Sea Control 574: Diplomacy for Better Stand-in Force Access in Japan with Daniel Hough

By Brian Kerg

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Hough joins the podcast to discuss his article, “Diplomacy for Better Stand-In Force Access in Japan.” Lieutenant Colonel Hough is a combat engineer officer serving as an operational planner in the III MEF G-357 Future Operations Branch in Okinawa, Japan. He deployed as a combat engineer officer in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and as an engineer advisor in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.

Download Sea Control 574: Diplomacy for Better Stand-in Force Access in Japan with Daniel Hough

Links

1. “Diplomacy for Better Stand-In Force Access in Japan,” by Daniel Hough, Proceedings, September 2024.

Brian Kerg is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

This episode was edited and produced by William McQuiston. 

Sea Control 573: The Great North Challenges the Mediterranean with Federico Petroni

By Alexia Bouallagui

Sea Control presents the first in a special series by cohost Alexia Bouallagui on Italian maritime security research. On this episode Alexia is joined by Federico Petroni to discuss Arctic geopolitics. Federico Petroni is a geopolitical analyst at Limes, the Italian review of geopolitics, and coordinator of the school of Limes.

This podcast is offered in both Italian and English. Skip to 26:21 for the English version.

Download Sea Control 573: The Great North Challenges the Mediterranean with Federico Petroni


Links

1. Artics fevers, Limes, Feb 2019 https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/la-febbre-dell-artico-14632937.

2. Artico: attacco al Mediterraneo? Da Taiwan a Gibilterra – Le Giornate del Mare 2024 a Roma, Limes, November 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXRDmb2EsHA.

Italian

La Battaglia per l’Artico: Il Grande Nord sfida il Mediterraneo – Nuova Guerra Fredda o Terra di
Nessuno?

Federico Petroni si unisce al programma per discutere di geopolitica artica. Federico Petroni è un analista geopolitico di Limes, la rivista italiana di geopolitica, e coordinatore della Scuola di Limes. Questo episodio è stato montato e prodotto da Alexia Bouallagui. È il primo episodio di una serie pensata per approfondire la ricerca sulla sicurezza marittima italiana.

Links:

1. La febbre dell’Artico, Limes, febbraio 2019
https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/la-febbre-dell-artico-14632937/.

2. Artico: attacco al Mediterraneo? Da Taiwan a Gibilterra – Le Giornate del Mare 2024 a Roma, Limes, November 2024,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXRDmb2EsHA.

Alexia Bouallagui is co-host of the Sea Control podcast, and edited and produced this episode.

Every Commander a Wargamer: Reforming Wargaming Education for the Fleet

By Jeff Appleget and Jeff Kline

Introduction

In the decade since Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work began his 2014 initiative to reinvigorate wargaming, there has been a decided uptick in the number of wargames being conducted for DoD. However, the quality and relevancy of DoD wargaming has not been uniform.

One of the primary causes for this lack of consistency is the dearth of wargaming capacity residing within DoD. Many combatant commands turn to the private sector and pay premium rates to have wargames conducted for them. Other DoD organizations conduct wargames using a pick-up team extracted from their staff that has little or no knowledge of wargaming. Wargaming is a skill that every Commander or Lieutenant Colonel should possess. However, there has been no DoD focus on educating uniformed personnel who can initiate, design, develop, conduct, and analyze wargames for their services.

This article highlights the Navy’s current wargaming education capability at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and makes recommendations for the Fleet to create a pipeline of naval officer wargamers to enhance the professionalism, preparedness, and knowledge of the servicemembers and organizations of the naval services.

Background

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been wargaming almost since its establishment in 1909. As with any military education, wargaming’s state of the art has evolved and advanced since that time. NPS’s sister institution, the Naval War College (NWC), contributed greatly to the U.S. Navy’s success in World War II through the focused Plan Orange series of wargames conducted from 1919-1940.

The use of wargaming waned as the 1960s ushered in the computer era and proponents of “Systems Analysis” advanced the idea that “computerized wargames” (what is known today as combat simulations) could replace commanders gathered around charts and maps and working through the risk calculus and the consequences of employing their forces against a thinking, malevolent adversary. In the 1970s and 80s, DoD created a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) enterprise that allowed combat simulations to dominate the analysis that underpinned the DoD’s acquisition process.

