African Maritime Forces Week

By Mr. Timothy Walker, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

Introduction

Developing robust regional maritime security mechanisms in Southern Africa necessitates greater emphasis on the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) strategic oversight and operational capacity. This paper briefly charts SADC’s maritime security strategy and architecture, spotlighting relevant geographic features, institutions, and challenges that complicate implementation and member-state engagement. It will conclude by offering several policy recommendations that can bolster the implementation of the SADC Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) in ways that complement existing structures and enhance multilateral efforts to improve maritime security.

SADC’s Institutional Framework

The Southern African Development Community is one of the eight Regional Economic Communities (REC) formally recognised by the African Union as a Regional Mechanism (RM) under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and thus entrusted with implementing continental peace and security mandates at the subregional level.¹ The APSA Protocol (2002) names RECs/RMs—among them SADC—as key instruments enhancing African peace and security, acting in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity

The United Nations Pact for the Future, adopted on September 22 2024, reinforces this mandate in Action 22 by calling on Member States to enhance cooperation at all levels to combat maritime threats and to promote information-sharing and capacity-building under international law.² By combining APSA’s subsidiarity principle with the Pact’s regional focus, Action 22 should encourage SADC member states to consider strengthening its ability to pursue strategic partnerships—with other RECs, the AU Commission, and UN bodies—to secure technical assistance, harmonise maritime laws, and integrate its security agencies into broader continental and global efforts.

Institutionally, SADC has evolved and endured, although the fruits of its engagement at sea remain relatively modest. SADC most recently adopted an IMSS in 2022.³ This comprehensive strategy was developed through a collaborative effort involving most of its member states at some stage. The IMSS aligns with the African Union’s (AU) 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy and the AU African Peace and Security Architecture, aiming to facilitate collective efforts to address a broad spectrum of maritime threats such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, and illegal fishing.

The Standing Maritime Committee (SMC), established in 1995, has steered the drafting of SADC strategies.⁴ This is SADC’s formal maritime platform, open to all SADC member states. It was established to maximise maritime military cooperation across Southern Africa, ensure mutual security to keep sea lines of communication open, develop and sustain regional maritime capabilities, and build the capacity to respond rapidly to emerging contingencies. The SMC is one of the standing committees of the operations (Ops) Sub-Sub-Committee (SSC), which falls under the Defence Sub-Committee (DSC). The DSC, in turn, reports to the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) as part of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security Cooperation (OPDSC).⁵

This structure has significant institutional implications, as the SMC is situated three bureaucratic layers deep. Consequently, naval issues often lack direct representation at higher decision-making levels. As a result, concerns from the SMC may be overlooked since their recommendations must navigate through the Army/land forces-centric Defence Sub-Committee before reaching the ISDSC and, ultimately, the OPDSC. This multi-layered bureaucracy can hinder timely responses to maritime crises and delay solutions.

The broader impetus for serious African maritime strategies came after Somali piracy surged southwards in the late 2000s. In 2009, just months after the African Union Head of State Summit in Sirte recognised piracy off Somalia as a continental crisis, SADC defence chiefs began discussing a regional response.

Yet littoral states relied almost exclusively on the Djibouti Code of Conduct (adopted January 29 2009) rather than a unified SADC plan, as well as the Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC), the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre (RMIFC) and the EU-funded MASE (Maritime Security) program to enable a cooperative, intelligence-led approach to maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.⁶ Despite repeated attacks in SADC waters from 2008 onwards, meaningful action only accelerated once South Africa itself felt it was being targeted—by then, it appears it was too late to galvanize sustained regional commitment through SADC.

The 2019-2022 IMSS significantly improved the initial framework established in 2011, which focused mainly on addressing the threat of Somali piracy in the Mozambique Channel. After implementing its first Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) in 2011—primarily reflecting South Africa’s priorities and considered a temporary measure—SADC recognised the need for a comprehensive review and broader regional consultation in 2016. A concept paper was commissioned in 2018, a Review Work Group convened in 2019 to draft a fully integrated MSS, and the SADC IMSS was officially adopted in 2022.⁷ Meanwhile, transnational threats such as heroin trafficking along the “Southern Route,” human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal fishing increased, often being addressed by initiatives led by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) rather than through SADC mechanisms.⁸

The 2011 SADC MSS was never formally promulgated as an official public document; it was treated as a classified sub-committee report. SADC has not publicly invoked UN frameworks that could bolster its mandate, at least not publicly. A 2012 UN report noted that SADC could manage local piracy threats if it developed the necessary maritime resources – encouragement that seems to have had little impact. By missing an opportunity to align a regional initiative with global commitments, SADC did not strengthen its maritime governance or contribute to broader international maritime security objectives.

