Tag Archives: India

African Maritime Forces Summit Week

India’s Evolving Role in Supporting African Maritime Security Architecture

Leave a comment

African Maritime Forces Week

By Dr. Abhishek Mishra, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi

Maritime security in an African context is increasingly assuming prominence within the wider African security agenda.1 Despite the continent being surrounded by water on all sides, “the process of developing an agenda for maritime security has been a relatively new development.”2 Africa’s colonial legacy prompted an inward and continental outlook, resulting in African nations being termed “sea blind.”3 Following the onset of Somalia piracy and attacks on commercial shipping, African countries and international organizations realized the vitality of ensuring maritime security. Nations, particularly ones that are endowed with long coastlines and extensive exclusive economic zones (EEZ), quickly realized the importance of protecting their maritime domain to facilitate national growth and development. However, the capabilities and capacities of African countries to undertake the task of ensuring maritime security remain limited. Lack of political will, inter-agency coordination, overlapping interests of regional and sub-regional organizations, lack of funding, and insufficient technical competencies and capacities are some of the persisting challenges.

For India and African nations, a safe and secure maritime environment in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a prerequisite for achieving sustained national development. Such security is not simply restricted to guarding coastlines or territories. It also involves safeguarding national interests in EEZs and protecting sea-lanes of communications (SLOCs) and trading routes. The African continent’s stake in the maritime domain is reflected in the fact that 38 of its 54 countries have coastlines or are small island nations. The continent is endowed with a coastline of about 26,000 nautical miles and the overall maritime industry in the coastline is estimated to be worth around $1 trillion per year.4 This includes ‘offshore hydrocarbon, energy, tourism, maritime transport, shipping and fishing sectors.’5

Africa’s maritime environment is globally significant. Huge amounts of international shipping activity pass through African waters. “Around 90 percent of the continent’s trade is carried by sea, thereby making the African Maritime Domain (AMD) crucial for commercial, environmental, developmental and security reasons.”6

In Africa, “the initial continent-wide efforts to beef up search and rescue capacities evolved with the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) 2000 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue,”7 following which a host of maritime rescue coordination centers and sub-centers were commissioned, ranging from Mombasa, Kenya, to Cape Town, South Africa, Lagos, Nigeria, Monrovia, Liberia and Rabat, Morocco.8 African maritime issues were discussed through a number of international meetings (conferences, symposiums, workshops) beginning in 2005, which provided platforms for African maritime stakeholders to come together and deliberate on issues of common interest in the maritime domain.9 These included Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS), Eastern and Southern Africa-Western Indian Ocean (EASWIO) conference, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) led by India.

The IMO also sponsored various meetings which led to the adoption of the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) in 2009, which subsequently led to the opening of three information sharing centres (ISCs) in Mombasa, Kenya; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and Sana’a, Yemen. In 2012, the African Union’s 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy) was released which realized the potential of the AMD and the possibility of exploiting Africa’s Ocean resources in a sustainable manner to achieve economic growth and development. This was followed by the Lomé Charter in 2016.

Since then, African countries are paying increasing attention to concepts such as “blue economy” or “blue growth” which is vital for the sustainable development of Africa’s coastal economies and ensuring food and energy security. Maritime security and blue economy are intimately linked: “secure oceans are a precondition for the development of the blue economy.”10 A stronger blue economy could play a pivotal “role in alleviating some of the root causes of maritime crimes” for African countries in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region.11

The current African Maritime Forces Summit (AMFS) 2025 also reflects an attempt to bring service chiefs and senior leaders to discuss aspects of naval capabilities such as promoting shared awareness, interoperability, crisis response capability, and capacity building to improve Africa’s maritime domain security.

Locating Africa within the Indo-Pacific Discourse

The twenty-first century has witnessed the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region as a key maritime domain and a hub of global trade and energy supplies. The Indo-Pacific region’s geographical boundaries stretch from the eastern shores of Africa, i.e. the Western Indian Ocean, to the western shores of America, and include important maritime choke points at Bab el Mandeb and Malacca Strait.12 Japan, India and France were among the first to recognize this geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific. Although the U.S.’ initial conception of the Indo-Pacific did not include any African states, Washington did affirm to “integrate African states in Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific forums” in the U.S. Strategy for Sub-Saharan African document released in August 2022.13 Africa’s inclusion in the Indo-Pacific is today also backed by several European countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In many ways, East African and Western Indian Ocean countries are central to the Indo-Pacific discourse.14 From an African perspective, three main priorities have emerged. The first relates to the growing militarization in the region, especially in the Horn of Africa, in which countries are setting military bases, regularly deploying naval warships, and investing heavily in hard infrastructure. While African countries do have genuine infrastructural deficiencies which require investments, not all the big-ticket investments and hard infrastructure projects are aligned with the national development priorities of African countries. The extensive foreign presence and growing militarization of the region is a source of tension for African countries and could have a destabilizing impact on the region.15

The second priority relates to the imperative of combating and tackling the menace of piracy and transnational crime. This poses severe challenges to African countries in the WIO, given the volume of trade that goes on this increasingly significant maritime trade route. Afghanistan’s opium production fuels maritime crimes throughout the WIO and provides important funding for violent non-state actors. According to Stable Seas, there are “19 active violent non-state actors that operate in the Western Indian Ocean region.”16

The third priority is ocean pollution, including dumping of toxic waste and emission of fumes by ships. All these issues pose significant threats but also provide an opportunity for countries within the Indo-Pacific to engage and cooperate in a constructive manner to seek solutions. This has increased the significance of the WIO and its littoral states to the Indo-Pacific discourse.

India’s Role in Supporting African Maritime Security Architecture

Maritime security cooperation has emerged as an important subset of broader Africa-India ties. India, sitting astride critical sea-lanes of communication in the IOR is emerging as a maritime power. The Indian Navy is increasingly positioning itself as a regional security provider with the principal objective of effectively patrolling the regional commons, as “a source of positive deterrence and provider of regional goods.”17 At the same time, there has been a growing maritime consciousness amongst African States about the importance of securing their maritime domain and sustainable use of marine resources in order to foster wealth creation and development.