This analysis capability led to the massive U.S. Armed Forces build up that contributed greatly to the break-up of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s. The Abrams tank, the Aegis cruiser, and the A-10 Warthog all benefited from systems analysts using combat simulations to quantify the goodness these weapon systems would bring to U.S. forces in a NATO-Warsaw Pact fight. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm gave U.S. forces one more chance to fight a ground-focused kinetic war before the U.S. plunged into nearly two decades of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare conflicts, warfare that was really a poor fit to analyze using our kinetic-focused combat simulations.

2014 saw a U.S. Department of Defense wargaming renaissance as Deputy Secretary of Defense Work championed a reinvigoration of wargaming throughout the services. As a result, senior leaders finally began to understand that wargames and combat simulations were two completely different tools that, when used properly together, could provide the foundation for robust analysis of new concepts, platforms and technologies. The use of these and other tools in a campaign of analysis provided organizations the means to do both qualitative and quantitative analysis to inform a spectrum of decisions to better position the U.S. DoD for an uncertain future against two growing powers that employ both kinetic forces and non-kinetic hybrid threats. The challenge is building and maintaining a DoD-wide wargaming capability to conduct such analyses.

Bringing the Fleet to NPS Wargaming Education

The NPS Operations Research Department was leaning forward and in 2009 began its own wargaming renaissance, positioning NPS to better advantage not only the Fleet, but the other DoD services and U.S. allies and partners. 

Focus on the Fleet

To accomplish this, the Wargaming Applications course was re-focused on applying the craft of wargaming to address existing and future Fleet challenges. Teams of junior to mid-grade officers provide direct support to real world sponsors by designing, developing, conducting, and analyzing wargames that focus current or future challenges of the Fleet, our sister services, allies, and partners. The wargaming course culminates with officer-conducted, Fleet-sponsored wargames during “wargaming week,” normally the last week of the academic quarter. NPS warrior-scholars come from all branches of DoD, and many of our partners and allies. Wargames are conducted at the Unclassified, CUI, Secret, and Top Secret/SCI levels.

Wargaming week occurs at NPS in early June (5-10 wargames) and early December (1-3 wargames). Outside attendees are welcome to attend wargaming week given that they have the proper security clearances. Since 2009, NPS officer teams have designed and conducted over 100 wargames, helping the Fleet underpin flagship concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Stand-In-Forces, and assessing a spectrum of Contested Logistics issues for OPNAV N4.

Joint and coalition wargames are also conducted for Fleet partners, such as examining the impact of emerging maritime capabilities and technologies for the Taiwan CNO, examining interoperability challenges for the U.S. Marine Corps Forces – Pacific (MARFORPAC) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and assessing the impact of emerging technologies for the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense – Strategic Capabilities Office (OSD-SCO).

Modernizing Wargaming

Combining the recent operational experience that our warrior-scholars bring to NPS with a seasoned faculty that conducts cutting-edge research for the Fleet provides NPS a competitive advantage in innovation over other DoD schools, FFRDCs, and civilian universities. As wargaming entered the second half of the 20th century, the surge in the DoD modeling and simulation (M&S) enterprise served to push wargaming to the side because senior military and civilian leaders didn’t understand that simulations could not supplant wargaming. Today the urge to again ‘computerize’ wargaming is re-emerging, necessitating another round of wargaming education to ensure we align both wargaming and our M&S enterprise to provide best advantage to DoD in the future.

The adjudication of wargames can leverage M&S if done in a deliberate and thoughtful manner, ensuring the M&S chosen to integrate into wargames is ‘fit for purpose.’ We have been researching the integration of M&S into wargames since 2009. To facilitate this research, warrior-scholars and faculty from our Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute have been integrated into the wargaming course and have tested many M&S tools in NPS wargames including Command PE (Professional Edition), a commercially available simulation; MAST (Modeling and Simulation Toolkit), a U.S. Navy owned agent-based simulation, as well as other M&S tools widely available or created by NPS warrior-scholars. Preliminary research results indicate that the purchase of a ‘one-size-fits-all” uber wargaming software platform is, in most cases, ill-advised.

