All posts by Guest Author

Intel Owns Red: How Red Teaming Can Prepare the Fleet for the Fight Ahead

Naval Intelligence Topic Week

By Lieutenant Commander Christopher Blake and Lieutenant Grace Jones

History has shown that a deep understanding of the adversary and the operating environment can deliver decisive victory and prevent calamitous defeat. It brought about the miracle of Midway. It could have prevented the shock and surprise of 9/11. It is what the Navy needs to focus on to prepare for the complex and irregular nature of modern and future warfare. Building such knowledge is best achieved by embracing Naval Intelligence (NAVINTEL)’s role as the Navy’s lead community for comprehensive ownership of Red. Holistic understanding of the adversary and empowered application of contrarian analytical techniques at all levels of warfare will close the gap between understanding one’s own force and adversary plans. This can enhance a commander’s decision advantage and yield victory even in the most challenging of circumstances.

The most effective way to reinvigorate NAVINTEL’s focus on owning Red comes via two main methods: deep understanding of the adversary and the application of structured contrarian analysis. We describe these combined phenomena as Red Teaming, a two-pronged analytical methodology that can and should be applied at all levels of war.

For this to happen, NAVINTEL must encourage and value deep cultural and contextual understanding of the adversary and implement structural and educational changes that ensure consistent application of outside-the-box thinking. Solutions must be simple, repeatable, and low-cost for maximum effect. Moreover, such a change will require buy-in and a shift in warfighting ethos at all levels of leadership. Through such a shift, real and meaningful change can come about at the individual and organizational level that prepares NAVINTEL, and by extension the fleet, for the complex fight ahead. Thankfully, the Navy’s culture and history of innovation and contrarian thinking provide an environment that is ready-made for Red Teaming.

Naval Intelligence: A Culture of Understanding, Autonomy, Innovation, and Ingenuity… but Not Red Teaming

From its birth, Naval Intelligence has demonstrated the values of innovation, ingenuity, and creative problem-solving founded in understanding of the adversary and the operating environment. In the early 1880s, when Navy Lieutenant T.B.M. Mason lobbied for the creation of a naval intelligence agency that would send forth attaches to collect information on fleet modernization around the world in order to inform America’s own naval development, he embodied the two prongs of Red Teaming advocated here. Lt. Mason’s focus on understanding and appreciation for contrarian thinking helped prevent the Navy from languishing in its post-Civil War decline and ensure that the development of America’s future fleet would produce the right force to fight capable foes like Germany and Japan.i The Navy continued this culture of innovation and ingenuity, resulting in world-changing inventions such as the computer, GPS, nuclear-powered maritime vessels, and virtual reality.ii Such a culture seems to be fertile ground for Red Teaming to thrive; the Navy, however, finds itself lagging behind other services when it comes to fostering an environment that encourages deep, creative thinking at all levels of war.

The U.S. Marine Corps had the Commandant’s Red Team,iii the U.S. Army had the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS),iv the Air Force has “The Air Force Red Team,”v and the Office of the Secretary of Defense recently established its own Red Team,vi but the Navy, and NAVINTEL in particular, have languished without a community-wide commitment to Red Teaming. A 2003 report on “DoD Red Teaming Activities” only mentions the U.S. Navy in the context of the Subsurface Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) Security Program,vii and the service has not meaningfully devoted more resources to Red Teaming in the 20 years since. No doubt elements of the Navy have conducted Red Team-like activities and have certainly demonstrated deep understanding of the adversary, but such activities traditionally lie at the strategic level of war and only in centralized pockets of expertise and excellence. That model will not be sufficient in today’s operating environment, nor in the foreseeable future. The democratization of Red Teaming expertise through cultural shifts, training, and staff integration is required for the fight ahead, where Distributed Maritime Operations will be the American concept by which victory could be achieved against adversaries who view warfare very differently.viii

The Problem Today: Three Warfares, Active Measures, and Blind Spotsix

“Today, defense and national security professionals face a number of critical challenges: emerging threats from state and non-state actors, technological disruption, socio-economic upheaval and political uncertainty at home and abroad. Even the rate of change is accelerating rapidly. In addition, leaders must also contend with internal and interagency friction as they develop and execute critical plans, operations, and strategies. What organizations need now more than ever is flexible planning capabilities that allow them to sense and respond effectively to these pressing problems.”—Bryce Hoffman and Marcus Dimbleby, Red Team Thinking LLCx

“While conventional warfare—set-piece battles between large military forces—largely defined twentieth-century conflict between major powers, irregular warfare will likely define international politics over the next year and beyond. Countries like China, Russia, and Iran compete with the United States using irregular methods because conventional and nuclear warfare are far too costly. The tools of irregular warfare are not strategic bombers, main battle tanks, or infantry soldiers, but hackers, intelligence operatives, special operations forces, and private military companies that often operate in the shadows.” —Seth G. Jones, Center for Strategic and International Studies xi

The operating environment today is more complex and volatile than the nation has seen since the Cold War, yet NAVINTEL’s training, ethos, and culture are not structured to consistently and reliably prepare its people to think on their feet at the individual or tactical unit level. Traditional views that bifurcate warfare into conventional force-on-force conflict, nuclear deterrence, and irregular warfare are insufficient for the types of challenges facing the fleet in an era of great power competition. The nation’s most significant competitors and adversaries (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors) do not see “warfare” as massed, organized conflict as the West often does. Rather, soft power often lands a more powerful blow than conventional military operations in today’s international landscape. Checkbook diplomacy, cyber warfare, misinformation, and state coercion abound as regular occurrences despite prevailing preferences to bin such actions as “irregular warfare.” When the irregular becomes the most regular threat at hand, our forces must adapt.

Thankfully, the NAVINTEL community is full of individuals who have developed deep knowledge of the target set and the ability to think beyond the pro forma most likely/most dangerous construct of adversary analysis. Lessons learned in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia can and should translate over to the rest of the NAVINTEL community. True in-depth understanding of a target by counterterrorism targeters has provided valuable assessments that enabled countless successful kinetic operations. Even beyond the counterterrorism realm, there are NAVINTEL professionals who have found their way into language training, cultural expertise, repeat area tours, and progressive assignments at multiple levels of warfare such that they have become true experts on competitors and adversaries in the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet Areas of Operations. Sadly, these individuals thrived in spite of the system, not because of it.

That said, the Navy should not abandon a focus on the worst-case, force-on-force scenarios at the heart of the Navy’s Operational Plan (OPLAN)-informed training. Rather, implementing Red Teaming as a core competency and cultural bedrock of the NAVINTEL community will enable Sailors at every level to respond to the expected while training for the worst. This is core to mission command, especially when battlespace awareness and communications capabilities are far from guaranteed. As Admiral William S. Sims said, “it often happened that the faults, more or less inevitable, of the higher authorities were repaired by their subordinates who thus won for them victories which they had not always deserved.”xii And so, inculcating Red Teaming as a core part of NAVINTEL’s baseline competency encourages the kind of thinking the Navy needs today.

The Red Teaming NAVINTEL Needs

It is essential to define the methods that need to be adopted. Doctrinally, the typical role intel plays in staff planning is the “red cell,” with a focus on the adversary, whereas the “red team”—where it does exist—is a separate unit focused on challenging assumptions (and usually enjoys direct access to the commander). This type of red team generally challenges widely-held views and scrutinizes analysis. As a result, the intel red cell focuses only on predictable adversary actions rather than broadly challenging assumptions or offering alternative assessments.

The Navy should stop decoupling these efforts and empower NAVINTEL to take ownership of Red Teaming beyond just adversary analysis. By also leading the development of structured contrarian analysis of own-force plans, alongside in-depth analysis of the adversary and the environment, NAVINTEL professionals will develop wider understanding and contextual analysis that will truly empower commander’s decision advantage. NAVINTEL teams must move beyond the capability side of the Deadly Force Triangle (capability, opportunity, intent) to holistically consider adversary plans, intentions, culture, and societal impacts that influence adversary decision-making. Only then will NAVINTEL empower commander’s decisions with sufficient understanding of not only what an adversary can do, but also with a consideration of all facets.

