Circular 25-10, A Leader’s Guide to Lane Training (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) [obsolete]; James B. Hickey, Closing with the Enemy: Company Team Maneuver (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, March 1998); Field Manual 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2016).
For insights from Operations Group on preparing for an NTC rotation, see Alan R. Cocks, “Objective NTC: Some Ideas for Leaders on How to Get There From Here,” Armor 95, no. 4 (July-August 1986): 11–19; Larry E. Word, Observations from Three Years at the NTC (Monterey, CA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1987), accessed 13 September 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a179386.pdf; Christopher R. Norrie, Thomas E. Lamb, and Michael J. Culler, “Ready Now-Our Number One Priority,” Military Review 98, no. 5 (September-October 2018): 61–69.

13. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 [obsolete]), 2-17, superseded by Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, July 2019.

14. Ibid., 2-12–2-17.

15. ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 [obsolete]), 4-1–4-2, superseded by ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, July 2019.

16. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, 2-5–2-17.

17. Ibid., 1-1–1-4.

Featured Image: U.S. Army tank crews engage targets downrange during gunnery training at Camp Ripley, Minn., April 3, 2019. (Photo by  Army Sgt. Mason Cutrer)

Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest CDR Salamander

By Alex Clarke

We’ve made it to Episode 14 and no Russian ships have broken apart on us, although apparently their floating docks are now their biggest threat, and we did warn them in Episode 13. Well, as that is the norm, here is Bilge Pumps as we three regular naval geeks of easy listening disposition do call it.

Today we are joined by the highly esteemed CDR Salamander for a two-part show that can best be described as what would happen if you sat four naval history geeks down in a room and gave them endless drinks, snacks, and told them to fix what was wrong with navies today. Although, we’re not in the same room, not even the same time zone, and definitely not the same continent. Alongside our love of naval history, one of us boxes with springy creatures and fights daily battles with ravenous wildlife, another builds model railways, the third’s Australian, and the special guest hobby farms something the size of most UK dairy farms.

So after all that what is Episode 14 about? Well the #Bilgepumps team is being topical, so the Chinese fleet is massive, ever growing more as an employment mechanism than a sensible strategy, but how does the west counter that? CDR Salamander joins us to help divine the answer.

#Bilgepumps is a still newish series and new avenue, although it may no longer have the new car smell, in fact more of pineapple and irn bru smell, with the faint whiff of cork, but we’re getting the impression it’s liked. So we’d very much like any comments, topic suggestions or ideas for artwork tweeted to us the Bilge Pumps crew (with #Bilgepump) at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).

Download Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest Cdr Salamander, Part 1


Download Bilge Pumps 14: The Future of the Escort Fleet with Special Guest Cdr Salamander, Part 2

Links

Alex Clarke is the producer of The Bilge Pumps podcast.

Contact the CIMSEC podcast team at [email protected].