Analysis of SMC minutes suggests that the SMC’s performance has depended heavily on each Chief of Navy’s institutional knowledge and dynamism. Newcomers must build relationships and learn procedures, meaning each leadership change risks rolling back work on key tasks.

Attendance and continuity have varied: political instability, budget constraints, and suspensions have led to uneven participation and occasional gaps in leadership when rotating chairmanships left little time to carry forward initiatives. By 2016, SMC minutes still flagged the same 2011 priorities: a regional Maritime Domain Awareness Centre, dedicated MSS funding, a vessel-reporting framework, and a permanent MSS coordinator at headquarters – indicating significant stagnation. Moreover, attendance has waxed and waned, possibly reflecting mutual indifference.

SADC’s Geopolitical and Geographic Challenges

Consensus-based SADC decision-making must accommodate very different national interests. SADC comprises 16 diverse member states, among which are ten coastal and island countries.⁹ The territory of some of the six landlocked countries borders and includes several of Africa’s ‘Great Lakes’ and rivers/waterways. Landlocked SADC member states also depend on neighbouring ports and infrastructure for their imports and exports and security at sea to keep costs down and revenue up.

SADC’s maritime geography gives it several obstacles to navigate, gives rise to many external geopolitical interests, and makes regional maritime security a critical concern beyond the region. It is more than simply a case of being located astride a major global shipping route. Many post-colonial boundaries are not yet agreed to, and former colonial powers dispute sovereignty over several islands. Calls for enhanced security, management and jurisdiction over the region’s offshore oil and gas deposits and fisheries have made maritime boundary delimitation a growing concern.¹⁰ Continental-shelf claims, and rising sea levels add further layers of potential dispute over maritime boundaries, many of which remain unresolved.

Operation Copper

After attacks in the Mozambique Channel in December 2010, Mozambique requested South African naval support. Under a 2011 Memorandum of Understanding and later a trilateral 2012 agreement adding Tanzania, Operation Copper deployed South African Navy (SAN) frigates and South African Air Force (SAAF) maritime patrol aircraft to Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique.¹¹ These continuous counter-piracy patrols were framed as being under a SADC mandate but were executed by South Africa, with only Mozambique (and briefly Tanzania) participating.¹² Moreover, under Operation Vikela, the SAN Valour Class frigate SAS Spioenkop (F147), with a Maritime Reaction Squadron (MRS) element aboard, was able to conduct barrier coastal patrols in the same area of operation for the SAMIM from March to May 2022.¹³

Although South Africa annually renews Operation Copper (due to expire in 2026), planning and reporting remain confined to South Africa’s Department of Defence (DoD) planning and reporting cycles.¹⁴ Targets and indicators appear only in South Africa’s Annual Performance Plan and Annual Report each fiscal year. Although framed as following from a SADC mandate, planning, preparation and employment (and reporting) remain almost entirely confined to South Africa’s defence cycles and bureaucracy, limiting regional buy‑in and transparency as well as inclusion of lessons learned or good practices into SADC’s maritime peace operations doctrines.

South Africa has struggled to deploy any naval vessels in recent years, and the necessity of continuing a counter-piracy patrol in an area of operations beset by multiple other threats, including violent extremism and terrorism, is increasingly debated.

Overcoming Capacity Constraints

Most SADC navies operate ageing fleets on minuscule budgets yet are tasked with covering vast patrol areas. Many of these vessels are not easily interoperable. Language barriers and doctrinal differences further complicate joint exercises: the last purely SADC maritime drill (Golfinho) occurred in 2009, although several riverine and special-forces exercises have been held.¹⁵ Major maritime exercises have been led by external partners such as the US. The Indian Navy held its first major maritime exercise with African countries in April 2025.¹⁶

Regional experience in the Gulf of Guinea shows how a Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) can evolve from political endorsement to concrete operations. At its 1128th session (December 19 2022), the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) welcomed efforts by naval chiefs in Port Harcourt to advance a Regional Maritime Task Force, marking a shift from policy talk to planning.¹⁷ This Task Force’s institutional development was aided by several Technical Committee meetings that laid out a Concept of Operations. Nigeria’s President Tinubu called in February 2025 for the AU to “prioritise the creation of a Combined Maritime Task Force”, and Nigeria’s offer to host its headquarters in Lagos further cemented political backing and resource pledges.¹⁸