This approach to Red Teaming incorporates two interrelated but distinct models: emulative Red and decision-support Red. These two are not mutually exclusive; rather, there is great benefit from borrowing techniques from both. For an emulative Red Team, the most important factor is in-depth knowledge of all aspects of the adversary like culture, history, organizational structure, and weapon systems characteristics. For a decision-aid Red Team, fluency in and application of structured analytical tools will help prevent blind spots, groupthink, or other unintended negative effects of human analysis and decision-making from taking root in the planning process.xiii Although the models differ in emphasis, borrowing techniques from both models is critical for NAVINTEL to institutionalize the type of thinking suggested here.

The Red Teaming principles developed by the Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFCMS, often referred to as Red Team University) are the simplest way to structure the recommended problem-solving methodologies. UFMCS’ approach is based on four principles: self-awareness and reflection (SAR), applied critical thinking (ACT), groupthink mitigation (GTM), and fostering cultural empathy (FCE).xiv The first three are cognitive concepts, whereas FCE is more akin to traditional adversary understanding, and all are critical for NAVINTEL. One additional key element that is absent, however, is own-force understanding. This should be considered the fifth principle. NAVINTEL often strays away from focusing on own-force, or Blue, which is rightfully the domain of our operations and logistics counterparts. But without a good grasp of what one’s own force can do, NAVINTEL professionals are unable to contextualize threat and environment intelligence in a way that effectively informs what should be done. These five pillars should be the baseline for the concepts NAVINTEL needs to adopt to tackle the complex challenges of today.

Incorporating Red Teaming into NAVINTEL Culture, Training, and Processes

NAVINTEL needs to train for, establish a culture of, and take the lead in conducting full-spectrum Red Teaming across all levels of war in order to re-establish a legitimate and holistic focus on understanding Red. For decades, memorization of weapons ranges, ship characteristics, and unit nomenclature has been at the heart of NAVINTEL training. This approach provides a necessary foundation for analysis, but is insufficient as it does not equip the force with the cognitive abilities necessary for the challenges at hand. NAVINTEL needs to breed a culture full of professionals who fully own Red and truly see the world through the eyes of the adversary.

This does not happen by promulgating another 300-page handbook or adding more training requirements to the litany of annual computer-based training courses. Rather, change of this magnitude comes about by addressing root-cause issues like culture, training, and organizational structures and norms. This does not happen overnight; rather, a consistent focus on the core tenets of deeply understanding the adversary and a keen focus on preventing analytical traps and blind spots will bring about the changes needed to ensure decision superiority.

The foundations of intelligence analysis are developed in training, and therefore the shift in culture and ethos must start with incorporating Red Teaming methodologies there. Current graduates of the Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (NIOBC) state that the curriculum is centered around the simple rote memorization of adversary systems, with little focus on the importance of understanding adversary culture and the subsequent effects on decision-making.xv Recently, training that focused on mitigating groupthink was incorporated—which is an exceptional first step—but it failed to challenge students to exercise when and how this analytical pitfall comes into play in military decision-making. Furthermore, it did not incorporate understanding of the adversary and the environment as part of the discussion. Implementing a block of instruction on self-awareness, critical thinking, and groupthink mitigation, followed by experiential-based scenario training that integrates concepts central to understanding of the adversary would go a long way to ensure that NIOBC graduates have baseline competency in Red Teaming. This is relatively low-cost compared to the possible alternative of establishing a standalone Red Team University, like the Army and the Marine Corps did. This simple solution has the potential to serve as a catalyst for further change and more capably meet today’s demands.

In order to leverage this baseline exposure to Red Teaming in a way that creates meaningful cultural and organizational change, the initiative needs a sponsor. The Navy Information Warfighting Development Center (NIWDC) could serve as an exceptional training and doctrine hub, as well as cultural champion, to help cement Red Teaming as part of NAVINTEL’s way of doing business. NIWDC is well-positioned to be aware of, understand, and influence training, doctrine, standard operating procedures, and warfighting methodologies across NAVINTEL. With a handful of adherents and experts, at little to no cost,  NIWDC could develop a knowledge and resource repository. NIWDC should be empowered to build out resources to support individuals as they transfer between geographic areas, as well as curated reading lists spanning cultural, political, and economic subjects. The burden of developing this caliber of awareness and understanding must shift from the motivated individual acting of their own volition (as the system currently works) to the NAVINTEL community embracing these tenets institutionally.

Once baseline training has been established and Red Teaming guidance made available, NAVINTEL should implement a series of Additional Qualification Designators (AQDs) to encourage Red Teaming and regional/target-centric expertise and professional emphasis. As it stands, NAVINTEL embraces the generalist approach to knowledge and skills development, often detailing personnel from one geographic area to another, from one warfighting function to another, tour after tour. Certainly this provides opportunities for an Intelligence Officer or Intelligence Specialist to develop the breadth of understanding necessary to lead at senior levels of service. However, this approach disincentivizes service members from developing focused expertise, with a few notable exceptions.

By expanding the current professional focus seen in the Indo-Asia Pacific region (encouraged by the awarding of an area-specific AQDxvi) across more of the major challenges facing the Navy today, opportunities for in-depth knowledge and professional career viability can be more fully developed. Additional career pipeline augments are needed, including double detailing in the same region, and investing in junior personnel by sending a small number through the Defense Language Institute (DLI) with a payback tour either in theater or in an intelligence community component.

As related to Red Teaming, we advocate the creation of a Red Team AQD, which will complement the perspective and advice already delivered to fleet leaders by NIWDC’s Warfare Tactics Instructor (WTI) program and associated cadre. In addition to producing and guiding individuals with subject matter expertise, this also leverages NIWDC as the hub for preparatory and reference material needed to develop in-depth knowledge.

We understand that NAVINTEL cannot make everyone regional subject matter experts, but there can be a greater emphasis on a continuum of learning. There are no shortcuts to developing this deep understanding and the Navy should not mandate such efforts for all NAVINTEL personnel, but it should offer incentives to acquire and maintain regional expertise. Further, by providing roadmaps, resources, and training on critical subjects, the community can develop a cultural standard of performance and incentivize excellence.

Specifically related to the decision support side of Red Teaming, this approach can also make great strides toward the goal of full-scale acceptance of Red Teaming as part of a staff or command’s way of decision-making. The private sector, especially over the last 30 years or so in the tech industry, has done an incredible job of encouraging personnel to be experimental, take risks, and learn through failure. Examples like Google’s Moonshot Thinkingxvii or Amazon’s approach to competition analysisxviii have resulted in world-changing innovation across a multitude of sectors. NAVINTEL would do well to learn from these types of organizations and evaluate how new initiatives and institutionalized contrarian thinking are approached. Simply bolstering the Course of Action (COA) Analysis phase of the Navy Planning Process (NPP)xix would do wonders for this kind of evolution. With a NAVINTEL cadre well-versed in Red Team thinking, the Navy would be better prepared to effectively execute the NPP and scrutinize assumptions and outcomes. Doing so at all levels of operations, planning, and technological development will provide a more agile and adaptive thinking process to commanders and other decision-makers.

Conclusion

Whether it’s a ship’s captain facing an enemy vessel or a SEAL in the heat of battle, during the critical moments, the commander needs to ask for intel’s assessment, and know the analysis is derived from the deepest possible understanding of the adversary. By training and institutionalizing NAVINTEL professionals to more holistically own Red, NAVINTEL can democratize Red Teaming, resulting in a service that will be better suited to tackle the challenges central to current and future generations of naval warfighters.

Lieutenant Commander Christopher Blake is a Navy Intelligence Officer with 21 years of experience in the Surface Warfare, Expeditionary Warfare, and Special Warfare communities. He currently serves as the Director of Intelligence and Information Warfare (N2) at Navy Expeditionary Warfighting Development Center (EXWDC), Virginia Beach, VA. 

