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The Training Mandate

This article originally published on the Marine Corps Gazette and is republished with permission.

By Captain William Bradley, USMC

“If a unit is not well trained, its men know it. This fact adversely affects their confidence, especially if they anticipate there is a possibility of using that training in a critical situation. Every soldier likes to feel that he is playing on a winning team—he knows he can’t win if he isn’t well trained.” —Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army

It is through training—through constant realistic and repetitious training of individuals and units—that military organizations acquire the skills they need to succeed on the battlefield. Nothing peacetime leaders do is more important.

Gen. Clarke had a very clear picture of the crucial role individual and unit training played in determining the outcome of an armed conflict. The hallmark of the Marine is his superior preparedness for battle, and the proud heritage of our Corps rests on this very foundation of superior training and discipline. As the din of battle becomes more unknown to a “peacetime” generation of Marine officers, it becomes even more crucial that leaders produce realistic training evolutions that will ensure success on the battlefield and the survival of the young Marines in their charge.

Every Marine officer is by now familiar with FMFM 1, Warfighting and the move to dispel the “zero-defect” mentality from our training and daily operations. But in an increasingly competitive promotion environment, glowing after-action reports often become the ultimate objective of our training evolutions, and our tolerance for risky experimentation is dictated largely by our concern for our own career patterns. Is this an exaggerated description of our current philosophy toward unit training? Perhaps. But who among us can honestly say that our major training evolutions are not heavily influenced to ensure a “successful” outcome? If the Marine Corps is to continue to win on the modern battlefield, we must reexamine our definition of “successful” training and determine to what degree we are really preparing for war as opposed to only ensuring our next promotion. FMFM 1 has this to say about training:

“Exercises should approximate the conditions of battle as much as possible; that is, they should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder and opposing wills…Dictated or canned scenarios eliminate the element of independent, opposing wills that is the essence of combat.”

While we would wholeheartedly agree with this basic tenet of preparation for war, again, who among us can say he has participated in major exercises where “success” was not artificially preordained?

On a larger scale, our major operations serve more as political vehicles than realistic simulations of conflicts we are likely to face. Year after year, we assault the same riverbed in the same locale during Exercise TEAM SPIRIT, with the ground combat element (GCE) headquarters already established ashore and dignitaries lining the beach. The Marine air-ground task force commander enjoys perfect command and control, for his communication battalion arrives 60 days beforehand to ensure it. Exercise GALLANT EAGLE kicks off in a similar manner, with I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters comfortably nestled into Bear Mountain well before the start of “hostilities.”

On the infantry battalion level, how many times do we “lose” a Combined Arms Exercise? How many times has an infantry battalion been decisively engaged with electronic warfare assets during the crucial phases of our perennial assaults up the Delta Corridor?

While recent conflicts have proven the willingness of Third World nations (and the Soviets) to conduct chemical warfare, for how long has any Marine unit trained realistically in a simulated chemical environment? It can be argued that certain artificialities must be maintained on a large scale to provide training for subordinate leaders. Will tomorrow’s adversary, however, be so accommodating as to allow us to comfortably establish our major headquarters and perfect our command and control systems before the advent of hostilities? Will Third World nations shelve their electronic warfare assets because we have not trained in an electronic warfare environment?

Can we be sure that our real enemies in the world will not employ nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against us, particularly when we know they have used these weapons extensively within the past decade?

While on the surface these questions may seem only rhetorical, we as leaders have failed in many ways to train and test ourselves and our Marines against some of the very obstacles we are almost certain to face. Regardless of our military occupational specialty (MOS), we can all reflect upon instances where we enjoyed artificial handicaps that ensured the right outcome for our exercises. George Allen, one of the most successful coaches in National Football League history, did not attain this distinction by constraining his defensive line during practice to ensure the success of his quarterback. Known for his grueling team training, Allen confronted his team with challenges during practice; this paid obvious dividends on the playing field. Is our training of Marines as rigorous and realistic as it could be, or do our exercises smack of “zero-defect” artificiality in the name of overall “success”? This is an important thought to consider, as our success on tomorrow’s battlefield will be measured not on a scoreboard but with the number of casualties we suffer.

