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Indo-Asia-Pacific

China as a Composite Land-Sea Power: A Geostrategic Concept Revisited

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The following is adapted from a new report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Seizing on Weakness: Allied Strategy for Competing With China’s Globalizing Military. 

By Toshi Yoshihara

China’s military is going global. Beijing possesses the largest navy in the world and is fielding an expeditionary fleet at a rapid pace. It established a permanent base in Djibouti in 2017 and is reportedly prospecting for more locations, from the South Pacific to the east coast of Africa, that could provide logistical support to China’s forward-deployed forces. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, far beyond the Western Pacific.

As the PLA goes global, Chinese leaders will need to meet multiplying demands on their attention and resources. They will have to work hard to defend their core interests in offshore areas, keep the peace along its interior, and maintain a durable overseas presence. Beijing’s omnidirectional and increasingly global security burdens will require adroit statesmanship to avoid overextension, a classic blunder that has humbled past great powers.

Imperial overreach is not as farfetched as one might assume, despite China’s impressive wealth creation over past decades. As a classic land-sea power, which faces the seas and shares contiguous borders with its neighbors, Beijing must always stay alert to threats in the continental and maritime domains. This inescapable two-front challenge imposes perpetual opportunity costs: every yuan spent on one area is one fewer yuan available for the other flank and vice versa. The trade-offs between its landward and seaward commitments could impose built-in limits on China’s global plans.  

Composite Land-Sea Power Concept

The idea that China’s dual orientation could complicate, if not derail, its ascent is not new, not least to Chinese strategists themselves. They took up the debate two decades ago when two scholars assessed the “composite land-sea power (陆海复合型国家)” concept and its implications for China’s future.1 Since then, analysts have wrestled with China’s dual-domain dilemma. The internal debates offer fascinating insights into how Beijing likely assesses its geostrategic obstacles. This discourse could regain salience as China opens a new global front to fulfill its ambitions as a world power.

The main lesson is that land-sea powers must obey geography’s limits. Past great powers that violated those constraints brought misfortune on themselves. At a minimum, land-sea powers must field armies and navies strong enough to defend both their terrestrial and maritime interests. According to two scholars, such powers “cannot neglect either sea power or land power. Both fists must strong.”2 By implication, land-sea powers must devote adequate resources against liabilities in the continental and maritime directions and they perpetually run the risk of diluting their energies across the two domains.

At the same time, dominance in the maritime and continental directions simultaneously is rarely sustainable over the long term. Land-sea powers must abide by the principle of strategic concentration, favoring one orientation over the other. But they must be careful not to blindly pursue sea power or land power while neglecting the other domain. To one scholar, Imperial Germany’s “excessive worship” of naval power unmoored it from its continental interests and spelled disaster for its long-term ambitions.3

Land-sea powers face the gravest danger when they are squeezed concurrently between hostile rivals on the landward and seaward flanks. Indeed, two-front wars have invariably spelled doom for past great powers. Mao Zedong’s “dual adversary” diplomatic strategy in the 1960s that pitted China against the United States and the Soviet Union has taught his successors the potential existential risks of picking two fights at the same time.

Russian, Chinese, and Mongolian troops take part in a military equipment parade at Tsugol training ground in Siberia not far from the Chinese and Mongolian border in September 2018. (Photo via AFP)

For land-sea powers, prudent statesmanship is invaluable. Leaders must strike a delicate balance between their multi-directional commitments and their scarce resources. To complicate matters further, resources dedicated to maritime affairs are frequently inapplicable to continental matters and vice versa. Sound judgments about risk, trade-offs, and so forth are therefore essential to success.  

No Longer a Dilemma for China?

For the past three decades, the dilemmas of a land-sea power have not been acute for China. Since the Cold War’s end, China has inhabited a congenial security environment, arguably unprecedented in its modern history. As one scholar claims, Beijing’s surroundings have been “the most favorable since New China’s founding, if not in its entire history.”4 Sustained amity with Russia and an uneasy peace with India have opened new strategic vistas to China. The absence of significant liabilities along its land borders have enabled China to invest in maritime and aerospace capabilities on a massive scale, transforming the PLA into a formidable force.5

Nevertheless, Chinese commentators have expressed misgivings that China’s rising maritime power might still trigger countervailing geopolitical responses. Some worry that China’s rapid ascent at sea could stimulate resistance by the United States, the leading naval power, and by China’s neighbors on land and at sea. Such “dual pressure (双重压力)” could undo China’s rise, just as similar counteractions have spoiled the ambitions of past land-sea powers.6

