We’ve made it to Episode 17 and the Bilge Pumps crew have been joined this week by the exceptional Prof. Sal Mercogliano (@mercoglianos), who is joining us to discuss pod propulsion, incremental manning, and all sorts of other fun and interesting things which could be coming to a national navy near you just as soon as they pay proper attention to the merchant navy.
Sal is the History Professor at Campbell University, an Adjunct USMMA, a prolific maritime historian, a merchant mariner, Captain-Northwest Harnett VFD, and an all-around brilliant passionate advocate for the sea and maritime security.
So after all that what is Episode 17 about? Well the #Bilgepumps team are being topical of course, what can be learned from things like the RMS Queen Mary or the Rolls Royce Experiments in uncrewed ships, the real question is will Alex or Drach crack the first bad joke or pun?
#Bilgepumps is still a new series and new avenue, and although possibly no longer having the new car smell, we are getting the impression that it’s liked. But now we need you. Do you have suggestions for topics? Comments on how we could improve? Or most importantly, ideas for artwork, then please either tweet them to us the Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepumps) at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).
The Challenge: Growing Uncertainty and Tensions in the South China Sea
Over the last decade, stability in the South China Sea (SCS) has progressively deteriorated because of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) actions. China’s leadership has followed a long-term, multi-pronged strategy. On the military front they have constructed a “Great Wall of Sand”1 through island building, deployed an underwater “Great Wall of Sensors;”2 and completed detailed planning and preparations to establish air defense identification zones3(ADIZ) in the SCS. Despite assurances from the highest levels of the CCP leadership, they have militarized islands in the SCS,4deployed bombers to the Paracels5 and built up military forces in the region.6 Diplomatically, the CCP has ignored international legal rulings, continued to assert sovereignty over disputed territories,7 and sought to dissuade, protest, and prevent Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS).8 On the commercial front, the CCP has encouraged its large fishing fleet to overfish within other states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs).9 When confronted, they have often harassed local fisherman and even purposely collided with them, leading to sinking vessels.10
A key feature of the CCP’s approach has been an attempt to calibrate individual disruptive and provocative actions in the SCS (and elsewhere) below the international threshold for armed conflict. As a result, responses from individual states, or coordinated action from nations with common interests, have been limited. The U.S. and other nations have requested clarity from the CCP or simply disregarded China’s unlawful and unfounded maritime claims. The only other notable responses have been the establishment of a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), a series of FONOPS, and the use of limited but targeted sanctions.11 A recent indicator of the state of increasing tensions in the region is the establishment of a new “crisis communications” mechanism between the U.S. and China,12 as well as reportedly strict orders from CCP leadership to avoid initiating fire,13 in an attempt to avoid sudden armed escalation in the SCS.
With hindsight, it is unmistakably clear that the CCP’s collective actions have been in support of a long-term strategy. It is equally apparent that traditional instruments of diplomacy and military power have had limited practical effect against incremental sub-threshold actions. Because no nation has a desire for escalation, the CCP’s strategy must be countered with sub-threshold asymmetric actions by the U.S. and allies. These actions must capture the CCP leadership’s attention, help them to understand that their provocations are taken seriously, and that there are corresponding negative consequences.
Aiki is a fundamental principle in Japanese martial arts philosophy that encapsulates the idea of using minimal exertion and control to negate or redirect an adversary’s strength to achieve advantage. The legitimacy of the CCP’s leadership rests on a core foundation of economic strength and growth, as well as prestige. Due to China’s geography, the principal artery of this economic growth is through the maritime approaches of the SCS. The most direct way to affect CCP behavior is to consider how the free flow of goods and energy at sea through the maritime approaches of the SCS may be altered. And by alternating these maritime flows, further impacts and restructuring of trade-flows and global supply chains may also occur.
No Good Options: Considering Maritime Asymmetric Strategies
Since the end of World War II, the overwhelming might of the U.S. Navy has guaranteed freedom of the oceans and ever-increasing maritime commercial activity that has lifted countless people out of poverty around the world. However, there are many indications of the American public’s growing desire for a retreat from the forms of global engagement that have been the norm since the Japanese Instrument of Surrender was signed 75 years ago on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay.14 Over the last two decades, the ship inventory and material readiness of the U.S. Navy have noticeably declined, while the PLAN has emerged as a regional naval power with increasing capabilities. Future American naval recapitalization efforts are likely to face the twin headwinds of a lack of political will and increasing pressure on defense budgets. Efforts to encourage allies to increase defense spending and concentrate on effective capabilities will continue, while suggestions to “lead from behind” will likely increase.
The core of American naval strategy will continue to be to fight an “away game” when required. The U.S. Navy will still be the world-leading force with its substantial naval power and effectiveness, even if no longer in quantity, and will contribute massively to global security, despite the growing pressures. However, in the next decade, the U.S. is likely to find it increasingly difficult to project power whenever and wherever it wants, as it had grown accustomed to since the end of the Cold War.