Lieutenant Grace Jones is a Navy Intelligence Officer with seven years of experience supporting Special Operations and conducting strategic level analysis. She currently serves as the Deputy Chief for Analysis and Production Headquarters at U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Stuttgart, Germany. 

These views are presented in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the official views or policies of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, EXWDC, or USAFRICOM.

References

[i] Captain J.M. Ellicott, USN (Retired), “Theodorus Bailey Meyers Mason, Founder Of The Office Of Naval Intelligence,” Proceedings Vol. 78/3/589 (1952), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1952/march/theodorus-bailey-meyers-mason-founder-office-naval-intelligence

[ii] Office of Naval Intelligence, “About: Heritage,” https://www.oni.navy.mil/About/Heritage/

[iii] LtCol Brendan Mulvaney, “Red Teams: Strengthening through Challenge,” Marine Corps Gazette (2012), https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/Mulvaney.pdf

[iv] United States Army Combined Arms Center, “University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies / Red Teaming,” https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming

[v] Defense Science Board Task Force, “The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities,” September 2003, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/redteam.pdf

[vi] Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense FY 21 Budget Estimates,” February 2020, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_Vol3_OSD_RDTE_PB21_Justification_Book.pdf

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] Edward Lundquist, “DMO is Navy’s Operational Approach to Winning the High-End Fight at Sea,” Seapower Magazine, February 2, 2021, https://seapowermagazine.org/dmo-is-navys-operational-approach-to-winning-the-high-end-fight-at-sea/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CDMO%20is%20a%20combination%20of,operational%20dilemmas%20on%20the%20adversary.%E2%80%9D

[ix] Seth Gordon, “The Future of Competition: U.S. Adversaries and the Growth of Irregular Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-competition-us-adversaries-and-growth-irregular-warfare

[x] Bryce Hoffman, “Introducing the Red Team Thinking Academy,” LinkedIn, 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/redteamthinking_introducing-rtt-academy-activity-6768548837477949440-5KT4

[xi] Seth Gordon, “The Future of Competition: U.S. Adversaries and the Growth of Irregular Warfare,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/future-competition-us-adversaries-and-growth-irregular-warfare

[xii] Benjamin F. Armstrong, “21st Century Sims: Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era,” Naval War College Review Volume 68 Number 4 (2015)

[xiii] CDR Fox, William. Interviewed by Christopher Blake and Grace Jones. Phone interview. Stuttgart, Germany, and Washington, D.C. March 1, 2021.

[xiv] University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, “Army Red Teaming Overview,” PowerPoint slide deck distributed to Department of Defense.

[xv] LTjg Jackson, Meadow. Interviewed by Grace Jones. Phone interview. Stuttgart, Germany, March 6, 2021.

[xvi] Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs, “Navy Creates Designation to Identify Officers with Pacific Region Experience,” February 4, 2015, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/Article/565444/navy-creates-designation-to-identify-officers-with-pacific-region-expertise/

[xvii] X.Company, “Moonshot Thinking,” https://x.company/moonshot/

[xviii] Jeff Bezos, “How Amazon Thinks About Competition,” Harvard Business Review, December 21, 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/12/how-amazon-thinks-about-competition

[xix] Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication, “Navy Planning NWP 5-01,” December 2013, p 3-3

Featured Image: The guided-missile destroyer Hohhot (Hull 161) attached to a destroyer flotilla with the navy under the PLA Southern Theater Command steams in waters of the South China Sea during a realistic maritime training exercise in early August, 2020. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Li Wei)

Brains and Brown Shoes: Building a Better Naval Aviation Intelligence Officer

Naval Intelligence Topic Week

By Lieutenant Peter McGee, USN, Lieutenant Gretchen Arndt, USN, and Commander Christopher Nelson, USN

Naval intelligence has historic roots in naval aviation, and like naval aviation, the heroes and legends of naval intelligence were born in the great carrier battles in the Pacific. Though seldom as glamorous as Kelly McGillis in Top Gun or as juvenile as the targeteer in Flight of the Intruder, naval intelligence officers are a familiar sight in ready rooms.1 Their names color the cruise plaques covering O-Club walls, generally identifiable as the junior-most officer in the mess. During the time-honored rhythm of pre-mission briefings, these Aviation Intelligence Officersor ‘AIs’present the most up-to-date threat situation, often the product of considerable coordination with the aviators throughout the planning process. From World War II through the Cold War, aviation intelligence epitomized excellence within the naval intelligence profession.

Times changed. The post-Cold War strategic environment and demands of the Global War on Terror shifted the focus of the Navy and naval intelligence. In turn, naval intelligence training shifted away from the high-end war at sea. Now, after a period of atrophy and the erosion of its military advantage, the U.S. is refocusing to compete against major powers.2 Today’s AIs are unprepared to support their aviators, and history suggests that naval intelligence will be called to redevelop a deep expertise in support of conventional missions against peer adversaries.3 Intelligence support to naval aviation will not only require a re-assessment of manning, training, and equipping but a re-evaluation of how we provide tactical and operational intelligence support to the fleet. A promising roadmap for reform lies in the EA-18G Growler squadrons of the electronic attack community.

Today’s Aviation Intelligence Officer

Aviation Intelligence Officers, mostly newly-minted ensigns, report to their squadrons eager to get involved as valuable contributors to their ready rooms by providing actionable intelligence to aviators. Their formal training consists of the Naval Intelligence Officer Basic Course (six -months) and the Basic Aviation Intelligence Course (two weeks). More recently, Air Force’s Intelligence Formalized Training Unit (IFTU) courses have been added to the AI training curriculum. Fresh from classroom learning, the AIs are excited and a bit nervous to get to the fleet.

Until this point, an AI’s training has largely consisted of PowerPoint montages, rote memorization, and briefing drills to inculcate technical language as well as the core skills and principles of intelligence tradecraft. These new officers have not received any training on the type of aircraft their aviators fly or even dedicated instruction on the principal threats to these aircraft. These two knowledge areas are the critical components to providing actionable intelligence. So, many eager AIs joining their squadrons quickly learn they were taught to play checkers while the aircrew they are supposed to be supporting are playing chess.4

An AI’s days at the squadron quickly fill with collateral duties that consume most of the workday.5 If fortunate, they have computers connected to a classified network in their local workspace and they may have access to other necessary networks somewhere on base. Even when they do have network access, however, the reliability of the connection is fitful at best.6

Despite multiple network accesses, AIs usually have little experience with relevant resources on each network and little time to devote to learning them. So, oddly, most air operations in the fleet are planned and supported only with the most basic intelligence resources, despite the wealth of information and analysis available on relevant computer systems. 

Squadron intelligence personnel must develop their own tactics, techniques, and procedures, often by trial and error. While squadron Training Officers oversee the in-squadron syllabi all aviators work through to advance their tactical knowledge and skill sets, no such program exists for AIs.7 Most AIs have regular contact with their Carrier Air Wing Intelligence Officeror CAG AI. This is a mid-career intelligence officer attached to their respective Carrier Air Wing staff. Due to geographic separation, possible lack of exposure to relevant aircraft-specific intelligence, and significant operational-level duties, CAG AIs are unable to fill a Training Officer-type role for squadron AIs. Isolated in an intelligence desert, countless squadron intelligence officers still successfully learn to thrive and make valued contributions to their ready-room and air wing. Those who do not thrive are deemed incompetent by their squadrons and ignored, and often depart for their next tour deeply disenchanted or elect to leave the Navy after a single tour. 

It is not all bad. AIs attend exercises and pre-deployment workups with their squadrons that focus on honing tactics and the operational capability of the squadron. During these evolutions, many intelligence training teams run effective syllabi to teach AIs to translate intel lingo to aviator speak, produce planning aides, and analyze blue and red capabilities. Exercises provide AIs with operational experience, valuable practice repetitions, and exposure to working closely with their aviators, all of which are salient skills. 

