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War Without Surprises: Education for Command in the PLA Navy

This republication is adapted from “War without Surprises—Education for Command in the People’s Liberation Army Navy,” published by the Naval War College Review of the U.S. Naval War College. It is republished with permission.

By Ryan D. Martinson

Most analyses of Pacific scenarios have focused on the quantities and capabilities of the platforms that the PLAN might employ to achieve its campaign objectives. To date, there are very few studies about the people who would operate this hard­ware or the officers who would command them. This article seeks to contribute to this neglected area of China security studies. Specifically, it examines the role of professional military education (PME) in preparing PLAN officers to com­mand forces in combat.

PME is a key part of military officers’ preparation for command. It teaches them to look beyond the narrow confines of individual platforms or units and to consider the political, operational, and strategic issues relevant to joint action. Perhaps most famously, the USN officers who led the campaign to defeat Japan in the Pacific War—Chester W. Nimitz, William Halsey Jr., Raymond A. Spruance, Richmond K. Turner, and others—leaned heavily on knowledge and experience gained while students at the U.S. Naval War College. The education they received in Newport in the 1920s and 1930s prepared them for leadership by forcing them to grapple with the scenarios, situations, and challenges they later faced in a war with Japan. Repeated simulation of that conflict through strategic- and tactical-level wargames was a core component of their educational experience.

In the PLAN, midcareer officers on the path to senior command are required to complete two separate certificate courses at the Naval Command College (海军指挥学院) in Nanjing. These programs respectively prepare officers to command forces at two different levels of warfare: the high-tactical level (i.e., combined arms) and the campaign level (i.e., operational). In the event of a conflict, the success of China’s maritime operations will depend heavily on its naval officers’ leadership acumen. Thus, the type and quality of instruction they received at the Naval Command College will have a direct bearing on China’s wartime performance.

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson (left) visits the PLA Navy Command College on January 15,  2019. (Photo by Chief Mass Communication Spc. Elliott Fabrizio, U.S. Navy)

Education for Command

Located in the city of Nanjing, the PLAN’s Naval Command College is the center of education for midcareer Chinese naval officers. The college provides two main courses of study: (1) an intermediate course, Naval Combined Arms Com­mand (海军合同指挥), for captains, and (2) a senior course, Naval Campaign Command (海军战役指挥), for senior captains. The intermediate course lasts ten months, the senior course five months. Officially, both courses are required for officers on the path to flag rank, but it is unclear to what extent this require­ment is enforced. Neither course confers a graduate degree, though the college does also offer separate MA and PhD programs for qualified officers.

Only PLAN officers may enroll in the two courses. While the college does ma­triculate foreign students, they take a separate course of study. This allows PLAN students to be fully immersed in the best available (i.e., classified) information about their own military and the militaries of potential adversaries. Officers from other PLA services do participate in short-term learning opportunities at the col­lege and may apply to its graduate-degree programs, but none appear to enroll in the naval command courses. PLAN officers who promote to flag rank will later attend a third educational course on joint operational command at the National Defense University in Beijing.

Intermediate Course

As the course title implies, students enrolled in the intermediate course focus their studies on the theory and practice of combined-arms naval warfare—that is, the employment of forces from two or more service arms (surface, submarine, air, marines, and coastal defense) to achieve operational objectives on or from the sea. The curriculum is intended to prepare them to serve in leadership posi­tions at the high tactical level, such as commanding an operation to degrade or destroy an enemy aircraft carrier strike group. Since 2012, the college has required intermediate students to study topics in military and national strategy, in recognition that naval officers—perhaps more so than the officers of any other service—must be prepared to make tactical decisions that could have major stra­tegic consequences. To that end, students take courses such as Strategic Guidance for Maritime Military Operations, taught by Professor Huang Chunyu. While in Nanjing, students are almost certainly required to demonstrate proficiency in Chinese Communist Party dogma, especially as reflected in the speeches and writings of party “core” and CMC chairman Xi Jinping.

Student learning objectives are met through several different pedagogical approaches. Courses had long been taught using a traditional lecture style. However, in 2014 the college began exploring the use of the “flipped classroom” methodology to increase student engagement. This approach requires students to come to class already prepared to discuss the content of outside readings. It is unclear what portion of courses are taught using this method today. Students are also assigned research projects relevant to real-world concerns and germane to their individual experience and expertise. One past project for intermediate students involved research on the best tactics for Chinese ship formations to “raid” (突击) enemy task forces.

Classroom lectures are supplemented by presentations from outside experts, both military and civilian, akin to the U.S. Naval War College’s Lectures of Op­portunity. Operational commanders are invited to visit the college to share their firsthand experience from the fleet. For example, in the summer of 2022, soon after completing a major training mission aboard a nuclear-powered sub­marine, the deputy chief of staff of a PLAN submarine base, Wang Jun (王俊), came to the college to present a lecture on the PLAN’s operational employment of submarines.

