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Sea Control 573: The Great North Challenges the Mediterranean with Federico Petroni

By Alexia Bouallagui

Sea Control presents the first in a special series by cohost Alexia Bouallagui on Italian maritime security research. On this episode Alexia is joined by Federico Petroni to discuss Arctic geopolitics. Federico Petroni is a geopolitical analyst at Limes, the Italian review of geopolitics, and coordinator of the school of Limes.

This podcast is offered in both Italian and English. Skip to 26:21 for the English version.

Download Sea Control 573: The Great North Challenges the Mediterranean with Federico Petroni


Links

1. Artics fevers, Limes, Feb 2019 https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/la-febbre-dell-artico-14632937.

2. Artico: attacco al Mediterraneo? Da Taiwan a Gibilterra – Le Giornate del Mare 2024 a Roma, Limes, November 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXRDmb2EsHA.

Italian

La Battaglia per l’Artico: Il Grande Nord sfida il Mediterraneo – Nuova Guerra Fredda o Terra di
Nessuno?

Federico Petroni si unisce al programma per discutere di geopolitica artica. Federico Petroni è un analista geopolitico di Limes, la rivista italiana di geopolitica, e coordinatore della Scuola di Limes. Questo episodio è stato montato e prodotto da Alexia Bouallagui. È il primo episodio di una serie pensata per approfondire la ricerca sulla sicurezza marittima italiana.

Links:

1. La febbre dell’Artico, Limes, febbraio 2019
https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/la-febbre-dell-artico-14632937/.

2. Artico: attacco al Mediterraneo? Da Taiwan a Gibilterra – Le Giornate del Mare 2024 a Roma, Limes, November 2024,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mXRDmb2EsHA.

Alexia Bouallagui is co-host of the Sea Control podcast, and edited and produced this episode.

Every Commander a Wargamer: Reforming Wargaming Education for the Fleet

By Jeff Appleget and Jeff Kline

Introduction

In the decade since Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work began his 2014 initiative to reinvigorate wargaming, there has been a decided uptick in the number of wargames being conducted for DoD. However, the quality and relevancy of DoD wargaming has not been uniform.

One of the primary causes for this lack of consistency is the dearth of wargaming capacity residing within DoD. Many combatant commands turn to the private sector and pay premium rates to have wargames conducted for them. Other DoD organizations conduct wargames using a pick-up team extracted from their staff that has little or no knowledge of wargaming. Wargaming is a skill that every Commander or Lieutenant Colonel should possess. However, there has been no DoD focus on educating uniformed personnel who can initiate, design, develop, conduct, and analyze wargames for their services.

This article highlights the Navy’s current wargaming education capability at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and makes recommendations for the Fleet to create a pipeline of naval officer wargamers to enhance the professionalism, preparedness, and knowledge of the servicemembers and organizations of the naval services.

Background

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been wargaming almost since its establishment in 1909. As with any military education, wargaming’s state of the art has evolved and advanced since that time. NPS’s sister institution, the Naval War College (NWC), contributed greatly to the U.S. Navy’s success in World War II through the focused Plan Orange series of wargames conducted from 1919-1940.

The use of wargaming waned as the 1960s ushered in the computer era and proponents of “Systems Analysis” advanced the idea that “computerized wargames” (what is known today as combat simulations) could replace commanders gathered around charts and maps and working through the risk calculus and the consequences of employing their forces against a thinking, malevolent adversary. In the 1970s and 80s, DoD created a Modeling and Simulation (M&S) enterprise that allowed combat simulations to dominate the analysis that underpinned the DoD’s acquisition process.

This analysis capability led to the massive U.S. Armed Forces build up that contributed greatly to the break-up of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s. The Abrams tank, the Aegis cruiser, and the A-10 Warthog all benefited from systems analysts using combat simulations to quantify the goodness these weapon systems would bring to U.S. forces in a NATO-Warsaw Pact fight. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm gave U.S. forces one more chance to fight a ground-focused kinetic war before the U.S. plunged into nearly two decades of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare conflicts, warfare that was really a poor fit to analyze using our kinetic-focused combat simulations.

2014 saw a U.S. Department of Defense wargaming renaissance as Deputy Secretary of Defense Work championed a reinvigoration of wargaming throughout the services. As a result, senior leaders finally began to understand that wargames and combat simulations were two completely different tools that, when used properly together, could provide the foundation for robust analysis of new concepts, platforms and technologies. The use of these and other tools in a campaign of analysis provided organizations the means to do both qualitative and quantitative analysis to inform a spectrum of decisions to better position the U.S. DoD for an uncertain future against two growing powers that employ both kinetic forces and non-kinetic hybrid threats. The challenge is building and maintaining a DoD-wide wargaming capability to conduct such analyses.

Bringing the Fleet to NPS Wargaming Education

The NPS Operations Research Department was leaning forward and in 2009 began its own wargaming renaissance, positioning NPS to better advantage not only the Fleet, but the other DoD services and U.S. allies and partners. 