To avoid triggering such countervailing responses, some scholars urge Chinese leaders to develop “limited sea power (有限海权)” to reassure the United States and China’s neighbors that Beijing harbors no hegemonic ambitions.7 Another argues that constructing a Chinese navy meant to maintain good order at sea might telegraph China’s benign intent.8

Still others believe that China’s best hedge against a dual-front challenge is to maintain good ties with Russia, by far the most powerful actor bordering China. According to this logic, Beijing can withstand pressure in the maritime direction if its relations with Moscow are on a steady footing.9 One analyst contends that Xi Jinping’s global initiatives to court partners, such as the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, could “reduce balancing pressures by maritime and continental great powers.”10

Despite the varying prescriptions—some of which have clearly been overtaken by events—these writings share an overriding imperative to avert counterbalancing coalitions that balked past land-sea powers.

The Return of Geographic Constraints?

For years, the opportunity costs of going to sea have been low, if not negligible. Put another way, Beijing has not yet had to pay significant penalties for turning decisively in the maritime direction. But convivial geostrategic conditions could well be reversed. China’s recent skirmishes with India along the Himalayan border, for example, show how territorial disputes could stoke great power animosities in unexpected ways. Indeed, sustained Sino-Indian border tensions could metastasize into a more intense rivalry, drawing Beijing’s attention to its southern flank. The standoff could serve as a test case for determining how well Beijing can manage landward liabilities even as it extends its reach at sea. 

To the north, several factors could complicate Sino-Russian relations, despite the strategic partnership between the two powers, including close military cooperation. The end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 freed Moscow to deploy ground-based theater-range conventional missiles. If Russia were to field such weaponry in numbers and in ways that threatened China, Beijing could respond forcefully to a more complex geometry of conventional missile competition in the continental direction, diverting resources from the maritime front. China’s quests for access to the Arctic and for influence in Central Asia, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative, could also introduce friction in Sino-Russian ties.

Wang Hai, deputy commander of the Chinese Navy, shakes hands with Russian Marines in a joint naval drill off Guangdong province on September 14, 2016. (Xinhua/Zha Chunming)

Other contingencies, such as the resumption of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, could draw Beijing into a major military conflagration and suck China into protracted, manpower-intensive postwar duties, including occupation and other stability operations. A security vacuum caused by political upheaval in a neighboring Central, South, or Southeast Asian country, could similarly pull China into a prolonged and costly landward commitment.

Implications for the United States and Its Allies

As China goes global and as its relationship with the West enters a more rivalrous phase, Washington and allied capitals should consider how they can leverage Beijing’s predicament. However, for the moment, the allies are constrained in their collective capacity to steer China’s relationships with its great continental neighbors, Russia and India, in directions that favor them. Geostrategic logic suggests that Sino-Russian enmity, akin to that of the Cold War rupture, would be a nightmare scenario for Beijing. But the current configuration of international politics indicates that efforts to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow would likely prove fruitless. Similarly, New Delhi’s tradition of independence and non-alignment have repeatedly dashed some Western hopes that India could be persuaded to counterbalance China’s ascent more overtly. 

Given that the close allies possess limited agency for now, they may have to settle for opportunism to exploit China’s geostrategic dilemma. They should watch closely for developments that could complicate Sino-Russian and Sino-Indian ties. China could well cooperate in allied plans and stumble into confrontation with its giant neighbors. In such scenarios, the allies would need to assess the opportunity costs of China’s landward commitments and the extent to which such additional fronts might lead to overextension. If signs of overreach were evident, then the allies would do well to apply even more pressure in the maritime domain—near and far from the mainland—to attenuate Chinese power. By doubling down on the maritime flank, the allies would force the PRC to compete more vigorously on both fronts while denying it relief in the seaward direction.

A theme that runs through the Chinese discourse is a clear-eyed sense of the limits on China’s geostrategic choices. Chinese strategists who possess a tragic sensibility about great power politics understand that favorable circumstances are never permanent. They recognize that Beijing must strive to cultivate conditions conducive to its outward orientation and that hostile great powers, especially if they were to coalesce against China, could undo its global plans. As the PLA goes global, it behooves allied policymakers to adopt a similarly tragic worldview and revisit age-old geostrategic dilemmas that will likely prove as nettlesome to China as they have for past aspiring land-sea powers.