While SADC has ratified and implemented regional fisheries and counter-terrorism agreements, their coordination with the standing maritime committee has lagged. A positive step is the Regional Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Coordination Centre in Maputo, operational since April 2023, strengthening data sharing and enforcement against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.¹⁹ This can be essential to creating a unified SADC Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Centre, which has been a standing item for almost two decades. EU’s Maritime Security (EU-funded) Program MASE and its Indian Ocean Regional Information System (IORIS) platform (developed under the Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific [CRIMARIO] project), India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), and a range of private-sector Automatic Identification System (AIS) providers each collect, process, and share maritime data under different frameworks, technologies, and governance arrangements. As a result, national agencies and regional stakeholders receive overlapping but non-identical situational awareness feeds, leading to gaps, delays, and conflicting interpretations that can complicate joint SADC operations.

Conclusion

While most Southern Africans formally endorse regionalism in maritime security, few have made sustained investments in SADC institutions. Despite an institutional anchorage dating to the mid-1990s aligned with continental frameworks and norms for peace and security, as well as two formal strategies adopted in 2011 and 2022, respectively, SADC’s ability to secure its extensive Atlantic and Indian Ocean littorals and become a more robust regional maritime security mechanism have remained limited.

Mr. Timothy Walker is a Senior Researcher at ISS Pretoria. Since 2011, he has championed maritime security as a critical policy priority, collaborating in shaping strategies that protect Africa’s vital maritime interests with key organisations like the African Union, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, and IORA. Timothy holds a master’s in political and international studies from Rhodes University, South Africa.

References

“Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) 2025 Inauguration.” Indian Ministry of Defence, April 13, 2025. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121521

“Annual Meeting of the Standing Maritime Committee.” South African Navy, March 13, 2023. http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Events/Annual-Meeting-Of-Standing-Maritime-Committee.aspx

“Communiqué: The 1128th Meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea.” PSC/PR/COMM.1128 (2022), December 19, 2022. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-the-1128th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-aupsc-on-maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea

Edmond, Patrick, Kristof Titeka, and Erik Kennes. “The DRC–Angola Offshore Oil Dispute: How Regime (In)Security Outweighs Sovereign Claims.” Journal of Southern African Studies 45, no. 5 (September 2019): 1–17.

“Exercise Golfinho, an Example for other Continental Brigades.” ISS Today. Accessed May 5, 2025. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/exercise-golfinho-an-example-for-other-continental-brigades

Haldar, Sayantan. “Prioritising Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indian Ocean.” Observer Research Foundation Expert Speak, December 18, 2024. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/prioritising-maritime-domain-awareness-in-the-indian-ocean

“Minister Sisulu signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Security Cooperation with Tanzania and Mozambique.” Government of South Africa, February 7, 2012. http://www.gov.za/news /media-statements/minister-sisulu-signs-memorandum-understanding-mou-maritime-security

“Maritime, Ports & Inland Waterways.” Southern African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/pillars/maritime-ports-inland-waterways

Martin, Guy. “Operation Copper now only with SA and Mozambique.” defenceWeb, March 20, 2014. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/operation-copper-now-only-with-sa-and-mozambique/

Marti, Guy. “SANDF Denies SAMIDRC Mission was a Failure as Withdrawal Begins.” defenceWeb, May 4, 2025. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/sandf-denies-samidrc-mission-was-a-failure-as-withdrawal-begins/

“Member States.” Southern African Development Community. https://www.sadc.int/member-states

“Mozambique duty for SAS Spioenkop.” defenceWeb, April 19, 2022. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/mozambique-duty-for-sas-spioenkop/

“Nigeria Calls for Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea at AU Summit; Navy to Provide Sea-lift Services.” State House Nigeria, February 16, 2025. https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/nigeria-calls-for-combined-maritime-task-force-for-the-gulf-of-guinea-at-au-summit-navy-to-provide-sea-lift-services/

“Operation Levante 2: A Regional Maritime Security Mission.” Indian Ocean Commission, August 26, 2024. https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/240823_Press-release-Levante2_ENG.pdf

“Pact for the Future.” Summit of the Future Outcome Documents. United Nations, September 2024. https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future

“Partnership to Counter Indian Ocean Drug Trafficking.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Accessed May 5, 2025. https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/partnership-to-counter-indian-ocean-drug-trafficking.html

Porto, João Gomes and Ulf Engel. “Imagining, Implementing, and Integrating the African Peace and Security Architecture: The African Union’s Challenges.” African Security 7, no. 3 (July–September 2014): 135-146.