Although engagement has been mostly bilateral, India and African countries are increasing their multilateral engagement through regional organizations like Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) and partaking in multinational maritime exercises like MILAN and Cutlass Express. Four principle avenues of India-Africa maritime cooperation have emerged:

  • Training African maritime and military personnel at various Indian institutes;
  • The Indian Navy regularly conducting anti-piracy patrols, escorting merchant vessels and maintaining a sustained presence in African waters due to its mission-based deployment patterns;
  • Increased information-sharing to develop maritime domain awareness (MDA) by establishing greater linkages with information fusion centers and maritime coordination centers in the region; and
  • Developing listening stations and posts, including one in Madagascar, another in Agalega island off Mauritius, and a proposed one in Assumption Island off Seychelles.

These efforts have been complemented by regular goodwill port visits, conclusion of white shipping agreements, conducting hydrographic surveys for African countries, and developing the Coastal Radar Surveillance network in Mauritius and Seychelles. India has recognized the varying priorities of African countries and has fine-tuned its own ways of maritime security cooperation in order to effectively respond to the emerging challenges.

Strategic Expansion: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR

Back in 2015 when Prime Minister Modi visited Mauritius, he articulated India’s vision of ‘SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region),’ which primarily focused on improving relations with India’s immediate neighbours like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles.18 It attempted to advance cooperation by utilizing Indian expertise and capability to address common maritime challenges. Fast-forward to 2025, India has now advanced the vision of Maritime Heads for Active Security and Growth for All in the Region (MAHASAGAR) which reflects a strategic recalibration intended to position India as a consequential maritime power in the Indian Ocean and extend its ambitions beyond its immediate neighbourhood. It represents a strategic expansion of the SAGAR vision to encompass East African littorals and the wider Indo-Pacific region. This progression is not mere rhetorical evolution. As India seeks to deepen its naval diplomacy, Africa has emerged as the new strategic frontier and gateway for its “broader ambitions as a credible and preferred security partner.”19 Today, MAHASAGAR signifies India’s recognition of Africa as central to its strategic maritime calculus.

AIKEYME 2025 and IOS Sagar initiative

Under the MAHASAGAR framework, two landmark initiatives were launched. First was the Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) initiative, a naval wargame to increase interoperability with African navies and maritime agencies, which took place in off Dar es-Salaam, co-hosted by the Indian Navy and the Tanzanian Peoples’ Defence Force (TPDF) in April 2025.20 Exercise participants included Kenya, Mozambique, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and South Africa. This was the first such multinational maritime exercise involving India and African nations designed to synergise combined operations to develop collaborative solutions to address regional maritime insecurities, including piracy, illegal fishing and trafficking of narcotics and small arms.

India also conducts trilateral exercises with Mozambique and Tanzania – known as the India-Mozambique-Tanzania Trilateral Maritime Exercise (IMT-TRILAT) – and with Brazil and South Africa — the India-Brazil-South Africa Maritime Exercise (IBSAMAR). African countries also regularly participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), MILAN exercises, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) has 9 African countries as members. This is important since the IORA provides another vital platform to highlight Africa’s developmental ambitions and challenges. With India set to assume the chairmanship of IORA in November 2025, there is now another opportunity for India and African countries to work closely on maritime issues.

The second initiative involved the Indian Ocean Ship-SAGAR (IOS-SAGAR). Under this, Indian patrol vessel INS Sunayna successfully completed a month-long deployment in the south-west Indian Ocean with 44 international crew from 9 African countries who jointly manned the Indian ship. Training assistance and capacity building initiatives have been a hallmark of India’s maritime engagement with Africa for a long time. Initiatives like IOS Sagar provided an opportunity to exchange best practices, undertake coordinated patrols, and enhance interoperability and mutual understanding.

Future Considerations 

Hosting joint exercises or deploying warships demands considerable time, funding and logistical commitment. While there are risks of stretching capacity due to Indian Navy’s balancing operations in the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and wider Indo-Pacific, there is also genuine value in deepening maritime ties between India and Africa.21 While burnishing credentials as a regional-security provider and cultivating closer defense ties with African nations is welcome, growing activities should not be mistaken for greater influence. India’s maritime presence in African waters must be backed by delivery, consistency and trust.

The year 2025 also marks the end of the African Union’s Decade of African Seas and Oceans. Rather than benefitting from insights into best practices for combating maritime threats, the past decade has exposed significant shortcomings in tackling maritime priorities. “Widespread gaps in implementation, coordination and lack of political will” persist.22 At the 5th Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) held in October 2024, the message was clear: Reformulate the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050, reinforce information sharing among MDA centers, and establish a Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA).23

However, no African country can achieve these goals alone. The need of the hour is for African countries to express unity which is encapsulated under the concept of ‘Sisonke’ meaning “together” in isiXhosa.24 In such endeavours, India, with its operational capability and maritime expertise, could become a key partner in fostering African maritime capacities and creating cooperative frameworks that offer modest and meaningful alternatives for African development and maritime security.

Dr. Abhishek Mishra is an Associate Fellow Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies in India. His research focuses on India and China’s engagement in Africa, aimed at developing partnerships under the framework of South-South cooperation, including a specific focus on maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region. Dr. Mishra has published widely on African maritime security, Asian-African cooperation, and on a range of African security issues. He holds a PhD in African Studies from the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi. Before joining MP-IDSA, Dr. Mishra was working on African issues at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Endnotes

1. Abhishek Mishra, “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges,” MP-IDSA Occasional Paper No. 64, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 2024, https://www.idsa.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/op-64-amishra-281024-1.pdf

2. Mishra “Evolution of African Maritime Security,” 41.

3. Timothy Walker, “From Missed Opportunity to Oceans of Prosperity,” Institute for Security Studies, October 13, 2015, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/frommissed-opportunity-to-oceans-of-prosperity

4. African Union, “2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy),” Version 1.0, 2012, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/11151/2050_aims_srategy.pdf

5. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Freedom C. Onuoha, “Whose Security Is It? Elitism and the Global Approach to Maritime Security in Africa,” Third World Quarterly, 44 no. 5 (2023): 946-966, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706

6. Abhishek Mishra, “India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 221, November 2019.

7. Ulf Engel, “The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security,” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf

8. Engel, “The African Union,” 8.

9. Christian Bueger, “Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime,” African Security, 6, no. 3/4, 2013, pp. 297-316, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2013.853579

10. Raj Mohabeer and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean,” Indian Ocean Commission, 2019, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strengthening-maritime-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean-policy-brief.pdf

11. Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security,” 1.