Focus on the Fleet

To accomplish this, the Wargaming Applications course was re-focused on applying the craft of wargaming to address existing and future Fleet challenges. Teams of junior to mid-grade officers provide direct support to real world sponsors by designing, developing, conducting, and analyzing wargames that focus current or future challenges of the Fleet, our sister services, allies, and partners. The wargaming course culminates with officer-conducted, Fleet-sponsored wargames during “wargaming week,” normally the last week of the academic quarter. NPS warrior-scholars come from all branches of DoD, and many of our partners and allies. Wargames are conducted at the Unclassified, CUI, Secret, and Top Secret/SCI levels.

Wargaming week occurs at NPS in early June (5-10 wargames) and early December (1-3 wargames). Outside attendees are welcome to attend wargaming week given that they have the proper security clearances. Since 2009, NPS officer teams have designed and conducted over 100 wargames, helping the Fleet underpin flagship concepts such as Distributed Maritime Operations, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Stand-In-Forces, and assessing a spectrum of Contested Logistics issues for OPNAV N4.

Joint and coalition wargames are also conducted for Fleet partners, such as examining the impact of emerging maritime capabilities and technologies for the Taiwan CNO, examining interoperability challenges for the U.S. Marine Corps Forces – Pacific (MARFORPAC) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), and assessing the impact of emerging technologies for the Defense Advanced Research Program Agency (DARPA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense – Strategic Capabilities Office (OSD-SCO).

Modernizing Wargaming

Combining the recent operational experience that our warrior-scholars bring to NPS with a seasoned faculty that conducts cutting-edge research for the Fleet provides NPS a competitive advantage in innovation over other DoD schools, FFRDCs, and civilian universities. As wargaming entered the second half of the 20th century, the surge in the DoD modeling and simulation (M&S) enterprise served to push wargaming to the side because senior military and civilian leaders didn’t understand that simulations could not supplant wargaming. Today the urge to again ‘computerize’ wargaming is re-emerging, necessitating another round of wargaming education to ensure we align both wargaming and our M&S enterprise to provide best advantage to DoD in the future.

The adjudication of wargames can leverage M&S if done in a deliberate and thoughtful manner, ensuring the M&S chosen to integrate into wargames is ‘fit for purpose.’ We have been researching the integration of M&S into wargames since 2009. To facilitate this research, warrior-scholars and faculty from our Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) Institute have been integrated into the wargaming course and have tested many M&S tools in NPS wargames including Command PE (Professional Edition), a commercially available simulation; MAST (Modeling and Simulation Toolkit), a U.S. Navy owned agent-based simulation, as well as other M&S tools widely available or created by NPS warrior-scholars. Preliminary research results indicate that the purchase of a ‘one-size-fits-all” uber wargaming software platform is, in most cases, ill-advised.

Bringing NPS Wargaming Education to the Fleet

Mobile Education Team (MET)

In 2011, NPS conducted its first five-day Mobile Education Team (MET) wargaming workshop for the Royal Canadian Air Force in Trenton, Ontario. Since then, we have conducted over 50 MET workshops across four continents. The wargaming workshop is designed to stand up an organic wargaming capability in an organization by creating wargaming apprentices from 16-20 of the organization’s personnel. The teaching philosophy, learn by doing, is exactly the same as the NPS resident wargaming course. Course participants are formed into teams. The teams then design, develop, conduct and analyze a wargame for their organization in the span of 5 days.

NPS has conducted these workshops for U.S. Naval Forces Europe and Africa (NAVEUR-AF), Sixth Fleet, U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) U.S. Naval Forces-Korea, Commander, Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces-Pacific, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, Taiwan Armed Forces, Indonesian Navy, Australian Defence Force, NATO Joint Warfare Center, NATO Special Operations Forces, as well as many others.

As organizations stand up and matured their wargaming capabilities, we began to field requests for advanced wargaming workshops. Our long-time partnership with the ADF resulted in a special three-week course that combined both basic and advanced workshops. The first two weeks are an extended basic analytic workshop that provides more exposure to a variety of wargames while still embracing the series of practical exercises that results in wargames being conducted by participants at the end of the two-week workshop. The third week is an advanced course that focuses on topics selected by the sponsor and tailored to participants who have completed the basic course in previous years and completed at least a year of practical wargaming experience. Common advanced course topics include wargaming facilitation, building the wargame’s foundation by the decomposition of a sponsor’s key issues and case studies of wargames that embrace innovation and unique models, methods and tools.

As NPS began our second decade of MET workshops, we were asked by organizations who had experienced our basic wargaming workshops to create a wargaming practitioner course consisting of three modules delivered over the course of 18-24 months at the sponsor’s home station by the NPS wargaming MET. After attending an NPS MET 5-day basic wargaming module and passing the wargaming apprentice certification exam (earning 4 Continuing Education Units (CEUs)), the wargaming apprentices are assigned to work on wargames for their organization and conduct self-study activities to prepare for the wargaming journeyman module.

The wargaming journeyman module is delivered by the NPS wargaming MET team, and upon the completion of the wargaming journeyman certification exam students earn an additional 4 CEUs. These wargaming journeymen again work on wargames for their organization and conduct self-study activities to prepare for the third and final module, the wargaming practitioner module. Upon completion of this module, students are then certified as wargame practitioners and 4 additional CEUs. Two EUCOM organizations, NAVEUR-AF and USAREUR-AF, have begun the process of creating wargaming practitioners in their organizations.

