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History

Father Fernando Oliveira: A Pioneer of Naval Strategy

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By CDR Luis Nuno Sardinha Monteiro, Portuguese Navy, for our Forgotten Naval Strategists Week

“Good war makes good peace”
In “Art of War at Sea” (Part I, Chapter 1)

Introduction

The Discoveries Era, a period of expansive exploration initiated by Portuguese navigators, prompted the emergence of a structured naval thinking in the 16th century. This originated mainly in the Mediterranean countries (specifically France, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Among the works produced at that time stands out a treatise written in 1555 by Portuguese Priest Fernando Oliveira, entitled “Arte da Guerra do Mar” (“Art of War at Sea”). It addresses, in a truly comprehensive and integrated way, a wide range of nautical and naval warfare issues, but it goes beyond a mere tactical and operational perspective, revealing a strategic vision with regard to the engagement of navies at the service of national interests, as well as other innovative strategic insights.

Life

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Fernando Oliveira was born circa 1507 and at the age of 10 entered a Dominican Convent, where he acquired the humanist values manifested in his writings. In 1536, he published a grammar of the Portuguese language. This was his first book and also the first Portuguese grammar ever published.

Oliveira was a venturesome man, with a profound love of seafaring. Therefore, he took every opportunity to get underway, be the ships Portuguese, French, English or Spanish. Sometimes Oliveira volunteered as chaplain, but most of the time he was hired as pilot, due to his extensive knowledge and experience of nautical sciences. Every now and then these ships engaged in naval combat and he was even taken prisoner on several occasions.

Oliveira parlayed his vast experience at sea to produce seminal treatises on nautical and naval warfare issues. Besides the already mentioned treatise “Art of War at Sea” (published in 1555), he also wrote:

  • An encyclopedic treatise dated circa 1570 and entitled “Ars Nautica” (“Art of Navigation”). This work was written in Latin and has three parts: one about navigation, another about naval construction (the first known scientific work on this topic), and a third addressing generic navies’ logistical and administrative matters;
  • A companion work on naval construction, written around 1580 in Portuguese and entitled “Livro da Fábrica das Naus” (“Book on the Building of Ships”);
  • A book entitled “História de Portugal” (“History of Portugal”), written probably in 1581.

With regard to naval strategy, Oliveira’s keystone work is “Art of War at Sea”, which is therefore the main subject of this text and from which all citations contained in this article have been taken.

“Art of War at Sea”

cover“Art of War at Sea” has one prologue and two parts, each of them containing fifteen chapters. It addresses a broad array of topics, such as naval construction, ship’s commissioning, navigation, seamanship, meteorology, oceanography, logistics, recruitment, training, education, command skills, maritime ceremonial and intelligence.

To illustrate his ideas, Oliveira often recalls warfare episodes from the Classical Era (ancient Greece and Rome) and from the Discoveries Era (with a focus on episodes of the Portuguese history).

In Chapter 14 of Part II, Oliveira lists 39 “general rules of war” that summarize and synthetize most of the issues covered in the book. These are very simple aphorisms, such as “better order than multitude” (stressing the value of military organization) and “war requires fairness and deceit, truth and lie, cruelty and pity, preserving and destroying” (noting the contradictory nature of war).

There is only one copy of the original treatise, which is at the National Library of Portugal, in Lisbon. However, the book has been republished four times: in 1937, 1969, 1983 and 2008. The most recent editions include a facsimile of the original 1555 edition.

Influences in “Art of War at Sea”

Oliveira was an erudite and cultivated person, who was inspired by the classical authors, as was characteristic in the Renaissance. His main reference for “Art of War at Sea” was the Roman writer of the 4th century Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, commonly referred to simply as Vegetius. Vegetius wrote “De Re Militari” (“Concerning Military Matters”), a treatise about warfare and military principles, which explained methods and practices used during the Roman Empire. In “Art of War at Sea”, Oliveira mentions Vegetius twenty eight times, and one of his most well-known maxims (“If you search peace, study war”) seems directly derived from Vegetius’ dictum “Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum” (“He who desires peace, prepare for war”).