“Ramaphosa Extends Operation Copper Maritime Security Deployment.” defenceWeb, April 11, 2025. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/ramaphosa-extends-operation-copper-maritime-security-deployment/

“SADC.” ISS African Futures. Accessed May 5, 2025. https://futures.issafrica.org/geographic/recs/sadc/.

“The SADC Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Coordination Centre – Set to Enter into Force in April 2023.” Stop Illegal Fishing, March 9, 2023. https://stopillegalfishing.com/news/the-sadc-fisheries-monitoring-control-and-surveillance-coordination-centre-set-to-enter-into-force-in-april-2023/

Walker, Timothy. “SADC’s Pursuit of Maritime Security in a Region Lacking Regionalism.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 47, no. 2 (June 2020): 51–68.

Wingrin, Dean. “South African Navy Calls for Regional Maritime Security Cooperation.” defenceWeb, September 11, 2024. https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/south-african-navy-calls-for-regional-maritime-security-cooperation/

Endnotes

[1] João Gomes Porto and Ulf Engel, “Imagining, Implementing, and Integrating the African Peace and Security Architecture: The African Union’s Challenges,” African Security 7, no. 3 (July–September 2014): 135-146.

[2] “Pact for the Future,” Summit of the Future Outcome Documents, United Nations, September 2024, https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future

[3] Dean Wingrin, “South African Navy Calls for Regional Maritime Security Cooperation,” defenceWeb, September 11, 2024, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/south-african-navy-calls-for-regional-maritime-security-cooperation/

[4] Timothy Walker, “SADC’s Pursuit of Maritime Security in a Region Lacking Regionalism,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 47, no. 2 (June 2020): 51–68.

[5] “Annual Meeting of the Standing Maritime Committee,” South African Navy, March 13, 2023, http://www.navy.mil.za/Pages/Events/Annual-Meeting-Of-Standing-Maritime-Committee.aspx

[6] “Operation Levante 2: A Regional Maritime Security Mission,” Indian Ocean Commission, August 26, 2024, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/240823_Press-release-Levante2_ENG.pdf

[7] Walker, “SADC’s Pursuit”, 62.

[8] “Partnership to Counter Indian Ocean Drug Trafficking,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed May 5, 2025, https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/partnership-to-counter-indian-ocean-drug-trafficking.html

[9] “Member States,” Southern African Development Community, accessed May 5, 2025, https://www.sadc.int/member-states

[10] Patrick Edmond, Kristof Titeca, and Erik Kennes, “The DRC–Angola Offshore Oil Dispute: How Regime (In)Security Outweighs Sovereign Claims,” Journal of Southern African Studies 45, no. 5 (September 2019): 1–17.

[11] “Minister Sisulu signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Security Cooperation with Tanzania and Mozambique,” Government of South Africa, February 7, 2012, http://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/minister-sisulu-signs-memorandum-understanding-mou-maritime-security

[12] Guy Martin, “Operation Copper now only with SA and Mozambique,” defenceWeb, March 20, 2014, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/security/maritime-security/operation-copper-now-only-with-sa-and-mozambique/

[13] “Mozambique duty for SAS Spioenkop,” defenceWeb, April 19, 2022, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/mozambique-duty-for-sas-spioenkop/

[14] “Ramaphosa extends Operation Copper maritime security deployment,” defenceWeb, April 11, 2025, https://www.defenceweb.co.za/african-news/ramaphosa-extends-operation-copper-maritime-security-deployment/

[15] “Exercise Golfinho, an Example for other Continental Brigades,” ISS Today, accessed May 5, 2025, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/exercise-golfinho-an-example-for-other-continental-brigades.