Northwest Pacific Wargame (NWPAC)

In 2024, the Naval Postgraduate School conducted its first Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)-directed wargame. The Northwest Pacific wargame had been conducted for over 35 years by the Naval War College. In recent years, the venue was moved from Newport, RI to Japan. The wargame is sponsored by the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Seventh Fleet and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force are the two primary organizations that provide the players, augmented by other joint and combined players. The transition from NWC to NPS required a new paradigm because of the different staffing models each organization has.

While the NWC relies on a wargaming faculty of over 30 personnel with a support organization, NPS combines staff, faculty and NPS students to form the core of the wargaming team. NPS has leveraged several different Operations Research (OR) curriculum courses (Wargaming Applications, Spreadsheet Modeling, Introduction to Joint Combat Models, Case Studies in OR) to have NPS warrior-scholars prototype and test M&S adjudication models, conduct post-game analysis, and most importantly, build the nucleus of the wargaming execution team to deploy to Japan to conduct the wargame.

Keeping Wargaming in the Fleet

As Robert Rubel pointed out in his excellent CIMSEC article “Restore Wargaming Focus to the Naval War College,” the Navy needs to produce a “critical mass of officers with intensive wargaming experience.” There are several challenges that must be negotiated to create the requisite pipeline to achieve this critical mass.

Creating the critical mass

While both the NPS resident and MET courses and workshops do provide the Fleet, DoD, and our allies and partners officers who have designed, developed, conducted, and analyzed wargames for real-world sponsors, the numbers of officers with this unique skillset needs to increase ten-fold to begin to build that critical mass of wargamers in the Fleet that Robert Rubel calls for.

But how many uniformed wargamers does DoD need? As a minimum, every combat arms Lieutenant Colonel and unrestricted line officer Commander should be a wargamer. Every officer with an Operations Research designation should be a wargamer. Every military strategist should be a wargamer. Every flag officer should be a wargamer. We should stop thinking of wargaming as something someone else does for DoD and start accepting responsibility for wargaming to keep the Fleet ready for tomorrow’s fight as well as helping us to shape the force so that we are prepared for an uncertain future.

We should be conducting analytic wargames to better inform future force structures and technologies. We should be conducting educational wargames to allow us to better understand current threats and operational environments. We should be conducting experiential wargames to keep our battle staffs familiar with their wartime roles and to be prepared to adapt plans in the face of an aggressive and unpredictable enemy.

This argues for wargaming to be inserted into JPME. And let us be clear about creating wargamers. Even the huge NWC success with Plan Orange from 1919-1940 didn’t create wargamers—the participants were players in those wargames. The Plan Orange wargames were designed and conducted by the NWC faculty.

Having the skillset needed to design and conduct wargames cannot be learned by simply being a player in a wargame. The book The Craft of Wargaming is a reference for any DoD officer tasked with leading a wargaming effort. It is based on our 11-week resident course and used for our MET engagements.

Utilizing the Critical Mass

Wargaming is a craft that requires its practitioners to keep their wargaming certifications current by designing, developing, conducting and analyzing wargames. This requires some thought and likely restructuring by the Fleet. Every Fleet organization that creates plans should have wargamers. Every numbered fleet and every Marine Expeditionary Force should have wargamers. Each of these organizations should be wargaming their plans on a routine basis. One NPS OR graduate stood up a wargaming cell at CENTCOM and quickly concluded that wargaming should be used in most, if not all of the seven planning steps outlined in Joint Pub 5-0. Currently, wargaming is only mandated in step four. Also, any plan that has sat on a shelf for over a year is likely of little value. Plans should be wargamed and updated at least once a year.

To begin to meet this challenge, we propose that every numbered U.S. Navy Fleet and Marine Expeditionary Force designate at least 10 staff officers to become wargamers.

Creating a wargaming capability at the Fleet’s operational command levels

The Navy needs to embed uniformed operations research analysts in each numbered U.S. Navy fleet by coding at least five staff billets with the Navy’s OR subspecialty 3211. In major joint staffs it is common for these analysts to be group together in some Commander’s Advisory or Analytical Group, but for a fleet staff these officers should be distributed to the future operations planning cell, the assessment cell, and the logistics cell, wherever they may reside in the staff’s N-codes. 

When a wargame is called for either in plans’ generation or assessment, these officers will form the core of a “cross code” wargaming team to design, develop, execute, and analyze the wargame for the commander. They will be augmented by other staff members who have gained education and experience in fleet wargaming. The fleet’s challenge is to maintain a critical mass of wargame experience in their uniform staff in the face of constant billet rotation. To do this, wargaming education must be integrated into naval staff preparation courses, or as part of an unrestricted line officer’s regular career pipeline.

Creating a pipeline to educate Fleet wargamers

A second step in integrating wargaming skills to the fleet is for the Navy to embrace higher education by sending URL officers to the NPS OR program. This will provide the seed corn to feed both the numbered fleet OR billets and to increase the number of Navy officers with the requisite wargaming experience. In the early 1990s it was not uncommon for each NPS Operations Research officer cohort to have as many as ten URL officers. That number has dwindled to two or three today. Type Commanders should insist on increasing their educational quotas for Operations Research. These officers bring a host of operationally relevant analytical skills to the fleet staffs and ships: from data analytics, operations assessment, campaign analysis, modeling and simulation, to wargaming.