In recent years, the college has created programs to foster online collaboration with students and instructors from other Chinese PME institutions. The goal is to bolster student familiarity and awareness of the equipment and weapons (装备性能), operational characteristics (作战特点), and operational methods (战法运用) of other services. This represents an effort to cultivate naval officers capable of serving in joint leadership positions—an imperative in the postreform PLA.

Aside from traditional academic course work, students engage in “practical learning activities” (实践性教学活动) while at the college. Since students can­not practice their new knowledge and skills through the movements of real ships, submarines, missile batteries, and aircraft, they use simulation tools. These are made available in the college’s wargaming center, the Naval Combat Laboratory (海战实验室中心). Students use the laboratory’s facilities to conduct scenario development; one-sided simulations; two-sided, opposition-force simulations (双方对抗); and joint exercises. For example, students might play out a scenario in which Red (i.e., Chinese) surface, air, submarine, and coastal-defense forces must provide “cover” (掩护) for a Red submarine as it tries to break through a Blue (enemy) blockade. Students and instructors also participate in major training and analytic games hosted by the Naval Combat Laboratory. All these simulation activities culminate in a capstone graduation wargame, discussed in detail in the next section.

For some students, these practical learning experiences take place beyond the college walls. In 2012, the college created a program to include students in fleet opposition-force exercises by “embedding” (嵌入) them in Red or Blue com­mand posts. The intention was to provide students with opportunities to “digest the theoretical knowledge” (消化理论知识) they accumulated in the classroom, “master use of operational methods” (掌握战法运用), and “gain familiarity with the real situation at the fleet” (熟悉部队实际). This initiative reflected a deliber­ate effort by the college to “get closer to the fleet and focus on real combat” (向部队靠拢, 向实战聚焦). Students participate in these exercises under the guid­ance of college instructors.

After completing the intermediate course, officers are eligible for deputy divi­sion leader (副师职) command. A surface warfare officer, for example, could be assigned to serve as the deputy commander of a destroyer flotilla (副支队长). From that position, they may, for example, deploy as the commander of a PLAN surface task force operating in contested areas of the East China Sea, with ample opportunity to apply the skills and knowledge learned in Nanjing.

Senior Course

Beginning in September, the senior course lasts five months. While in Nanjing, the officers study “the theory of joint operational command” (联合作战指挥理论), “familiarize themselves with the employment of forces from other services and service arms” (熟悉军兵种运用), “research joint campaigns and operational methods” (研究联合战役战法), and study historical naval campaigns. Stu­dents likely master current PLA campaign doctrine and strategic guidelines as pro­mulgated by the CMC, in preparation for their future roles. Instructors assign senior students research proj­ects relevant to their warfare foci, such as best approaches to prevailing in a contest over a disputed island. Like students in the intermediate course, senior students some­times are sent out to the fleet to embed in command posts, both Red and Blue, during opposition-force exercises. Given the new emphasis on jointness, students have the option of visiting other PME institutions to learn how different services operate. As in the intermediate course, simulation is a major part of the curriculum, with a focus on the operational or campaign level of war. After graduation, senior students are eligible to serve in billets with the grade of division leader (正师职). A graduate could, for example, command a destroyer flotilla, or serve as the deputy commander of a naval base.

The Capstone Graduation Exercise

In January or February each year, students from the intermediate and senior command courses participate in a campaign-level capstone wargame formally called the “graduation joint exercise” (学员毕业联合演习). The exercise, code-named SEA PLAN (筹海), occurs over seven to ten days and involves about two hundred students plus approximately one hundred outside observers and partici­pants from other PLAN units, the theater commands, and other PLA services.

Though called “exercises” (演习) or “drills” (演练), these events meet the basic definition of a wargame (兵棋推演) as understood in both China and the West: namely, a simulated conflict involving opposing sides, who make decisions on the basis of established rules. Participants are divided into Red and Blue—and often Green (i.e., third party)—teams. Each side comprises different cells representing different levels of leadership in the chain of the command. The teams are given objectives and develop plans to achieve them. The conflict progresses on the basis of alternating decisions made by the warring sides, expert judgments about the outcomes of these decisions, external circumstances controlled by game direc­tors, and, of course, chance.

The annual SEA PLAN exercise is a major event at the college. The college’s president is heavily involved in the game; he or the political commissar serves as the overall exercise director (总导演). The head of the college’s Training Department and the college’s vice president serve as his deputies (副总导演). Executive game directors are senior members of the college faculty. The game di­rector (导演组组长) for the 2021 SEA PLAN exercise, for example, was Ji Shixun (计世勋), head of the college’s Operational Command Department.