Realistic training is just as vital on an individual scale as it is to the grandest of armies. The training of our Marines in individual combat skills is far superior to that received in most armies of the world, yet we must remember that the title “Marine” must be earned every day through continual training for combat. Two significant factors come into play here. First, the individual Marine must have the mental and physical toughness necessary to withstand the horrors of war. Second, the Marine must be so skilled in his MOS that his job will be second nature when it counts. FMFM 1 states that:

“any view of the nature of war would hardly be accurate or complete without consideration of the effects of danger, fear, exhaustion and privation on the men who must do the fighting…”

Although we must provide a safe training environment for our Marines, to what extent do we simulate environments of “danger, fear, exhaustion, and privation” to train in? Recent initiatives by the Commandant, such as Basic Warrior Training and the reinstitution of the School of Infantry for all new recruits, have done much to improve the training of Marines. But all too often we as leaders accept platitudes such as “You don’t have to practice being miserable” to rationalize making our training as painless as possible. But misery is guaranteed in combat, and the more a combatant is accustomed to it, the less it will affect him when his life is on the line.

Of course, training should not be sadistic, but dealing with cold, exhaustion, and adverse elements are skills just as valuable as marksmanship and MOS proficiency. While our defeat in Vietnam was largely due to political constraints, let us not forget the formidability of an enemy whose idea of rest and relaxation was a bowl of rice. Mental toughness cannot be developed in an environment of complacency, where those responsible for training are able to rationalize easing requirements. It is our mandate as leaders to give our young Marines the best chance to come home alive from combat. Coddling them with overly comfortable surroundings in training will not prepare them for the mental and physical challenges they must face.

In his classic Book of Five Rings, Miyamoto Musashi says, “It is a strength of [the warrior] to be able to fight on as usual because of day in, day out practice.” MOS proficiency, like any other learned skill, is a product of continual repetition. Yet how many times have we encountered Marines who were unable to perform rudimentary functions within their area of expertise? Is this their fault or have we failed as leaders?

It is incumbent on us to drill our Marines repeatedly; to have them perform the rudiments of their MOS again and again until all facets of their jobs become second nature. This is a lofty goal, yet one we must strive for. Going back to George Allen, his success rested on the superior training of the individual members of his team. We must all train our team of Marines with that same demand for constant drill and repetition; we pay a much heavier toll for defeat than does a football team.

To subject a unit to repetitious training under difficult conditions would do little to enhance our popularity within our own unit and would probably generate discontent within the ranks of the less disciplined. If world tensions lessen and the prospect of major conflict dims, it will become even more crucial that we as leaders prepare our Marines to fight and win under all kinds of adverse conditions.

Many nations throughout history have suffered terrible defeat because of the poor state of readiness they possessed on both the unit and individual combatant level. It may be difficult to equate the readiness of small units with the fate of a nation, but history has shown us time and again the cost of complacency. Let us not waste the lives of our Marines needlessly because of the political difficulties associated with training them for the realities they are almost certain to encounter in combat.

This article is not intended as an indictment of Marine Corps training as a whole, for our proud heritage continues whenever we are called upon. Nevertheless, we must always ask ourselves if we are really preparing Marines for the challenges they will face. Or do we become complacent, finding it easy to allow ourselves training artificialities that will make us “look good” in the eyes of our seniors? Who among us is willing to risk “failure” in a training environment full of the obstacles we are sure to face in real combat? Those of us who are willing to take that risk may not fare as well at promotion time, but we are more likely to bring our Marines home alive from the next war. 

This article originally published in 1990, and won the 1990 CG MCCDC Leadership Writing Award under the title “To Keep Our Powder Dry.”

Captain Bradley recently completed the Command and Control Systems Course, MCCDC and is currently stationed with 2d MAW Cherry Point.

Featured Image: Students of Martial Arts Instructor Course 2-14 grapple against each other during their final exercise on Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., April 17, 2014. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Ali Azimi/Released)

Distinguishing Rice from Wrong: Important Lessons from the Hamburg Port Drug Bust of 2020

By Dr. Ian Ralby

In the summer of 2020, the Port of Hamburg, Germany, had one of the largest drug busts in its history. On June 26, a container arrived in Hamburg carrying 1.5 tons of cocaine worth roughly $353 million USD. German authorities discovered the large quantity of trafficked narcotics hidden in sacks of rice destined for Poland. Almost every media report to date has talked about the fact that the vessel that carried these drugs into Hamburg was the Malta-flagged, French-owned CMA CGM Jean Gabriel, and almost every media report to date has noted that the sacks of rice containing the cocaine came from Guyana. Oddly, however, the Jean Gabriel had not been to Guyana in 2020. In fact, since its construction in 2017, it has never been to Guyana. Furthermore, the vessel was already on another voyage to South America by the time the drugs were discovered in Hamburg. This begs the question: what is going on here? 