Tactical Training Groups can also begin to offer a one-week wargaming course either leveraging NPS instructors or creating a core capability to instruct within their own staff. This course should be made a prerequisite for fleet staff assignment, unless an officer has already received wargaming education and been certified as a wargaming practitioner. In turn, officers can receive a new wargamer Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) or Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC) code for their Officer Data Card to enhance opportunities for assignment and promotion.

The Naval Staff College at the Naval War College may also begin to integrate wargaming education and practice in their curriculum. Officers involved in these courses would then be available to contribute directly to the Naval War College’s wargaming agenda. 

As these institutional changes occur, individual fleet commanders should designate staff across their codes as the wargaming team and receive the week-long NPS MET wargaming course. To mitigate staff rotation challenges, this MET course can be hosted every year or eighteen months and assigned a real-world fleet issue to wargame as desired by the commander. This proposal will ensure the staff has qualified wargamers and provides a regularly scheduled wargaming course for the commander to leverage in their fleet’s planning cycle.

Conclusion

The Naval Postgraduate School has played a critical role in DoD wargaming education for the past 15 years. Through our NPS resident wargaming course, we have educated over six hundred officers who can design wargames. At the same time, NPS officer teams have conducted over one hundred wargames for DoD, allies and partners. NPS has provided wargaming courses through its Mobile Education Team in both the INDOPACOM and EUCOM areas of responsibilities to over one thousand U.S., allied and partner defense professionals since 2011. NPS has been exploring modernizing wargaming through the judicious integration of models and simulations for well over a decade. As we prepare for the daunting security challenges currently facing the U.S. and its allies and partners, NPS wargamers will be using their skills to ensure we meet those challenges when the time comes.

Dr. Jeff Appleget is a retired Army Colonel who has taught wargaming at NPS since 2009, mentoring over 100 warrior-scholar conducted wargames. He is a co-author of the book The Craft of Wargaming.

Jeff Kline is a retired Navy officer who is currently a Professor of Practice in the Operations Research department. Jeff has taught Joint Campaign Analysis, led the NPS Warfare Innovation Continuum, and coordinated Naval wargaming sponsorship for NPS wargaming for over 20 years.

Featured Image: NPS students participate in analytic wargames they designed to explore solutions for some of DoD’s most pressing national security concerns. (NPS photo by Javier Chagoya)

Wargaming the Future: A Year in Review of Wargaming at USC

By Jack Tribolet

In Fall 2023, the University of Southern California reconstituted its previously abandoned wargaming club. Ultimately, wargaming reemerged in two places for USC’s midshipmen, one as a mandatory test of knowledge after a precursory look at the impending Taiwan crisis in the Introduction to Naval Science (NSC 101) course and, second, as part of an optional club that met once a week for two hours. Observed midshipman learning from each group, spotlighted valuable lessons and provided two options for wider curriculum installment across the NROTC enterprise and Fleet. The educational application of wargames reaped undeniable returns to midshipmen growth, thus demanding the question—why is the Fleet not installing wargaming as an official, curriculum-integrated means of junior officer education?

USC ROTC wargaming. (Photo by Lieutenant Jack Tribolet)

In military history, wargaming has undeniably been well-applied in the analytical sphere to test doctrine and capabilities spanning from a reeling Prussian Army in the Napoleonic Wars to the generation of War Plan Orange pre-WWII. Today, gaming continues to occur at the highest levels of the US military. However, as an educational tool, few concrete steps have occurred to gain the full benefit of this powerful tool.

A couple of anomalies exist, such as the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfighting at Marine Corps University (MCU), which has developed its Wargaming Cloud to provide easy online access to competitive games to its students. Additionally, the newest edition of the NROTC governing Professional Core Competencies (PCCs) includes three vague line items regarding instructing basic knowledge of wargaming. Still, the MCU alone does not have adequate reach, and the new PCCs fail to provide instructors with the “how-to” and “why” necessary for organizational change. Modern wargaming began at the Naval Academy five years ago in the form of an elective course and an extracurricular activity with plans for outreach to the fleet and the ROTC community. In its current incarnation, wargaming has been broadened but only within the confines of Annapolis. However, there is currently no coordination in its current state.

Filling the Sails of Organizational Change

When starting the USC Wargaming Club, my first instinct was to find the most up-to-date educational wargame, Sebastian Bae’s Littoral Commander, and entice midshipmen with pizza in their off time to gain attendance. Robust class and work schedules left the club only meeting once a week in the evening for two hours. Excitement about launching a new organization emerged quickly, however, the rationale behind wargaming was not immediately clear to the students. Consequently, I recognized that the club would not survive my departure back to the Fleet. The club had to become self-sufficient to create lasting organizational change within the USC Trojan Battalion. Going back to the drawing board, I realized that the midshipmen needed a complete comprehension of “why” wargaming served a purpose, see personal progression, and, most importantly, they needed to have fun while participating.

Although we later employed Littoral Commander to significant effect, the need to simplify gameplay for participants unfamiliar with hex-based wargames prompted a search for a more accessible alternative.” Eventually, the club settled on Axis & Allies. We had a physical copy and multiple digital copies running side-by-side. Axis & Allies, while set during WWII, provided the essential lessons I wanted the students to gain initially—geographical familiarity, combined arms, and, most importantly, economy of force.