The capstone exercise is also a major event for the PLAN and the rest of the military. Personnel from the theater commands, other services, and PLAN Headquarters commonly send observers to the games. SEA PLAN is considered a model for a campaign-level “command opposition-force exercise” (指挥对抗演习). Therefore, training departments from across the fleet send personnel to watch, participate, and learn.

The SEA PLAN exercises are held in the college’s Naval Combat Laboratory. The laboratory is considered the PLAN’s most advanced facility for campaign and tactical-level wargaming. It has been designated a “key warfare laboratory” (全军重点实验室), one of the few within the Chinese military. It is the navy’s only warfare lab (作战实验室) that does campaign and tactical simulation train­ing, operational-methods research, and testing and validation of operation plans. One PLA Daily article described the laboratory as “famous across the whole mili­tary” (全军著名的). Housed in “a mysterious structure” (一栋神秘建筑) next to the main teaching building, it is rarely photographed, either inside or outside.

Students from both the intermediate and senior courses participate in the Red cells, with senior course students serving as campaign-level leaders. Students make the bulk of the decisions, applying the knowledge they learned in the class­room. College faculty members grade them on their performance.

While some students are assigned to the Blue and Green teams, many of these positions are filled by college faculty members—specifically, personnel from the college’s Blue Team Center (蓝军中心). Created in August 2012, the Blue Team Center serves as a think tank comprising thirty-plus faculty experts who engage in intensive study of the strategies, doctrines, tactics, operational concepts, orga­nization, and leadership culture of real-world potential adversaries. Members of the college’s Blue Team Center are much sought after by the fleet for their exper­tise and frequently travel to support fleet exercises, providing advice to exercise organizers and playing members of Blue or Green command posts.

SEA PLAN organizers craft games that are intended to be realistic. Scenarios are based on real-world concerns and real-world adversaries or potential adversaries. Students who play Red are playing China. Participants who play Blue or Green are playing Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, or the United States, de­pending on the scenario. For Red, the game’s command interface is based on the Integrated Command Platform (ICP) actually used by the PLA since late 2008. The capabilities of Red forces match existing Chinese capabilities. The same goes for Blue and Green. Students are required to give mock press conferences to ex­plain and defend their side’s actions, as military officers might be required to do in an actual conflict. Students apply real doctrinal concepts, such as the “Three Warfares” (legal warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion warfare), to their campaign execution.

Red’s command levels are based on existing command-and-control structures, which have changed in recent years. The designers of SEA PLAN–2016 eliminated fleet command-post cells, replacing them with joint maritime operations com­mand posts, which, as in the real world, had the authority to command all PLA forces operating over water. According to participants, the new command-and-control arrangements increased the speed and efficiency of force employment, though commanders apparently had a difficult time processing the larger amount of information they received. To make these cells more realistic, the college invited outside experts to play other-service members in the joint cell. For the 2021 capstone exercise, for example, the college invited nearly a hundred outside personnel from the PLAGF, PLAAF, PLARF, and PLA Strategic Support Force from an unnamed theater command (probably the Eastern Theater Command) to play in the game cells.

SEA PLAN scenarios echo real-world events and concerns. In the Xi Jinping era (2012 to present), several of the games have involved “gray zone” incidents that escalated to armed conflict. For example, the 2014 war-game scenario started with a collision between a Red coast guard cutter and a Blue warship, resulting in injuries to Red personnel. The incident quickly escalated to conflict. The 2016 game centered on Red’s defense of a large oil-and-gas-drilling platform pre­sumably placed in contested waters, a scenario identical to that which occurred between China and Vietnam from May to July 2014 in the South China Sea. In the 2017 game, Red installed an “ocean monitoring station” (海洋监测站) in a disputed area, leading to a forceful response from Blue, including “obstruction and sabotage” (阻挠和破坏). At the time, the PRC was planning to install such a station at Scarborough Shoal, though it ultimately chose not to. The 2021 game was a Taiwan conflict scenario, presumably reflecting the growing tensions over the status of the island nation.

Naturally, U.S. military intervention in the types of regional conflicts being wargamed is a major concern for the players, and the college often includes a Green cell to play the United States (for those games where the United States is not the opposing Blue force). Green forces intervene in the conflicts in a variety of ways: they employ electronic warfare to obstruct Red operations; invent legal­istic rationales for maintaining presence in the vicinity of the conflict, complicat­ing Red’s actions; and share intelligence on Red with their partners and allies. In the 2021 game, Blue (as the United States) directly intervened in a Taiwan crisis, leading to armed conflict with Red. The episode began with a battle of wills: Blue insisted on maintaining a humanitarian corridor by creating no-fly and no-sail zones (禁飞禁航区) adjacent to the island. It then dispatched aircraft to the scene to conduct electronic-warfare attacks “to isolate the battlefield” (战场阻隔), putting Red in “a very difficult spot” (防不胜防). Red employed ocean surveillance vessels and antisubmarine warfare air­craft—which dropped large numbers of sonobuoys—to track Blue submarines operating in the area. Game adjudicators judged these efforts to be successful, with one Blue submarine sunk, the victim of a torpedo fired by a Red surface combatant. Blue responded with “integrated air and sea strikes” (海空一体打击行动) with the support of unmanned aerial vehicles employing electronic-warfare tactics, sinking or damaging several Red ships. Ultimately, Red prevailed by leveraging what its campaign commander—Senior Captain Jiang Zhonglin (蒋忠林)—described as its “obvious joint strike advan­tages in the theater” (我作战海区联合打击优势明显).