For these reasons asymmetric strategies must be developed by the U.S. and key allies, both as a hedge against decline and to act as force multipliers. The imperative is not new. When the U.S. Navy’s inventory began to first noticeably decline during the 2000s, the idea of a 1,000-ship navy gained prominence.15 This was more of a conceptual framework and a call for expanding cooperation, than a significant change in activities or force structure. The U.S. Navy has for decades used multinational task group exercises and interoperability training with allied navies to increase capability. Concepts have also been developed to use conventional weapons in asymmetric “hedgehog” strategies, particularly by key allies and partners, but these are mainly meant to be used if, and when, a conflict arises. What is needed is for the U.S. to help its allies and key partners to cooperatively develop comprehensive maritime-based asymmetric sub-threshold strategies to respond to the CCP’s activities and incursions.
Since antiquity, the oceans have been a venue for naval powers, big and small, to clash in pursuit of their respective national interests.16 If American maritime power recedes, local power vacuums will eventually be filled. The chances for naval conflict will increase between regional hegemons, like China, and smaller states, especially those with predominantly coastal navies. For the broader Indo-Pacific region, and especially in the SCS, several key factors further increase the odds of conflict. The number of small surface combatants in the Indo-Pacific has greatly increased (Figure 1) as well as the number of nations acquiring and operating them (Figure 2). This growth in small surface combatants is in direct response to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that gave each nation an incentive to protect its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). All navies have the following basic options at their disposal: fleet engagement, blockade, raids on commerce (guerre de course), and raiding (guerre d’razzia).
Figure 1. Number of Small Naval Surface Combatants (50-4,000 tons displacement), 1980-2014, by Region, with China featured. (Click to expand)17
Most small navies have neither the means nor the strategic interests to seek out a climactic fleet engagement. Traditional sea control is beyond the means of smaller coastally oriented navies. Instead, they seek to defend the sovereignty of their EEZ and maintain a force that is credible enough to deter aggression by being capable of exacting a heavy price from their adversary, even if they have no chance of defeating a larger foe.18 Sea denial approaches typically focus on the use of shore-based missiles and aircraft, sea mines, torpedoes, submarines, and fast attack surface combatants. Technological advances have allowed for increasingly more capable missiles to be effectively deployed on smaller combatants, as well as from land. But these are less useful against sub-threshold actions. Likewise, blockades are difficult to implement effectively and have a high probability of leading to escalation, especially over time.19
Effective asymmetric strategies are needed. There are options beyond sea control and sea denial, primarily sea disruption or harassment: raids on commerce (guerre de course) and raiding (guerre d’razzia).20
Figure 2: Small Naval Surface Combatants (50-4,000 tons displacement) of Asia, 1980-2014.(Click to expand)21
Commerce raiding is resource-intensive and typically best employed during a protracted war. Historically, it has been carried out by a near-peer navy, or at minimum, a navy that enjoys a specific technological or geographic advantage. The U-boat enabled Germany to use this approach against Great Britain and the U.S during both World Wars. This was also part of the U.S. Navy’s strategy against Japan from 1942-45. The nascent American Navy in both the American Revolution and War of 1812 was no match for a direct confrontation with the Royal Navy, but successfully conducted limited commerce raiding against Great Britain because of favorable geography and the technical superiority of its frigates over their Royal Navy counterparts. Guerre de course does not seek to achieve a direct naval result, but to diminish the national will of an adversary through protracted economic pain. Ultimately, guerre de course is not a good option for a small coastal navy because the convoy is an effective counter-strategy, as has been demonstrated from antiquity, through the Anglo-Dutch Wars, to the Napoleonic Era and 20th Century wars.
Generalized raiding has a long historical tradition as an asymmetric approach to maritime strategy. This was especially prevalent before the modern era, when weaker central governments did not have the resources to maintain highly trained standing navies. With the advent of strong central governments and professional navies, guerre d’razzia fell out of favor with major powers because it was ultimately counterproductive to their respective hegemony. Since the age of steam and steel, the disparity in capabilities between major navies and all others has grown so large that guerre d’razzia became rare and highly localized. Its use dwindled to specific regions where a major power could use a smaller ally as a skirmisher against a major power adversary.
Coupled with longer-term efforts for economic sanctions, increased patrols, direct support, capacity building and collective statements,22 such a guerre d’razzia strategy could be revived in the SCS. A robust asymmetric strategy of guerre d’razzia could include maritime irregulars, privateers/raiders, and proxy forces employed in hit-and-run raids on commercial ships. Maritime raiding requires speed, deniability, non-uniform assets, and the ability to blend back into the local surroundings. Coastal navies could employ these sub-threshold/gray zone tactics to minimize a regional great power’s conventional military response to their provocations. Of course, there would be a certain irony of nations employing maritime “guerrilla tactics” against the CCP. Guerre d’razzia may be enticing to some states, because the economic dimension of Chinese power remains at the forefront of the CCP leadership’s thinking, especially with the continued slowing of the Chinese economy.