Toshi Yoshihara is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). He is co-author, with Jack Bianchi, of Seizing on Weakness: Allied Strategy for Competing with China’s Globalizing Military, a CSBA report from which this article is drawn.

References

1.  邵永灵 时殿弘 [Shao Yongling and Shi Dianhong], “近代欧洲陆海复合国家的命运与当代中国的选择 [The Destiny of Modern European Hybrid Land-Sea Power and Contemporary China’s Choices],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 10, 2000, p. 50.

2. 郑义炜 张建宏 [Zheng Yiwei and Zhang Jianhong], “论陆海复合型国家发展海权的两难困境—欧洲经验对中国海权发展的启示 [On the Dual Dilemma of Developing Seapower for Hybrid Land-Sea Powers—Lessons from Europe’s Experiences for China’s Seapower Development],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 3, 2013, p. 64.

3. 刘中民 [Liu Zhongmin], “关于海权与大国崛起问题的若干思考 [Some Thoughts on the Problems of Seapower and the Rise of Great Powers],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 12, 2007, pp. 10-11 and 刘中民 [Liu Zhongmin], “中国海洋强国建设的海权战略选择—海权与大国兴衰的经验及其启示 [Seapower Strategy Choices for the Development of China’s Maritime Great Power—The Experiences and Lessons of Seapower and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 8, 2013, p. 78. See also 古天姣 [Gu Tianjiao], “我国建设海洋强国的困境分析及战略选择 [An Analysis of the Dilemmas of Our Nation’s Development into a Maritime Power and Our Strategic Choices],” 行政与法律 [Public Administration and Law], no. 9, 2014, p. 77.

4. 刘中民 [Liu Zhongmin], “中国海洋强国建设的海权战略选择 [Seapower Strategy Choices for the Development of China’s Maritime Great Power],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 8, 2013, p. 78.

5. See 王勇 [Wang Yong], “浅析中国海权发展的若干问题 [Analysis of Several Problems of China’s Seapower Development],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 5, 2010, p. 95 and 刘新华 [Liu Xinhua], “海权优先: 当代中国的地缘战略选择 [Seapower Takes Precedence: Contemporary China’s Geostrategic Choices],” 社会科学 [Journal of Social Sciences], no. 7, 2008, p. 58.

6. 吴征宇 [Wu Zhengyu], “海权与陆海复合型强国 [Seapower and Hybrid Land-Sea Great Powers], 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics],” no. 2, 2012, pp. 47-50 and 吴征宇 [Wu Zhengyu], 论陆海复合型国家的战略地位—理论机理与政策选择 [On the Strategic Position of Hybrid Land-Sea Powers—Theoretical Mechanisms and Policy Choices], 教学与研究 [Teaching and Research], no. 7, 2010, pp. 69-70.

7. 郑义炜 [Zheng Yiwei], “陆海复合型的中国发展海权的战略选择 [China’s Strategic Choices for Developing Seapower as a Hybrid Land-Sea Power],” 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics], no. 3, 2013, p. 25 and 刘中民 [Liu Zhongmin], “中国海洋强国建设的海权战略选择 [Seapower Strategy Choices for the Development of China’s Maritime Great Power],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 8, 2013, p. 80.

8. 吴征宇 [Wu Zhengyu], “海权与陆海复合型强国 [Seapower and Hybrid Land-Sea Great Powers], 世界经济与政治 [World Economics and Politics],” no. 2, 2012, p. 50.

9. 郑义炜 [Zheng Yiwei], “陆海复合型中国“海洋强国”战略分析 [Analysis of China’s Hybrid Land-Sea “Maritime Power” Strategy],” 东北亚论坛 [Northeast Asia Forum], no. 2, 2018, p. 88.

10. 秦立志 [Qin Lizhi], “陆海复合型国家战略转型的动力机制—兼论对中国的启示 [The Dynamic Mechanism Behind the Strategic Transformation of Hybrid Land-Sea Powers—Implications for China],” 太平洋学报 [Pacific Journal], no. 2, 2019, p. 11.