[16] “Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME) 2025 Inauguration,” Indian Ministry of Defence, April 13, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121521

[17] “Communiqué: The 1128th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea,” PSC/PR/COMM.1128 (2022), December 19, 2022, https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-the-1128th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-aupsc-on-maritime-security-in-the-gulf-of-guinea

[18] “Nigeria Calls for Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea at AU Summit; Navy to Provide Sea-lift Services,” State House Nigeria, February 16, 2025, accessed May 5, 2025, https://statehouse.gov.ng/news/nigeria-calls-for-combined-maritime-task-force-for-the-gulf-of-guinea-at-au-summit-navy-to-provide-sea-lift-services/

[19] “The SADC Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Coordination Centre – Set to Enter into Force in April 2023,” Stop Illegal Fishing, March 9, 2023, https://stopillegalfishing.com/news/the-sadc-fisheries-monitoring-control-and-surveillance-coordination-centre-set-to-enter-into-force-in-april-2023/

Featured Image: Officials are pictured at a SADC anti-corruption event, 2024. (SADC photo)

African Maritime Forces Week

By Dr. Christian Bueger, University of Copenhagen

Maritime security is a global responsibility. All nations, including those without coastal waters, depend on the sea for trade, food, energy, and digital communication. Safeguarding shipping, protecting energy infrastructures, subsea data cables and the marine environment, fighting pollution, illicit fishing and other blue crimes are tasks that require nations worldwide to work together.

The global distribution of resources, capital and expertise, post-colonial legacies, but also the roles that states are given under the law of the sea, imply that states perform different functions in providing maritime security. States have regulatory roles as coastal, port or flag states, in providing search and rescue services, but also in terms of the maritime industries within their jurisdictions, whether that is shipping, fishing, or energy production.¹

Some states, such as the small island nations of Cabo Verde and Seychelles are responsible for managing and safeguarding enormous maritime zones, with very limited resources. Other states, such as Congo, Mozambique or Somalia, are witnessing violence, are recovering from armed conflict, or deal with severe economic problems, and struggle to prioritize effective governance of the sea. This implies significant gaps in capacity – whether in terms of institutions, staff, equipment, technology or expertise – leading to situations where states de facto cannot control, govern and protect activities in their maritime zones.

While all nations benefit from the sea in one way or another, the income gained from the oceans is heavily concentrated. Research has documented that 60 per cent of the wealth generated by the sea ends up in the hands of only 100 corporations.² The revenues from these corporations benefit only a few powerful states economically. This implies that these ocean economies have the responsibility to make strong contributions to safeguard the seas.

Also, maritime security and safety risks are unequally distributed. For example, large proportions of global ship traffic pass by the island states of Mauritius and Madagascar, implying severe risks of accidents and oil spills that can devastate the marine environment. Since ships enjoy freedom of navigation and do not stop in the island ports, these nations face high risks, but zero benefits.

Maritime spaces are interdependent, and so are blue crimes. As the Evergreen accident in the Suez Canal highlighted, a maritime incident in a strategic location can have large scale repercussions for world trade and global supply chains.³ Blue crimes, such as piracy, illicit fishing, the smuggling of narcotics or of people take place across states and regions and have trans-regional and often global effects.⁴ Moreover, in international waters all states that have signed, or comply with, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea have the “obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment” (Article 192).

While maritime security is a global responsibility, given the unequal distribution of territories, capabilities, risks and revenues burden sharing is required. In Africa many nations need support in providing maritime security, while not undermining their sovereignty and regional integration processes. This creates at least three major challenges: Problems linked to (1) how to deal with multi-level governance, (2) how to render capacity building effective, and (3) how to mitigate potential tensions of militarization.

Recalibrating the Maritime Security Multi-Level Governance System

Maritime security is an object of a quite complicated international regime complex. At which level maritime security is best provided is debatable. While the national level is obviously pivotal, most maritime security issues are transnational in character. On a global scale, more than twenty global international organizations deal with maritime security as a recent report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has documented.⁵ This includes the ‘big five’ of international maritime security agencies: the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which each address maritime security from a different mandate.

Also, a wide range of regional cooperation mechanisms deal with maritime security. ‘Terrestrially’ organized regional organizations, such as the African Union or Africa’s regional economic communities have outlined maritime strategies and programmes. ‘Aquatic-oriented’ regional organizations addressing maritime security include those established under the Regional Seas Conventions supported by UNEP⁶ – the Abidjan, Nairobi, Jedda and Barcelona Conventions –, dedicated maritime security arrangements – such as the Djibouti and Yaoundé Code of Conduct facilitated by the IMO – or issue-specific regional organizations, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission supported by FAO. Mini- and bi-lateral cooperation, such as the jointly managed maritime zone between Mauritius and Seychelles, complement the picture.

