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Do You Have To Do “Analysis” To Call It A Wargame? Actually, No.

By BJ Armstrong and Marcus Jones

“If my career were ahead instead of behind me, I should endeavor to the extent of my ability, and at the earliest opportunity, to acquire as thorough a knowledge of the principles of the art of war as possible, and should neglect no opportunity to train myself in their application by playing competitive war games.” –Admiral William Sims, 1921

With enemy destroyers approaching from the southern end of the Philippine archipelago, the commander faced a critical decision: Should he launch a risky strike with his dwindling VLS weapon supply, or chart a course eastward to evade and regroup in the vast Pacific for a future battle?

This scenario was the challenge for a Midshipman Fourth Class, serving as the commander of American forces in a recent wargame hosted by the Naval Academy Wargaming Society in collaboration with Bancroft Hall’s training program. Facilitated by CDR Ken Maroon, PhD, these combat scenarios in and around the contemporary South China Sea have become a staple of Saturday mornings in the Wargaming Lab beneath Mahan Hall. Acting as part of a makeshift Maritime Operations Center, Naval Academy Plebes in this scenario not only reinforced their professional knowledge of American naval forces, but also grappled with the complexities of naval decision-making and critical thinking in a dynamic, high-pressure environment.

Phil Pournelle’s recent article “Does it Matter if You Call It a Wargame? Actually, Yes,” calls on CIMSEC readers and the larger military and national security community to consider the taxonomy of how we think about the events that are commonly called “wargames.” He offers vital distinctions and a way to think about the teleology of exercises that often fall into a rather large kitchen sink. However, there is an important element of the wargaming enterprise which is overlooked, when the focus is only on analysis and the operations research outcomes that good wargames can provide, but not their education value.

Educational wargaming is not merely an exercise in concept development in the upper reaches of command. It is a crucible for forging the decision-making skills, adaptability, and intellectual overmatch required for contemporary naval challenges in the earliest stages of a young officer’s development. Wargaming, particularly at the pre-commissioning level, transforms the learning experience by engaging participants in narrative-rich, synthetic environments that mimic the pressures of real-world decision-making. Drawing on historical precedents and recent innovations, we see a central role of wargaming in cultivating the next generation of naval leaders at the U.S. Naval Academy. 

More Than Concept Development and Analysis

Since the 19th century, wargaming has been an invaluable educational tool for the U.S. military. Early efforts, including Kriegspiele at U.S. Army schools after the Civil War, were followed by Lieutenant McCarty Little’s development of a wargaming curriculum in the early years of the U.S. Naval War College. Later, the interwar games conducted there shaped the strategies and tactics for victory in the Pacific during World War II and were transformative not only because they tested operational concepts but because they prepared commanders for the cognitive and emotional challenges of command. This historical precedent underscores the enduring value of wargaming in creating synthetic experiences that sharpen the mind for future crises.

In the 21st century as they did then, these efforts offer a low-cost, low-risk environment for naval professionals to test tactics, strategies, and operational concepts, shape their knowledge of past and contemporary military scenarios, and condition their decisions within them. At USNA, a host of recent initiatives have laid the keel of our midshipmen’s knowledge of the maritime world and established their understanding of the core concepts of American seapower.

The Naval Academy is doubling down on the educational value of wargames through Saturday morning battalion training sessions, the activities of the student-led Wargaming Society club, wargame scenarios in history department classrooms, and the incorporation of wargame modules into the new Maritime Warfare (NS300) course taught by the Professional Development Department.

The resurgence of wargaming in military education over the past decade underscores its value in achieving an intellectual overmatch against today’s potential adversaries. In 2015, then Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus described wargaming as invaluable for testing new ideas in a low-risk environment. Former Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger later emphasized that wargaming is essential for practicing decision-making against a thinking enemy, while then-Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown highlighted the role of wargaming in adapting continually to a shifting global strategic landscape. ​Despite this, current military education often delays wargaming exposure until mid-career, resulting in missed opportunities for developing decision agility and professional competency from the outset of a naval professional’s development.