However, this would be antithetical and illiberal to the predominant view of an international rules-based order. By upholding a rules-based order in the SCS, the U.S. has been a key enabler of ensuring the conditions for Chinese economic growth and power, as well as gray zone methods of coercion. Until recently, the U.S. has accepted the role as the world’s security guarantor, especially in critically important maritime zones. As a result, the U.S. and key allies have continued to ensure the free flow of commerce across the entirety of the SCS, while the PRC has simultaneously been free-riding and increasingly provocative. But what else can be done?
The Least Bad Option: Rerouting the Sea Lanes
Some have rationalized their acceptance of the militarization of the islands in the SCS on the basis that it was unlikely to affect commercial shipping directly.23 However, the steady deterioration of the situation in the SCS should encourage skepticism of those assumptions. The CCP’s continued provocative actions in the SCS have negatively affected the long-guaranteed security in the region for all. The dependability and predictability of shipping transits through the SCS sea lanes have become increasingly uncertain.
The U.S. and its regional allies and partners should recognize the reality of this major shift and adapt accordingly to establish a new major maritime trade route. This would re-route the preponderance of maritime traffic not destined for China from the Strait of Malacca through the Java Sea and the Makassar Strait, then the Celebes Sea, and north along the east side of the Philippines (Figure 3), instead of around the Spratly Islands. This approach would only increase shipping times by a few days and ensure maritime trade flows to key allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan. By rerouting shipping around the South China Sea, the volume of maritime traffic that China could threaten or coerce would decrease and correspondingly diminish its leverage.
Figure 3. Shipping Routes Through the South China Sea (CSBA Graphic). Shipping Flows (various cargo types) in the Indo-Pacific (top left ); simplified primary shipping routes used today in the South China Sea (bottom left); proposed alternative primary shipping routes (right).[Click to expand]24The U.S. should declare that until further notice, it will only ensure the security of shipping trade flows in the southern half of the SCS. Even without immediate crisis or war, the U.S. administration could announce that due to CCP actions, including illegal island building and militarization, the U.S. can no longer guarantee the security of shipping in the specific region of the northern half of SCS (above the Spratly Islands). It should urge China to return to recognizing and adhering to long-standing international norms, or the effect will be a permanent re-routing of key global shipping. The U.S. should be clear that shipping will still be protected for all ASEAN states bordering the SCS (e.g. Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Cambodia), all of which can be accessed via the southern half, and with transits closely following the coastline, particularly in the case of Vietnam and the Philippines. Shipping flows to Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan will continue to be protected, and it will continue to be in their mutual interest to support the establishment and patrols of this alternative route that avoids the most contested parts of the SCS. A corresponding presidential direction to INDOPACOM would ensure that FONOPS would still be conducted throughout the entirety of the SCS, but that protection of shipping is no longer “guaranteed” in the northern half.
By focusing on the southern half of the SCS, potential vulnerabilities from China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands would be minimized, while still ensuring critical shipping flows to regional states. This would prioritize the scope of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard activities,25 while still conducting FONOPS in the northern half of the SCS, as desired. The U.S. must emphasize to Indo-Pacific nations that this is not ceding the SCS to become effectively a Chinese “lake,” but instead reassure them that the objective is to re-route global shipping traffic to a more free, open, predictable, and stable alternative.
Understandably, the main consideration for global shipping is security and stability to enable predictable schedules. The U.S. and like-minded countries should encourage this alternative routing, for stability and predictability, and so maritime forces can be better used to collectively ensure shipping in a much safer and less contentious new route. Inevitable outrage or backlash from the CCP will only help to re-enforce the urgent need for implementing this approach.
By shifting the preponderance of maritime traffic out of the northern half of the SCS, especially those sailing to non-Chinese destinations, this would also make the task of target deconfliction easier in the undesirable event of future hostilities. This is especially important within close proximity to the sophisticated surveillance and weapons capabilities China has deployed on many of the artificial islands.26 Vessels remaining in the northern half of the SCS would likely be destined for Chinese ports, or be military vessels, which would enable other strategies, such as sea denial or blockades to be much easier to execute when necessary. Attempts to disrupt or attack vessels following the alternative shipping route outside of the SCS would be more difficult due to its proximity to allied territory where combined sea, air, and land would be available to provide substantial and effective support and safety.
Some piracy already occurs in the SCS.27 However, without the express guarantee of securing the shipping lanes in the northern half of the SCS, a corresponding increase in piracy and raiding-like activity may follow, concentrating to this geography. An uptick in this activity may be a result of the obvious pursuit of plunder, or potentially some states opportunistically enacting a limited guerre d’razzia strategy. Commerce raiding in the northern SCS would be unlikely to affect the Chinese economy directly, given its massive size. However, the unfortunate occurrence of commerce raiding would likely require the PLAN to become encumbered with dealing with local problems, chasing asymmetric ghosts at sea.
Conclusion
If select states were to employ maritime guerilla warfare in a limited and targeted way in the northern half of the SCS, China would have a clear glimpse of the implications of a world without the U.S. Navy and allies and partners guaranteeing the free flow of shipping. This would be a stark reminder of the key differences between a regional great power and the constructive and rules-based role of a global hegemon. This continued activity would further incentivize the restructure of trade flows and global supply chains, particularly away from the instability associated with transiting to Chinese ports, and instead to ASEAN countries. Key Indo-Pacific nations could more effectively employ their fleets of coast guard vessels and small combatants to support limited-range convoy escorts along the new routes, as well as fisheries patrols, enabling them to contribute more to their own security and the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, while avoiding a hyper-localized region of instability.