The short answer is: though the media reports did not clarify this, the container of Guyanese rice was actually transshipped in the Dominican Republic, where it embarked the Jean Gabriel before ending up in Germany, where it was being stored for a time before heading to Poland. A closer look at this case and the confused reporting on it shines a light on three key takeaways that will be important for addressing new trends in drug trafficking. 

The Vessel

Though the CMA CGM Jean Gabriel arrived in Hamburg on June 26, the German newspaper Hamburger Abendblatt broke the story of the bust on August 10. In the days following, many other papers and commentators retold what happened, the most in-depth reporting indicating that the rice came from the Berbice Mill in Guyana, where it left port on May 26. None of the initial stories, however, particularly in the international media, clarified that Jean Gabriel was not the vessel that had picked up the rice from Guyana. Indeed, the media largely made it seem that Jean Gabriel had, perhaps knowingly, taken the drugs from Guyana to Hamburg, and a number misreported that the drugs were found on the ship itself. A closer look at the movements of the vessel, however, helps clarify some of the confusion in this reporting.

This Windward image of the Jean Gabriel’s path between May 26, when the cocaine-filled rice shipment left Guyana, and June 27, a day after the vessel arrived in Hamburg, shows that the ship did not go near Guyana (visible between Venezuela and Suriname on the map): 

Track of CMA CGM Jean Gabriel from May 26 to June 27, 2020. (Image from Windward Predictive Maritime Intelligence, wnwd.com. Click to expand.)

Furthermore, examining the port calls during that time, we can see the vessel stopped at the following ports on the following dates, none of which are remotely close to Guyana: 

Date: Port: Duration: 
May 27, 2020 Puerto San Antonio, Chile 2 Days
June 1, 2020 Callao, Peru 1 Day
June 8, 2020 Colon, Panama 11 Hours
June 10, 2020 Cartagena, Colombia 20 Hours
June 12, 2020 Caucedo Andres, Dominican Republic 1 Day
June 23, 2020 Rotterdam, Netherlands 2 Days
June 25, 2020 London, United Kingdom 1 Day
June 26, 2020 Hamburg, Germany 1 Day

Before trying to resolve the uncertainty concerning where the drugs were embarked on the ship, it is worth looking at what happened after Jean Gabriel called in Hamburg. As noted, some media reports, including industry journals, indicated that the drugs were “found onboard a containership docked in the port.” Looking at the movement of the vessel after arrival, however, suggests this was not the case. A day after arriving in Hamburg, the Jean Gabriel was already underway, heading to repeat the route to South America. The following Windward image is of the vessel’s path from June 24, just before it arrived in Hamburg, until August 10 when the story of the drug interdiction broke: 

Path of the CMA CGM Jean Gabriel from June 24 to August 10, 2020. (Image from Windward Predictive maritime Intelligence, wnwd.com. Click to expand.)

These two images, plus the list of port calls, cast serious questions about the accuracy of the reporting on this incident. Even the reports themselves are contradictory, some suggesting the drugs were found on the ship, others once it was in storage. By looking at the ship data on Windward, though, we can tell that the container with the cocaine-filled rice sacks was definitely not embarked in Guyana, and it is highly unlikely that the drugs were discovered while the container was still onboard. The vessel does not appear to have been delayed at all, indicating that the container came off as planned, validating the news stories detailing that the container had been in storage awaiting transshipment to its final destination of Poland before the drugs were discovered.

Drug trafficking in containerized cargo has increased in recent years. A third of all drug trafficking is now estimated to be transported in this fashion, but that comes with a difficult question. Given the volume of the cargo being moved – 90 percent of world trade moves by sea – do the ships have any awareness they are carrying drugs? In many cases the answer has been “no,” as the cargo was loaded and unloaded like any legitimate container. This brings up the first key takeaway: As containerized drug trafficking increases, reporting on it needs to be careful not to accuse or make false and misleading claims about vessels and shipping lines. 