Introducing wargaming at the pre-commissioning level lays the groundwork to address the Department of the Navy’s admitted deficiency in wargaming literacy at the operational and strategic levels of war. By introducing the practice of wargaming as early as possible in an officer’s development, we cultivate a mindset that embraces complex, multi-layered, competitive decision-making and innovative thinking about enduring military problems and concepts. Early exposure also mitigates later-career reliance on professional civilian wargamers and facilitates the operational integration of wargaming principles into military organizations. This in turn enhances the role and value of wargaming later in officers’ careers.

Laying the keel with early wargaming experiences embeds key cognitive attributes in young officers, preparing them to think deeply and creatively about history and its relation to contemporary warfare. The initiatives at USNA introduce midshipmen to the complexities of naval decision-making early in their careers, fostering the critical thinking and adaptability essential for future operational challenges. By embedding these skills at the pre-commissioning level, USNA prepares its graduates to contribute meaningfully to advanced wargaming processes later in their careers.

Wargaming as Interdisciplinary Thinking and Applied History

The educational program at USNA is admirably multidisciplinary, with particular focus on the study of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM). Integrating wargaming into this educational framework puts specific aspects of STEM education into context, demonstrating how these disciplines contribute to the multi-domain operations of today’s Joint Force. For example, understanding hypersonic technology’s impact on military operations or how cyber capabilities enable traditional land, sea, and air operations provides a deeper and broader understanding of modern warfare. Additionally, wargaming offers invaluable practical applications for the disciplines of math and economics by highlighting the central role of risk and probability in the adjudication at the heart of wargame processes, allowing midshipmen to apply theoretical concepts to real-world strategic and tactical scenarios.

Done well, educational wargaming serves as a form of applied history, offering midshipmen a unique way to engage with historical events, processes, causation, and outcomes. By building and working through historical scenarios, students develop a deeper understanding of the complexity and contingency of historical decision-making, amplifying their growth as leaders at every level. Midshipmen learn to ask the hard questions and wrestle with complex answers in ways that apply both to thinking about the past and reasoning through the operational and strategic challenges of the present.

Critical thinking and decision-making skills are, of course, buzzwords of the moment in higher education generally and officer development especially. More than just asking hard questions, however, thinking critically involves being willing to explore disruptive and alternative ideas. The process of designing, playing, and analyzing wargames requires students to think strategically, anticipate opponents’ moves, and make quick, informed decisions under pressure. These skills are directly transferable to real-world military and civilian leadership roles, where effective decision-making can have significant consequences. Of course, poorly designed scenarios can reinforce false assumptions or oversimplify complex realities, leading to flawed conclusions. As Peter Perla warns, the danger lies in creating narratives that are emotionally compelling but factually misleading.

To maximize their educational value, wargames must strike a careful balance between realism and abstraction, ensuring that participants grapple with the uncertainty and complexity of real-world operations without succumbing to simplistic or sanitized portrayals. Moving forward, wargaming activities at the Naval Academy must remain engaged with the Fleet’s contemporary posture and challenges, lest the practice of wargaming become abstract and fall into irrelevance.

Charting a Course on the Severn

Wargaming has a long history on the banks of the Severn River, though perhaps not as long as in Narragansett Bay. In the 1930s and 1960s, Naval Academy professors developed wargames for class use to enhance historical and contemporary understanding. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Academy relied on computer-based Navy Tactical Game (NAVTAG) to provide valuable opportunities for professional development and competition between companies and classes. The NAVTAG provided both educational and training simulation opportunities to the Brigade, but was sunset because of lack of financial and technical resources with the end of the Cold War.

In 2020, the Naval Academy Museum and History Department launched a wargaming initiative which created two main lines of effort. For a few years the History Department offered an experimental historical wargaming class, where midshipmen intensively studied an historical scenario and developed a wargame based on it. Concurrently, the Combat Action Lab was established, an Extra-Curricular Activity (ECA) today called The Wargaming Society, for Midshipmen to engage with the practice in an informal, midshipman-led setting. These efforts have developed over four years to include professional development events on Saturday mornings and the introduction of contemporary wargaming problems as the crowning experience in the new Maritime Warfare course. Efforts to bring these and other multidisciplinary lines of effort together, with the necessary resourcing and organizational structure, offer much promise for a robust future wargaming enterprise at USNA.