Featured Image: Russian and Chinese forces operating in a combined exercise in Spring 2018. (Photo via Russian Ministry of Defense)

Wargames

Wargaming at the Academy: Why Invest in NHWL and Building A Culture of Wargaming 

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By M. Scott Bond

The reemergence of peer competition suggests the naval services may not operate in the same manner or with the same freedom as they have in recent decades. In response, the Navy and Marine Corps are developing new operational concepts which embrace distributed warfare, which pushes command and capabilities down the organizational chain. As such, junior officers may need to learn combat decision-making skills earlier in their careers than their predecessors. Combat decision-making, like all critical thinking, requires time and practice to develop. As Sebastian Bae notes in the July 12th edition of the Preble Hall podcast, just as “reps and sets” in physical training provides the foundation for athletic performance, wargames provide mental reps and sets for military decisionmakers. Wargames are effective because, as Peter Perla and Ed McGrady note, they provide a space for students to make decisions and deal with the consequences. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Joint Chiefs have also recognized wargaming’s educational value by designating it a leadership development tool. Yet, the professional military education (PME) pipeline only has so much compressibility. As such, there is a growing demand to teach junior officers the basics of combat decision-making. The Naval Academy can try to meet this need by leveraging its nascent Naval History Wargaming Laboratory (NHWL) to give midshipmen the opportunity to think through tough tactical problems before the lives of Sailors and Marines are on the line.

Some may argue that, despite demand signals, classroom constraints make wargaming a poor fit for the academy. It is true that classroom time and space constrains may limit game effectiveness Additionally, educators often must design, procure, execute, and adjudicate a game without any support to offset costs, in both time and money, or ensure quality. That said, these barriers to educational wargaming are not insurmountable. Jim Lacey and Philip Sabin have separately written about adding wargames to their seminars, and noted increased student preparation, participation, and comprehension of the subject matter as positive results. Institutions such as the Naval War College (NWC) or Army Command and General Staff College have mitigated the above constraints through funding trained wargaming staffs, effectively underwriting wargaming costs for educators. While it is true that the NHWL is already providing curricular and extracurricular wargames under its own funding, its capacity to expand may be limited. The NHWL’s current staff consists only of a part-time director and a part-time adjunct. This minimalist structure likely has little capacity to expand beyond this proof-of-concept stage and could be vulnerable to future personnel changes. The academy will need to invest more in the NHWL to reap the maximum benefits wargaming has to offer.

Equally important is creating a culture of wargaming. The set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that make up academy culture play a critical role in setting priorities for midshipmen and educators. If academy culture does not value wargaming as a worthwhile educational tool, then the overall benefit to the academy will be limited. The NWC’s oft cited success during the interwar period was in part due to student and educators’ culture which placed a strong emphasis on wargaming. A similar trend can be found at other PME institutions with records of wargaming excellence. The NHWL and broader wargaming’s benefits may be limited without broader cultural buy-in from midshipmen and educators.

Options for Investment 

There are many ways the academy can invest into the NHWL and foster a culture of wargaming, each with its own costs and benefits. There are five options in particular which might maximize the academy’s return on investment while also fulfilling its mission. 

Option 1: Explore Creative Funding Options  

It is important to recognize the zero-sum nature of the academy’s budget. Top-down cuts to add funding to the NHWL may hazard budget fights, which could create inter-departmental tensions that undermine the lab’s effectiveness. While some reallocations may prove necessary, the academy could explore alternative funding. For example, the academy could choose to add a “Wargaming Lab” fee to the amount withheld from midshipmen pay, such as has been done for necessities like laundry and haircuts. Along similar lines, the academy could adopt a “pay to play” methodology, with departments paying a fee to the lab for access to game design and execution support. 

Another option is to mimic the success of USNA athletics. The Naval Academy Athletic Association (NAAA) is a 501c3 whose mission is to “promote, influence, and assist in financing the athletic contests of the midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy.” Navy athletics owes much of its success to the NAAA’s ability to secure funding for quality staff and facilities. The academy could set up a similar wargaming association to help find and generate funds for the NHWL, decreasing the need to adjust internal budgets. True, NAAA benefits from the high visibility of sporting events. Yet, the rise of e-sports seems to indicate that wargaming could have similar levels of visibility. 

Option 2: Leverage the NHWL to Incorporate Educational Games into other Subjects 

If the academy wishes to maximize its return on investment and foster a culture of wargaming, it could work with the lab to develop targeted wargames which augment current academic programs. Wargames have educational utility outside of combat decision-making. Educational research indicates that student information retention and comprehension increase when traditional classroom methods are augmented with educational games. As such, the NWHL could be leveraged not only to provide quality games directly to the students but also to assist educators in other departments in enhancing their own curricula. For example, the professional knowledge (or ‘ProKnow’) curricula could be augmented with targeted wargames for each warfare module. The NHWL’s inaugural wargame coincidentally coincided with the players’ surface warfare ProKnow module. While unplanned, most players found the opportunity to apply the professional knowledge to be a valuable experience. Other academic fields can equally benefit. For example, the University of the City of London’s Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture programs use a modified version of the game Harpoon to teach engineering trade-offs in warship design to naval architecture and maritime engineering students.  