Conclusion

Fifteen years after the end of World War II, the then-retired Chester Nimitz vis­ited the U.S. Naval War College, where he praised the institution for its valuable role in preparing naval officers like him for command in the Pacific. Perhaps with some exaggeration, he declared: “The war with Japan had been re-enacted in the game rooms here by so many people and in so many different ways that noth­ing that happened during the war was a surprise—absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics toward the end of the war; we had not visualized those.” That is high praise—and similar to what may well be applied by PLAN admirals to the Naval Command College in the future.

As this article has shown, the college at Nanjing is almost entirely focused on preparing naval officers to serve command positions in the future mari­time conflicts that China is most likely to fight. Students participating in the intermediate-level course are dedicated to the study of combined-arms naval command, while officers in the senior course concentrate on naval campaign command. In recent years, course work on strategic-level issues has been in­troduced to ensure commanders are able to grasp the larger context of their actions, but the core purpose of learning is to cultivate naval officers who can make rapid and smart decisions about how best to employ Chinese naval assets to prevail in conflict at sea.

The PLAN Naval Command College’s focus on naval warfare is reflected in its full embrace of educational wargaming. Gaming is treated as a didactic tool for both the intermediate and senior courses. Students are expected to leverage the advanced facilities available at the college’s Naval Combat Laboratory—the PLAN’s most advanced facility for tactical- and campaign-level wargaming. Moreover, the heart of the college’s academic calendar is a seven-to-ten-day capstone wargame held each winter. The school’s senior leaders are directly involved in the game, a reflection of the importance attached to it. The college as­signs members of its Blue Team Center—the PLAN’s premier corps of experts on China’s future enemies—to join the Blue and Green cells. The scenarios are real­istic, and the capabilities, organization, and doctrines of Red, Blue, and Green are intended to reflect real life. The result appears to be a highly valuable educational experience for the participants. In the words of one recent student, Li Haichen (李海臣), the sense of “shock and reflection brought by this exercise will follow me throughout my career.”

In sum, the Naval Command College strives to provide midcareer officers with a full appreciation of the conflict scenarios China could face and the military problems with which PLAN officers must grapple to serve as effective wartime commanders at the high-tactical and operational levels of war. Therefore, gradu­ates should return to the fleet well versed on the PLAN’s best estimates of how the next maritime conflict might start, where it will take place, who will be involved, and what roles PLAN forces will be expected to play.

This preparation, of course, does not guarantee superior command perfor­mance in China’s next conflict. As the profiles of three recent graduates of the senior course suggest, students come to Nanjing very raw, with deep experience in a particular warfare community, often in a single unit or geographic area, but with little if any meaningful engagement with other warfare communities in the PLAN, let alone joint experience. It is difficult to imagine that a mere five months at the college can transform these students into effective campaign-level commanders. Moreover, despite some efforts by the college to teach students about the cultures, capabilities, and jargon of other services, it fundamentally remains an institution focused on naval education. This focus puts it at odds with the current PLA imperatives to cultivate officers prepared for joint command. Lastly, effective wartime leadership requires a number of other qualities that may not—perhaps cannot—be cultivated at the Naval Command College, owing to factors inherent in China’s Leninist system. These involve questions of character, individual empowerment, and independence of thought.

Nevertheless, the PLAN’s approach to midcareer officer education should prompt some reflection within U.S. PME institutions—above all, within the U.S. Naval War College. Do existing curricula strike the right balance between strategy and policy studies and the practice of modern naval warfare? Do all graduates depart the College with a solid understanding of the capabilities, doc­trines, and organization of the country’s most dangerous potential adversary? How much educational wargaming is needed to give naval officers ample oppor­tunity to apply the knowledge they gain in the classroom? Despite the tendency of USN leaders to glorify the achievements of the War College in the 1920s and 1930s, it is the PLAN—not the U.S. Navy—whose midcareer officer education more closely resembles the practices of that era. Has the College simply evolved a better approach, or might there be elements from the past worth resurrecting?

Ryan D. Martinson is an assistant professor in, and a core member of, the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. He researches China’s maritime strategy, especially its coercive use of sea power in East Asia. In 2021, Martinson won the Naval War College’s Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award.