When today’s naval professionals and veterans think of wargaming, they often map it to operations research analysis, Pentagon decision-making, and mid-to-senior career development. There is great value in the analytical games, as described by CDR Anthony LaVopa in his recent article “Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alpha Wargaming Experience,” and in their staff and war college level use. But, wargames are ‘story-living experiences’ that transcend traditional methods of teaching and analysis at all levels of seniority and experience including at the precommissiong level. By immersing participants in synthetic environments where decisions have tangible consequences, they provide a powerful means of cultivating the intellectual and emotional resilience essential for leadership in today’s demanding operational environments. As the U.S. Naval Academy continues to expand its wargaming initiatives, it is laying the keel for a generation of officers prepared to confront the uncertainties of a rapidly changing strategic landscape.

Captain Benjamin “BJ” Armstrong, PhD is an Associate Professor of War Studies and Naval History and the U.S. Naval Academy. 

Dr. Marcus Jones is an associate professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy.

The thoughts and opinions expressed by the authors of this article are offered in their personal and academic capacities and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of the U.S. Navy or any government agency. 

Featured Image: U.S. 5TH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Jan. 1, 2013) An F/A-18C Hornet of the Warhawks of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 97 launches from the aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kenneth Abbate/Released)

Notes to the New Administration Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

For the past week, CIMSEC featured a series of submissions sent in response to our Call for Articles for short notes on what the new U.S. administration can consider to strengthen American naval power, reinforce alliances, and compete effectively against great powers. Authors examined a multitude of issues and offered recommendations for reform. From shipbuilding shortfalls to competing with China, to reinforcing alliances and strengthening logistics, the new administration faces many challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain. 

Below are the authors that featured during this series. We thank them for their contributions.

Prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for Protracted War against China,” by Walker Mills

“There is no reason the U.S. military should expect a conflict with the PRC to be short, or to be won quickly. Rather, history tells us the opposite. Why would we expect the world’s most populous country and the second-largest economy to back down after only the opening salvo of a war it started, even if the opening round went poorly?”

Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” by Captain Robert C. Rubel, USN (ret.)

The Naval War College was the critical engine that drove the warfighting education of the officer corps that designed, perfected, and fought the fleet that produced victory at sea in World War II. But today, the college has become moribund in terms of its relevance to the emerging warfare environment.”

U.S. Ground Forces Can Check Chinese Naval Advantage Now,” by Brian Kerg

While it may take the U.S. years to build a single ship, it can raise, man, and equip ground forces optimized for operations on key maritime terrain at the speed of relevance, raising minimally required forces in under a year. Such forces, once raised, can achieve asymmetric and decisive strategic deterrent effects through permanent deployment to decisive points within the territory of U.S. allies such as Japan and the Philippines, and partners such as Taiwan.”

The Best of Both Worlds: Educating Future Navy Officers,” by Claude Berube

The Navy should have one commissioning source – the U.S. Naval Academy. But it should be adapted to benefit from other educational programs and experiences domestically.”

Fill the Vacuum: Establish a Sustained Naval Presence in the Yellow Sea,” by William Martin

In recent years, China has increased its aggressive activity in this vital maritime lane, to the detriment of U.S. interests, the security of allies, and the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies must increase force presence along this key maritime terrain to disrupt PLA confidence in freely maneuvering through these waters as they conduct operations counter to U.S. interests.”

Found in Translation: Bolster U.S. Coalition Warfighting by Fixing the Linguist Shortfall,” by Benjamin Van Horrick

Linguists will serve as an invaluable link in the killchain during wartime. All available assets from across the coalition must be brought to bear to make sense of the environment, prosecute targets, and support maneuver in all forms. Linguists will minimize friction and the fog of war as coalition members shorten the time between sensing and striking a target – no matter what country the capabilities originate from.”