Such governance arrangements can significantly overlap and create the risks of duplication or interface conflicts between organizations. Is a problem such as illicit fishing best addressed through a global mechanism (e.g., the Food and Agricultural Organization), through a terrestrial-oriented body, such as the African Union, a dedicated maritime body, such as the Indian Ocean Commission’s Maritime Security (MASE) architecture operative in the Western Indian Ocean, or by an issue-specific regional body, such as the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission?

Moreover, is African maritime security provision best organized in continental terms – through pan-African mechanisms – or better approached through the lenses of ‘African seas’ with dedicated arrangements for the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean? And what happens if regional actors or international donors prefer one arrangement over the other, or, even worse, sideline and ignore one another?

These questions escape easy answers. Transparency and information sharing between organizations, and considerations of the principle of subsidiarity can be key to addressing them. Informal formats such as the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) for the Western Indian Ocean, or the G7++ coordination mechanism in the Gulf of Guinea can play very important roles in facilitating the needed transparency, information sharing, and strategic dialogues.

Informal maritime security governance arrangements that do not draw on formal legal treaties or have standing secretariats are often beneficial, since they allow for flexibility and experimentation, and avoid lengthy negotiations.

However, informality comes at a price. It often implies a lack of accountability – participants cannot be held accountable for their (in)actions. Moreover, the absence of formal rules for membership implies that important stakeholders might be excluded, and the lack of permanent administration can limit efficiency and the buildup of specialized expertise over time.

While this calls for efforts at formalizing cooperation, cases such as the failure to ratify the 2016 ‘African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa’ (known as the Lomé Charter) illustrate that formalization and treaty making is not an easy process, either. Hence, careful and realistic calibration between formal and informal cooperation across different regional constructions is necessary.

Learning to Learn: Capacity Building Traps

The global responsibility to protect the sea under the condition of unequal distribution of revenues and risks implies that states benefiting from the ocean economy have a duty to assist through capacity building and technical assistance. Capacity building aims at enabling states and regions in performing crucial maritime security functions and developing their potential to govern the sea. Yet, research has shown that successful delivery of capacity building is full of intricacies.⁷

Project cycles of two to three years and emphasis on ‘low hanging fruits’ – short-term workshops, exercises or provision of equipment – can imply that there is limited focus on sustainability and long-term maintenance of capabilities. Donors bring with them their own priorities, idealized ways and institutional preferences of how maritime security challenges should be handled. They might prefer one agency over another, leading in the worst cases to organizational rivalry or political disruption. Capacity building is always a political intervention and hence implies effects on national and regional power constellations or might be perceived as threatening national sovereignty and hence evoke resistance. Some donors might, moreover, directly pursue commercial or political interests in providing capacity building, such as market development, arms trades, or countering the political influence of another state.

Such challenges are not easily overcome and hence place severe restrictions on what can be achieved through capacity building. Yet, success stories such as the building of the MASE structures by the Indian Ocean Commission supported by the European Union, or country cases, such as Seychelles, that have successfully disrupted piracy,⁸ illustrate the significant benefits that capacity building can bring, nonetheless.

The Militarization Dilemma: Avoiding Geopolitical Tensions 

Not all gaps can be addressed through capacity building. Sustainable capacity building takes time. Human resources can be constrained. Maritime security threats can escalate to a scale that they become impossible to handle operationally by one state alone, as was the case with piracy off the coast of Somalia, or the increase in narcotics trade in the South Atlantic or Western Indian Ocean. High sea crimes demand international action.

To live up to their obligations, global ocean powers and other states need to directly contribute to maritime security through operations at sea. Since most coast guards and maritime police forces lack the capabilities to operate far from their home shore or stay out for prolonged periods at sea, operations usually require the employment of naval forces.

The use of high-end military forces leads to a dilemma.⁹ More military forces enhance maritime security on the one side. Their presence strengthens law enforcement and surveillance at sea and provides more robust deterrence of maritime crime. Indeed, military operations, including by the European Union’s Operation Atalanta and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, have been vital in curbing piracy off the coast of Somalia or in fighting the maritime narcotics trade.

Yet, on the other side, the employment of naval forces is also a form of power projection and geopolitical signaling. Growing numbers of military vessels in regional seas, while beneficial for fighting maritime crimes, can lead to growing tensions or even escalatory dynamics. They also might undermine national sovereignty and lead to unintended dependencies or claims to permanent bases if countries are too reliant on outside military forces. Effective mechanisms of confidence building and deconfliction are vital to mitigate this challenge.