The reporting on this matter made it sound like the CMA CGM Jean Gabriel was involved or somehow responsible. Confused reporting can inadvertently cast aspersions on innocent parties. To date, there has been no indication that the Jean Gabriel, its crew, or CMA CGM was involved in this drug trafficking enterprise – the cartel simply took advantage of the infrastructure of global maritime commerce.

That infrastructure is crucial to our economy and our way of life – goods of all sorts, including basic necessities, flow constantly around the world. Therefore, we must be cautious not to assume connections between what is found in a container and the vessel or line on which it is found. Denigrating shipping lines for inadvertently carrying drugs, rather than assisting them in countering the movement of narcotics, serves only to diminish the free flow of maritime commerce and provide exploitable opportunities for drug cartels. We tread that path to our own detriment.

The Container

Having shown that the Jean Gabriel never went to Guyana, the question remains how the problematic container got on board. The answer can be found in the local coverage of the matter. Stabroek News, a Guyanese paper reporting on the response of the Guyana Rice Development Board (GRDB) to the drug bust, went into depth on how the rice got from the Berbice Mill to the point when it left Guyana. The rice came to the port in several different trucks and was loaded into containers for a consignment to FHU Konpack, a Polish import company. GRDB claims to have followed standard operating procedures in checking the quality of the rice at the mill and then fumigating it at the port. It is not clearly stated, but it seems that there were multiple containers of rice, though the allegation is only one of them contained cocaine. As the report indicates, the containers were sealed and documented on May 21 and 22. They were then loaded onto the MV Asiatic Wind, a Singapore-flagged, German-owned vessel that does mostly intra-Caribbean container transfers. 

From following the movement of the vessel on Windward we can see, as was reported, that it left Guyana on May 26 and arrived in the Dominican Republic on June 7. 

Path of the MV Asiatic Wind from May 26 to June 7, 2020. (Image from Windward Predictive Maritime Intelligence, wnwd.com. Click to expand.)

On this voyage, it called at the following ports: 

Date: Port: Duration: 
May 25, 2020 Georgetown, Guyana 1 Day
May 27, 2020 Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago 1 Day
May 29, 2020 Bridgetown, Barbados 16 Hours
June 4, 2020 Kingston, Port Bustamente, Jamaica 19 Hours
June 7, 2020 Caucedo Andres, Dominican Republic 1 Day

Given that we also know the port calls for the CMA CGM Jean Gabriel, we can confirm the Stabroek News report that the container disembarked the Asiatic Wind for transshipment in the Port of Caucedo, Dominican Republic, on June 7. That report would also seem accurate, suggesting that the container was loaded onboard the Jean Gabriel on June 13 and set sail that same day for Europe. Once unloaded in Hamburg on June 27, it was stored for onward transshipment to Poland. According to the reports, an intelligence tip alerted German authorities to the possible presence of drugs. Otherwise, the container might have completed its journey without being interdicted. This brings us to the second takeaway from this case: It may be more important to watch the movement of containers than it is to watch the movement of vessels when tracking drug shipments, particularly as container transshipment creates confusion as to the actors who may be involved in the journey of the drugs. 

The news stories around this case, and even some criminology publications, all focused on the vessel that brought the container to Hamburg. The real story is the voyage of the container, as that is how we can determine how the drugs actually got from wherever they originated to Germany. Virtually every international media report mentioned Jean Gabriel. Only the local reports mentioned the MV Asiatic Wind. Even then, there is nothing conclusive to indicate any connection between the vessel and the drug operation, though an important concern is raised below about part of the latter vessel’s voyage. As drug cartels use containerization to move an increasing volume of narcotics, they cannot be allowed to take advantage of general sea blindness and confusion about maritime commerce to obscure their activities. 

Based on the publicly available information, it is impossible in this particular case to conclusively determine where the drugs entered the container. If the container was unsealed and resealed in the process of moving from Guyana to Hamburg – a process known as “rip-on, rip-off,” it would have required a sophisticated and likely quite noticeable operation, most likely in the Port of Caucedo. The container’s seal would have to be removed, the container opened and unpacked, the drugs inserted into the rice sacks, the container repacked, and a fraudulent seal fitted to avoid detection. There is also, as has been the case in other major busts, the possibility that the drugs were embarked and loaded while the vessel was at sea. The vessel tracks of the Jean Gabriel do not indicate any suspicious activity that could account for that. The only feature that Windward shows that could, in other circumstances, be considered suspicious is a change in draft from 11.7 meters to 12.1 meters that occurs between London and Hamburg. There is no anomalous activity to suggest the vessel slowed to pick up anything at sea, so this is almost certainly caused by the change in buoyancy from salt water to fresh water. Based on the movements of the vessel, therefore, it seems unlikely that the Jean Gabriel was engaged in any untoward activity that would indicate involvement in drug trafficking. 