Bringing NPS Wargaming Education to the Fleet

Mobile Education Team (MET)

In 2011, NPS conducted its first five-day Mobile Education Team (MET) wargaming workshop for the Royal Canadian Air Force in Trenton, Ontario. Since then, we have conducted over 50 MET workshops across four continents. The wargaming workshop is designed to stand up an organic wargaming capability in an organization by creating wargaming apprentices from 16-20 of the organization’s personnel. The teaching philosophy, learn by doing, is exactly the same as the NPS resident wargaming course. Course participants are formed into teams. The teams then design, develop, conduct and analyze a wargame for their organization in the span of 5 days.

NPS has conducted these workshops for U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa (NAVEUR-AF), Sixth Fleet, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) U.S. Naval Forces-Korea, Commander, Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces-Pacific, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, Taiwan Armed Forces, Indonesian Navy, Australian Defence Force, NATO Joint Warfare Center, NATO Special Operations Forces, as well as many others.

As organizations stand up and matured their wargaming capabilities, we began to field requests for advanced wargaming workshops. Our long-time partnership with the ADF resulted in a special three-week course that combined both basic and advanced workshops. The first two weeks are an extended basic analytic workshop that provides more exposure to a variety of wargames while still embracing the series of practical exercises that results in wargames being conducted by participants at the end of the two-week workshop. The third week is an advanced course that focuses on topics selected by the sponsor and tailored to participants who have completed the basic course in previous years and completed at least a year of practical wargaming experience. Common advanced course topics include wargaming facilitation, building the wargame’s foundation by the decomposition of a sponsor’s key issues and case studies of wargames that embrace innovation and unique models, methods and tools.

As NPS began our second decade of MET workshops, we were asked by organizations who had experienced our basic wargaming workshops to create a wargaming practitioner course consisting of three modules delivered over the course of 18-24 months at the sponsor’s home station by the NPS wargaming MET. After attending an NPS MET 5-day basic wargaming module and passing the wargaming apprentice certification exam (earning 4 Continuing Education Units (CEUs)), the wargaming apprentices are assigned to work on wargames for their organization and conduct self-study activities to prepare for the wargaming journeyman module.

The wargaming journeyman module is delivered by the NPS wargaming MET team, and upon the completion of the wargaming journeyman certification exam students earn an additional 4 CEUs. These wargaming journeymen again work on wargames for their organization and conduct self-study activities to prepare for the third and final module, the wargaming practitioner module. Upon completion of this module, students are then certified as wargame practitioners and 4 additional CEUs. Two EUCOM organizations, NAVEUR-AF and USAREUR-AF, have begun the process of creating wargaming practitioners in their organizations.

Northwest Pacific Wargame (NWPAC)

In 2024, the Naval Postgraduate School conducted its first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-directed wargame. The Northwest Pacific wargame had been conducted for over 35 years by the Naval War College. In recent years, the venue was moved from Newport, RI to Japan. The wargame is sponsored by the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force are the two primary organizations that provide the players, augmented by other joint and combined players. The transition from NWC to NPS required a new paradigm because of the different staffing models each organization has.

While the NWC relies on a wargaming faculty of over 30 personnel with a support organization, NPS combines staff, faculty and NPS students to form the core of the wargaming team. NPS has leveraged several different Operations Research (OR) curriculum courses (Wargaming Applications, Spreadsheet Modeling, Introduction to Joint Combat Models, Case Studies in OR) to have NPS warrior-scholars prototype and test M&S adjudication models, conduct post-game analysis, and most importantly, build the nucleus of the wargaming execution team to deploy to Japan to conduct the wargame.

Keeping Wargaming in the Fleet

As Robert Rubel pointed out in his excellent CIMSEC article “Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” the Navy needs to produce a “critical mass of officers with intensive wargaming experience.” There are several challenges that must be negotiated to create the requisite pipeline to achieve this critical mass.

Creating the critical mass

While both the NPS resident and MET courses and workshops do provide the Fleet, DoD, and our allies and partners officers who have designed, developed, conducted, and analyzed wargames for real-world sponsors, the numbers of officers with this unique skillset needs to increase ten-fold to begin to build that critical mass of wargamers in the Fleet that Robert Rubel calls for.