It is time for the U.S. and key allies to refocus their efforts and enact an effective response in the South China Sea by re-routing the sea lanes for peace, stability, and freedom for all nations of the Indo-Pacific that adhere to international law and rules-based order.
Christopher Bassler is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
Matthew McCarton is a Senior Strategist at Alion Science and Technology Corporation.
4. https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/its-official-xi-jinping-breaks-his-non-militarization-pledge-in-the-spratlys/; and https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818
9. https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/china-illegal-fishing-fleet/; and https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3097929/chinese-fishing-boats-near-galapagos-have-cut-satellite
10. https://csis-ilab.github.io/cpower-viz/csis-china-sea/; and https://maritime-executive.com/article/report-chinese-vessel-rams-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-s-china-sea
14. Zeihan, Peter, Disunited Nations: The Scramble for Power in an Ungoverned World, Harper Business, 2020.
15. McGrath, Bryan G. “1,000-Ship Navy and Maritime Strategy,” Proceedings, January 2007.
16. Rodgers, William L., Admiral (USN), Greek and Roman Naval Warfare: A Study of Strategy, Tactics, and Ship Design from Salamis (480 B.C.) to Actium (31 B.C.) Naval Institute Press, 1937; Rodgers, William L., Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.), Naval Warfare Under Oars; 4th to 16th Centuries, Naval Institute Press, 1940.
17. McCarton, Matthew, A Brief History of Small Combatants- Their Evolution and Divergence in the Modern Era, Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) – Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD) report, September 2014.
18. Borresen, Jacob, “The Seapower of the Coastal State,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 17, 1994 -Issue 1: SEAPOWER: Theory and Practice
20. Armstrong, B.J. Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy, University of Oklahoma Press, 2019.
21. McCarton, Matthew, A Brief History of Small Combatants- Their Evolution and Divergence in the Modern Era, Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) – Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD) report, September 2014.
24. Top left in Babbage, Ross (ed.), “Which Way the Dragon? Sharpening Allied Perceptions of China’s Strategic Trajectory” CSBA Report, 2020; with data from Kiln and University College London, “Visualization of Global Cargo Ships,” (available at: https://www.shipmap.org/). The passage frequency and routing of different types of ships is indicated by the colored lines. Yellow = container ships, Mid-blue = dry bulk carriers, Red = tankers, Light blue= bulk gas carriers, Pink = vehicle carriers
Featured Image: China’s sole aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, arrives in Hong Kong waters on July 7, 2017, less than a week after a high-profile visit by president Xi Jinping. (Photo via AFP/Anthony Wallace)
ASEAN and its members are in an increasingly dangerous dilemma. They are under mounting pressure to choose between the U.S. and China in their competition for political and military preeminence in the region. In response, ASEAN member states are maneuvering to maintain their ‘neutrality’ and pursue ASEAN ‘centrality’ in international affairs affecting the region. Their perspectives and roles in this great power competition merit closer examination, as well as how they are adapting to it, and what—if anything—ASEAN can do.
Over the past year, China has taken actions that have alarmed rival South China Sea claimants and stoked the U.S. narrative that China is a threat to the region. Because these small and medium states — alone or in combination — are no military match for China, their response has been to maneuver diplomatically, both openly and behind the scenes. However, the U.S. sees this situation as an opportunity to further its own agenda vis a vis China and co-opt these states in the process.
On July 13 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo heightened tensions by announcing a ‘new’ policy on the South China Sea. The statement’s political core was that “America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources. The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire.” Pompeo vowed that “We will support countries…who recognize that China has violated their legal territorial claims and maritime claims as well . . . We will provide them the assistance we can, whether that’s in multilateral bodies, whether that’s in ASEAN, whether that’s through legal responses. We will use all the tools we can . . .” (emphasis added). This could include military means.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has outlined an across-the-board reorientation of the Department of Defense with the goal of countering China’s influence in Asia. He has said that strengthening partnerships with Southeast Asian nations will provide the U.S. with an “asymmetric advantage” over China.
The U.S. followed these statements up with a diplomatic full court presson Southeast Asian countries to join it in its campaign against China’s policies and actions in the South China Sea. Pompeo called several key ASEAN foreign ministers seeking their support for the ramped up U.S. initiative. But he apparently did not receive the hoped-for response. Indeed, regional reactions ranged from cautious to negative.
The principle target of the U.S. policy clarification was ASEAN and in particular China’s rival claimants within it: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. But the response of ASEAN was underwhelming. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers collectively issued an unremarkable statement on ASEAN’s 53rd anniversary reaffirming their intent to maintain Southeast Asia as “a region of peace, security, neutrality and stability” amid “growing uncertainties resulting from the changing geopolitical dynamics in the regional and global landscape.”