Using a crawl, walk, run method, the students progressed from game familiarity to spending significant time developing pre-game team strategies reproduced across multiple iterations simultaneously as different crews clashed. Teams soon learned the necessity of flexible plans and the requirement to anticipate enemy strategy.

Furthermore, the juxtaposition of digital games coinciding with the physical version delivered some interesting observations regarding the pros and cons of digital versus analog gaming. Midshipmen clearly preferred the video game version, appreciating its built-in rule enforcement and streamlined mechanics. However, I noticed that the board game players, while taking significantly longer to complete their iteration, had more buy-in to their game, non-active players remained attuned to the action, while their compatriots observing the digital game on a large television often had their heads down in phones or idle conversation.

Despite sometimes lacking full attention, the digital gamers far outpaced their board game brethren, finishing games in a little more than half the time. Generation Z’s preference for video games cannot be overstated. Digital games must be the organizational choice, and, unlike MCU’s Wargaming Cloud, it should include AAA titles such as Command: Modern Operations and Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age to maintain midshipman attention. This generational bias is a lesson that Sebastian Bae has recognized as Littoral Commander has recently gone into production to digitize.

A Soviet Kiev-class carrier burns after taking multiple Harpoon anti-ship missile hits in Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age. (Screenshot via Sea Power wargame)

While not as robust as Littoral Commander, Axis & Allies served its purpose; it drew participation, and the lesser complexity ensured inexperienced gamers remained engaged. The digital versions felt more familiar to a video game-saturated generation, whereas many had never played complex board games. This basic introduction to gaming offered accessible decision-making opportunities while reinforcing key lessons mentioned earlier.

After a semester of Axis & Allies, the club shifted to some of Sebastian Bae’s microgames, Callsign and Find, Fix & Finish. Due to their simplistic mechanics and single focus, these mini-games took ten to twenty minutes for the midshipmen to complete, allowed for multiple rounds per session. Looking around the room full of engaged students, I recognized it was time to return to Littoral Commander.  

Sebastian Bae’s Littoral Commander has everything you’d want to instruct midshipmen on the Taiwan Crisis: scenarios based around Taiwan, Luzon, the Straights of Malacca, and Okinawa. The game contains all five domains of war and even informational warfare elements. Once learned, these attributes are perfect for future Navy/USMC leaders to simulate scenarios and provide realistic decision points. However, the initial learning curve can be time-intensive for board game amateurs. Furthermore, setting up the board can take thirty to sixty minutes, even with multiple helpers. Lastly, I found the students spending far too much time selecting Joint Capability Cards (JCCs), which include nearly a hundred unique abilities to choose from for play. To mitigate these issues, I began showing up an hour early to set the board and decided the JCCs each team would have.

Game pieces from the wargame Littoral Commander. (Photo via No Dice No Glory)

Littoral Commander subsumed the last three weeks of Wargaming Club at USC. To ensure maximum participation, I created a scenario that included Luzon and the Philippines so that we could have a total of twelve players. This time around, the game was a total hit. Participation and attentiveness soared, and unlike Axis & Allies, the midshipmen recognized their future platforms and weapon systems, instilling a sense of realism and urgency into the gameplay.

In the end, China maintained a foothold on Luzon but was repelled by Taiwan with heavy losses, resulting within the realm of possibility and aligned with published professional wargames. The eagerness to play Littoral Commander surpassed previously observed midshipman behavior, and most of all, when Sebastian Bae announced the video game version, the midshipmen applauded his decision to go digital. They will undoubtedly be some of his first customers.

Lessons in Integrated Gaming

Creating USC’s Wargaming Club arose after three years of running an end-of-semester wargame for the 4/C (freshman) NSC 101 course. The class objectives for the NSC 101 course span basic introduction topics: Navy organization, traditions, platforms, USMC, and UCMJ, among others, but by time demands, it leaves roughly half the class time to dive into other topics.

Midshipmen love sea stories, which bring to life the job they aim for; however, in these dangerous times, I found it highly pertinent to study the Taiwan Crisis and Ukraine War with the extra time. This teaching strategy came to fruition in my second year when I assigned Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes’ excellent book, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2018). The midshipmen read and presented on various pertinent subjects: regional geography, history, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) platforms, US platforms, current events, and even culminated in a Q & A session with Dr. Holmes himself.

The final two instructional hours of the class weaved the entirety of their recently gained Taiwan knowledge into an instructor-led wargame. Dividing the class into two, they developed three courses of action, giving the CCP the initiative. The Allies had to create three scalable defensive strategies for their opening move. Forcing pre-planned responses emulated the fog of war surrounding a new conflict and demonstrated the rapidity with which plans can fall apart. Furthermore, I encouraged subterfuges at home and learned that many attempts occurred to steal one another’s plans during the interim between classes.

The NSC 101 wargame panned out on a large whiteboard, with me as a sort of “dungeon master” controlling the board and pushing the pace of play. I determined any probability-based moves or attacks by giving an odds of success and employing dice for the participants to roll. Like the final game of Littoral Commander, this wargame mainly centered around the Philippines, where the CCP gained a foothold despite enormous losses. Unlike Littoral Commander, this conflict iteration spread throughout most of Asia, including Korea and Japan, demonstrating the incredible danger a Taiwan War poses to spreading across the hemisphere.