But how many uniformed wargamers does DoD need? As a minimum, every combat arms Lieutenant Colonel and unrestricted line officer Commander should be a wargamer. Every officer with an Operations Research designation should be a wargamer. Every military strategist should be a wargamer. Every flag officer should be a wargamer. We should stop thinking of wargaming as something someone else does for DoD and start accepting responsibility for wargaming to keep the Fleet ready for tomorrow’s fight as well as helping us to shape the force so that we are prepared for an uncertain future.

We should be conducting analytic wargames to better inform future force structures and technologies. We should be conducting educational wargames to allow us to better understand current threats and operational environments. We should be conducting experiential wargames to keep our battle staffs familiar with their wartime roles and to be prepared to adapt plans in the face of an aggressive and unpredictable enemy.

This argues for wargaming to be inserted into JPME. And let us be clear about creating wargamers. Even the huge NWC success with Plan Orange from 1919-1940 didn’t create wargamers—the participants were players in those wargames. The Plan Orange wargames were designed and conducted by the NWC faculty.

Having the skillset needed to design and conduct wargames cannot be learned by simply being a player in a wargame. The book The Craft of Wargaming is a reference for any DoD officer tasked with leading a wargaming effort. It is based on our 11-week resident course and used for our MET engagements.

Utilizing the Critical Mass

Wargaming is a craft that requires its practitioners to keep their wargaming certifications current by designing, developing, conducting and analyzing wargames. This requires some thought and likely restructuring by the Fleet. Every Fleet organization that creates plans should have wargamers. Every numbered fleet and every Marine Expeditionary Force should have wargamers. Each of these organizations should be wargaming their plans on a routine basis. One NPS OR graduate stood up a wargaming cell at CENTCOM and quickly concluded that wargaming should be used in most, if not all of the seven planning steps outlined in Joint Pub 5-0. Currently, wargaming is only mandated in step four. Also, any plan that has sat on a shelf for over a year is likely of little value. Plans should be wargamed and updated at least once a year.

To begin to meet this challenge, we propose that every numbered U.S. Navy Fleet and Marine Expeditionary Force designate at least 10 staff officers to become wargamers.

Creating a wargaming capability at the Fleet’s operational command levels

The Navy needs to embed uniformed operations research analysts in each numbered U.S. Navy fleet by coding at least five staff billets with the Navy’s OR subspecialty 3211. In major joint staffs it is common for these analysts to be group together in some Commander’s Advisory or Analytical Group, but for a fleet staff these officers should be distributed to the future operations planning cell, the assessment cell, and the logistics cell, wherever they may reside in the staff’s N-codes. 

When a wargame is called for either in plans’ generation or assessment, these officers will form the core of a “cross code” wargaming team to design, develop, execute, and analyze the wargame for the commander. They will be augmented by other staff members who have gained education and experience in fleet wargaming. The fleet’s challenge is to maintain a critical mass of wargame experience in their uniform staff in the face of constant billet rotation. To do this, wargaming education must be integrated into naval staff preparation courses, or as part of an unrestricted line officer’s regular career pipeline.

Creating a pipeline to educate Fleet wargamers

A second step in integrating wargaming skills to the fleet is for the Navy to embrace higher education by sending URL officers to the NPS OR program. This will provide the seed corn to feed both the numbered fleet OR billets and to increase the number of Navy officers with the requisite wargaming experience. In the early 1990s it was not uncommon for each NPS Operations Research officer cohort to have as many as ten URL officers. That number has dwindled to two or three today. Type Commanders should insist on increasing their educational quotas for Operations Research. These officers bring a host of operationally relevant analytical skills to the fleet staffs and ships: from data analytics, operations assessment, campaign analysis, modeling and simulation, to wargaming.

Tactical Training Groups can also begin to offer a one-week wargaming course either leveraging NPS instructors or creating a core capability to instruct within their own staff. This course should be made a prerequisite for fleet staff assignment, unless an officer has already received wargaming education and been certified as a wargaming practitioner. In turn, officers can receive a new wargamer Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) or Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) code for their Officer Data Card to enhance opportunities for assignment and promotion.

The Naval Staff College at the Naval War College may also begin to integrate wargaming education and practice in their curriculum. Officers involved in these courses would then be available to contribute directly to the Naval War College’s wargaming agenda. 

