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Revamp Force Design for Sea Control and Joint Integration

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

Given how 20 to 30 percent of the fleet’s platforms could be replaced by 2045, a thoughtful and imaginative force design process must go beyond measuring the relative importance of existing and planned platforms and capabilities. The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.

The Navy’s force design should be oriented on the strategic intelligence estimate of the future joint operating environment, the naval enduring functions (missions), and the overlapping required capabilities espoused by the Joint Warfighting Concept. Focusing on the platforms, people (through recruiting, training, and education), and doctrine required to effect operational concepts will allow the Navy to cover its enduring missions and provide needed capabilities. Additionally, the Navy can meaningfully contribute to the Joint Warfighting Concept and effectively defend its budget requests by clearly articulating an integration pathway through the joint force.

The Navy should design its force utilizing hierarchical tiers of sea control. For example, the Navy shall ensure supremacy in the U.S. near seas with the ability to protect the homeland’s approaches to ports and coastline. For the next tier, it shall provide naval superiority in the vital sea lanes that are the economic lifelines to the homeland and her allies. It should also be able to contest the seas where superiority is not possible, but where necessary logistics must transit. Lastly, as the final tier, it can provide sea denial in the areas where an adversary is strongest. These differentiated tiers, overlayed with the future joint operating environment, will demand discrete capabilities that drive a bespoke high-low force mixture. Furthermore, lower-end capabilities provide greater integration opportunities with regional allies and partners, the true strategic center of gravity.

The adage is a ship is a fool to fight a fort. The Navy should avoid the temptation to believe that more ships or traditional platform-centric models of force design will effectively compete with pacing threats, especially when competitors have fielded holistic, land-based networks of capability (forts) oriented toward the maritime domain. Furthermore, the Navy must not repeat the experience of using expensive, high-end systems designed for peer combat in low-level engagements persisting below the level of conflict. To do so, the Navy’s force structure should incorporate more economical platforms for cooperation and competition, preserving the lifespan and readiness of higher-end vessels.

Historically, the Navy pursued a force design independent of the other services, and a force posture the Navy felt was required to win a war within the maritime domain on its own. The practice led to duplications of capability, but the modern defense industrial base does not afford the luxury of excess. Today offers an opportunity for the Navy to change course on force design, which will require strong leadership to redirect the accumulated inertia.

Commander Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is a U.S. naval flight officer and prospective executive officer of Strike Fighter Squadron TWO TWO. He recently completed a fellowship with the Halsey Alfa advanced research program at the U.S. Naval War College and is a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). CDR Tenbusch is Space Policy and Nuclear Public Policy fellow at Nonproliferation Education Center, and is pursuing a Master’s in Space Systems at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Commander Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a U.S. naval aviator and a special operations joint terminal attack controller instructor. He currently serves as the Joint Close Air Support division officer at the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center where he follows unmanned systems employment and tactics. CDR Phillips-Levine is a Nonproliferation Education Center Space and Nuclear Public Policy Fellow, and is pursuing a Master’s in Systems Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Featured Image: An aerial view of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, Washington (USA), on 24 November 2012. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Sea Control 466 – Deliberate Campaigning in the Pacific with Benjamin Van Horrick and Steven Bancroft

By Jared Samuelson

Benjamin Van Horrick and Steven Bancroft discuss their work in the Pacific with Task Force 76/3 and re-imagining command and control relationships.

Benjamin is a Marine Corps logistics officer, and the current logistics operations officer for Task Force 76/3. Steven is the future operations officer for TF 76/3.

Download Sea Control 466 – Deliberate Campaigning in the Pacific with Benjamin Van Horrick and Steven Bancroft


Links

1. “A Strait Too Far: How a Deliberate Campaigning Approach in the Pacific Can Make Beijing Think Twice,” by Benjamin Van Horrick, War on the Rocks, June 5, 2023.
2. “Creating a Sea Change: TF 76/3, Adaptation, Experimentation, and the Joint Force,” by Steven Bancroft and Benjamin Van Horrick, Modern War Institute, March 1, 2023.

3. “The Complicated Legacy of Jean Larteguy’s “The Centurions” and America’s Post-9/11 Wars,” by Benjamin Van Horrick, Modern War Institute, August 30, 2023.
4. The Chinese Invasion Threat, by Ian Easton, Eastbridge Books, April 2019.

Jared Samuelson is Co-Host and Executive Producer of the Sea Control podcast. Contact him at [email protected].

This episode was edited and produced by Addison Pellerano.

Empowering Division Officers and Enhancing Sailor Stability

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Lt. Upton Wallace

There are two key areas that, if addressed strategically, can enhance the effectiveness of our Navy – empowerment of division officers and stability for our sailors.

The empowerment of division officers is critical yet undervalued in the U.S. Navy. In other branches of the military, officers at similar levels are given a broader scope of authority and responsibility, which fosters a more efficient chain of command and enhances leadership development. Division officers in the Navy should be afforded the same level of trust and autonomy. This can be achieved by reducing micromanagement, promoting a culture of calculated risk-taking and innovation, and providing clear guidelines on the extent and limits of their authority.