As William Choong of the Singapore based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute put it, “Challenging China on values and democracy was ‘not going to take off’ in Southeast Asia. We are not going to see the same kind of pushback that the U.S. expects to see in ASEAN. This whole confronting China and kicking down the front door, I don’t think that’s an ASEAN way.” Some states are also concerned that like during the Cold War they could become the pawns or surrogates of great powers and suffer consequences.
Moreover, if the U.S. implements the policy, it will be a double-edged sword. As Shahriman Lockman of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia argued, the U.S presence “has the effect of both deterring but also potentially escalating matters with China…The worst-case scenario is for things to escalate, and then the U.S. gets distracted by something in the Middle East, and we get saddled with more Chinese ships in our waters.”
Some are also concerned that even if they cooperate, the U.S. commitment may not continue. Indeed, some suspect that this offensive may just be a last-minute, superficial ploy to help Trump in his re-election campaign.
As Joseph Liow of Singapore’s National Technical University says, “While U.S. patrols are instrumental to regional security, no ASEAN state would ever declare that because they do not want to be seen siding with Washington against Beijing.”
Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi attending the virtual Asean Informal Action Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in June 2020. (Photo courtesy of the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry)
Indonesia and Singapore have remained neutral regarding this new American aggressiveness. Indonesia said that any country’s support for Indonesian rights in the Natuna Sea is “normal.” Its Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, added, “ASEAN must always cooperate to maintain our regional peace and stability and not be dragged into the storm of geopolitical tension or be forced to choose sides.” Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Hishamuddin Hussein struck a similar note, saying Malaysia must ensure it is not “dragged and trapped” in a political tug of war between great powers. Hishamuddin is particularly concerned that the China-U.S. struggle could split ASEAN.
President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines publicly stated that he will form policies regarding China that are in its best interests—not necessarily those of others, including the U.S. Even Vietnam, China’s leading regional critic, did not call out China by name in response to Pompeo’s statement but only “welcomed countries’ positions on the South China Sea that are in line with international laws.”
There are good reasons why these countries have difficulty choosing between the two. While they may be more ideologically aligned with the U.S., many have economic and longer-term geopolitical reasons like relative proximity to China that make them reluctant to openly confront it militarily or diplomatically – even with U.S. backing. Beijing will likely use the economic needs of these nations as leverage to prevent their unity against China. As such, Pompeo’s policy clarification overestimated Southeast Asian countries’ overt supportiveness.
It was never realistic to think ASEAN and its South China Sea claimants would automatically support the United States and its increasing emphasis on great power competition with China. Other than perhaps Vietnam – and its support for military intervention is questionable – it is doubtful that backing up the specifics with threats of force will be welcomed in Southeast Asia. These states are already particularly concerned with the military buildup in the region by both superpowers.
A more aggressive U.S. diplomatic and military posture could force regional nations to choose between it and China, and the U.S. may not like the outcome. Indeed, the U.S. is discovering the hard way (e.g. the Philippines) that its soft power relationships in Southeast Asia are neither as deep nor as enduring as it thought. The only way to rebuild the integrity and robustness of its relationships with Southeast Asian nations is for it to demonstrate respect and awareness of their self-defined national interests to a degree equal to its own.
ASEAN countries could contribute to conflict avoidance by individually or preferably multilaterally expressing opposition to the U.S. and Chinese military presence. There has already been some movement in this direction. After one incident in October 2018, Ng Eng Hen, Defense Minister of Singapore, a U.S. strategic partner, said that“Some of the [US-China] incidents are from assertion of principles, but we recognize that the price of any physical incident is one that is too high and unnecessary to either assert or prove your position.”
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte has said that the threat of confrontation and trouble in the waterway comes from outside the region. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad then argued that“if the strategy does not include sending the Seventh Fleet into the area, we are welcome to that…big warships [in the South China Sea] may cause incidents and that will lead to tension.” In response to the new U.S. statement, Malaysia’s new Foreign Minister Hishamuddin Hussein called for the big powers “to avoid military posturing.”
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has said that it is “important for ASEAN to keep sending out messages to great powers involved in the dispute to maintain regional peace and stability in the South China Sea.” Considering previous relevant statements by high-level Indonesian government officials, this appears to be a plea to both China and the U.S. to cool tensions and exercise more restraint in their military operations in the region.
However, ASEAN is far from united on this issue—in part because it primarily concerns China’s rival claimants: Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. So far the voicing of these concerns has not had the desired effect. An escalating and strengthening chorus of concern could help reduce the potential for conflict and confrontation. As ASEAN states run out of diplomatic maneuvering space, this may become their only option other than openly casting their lot with either the U.S. or China.
Mark J. Valencia is an adjunct senior scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China.