However, intelligence training teams are generally undermanned and under-supported, and the limitations of training environments mean AIs don’t develop some of the most vital skill sets required for real-world operations. In training, basic questions about (often notional) adversary equipment and employment are funneled directly to training teams. In real-world operations, there is no one-stop shop for answers. Time-limited training evolutions rarely empower AIs with substantive, functional knowledge of the range and depth of resources available or the ability to draw meaningful assessments from the data. Without dedicated, in-depth aviation intelligence training prior to arrival and at their squadron and with no training team for guidance, the intelligence support that AIs can provide in unscripted, real-world missions reflects their training: haphazard at best.

A New Age, New Threats

By all accounts, aviation intelligence training and equipment have largely stagnated over the years.8 In contrast, adversaries including China and Russia have spent the last three decades studying western air campaigns.9 Advanced systems like the Russian Flanker strike-fighter and S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) families and China’s HQ-9 SAM family represent strong returns on decades of investment in aircraft and air defense technology. Gone are the days when the primary threats facing our aviators were single-digit-range SAMs and early generation fighters. No longer do our adversaries’ air defenses function under the comfortable predictability of the Soviet military hierarchy. 

Today, shooters and sensors are highly mobile, have long ranges, and come with effective countermeasures. Adversary aircraft have upgraded, modern weapons systems and sensors. Thanks to the revolution in computing, command and control networks are digitizing, and electronically-scanned array radars are becoming the norm. Moreover, our adversaries understand the tactical implications of using the electromagnetic spectrum and track our overhead architecture.10 The characteristics of adversary land-based Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) increasingly resemble those of a maritime environment. All the while these same technological advances have migrated to deployed warships on the high seas.11

Just over two decades ago, during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, skilled and determined Serbian SAM operators shot down the ‘invisible plane’the F-117with the then-legacy SA-3 system. Today, our adversaries are more skilled and determined but now operate state-of-the-art weapons. This complicated threat requires better intelligence support. 

Need an Aviation Intel Expert? Call the Growlers! 

Thankfully, there is a glimmer of hope for aviation intelligence. It begins in the EA-18G Growler community on Naval Air Station Whidbey Island. Newly arriving intelligence professionals attend a two-week course on how to provide tailored intelligence support to EA-18G aircrew. Run by the Intelligence Division at the Electronic Attack Weapons School (EAWS), the class’s lectures and practicums cover topics such as “EA-18G Capabilities,” “EA-18G Employment,” “Threats and IADS,” “Mission Planning,” and “Common Operational Picture Management.” In addition to the course, Electronic Attack Wing Pacific (CVWP) manages a personnel qualification standard (PQS) that all EA-18G intelligence personnel must complete. This PQS deepens the understanding of how to support EA-18G tactical employment with intelligence. Armed with pragmatic instruction and reliable access to classified networks on the flight line, there is little excuse for AIs to be idle at their squadrons. 

When their squadrons begin workups, the AIs go through this course again, but this time the learning includes joint intel-aviation mission planning sessions for flights on the range. The senior intelligence officers on staff at CVWP conduct pre-deployment readiness inspections of the squadron’s Intelligence Division. These inspectors examine metrics such as the percentage of intelligence personnel who have completed the EA-18G Intelligence Basic Course and the EA-18G Intelligence PQS. They ensure the squadron is adequately manned and work with squadron leadership to rectify any deficiencies. Furthermore, when the squadron is “on the beach” (i.e. not deployed aboard the ship or on detachment away from home field) these intelligence officers conduct a wide range of supportive actions, including arranging external training, mentoring AIs, and advising Skippers on fitness report language.12

After returning from deployment, AIs may apply to attend the Growler Tactics Instructor (GTI) course in Fallon and earn their patch as a Growler Intelligence Officer (GIO). This rigorous program allows top-achieving intelligence officers to attend one of the most prestigious and intensive training courses in the Navy. The AI graduates bring a superb skill set back to the fleet and to the larger intelligence community, often choosing (like their aviator colleagues) to take instructor duty at EAWS or the GTI course in Fallon, Nevada. 

In the Growler community model, AIs participate in a sensible and structured curriculum of classroom learning, practicums, and on-the-job training that complements the Optimized Fleet Response Plan. They also have the option to continue their training with a postgraduate-level course. By grounding intelligence training in their specific platform, Growler AIs hone their ability to provide relevant assessments to their squadrons, better support to mission planning, and develop a deeper knowledge of the adversary. Many other Weapons Schools are reviewing EAWS’s intelligence syllabus and creating their own platform-specific intelligence training regimes.

The key enablers of the electronic attack community program are the noteworthy investment by CVWP and the cadre of intelligence professionals assigned to MT&E roles. The EA-18G Intelligence Basic Course is designed and taught by a GIO with a team of enlisted intelligence specialist sailors. A GIO is also on staff at the Growler Tactics Instructor course in Fallon, focused on tactical innovation and development. The CVWP N2 and N21 oversee manning, training, and equipping squadron Intelligence Divisions for deployment. Clearly, the AIs on the Whidbey flight line have a coherent administrative chain of command of intelligence officers and access to subject matter experts on intelligence tactics. This is a model the rest of Naval Aviation would do well to examine. 

Build It and They Will Come 

Encouragingly, structured training programs for naval aviation intelligence are under development by Naval Air Forces (CNAF) and Naval Aviation Warfare Development Center (NAWDC). The current CNAF proposal resembles the qualification curriculum of naval aviators, consisting of five qualification levels achieved by a mixture of formal classroom instruction and on-the-job training. This plan essentially formalizes a VAQ-like program for all AIs regardless of platform. Where infrastructure and manning are limited, it creatively substitutes USAF IFTU courses for Navy-led training.[13]

Changes in the broader naval intelligence manning process also complement CNAF’s push for better intelligence: additional qualifications are now available for squadron and WTI experience, and incoming CAG AIs are required to have, at a minimum, prior service in aviation intelligence or as a naval aviator. Initial results from all these initiatives have been positive,[14] but to succeed fully, naval intelligence must consider the following fundamental reforms:

  • Solve the technology issues

Intelligence officers require regular access to the wider intelligence community to do their job. Today, this is chiefly done via computer networks. Every squadron must have a reliable classified network connection and access to necessary networks at the Weapon Schools and Type Wings. Improve the afloat classified networks and install additional network access at every workstation in the critical intelligence centers afloat, and improve the transparency of fleet intelligence acquisitions to ensure a regular and vigorous user-to-programmer dialogue.

  • Increase the intelligence staff responsible for manning, training, and equipping fleet squadrons. 

In the VAQ model, the relatively robust intelligence chain of command provides the resources, products, mentorship, and advocacy that allows Growler AIs to succeed in their squadrons and the fleet. However, for many AIs, the closest mid-career intelligence officer in the chain of command is physically remote and juggles a myriad of duties, the majority of which are the air wing’s operational issues rather than squadron-level AI support.  

  • Incentivize Weapons Tactics Instructor tours by raising their career value, not by double detailing. 

In the VAQ model, a small cadre of intelligence WTIs retains, teaches, and passes on the specialized knowledge of Navy platforms and threat systems to each new class of AIs. This cadre also helps to develop new tactics and relationships for the community to improve the mission performance. Unfortunately, naval intelligence currently disincentivizes officers from becoming instructors by placing its highest value on competitive billets such as intelligence centers. This approach ensures that fleet-level TYCOM or other man, train, and equip assignments remain backwater jobs. Naval intelligence should follow the example of the unrestricted line communities and send its best and brightest JOs to instructor and WTI tours at ashore and afloat fleet training commands. Increase the number of intelligence instructor duty billets at training commands to develop robust and sustainable training environments.

  • Fix the career timeline squeeze. 

The naval intelligence career pipeline does not allow time for both a full competitive tour and a WTI instructor tour before appearing before the O-4 board. Intelligence officers must choose between pursuing excellence in warfighting or batting at a promotion wicket. Consider ranking the completion of a WTI Instructor tour equal to that of the coveted “early promote” ranking (the highest competitive category in officer fitness reports) at a competitive intelligence command. At these large intelligence centers, intelligence officers are vetted for promotion at the end of the tour by intelligence COs. At WTI Instructor tours, however, intelligence officers are vetted before the tour by line COs and held to a competitive standard throughout the tour. 