As these institutional changes occur, individual fleet commanders should designate staff across their codes as the wargaming team and receive the week-long NPS MET wargaming course. To mitigate staff rotation challenges, this MET course can be hosted every year or eighteen months and assigned a real-world fleet issue to wargame as desired by the commander. This proposal will ensure the staff has qualified wargamers and provides a regularly scheduled wargaming course for the commander to leverage in their fleet’s planning cycle.

Conclusion

The Naval Postgraduate School has played a critical role in DoD wargaming education for the past 15 years. Through our NPS resident wargaming course, we have educated over six hundred officers who can design wargames. At the same time, NPS officer teams have conducted over one hundred wargames for DoD, allies and partners. NPS has provided wargaming courses through its Mobile Education Team in both the INDOPACOM and EUCOM areas of responsibilities to over one thousand U.S., allied and partner defense professionals since 2011. NPS has been exploring modernizing wargaming through the judicious integration of models and simulations for well over a decade. As we prepare for the daunting security challenges currently facing the U.S. and its allies and partners, NPS wargamers will be using their skills to ensure we meet those challenges when the time comes.

Dr. Jeff Appleget is a retired Army Colonel who has taught wargaming at NPS since 2009, mentoring over 100 warrior-scholar conducted wargames. He is a co-author of the book The Craft of Wargaming.

Jeff Kline is a retired Navy officer who is currently a Professor of Practice in the Operations Research department. Jeff has taught Joint Campaign Analysis, led the NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum, and coordinated Naval wargaming sponsorship for NPS wargaming for over 20 years.

Featured Image: NPS students participate in analytic wargames they designed to explore solutions for some of DoD’s most pressing national security concerns. (NPS photo by Javier Chagoya)

If the U.S. Navy can’t Repair Ships in Peacetime, how will it do so in War?

By Michael Hogan

Introduction

The Navy has well-documented issues with building warships. Less discussed, but equally important, are issues with repairing the ships it already has, which jeopardizes its ability to meet its own goal of sustaining a across all platforms. As the Navy focuses on preparing for a great power conflict potentially, the Navy needs to improve not just its peacetime ship repair capability but also expand its capacity to account for wartime repair requirements. While the issues facing the U.S. shipbuilding industry are complex, and it will take time to expand shipbuilding capacity for large combatants, the U.S. shipbuilding sector does have a robust capacity to build smaller vessels that can improve the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities. In fact, there are 125 private U.S. shipyards that are capable of building small vessels needed for repair and salvage. The United States needs to prepare now for battle damage repair by investing in repair ships, and learning lessons from recent emergent repairs and the last major war it fought at sea.

Historical Precedent: World War II

A potential war with China will be fought mostly in the Pacific theater, which forces the United States into a major logistical challenge due to the tyranny of distance from the homeland. During the last great power naval conflict, the U.S. Navy learned the importance of battle damage repair for sustaining a distant fight. One important component of victory in the Pacific was the work of naval auxiliaries that supported combatants, generally organized in Service Squadrons. Initially equipped with just oilers and other logistics platforms to replenish warships, fleet commanders realized the importance of deploying repair assets, especially fleet and salvage tugs, with these service squadrons to provide at-sea capabilities for recovering damaged vessels.

Fleet tugs, often cited in historical accounts, were essential in rendering salvage services. These tugs towed damaged vessels to areas where repairs could be made, often preventing the permanent loss of ships. The absence of fleet tugs at the Battle of Midway likely foreclosed the fate of the precious aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, as the Navy had not yet fully grasped the vital importance of salvage tugs in saving battle-damaged ships. Similarly, the carrier USS Hornet, destroyer USS Porter, and cruiser USS Atlanta were lost largely due to inadequate salvage capabilities.

As the importance of tugs became clear during the war, they were used extensively throughout the Pacific campaign to save ships, allowing temporary repairs and enabling them to return home for more permanent fixes. The United States invested heavily in this capability during the war, building more than 200 tugs and over 40 rescue and salvage ships. Floating drydocks also played a crucial role, enabling the Navy to make the repairs necessary to restore ships to seaworthiness—even if only temporarily—so they could return to the United States for more extensive repairs. When ships could not be saved, salvage vessels stripped valuable repair parts, ensuring that forward-deployed ships had access to critical resources. The ability to recover damaged ships and clear sunken vessels from ports was vital to maintaining momentum in the American island-hopping campaign, extending the time that ships could remain on station.