The other main influence in “Art of War at Sea” is St. Augustine, who lived in the 4th and 5th centuries. St. Augustine was a notable theologian and philosopher, who – among other seminal contributions to western Christianity and philosophy – helped crafting the “just war” theory. According to St. Augustine, Christians should be, by the very nature of their faith, against war. However, he considered that the pursuit of peace should always include the option of going to war (a “just war”) if that was the only option to prevent a grave wrong. Oliveira, as a man of the Catholic Church, also believed firmly in “just wars” and dedicated a whole chapter to this issue. Invoking St. Augustine, he defines “just war” as “the one that defends a people from those who want to offend it without reason or the war that punishes the offenses to God” (Chapter 4, Part I). He also considered that “the war of Christians that fear God is not bad, it is full of virtues, because it is done with a desire for peace, without greediness nor cruelty, as a punishment to the bad and relief of the good” (Prologue).

Strategic Thinking

“Art of War at Sea” reveals a reflection upon the importance of naval power as the key to maintaining a mighty empire, such as the Portuguese, with territories and possessions in all five continents.

In the 16th century, the concept of “naval power” had not been introduced. Nevertheless, a careful reading of “Art of War at Sea” shows that Oliveira used the expression “war at sea” with a meaning that encompasses all the aspects of military organization for sea warfare, including construction, commissioning, training and operation of warships, i.e. very similar to what would later be defined as “naval power”.

In the prologue, Oliveira emphasizes the importance of “war at sea” (i.e. “naval power”):

“In particular for this land’s men, that now use the sea more than any others, thus acquiring high profit and honor. (…) Nurturing this war [i.e. this power], Portuguese people have gained lots of wealth & prosperity (…) & have gained honor in a short period of time, as no other nation in longer periods” (Prologue).

In the 3rd chapter, Oliveira returns to this idea that nations must defend their interests at sea through the use of naval power. He emphasizes that maritime security must not be taken for granted, reiterating the importance of naval power to preserve political and economic interests:

“Because the sea is very licentious (sic) and men cannot avoid using it to trade, to fish and to other purposes, taking supply and profit from it, it is essential to safeguard it, through fear or severe punishment. (….) Due to all these reasons, it is necessary to have navies at sea, that safe keep our coasts and passages and that protect from the surprises that can storm from the sea, which are much more sudden than the ones coming from land” (Chapter 3, Part I).

In addition, I would like to briefly present some of the perennial strategic principles than can be found in Oliveira’s work and illustrate each of them with a citation from “Art of War at Sea”.

  • Importance of readiness at sea: “Promptitude gives victory to the diligent and negligence defeats the careless”.
  • Importance of the surprise factor: “Sudden attacks terrify the enemies, but expected encounters do not frighten them”.
  • Time as a fundamental element of strategy: “There is a time to engage in battle, when we have an opportunity or when the advantage is on our side”.
  • Space as a fundamental element of strategy: “The location is often worthier than the force”.
  • Importance of deception: “Let us dissimulate as much as we can, so that we will be taken as liars”.
  • Importance of intelligence: “As important as covering our intentions, is trying to know the opponent’s”.
  • Importance of unity of command: “It is necessary that man of war have a head (…) and one that commands over everyone”.

Finally, another characteristic of Oliveira’s thinking was his backing of the use of naval power for spreading Christianity. In fact, he praised the Portuguese Discoveries as to “allow multiplying the God’s faith & the salvation of men” (Prologue).

Conclusion

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Although written more than 450 years ago, Oliveira’s “Art of War at Sea” is a very comprehensive work, addressing the various elements related to the building up, organization and employment of naval power. Oliveira sought inspiration in the doctrines of Classical authors and in the philosophy of Church thinkers, innovating in the conceptualization of the use of naval power as an instrument to serve the political goals and the economic interests of his country. He was a man ahead of his time, establishing some of the basis of modern naval strategy.