Conclusion 

Today’s naval aviation intelligence training is mediocre. In a future peer adversary fight, inadequate aviation intelligence training will spell catastrophe. A future fight may require matching US forces against an even more advanced Chinese military and an equally determined and deadly Russian bear. The problems facing the naval aviation and intelligence communities are complex, and hard decisions must be made to invest more time in naval intelligence education and training. Naval intelligence must once again return to its historic roots of providing high value actionable intelligence to enable naval aviation success and save aviators’ lives.

CDR Christopher Nelson, USN, is the Deputy Senior Naval Intelligence Manager for East Asia at the Office of Naval Intelligence. He is a graduate of the US Naval War College and the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in Newport, RI. Once upon a time, he was the aviation intelligence officer for the “Topcats” of SEA CONTROL SQUADRON 31. He is a regular contributor to CIMSEC and is also the artist behind Vulture’s Row on the USNI Blog

LT Peter McGee, USN, is assigned to OPNAV N2N6 International Programs and Engagement and is a graduate of the US Naval Academy. He served as the Intelligence Officer for Electronic Attack Squadron 136. 

LT Gretchen Arndt, USN, is the Growler Intelligence Officer at the Electronic Attack Weapons School at NAS Whidbey Island. She is a graduate of Northeastern University and the Growler Tactics Instructor Course. Her first tour was with Electronic Attack Squadron 133. She co-authored an article on this topic in the February, 2021, issue of Proceedings with LT Ben Hernandez.

Notes

[1] Readers might recall the aviation intelligence officer in the movie Flight of the Intruder who was discovered to be responsible for urinating in the Commanding Officer’s coffee decanter. 

[2]  Jim Mattis, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2018.

[3] The following publications outline the development of better aviation intelligence training, standards, and requirements: Wyman H. Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (Washington, D.C: Office of Naval Intelligence and Naval Historical Center, 1996); Richard Saunders, “Preparation of the US Navy Intelligence Officer” (Quantico, Virginia, United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1996); Rana Pennington, “Behind the Green Door,” USAF Fighter Weapons Review, 1999. Improvements in training were most often necessitated by the outbreak of war.

[4]  Navy Intelligence’s ignorance to blue capabilities is well documented in the following article: CDR Christopher Nelson, USN, and Eric Pedersen, “Naval Intelligence Must Relearn Its Own Navy,” Proceedings, March 2020.

[5]  Collaterals such as command security manager, coffee mess, and others seem to consume an overwhelming amount of time in the face of more important work.

[6] Navy network reliability and dependability is a recurring theme over the years. RAND conducted a detailed study exploring reliability and dependability issues of Navy networks, Navy Network Dependability: Models, Metrics, and Tools, the report notes that the issues with network dependability were a combination of software issues, hardware issues, and human error. Also see GAO Report 07-51, titled “Information Technology: DOD Needs to Ensure That Navy-Marine Corps Intranet Program Is Meeting Goals and Satisfying Customers.” Information Technology: DOD Needs to Ensure That Navy Marine Corps Intranet Program Is Meeting Goals and Satisfying Customers.

[7]  Many Training Officers, senior JOs, and Department Heads go out of their way to teach, mentor, and train their intelligence officers. This training is invaluable. However, intelligence officer training is inevitably second priority to aviator training. Besides, aviators typically only have limited exposure to the Intelligence Community. 

[8]  This theme is consistently emphasized across naval intelligence in prizing-winning essays: CDR Wolf Melbourne, USN, “Naval Intelligence’s Lost Decade,” Proceedings, December 2018; LT William Murray, USN, “Reimagine Intelligence Officer Training,” Proceedings, January 2019.

[9]  U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Military Bookshop, 2011).

[10]  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019; Michael Chase and Arthur Chan, China’s Evolving Approach to “Integrated Strategic Deterrence” (RAND Corporation, 2016).

[11]  For examples, refer to the recent articles in Proceedings on China’s Luyang III DDG and Jiangkai II FFG: Eric Wertheim, “China’s Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyer Is a Potent Adversary,” Proceedings, January 2020; Eric Wertheim, “China’s Multipurpose FFG,” Proceedings, June 2020.

[12]  EAWS provides unit level tactical training to fleet VAQ squadrons. CVWP is the TYPE wing for EA-18G squadrons and is also located on NAS Whidbey Island. The CVWP N2 and N21 also function as a ‘CAG AI-lite’ for Expeditionary (non-boat) VAQ squadrons. 

[13]  NAWDC has simultaneously initiated reforms of its fleet intelligence training curriculum.

[14]  Personal correspondence with Captain John Markley, USN, COMNAVAIRLANT N2.

Featured image: A U.S. Navy E/A-18G Growler, assigned to the “Cougars” of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 139, flies over the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in support of Operation Inherent Resolve. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Justin Parsons)

Bill Owens on the Strategic Studies Group and Taking Strategy to Sea

1980s Maritime Strategy Series

By Joe Petrucelli

CIMSEC discussed the development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy and the role played by the CNO Strategic Studies Group with Admiral William Owens (ret.). Admiral Owens was part of the first SSG during 1982. In this discussion, he discusses changes brought about by the Maritime Strategy, the implementation of the Maritime Strategy concepts by the fleet, and what lessons the Maritime Strategy and SSG have for the modern era.

What was new about the Maritime Strategy and how was it a shift from 1970s concepts and plans?

For the Navy and the Marine Corps, for the entire Defense Department, and for our country the Maritime Strategy was a turning point in the Cold War! For most of the years since World War II the United States Navy and Marine Corps had been focused on how to most efficiently get land and air forces into Central Europe to protect against a Soviet attack. This was the focus of all our force planning. All our analytic efforts in the Pentagon and the grand majority of money in the defense budget was organized around that particular task. The Maritime Strategy changed all of that in profound ways.

Can you briefly describe your personal involvement in the strategy development process?

My personal role was as a member of the first Strategic Studies Group, the SSG. This SSG and the concept was set up by Admiral Tom Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). And it is thanks to Tom Hayward, his vision, and his leadership style, that we wound up with a Maritime Strategy that materially changed everything.

Tom Hayward established the group under Bob Murray, a wonderful gentleman who had been the Under Secretary of the Navy. My personal involvement then was as one of the eight members of that first SSG. Admiral Hayward had personally chosen the eight of us, one from each branch of the Navy and two from the Marine Corps, to spend a year together. That was a transformative year for me and for all of us. As a submariner, I had spent all of my years, about 18 of them, in the submarine force, and had very little experience in the grand strategy of the Navy or the Defense Department. Indeed, I had very little knowledge of the other branches of the Navy, such as the fighter community, the surface navy, the amphibious forces, or the Marine Corps. This year changed all of that for me personally and immersed me in what was, we thought, the principal effort to bring together a very different position for our Navy.

While Secretary Lehman had talked about a different strategic force and several had talked about the need for a more offensive Navy, never before to my knowledge had we put together such a broad view of what the Navy and Marine Corps could possibly execute as principal members of U.S. forces. It is important to note Admiral Hayward’s role in the formation and tasking of the SSG, and in his leadership in imagining the entire year for the eight of us. I will always remember that as a precious lesson of how to lead! The CNO told us personally when we asked “what was the deliverable,” that he did not know. He said, “I formed this group because I have tremendous confidence in each of you, and I expect you to spend a year with no restrictions to do something good for the United States Navy and to make the year worthwhile in every respect, including for yourself.”

Follow-up sessions with Admiral Hayward occurred only two or three times during the year, and under Bob Murray’s leadership we had no restrictions, all doors were open, and all lines of thought were encouraged. This was the only time in my entire time in the Navy that I saw this degree of complete confidence and “gutsy” leadership to do something very special for our Navy and our country.