Featured Image: Participants of the ASEAN Regional Forum Retreat pose for a photo in Singapore, Singapore, August 4, 2018. (State Department Photo)
Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean revolves around retaining preeminence across the body of water, tacitly seen as India’s Ocean; a term implying if not hegemony, then at least a sort of regional leadership and regional preeminence. The External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was explicit at the Indian Ocean Conference held in the Maldives in September 2019 that India’s “core interests are in Indian Ocean,” that “the fact remains that where India can really make a difference is in the Indian Ocean itself,” and that the Indian Ocean is for India “a natural arena for its influence and of overriding security consequence.” Jaishankarwent on in March 2020 to argue in a speech titled “Emerging Geopolitical Landscapes” that “where maritime security is concerned, India has emerged as a key player, especially in the Indian Ocean.”
Indian strategy in and for the Indian Ocean during the 2010s has been threefold: building up its naval-maritime infrastructure (bases and support facilities), building up power projection assets, and strengthening relations with increasingly China-concerned powers.
Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean during the 2010s has involved building up its naval infrastructure out from the Indian subcontinent. This has involved development of military facilities on the Lakshadweep archipelago off the western coast, but even more so on the larger Andaman and Nicobar archipelago on the other eastern side of the Bay of Bengal at the head of the Malacca Strait.
This has also involved support facilities with sympathetic partners like Oman (Duqm), Iran (Chabahar), Madagascar, Mauritius, and Singapore. A common sub-theme is India trying to avert Chinese penetration of Indian Ocean micro-island states and littorals, where China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is considered by Delhi as detrimental to Indian interests. In that vein, the Indian Navy has established Joint Exclusive Economic Zone surveillance exercises with the navies of the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius; and Coordinated Patrols (CORPATs) with the navies of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean during the 2010s also involved building up its naval assets, headed by aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. The Indian Navy currently operates one aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya (a refurbished Soviet carrier), while the second, INS Vikrant, is under construction in Cochin, ready to commence her basin trials in September 2020, due for delivery in 2021, and active commissioning expected in 2022. Both vessels have a displacement of around 45,000 tons each. A third aircraft carrier, INS Vishal, a 65,000-ton giant with 54 aircraft, is envisaged for the longer term. India’s Navy chief Admiral Karambir Singh reiterated in December 2019 that the force’s long-term capability planning envisaged the induction of three aircraft carriers so that two are continuously available for deployment in the Indian Ocean Region, one by the Western Command, and one by the Eastern Command. The Indian Navy is expected to push for a grant of Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) clearance for the third carrier, the IAC- 2, soon.
This building up of India’s naval assets represents internal balancing. Yet the navy’s share in the defense budget declined from an 18 percent high in 2012 to a lower 13 percent by 2019-2020. Due to recent budget constraints, the requirement of 200 ships has been brought down to 175. Moreover, in February 2020 Chief of Defence Staff General Bain Rabat indicated that in competitions for resources the acquisition of new submarines might take priority over aircraft carriers.
An Indian Navy flotilla of the Western Fleet escorts carriers INS Vikramaditya (R33) and INS Viraat (R22) in the Arabian Sea (Wikimedia Commons)
Thirdly, Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean in the 2010s involved strengthening cooperation in the Indian Ocean with other significant external (U.S. and Japan) and internal (France, Australia, and Indonesia) actors. Diplomatic milestones for this line of effort include:
All three elements of India’s maritime strategy are implicit levers to constrain and manage the otherwise growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. This implicit leverage was demonstrated at the start of 2020 at the Raisina Dialogue, held January 14-16, which included a panel titled “Fluid Fleets: Navigating Tides of Revision in the Indo-Pacific.” On the panel, India’s Chief of Naval Staff Karambir Singh sat alongside Australia’s Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral David Johnston, Japan’s Chief of Staff, General Koji Yamazaki, France’s Deputy Director of Strategy at the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, Luc de Rancourt, and the U.K.’s Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Tony Radakin. At that discussion, Admiral Singh noted of China that “they have seven to eight warships in the Indian Ocean at any given time [.…] We are watching. If anything impinges on us, we will act”; to which he gave the then-recent example of the Indian Navy escorting Chinese ships out of their sensitive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in December 2019.
During 2020, two unexpected events signally affected India’s maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean. In retrospect it was no surprise that the biannual Naval Commanders’ Conference held in August 2020 particularly focused on the entry and operations of “extra-regional” forces (read: China) in the Indian Ocean Region, and operational procurements. The Ministry of Defence said that the Commanders Conference “assumes greater significance in the backdrop of recent events on our northern borders [Galwan] and the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19.” Both of these issues are affecting India’s maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean.
COVID-19 and Its Impact
COVID-19 first hit India in January 2020, with national lockdowns introduced in March, but cases were still spreading rapidly. Current figures recorded in late September listed India as having 5,487,580 confirmed cases, second only to the U.S.’ 6,883,931. India’s confirmed COVID-19 deaths number at 87,882 (third behind U.S.’ 200,710 and Brazil’s 136,895). The resulting impact of COVID-19 on Indian maritime strategy for the Indian Ocean has been fivefold.
Firstly, it disrupted basin trials of India’s second aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, due in September 2020, with commissioning now delayed until September 2021. Secondly, Indian regional naval diplomacy was disrupted as the biannual MILAN itineration, due to be held in March 2020, was cancelled. In one sense this was a setback for Indian naval diplomacy, yet after a record number of invites (41, but not including Pakistan or China) and acceptances (over 30), it still showed India’s increased status in the Indian Ocean in 2020.