Featured Image: The guided-missile destroyer Nanchang steams in tactical formation during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zou Xiangmin)

The Caribbean Sea: A Strategic Area with Many US Allies and Partners

By Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

In late March, the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) and the Guyanese patrol vessel Shahoud carried out joint exercises in Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and international waters. Washington has many allies and partners across the Greater Caribbean, particularly among the region’s English-speaking nations. Despite having limited budgets and assets, the defense forces of the English-speaking Caribbean are training and increasing their capabilities to carry out missions, which aligns with US diplomatic and military objectives.

Ongoing Dialogue

The good news is that high-level interactions between the U.S. military and Caribbean militaries continue. U.S. Navy Admiral Alvin Holsey, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), traveled to Trinidad and Tobago last December to participate in the Caribbean Nations Security Conference (CANSEC) 2024.

In early January, U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Nathan Moore, Commander of the Atlantic Area, visited Barbados and met with Barbados Defence Force Chief of Staff Brigadier Carlos Lovell. The two senior officers discussed further cooperation on common threats, including transnational organized crime and illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Subject Matter Experts from the U.S. military traveled to Jamaica in March and visited the Jamaica Defence Force’s Joint Information and Operations Centre.

The Jamaican Defense Force hosted three key Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) at the Joint Information and Operations Centre in March 2025. (JDF photo)

More recently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname in late March. The tour was a chance to address Caribbean defense and security issues: during his stop in the Jamaican capital, Rubio also met with Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Stuart Young and discussed the bilateral security partnership and regional security issues.

Recent Acquisitions by Caribbean Forces

Improving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) remains a priority for Caribbean governments and their defense forces. Hence, regional naval forces acquire new surface and aerial assets for these missions. The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) has led the way over the past decade via the Sandy Bottom Project, which enabled the acquisition of a fleet of different Damen-made surface vessels, including patrol vessels. The RBDF has also acquired a fleet of drones. Similarly, the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) has acquired four offshore patrol vessels, also manufactured by Damen, for the JDF Coast Guard; the HMJS Norman Manley arrived in late 2023.

More recently, the Antigua & Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) Coast Guard announced in late February the commissioning of a new speedboat for the fleet, hull number CG11-1 Swordfish. This acquisition demonstrates Saint John’s commitment to strengthening the ABDF and improving MDA. Suriname’s Navy is now operating the patrol vessel RSS Barracuda (P501), acquired through a lease-to-buy agreement with Damen Shipyard Group. The ship will have “a crucial role in the protection of the maritime area of ​​the country,” explained the Ministry of Defense. (Suriname’s official language is Dutch, not English, but I will mention it nonetheless).

Guyana deserves special attention. In late 2024, Guyana finally received the 115-foot Defiant patrol vessel GDFS Berbice, produced by the U.S. shipyard Metal Shark. Berbice is the new flagship of the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) Coast Guard and will support maritime operations. Given that Guyana has a border dispute with neighboring Venezuela over Guyana’s Essequibo region and oil-rich waters, acquiring new platforms for the GDF is a priority. In fact, in early March, the Venezuelan patrol vessel ABV Guaiqueiri PO-11 entered Guyana’s exclusive economic zone and harassed oil assets operating there. In a statement, the Guyanese government explained that, “The Venezuelan naval vessel communicated threateningly via radio communication that FPSO PROSPERITY was operating in Venezuela’s exclusive economic zone before continuing in a Southwestern direction towards other FPSOs, to which it delivered the same message.” The Venezuelan Ministry of Defense justified the operation, arguing it took place in contested waters.

GDFS Berbice being launched by Metal Shark in Louisiana. (Metal Shark photo)

The U.S. military and coast guard presence in the Caribbean

The U.S. military, particularly SOUTHCOM, its maritime component U.S. Fourth Fleet, and even U.S. Northern Command (with The Bahamas within its area of responsibility) continue to engage Washington’s English-speaking allies throughout the Caribbean. Engagement is not limited to meetings but also bilateral and multinational military training. For example, SOUTHCOM sponsors the annual exercise Tradewinds, specifically designed for the Caribbean – Trinidad and Tobago hosted Tradewinds 2024. Bilateral training occurs when U.S. warships visit the Caribbean. Passing exercises (PASSEX) are fairly common, case in point, at the time of this writing, in late March, the Normandy and the Shahoud carried out joint exercises, including PASSEX, “in international waters and the Guyana Exclusive Economic Zone to exercise communications and interoperability, and practice joint maneuvers,” according to the U.S. embassy in Guyana.

SOUTHCOM remains focused on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) missions across the Caribbean – and the rest of Latin America. The U.S. hospital ship Comfort is often deployed. However, in recent years, the Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport vessel USNS Burlington (T-EPF 10) has also traveled throughout the Caribbean to assist populations in need. HA/DR operations are already taking place this year.