12. Elizabeth Roche, “India’s View of Indo-Pacific Stretches from East Coast of Africa to West Coast of US: Shringla,” The Mint, November 3, 2020, https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-s-view-of-indo-pacific-stretches-from-east-coast-of-africa-to-west-coast-of-us-shringla-11604423464721.html

13. “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” August 2022, https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf

14. Abhishek Mishra, ed, “Reflections on the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from Africa,” Observer Research Foundation, December 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/public/uploads/posts/pdf/20230407120854.pdf

15. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma,” African Security Review 31, no. 2, 2022, 195-210, doi:10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

16. Meghan Curran, Christopher Faulkner, Curtis Bell, Tyler Lycan, Michael Van Ginkel, and Jay Benson, “Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain,” Stable Seas, One Earth Foundation, August 2020, 190, https://www.stableseas.org/post/violence-at-sea-howterrorists-insurgents-and-other-extremists-exploit-the-maritime-domain

17. Abhijit Singh, “India’s Evolving Maritime Posture in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf,” Emirates Diplomatic Academy, August 2020, https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/eda-insight-aug-2020-eng-abhijit.pdf?sfvrsn=6

18. “Text of PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India,

March 12, 2015, https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=116881

19. Ashish Singh, “India’s Maritime Pivot: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR with Africa on Sight,” The Sunday Guardian, April 13, 2025, https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/indias-maritime-pivot-from-sagar-to-mahasagar-with-africa-on-sight

20. “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiative of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME),” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 24, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491

21. Abhijit Singh, “Delhi’s Balancing Act in Western Indian Ocean,” Hindustan Times, 18 April 2025, https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/delhis-balancing-act-in-western-indian-ocean-101744989142768.html

22. Timothy Walker, “Sink or Swim: Africa’s Crucial Milestones in 2025,” Institute for Security Studies, 16 January 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sink-or-swim-africa-s-crucial-maritime-milestones-in-2025

23. “Sea Power Conference Produces Cooperation Goals,” Africa Defence Forum, 30 April 2025, https://adf-magazine.com/2025/04/sea-power-conference-produces-cooperation-goals/

24. “SA Navy Chief Seeks Improved African Maritime Security through Cooperation, Exercises,” defenceWeb, 4 September 2023, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/sa-navy-chief-seeks-improved-african-maritime-security/

References

African Union, ‘2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy),’ Version 1.0, 2012. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30929-doc-2050_aim_strategy_eng_0.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime.” African Security, 6 no. ¾ (2013): 297-316. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/19392206.2013.853579

Bueger, Christian and Jan Stockbruegger. “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma.” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210. doi:10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

Curran, Meghan, Christopher Faulkner, Curtis Bell, Tyler Lycan, Michael Van Ginkel, and Jay Benson. “Violence at Sea: How Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Extremists Exploit the Maritime Domain.” Stable Seas, One Earth Foundation, August 2020. https://www.stableseas.org/post/violence-at-sea-howterrorists-insurgents-and-other-extremists-exploit-the-maritime-domain

Engel, Ulf. “The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security.” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf

“Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiative of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR (IOS SAGAR) and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME).” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, March 24, 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2114491

Mishra, Abhishek. “Evolution of African Maritime Security: Imperatives, Governance and Challenges,” MP-IDSA Occasional Paper No. 64. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 2024.

Mishra, Abhishek. “India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The Case of Western Indian Ocean.” ORF Occasional Paper No. 221, November 2019.

Mishra, Abhishek, ed. “Reflections on the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from Africa.” December 2021, Observer Research Foundation.

Mohabeer, Raj and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Security in the Western Indian Ocean.” Indian Ocean Commission, 2019. https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Strengthening-maritime-security-in-the-western-indian-ocean-policy-brief.pdf

Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi and Freedom C. Onuoha, “Whose Security Is It? Elitism and the Global Approach to Maritime Security in Africa.” Third World Quarterly 44 no. 5 (2023): 946-966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2023.2167706

Roche, Elizabeth. “India’s View of Indo-Pacific Stretches from East Coast of Africa to West Coast of US: Shringla.” The Mint, November 3, 2020. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/india-s-view-of-indo-pacific-stretches-from-east-coast-of-africa-to-west-coast-of-us-shringla-11604423464721.html

“SA Navy Chief Seeks Improved African Maritime Security through Cooperation, Exercises.” defenceWeb, September 4, 2023. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/sa-navy-chief-seeks-improved-african-maritime-security/

“Sea Power Conference Produces Cooperation Goals.” Africa Defence Forum, April 30, 2025. https://adf-magazine.com/2025/04/sea-power-conference-produces-cooperation-goals/25

Singh, Abhijit. “Delhi’s Balancing act in Western Indian Ocean.” Hindustan Times, April 18, 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/delhis-balancing-act-in-western-indian-ocean-101744989142768.html

Singh, Abhijit. “India’s Evolving Maritime Posture in the Indian Ocean: Opportunities for the Gulf.” Emirates Diplomatic Academy, August 2020. https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/eda-insight-aug-2020-eng-abhijit.pdf?sfvrsn=6

Singh, Ashish. “India’s Maritime Pivot: From SAGAR to MAHASAGAR with Africa on Sight,” The Sunday Guardian, April 13, 2025. https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/indias-maritime-pivot-from-sagar-to-mahasagar-with-africa-on-sight

“Text of PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda.” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 12 March 2015. https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=116881