The Asiatic Wind does have one anomaly, however, that bears noting. Before entering the Port of Kingston, the Asiatic Wind, on June 3, inside Jamaica’s territorial sea, made a sharp 90-degree turn and went dark for 12 hours and 36 minutes. This means the vessel was not transmitting on its Automated Information Systems (AIS) during that time, a violation of law unless documented in the master’s log book, and often an indicator – though inconclusive – of suspicious activity. Given the distance traveled from when the vessel went dark to where it reappeared, Windward calculates that 11 hours and 36 minutes cannot be accounted for during that dark period. While it is unclear what happened in that interval, if investigators are unable to find a land- or port-based point of embarkation for the drugs, embarkment at sea is another possibility that cannot be ruled out without further examination. 

Returning to the takeaway about following the container, accurately revealing the story of what happened is not about ignoring the vessels, but about watching their movements in relation to the container at issue. Ultimately, the tip to German authorities, together with the fact that the 1,277 packages of cocaine found in this container were stamped with different symbols, including a cat’s face, the Gallic rooster, and the Ampelmännchen – a red and green German pedestrian crossing symbol – should give ample indications to investigators as to potential sources, traffickers, and buyers. In the process, the full journey needs to be examined, and even this anomaly in Jamaica should be reviewed. And finally, the rice itself may be an important piece of the puzzle. 

The Rice

Using sacks of rice to convey and conceal drug shipments has become an increasingly common phenomenon in the illicit narcotics space. Incidents include the August 2014 discovery of 100 kilograms of ketamine in a container of rice entering Canada from India, the February 2018 interdiction of the MV Sunrise Glory in Indonesia with a ton of crystal methamphetamine in rice sacks, and the September 2020 interdiction of the Maersk Sembawang in the UK with a rice shipment containing over $160 million USD in heroin. 

In 2015, an Argentine case even demonstrated the efforts of drug cartels to fuse the cocaine with the rice to make it harder to detect. Just last year, Suriname – Guyana’s neighbor to the east – saw one of its biggest drug busts in history. A consignment of rice in the Jules Sedney Port in Paramaribo was discovered to have 2,300 kilograms of cocaine hidden inside it, divided among eight containers that were to be loaded on a ship and taken via Guadeloupe to mainland France. The rice merchant whose shipment it was – a 30 year old father of two girls – was arrested on January 8, 2019, and released shortly thereafter. A week later, however, he was found dead on a popular beach in Guyana, murdered by a gunshot to the forehead. 

Even with this catalogue of cases from other parts of the world, involving a variety of drugs, the nexus between rice and cocaine may be most acute in Guyana. On August 13, 2013, officials in the Dominican Republic found 70 kilograms of cocaine in a Guyanese rice shipment. On August 28, 2017, Jamaican officials found 78 parcels of cocaine worth nearly $700,000 USD in a Guyanese rice shipment. On October 30, 2017, Guyana officials found 67 kilograms of cocaine in a Guyanese rice shipment that was destined for Belgium, discovering it before it left their own port. These are just some of the more high-profile cases. 

This frequency of cocaine busts in rice shipments runs in parallel to a broader trend around the world where transnational crime groups and terrorist organizations are turning to benign, ubiquitous goods for income streams. Charcoal, fuel, honey, sugar, and fish are all being used by criminal groups to create income for nefarious operations. But they are also using these benign goods as direct cover for those operations. In the case of the rice, the connection between the rice producer and the cartels should be monitored, as the cartels may seek to buy up and directly own the supply chain, rather than simply control it through duress, manipulation, or payout. The death of the Suriname rice merchant in Guyana should be an indication of how serious this matter is. This brings us to the final takeaway of the incident: While the focus of the interdiction is on the cocaine and its supply chain, a wider law enforcement effort is needed to examine the relationship between benign goods and illicit activities to help ensure that, while drug cartels may use goods like rice to obscure cocaine shipments, they do not end up controlling both the legitimate and illegitimate markets at the same time. 