The Lesser Antilles Medical Assistance Team (LAMAT) 2025, commenced on 24 February, during which U.S. military medical personnel will visit several Caribbean nations. While LAMAT 2025 does not involve vessels, the humanitarian exercise will provide invaluable medical services to the inhabitants of Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana. “All involved agree LAMAT’25 is a win-win scenario, benefiting both U.S. military personnel and partner nations. The mission enhances medical readiness and strengthens partnerships while improving healthcare infrastructure in underserved areas,” explained Air Forces Southern, the aerial component of SOUTHCOM.

The U.S. Navy deployed several assets over the past years throughout the Caribbean as regional countries were hit by deadly and destructive natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. (In previous commentaries for CIMSEC, this author suggested that SOUTHCOM deserves a permanently assigned hospital ship.)

As for security operations, U.S. Navy warships, particularly destroyers and littoral combat ships (LCSs), and U.S. Coast Guard cutters regularly patrol the Caribbean Sea to interdict illicit maritime activities, particularly drug trafficking via vessels and the infamous narco-submarines. Recent platforms deployed to the Command’s area of responsibility include the LCS St. Louis and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner (DDG 116). The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Valiant unloaded approximately 12,470 pounds (5,656 kilograms) of cocaine in early March at Coast Guard Base Miami Beach, worth an estimated $141.4 million. The contraband was seized thanks to six interdictions in the Caribbean Sea.

Finally, the Caribbean Sea is ideal for testing emerging technologies. At the time of writing, Operation Southern Spear is underway as the U.S. Navy is testing Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs). The objective is to test new systems to develop the future U.S. Navy’s hybrid fleet as part of the service’s Project 33. 

Discussion and Analysis

Some Greater Caribbean countries have governments that clash with U.S. diplomatic aims, namely Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. However, the region has many historical and trustworthy U.S. allies and partners. In a recent interview, Belize Defence Force commander Brigadier General Azariel Loria discussed training exercises with SOUTHCOM, including Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) and the Louisiana National Guard via the State Partnership Program. “We are eager to continue joint training exercises focused on countering transnational threats, with the goal of incorporating tactical operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and specialized training on counterterrorism and disaster response,” he said. BG Loria added that the BDF “looks forward to more innovated ways to take our partnership to another level to improve coordination between our land, air, and maritime units.” In other words, the commanding officers of the English-speaking Caribbean defense forces see the U.S. armed forces (including the Coast Guard) as important allies and partners for training and operating together to combat crimes in air, land, and sea. This relationship must not be lost.

The issue of equipment availability and serviceability is an obvious problem within the region. The Caribbean Sea is a large body of water, and Caribbean countries are not one single unified island nation. Depending on the country, each nation can include countless islands, islets, cays and atolls, and a vast maritime territory. Hence, regional naval forces require a fleet of surface vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to properly monitor and command their maritime territory. Certainly, more vessels demand additional expenses like port infrastructure, fuel, ammo, and crew, among other financial considerations, meanwhile defense budgets across the Caribbean remain limited, hamstringing fleets across the Caribbean. However, the examples mentioned in this analysis- the Bahamas and Jamaica acquiring several ships and the more modest acquisitions of Guyana and Antigua & Barbuda- demonstrate civilian authorities’ commitment to assign more budgets for maritime procurement programs.

Unfortunately, the threats of illicit activities and challenges across the Caribbean will remain ever-present. The sea is the preferred corridor for drug trafficking, while IUU fishing and human and weapons smuggling are also constant challenges and threats. An ongoing concern is the crisis in Haiti, which is forcing Haitians to migrate, often via vessels. Moreover, piracy is making a comeback. Last year, there were reports that two Haitian criminal entities, 5 Seconds and Taliban gangs (no relation to the Afghan Taliban), captured the freighter Magalie at Port-au-Prince’s Varreux terminal district, stealing one-sixth of the cargo of rice and took the crewmembers hostage. The situation was resolved when the police stormed the ship. Even though the incident occurred while the ship was docked, the situation in Haiti has become so dire that it now affects maritime shipping.

For the Caribbean, cooperation is the correct answer. Given the threat environment in the Caribbean Sea and limited surface and aerial assets to patrol this vast body of water, strengthening military-to-military relations advances U.S. and Caribbean interests. A lack of sufficient patrol vessels operated by Caribbean coast guards does not mean a lack of willingness to combat maritime crimes. The U.S. government should provide more tools, including a bigger budget for SOUTHCOM. Armed with a bigger budget, SOUTHCOM can expand its low-cost/ high-impact engagements, benefiting all partners across the Caribbean region.

Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is an analyst who focuses on international defense, security, and geopolitical issues across the Western Hemisphere, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. He is the President of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, DC, and a non-resident Senior Associate at the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Follow him on X/Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.