The SSG is often cited as a key (if not the key) driver behind the emergence of the Maritime Strategy. But at the same time, other initiatives and groups, including exercises such as Ocean Venture ’81, the OP-603 strategist community, the Advanced Technology Panel, and Secretary Lehman’s personal involvement were combined with pre-SSG elements such as Sea Plan 2000 and the Global War Games. In your opinion, which of these elements were the most significant and how did they interact with each other to create what we know as the Maritime Strategy?

While many of these products were well-known to us, there were none in my opinion which laid out the specifics of a new Maritime Strategy, one that would indeed change all of the force analysis, and that would change the thinking in the Congress and in the inner halls of the Kremlin. Regarding which organization came first with the Maritime Strategy, I leave it to the readers. But from our standpoint in the SSG, we had been sent by Admiral Hayward to “do good for the U.S. Navy,” and after many, many discussions among ourselves and many other potential activities that we could have undertaken, we chose to look at how the United States Navy and Marine Corps could play a much more offensive role in what was then the great challenge, the Soviet Union. I know that others were interested in this work, the CNO’s staff was doing work on strategy, and Secretary Lehman had done some work thinking about the Navy of the future.

But for us, we were not aware of any macro-level strategy for our country that dealt with the use of offensive maritime forces. Additionally, when we were looking to brief various commands, through Bob Murray and Admiral Hayward, there was a decision that we should go and visit all of the four-star U.S. Navy commanders to represent a new way of thinking about our Navy, which we called the Maritime Strategy. So, regarding who the originator was, from our standpoint we believed that we were taking the lead and had founded something that could be very special for our country, and I believe it was the SSG who dubbed it the Maritime Strategy.

How did the SSG, and through it the Maritime Strategy, influence and spur innovation in real-world fleet operations and exercises, both at the theater and at the tactical levels? What role did the SSG’s extensive travel to operational fleet commands, or the feedback received from the theater commands and flag ranks, help influence the strategy?

Commander Art Cebrowski and I were the two most junior officers on the first SSG. The natural flow had us both involved in developing presentations, doing some writing, and then eventually being the two briefers that took the Maritime Strategy to each of the four-star commanders-in- chief of the theaters. As such we were able to internalize and absorb the many comments that we received, which were at first quite doubtful, and then in a growing way, believing that there was indeed a new way possible to use naval force. Eventually Art and I started to feel more and more confident. With Bob Murray as an enormous mentor, a shield, we had a great interface with CNO Admiral Tom Hayward to continue our work and then to broaden it.

We noticed that within a few months exercises were being conducted in the various fleets, especially Seventh Fleet, to test out some of the concepts in the field. But more importantly, each of us was blessed to move on to become more senior and start exercising these concepts ourselves. As a young one-star admiral, I was able to mass four dozen attack submarines far forward and “demonstrate to the Soviets directly that we were there in numbers.”

When we looked at the ability of the United States Navy to take the battle forward to the Soviet bastions, to the northern flank of Norway and even the Arctic, when we were able to use carriers, surface forces, and the submarine force together far forward both in the Atlantic and the Pacific, we started to realize that we were having an impact on the Soviets themselves. No longer were the bastions and the northern and western flanks totally the property of the Soviet Union. After the Cold War was over, there were intelligence reports reflecting the critical difference the Navy and Marine Corps’ positioning had had on strategic thinking in the Soviet Union and indeed in their reflection that they could not win, no matter how much they poured into their defense systems.

Why did the Maritime Strategy “work,” if it did, and what about the process has been so hard to replicate?

The Maritime Strategy worked because there was an open mind in the leadership ranks of the Navy, there were very active supporters in OP 603, and in the intelligence community. And I would note that Rich Haver was particularly valuable to us in gaming and supporting our efforts. Rich was a senior civilian, an intelligence professional working in the Chief of Naval Operations office directly in what was called Code 009. He was extremely interested in the SSG’s deliberations and participated in many of our wargames and discussions. He was also a source of information from the intelligence community, and we spent considerable time with Rich regarding the intelligence implications of our thoughts on the Maritime Strategy. We saw a lot of Rich in Newport with the SSG.

Underlying it all, of course, was Tom Hayward and Bob Murray’s terrific leadership. They were the single most important factors in driving the success of those first SSGs! I think it was hard to duplicate the work of the first three or four SSGs, as follow-on CNOs did not lead the effort in the same sense that Tom Hayward did, and there was never another Bob Murray. I think the concept is strong and could remain strong under the right leadership. In other words, “take the very best from the warfare communities, give them a free rein for a year, and ask them to deliver a product that is worth the time and effort for their Navy and Marine Corps.” I don’t think that ever happened again after the first two or three SSGs.

How did the strategy interface with the POM process? What was its budgetary and programmatic influence, what mechanisms channeled this influence, and how did these processes change over this time period?

Because of senior leadership and our exposure to all of the Navy’s four-star officers, there eventually was considerable support and understanding of what the United States Navy and Marine Corps capability was, and I believe that flowed through every branch of both services. Especially for those of us who became three- and four-star officers, we drove the Maritime Strategy as part of all of our budgeting and programmatic directions. It was a critical part of my own efforts both as the first N-8 in the Navy staff and as the Sixth Fleet commander, and then the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Putting pressure on the Soviet Union, and indeed realizing that the Navy and Marine Corps were operating forward, aggressively, and offensively, I believe this carried over after the Cold War ended in the way we thought about our service. It changed the paradigms of World War II. Of course, the submarine force had always been operating forward. But now we were able to operate with other branches of the Navy and Marine corps in a very offensive forward position, and we coordinated those actions with other naval forces to make a much larger difference. In many ways the Maritime Strategy was a coming-of-age for maritime forces.

What lessons can be taken from the 1980s for engaging in modern great power competition, both specifically about the role of the SSG and its functionality, and more generally about the centrality of the Maritime Strategy in 1980s great power competition?

Many of the lessons of the 1980s pertain to naval and Marine forces today, and will in the future. And when we are thinking of great power competition it allowed us to think of truly offensive and game-changing actions in the forward theaters, which pertains as much in today’s world as it did then. I predict that this will continue as we look to the future.

The lessons of the SSG were profound for me. The degree of thinking and engagement that a dedicated, supported from-the-top-group of quality officers can provide, was stunning. Art Cebrowski and I, I’m sure, had our lives changed in many ways from this experience. The leadership lessons learned from Tom Hayward, Bob Murray, and others who supported us also had a profound effect on Art and myself. And I have to add, the loss of Art Cebrowski to our entire Defense Department was a loss that is more than one could ever have imagined.

How did the strategy enhance the Navy’s ability to tell its story to outside audiences, such as Congress, the other services, and allies? How was it received and challenged by outside audiences?

The Maritime Strategy dramatically enhanced the Navy’s confidence in what it already knew in part that it could do. Whether it was with Congress, where the demonstration of the Navy and Marine Corps offensive forces working jointly with the other services became known, or with our allies, where this broad naval offensive power was broadly accepted, the maritime strategy was clearly now a part of everything we did. And in many cases, such as the United Kingdom, our allies joined as part of our forward-thinking Maritime Strategy.

Many audiences of traditionalists, including several of our four-star commanders at the time, were strongly unconvinced, even disapprovingly so. But it did not take long with continued exercises, demonstrated capability, and a realization on the Hill that this was something that could truly change America’s position in the world of military power, that there was widespread acceptance.

For many of us throughout our careers, we took pride in showing our friends and allies around the world and in the United States the true power and ability of our maritime forces to operate freely, jointly, and with substantial capability even in the most challenging areas. It is hard to say this needs to be proven now, since this is the way our country’s military services take military force forward, with naval forces on the leading edge!