Option 3: Embrace Distributed Gaming

COVID restrictions on gathering size have renewed interest in distributed wargaming. Distributed play through digital media, either via digitized tabletop games or combat simulations, may hold special value for the academy. Collocating enough people for enough time to play a manual wargame limits the possible number of iterations, and thereby constrains learning outcomes. Distributed wargames remove the need for collocation and reduce playtime by automating rules adjudication and thereby increase the amount of possible game iterations. Digital wargaming platforms such as OSD’s SWIFT, the open source VASSAL engine, or Command: Modern Operations (C:MO) could allow educators to assign games as homework. It should be noted that there seems to be little reason for the academy to accept tailored game development costs given the breadth of games within the Department of Defense wargaming ecosystem and across commercial platforms. Leveraging these games in assignments could be combined with a player-written analysis of game events and outcomes to leverage traditional educational techniques. Granting midshipmen access to these tools outside of assignments could also foster a culture of wargaming by allowing students to enhance their personal interest in their education.

Option 4: Teach Midshipmen How to Play

The NHWL has already added a wargame design course. This could be an important first step both for developing capable future officers and building a culture of wargaming on campus. Equally important is teaching students how to play wargames. A major hurdle for an analytical wargame’s referee team (or white cell) is shepherding non-gamers through the learning curve while also running the game. A course dedicated to introducing and playing DoD wargames, such as the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Assassin’s Mace or NWC’s War at Sea, would not only give the mental reps and sets required to succeed in future naval operations, but also could equip students to use the same analytical tools that are already being used in the fleet. This effort might also strengthen the academy’s own connections with the fleet and help integrate it with the wider naval wargaming community. 

Option 5: Connect with the Greater Wargaming Community

The NHWL has already noted its desire to host inter-academy events. If this becomes a reality it could represent an important start to integrating with the wider wargaming community. Such a program could be expanded to include NROTC or international teams, perhaps in a similar fashion to the Army’s Ranger Challenge competition. Such a program could leverage existing competitive spirits to build interest in wargaming. The academies of several U.S. allies already include wargaming within their curricula, thus this could be an easy sell. Joint events using mixed teams could be used to build joint understanding and camaraderie between future combat commanders.  

Knowing the Limitations

Marcus Jones noted in the same Preble Hall podcast that wargames cannot teach the realities of combat. While wargaming helps prepare students to make the most of their own and their senior officer’s experiences by reinforcing the fundamentals, real-world experience and combat exercising is more likely the master educator. Neither can wargaming replace the time-tested educational techniques at the heart of the academy’s academic traditions. Rather, they complement and enhance each other. Rex Brynen pointed out in 2016 the benefits of educational area function of the games’ design, implementation, curriculum integration, and educational requirements. If any one of these factors is missing, the benefit of the game diminishes. The time and space constraints of the classroom also impose both opportunity costs and limits to game effectiveness. Balancing the expected game benefits against sacrificed lecture material or other teaching methods could be a critical step in safeguarding the academy’s investment.

Conclusion 

It is important to keep in mind why wargaming and warfighting education at the academy seems necessary. The naval environment is undergoing systemic changes which have undermined the assumptions upon which the current officer warfighting educational pipeline is built. The Navy and Marine Corps’ new operational concepts could demand that officers be schooled in tactical and joint thinking much earlier in their careers. The days of officers slowly acquiring tactical and operational knowledge in preparation for command appear to be coming to an end. Rather, the fleet will need young officers ready and able to operate jointly in a rapid, lethal, and complex maritime warfighting environment. Creating such officers could necessitate pushing warfighting education down to more junior levels as early as possible.

The Naval History Department and Museum’s announced NHWL could give the academy a valuable new tool to meet this need. The maritime threat environment is changing, and the Navy and Marine Corps are evolving in stride. Military educators – including those at the academy – would do well to embrace this transformation.

M. Scott Bond is a Technical Analyst researching emerging warfare concepts and East Asia with the nonpartisan, nonprofit RAND Corporation. He also services as the Junior Analyst Ambassador for the Military Operations Research Society’s Wargaming Community of Practice.

