Notes to the New Administration Week
By Michael Tkacik
War between the United States and China would be devastating for both states and the world. Such a conflict could include a nuclear exchange and the likelihood of that exchange spiraling out of control is high. Avoiding war between the U.S. and China must be the highest priority of the incoming administration.
China is a rising, revisionist great power, while the U.S. is a declining, status quo great power. In such a situation, variables lean toward war. To avoid war, the costs must clearly outweigh the benefits for the revisionist state – China – and foster deterrence.
Unfortunately, because the U.S. has denuded itself of manufacturing, internal balancing has reduced impact on China. But external balancing – cooperating or allying with like-minded states – may impact China’s cost-benefit calculation. In the Indo-Pacific, this means cooperating with states that have deterrent-inducing characteristics. These characteristics include industrial capacity, operational benefits, strategic depth, and countervailing strengths.
Because China has such a massive manufacturing advantage, it would probably win a long conventional war with the United States. As the U.S. out-manufactured past opponents in the 20th century, so too China could replace lost military capacity more quickly and in far greater amounts than the U.S. could. It has been widely noted that the Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times greater than America’s. China’s overall manufacturing capacity is 31 percent of global output while the U.S. accounts for only 16 percent.
The U.S. must bolster manufacturing capacity by cooperating with like-minded states. Regional allies Japan and South Korea both have significant manufacturing capacity and some of it in key areas such as shipbuilding. The U.S. should begin using that capacity for maintenance work and eventually for production of certain U.S. assets. Formal agreements on cooperative manufacturing should be reached with both countries.
Not all states have the advanced manufacturing capacity necessary for a long war, but some states bring operational advantage. The Philippines spreads across the first island chain and provides ample room for dispersing forces, especially land-based missiles that can help to deter Chinese aggression. Pacific Island nations such as the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Micronesia provide depth for dispersion and logistical support. The U.S. should work to improve ties across the first and second island chains and improve capacity to support military operations.
Australia and New Zealand provide geostrategic depth as well as shared political ideals. Here, cooperation takes the form of AUKUS and the Quad, though neither organization includes New Zealand. The Five Eyes is a beginning, but New Zealand should be more deeply integrated into the U.S. deterrent strategy, perhaps by offering a role in AUKUS, the Quad, or a third organization similar to ANZUS.
Another way to deter China is to raise the possibility of war on multiple fronts with multiple states. In this regard, both India and Vietnam have long-standing differences with China that have led to war in the past. Cooperation must be heightened with these states. Formal statements supporting the status quo would be a start. Increased military aid to each state makes them more able to resist Chinese aggression. Though it is not currently foreseeable that either India or Vietnam would directly assist the U.S. in a war with China, the process of creating incentives for greater cooperation now could one day lead to a reasonable expectation of assistance during war. This, in turn, would help deter Chinese revisionism.
It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.
Michael Tkacik ([email protected]) holds a PhD from the University of Maryland and a JD from Duke University. He has published articles in a variety of journals. Tkacik’s current research interests include the implications of China’s rise, China’s behavior in the South China Sea, and nuclear weapons policy across Asia. He is a professor of government and director of the School of Honors at Stephen F. Austin State University in Texas.
Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Matt Shibata teaches a Philippine Marine proper weapon handling techniques during Air Assault Support Exercise 2015-2 at Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Philippines, July 15, 2015. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tyler S. Giguere/Released)