Admiral William Owens (ret.) is a retired four-star U.S. Navy admiral. He was Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from 1990 to 1992, which included Operation Desert Storm. Owens also served as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources. Owens was the Senior Military Assistant to two Secretaries of Defense (Secretaries Cheney and Carlucci) and served in the Office of Program Appraisal for the Secretary of the Navy. He began his military career as a nuclear submariner. He served on four strategic nuclear-powered submarines and three nuclear attack submarines, including tours as Commanding Officer of the USS Sam Houston, USS Michigan, and USS City of Corpus Christi. He currently serves as an executive in the private sector, as well as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Joe Petrucelli is an assistant editor at CIMSEC, a reserve naval officer, and an analyst at Systems, Planning and Analysis, Inc.

The opinions expressed here are the author’s own, and do not necessarily represent the positions of employers, the Navy, or the DoD.

Featured Image: October 22, 1988 – Guests observe the Nos. 1 and 2 Mark 7 16-inch/50-caliber guns being traversed and elevated as the battleship USS WISCONSIN (BB 64) “comes alive” during its recommissioning. (National archive photo)

Mike McDevitt on the Strategic Studies Group and Connecting Strategy with Programming

1980s Maritime Strategy Series

By Joe Petrucelli

CIMSEC discussed the development of the 1980s Maritime Strategy and the role played by the CNO Strategic Studies Group with Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (ret.). RADM McDevitt served on the second SSG and went on to serve in operational and programmatic roles implementing the Maritime Strategy. In this discussion, he discusses changes brought about by the Maritime Strategy, the attempts to bureaucratically ensure that strategy informed navy programming, and what lessons the Maritime Strategy and the SSG have for the modern era.

What was new about the Maritime Strategy and how was it a shift from 1970s concepts and plans?

The maritime Strategy was new in a number of ways. First, it was strategically dangerous, and as a result was controversial because it embraced the use of U.S. anti-submarine forces, primarily nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), in a campaign to sink Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The goal was to eliminate or substantially reduce the Soviet nuclear strategic reserve (follow-on strike capability). The argument in support of this course of action was that as Soviet SSBNs were sunk this would negatively affect Soviet “correlation of forces” calculations, creating a perception of increased vulnerability and lead them to seek war termination. The counter argument was it would cause the Soviets “to use them rather than lose them,” thereby triggering nuclear war.

Secondly, the Maritime Strategy was intended to be a global strategic approach, in short, the navy would “horizontally escalate” the conflict. The assumption was that war would break out on the Central Front (a Soviet invasion across the inter-German border). Rather than merely fighting the Soviets in and around Europe, the U.S. Navy would expand the war to Asia by using Pacific Fleet capabilities, especially those stationed in Japan, to attack Soviet bases in the Soviet Far Eastern Military District (TVD). High on the list were Soviet Backfire (TU-22M) bomber bases. The main implication for the navy was that the Pacific Fleet would stay in the Pacific and not be “swung” to the Atlantic. Today of course any conflict with China would require Atlantic Fleet forces to “swing” to the Pacific. Admiral Hayward, who was the CNO who established the SSG, was a big proponent of attacking the Soviet Navy on a global basis, especially in the Pacific. He was a former Pacific Fleet commander who hated the “swing strategy.”

Thirdly, it promoted an offensive use of the 600-ship navy and explained how and why the 600-ship navy would actually be used. The strategic intent of the strategy was to put pressure on the Soviet “flanks” by using carrier air (keep in mind in those days each air wing included aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons) and SSNs. While I do not claim to be an expert on navy strategies in the 1960s and 70s, they all revolved around the primary mission of securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to Europe so the bulk of the U.S. Army could get there in time to keep the Red Army from overrunning western Europe. Based on intelligence, the Maritime Strategy judged that the vast Soviet submarine fleet would not be involved in attacking SLOCs and instead would be protecting their own SSBN forces. Yet another reason for an anti-SSBN operation.

Finally, the strategy was strongly informed by the absolute best intelligence available. It was not simply an aspirational document, many of the ideas and concepts (including novel tactical ideas) embedded in the strategy found their way into official war plans, were constantly wargamed, and practiced in major fleet exercises.

I would also add that it rested on a number of assumptions regarding Soviet behavior and their reactions to U.S. operations that could have been very wrong. Similarly, some innovative tactics suggested by the SSG such as using the radar shadows created by steep walled fjords and small islands emerging from deep water in the Aegean and in Northeast Asia to protect carriers were very risky. The idea was that anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) radar seekers could not discriminate between the merged radar return of the land and ships operating nearby, thus protecting them from Backfire-launched ACSM’s. This implied that carriers might have to fly from anchor, something I witnessed years later in Diego Garcia.

What was your personal involvement in the Maritime Strategy development process?

On the eve of detaching from destroyer command in July 1982 and heading to a good assignment in Washington, my orders were changed, and I was assigned to the second Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College. I had no idea what the SSG was and did not want to go. I received a phone call from the CNO’s office and was told to shut up and execute my orders. It turned out to be a transformative career experience because it exposed me, for the first time, to real world maritime strategy and exceptionally good intelligence. Note the small “m and s,” what we know today as “the” Maritime Strategy” did not exist, it had not yet been written. SSG 2’s task was to globally expand, if practicable, the concepts developed during the first SSG that sketched offensive operations beyond the GI-UK gap against the Soviet Northern Flank.

The eight of us were divided into two teams, one to focus on the Pacific, and one to focus on the Mediterranean. I was the surface guy on the Med team. It is probably best to not go into any details about our work beyond what I suggested in responding to your first question. It was a full year of study, wargaming, discussion, many visits to the Office of Naval Intelligence and CIA, and travel to LANTFLT, NAVEUR, and 2nd and 6th Fleets. And of writing, theorizing, arguing, and then finally briefing our product to the CNO and many three-stars and four-stars. Former Under SECNAV Robert Murray led the SSG. He was, and remains, a notable strategist in his own right and was a terrific leader and mentor to all of us. His presence during our travels guaranteed that we had access to senior officers and officials, who left to their own devices probably did not look forward to being questioned by five captains, two colonels, and one commander about how they planned to fight the Soviets.

The SSG is often cited as a key (if not the key) driver behind the emergence of the Maritime Strategy. But at the same time other initiatives and groups, including exercises such as Ocean Venture ’81, the OP-603 strategist community, the Advanced Technology Panel, and Secretary Lehman’s personal involvement were combined with pre-SSG elements such as Sea Plan 2000 and the Global War Games. Which of these elements were the most significant and how did they interact with each other to create what we know as the Maritime Strategy? 

The SSG was not the key. The Maritime Strategy had many parents, it was an iterative process; it did not emerge full-blown overnight. The most influential player by far was CNO Admiral Tom Hayward who started the U.S. Navy down the maritime strategy road. He saw a need for naval strategic thinking and made it an imperative. When John Lehman became SECNAV he completely embraced what Hayward had initiated, and brought the energy, vision, and political savvy necessary to link his 600-ship navy vision to a believable concept of operations that came to be called the Maritime Strategy. It was not a passing fancy for him, he kept his foot on the gas pedal in terms of training and exercises once the initial headwork was done. SSG work caught his eye because it provided an operational template of how naval forces could actually be used to make a strategic difference in what had long been viewed as a continental conflict that only demanded safe and efficient taxi service from the Navy. Because of his interest, the most senior naval officers had to consider seriously the work of the SSG.

But, in terms of pulling all threads together into a coherent strategic document that took seriously inputs from fleet commanders, the credit should go to the OP-603 team. Those of us in SSG 2 did not think we were writing “the” maritime strategy. At the end of our year however, we did think we had knit together a concept of operations that would be effective in the two theaters of operations we addressed.

Finally, I think it would be a grave mistake to not acknowledge the seminal importance of the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-15-82D of March 1983). It was being written while SSG 2 was doing its work, and all the players mentioned in your question were aware that it was being prepared and benefited from its findings. It has since been declassified and is included as an appendix in John Hattendorf’s Naval War College Newport Paper 19, “The Evolution of the U.S, Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1997-1986.” It is definitely worth reading today.

How did the SSG, and through it the Maritime Strategy, influence and spur innovation in real-world fleet operations and exercises, both at the theater and at the tactical levels?  What role did the SSG’s extensive travel to operational fleet commands, and the feedback received from the theater commands and flag ranks, help influence the strategy? 