Featured Image: CARIBBEAN SEA (Mar. 27, 2025) – The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) conducts a passing exercise with Guyana Defence Force Defiant-class patrol ship GDSF Shahoud in the Caribbean Sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dylan M. Kinee/Released)

NATO Naval Power Week Concludes on CIMSEC

By Dmitry Filipoff

Last week CIMSEC featured articles submitted in response to our Call for Articles on NATO Naval Power.

Authors explored a wide variety of themes and scenarios for the NATO alliance. How does NATO naval strategy evolve if the U.S. scales back its commitment and the Ukraine war rages on? How does the accession of Finland and Sweden change the maritime geography of NATO’s naval threat environment? How are allied nations deploying naval formations to the Indo-Pacific and contributing toward deterrence against China? NATO is at a historic inflection point and its future could take many directions.

Below are the articles and authors that featured during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions.

Parting Ways: A NATO Naval Strategy Without America,” by Paul Viscovich

In this era of increasing danger, great power competition, and uncertain loyalties, the time has come for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to declare its independence. As at the time of its founding, NATO’s strategic adversary is Russia. But unlike during the Cold War, the Alliance can no longer count on the military and industrial might of the United States in confronting the threat.”

Maritime Security on NATO’s Southern Flank: The Case for a Spanish Coast Guard,” by Gonzalo Vázquez

Following the example of many of its European and American allies in NATO, it is worth exploring the potential establishment of a Spanish Coast Guard that merges all these existing services under a single, professional service with a unified and clearly defined command structure.”

The Case for a Baltic SNMG-3: Developing Regional NATO Forces at Sea,” by Steinar Torset and Ian Bowers

NATO should create a third Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) dedicated to operations in the Baltic. This would fully exploit the operational benefits of Finland and Sweden joining NATO and take advantage of ongoing force developments in other Baltic NATO navies, including Poland and Germany.”

Keeping America Engaged: Three Possibilities for European Navies,” by Michael D. Purzycki

To keep the U.S. engaged in the waters around Europe, European NATO members must find areas of common interest with the U.S. The threat of China to both European and American security interests creates many such opportunities. By monitoring China’s activities in the Arctic, becoming more active in the Indo-Pacific, and buying American, Europeans can maintain a strong military and industrial link to the U.S. even if U.S. military presence in and around Europe shrinks in the near future.”

French Maritime Strategy – Carrier-Led and Indo-Pacific Focused,” by David Scott

French maritime strategy has been on full public display with the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG) from November 2024 to April 2025, carrying out an extended deployment across the Indo-Pacific in the furthest ever Operation Clemenceau.”

Strengthening Unity of Effort in the Atlantic: Lessons from Wargaming,” by Walter Berbrick and Terence Nicholas

By stress-testing command structures, exploring new approaches to force employment, and fostering greater integration between U.S. and NATO maritime forces, wargames have directly informed adjustments that enhance unity of effort across the Atlantic. These insights have helped refine coordination among key commands, sharpen deterrence, and improve readiness to respond to emerging threats in an increasingly complex security environment.”

A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union,” by Anna Matilde Bassoli

“The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy.”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

Featured Image: July 7, 2022 – U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Michael Sciretta assumes command of Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2) at a change of command ceremony on board the Italian frigate Carlo Margottini in Taranto Naval Station in Puglia, Italy. (NATO photo)

A Post-Mortem of the Red Sea Crisis: NATO versus the European Union

NATO Naval Power Week

By Anna Matilde Bassoli

After more than a year of disrupted global trade, the Red Sea Crisis appears to have no end in sight. Rather, in a series of leaked messages, senior U.S. officials have cast doubts over U.S. involvement and “having to bail Europe out again.” However, while frustration on each side of the pond is understandable, emotions fail to address the root causes of growing transatlantic distrust. The disjointed approach of the U.S. and the European Union to the Red Sea Crisis deserves thorough analysis as a critical yet overlooked cause of transatlantic distress. Indeed, the issue between the transatlantic allies is not who has to bail out whom. Instead, the emergence of the European Union (EU) as a security actor in the maritime domain has weakened the U.S. grip on NATO’s naval strategy. A coherent NATO naval strategy requires the United States and its European allies to align their postures, without the EU as the third wheel.

On December 18, 2023, the United States called upon allies to respond to the Houthi attacks on global shipping with the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. This multinational coalition was intended to include the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and others. However, only the UK, Canada, and Norway upheld their commitment. A few days after this announcement, most European navies withdrew to join the EU-led Operation Aspides, an overlapping defensive mission. Specifically, European navies explicitly rejected US leadership and command in an unprecedented transatlantic schism. The establishment of the EU-led Operation Aspides has resulted in a divided naval commitment and undermined efforts in the Red Sea Crisis in three crucial ways.