ESBs for Intermediate Naval Lift in Support of Expeditionary Operations,” by Major Christopher “Pink Sheets” Lowe, USMC

To increase the capability of the naval expeditionary force to meet the demands across the global maritime commons and in non-permissive maritime environments, the Navy should acquire at least 30 Lewis B Puller (ESB-3)-class Expeditionary Mobile Base ships.”

A High-Low Naval Portfolio: Maximize Strategic Returns with Balanced Force Design,” by Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

“To remain both cost-effective and globally engaged, the U.S. Navy needs a balanced mix of high-end capital ships and smaller, more economical vessels, even if the latter are inherently less armed and defended. This tradeoff is not only acceptable but strategically beneficial, given the Navy’s role in day-to-day operations.”

An Investment in the U.S. Navy is an Investment in Prosperity,” by Sam J. Tandgredi

The U.S. Navy has a purpose that goes beyond warfighting. It is a critical geo-economic instrument that through global naval dominance helps sustain the U.S. dollar as the world reserve currency. An investment in naval dominance is an investment in continued prosperity. Without it our future will be poorer.”

Refocus on Warfighting To Boost Recruiting and Retention,” by Karl Flynn

Make America’s youth want to serve by clearly stating our national security imperatives, minimize distractions from core warfighting functions, and eliminate all lowered standards.”

Reconsider Red Sea Risk: Revealing U.S. Navy Air and Missile Defense Capability to China,” by Clay Robinson

“China’s relatively unfettered access to significant quantities of data on U.S. combat engagements, and their ability to glean the capabilities and limitations of critical U.S. Navy air and missile defense capabilities, may represent a far greater boon for them in the long run.”

Work with Allies to Strengthen Deterrence against China,” by Michael Tkacik

It is increasingly clear that China has the advantage in a long war, making the current state of deterrence untenable. Therefore, the U.S. must seek partners to increase the costs of Chinese revisionism and augment U.S. capabilities.”

Build Containerized Missile Ships for Rapid and Affordable Fleet Growth,” by Captain R. Robinson Harris, USN (ret.) and Colonel T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret.)

There is a solution that is faster and more affordable – purchase used merchant container ships and outfit them with containerized missiles, drones, and other modular capabilities.”

Balance AUKUS and Amphibious Fleet Readiness,” by Chris Huff

While a strategic success with long-term benefits, AUKUS has introduced challenges due to increased costs, resource competition, and extended production timelines for Virginia– and Columbia-class submarines. These issues have adversely affected the Navy’s amphibious fleet, undermining the Marine Corps’ ability to maintain readiness and execute its vital global responsibilities.”

It is Time for a New Maritime Strategy,” by Peter Dombrowski

An ambitious new maritime strategy will help the Navy raise more resources, generate positive attention from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and win appropriate congressional guidance to set the Navy on the right course for the coming decade. If the Navy is to meet the pacing threat posed by the PLA Navy, it must rally public support, galvanize Congress, and convince the world that the United States fully remains the world’s premier naval power.”

Invest in Sustainment Capabilities to Increase Combat Credibility,” by Joseph Mroszczyk

The new administration must urgently focus its efforts on strengthening the U.S. military’s combat credibility in the Western Pacific through investments in capabilities that enable at-sea and distributed logistics. To deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from aggression against Taiwan, the U.S. military must demonstrate it can effectively sustain combat at great distances and across a distributed force.”

Rebuild Commercial Maritime Might to Restore U.S. Sea Power,” by Commander Ander S. Heiles, USN

The administration faces an urgent choice – continue America’s narrow focus on naval power or comprehensively rebuild the commercial capability Mahan identified as essential to national power. By restoring the balance between combat and commercial maritime capabilities, the U.S. can secure its position in the era of great power competition.”