“U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” Executive Council of the President National Security Council, August 2022. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf

Walker, Timothy. “From Missed Opportunity to Oceans of Prosperity,” Institute for Security Studies, October 13, 2015. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/frommissed-opportunity-to-oceans-of-prosperity

Walker, Timothy. “Sink or Swim: Africa’s Crucial Milestones in 2025,” Institute for Security Studies, January 16, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/sink-or-swim-africa-s-crucial-maritime-milestones-in-2025

Featured Image: INS Chennai (D65) and KNS Jasiri (P3124) carrying out drills of the coast of Dar-es-Salaam during the Africa India Key Maritime Exercise. (Photo by Kenyan MoD)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

India-U.S. Strategic Convergence in the Indo-Pacific Region

Leave a comment

By Jyotirmoy Banerjee

As early as 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the need for U.S. naval cooperation with the Indian Navy, given the importance of the Indo-Pacific basin for world trade. Although the Pacific was already an American lake since the end of World War II,1 in 2011 President Obama launched the new strategy of “rebalancing “Asia-Pacific as a “pivot.” This, notes a Philippine study,2 was an indication of the growing alarm that the U.S.—and many Indo-Pacific littorals—continued to feel about the dramatic rise of China’s economic and military power. Further, as a U.S. commentary noted, “China scared everybody into our arms”3 The U.S. Defense Department’s strategic guidance released around this time singled out India to observe that the U.S. “is also investing in a long term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.”4

To be sure, the U.S. has a large number of military bases in the Asia-Pacific region, and deploys some 80,000 troops in Japan and South Korea. U.S. naval and air power can be credibly projected into every part of this region stretching from Bollywood to Hollywood and from the polar bear to the penguin. Under President Obama, however, the U.S. strategic priority, or “rebalancing,” was meant to shift from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, and expand U.S. presence within the region by forging closer military, trade, and other ties. President Trump’s Defense Secretary Jim Mattis took the shift further and termed India as a “Major Defense Partner” while urging U.S. agencies to expedite drone sales to India.5 On 30 May 2018 he renamed the U.S. Pacific Command as INDOPACOM, or Indo-Pacific Command, in Honolulu as America’s “priority theater.” Shortly thereafter, at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore Mattis stressed the concern of not only the U.S. but several other littorals of Asia’s eastern periphery at China’s allegedly overbearing behavior, e.g. placing war potential on the features it occupies in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, including “the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers, and more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island.”6

India’s Prime Minister Modi, however, refrained from censuring China, presumably to avoid being openly ensnared in a U.S.-led “counter-China” strategy. But Mattis called for underpinning a free and open Indo-Pacific with his country standing “shoulder to shoulder with India, ASEAN and our treaty allies and other partners.” He identified the “Indo-Pacific” region as “critical” for America. He did not hesitate to transparently arraign India against China: “The U.S. values the role India can play in regional and global security, and we view the U.S.-India relationship as a natural partnership between the world’s two largest democracies, based on a convergence of strategic interests, shared values, and respect for a rule-based international order.”7 Indeed, Hillary Clinton had openly come out against China’s long-standing claim of practically all of the South China Sea—with its so-called “9-dash Line”—during her Hanoi visit in 2010. This was welcomed by the affected states of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.8 Nevertheless, China continued to pursue its “active defense strategy” and “anti-access /aerial denial (A2/AD)” to counter any intervention in waters under its control, presumably by the U.S.

In November 2013 Beijing had gone ahead with establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over portions of the East China Sea. It was a matter of concern that China might establish a similar zone in the South China Sea conflicting with territorial claims by others. In August 2018 the PLA Navy (PLAN) sent two frigates and a supply ship to the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia. And a Chinese commentary proudly proclaims, “As China’s ship-building industry has been making rapid progress in recent years, the number of warship types has also increased, including combat support ships that are essential among the ocean-going fleets…The Type-901 comprehensive supply ship Hulunhu (Hull 965) is known as the “nanny of aircraft carriers.’” 9

There were other reports of PLAN exercises too. “Naval vessels from three theater commands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have conducted air defense and anti-missile live-fire exercises in the East China Sea,” declared the PLA Daily in August 2018. The exercises would beef up the PLAN’s defense capability “in response to potential threats from anti-ship missiles from Japan, the U.S., and other countries near China.”10 The PLAN hosted that same month “Seaborne Assault,” a five-nation military exercise.11 China deployed several hundred surface-to-air missiles as well as the anti-ballistic missile interceptor HQ-26 on the South China Sea islands. Chinese military expert Yin Zhuo justified such deployment in light of the powerful naval force of the U.S. in the region. Yin alleged that the U.S. was the one which truly threatened regional stability, though Western media had been spreading the theory of the “so-called China threat.”12

The reasons for China’s apparent high-handedness around the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the East and South China Seas through the Indian Ocean all the way up to eastern Africa are not far to seek. Beijing’s energy-hungry, export-driven economy that heavily depends on raw material and fuel imports seeks to buttress its supposed lordship over regional SLOCs which, however, are also critical to the survival of other Asia-Pacific states. China transports $1.5 trillion worth of goods, including petroleum through the IOR.13 In 2015, in an unprecedented move that worried New Delhi, a Chinese nuclear submarine deployed to the IOR. Stretching Beijing’s overseas influence, a PLA military contingent also appeared that year in South Sudan on a UN peace-keeping mission while a hospital ship offered free medical services to Fijian islanders.14 In July 2017 reports circulated that the PLA was setting up China’s first permanent overseas deployment in Djibouti – right next to the U.S. Navy’s Camp Lemonnier base there – since its withdrawal from North Korea in 1958.15 In August 2017 the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning started its exercises in the East China Sea but then quickly shifted its force to South China Sea and flew its combat aircraft – the J-15 “Flying Shark” – for the first time over that sea. The U.S. has sent a number of aircraft carrier strike groups to cruise in the South China Sea and, alleged China Military, frequently harassed Chinese soldiers stationed on the islands. The presence of the Liaoning was to stake out China’s claims in the region. Moreover, the South China Sea is an important advance base for China’s strategic nuclear submarines and Liaoning can be there to provide air cover for them.16

Regarding China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there are fears that engaging China in these large infrastructure projects could put participating countries at debt risk. The port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is an example. And many in Pakistan anticipate a similar debt-ridden fate over the Chinese-aided Gwadar port in their country. It is feared that this debt will then be used by China as leverage to gain access to resources and pursue its strategic interests.17

The issue of military or economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific is just a part of the greater challenge: finding a balance of power between the U.S. and China that is acceptable to both nations. Ever since the 1997 Bill Clinton-Jiang Zemin talks and despite a number of other high-level meetings, U.S.-China relations remain characterized by the classic “Thucydidean trap,” where the status quo power (U.S.) is concerned at the rise of another power (China). The resulting strategic tension bodes ill for both as well as the region.