COVID-19 also meant that the INDRA exercises with Russia in September 2020 were restricted to at-sea only. Nevertheless, India’s readiness (matched by Russia) to deploy two warships and a supply tanker in the Bay of Bengal indicated India’s natural focus and locational advantage in these waters. They also were subtle message for China that its close links were not exclusive, and that China could not necessarily rely on Russia in any China-India conflict.
The pandemic enabled India to extend COVID-related assistance to various Indian Ocean states. This was on show in June 2020 with Mission Sagar, which India claimed was “a major milestone in India’s engagement with Indian Ocean region countries.” There, the landing ship INS Kesari was sent to the Maldives, Mauritius, Comoros, Seychelles, and Madagascar, complete with teams of healthcare professionals, medicines, and food onboard to help with pandemic response. Meanwhile, India’s naval might was on show in Operation Samudra Setu (Sea Bridge), in May 2020. There, INS Jalaswa and INS Magar, dispatched from India’s Southern Command at Kochi and escorted by other warships of the Western Fleet, brought back over 600 COVID-threatened Indian citizens from the Maldives.
Structurally, India slid into marked economic downturn as the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated during summer 2020. Its economy shrank 23.9 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2020. A 4.2 percent GDP growth for 2019-2020 (in slow decline since January 2018) is already set to be replaced by a negative 3.2 percent figure in 2020-2021. The result is that India’s capitalization program is under threat, and the drive to initiate a three-aircraft carrier program is threatened with delay at best and cancellation at worst.
Galwan and its Impact
The second major challenge facing India in 2020 was deadly confrontation with China. This was sharpest at the Galwan Valley, where China objected to Indian moves up the valley. Confrontation between forces escalated in mid-June 2020, with 20 Indian soldiers reported as killed in direct fighting with Chinese troops.
Eventual pullbacks of forces were halting and uneasily carried out in late July, but with further warnings coming from India on August 30. The Foreign Ministers’ joint press statement released by Jaishankar and Wang Yi may have had a five-point plan of action, but hardly represents something new, and left vague calls for “new confidence building measures” without any substance. Yet clearly India’s focus firmly remains on its land frontier, and the swathe of confrontation points that have opened up. The Indian Parliament was updated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on September 15:
“As of now, the Chinese side has mobilized a large number of troops and armaments along the LAC as well as in the depth areas. There are several friction areas in Eastern Ladakh including Gogra, Kongka La and North and South Banks of the Pangong Lake. In response to China’s actions, our armed forces have also made appropriate counter deployments in these areas to ensure that India’s security interests are fully protected.”
However, the extended confrontation and continuing standoff at Galwan has had an ambiguous two-fold impact on Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean. On the one hand this has contributed to a further deterioration in India-China relations, both at the government level, and in terms of wider public opinion. China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean is all the more perceived in India as a threat to Indian interests, and part of a disadvantageous encirclement policy by China and an increasingly encircled position for India. On the other hand, the extended land confrontation and growing friction along the Himalayas reinforces a landward imperative and encourages reinforcement of India’s army and air force presence along its northern flank, which could come at the expense of naval acquisitions.
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, center, visits Ladakh in July 2020 after deadly clashes between Chinese and Indian troops (Indian Press Information Bureau)
In the wake of Galwan, India has accelerated weapons purchases. India’s Ministry of Defence announced on July 2 that “in the current situation and the need to strengthen the Armed Forces for the defence of our borders” arms procurement projects worth U.S.$5.55 billion were approved. These included long-range land-attack missile systems with a range of 1,000 kilometres and Astra missiles featuring beyond visual range capability. Both “will bolster the attack capabilities of the Navy,” and “will serve as a force multiplier and immensely add to the strike capability of the Navy.”
The Indian Navy argument is that Chinese aggression in the Himalayas generates the need for a stronger Indian position in the Indian Ocean, in the face of related Chinese expansion there. Even as India reinforced its troop levels on its northern flank, simultaneously in the wake of Galwan, India’s navy was deploying more actively and dispatched in greater strength around the Malacca Strait. The navy thereby demonstrating India’s potential to threaten China’s sea lines of communication, the so-called Malacca Dilemma facing Beijing. The Indian Navy has also been pushing a sense of urgency for “Acceptance of Necessity” (AoN) for a third aircraft carrier, which has been pending since 2015.
Certainly, India has immediately sought to strengthen its own position in the Indian Ocean, through an extra focus on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The geopolitical and military value of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands remain tangible. In conjunction with the Indian littoral and the Eastern Command at Vishvakapman, India’s possession of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands provides a firm enclosure of the Bay of Bengal, and a chokepoint onto the Malacca Strait.