The popularity of this semester-end wargame surged through the students, many even asking to continue the game despite the course ending. Thirty-five students participating in a single match proved a significant challenge, but I solved it by randomly cold calling to ensure maximum attentiveness and participation. This wargaming model in educational settings is easily replicable, which any Officer Instructor with Fleet experience could imitate.  

Ultimately, the purpose of wargaming remains to put the participant in the decision-making hot seat. To make important decisions under pressure, see the fallout of said decisions and enemy reaction, and most importantly, receive instructor feedback on their choices. The USMC has far outpaced the Navy in decision-making training with its Tactical Decision Games (TDGs) and Decision Forcing Cases (DFCs). The naval aviation community has simulator events and occasionally decent pre-flight walkthroughs. Still, these mainly revolve around platform tactics, techniques, and procedures, rarely forcing the participant to make gray-zone decisions.

Initiating decision-making training must begin early in officer accession pipelines and is best accomplished through curriculum-mandated wargaming. Incoming Officer Instructors could quickly receive instructional training to incorporate wargaming in NROTC at the Teaching in Higher Education course run biannually. The professional wargaming community has a deep bench full of capable instructors to maximize gaming in the NROTC enterprise, which would ultimately have a significant long-term effect and organizational change by delivering wargame literate officers to the Fleet. For now, the Trojan Battalion is preparing its first Wargaming Club meeting with the permanent absence of the Officer Instructor, who kicked the program off, meaning they achieved the first step towards organizational change.

Lieutenant Jack Tribolet was an Assistant Professor of Naval Science at the University of Southern California ROTC and was the course coordinator for Seapower and Maritime Affairs. He recently returned to the fleet as a Tactical Action Officer assigned to the Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69).

Featured Image: A student describes his strategy during hands-on exercises at the Basic Analytic Wargaming Course taught by the Naval Postgraduate School Wargaming Mobile Education Team in Wiesbaden, Germany, Aug. 30 thru Sept. 10, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by Thomas Mort)

Security or Safety: What is AIS Really For?

By Jessie Caldwell

The proliferation of spoofing techniques has diminished the value of Automatic Identification System (AIS) in the context of maritime law enforcement. The open nature of the system prevents higher levels of data security and verification, meaning spoofed and falsified information will remain difficult to prevent without changing the very foundation of AIS. Given the need for accurate data when dealing with problems like sanctions violations or illegal fishing, using AIS data only muddies the waters and makes successful enforcement more difficult. 

AIS uses very high frequency (VHF) transmissions to automatically transmit and receive vessel information.1,2 It was designed as a safety tool to complement radio, visual, and radar navigation for collision avoidance, and the UN Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention mandates all ships over 300 tons on international voyages and all passenger ships to maintain a functional AIS, broadcasting at all times. 

As AIS usage has increased, so have its applications. Sites like MarineTraffic and AISHub receive data from privately or publicly owned receivers and display it in real time, creating a public resource for maritime domain awareness. This data is used for cargo tracking, environmental research, search and rescue operations, sanctions enforcement, and illegal fishing investigations.3,4 AIS has additionally become an integral element of electronic chart and display information systems (ECDIS).5

What is Spoofing? 

The primary threat to AIS data is spoofing. Spoofing is a cybersecurity term, describing efforts by an actor to falsely represent themselves through illegitimate data. All types of data sent by the AIS, identified by C4ADS as dynamic, identifying, and voyage information, can be spoofed.6 

These threats are caused by weaknesses in the way the system generates, verifies, and transmits data. Both radio and software-based transmissions are vulnerable, but the distinction is rapidly becoming irrelevant due to software-defined radio. Traditional radio spoofing involves actors manipulating their systems to hide their identity or location while onboard. Trend Micro reported that after “purchasing a 700-euro piece of AIS equipment and connecting it to a computer in the vicinity of a port, the researchers could intercept signals from nearby craft and send out modified versions to make it appear to other AIS users that a vessel was somewhere it was not.”7 The cost of generating these signals is constantly decreasing. With the advent of software-defined radio, or radio that uses software instead of hardware, personal computers can be modified with a thirty-dollar piece of equipment and begin broadcasting.8

Software based spoofing is more versatile than radio-based. Global Fishing Watch describes the difference between software and radio frequency spoofing, “in past (radio frequency) cases, we observed vessels on the water that were broadcasting positions that corresponded to an area other than the true location of the vessel. In these new (software) examples, however, AIS tracks were present where vessels appear not to have been actually broadcasting AIS at all.”9 Many of the software-based spoofing exploits are caught because spoofers make identifiable mistakes. A telltale sign of software created ships are those detected outside the range of any terrestrial data receivers that could reasonably pick up their transmissions.

Bjorn Bergman, a data analyst with Global Fishing Watch, has another way of identifying digital intrusions. WIRED reported “the fake tracks were all shown as coming from shore-based AIS receivers, with none collected by satellites. Given that real AIS signals from civilian ships near the supposed warship tracks were received by satellites overhead, Bergman believes this shows the fake AIS messages were not generated by actual malicious transmissions.”4 The pattern in fake transmissions Bergman has identified is not public and has not been tested by outside sources, but he argues the problem is widespread:

“we don’t know how the false positions get combined with real data from terrestrial AIS antennas, though we can hypothesize that they could be produced by an AIS simulator program…While we initially thought the false data might be entering the data feed from a single terrestrial AIS station, it appears that false AIS positions were reported at a number of different terrestrial stations.”