In such a changing strategic naval scenario, where the U.S. has been taking a fresh look at its naval deployments and diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific, India with its vast coastline and geographic position can play a significant role. Over 80 percent of world oil exports, 50 percent of the global container traffic and 33 percent of global cargo trade move through the IOR and its strategic chokepoints like the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. The renaming of the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific clearly signaled the role the US expected India to play in countering China.

In its turn India had already stressed in its January 2015 statement on “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over-flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. In a transparent reference to China it had added, “We call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means…”18

India also provided some muscle to that statement. In May 2016 a strong Indian naval force deployed to the South China Sea,  took part in the Malabar-16 exercise with the  U,S, and Japanese navies,  and also called at the  ports of several littorals stretching all the way to the East China Sea right up to Vladivostok. The Indian Navy declared the region as being of “vital strategic importance to India.”19 In 2017 a U.S. naval study observed that “India’s maritime engagement and activities with Southeast and East Asian countries are increasing…indicating greater space for USN-Indian Navy cooperation” and that “U.S.-India naval ties under the Modi administration are thriving.”20

Following the new U.S. conventional arms transfer policy and the drone export policy of April 2018, State Department official Ambassador Tina Kaidanow declared that the U.S. was “raising the bar in the [arms transfer] relationship with India.”21 India, however, has been more circumspect on that relationship. Even though the Doklam border conflict with China was just a few months old,22 Premier Modi did not raise the issue of China’s assertiveness at the Shangri-La Dialogue, as already noted. However, he highlighted India’s naval activities and cooperation with regional navies, including the U.S. Nor did India quickly fall in line with Japan urging an early meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the quad, revived in 2017, with U.S., India and Australia. The dialogue was held in June 2018 only after India completed its diplomatic engagements with China and Russia. New Delhi was also careful to not mix up the Malabar Exercises with the U.S. navy with the Quad, which India believed would be a red flag to China.23

At the same time, India was delighted that in April 2018 the Trump administration decided to release armed Guardian drones to India,24 no doubt partly upon Mattis’ urging, and thus taking a step further to cement bilateral strategic ties. It would be the first time U.S. sells a large armed drone to a country outside the NATO. For the past few years only unarmed drones had been permitted to India. India’s importance for the U.S. lies in the fact that its navy, with its two dozen destroyers and frigates, an aircraft carrier, and assorted submarines, including a nuclear-powered one, as well as other vessels, is the largest among Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littorals.

In July 2018 the Indian Navy adopted a “new mission-based deployment” plan. It involves deploying mission-ready ships and aircraft along critical sea lanes of communications.25 This was in response to the uneasiness created by China’s “string of pearls” strategy, a U.S. coinage, which China calls the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”26 It refers to Beijing’s ever-expanding overseas commercial and concomitant military ties, naval movements and base and facility acquisitions in the IOR (Hambantota and Colombo port  in Sri Lanka, Cocoa Island and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar, Gwadar and Karachi in Pakistan, and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa),  construction of seaports, railroads and highways in littoral states,  island-building in the distant waters of the South China Sea and a massive submarine-building program, with the country now boasting more submarines than the U.S.27 What’s more, a Pentagon report on 16 August 2018 raised the spectre of PLA bombers training to strike the U.S. and its allies.28

In early September this year, an Indo-US ‘2+2′ dialogue was held for the first time at the Foreign at the Foreign and Defence ministers’ level in New Delhi. The significant results included the signing of The Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). This was a landmark agreement in  Indo-US defence and security relations. The ensuing joint statement described the two countries as “strategic partners, major and independent stakeholders in world affairs.”29

Beijing’s ambitious moves look very much like an attempt to turn China into the hub of a new order in Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It is also to counter the U.S. “pivot” to Asia. China’s $40 billion Silk Road Fund and its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are further indicators of its policy. It plans to develop a 3,000-kilometer, $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connecting its restive Xinjiang province to the Baluch port city of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. India has responded with a comparatively feeble “Look East Act East” policy, but India will need the U.S. as much as the U.S. needs India to shore up countervailing power to China’s seaward thrust in the IOR.

Dr. Jyotirmoy Banerjee, former Professor of International Relations (Strategic Studies), Jadavpur University, Kolkata has over four decades of academic experience, including frequent research and teaching stints in Germany, Poland and the USA. Besides winning Fulbright, Alexander von Humboldt and Goethe Institute Fellowships, each several times, he has been recipient of other post-doctoral grants of the Rockefeller, Erasmus Mundus, InterNationes and UGC research programs. His academic peregrinations have stretched from India’s academia to California-Berkeley, Pennsylvania, Hawaii (Manoa), Massachusetts, St.Francis College, Indiana, Berlin (FU), German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn and Berlin, German Foreign Ministry (AA), the Toenissteiner Kreis in Cologne as well as Wroclaw University in Poland. He has presented at the State Department, U.S. National Security Council, and the Library of Congress in Washington DC.

References

[1] Cumings B. (2016) The Obama “Pivot” to Asia in a Historical Context of American Hegemony. In: Huang D. (eds) Asia Pacific Countries and the US Rebalancing Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp 11-30.