Featured Image: ANNAPOLIS, Md. (July 18, 2020) The United States Naval Academy holds an Oath of Office Ceremony for the members of the Class of 2024, Companies 16-30. (U.S. Navy photo by Stacy Godfrey/Released)

Book Review

A Holidays 2020 Reading List

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By the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast Hosts

Aloha Shipmates! We at the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast have put our heads together to come up with a “Holidays 2020 Reading List” or perhaps more appropriately named  “What We Were Able to Read This Year…” reading list. We’ve each chosen a few books that we read and loved this year and are at least tangentially related to international maritime security. We’ve also included a few that either we didn’t get to in 2020 or we’re looking forward to in 2021.

Walker Mills

Missionaries, by Phil Klay, Penguin Press, 2020. 

Missionaries is veteran author Phil Klay’s second work, coming after his award-winning collection of short stories Redeployment (2014). Well-received by U.S. and Colombian critics, Missionaries is a wrenching story about several characters coming together in Colombia as the government was finishing a peace agreement with the FARC in 2015-2016. Klay uses his characters and their lives to explore violence at the human, community, and system levels and its impact on the human soul. 

Feeding Victory: Innovative Logistics from Lake George to Khe Sanh, by Jobie Turner, Kansas University Press, 2020. 

Feeding Victory is an eminently readable book about logistics in war. Jobie Turner, an Air Force colonel, breaks down five different case studies in logistics – all unique in their own way. The history is mixed with analysis and takeaways for the contemporary practitioner. Perhaps most interesting to CIMSEC readers will be the Guadalcanal case study where Turner compares and contrasts Japanese and American expeditionary logistics in the months-long struggle for the island. 

Cod: A Biography of the Fish the Changed the World, by Mark Kurlansky, Penguin Books, 1997.

Though over twenty years old, Cod is still a riveting introduction into the world of commercial fishing through a deep dive into the history of a single fish: Atlantic Cod. Fishing is more relevant than ever – in 2020 the United States Coast Guard released an “Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing Strategic Outlook,” massive Chinese fishing fleets off the Galapagos attracted international attention, and the United Kingdom has threatened to use naval vessels to protect its fisheries in the event of a no-deal Brexit. Kurlansky’s book is a quick read and each chapter includes a recipe for cod to help deal with the inevitable craving. Listeners can check out Sea Control 206 about the “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the UK or Sea Control 219 to catch a conversation with USCG Commandant Karl Schultz about the IUU Fishing Strategic Outlook. 

To-be-read:

The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare by Christian Brose, Hachette Books, 2020.

Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, by David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Oxford University Press, 2020.

Both of these are books came highly reviewed and despite the fact that I pre-ordered them I still have not managed to read them yet. But I’ve followed the authors’ work at War on the Rocks and intently listen to their podcasting. I’m sure these books won’t disappoint.

2034: A Novel of the Next War, by Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis, Penguin Press, 2021.

Can’t overstate how excited I am for this one. Ackerman is a former Marine who has written several very good books, including the award-winning Dark at the Crossing, and Stavridis has written several previous books about leadership (including another book on this list) and his extensive Navy experience including serving as former Supreme Allied Commander at NATO.

Jared Samuelson

Learning War, by Trent Hone, Naval Institute Press, 2018.

Selling Seapower: Public Relations and the U.S. Navy, 1917-1941, by Ryan D. Wadle, University of Oklahoma Press, 2019.

These books are paired because they address the question “how did we get here?” for two different communities in the Navy. If you are a surface warfare officer, you have undoubtedly spent hours in the darkened cold of your ship’s Combat Information Center. How did that space come to be, why is it designed the way it is, and what problems was the Navy trying to solve? Learning War addresses all those questions and, if that weren’t enough, you get a graduate-level discussion of the evolution of the officer corps and some early 1900s ship design. Listen to Sea Control 209 with author Trent Hone to learn more. I thought Selling Seapower did much the same for today’s public affairs community, from its birth in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the development of the collateral duty Public Affairs Officer, and the Navy’s relationship with mass media (spanning early radio to film). 

The Alice Network: A Novel, by Kate Quinn, William Morrow Paperbacks, 2017.

The best possible endorsement I can give this book is that I read it in less than 48 hours while co-parenting an infant and doing my day job. It was that good. The pace is incredible and the historical setting will have you picking up your phone to Google “did X really happen” multiple times. The author’s follow-up, The Huntress, is sitting on my to-be-read pile.

The Riddle of the Sands, by Erskine Childers, Modern Library, 2002.