Because of the lack of verification, it is not immediately clear where or which data is poisoning AIS feeds. This problem will only continue to develop as spoofers become more skilled in masking their activities and creating more realistic falsified data.

Illegal Fishing 

The back-and-forth between law enforcement and malicious actors is best demonstrated in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. Continuous enforcement at-sea presence is impractical given the sheer size of EEZ’s or restricted fishing zones, so AIS at first appears as an easy solution to tag broadcasting vessels that stray into unauthorized areas and appear to engage in fishing. However, as AIS monitoring became widespread, criminal behavior changed. To stay under the radar, vessels began to “go dark” by turning off their AIS before engaging in illegal activity. Numerous studies show fishing vessels allegedly engaging in this trick in the waters around the Galapagos.11 Therefore, a vessel with a nonfunctional or intermittently broadcasting AIS transmitter, potentially indicates that it is engaging in illegal fishing, warranting further investigation. To obfuscate this, spoofing is the logical alternative. Instead of “going dark”, vessels change their digital identity.

A vessel’s AIS signature has become a increasingly relevant to law enforcement case package development, helping to identify vessels engaged in illicit activities, and tracking them through time and space. A vessel’s digital identity is primarily made up of the information transmitted by AIS. Some elements are self-reported and can be purposefully entered incorrectly to disguise illicit activity. The most important piece of identifying information is the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number, a unique nine-digit number assigned to a vessel. It is supposed to remain unchanged save for during reflagging.6 There are security measures built into the hardware to prevent tampering and digital identity fraud. In some cases, the MMSI can only be changed after entering a passcode. These passcodes, while ostensibly only known by manufacturers and authorized technicians, can be found online, allowing sailors to reprogram and change their MMSI independently.

Vessel owners can also purchase multiple AIS transponders and use them to generate new ship identities with a “clean” MMSI number to confuse authorities. C4ADS refers to these two processes as MMSI tampering, occurring “when a vessel transmits the MMSI number of another vessel or an entirely fraudulent one in order to obfuscate its identity and activities. In effect, MMSI tampering creates new digital identities that severely impair the ability of maritime authorities and other vessels to identify a vessel and monitor its movements.”6 As such, spoofers can now generate an entirely false vessel history or steal a clean vessel’s data. 

Sanctions Enforcement 

North Korea is well known for spoofing the identities of their vessels to make it more difficult to timely identify which ships are violating sanctions.10 The 2019 case of the Tae Yang, a North Korean-flagged vessel, demonstrates this. The ship began broadcasting its location with the MMSI number of another vessel, the Mongolian-flagged Krysper Singa, while visiting North Korea. The real Krysper Singa was around Singapore. By stealing the Krysper Singa’s digital identity the Tae Yang made it appear that the other vessel was violating sanctions and kept its own MMSI number clean. This appeared on commercial databases as a “teleporting” ship since both vessels were broadcasting the same number the ship would appear first around Singapore, then suddenly seem to teleport to North Korean waters, then back. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) as part of its Project Sandstone series discovered that commercial AIS tracking systems automatically clean and correct data, instead of highlighting anomalies. In this case they “inadvertently and incorrectly (linked) the real Krysper Singa to sanctions violations committed by the Tae Yang.”9 A careful review of satellite imagery was required to correctly identify the Tae Yang as the ship engaging in ship-to-ship transfers (STS) to violate sanctions. Another North Korean vessel, the KUM RUNG 5, cycled “through around 30 different identifiers, including names, Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, callsigns, and even IMO numbers, which are meant to be unique to just one vessel throughout its lifetime. This includes the use of at least four names in 2020 alone. Because the identifiers are programmed onboard the vessel, confirming the authenticity of the broadcast is not possible without other means of verification.”12 The Tae Yang didn’t hide the presence of a vessel at their location, but by switching their identification, made it more difficult to determine the real culprit. 

This problem extends beyond the vessel actively engaging in identity theft . Innocent third parties like the Krysper Singa are affected. Even if mariners correctly program their MMSI and other information, malicious actors can intercept and change the data from a terrestrial receiver as it is transmitted to online maritime tracking sites. 

Many tracking providers use the same data sources so a faked ship will appear on multiple maritime traffic sites.4 The malicious actor can therefore be on the other side of the globe from the targeted vessel, widening their reach, and achieve results similar to VHF spoofing. Hackers can intercept data packets and change a ship’s identity by changing their MMSI number, name, IMO number, and altering coordinates or headings. They can even “move” a vessel to an entirely new location. 

For example, at a 2013 hacking conference, two researchers moved a real vessel, the Eleanor Gordon, that was at the time located in the Mississippi River, to appear on a lake in Dallas.13 The false positions or identities generated by this type of threat are less likely to threaten vessels directly, as they rely on their onboard AIS and other methods of navigation, but they directly impact the other uses of AIS. Maritime law enforcement cannot rely on the publicly available aggregate data where these fake digital signals appear. Sanctions monitoring, fisheries enforcement, marine traffic analysis, and environmental research all rely on this data and spoofing leaves is meaningfully compromised.