[2] Uriel N. Galace, “In Retrospect: Assessing Obama’s Asia Rebalancing Strategy”, http://www.fsi.gov.ph/in-retrospect-assessing-obamas-asia-rebalancing-strategy/, CIRSS Commentaries, VOL. III, NO. 16, December 2016, electronically accessed 8/9/2018, 10.34 P.M. IST (All times are in Indian Standard Time unless otherwise mentioned).

[3]  MICHAEL J. GREEN, “The Legacy of Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia”, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/. | SEPTEMBER 3, 2016Electronically accessed 8/10/2018, 06.20 A.M.

[4] Quoted in S. Amer Latif,”India and the New U.S. Defense Strategy”,https://www.csis.org/analysis/india-and-new-us-defense-strategy,February 23, 2012.Electronically accessed on 8/19/2018,6:50 AM.

[5] “’Once-in-a-generation’ opportunity for US to find more common ground with India: Jim Mattis”, Apr 27, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defense/once-in-a-generation-opportunity-for-us-to-find-more-common-ground-with-india-jim-mattis/articleshow/63936701.cms. Electronically accessed on 8/26/2018, 4.00 AM.

[6] Euan Graham, “Mattis Lays Out U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at Shangri-La,” https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/04/mattis_lays_out_us_indo-pacific_strategy_at_shangri-la_113504.html, June 04, 2018. Electronically accessed on 8/14/2018, 04.50 A.M.

[7] Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis; John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS, June 2,2018.Transcript. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/ Electronically accessed on 9/13/2018, 04.46 A.M.

[8] Jeffrey A. Bader, “The US-China Nine-Dash Line: Ending the Ambiguity”, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-u-s-and-chinas-nine-dash-line-ending-the-ambiguity/, Feb.6, 2014. Electronically accessed on 14 August 2018, 6.12 A.M.

[9] Bei Guo Fang Wu,” PLA Navy ends era of “supply-ship troika” in its escort mission”, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/09/content_9247256.htm, Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018, 4:36 AM. Emphases added.

[10] Li Jiayao (Global Times Editor), “PLA naval exercises in East China Sea test missile interceptions”, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/13/content_9249528.htm, Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018, 4:38 AM.

[11] Li Jiayao, “”Seaborne Assault” concluded in China”, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/11/content_9249169.htm. Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018 4:41 AM.

[12] “China’s missile deployment in South China Sea completely reasonable: expert”, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2017-01/04/content_4769263.htm. Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018 5:17 AM.

[13] Sarosh Bana, “Rebalancing with India”, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/rebalancing-with-india_sbana_310516. Electronically accessed on 8/25/2018, 3.34 AM.

[14] http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/09/content_9246542.htm. Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018 4:43 AM; http://search.chinamil.com.cn/search/milsearch/stouch_eng.jsp. Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018 4:56 AM. 12 Charles Clover,Sherry Fei, “Chinese military base takes shape in Djibouti” https://www.ft.com/content/bcba2820-66e1-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614, JULY 12, 2017.Electronically accessed on 9/9/2018, 4.55 A.M.

[16] “Expert: China’s home advantage in South China Sea cannot be overlooked”, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Opinion/2017-01/04/content_4769264.htm. Electronically accessed on 8/13/2018 5:27 AM. The expert Li Jie, however, believes that aircraft carrier Liaoning is developed based on the Russian-made aircraft carrier Varyag and therefore it will inevitably be affected by the original design. But more critically, the number of ship-borne fighter jets of Liaoning is only half of that of US super aircraft carriers. In this way, it is hard for ship-borne fighter jets of Liaoning to bear air defense, anti-submarine and long-range strike at the same time.

[17]  Darlene V. Estrada, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Philippines,” VOL. V, NO.3,March 2018, http://www.fsi.gov.ph/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-implications-for-the-philippines/ Electronically accessed on IST 8/10/2018 6:36 AM.

[18] US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region”, January 25, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/24728/USIndia_Joint_Strategic_Vision_for_the_AsiaPacific_and_Indian_Ocean_Region. Electronically accessed on 8/25/2018, 5.11 AM.

[19]  Sarosh Bana, op.cit.

[20] Nilanthi Samaranayake, Michael Connell,Satu Limaye,”The Future of U.S.-India Naval Relations”,February 2017,Center for Naval Analyses, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1029962.pdf. Electronically accessed on  8/25/2018,5:58 AM.

[21] U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,August 8, 2018 (transcript), https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead. Electronically accessed on 9/9/2018, 7 AM.

[22] The dispute was over Chinese construction of a road in Doklam near a trijunction of India-China-Bhutan border area.

[23]  Indrani Bagchi, “ India, Australia, US, Japan to hold meet in Singapore”, Jun 6, 2018. Electronically accessed on 8/19/2018, 6 A.M.

[24] Ajay Banerjee, “India could be gainer as US changes policy on supply of armed drones”, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-could-be-gainer-as-us-changes-policy-on-supply-of-armed-drones/576937.html, 8/19/2018, 6:16 AM.; “US offers India armed version of Guardian drone: Sources”,  “https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-offers-india-armed-version-of-guardian-drone-sources/articleshow/65043647.cms, Jul 18, 2018. Electronically accessed on 9/9/2018, 6/20 AM.

[25] “Navy to implement new plan for warships in Indian Ocean region”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defense/to-counter-china-navy-to-implement-new-plan-for-warships-in-indian-ocean-region/printarticle/61231821.cms. Elecronically accessed 8/21/2018, 1.20 AM. 

[26] “China reinvents ‘string of pearls’ as Maritime Silk Road”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-reinvents-string-of pearls-as-Maritime-Silk-Road, April 29, 2015. Electronically accessed 8/21/2018. 2.21 AM.

[27] Ibid.

[28] “Chinese bombers ‘likely training for US strikes’ says Pentagon”, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/Chinese-bombers-likely-training-for-US-strikes-says-Pentagon, August 17, 2018. Electronically accessed 7/21/2018, 8.01 PM.

[29] Indrani Bagchi, “2+2 talks set strategic direction for Indo-US ties”, Sep 9, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/22-talks-set-strategic-direction-for-indo-us-ties/articleshow/65737608.cms, Electronically accessed 16 Sept.2018, 6.16 PM.