It is Time for a Real Maritime Strategy: Focus on Shipbuilding, Seafaring, and Sway,” by Christopher Costello

The United States needs a true, comprehensive maritime strategy. It takes the form of an interconnected effort that recognizes that seapower does not flow from naval power alone and the conditions under which the U.S. developed into a great maritime power have shifted. Readjustment is necessary.”

It is Time to Build Small Warships,” by Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato

“Scholars and engineers at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed a bi-modal fleet concept featuring a mix of small sea denial and large sea control vessels to correct this weakness. The key to implementing this strategy is the LMACC, or Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability.”

The Specter of Tariffs and the Revival of the U.S. Merchant Marine,” by Ben Massengale

Imposition of those tariffs could provide a window of opportunity to revive the U.S. Merchant Marine by making foreign vessels less competitive in conducting trade in the U.S. This could be done by granting cargo imported by U.S.-flagged vessels a reduced tariff to not only compensate for the additional cost it takes to operate an American ship, but also making its operations significantly more profitable than its foreign competitors.”

Develop Strategies to Counter China’s Gray Zone Tactics,” by Roshan Kulatunga

China’s approach involves a systematic infiltration of various sectors, including technology, academia, media, and even political domains, to gather intelligence and insights into the strategies of possible adversaries. This multifaceted approach allows China to build a nuanced understanding of U.S. capabilities and intentions while subtly undermining them.”

Strengthen America’s Maritime Borders,” by David Ware

What is concerning today is that the DHS intelligence and enforcement posture for national security purposes, for both large and small vessels, appears to have taken a backseat to focus strictly on immigration concerns. This creates a maritime security opening for adversaries to exploit.”

Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture,” by Francis Crozier

The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment.”

Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power,” by Jason Lancaster

A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image:  Ships and submarines participating in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise sail in formation in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands July 27, 2012. (U.S. Navy Photo)

Legislate New Fleet Acts for a Generational Investment in Naval Power

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Jason Lancaster

The Navy’s annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan should be replaced with a congressionally-appropriated fleet act. This act would fund the construction of the fleet the nation needs. Over the past 10 years of annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans the fleet has shrank, not grown. U.S. shipbuilders lack the capability to build the required ships because there is little consistency in U.S. warship procurement.

Annual budget changes destroy consistency in the annual 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. The table below displays the ever-shrinking fleet. The fleet in fiscal year (FY) 27 and 44 are highlighted. FY44 was used instead of FY49 for consistency throughout the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans.

During the late 19th century and early 20th century, the United States, Imperial Germany, and AustriaHungary used fleet acts to fund desired force designs. Congress funded the Two-Ocean Navy Act in 1940 to expand the fleet by more than 70 percent. One would think that the imperial governments of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary would only have to persuade their Kaiser, but both nations’ Chiefs of Navy had to have their shipbuilding plans approved by their respective parliaments.

The Two-Ocean Navy Act of 1940 provides a framework for a similar congressional act. In 1940, Congress authorized:

(a) Capital ships, 385,000 tons
(b) Aircraft carriers, 200,000 tons
(c) Cruisers, 420,000 thousand tons
(d) Destroyers, 250,000 tons
(e) Submarines, 70,000 tons

This act provided significant funding for ships, munitions, and shipyard expansions. It would help give the Navy a running start on wartime expansion by the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor more than a year later.

In Imperial Germany, Admiral Tirpitz proposed a fleet act that requested a Navy of a certain size. This plan assumed a replacement ship for each battleship after it reached 25 years of service life. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were passed in 1898, 1900, 1908, and 1912. Tirpitz’ Fleet Acts were based principally on assessments of the UK Royal Navy’s strength and requirements to defend overseas colonies.

Austria-Hungary had a similar system. After Italy began building battleships, Admiral Montecuccoli’s initial fleet plan was denied due to domestic politics. Admiral Montecuccoli eventually persuaded a shipyard to produce the first two ships. He secured a personal loan of 32 million Austrian Crowns to begin construction on the Viribis Unitis and Tegethoff while promising the government would procure the ships the following year.