USS ABSD-6 repairing USS South Dakota (BB-57) in Guam after an accidental explosion on May 6, 1945, while rearming from USS Wrangell (AE-12). (U.S. Navy photo)

Current State of the Salvage Fleet

Today, the U.S. Navy’s salvage fleet is far less robust than the one that was essential to winning the Pacific campaign. After the Cold War, the Navy dramatically downsized its auxiliary ship fleet, reducing the number of vessels from 113 in 1994 to 52 in 1997, including the decommissioning of nearly all tenders. Currently, Military Sealift Command (MSC) operates only three ocean-going tugs, two rescue and salvage ships, and two submarine tenders, with the newest of these vessels commissioned in the mid-1980s. In contrast, China, the pacing threat of the United States, has 30 tugs, 46 rescue and salvage ships, and 12 tenders between its navy and rescue and salvage bureau.

As analyst and retired naval officer Brent Sadler notes in U.S. Naval Power in the 21st Century, there are no large floating dry docks capable of repairing Ohio-class submarines and large surface combatants—despite their critical role in post-accident recovery, such as the repair of the USS San Francisco after its grounding in 2005. Floating drydocks provide a mobile repair capability, allowing significant repairs to be conducted in locations where permanent infrastructure does not exist, such as forward deployed bases during a regional conflict. This results in the US Navy either needing to bring the damaged vessel back to one of the homeland drydocks, which are already at capacity with modernization and maintenance, or lease a floating drydock from private industry. The Navy must also rely on chartered commercial heavy-lift ships to move damaged vessels, such as when the USS Cole had to be transported to Pascagoula for repairs after the 2000 terrorist bombing.

(Jan. 27, 2005) Apra Harbor, Guam:  USS San Francisco (SSN 711) in dry dock to assess damages sustained after running aground approximately 350 miles south of Guam. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Mark Allen Leonesio)

Recent Incidents and Issues

The U.S. Navy has not faced significant battle damage repairs since the 2000 terrorist bombing of USS Cole, the closest a U.S. Navy ship has come to combat damage in the last 30 years. Nevertheless, repair issues during recent forward-deployed collisions, allisions, and groundings mark a good approximation of what to expect, albeit on a smaller scale. Minor repairs following a collision, such as USS Jacksonville in 2013, can be made pier side, even in foreign ports, with the assistance of a submarine tender. Although, as noted above, the tender capacity has been drastically reduced in recent years. With public shipyards operating near capacity, however, more significant collision repairs require trade-offs.

Following two 2017 surface collisions in the Pacific, USS John McCain and USS Fitzgerald both required extensive repairs prior to their return to service. McCain was repaired in Yokosuka at Ship Repair Facility-Japan vice bringing it back to the U.S. for repairs. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, was contracted out to Huntington Ingalls Industries shipyard in Pascagoula, MS. Both ships required leasing a heavy lift transport to their repair destination, like Cole. The grounding of the USS Connecticut in 2021 offers a different trade-off. After colliding with a seamount, the submarine remained at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard from December 2021 to July 2023, until entering dry dock for her previously scheduled Extended Dry-docking Selected Restrictive Availability (EDSRA), where the repairs would be made. In this case, Connecticut was “lucky” that the incident occurred close to a scheduled maintenance period.

The guided missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Japan, for repairs and damage assessments, July 13, 2017. The USS Fitzgerald sustained damage during a June 17 collision with a merchant vessel, resulting in the deaths of seven Sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Christian Senyk)

Even if the U.S. Navy added the recommended salvage tugs and floating drydocks, the navy’s shipyards are already stretched beyond their limits with planned modernization and maintenance. For example, faced a prolonged and costly repair timeline when the submarine’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 overhaul was canceled to accommodate ballistic missile submarine and aircraft carrier maintenance, losing its dive certification in 2017. Only in early 2024 was a contract signed to begin the overhaul, nine years after its last deployment, with expected completion in 2029 at the cost of $1.17 billion. The loss of operational capability, crew experience, and the daily upkeep costs over almost 15 years could add up to be more detrimental than the price tag itself, especially when the fleet is already straining to meet operational demands.