Featured Image: Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis meets with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Washington, D.C., June 26, 2017. (DOD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Jette Carr)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

China’s Rise and Indian Ocean Ambitions

Leave a comment

By Aswani Dravid

Though the Indian Ocean was considered exotic for centuries, it was transformed into a mere colonial sea by the 18th century. The European powers divided the South Asian continent among themselves to a degree that these South Asian countries no longer identified with the larger whole. However, the British retreat from the region and subsequent de-colonization spree around the periphery of the Indian Ocean raised a complex situation of an Indian Ocean vacuum. By the end of the 1940s many of the countries in Africa and Asia became independent from their colonial rulers and many of these newly emerged free countries lived in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. The British announcement in 1968 to withdraw from east of the Suez by the end of 1971 marked the end of over 150 years of British supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the Second World War ended colonialism and the European countries ceased to be the rulers of this ocean. The United States and the Soviet Union became the new involved parties. However, even though the Cold War divided the world into two blocs, both the U.S. and USSR did not seriously attempt to fill the vacuum left by the British in this area. Now in the Post-Cold War era, according to Ashwani Sharma, “the realm of world politics had transformed beyond all recognition, as was the Indian Ocean in its appearance and role, implicitly and explicitly due to the metamorphoses of the world.” During that period, the geo-strategic undercurrents of the Indian Ocean had changed significantly due to the tireless struggles of new players in the region, especially China and India, to achieve strategic aims in the IOR. Though the United States still holds an impressive locus in the Indo-Pacific, the complex upheavals during the last century only allowed them to restructure their strategy to truly sustain its dominance in the area only recently.

This region, the Indo-Pacific, is at present one of the fastest developing regions of the world, displaying unmatched vigor in socio-political, economic, and geo-security terms. Robert Kaplan has rightly stated that “the 21st-century power dynamics will be revealed in the backdrop of keen interest and influence of three key players, i.e., China, India, and United States and their interests could be some sort of an overlap and intersection.” In short, the Indo-Pacific has rightly emerged as the economic and geopolitical center of gravity of the world in the 21st century. China unlocked its economy in the year 1978 and accomplished approximately a rate of 10 percent growth for three decades. China has lifted millions of people out of poverty through a systematic growth pattern. China has now risen to become the second largest economy in the world, second only to the United States. Japan, which enjoyed the position of the only Asian developed nation for decades, was pushed to the world’s third position. With their vigilant strategic investments, China’s economic growth and global influence are increasing.

After China declared itself the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its naval operations were limited to defending the coasts for nearly three decades until the 1980s. By the end of that decade, the strategy sought to expand its naval capabilities beyond coastal waters. Most of the Sea Lines of Communications of China pass through the Indian Ocean and a few through the Pacific Rim. One of China’s foremost concerns is the protection of these SLOCs. The Indian Ocean is home to major chokepoints that Chinese vessels must traverse and where any threat in this ocean directly distresses the ambitions of China. The rise of China as a superpower in Asia and its revival of the ancient Maritime Silk Route (MSR) and One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) have raised concerns in India. Any nation, in order to ensure its sphere of influence would not only accumulate strength to its camp but also take measures that ensure that the enemy’s camp would be weakened without adequate logistics. In addition to port construction and acquisition efforts in the Indian Ocean that add to the value of these SLOCs and strengthen China’s logistical infrastructure, China’s concurrent naval modernization efforts also generate concerns for India. The evolution of Chinese naval modernization has been steady and it has eventually become the largest navy in Asia today, with a plentiful addition of surface ships and submarines. Far seas training and deployments in this region have become the new norm for China’s Navy.

China aims to create a counterbalance through economic and strategic partnerships with the various littoral nations in the IOR in order to reinforce her existence in the region. China’s investment in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, its electronic gathering amenities in isolated islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, and others are certain instances to prove China’s increasing interest in the IOR. China has maritime disputes with many of its neighbors and many of the Southeast Asian nations are in conflict with China over the latter’s expansionist tendencies and dominance. However, China has no major disputes or tensions with India’s neighbors in the IOR and is instead cultivating maritime partnerships with these states. For example, China is building maritime relations with Pakistan through its investments in Gwadar Port and a mainland highway connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in the Xinjiang region. All these efforts ensure that China will be somewhat relieved from the threat of chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and will have a smoothly flowing trade and supply chain.

Due to India’s growing dependence on oil and energy resources, any interference in the stability or peace of the Indian Ocean will have a cataclysmic impact on the economic and political stability of the nation. A peaceful and reliant Indian Ocean is the responsibility of the littoral and island states in this region to an extent that the “overall political character of the Indian Ocean had changed from one of European dominance to that of local assertion.”

Aswani Dravid is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Policy and Administration in University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun, Uttarakhand.

References

Buckley, C. (2013, January 29). China Leader Affirms Policy on Islands. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/world/asia/incoming-chinese-leader-will-not-to-bargain-on-disputed-territory.html

Dowdy, W. L., & Trood, R. B. (1983, September 1). The Indian Ocean: An Emerging Geostrategic Region. Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 38(3), 432-458.

Jain, B. (2017, April 4). India’s Security Concerns in the Indian Ocean Region: A Critical Analysis. Future Directions International. Retrieved from http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/indias-security-concerns-indian-ocean-region-critical-analysis/

Kaplan, R. (2010). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York City: Random House.

Kumar, K. (2000). Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: APH Publishing.

Majumdar, D. (2016, June 27). Why the US Navy Should Fear China’s New 093B Nuclear Attack Submarine. The National Interest. Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-us-navy-should-fear-chinas-new-093b-nuclear-attack-16741

O’Rourke, R. (2017, January 5). China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report.

Pant, H. (2009). India in the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch between Ambitions and Capabilities. Pacific Affairs, 82(2), 279-297. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25608866

Sharma, A. (2018). The Indian Ocean: Cold War – Post-Cold War Scenario. International Journal of South Asian Studies , 23.