Originally printed in 1903, The Riddle of the Sands was a recommendation from an old friend and former CO that took me completely by surprise. The book is the story of two friends ostensibly on a late summer sailing expedition in the Baltic and North Seas who stumble onto a sinister plot whilst being pursued by German agents. No less than Winston Churchill cited the novel as a reason the British ultimately established multiple naval bases on the North Sea prior to World War I.

To-be-read:

Grey Dawn: A Tale of Abolition and Union, Balance of Seven, 2020, by Sea Control 163 guest and now host of her own podcast, Friday Night History, Dr. Nyri Bakkalian. 

How the Few Became the Proud, Naval Institute Press, 2019 by Sea Control 184 guest Dr. Heather Venable. I have a literal signed copy just waiting to be cracked open. Massive personal failure on my part.

Wargaming Experiences: Soldiers, Scientists and Civilians, by Natalie Wojtowics, J10 Gaming, 2020.

Battle in the Baltic: The Royal Navy and the Fight to Save Latvia & Estonia, 1918-1920, by Steve R. Dunn, Naval Institute Press, 2020.

This book seemed like a logical successor after reading Michael B. Barrett’s Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands in preparation for Sea Control 168. Cautiously optimistic the author will be coming to a podcast near you in 2021!

Anna McNeil

Can’t Hurt Me: Master Your Mind and Defy the Odds, by David Goggins, Lioncrest Publishing, 2018.

If talks about resilience and hope are ringing empty in your ears this holiday, or you feel depression and disempowering thoughts setting in, this is the book I suggest you begin with. Cultivate the knowledge that you can and will get through to a brighter future. Then, move forward with intention for the new year ahead.

Honor Harrington series, by David Weber, 2002-2017.

Science Fiction. Space Navy. Military-Industrial complex. Vast sprawling strategic positioning and tactical level skirmishes. Personal assistant on the Commander’s shoulder and in her ear. A female protagonist who lives up to the name Honor. The first of this series, On Basilisk Station, was given to me by my grandfather, a retired U.S. Navy Electronics Technician. It was a large part of the reason I considered joining the Navy. The best fiction is that through which we can more clearly imagine possibilities for ourselves in the real world. Fiction lovers can check out the wrap-up of CIMSEC’s Fiction Week in Sea Control 216 with an interview of the winning authors Mike Burke and Nick Nethery. 

The Good Shepherd, by C.S. Forester, reissue by Penguin Books, 2018.

Yes, Hollywood made a movie of this already, but the discussion on social media about the proper use of helm commands doesn’t even scratch the surface of how much justice is done to the seagoing service. Read the first ten pages and you’ll see why I was suddenly inspired to write Steering Casualty and Tactical Signals drill cards.

To-be-read:

Navigating the Seven Seas of Leadership: Leadership Lessons of the First African-American Father and Son to Serve at the Top in the US Navy, by MSCM (ret) Melvin G. Williams Sr., and VADM (ret) Melvin G. Williams, Naval Institute Press, 2011.

Wisdom direct from the experiences of one very special military family, written down and offered to the benefit of anyone willing to read it. This book was written with such generosity and goodwill toward all mankind that it simply must be on my holiday reading list.

The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations, by Christopher P. Twomey, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2010.  

I suppose this could be considered a book about peace on Earth. Or rather, understanding how to use the military to lead options other than shooting wars.

Icebound: Shipwrecked at the Edge of the World, by Andrea Pitzer, Scribner, 2021.

Get ready to be transported out of your own struggles into the tale of the famous polar explorer William Barentz’s year-long fight for survival in the Arctic. Out in January 2021! 

Jonathon Frerichs

Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition, by Wayne Hughes and Robert Girrier, Naval Institute Press, 2018.

 A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R. Holmes, Naval Institute Press, 2019.

During a month-long temporary duty assignment to Naples, Italy, I recognized that I utterly lacked an understanding of how the Navy operates (despite having deployed on three different Marine Expeditionary Units, or MEUs). Seeking answers, I picked up Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations from the Navy Exchange on base. With nothing else to do in the evenings but eat Napoli pizza, I quickly devoured the book and found it immediately valuable in expanding my knowledge of naval operations. Upon completion, however, I found myself thirsting for a better understanding of how naval forces have contributed to obtaining national strategic objectives. 

Enter A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy – a perfect complement. This short, digestible book is power packed with historical examples and an easy-to-apply framework through which to look at the application of naval forces from competition to crisis to conflict. For either the military historian or the naval practitioner, this book is guaranteed to be a great read and valuable resource. 

The Art of War: A New Translation by Michael Nylan, Sun Tzu, W. W. Norton and Company, 2020. 