The Austro-Hungarian Navy dealt with partisan politics. Montecuccoli was an expert at balancing political factions to accomplish his fleet plan. Czech delegates publicly voted against the Navy bill for partisan reasons, but privately supported it. The Czech company Skoda Works produced steel armor and battleship guns, offering well-paying jobs for Bohemia and Moravia, but the central government was antagonistic toward Czech independence.

Today, we have witnessed the Navy attempt to back out of block buys designed to reduce cost because annual DoD budgets did not support additional ships for the navy. A fleet act would provide the steady demand signal for ships that would enable companies to invest in required materials to sustain affordable shipbuilding for the long term.

It took decades for the Navy to reach this state. It will take steady and consistent funding to return the Navy to its desired size. A fleet act could provide a more viable mechanism for adjusting the Navy’s force structure and making a generational investment in naval power compared to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, which has lost much of its usefulness.

Commander Jason Lancaster, USN, is a student at the National War College. He has served at sea in destroyers, amphibious ships, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an instructor at the Surface Warfare Officers School, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: 1994 – A view of various ships under construction at the Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard, Pascagoula, Mississippi. Front to back are the guided missile cruiser Port Royal (CG-73), the guided missile destroyer Stout (DDG-55) and the guided missile destroyer Mitscher (DDG-57). Inboard of Stout is the guided missile destroyer Ramage (DDG-61) and inboard of Mitscher is the guided missile destroyer Russell (DDG-59). (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Reassess the Navy’s Global Force Posture

Notes to the New Administration Week

By Francis Crozier

Time and time again the Navy seems to have to reckon with three irreconcilable questions:

1. What does the Navy want to do with its global reach?
2. What legitimate global interests does the Navy have?
3. Does the Navy have the logistical capability to stay in proximity to those interests?

Issues like these have stood out during Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led effort to protect international shipping passing through the Red Sea. Two issues in particular stand out, with the first being the problems faced by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the second being the regular retasking and deployment extensions of warships.

The MSC backbone for fleet replenishment is often understaffed and underfunded, with few oilers in the 5th fleet area of responsibility. USNS Alan Shepard and USNS Big Horn were taken out of action after running aground in May and September of last year, leaving only USNS Amelia Earhart to replenish coalition and U.S. warships.

The Navy is fortunate to have the ability to contract private oilers on short notice that are U.S.-Navy certified and capable of refueling warships at sea. But this service comes at triple the cost of contracting MSC oilers and cannot always be relied upon if a large naval conflict were to kick off. The MSC also cannot support a global Navy with global reach if it is actively sidelining vessels to ensure proper manning to those ships it deems critical to sustain operations. Contracting private oilers is a stop-gap and not a permanent solution.

Second, Operation Prosperity Guardian required repeated retasking of critical assets from theaters where arguably the U.S. has greater strategic interests. In order to allow the Eisenhower CSG to return to Norfolk, covering the Red Sea required retasking the Theodore Roosevelt CSG from her deployment to the 7th Fleet area of responsibility. The Abraham Lincoln CSG was also retasked to the Middle East before they even entered the 7th fleet AOR. These decisions left no operating CSG in the 7th fleet for the first time since 2001, despite repeated Navy and administration pronouncements of China being the number one national security threat.

The Navy must choose its battles more carefully and come to grips with the limited resources it currently has. Repeatedly extending deployments for surface combatants and carriers critical to a war with China will result in long-term consequences for readiness, as exemplified by incidents like the delayed Boxer ARG deployment. The new administration should make a comprehensive reassessment of global force posture and consider optimizing the Navy’s presence against China, especially with the Navy focused on a potential conflict in 2027.

Francis Crozier is a pseudonym for a sailor who holds a Bachelors Degree in World Politics focusing on Russian Affairs and Economic Development from the Ohio State University. He currently serves as a Petty Officer Second Class on board a U.S. destroyer.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official positions or opinions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Featured Image: U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Mitchell Parcell, a V-22 tiltrotor crew chief assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a native of Montana, observes the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) in the Luzon Strait Oct. 8, 2024. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Amelia Kang)