Wearden, G. (2010, August 16). Chinese economic boom has been 30 years in the making. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/aug/16/chinese-economic-boom

Featured Image: CSCL Pacific Ocean Elbe (Wikimedia Commons)

Indo-Asia-Pacific

The Great Game in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Partnership Opportunities for the U.S.

1 Comment

By Chad Pillai

There is a growing strategic competition underway in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea between India and China focused on acquiring commercial ports and military facilities. It is a race for strategic access, leverage, and influence for energy resources, markets, and national security. This competition between two relative new naval powers in the region will directly influence the U.S. and its regional partners in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Area of Responsibilities (AORs), beyond the usual purview of Pacific Command (USPACOM) whose AOR India lies within. For the U.S., this represents a strategic opportunity to compete against China’s growing influence by expanding its relationship with India in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.

Nyshka Chandran reported on CNBC in February 2018 that “China and India are competing for regional supremacy in the Indian Ocean as they look establish a stronger military and economic presence in bordering countries.” China’s move into the Indian Ocean, as part of its “String of Pearls” approach to expand its strategic reach, is well documented. The formal establishment of China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti serves as its first military marker on the global map. Recently, China has been in negotiations with Pakistan to expand its access to the port of Gwadar and open its second overseas naval base in Jiwani, Pakistan which is about 80 km from Gwadar. These two locations would provide China the means and proximity to militarily influence two of the world’s eight strategic chokepoints, the Bab el-Mandeb straits along at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, China has been expanding its economic presence in the Seychelles, Maldives, and in Oman.

While China expands its presence, India has not remained idle. It has invested in the commercial port of Chabahar, Iran to give it greater access to Afghanistan, circumventing Pakistan. However, questions arise on whether India can use the port to effectively compete against China and its One Belt and One Road (OBOR) strategy. In addition to the port in Iran, India is competing for access to the Seychelles, Maldives, and Oman. The recent tensions between China and India, after China deployed 11 warships to the Maldives in February illustrates this growing rivalry. In the Seychelles, India is spending $46 million dollars in foreign aid to improve costal defense and airstrips; however, that has run into recent issues with the president of the Seychelles. While India doesn’t lack in its ambition to compete with China, it lacks a cohesive political and economic decisionmaking body like China to invest and outcompete, and lacks in its naval capabilities to effectively challenge the Chinese. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), China’s naval surface combatants dwarfs India (83 Chinese combatants vs. 27 Indian Combatants; 57 Chinese attack submarines vs. 15 Indian attack submarines; and 4 Chinese ballistic submarines vs. 1 Indian in development). Of course, the naval disparity between the two nations is spread out across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and China must overcome its “Malacca Straits Dilemma” to surge forces into the Indian Ocean.

This growing competition between China and India present a strategic opportunity for the U.S. to offset China’s growing presence in the region. While the U.S. has generally viewed India as a strategic partner in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR to offset China, it represents an opportunity to counter-balance China in the USCENTCOM and AFRICOM AOR as well. In concerted effort by USCENTCOM, in partnership with PACOM, can find ways to enhance the Indian Navy’s force projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea to challenge China’s small, but growing, military presence in the region. U.S. Navy Central Command (USNAVCENT) can spearhead this effort on behalf of CENTCOM by encouraging India to more fully participate in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) that focuses on Counter-Piracy operations.  NAVCENT could consider future joint naval exercises focusing on combined naval operations, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and carrier-based operations. Such combined exercises can assist India in expanding its capabilities and capacity to exert greater influence, in concert with U.S. interests, in the region as a means to counter-balance China’s presence. Additionally, as Harry Halem recently noted, the U.S. can encourage greater cooperation between its allies and partners in the region, to include Israel, to cooperate with India. This also includes expanding ongoing Indian-French naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean as seen by France’s deployment of its Charles De Gaulle strike group to exercise with the Indian Navy. For the U.S., these efforts will have to be delicately balanced with the U.S. relationship with Pakistan and it may raise concerns on the Pakistani Navy’s ability to counter-balance India as well.

Increased ties between the U.S. and India will also support increased foreign military sales of U.S. capabilities. Recently, the U.S. has become one of India’s primary weapons exporters with sales of “Boeing P-8I Neptune — a version of the U.S. Navy’s P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft.” Additionally, the U.S. offered to sell its Harpoon missile to India. The recent cancellation of the Indian-Russian Stealth Fighter presents an opportunity for the U.S. to offer its platforms to include the F/A-18 Super Hornet. An area of future opportunity may lie in a combined shipbuilding program to assist the Indian Navy in its modernization efforts. These sales will contribute towards developing increased interoperability between the U.S. and Indian Navies, along with allied and partner navies in the region.

While China is attempting to build upon the legacy of Zheng He (Ming Dynasty), India must learn to use its geographic positional advantage in the Indian Ocean that dominates east to west maritime traffic. The key to leveraging its geographic positional advantage in the Great Game of the Indian Ocean will be based on a mutual desire by India to expand its military, primarily naval, capabilities to compete with China and, a mutual desire by the U.S. and India to expand their military cooperation. For the U.S., India can no longer be viewed simply as a PACOM partner. Instead, it must be viewed as a trans-regional partner who has the ability to influence both the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs as a counter-balance to China’s growing global ambition. As Robert Kaplan, author of Monsoon, has noted, the Indian Ocean represents the fulcrum between American Power in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, and its growing relationship with India will shape its desire to remain atop the global order against a rising China.

Chad M. Pillai is an experienced Army strategist and is a member of the Military Writers’ Guild, Army Strategy Association, and contributes to the U.S. Naval Institute. He has operational experience in the CENTCOM AOR and has traveled to India, to include 1998 during the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998. He received a Masters in International Public Policy from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The article reflects the opinion of the author and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government and the U.S. Department of Defense.

Featured Image: SASEBO, Japan (June 10, 2016) – Rear Adm. Brian Hurley, center, deputy commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, tours the Indian navy Kora-class corvette INS Kirch (P62) during Malabar 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Ryan J. Batchelder/Released)