I have digested bits and pieces of various translations of The Art of War over my career, but never sat down and read it cover to cover. When I saw @teaandtactics recommend the book, I decided I would bite and resolve my academic shortfall. Combining a depth of Chinese history and a nuanced fluency of the Chinese language, Nylan has created a translation that is easy to read, cover-to-cover. Additionally, in her introduction she provides an opportunity to apply the ideas of strategy and conflict to life outside of war. 

To-be-read:

To Rule Eurasia’s Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea, by Geoffrey Gresh, Yale University Press, 2020.

Just received my copy of this book. Upon a quick scan, I am excited to digest the multinational look at great power competition in the maritime domain. Many recent books have focused on looking at great power competition through a bipolar lens (Russia/United States or China/United States) but this book appears to take a much more expansive and systemic look at how great powers compete in the maritime domain. If you’re interested in To Rule Eurasia’s Waves, be on the lookout for a future Sea Control episode. 

The Pacific War trilogy, by Ian Toll, W. W. Norton & Company, 2011-2020.

I continue to see these recommended from military history scholars and servicemembers alike.

Andrea Howard

If 2020 did not provide enough existential fodder for society, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World  Basic Books, 2018, by Pedro Domingos serves as one of the best introductions on how machine learning – and the prospective development of a unifying master algorithm – will forever alter the world. Unsupervised learning algorithms can structure and illuminate meaning from raw data, and the naval-oriented mind will see the innumerable applications from fire control systems to underwater mapping. 

Shifting over to a work that explicitly discusses the impact of cyber developments in the warfare domain, I recommend Cyber Security and Cyberware: What Everyone Needs to Know by P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Oxford University Press, 2014. While exploring the ramifications of the Stuxnet virus and cyber units within the American and Chinese military structures, the authors outline how future conflicts will touch every individual via cybercrime in the financial realm and attacks on infrastructure. 

To round out the two above choices, the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ top choice for 2020 is a strategic must-read. The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare by Christian Brose, Hachette Books, 2020 explores the emerging technologies that present disturbing threats to American military superiority, but he also advocates for the development of a battle network of systems (a “kill chain”) to uphold deterrence and ultimately prevent war. 

To-be-read:

For my upcoming deployment, I’m intending to bring along The Leader’s Bookshelf by Admiral James Stavridis and R. Manning Ancell, Naval Institute Press, 2017 to consume the lessons learned from the active and retired four-star military officers’ habits and favorite books. The promised efficiency will be necessary for the small bits of time afforded before hitting the rack and awaking for watch.

Readers and listeners can get to know the podcast team better by listening to Sea Control  214 “Meet the Team!” or finding us on Twitter at @jwsc03,  @AndreaR_Howard, @WDMills1992, @2BAtSea, and @hoplitemarine. 

Featured Image: Book collection, photo via the U.S. Naval War College.

Podcast

Bilge Pumps Episode 30: Christmas Special with Cmdr. Michael Clapp & Maj Gen. Julian Thompson

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By Alex Clarke

Bilge Pumps, Episode 30. This is it, the Christmas Special you have all been waiting for! The regular Bilge Pumps Crew is joined by Commander Michael Clapp (ret.) and Major General Julian Thompson (ret.) – the command from the Amphibious Task Group, the Inshore Squadron, and 3rd Commando Brigade during the Falklands War. We hope you enjoy the conversation and have as much fun listening to it as we did making it.

For those interested in taking part in our competition, please send your PDF submissions to [email protected] by January the 10, 2021.

#Bilgepumps is still a newish series and new avenue, which may no longer boast the new car smell, in fact decidedly more of pineapple/irn bru smell with a hint of jaffa cake and the faintest whiff of cork. But we’re getting the impression it’s liked, so we’d very much like any comments, topic suggestions or ideas for artwork to be tweeted to us, the #Bilgepump crew (with #Bilgepumps), at Alex (@AC_NavalHistory), Drach (@Drachinifel), and Jamie (@Armouredcarrier). Or you can comment on our Youtube channels (listed down below).

Download Bilge Pumps Episode 30: Christmas Special with Cmdr. Michael Clapp & Maj Gen. Julian Thompson

Links

1. Dr. Alex Clarke’s Youtube Channel
2. Drachinifel’s Youtube Channel
3. Jamie Seidel’s Youtube Channel

Alex Clarke is the producer of The Bilge Pumps podcast.

Contact the CIMSEC podcast team at [email protected].