It is important to keep in mind that only the first two SSGs had any direct influence on what we know today as the Maritime Strategy. OP-06 was already briefing an early version of the maritime strategy in late 1982, early 1983. By that time, the fleet commanders recognized that both the new CNO Admiral Watkins and SECNAV Lehman had positive views about both the OP-06 work and the products of SSG1 and 2, and as a result were testing many of the supporting operational concepts and tactical ideas at sea. In short, by the summer of 1983 the institutional navy was engaged, and the work of subsequent SSGs was certainly important but not central to the Maritime Strategy itself. 

Why did the Maritime Strategy “work,” if it did, and what about the process has been so hard to replicate? 

It worked because it provided a credible answer to key strategic and budgetary questions. Why do you need a 600-ship navy? What will you do with it? It explained to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and most importantly the Congress why you needed a navy that size. It did this by having a good story that explained how the navy would actually be used in case of general war in Europe. And it explained how the Navy “would make a strategic difference” to the country.

It also worked because the United States had what I would call an “official enemy.” It was politically correct to talk openly about what was needed to stop Soviet aggression in Europe, and to punish the Soviets globally by attacking them wherever found. When the Cold War ended, other than North Korea or Iran, the U.S. ran out of “official enemies,” and as a result, the rationale for naval forces shifted to an era that CNO Admiral Watkins had dubbed the “Violent Peace.”

Necessarily, the Navy’s public rationalization had to shift to what the Navy actually had been doing throughout the Cold War except, of course, fighting Russians. The focus became the importance of combat credible forward presence and fighting limited wars. This was an accurate operational characterization of what the Navy did, and continues to do, but these are very hard arguments to shape into a compelling “naval strategic story.” In short, since 1991 there has been no widely agreed upon enemy that could generate a significant enough demand signal for a major navy buildup or naval strategic story like that of the early 1980s.

It appears that China may now be filling that gap today. Thwarting Chinese aggression against treaty allies and important friends (e.g., Taiwan) is a major strategic problem. Interestingly, what the Office of the Secretary of Defense calls China’s operational concept, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), is nothing more than a derivative of what the Soviets had planned to do to keep U.S. Navy carrier forces as far away from Soviet territory as possible. Of course today smart ballistic missiles and 24/7 space-based surveillance and targeting make it a lot harder to deal with that threat compared to 35 years ago. The problem of how to credibly honor our defense obligations to countries that live in the shadow of China’s capability suggests to me that a new SSG is needed to focus on this problem.

How did the strategy interface with the POM process? What was its budgetary and programmatic influence, what mechanisms channeled this influence, and how did these processes change over this time period? As part of this, can you describe the Summary Warfare Appraisal process and how that worked? 

A perennial complaint from those that critique the POM (the program objective memorandum) process in OPNAV is that it is strategy-free. In reality this is not entirely true since systems have been assessed against threats to be credible. In my day, the navy program was the domain of DMSO of Navy Program Planning (OP-090). To inject strategy into the process CNO Hayward transformed an existing DMSO into a new organization named Director of the Office of Naval Warfare (OP-095). Shortly thereafter the VCNO (Admiral Bill Small, another very influential strategic proponent) told 095 to assess the navy program against the emerging Maritime Strategy. He wanted to make certain the Navy was programing capabilities that were relevant to the strategic concepts embodied in the strategy. This involved a number of assessments, directives, and so forth from the CNO directing that program sponsors follow the strategic objectives, as defined by 095.

After my SSG assignment ended in July 1983, I wound up in the middle of this “experiment” when assigned as the Deputy Director of OP-950 (Warfare Appraisal Branch), an office headed during my time by Rear Admiral Bobby Bell and then-Rear Admiral Bill Fogarty, both terrific bosses. Our job was to create a “report card” for the CNO on how well the rest of OPNAV was doing in following the dictates of the strategy. The report card would be in the form of a briefing to the CNO and all his three-star DCNO and DMSOs. It was called the Summary Warfare Appraisal. My main job was to oversee the building of this briefing and then be the one who briefed it to the CNO and others. At the time OP-095 was headed by Vice Admiral Lee Baggett, a brilliant officer, who left no detail to chance. Since the Summary Warfare Appraisal was full of individual programs, all of which we had to evaluate/grade, Vice Admiral Baggett and I spent hours in his office while he annotated his copy of our report card with telling programmatic details, including recommendations to kill, enhance, or sustain a given program based upon whether they contributed to the Maritime Strategy or not. There was a great deal of preliminary work that went into this process, especially detailed programmatic assessments of individual warfare areas (e.g., ASW, AAW, Strike, and so forth) which were measured against maritime strategic criteria.

The goal of the report card brief was to obtain CNO approval. Once CNO approved, as modified by discussions during the brief, we (OP-950) drafted a directive from CNO to OPNAV on how to modify the program to bring it into line with maritime strategic objectives. During my two-and-a half years of doing this, the process had many twists and turns as three-star personalities changed, and the Maritime Strategy became more widely understood and accepted within the higher levels of the Navy, especially OPNAV. On balance it was a process that CNO Watkins liked and was comfortable with, and it did connect strategy with programs. When he retired, as usual, the next CNO had his own ideas on how he wanted to address strategy-program integration. By that time I was back at sea, and that was someone else’s problem.

What lessons can be taken from the 1980s for engaging in modern great power competition, both specifically about the role of the SSG and its functionality, and more generally about the centrality of the Maritime Strategy in 1980s great power competition? 

Dealing with two great powers is going to be harder than it was to deal with one. While Russia and China are not allies, and probably have no intention of joining a war against the United Sates in support of their close neighbor; they may share intelligence and surveillance information, sell weapons systems and ammunition, and take advantage of Washington’s distraction with the other. Washington should not, but could easily, ignore treaty allies who might be threatened by an unengaged Russia or China. These are all unique problems that do not map well against the 1980s.

We cannot forget that the Maritime Strategy never had to be executed. For all our clever ideas, we could have gotten our asses kicked conventionally. Just consider, in 1982 the Soviet Navy had 278 submarines, not counting SSBNs, and 1,200 naval combat aircraft. The Maritime Strategy’s timing was fortunate. Less than a decade after it was issued the Soviet Union put itself out of business. That had a lot to do with Mikhail Gorbachev and not much to do with the Maritime Strategy. It was an incredibly risky strategy, and frankly in hindsight, I doubt the president would have permitted an anti-SSBN operation because of the risk of escalation to nuclear war.

What was important about then that needs to be applied today was the totality of the intellectual horsepower the Navy Department brought to bear on the signal task of making a case for a navy that could make a strategic difference in the event of great power war. Today, the navy needs to recognize that in a fight with China its biggest problem is not just the PLA Navy; it is also the PLA Rocket Force, the PLA Air Force, and the PLA Strategic Support Force. It is the totality of China’s military power that can be brought to bear in East Asia. If it were strictly a navy-to-navy faceoff, the PLA Navy would be in deep trouble. 

Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (ret.) served on the second SSG after a destroyer command and went on to command a destroyer squadron, and after flag selection, an aircraft carrier battle group. He subsequently served as the Director of the East Asia Policy Office for the Secretary of Defense, the Director for Strategy, War Plans and Policy (J-5) for U.S. CINCPAC, and the Commandant of the National War College in Washington, D.C. He founded CNA’s Strategic Studies division in 2000, and since stepping down as a Vice President in 2012, has been active as a Senior Fellow, leading several major projects related to maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas and China’s ambition to become a “great” maritime power. He is the author of the recent book China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power, published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press.

Joe Petrucelli is an assistant editor at CIMSEC, a reserve naval officer, and an analyst at Systems, Planning and Analysis, Inc.

The opinions expressed here are the author’s own, and do not necessarily represent the positions of employers, the Navy or the DoD.

Featured Image: May 1, 1985 – A port bow view of the Spruance class destroyer USS HAYLER (DD 997) executing a high-speed maneuver. (National Archive photo)