Father Fernando Oliveira anticipated notable strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, who (350 years later) brilliantly theorized about the influence of sea power upon history and its importance, to enhance nations’ wealth and prestige. It is interesting to note two other similarities between Oliveira and Mahan: (1) both resorted extensively to history, choosing specific episodes to illustrate their ideas; (2) both were very religious Christians (although Oliveira was Catholic and Mahan Protestant), having views consistent with the theories of “just war” and advocating the use of naval / sea power to disseminate Christianity.

Unfortunately, “Art of War at Sea” did not have the international projection it deserved and Oliveira remains an obscurity. That can be partially explained because his treatise was written in ancient Portuguese and was never translated to another language. Hopefully, that shortfall is about to be overcome, since my countryman Tiago Maurício is currently translating Father Fernando Oliveira´s “Art of War at Sea” to English. This may allow that treatise getting the attention it deserves, due to its historical value, to the broad range of issues addressed and to its strategic insights – much of which are still valid in the 21st century.

Luís Nuno Sardinha Monteiro is a Commander of the Portuguese Navy. He was Commanding Officer of the fast patrol craft “Dragão” (1992-1994) and of the Portuguese sail training ship “Sagres” (2011-2013). He holds a MSc and a PhD in Navigation Technology, both from the University of Nottingham (UK). He published several books and papers on navigation and naval / maritime strategy. He is currently serving at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, in Norfolfk (USA).

 

 

History, Theory

Expanding the Naval Canon: Fernando de Oliveira and the 1st Treatise on Maritime Strategy

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Every community has a canon that best encapsulates the genealogy of personalities, ideas, and events that shape the way the community sees itself and is perceived by others. The naval community is no exception. This article suggests that an important monograph has been overlooked in that canon: Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” published in 1555. It is the oldest treatise on maritime strategy.

The naval lore and the mainstream canon
Maritime strategy and war at sea have long occupied the minds of sailors and statesmen. The scholarly study of maritime strategy, however, is a relatively recent endeavour. Its roots in the modern western tradition are found in the United Kingdom during the latter half of the 1800s.

Authors such as the Colomb brothers, Sir John Laughton, and, more famously, Sir Julian Corbett were among the first to muster a robust understanding of strategy in discussions of naval problems. The United States soon followed suit as Alfred Mahan, William Sims, and Willis Abbot, among others, penned numerous other works to an increasingly sophisticated naval lore.

Not surprisingly, the standard account of the disciplinary evolution of maritime strategy and naval affairs reflects this Anglo-Saxon outlook. This account is taught in naval academies and some civilian universities around the world, further reinforcing the existing canon. Other influences surely contribute to the debate, including Jomini and Beaufre, and even ancient Greeks, such as Thucydides and Themistocles, but by and large the naval lore is founded on works dealing with the British and American experiences at sea.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (1555)

In its rise to become the first global maritime empire, Portugal had to develop an understanding of maritime strategy that enabled the achievement of its political aims. Like Britain’s Corbett and America’s Mahan, Portugal’s greatest maritime strategist was Fernando de Oliveira. Writing at the peak of Portuguese power, Oliveira put in writing the foundations of that global empire.

Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” (Arte da Guerra do Mar), published in Coimbra in 1555, stands as the oldest treatise on maritime strategy. Oliveira himself acknowledges that very little had been written on the subject; he only refers to Vegetius (4th century AD) for his important but sparse insights into naval warfare. In historical context, Oliveira wrote this treatise three centuries before Corbett, Mahan, and others acquired the habit of thinking strategically about naval warfare. So what can we find in Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea”?