By creating invisible supply chains of illicit goods amid  supply chains of legitimate goods, cartels can make law enforcement detection and interdiction even more difficult. 

Conclusion

Even beyond the confused reporting and the various transportation dynamics reviewed, there is an overarching indication of criminal mindsets that should be considered extremely concerning when reviewing this case. Criminality is a risk-reward calculus. When the risk is low and reward is high, criminals are in their sweet spot of pursuing profit. The hope is that the interdiction of a shipment serves as a meaningful disruption of the illicit supply chain and deters criminality through a change in the risk-reward calculus. If Guyanese rice has been interdicted numerous times in the past with cocaine, yet it is still being used as a means of transporting cocaine, what does that say about how often it is successful? 

The fact that it is still being used to obscure such large quantities of drugs suggests that in this instance, the risk-reward calculus, or more accurately, the rice-reward calculus, remains in favor of the criminals. Either the cartels are futilely making repeat attempts and hoping for a different result, or law enforcement is blind to the majority of what is moving. Businesses that don’t maintain a bottom line do not survive, so if the drug cartels are still using this tactic after a decade of sporadic interdictions, we have to assume that the majority of the time the criminals are successful.

The November 4, 2020 bust of 11.5 tons of cocaine in a scrap metal shipment that went from Guyana to Belgium further reveals the extent to which cartels feel that stashing extremely large quantities of drugs amid benign cargoes serves their interests. This is a sobering conclusion and should inspire a redoubling of efforts to rethink and reimagine how we approach countering the movement of narcotics and illicit substances. 

Dr. Ian Ralby is a recognized expert in maritime law and security and serves as CEO of I.R. Consilium. He has worked on maritime security issues around the world, and has spent considerable time focused on and was previously based in the Caribbean. He spent four years as Adjunct Professor of Maritime Law and Security at the United States Department of Defense’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and three years as a Maritime Crime Expert for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. I.R. Consilium is a family firm that specializes in maritime and resource security and focuses on problem-solving around the world.

Featured Image: Port of Hamburg, Germany. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Bilge Pumps 36: The Long War and Valentines Tips!

By Alex Clarke

After Episode 35, we decided to go full Long War and it has brought out the vocabulary in all of us…plus Valentines tips! (Posting after the fact of course due to the CIMSEC server migration).

#Bilgepumps is still a newish series and new avenue, which may no longer boast the new car smell, in fact decidedly more of pineapple/irn bru smell with a hint of mint cake and the faintest whiff of fried chicken. But we’re getting the impression it’s liked, so we’d very much like any comments, topic suggestions or ideas for artwork to be tweeted to us, the #Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepumps), at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).

Download Bilge Pumps 36: The Long War and Valentines Tips!

Links

1. Dr. Alex Clarke’s Youtube Channel
2. Drachinifel’s Youtube Channel
3. Jamie Seidel’s Youtube Channel

Alex Clarke is the producer of The Bilge Pumps podcast.

Contact the CIMSEC podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Bilge Pumps 35: Crew, Command, and Combat…or Rather, Uncrewed, Command Culture, and Gunfight Knives

By Alex Clarke

Dear all, for this Bilge Pumps we once more must apologize in advance for the amount of, this time, British in this podcast. We are on the topic of the Long War and of a couple of Alex and Drach’s particular passion topics, for example command culture and why it needs to be carefully managed both from a moral and an operational perspective. We also discuss the range of the Carrier Air Group and why a lot of the complaints currently being leveled at aircraft carriers are more a factor of that than the aircraft carrier itself as a concept.

#Bilgepumps is still a newish series and new avenue, which may no longer boast the new car smell, in fact decidedly more of pineapple/irn bru smell with a hint of mint cake and the faintest whiff of fried chicken. But we’re getting the impression it’s liked, so we’d very much like any comments, topic suggestions or ideas for artwork to be tweeted to us, the #Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepumps), at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).

Download Bilge Pumps 35: Crew, Command, and Combat…or Rather, Uncrewed, Command Culture, and Gunfight Knives

Links

1. Dr. Alex Clarke’s Youtube Channel
2. Drachinifel’s Youtube Channel
3. Jamie Seidel’s Youtube Channel

Alex Clarke is the producer of The Bilge Pumps podcast.

Contact the CIMSEC podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.