Conclusion 

Under the present framework and technologies, it is extremely challenging to eliminate AIS spoofing. The system itself was not designed to pass along verified data – it was meant to be open and easy to transmit employ as a safety tool. It lacks inherent virus or malware protection, encryption, or data verification tools.14 Encryption is a potential method,15 however, as Ken Munro writes on Pen Test Partners blog,

“if nearby vessels don’t have the ability to decrypt the data, the safety benefit of AIS is lost…Finally, even if all transceivers featured and used encryption, a rogue user could simply purchase a legitimate transceiver from which to transmit tampered data.”3

Part of AIS as currently designed is that all ships can access it for safety. Attempts to limit bad actors from transmitting run the risk of preventing legitimate vessels from using AIS.

If spoofing is impossible to stop, the best option in the short term is to continue to improve detection capabilities. Machine learning and other big data tools have begun automating detecting certain patterns in AIS data that suggest activities like fishing or STS transfers and identifying vessels from vessel registry databases.7 Global Fishing Watch has developed an algorithm for identifying ghost ships and other researchers are developing similar programs to catch “teleporting” or identity switching vessels.11 This would limit the benefits to spoofing for illicit actors, as they would no longer be able to conceal and confuse their identity as successfully.

In the long term another system could be developed to directly address the deficiencies of AIS. Navigators can use other methods to augment AIS and prevent collisions while at sea. On shore, AIS was not designed for law enforcement. There is no way of verifying data to a high enough standard while keeping the system true to its roots as a safety tool. In the balancing act of openness and security, AIS was designed to be as open and easy to access as possible. Trying to force it to be more secure lessens its applicability as a universal safety tool. 

Jessie Caldwell is a recent graduate of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She holds a Masters in International Affairs, focusing on transnational security issues.

These views are expressed in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the official view of any government agency.

References

1. NAVCEN. “AIS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS.” AIS Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Coast Guard, 17 Feb. 2022, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISFAQ. 2

2. NAVCEN. “HOW AIS WORKS.” How Ais Works, U.S. Coast Guard, 8 Sept. 2016, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=AISworks.

3. Munro, Ken. “Hacking AIS.” Pen Test Partners RSS, 18 Sept. 2018, https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/hacking-ais/.

4. Harris, Mark. “Phantom Warships Are Courting Chaos in Conflict Zones.” Wired, Conde Nast, 29 July 2021, https://www.wired.com/story/fake-warships-ais-signals-russia-crimea/. 

5. Fisk, Samantha. “Gloves off as Criminals Move from AIS Spoofing to AIS Hacking -.” Fathom World – Shipping and Maritime Industry News, 16 Sept. 2019, https://fathom.world/gloves-off-as-criminals-move-from-ais-spoofing-to-ais-hacking/.

6. Boling, Andrew, et al. “Unmasked: Vessel Identity Laundering and North Korea’s Maritime Sanctions Evasion.” C4ADS, 2021, https://c4ads.org/unmasked. 

7. Simonite, Tom. “Ship Tracking Hack Makes Tankers Vanish from View.” MIT Technology Review, 18 October 2013, https://www.technologyreview.com/2013/10/18/82918/ship-tracking-hack-makes-tankers-vanish-from-view/. 

8. Balduzzi, Marco. “AIS Exposed Understanding Vulnerabilities & Attacks 2.0.” Blackhat.com, Black Hat Asia, 2014, https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Balduzzi/Asia-14-Balduzzi-AIS-Exposed-Understanding-Vulnerabilities-And-Attacks.pdf. 

9. “Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices.” U.S. Department of the Treasury, 14 May 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/north-korea-sanctions. 

10. Trainer, Cameron, and Izewicz, Paulina. “Unauthorized Flags: A Threat to the Global Maritime Regime.” Center for International Maritime Security, 20 July, 2020, https://cimsec.org/unauthorized-flags-a-threat-to-the-global-maritime-regime/. 

11. “Fisheries intelligence report reveals vessel behaviors associated with spoofing activity.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 17 October 2023, https://globalfishingwatch.org/press-release/fisheries-intelligence-report-reveals-vessel-behaviors-associated-with-spoofing-activity/ 

12. Storm, Darlene. “Hack in the Box: Researchers Attack Ship Tracking Systems for Fun and Profit.” Computerworld, Computerworld, 21 Oct. 2013, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2475227/hack-in-the-box–researchers-attack-ship-tracking-systems-for-fun-and-profit.html. 

13. Bergman, Bjorn. “Systematic Data Analysis Reveals False Vessel Tracks.” Global Fishing Watch, Global Fishing Watch, 29 July 2021, https://globalfishingwatch.org/data/analysis-reveals-false-vessel-tracks/. 

14. Bateman, Tom. “Fake Ships, Real Conflict: How Misinformation Came to the High Seas.” Euronews, 28 June 2021, https://www.euronews.com/next/2021/06/28/hms-defender-ais-spoofing-is-opening-up-a-new-front-in-the-war-on-reality. 

15. Katsilieris, Fotios, et al. “Detection of Malicious AIS Position Spoofing by Exploiting Radar Information.” IEEE Xplore, 12 July 2013, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6641132.

Featured Image: A containership steaming during sunset. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)