Frontispiece of the original "Arte da Guerra do Mar" (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.
Frontispiece of the original “Arte da Guerra do Mar” (1555), by Fernando de Oliveira.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the principles of war at sea whereas the second explores its conduct. Each part has fifteen chapters. The genius of Oliveira’s work is found not merely in his (dated) analysis of Portugal’s 16th century navy, but, more importantly, in his comprehensive grasp of the (perennial) foundations of maritime power. The chapters focus on topics such as just war theory, strategic theory, leadership, shipbuilding, logistics, personnel recruitment and retention, and military readiness. And this is just in the first half. The second part goes on to tackle force structure, situational awareness, oceanography, and intelligence, among other topics.

These are obviously modern terms to describe very old phenomena. However, the challenges of 16th century naval power are not dissimilar to those of today’s navies whose countries depend on the sea for wealth and prestige. Oliveira, like Corbett and Mahan, was aware of this and expressed it in the opening pages of the treatise. Discussing naval matters, the author argues, “is a useful and necessary matter, particularly for the people of this land [Portugal] who now fare more at sea than others, whereby they gain many profits and honour, and also run the risk of losing it all, if they do not preserve it […].” This verdict ought to resonate contemporary strategists from nations such as the United States, Britain, and Japan, but also those strategists whose countries have maritime ambitions, such as China and India.

Fernando de Oliveira (or Fernão de Oliveira) was an interesting man living in interesting times. A true polymath educated in a Catholic seminary, it soon became evident that God had other plans for him. Oliveira dwelled in the maritime community of Lisbon, then as now a capital with an umbilical connection to the sea, learning key skills that made him a valuable asset for any navy. These skills included: navigation (he became a pilot aboard a French warship in expeditions against British commerce); shipbuilding (two English kings coveted his counsel whilst a prisoner of war in London); negotiation (he led a prisoner exchange when a Portuguese military expedition to north Africa failed; and possibly espionage (some sources mention his spying for the Portuguese Crown in negotiations with the Vatican).

In between his adventures, Oliveira wrote invaluable works that rival “The Art of War at Sea” in scope and insight. These include the world’s first encyclopaedic treatise on navigation and shipbuilding entitled Ars Nautica (ca. 1570), which he later expanded into the first treatise on naval architecture, Livro da Fabrica das Naos (ca. 1580), the first book on Portuguese grammar, Grammatica da Lingoagem Portuguesa (1536), and one of the first books on Portuguese history, Historea de Portugal (ca. 1581). These works attest to Oliveira’s genius. Unlike Corbett, who entertained a career as a novelist at first, Oliveira made a lasting literary contribution to fields beyond maritime strategy.

Conclusions
There is every reason for Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” to become compulsory reading for sailors, mariners, strategists, historians, and laymen with an interest in the complexity of conflict at sea. I will highlight only four of them.
First, the book is a distant yet direct ancestor to the current mainstream canon of maritime strategy. Incorporating this source into the canon and submitting it to academic scrutiny will help illuminate the origins of Western maritime strategic thought.
Second, there is an inherent value in studying Oliveira’s work in the context of naval warfare in the age of sail, particularly Portugal’s path toward a global maritime empire.
Third, the book retains great relevance for current debates on maritime strategy. Oliveira’s thoughts on the building, maintenance, and deployment of navies in the pursuit of policy can inform decision-makers, analysts, and the larger policy community on the often misunderstood nature and character of naval warfare.
Fourth, “The Art of War at Sea” can foster a debate on broader issues of strategy and power in light of existing scholarship on just war theory, military leadership, defence economics, and so forth.

In conclusion, it is high time for the naval community to retrieve Fernando de Oliveira’s “The Art of War at Sea” from the dustbin of history. My current efforts to translate the treatise to English will hopefully set this process in motion.

 

Tiago Mauricio is a WSD-Handa non-resident fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS. He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London and is continuing his studies at Waseda University, after spending two years as a researcher at Kyoto University, Japan. He is currently translating Fernando de Oliveira’s Arte da Guerra do Mar (1555) to English.