An empowered division officer can make quicker decisions, reduce red tape, and foster a more responsive and agile team. Most importantly, it enhances the leadership growth of these officers, preparing them for higher roles and responsibilities. It is crucial that we create an environment where our officers are trusted to lead and are given useful mandates for developing their leadership skills.

Secondly, we should address the issue of sailor stability. The frequent Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves can disrupt the personal lives of sailors and their families, affecting their morale and overall effectiveness. While we understand the operational need for such moves, a more strategic approach can mitigate the negative impacts.

Possible strategies include extending tour lengths where feasible, providing more predictable rotation schedules, and exploring options for geo-batching. This would allow sailors to achieve a better work-life balance, thereby enhancing their commitment and productivity. It is time the Navy gives more careful consideration to the human element of our operations, ensuring our sailors are not just effective, but also content and stable.

These two areas of focus – empowering division officers and enhancing sailor stability – are interconnected. A more empowered division officer will better understand and address the unique needs of their sailors, including their need for stability. More content and stable sailors will be more responsive to their officers, creating a more trusting and effective chain of command.

As we move into this new era of naval operations, we must ensure that our leadership structures and policies respect the realities of our personnel’s lives and the operational environment. By addressing these areas, we can foster a Navy that is not only effective in its operations, but also a more rewarding place to serve.

Lieutenant Upton Wallace is a division officer at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FRS (HSM-40) based in Mayport, Florida. Originally hailing from St. Andrew, Jamaica, Wallace began his Navy career in 2003, enlisting as an aviation structural mechanic, and advanced to the rank of aviation structural mechanic chief. In 2017, Wallace earned a commission through the Limited Duty Officer program. He has participated in Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Sixth Fleet operations responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Featured Image: EAST CHINA SEA (July 28, 2020) Chief Fire Controlman Reynard McNeil Jr., from San Diego, communicates with the combat information center prior to a close-in weapons system live-fire exercise aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Taylor DiMartino)

Counter China’s Goal of Displacing American Command of the Sea

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Robert C. Rubel

The Navy is the nation’s primary source of strategic thinking and advice on the role of the ocean in U.S. security. When the unity of the world ocean becomes a factor in U.S. security strategy, the Navy must “advise up” beyond its specific Title X responsibilities. It did this in the 1980s with the Maritime Strategy and again in 2007 with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Both efforts were successful in solving the problems that prompted their development, but both adhered to the structure of the Unified Command Plan that was established to provide command and control of power projection into Eurasia, which consisted of deterrence, influence, and actual use of military force when needed. This was consistent with the concept of containment in the Cold War and countering strategic instability in the post-Cold War world. Navy fleet design was oriented on power projection capability, both in the specific weapons carried by ships – primarily tactical aircraft and Tomahawk missiles – and in the number and types of ships in the battle force. 

The rise of China as a contender for global leadership presents a different kind of great power threat than the Soviet Union. China explicitly seeks global leadership with which it can restructure the existing order, which was established by Allied statesmen at the end of World War II to avert another world war. To support its goals, China is creating a navy that it hopes can directly challenge the U.S. Navy for supremacy on the world ocean, something the USSR never aspired to do. The combination of China’s economic and industrial power, and its sweeping global objectives, presents the U.S. with a new and more difficult challenge that previous approaches to security will not properly address.

The U.S. must adopt a new approach to defending the global order, one that is heavily based on maintaining and exercising global command of the sea. The current security strategy happens to be based on this superiority, but American command of the sea has been so complete for so long that it has become a background tacit assumption rather than explicit goal. That has to change, especially if the Navy is to develop a feasible and effective fleet design going forward.

Command of the sea is a strategic condition in which the weaker navy either cannot or will not directly challenge the stronger, a power balance that is relevant in both war and peace. In war it allows the nation to use the sea as necessary for operations, and in peace allows the nation to adopt policies on the use of the sea that are consistent with its national interests and values. If China succeeds in displacing the U.S. Navy as the preeminent naval power, it will likely impose a more authoritarian set of norms on the oceans, and trigger far-reaching consequences. Numerous elements of U.S. national security, economic relations, and foreign policy would be compromised.

It is not enough for the U.S. Navy to focus on projecting power ashore at specific times and places, supported by sea control. The Navy, in conjunction with allies, must create a capability to command the sea that China dares not challenge. This calls for capabilities and methods that are much more than just iterations upon current trends and legacy systems. The U.S. Navy must conduct urgent investigations and research into what novel capabilities and warfighting concepts can offer enduring command of the sea, and develop both a global maritime strategy and derivative fleet design based on the most promising approaches.

Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and professor emeritus of the Naval War College. He served on active duty in the Navy as a light attack/strike fighter aviator. At the Naval War College he served in various positions, including planning and decision-making instructor, joint education adviser, chairman of the Wargaming Department, and dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He retired in 2014, but on occasion continues to serve as a special adviser to the Chief of Naval Operations. He has published over thirty journal articles and several book chapters.

Featured Image: Sailors aboard the Chinese Navy guided-missile destroyer Dalian (Hull 105) line the deck at attention during a far-sea joint training drill in early April, 2023. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Yang Yunxiang)