Location of the Andaman islands, found east of India and northwest of the Malacca Strait (Wikimedia Commons)
Consequently, exercises in which several destroyers and frigates were joined by maritime patrol aircraft were conducted around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in July 2020. Headed by the Eastern Command naval chief Rear Admiral Sanjay Vatsayan, units came from the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), the Eastern Naval Command, and with some warships deployed near the Malacca Strait also taking part. Submarine hunting Poseidon-8I aircraft, complete with Harpoon Block-II missiles, torpedoes, rockets, and depth charges were dispatched from their base at INS Rajali naval air station in Arakkonam (Tamil Nadu). They were seen as sending “a signal to China” according to the Times of India on July 18.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a point of visiting the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in August 2020. This marked a explicit focus on the strategic importance of these islands by Modi:
“The Indian Ocean has been the centre of India’s trade and strategic prowess for thousands of years. Now that India is following the new policy and practice of trade and cooperation in Indo-Pacific, the importance of our islands including Andaman and Nicobar has increased further.”
Extending Strategic Cooperation in the Indian Ocean with France, Japan, Australia, and the U.S.
A tacit development since Galwan has been a push by India to strengthen its partnerships with other powers operating in the Indian Ocean that also have concerns about China’s assertiveness.
India’s support from the U.S. in the Indian Ocean continued to strengthen in 2020. India was more than happy with U.S. endorsement in February 2020 in their Strategic Convergence in the Indo-Pacific(part of their “Vision and Principles” Joint Statement) that “the United States appreciates India’s role as a net provider of security, as well as developmental and humanitarian assistance in the Indian Ocean Region.” The term “net provider of security” describes India as taking a leading regional role and providing security for others beyond India’s own immediate needs. Delivery of advanced American-made Sikorsky anti-submarine helicopters, with China in mind, was accelerated in May 2020. July 2020 also witnessed naval drills with the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group in the Andaman Sea.
India’s relationship with France has also deepened. The two navies conducted joint patrols around Reunion in March 2020. These joint activities with France represent an operationalization of the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) that India signed with France in 2018. The LSA has expanded the presence and the type of naval operations that the Indian Navy is able to undertake in the Southwestern Indian Ocean, given that France has military facilities on the islands of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands – all of which could now be used by India. India can also now tap into France’s base at Djibouti. This in effect further extends India’s strategic footprint and effective area of operation in the Indian Ocean further southward and westward.
June 2020 saw Indian Navy ships INS Rana and INS Kulish exercising with the Japanese Navy ships, JS Kashima and JS Shimayuki. A significant logistics development was the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed in September 2020 between India and Japan. This will enable closer cooperation with Japan in the Indian Ocean, with Japanese access to the Andaman and Nicobar islands being likely, reciprocated with Indian access to Japan’s base at Djibouti.
Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force sailors look upon INS Rana during a joint exercise in June 2020 (Photo via JMSDF Twitter)
Relations with Australia moved forward noticeably in 2020. Their summit in June 2020 witnessed their joint Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. It also witnessed their Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA). From India’s point of view this enables Indian use of military facilities on Australian territory in the Eastern Indian Ocean, notably Christmas Island and Cocos Island. This in effect further extends India’s strategic footprint and effective area of operation in the Indian Ocean further eastward. INS Sahyadri and INS Karmuk also carried out anti-air bilateral exercises with the Australian Navy in the eastern Indian Ocean in September.
India has also further strengthened its strategic position in the Indian Ocean with two new trilaterals.
The first India-France-Australia trilateral dialogue was held in September 2020. Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Foreign Secretary of India, met French and Australian counterparts, held virtually due to the pandemic. Their statedfocus was “economic and geostrategic challenges and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” explicitly with regard to the pandemic, but also implicitly with regard to China. Their mutual support for the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) was stated, as was their common focus on “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific region.” The advantage for India in this new minilateral is that it reduces naval dependence on just cooperation channeled via the United States.
Another new minilateral in the offing. In early September it was announced that External Affairs Minister Jaishankar would be meeting for an upcoming meeting with his Indonesian and Australian Foreign Minister counterparts, with agreement set on maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
A final impending effect of India’s confrontation with China at Galwan is a sense of India now withdrawing its previous hesitations over allowing Australia to participate in the trilateral MALABAR naval exercises currently held between India, the U.S., and Japan. The expected invite to Australia for the next MALABAR exercise in the Bay of Bengal, in Fall 2020, represents Indian acceptance of the so-called “Quad” taking on some military dimensions.
Conclusion
Paradoxically, though COVID-19 has weakened India’s economic ability to fund its naval infrastructure and assets program for the Indian Ocean, it has enabled India to strengthen its links with Indian Ocean micro-states through the humanitarian assistance delivered by the navy. Meanwhile, land confrontation with China at Galwan has encouraged India to deepen its military links with other maritime powers operating in the Indian Ocean. In an unstated but evident balancing fashion, this is enabling India to improve its maritime position in the Indian Ocean vis-à-vis China.
David Scott is an associate member of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. A prolific writer on maritime geopolitics, he can be contacted at [email protected].
Featured Image: Indian Navy destroyer INS Kochi enters Port Victoria, Seychelles. (Photo via Indian Navy spokesperson Twitter)