At a time when Congress is focused on getting newly built submarines delivered promptly, the inability to use one that the U.S. Navy already owns is unacceptable. These types of delays will only become more commonplace in a conflict without expanding our salvage and repair capabilities.

Congress has shown that it is willing to address such shipyard issues, for example, allocating, but this is focused on producing new construction submarines for the U.S. Navy and the AUKUS agreement. The 2018 investment in the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan was important but it is over budget and behind schedule, and the chronic delay in ship repairs remains. In FY21 and 22, less than 40 percent of ships completed maintenance availabilities on time.

All these shortfalls come during planned, peacetime maintenance periods. If the U.S. Navy needs to make repairs to battle damage in a major conflict, they do not have the salvage capabilities to conduct repairs at sea or forward deployed, they do not have the industrial base to support the additional work, and they do not have the open shipyard space to put the damaged ships. To make U.S. ship repair shortcomings worse, China has more than 200 times more capacity for shipbuilding, including a large commercial capacity, that can likely be repurposed in time of conflict for repairs.

(October 31, 2000) The semi-submersible ship M/V Blue Marlin carrying the damaged USS Cole. (U.S. Navy photo)

The Way Ahead

To address these deficiencies in repair and salvage capabilities, the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, and Congress must learn from recent incidents and the lessons of World War II. First, the Navy should implement the recommendations from the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on ship repair, such as “developing a ship industrial base strategy that aligns with the National Defense Industrial Strategy.” As part of this, the Navy needs to examine all emergent repairs spurred by modern incidents starting with USS Cole to identify gaps in planning and capabilities, and the root causes of delays. This should include where salvage and repair ships were needed and unavailable. Any needed infrastructure or platform investments, such as forward-deployed floating drydocks, should be forwarded to Congress for supplemental funding. Immediate investments in these capabilities will bolster the U.S. Navy’s ability to better perform peacetime maintenance while building capacity to absorb battle damage repair in future conflict.

Second, Congress should pass the bipartisan SHIPS for America Act, providing 10 years of funding to boost the commercial shipbuilding industry and the merchant marine. This will help to provide more shipbuilding and repair capability and capacity throughout the United States in the event of future conflicts, and train qualified personnel for the MSC that mans and operates the Navy’s repair and salvage fleet. The combination of short- and long-term investments will turn the tide on the U.S. Navy’s repair capabilities before ships are lost, while sustaining them for decades to come.

Third, the Department of Defense needs to recognize ship repair as equal to shipbuilding when prioritizing funding. Ship repair is a subset of some of the Secretary of Defense’s 17 FY26 budget priorities, and a priority of the CNO’s Navigation Plan. Repairing ships already in Navy service reduces the effect of problems in shipbuilding. Finding ways to repair ships quicker increases public shipyard capacity, but this alone is not enough. The Department of Defense needs to create its own surge capability for the desired increase in naval fleet size and invest in private industry surge capability that can be optioned in case of added battle damage repair. Allocating the requisite funding to improve capacity and capability now will better prepare the U.S. Navy for great power conflict.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy faces a growing challenge in maintaining a combat-ready fleet. It was lucky when a recent collision between the USS Harry S Truman and a merchant vessel outside the Suez Canal required only minor repairs before the carrier could return to sea. If the Navy is to meet the demands of a major conflict, it must prioritize not only shipbuilding but also ship repair and salvage capabilities. The lessons of the past are clear—effective battle damage repair and salvage can mean the difference between victory and defeat. This means not just adding to the capacity to repair current ships but also building capacity for the larger fleet of the future and creating a surge capacity for times of conflict. By addressing these gaps now, the United States can ensure the Navy is prepared for whatever the future holds.

Michael Hogan is a Commander in the United States Navy and a career submarine officer with tours aboard both fast attack and ballistic missile submarines, most recently as Executive Officer of USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) (Blue). He is currently the Senior U.S. Navy Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of the U.S. Defense Department, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. government. No federal endorsement is implied or intended.

Featured Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) departs Pier 9 at Fleet Activities (FLEACT) Yokosuka, Dec. 1, 2017 to proceed to anchorage in Yokosuka Harbor aboard heavy lift transport vessel MV Transshelf in order to make underway preparations. (Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Benjamin Dobbs)

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.