Navigating the Challenges: A Maritime Security Clearing House?

Translating the global responsibility to protect the sea into action requires innovative approaches to these complex challenges. Raising awareness among African nations and their international partners is fundamental. High-level attention must focus on recalibrating governance structures, ensuring the sustainability of capacity building, and mitigating tensions arising from militarization. Information sharing that enhances transparency and builds confidence is essential. This necessitates effective clearing house mechanisms that not only facilitate these processes but simultaneously promote ocean literacy and maritime domain awareness.

Formats such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings or the Indian Ocean Commission’s Regional Operational Coordination Center are important instances of a growing number of operational mechanisms and maritime domain awareness centers aim at facilitating this flow of information. Yet, equal efforts are needed at strategic, diplomatic, and political levels. The revitalization of the Sea Power for Africa Symposium in 2024 and ambitions to initiate a pan-African coastguard functions forum are important steps in this direction. The question of whether maritime security is best addressed at a terrestrial continental pan-African level or through regional seas cooperation in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean Sea, however, needs serious consideration.

Acknowledgments: Research for this article has benefitted from support by the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group funded by the Velux Foundation.

Dr. Christian Bueger is a professor of international relations at the University of Copenhagen, where he leads the ocean infrastructure research group, and a research fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). He is the author of Understanding Maritime Security (Oxford University Press, 2024, with Timothy Edmunds). He has explored questions of international security and the sea in over 200 publications. In his current research he is investigating global maritime security governance and the challenges of critical maritime infrastructure protection. Further information is available on his personal website at www.bueger.info.

Endnotes 

1. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024).

2. J. Virdin, T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner, “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy,” Science Advances 7, eabc8041 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

3. Nguyen Khoi Tran, Hercules Haralambides, Theo Notteboom, and Kevin Cullinane, “The Costs of Maritime Supply Chain Disruptions: The Case of the Suez Canal Blockage by the ‘Ever Given’ Megaship,” International Journal of Production Economics 279 (2025), 109464, doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2024.109464.

4. Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea,” Marine Policy 119 (2020),104067. doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

5. Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger, “Securing the Seas: A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

6. Elizabeth Mendenhall, “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program,” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

7. Christian Bueger, “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit,” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no.2 (2019): 149–56; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Understanding Maritime Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024), 180-187.

8. Christian Bueger, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon, “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles,” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

9. Christian Bueger and Jan Stockbruegger, “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma,” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

References

Bueger, Christian and Jan Stockbruegger. “Maritime Security and the Western Indian Ocean’s Militarisation Dilemma.” African Security Review 31, no. 2 (2022): 195-210, doi: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2053556.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. “Blue Crime: Conceptualising Transnational Organised Crime at Sea.” Marine Policy 119 (2020): 1040670, doi: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104067.

Bueger, Christian and Timothy Edmunds. Understanding Maritime Security. Oxford University Press, 2024.

Bueger, Christian, Ryan Adeline, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Anti-piracy Lessons from the Seychelles.” War on the Rocks, April 23, 2024. https://warontherocks.com/2024/04/anti-piracy-lessons-from-the-seychelles/

Bueger, Christian, Timothy Edmunds, and Jan Stockbruegger. “Securing the Seas. A Comprehensive Assessment of Global Maritime Security. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2024. https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Securing_the_seas_web-1.pdf

Bueger, Christian. “Maritime Security and the Capacity Building Challenge: Introducing the SafeSeas Best Practice Toolkit.” Seychelles Research Journal 1, no. 2 (2019): 149–56.

Mendenhall, Elizabeth. “The Limits of Marine Regionalism in Global Ocean Governance: the UNEP Regional Seas Program.” in The Politics of Global Ocean Regions, ed. Christian Bueger, Elizabeth Mendenhall, Rebecca Strating. Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming.

Virdin, J. T. Vegh, J.-B. Jouffray, R. Blasiak, S. Mason, H. Österblom, D. Vermeer, J. Wachtmeister, and N. Werner. “The Ocean 100: Transnational Corporations in the Ocean Economy.” Science Advances 7 (2021). DOI:10.1126/sciadv.abc8041

Featured Image: A boarding team undertakes an operation as part of the simulated exercise in Seychelles. (Photo via UNODC/Global Maritime Crime Programme)