First, this divided effort has effectively deprived Prosperity Guardian of European naval assets over the past year. The Italian Navy has committed two destroyers and two frigates to Aspides, contrary to the single frigate initially announced in support of Prosperity Guardian. The French Navy has provided three frigates to Aspides, while it remains unclear what role they would have played in Prosperity Guardian. Similarly, the German and Belgian navies each contributed a frigate. Other European navies have divided their limited commitments between both missions, although it is unclear under which command. For example, the Hellenic Navy provided two frigates to Aspides, while the Royal Netherlands Navy contributed one frigate, a joint support ship, and aviation assets. Even the newest members of NATO, Sweden and Finland, have shown inconsistent commitment, with both countries providing only limited personnel. Despite its initial commitment to the US-led effort, Spain made no contributions. Interestingly, however, Spain’s ports benefited from the crisis, placing the country in an ambiguous position.

These commitments – or lack thereof – contrast sharply with the United Kingdom’s contribution to Prosperity Guardian during the same timeframe. In addition to the destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Duncan, the Royal Navy provided two frigates and critical air support. While this still pales compared to the US show of force, it demonstrates the UK’s consistency in its transatlantic commitment. The other European powers cannot claim to have done similarly. The Danish Navy, for instance, sent the HDMS Iver Huitfeldt, but ship malfunctions plagued its performance, resulting in the dismissal of the Danish chief of defense. Furthermore, the French Navy has prioritized French-linked vessels, indicating that national interests rather than transatlantic ones drive their participation.

Second, the European decision to withdraw from participation in Prosperity Guardian shows how Europe was already veering towards strategic autonomy before the Trump administration came to the White House. Upon announcement, the Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense specified that Italy, France, and Germany were pushing for an EU-only operation of a purely defensive nature, without land strikes. This European insistence on going solo deserves a deep dive. For starters, Europeans have criticized the Trump administration’s stance on transatlantic relations in recent weeks, calling for renewed unity. However, the lack of European support for the US-led effort demonstrates that European conduct has been inconsistent with their leaders’ rhetoric and parallel maritime commitments. For instance, Europeans have been eager to participate in Indo-Pacific exercises and showcase these efforts as a sign of strong friendship. In the same breath, Spain has actively participated in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean. However, a key question arises: how can the United States truly trust its European allies if they only show up to train and not to engage?

In this respect, the US offensive approach against the European defensive posture demonstrates that the transatlantic allies could not be more distant. By the time European navies were rotating their naval forces in the summer of 2024, some commentators had already started casting doubts on the effectiveness of Prosperity Guardian as a purely defensive mission. In response to this lack of results, the United States doubled down on eliminating the Houthi threat and deterring further attacks with strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen under Operation Poseidon Archer. Once again, however, European commitment has been limited, and preference has been given to the defensive posture of Operation Aspides. The problem plagues transatlantic relations is not the Trump administration’s aggressive stance towards Europe. Rather, the lack of entente between the US’s forward-leaning posture and the EU’s defense posture has eroded trust and partnership across the Atlantic.

Third, the US’s lack of acknowledgment of the EU as a security actor has undermined its efforts. Most recently, Michael C. DiCianna has argued that “Europe needs to fight the Houthis.” However, his analysis focuses only on Prosperity Guardian, as if it were the only ongoing operation in the Red Sea, incorrectly accounting for the European contribution. Similarly, Doug Livermore acknowledges European contributions but employs a US-only perspective to make the case for using force in the Red Sea Crisis. Neither of these authors seems to grasp the actual problem. It is not that Europe does not fight – from the European perspective, they are protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Rather, the European and US perspectives on transatlantic security and interests do not align.

This analytical bias highlights two major problems in the US debate. First, it shows that the United States only views Europe through NATO lenses, while Europeans increasingly look to the EU to bolster their security needs. Operation Prosperity Guardian and Operation Aspides began while transatlantic relations were still good. So, why did the Europeans part ways with the United States? The most evident answer points to European strategic autonomy, meaning a European defensive approach for European interests within the EU.

As evident in the Red Sea, none of this concerns the United States. Rather, Aspides attempts to demonstrate that Europe could rely on the EU as a security actor. The strong push behind an EU-led, European-only defense, particularly regarding defense spending and the primary US request since the first Trump administration, is not the result of a sudden storm. Instead, renewed US aggressiveness has further nudged the Europeans towards strategic autonomy. Indeed, Europeans have been most vocal and proactive regarding their security, not within NATO, but in the EU. The EU will never fight for US interests or in the US way. This is not what the EU was created for. On the contrary, this was why NATO was established, making it an organization suited to defend US and European interests in the American way.

This also highlights the second major problem in the US debate. Because the United States ignores the EU as a security actor, it fails to recognize that the EU and NATO rely on two opposite perspectives. Misunderstanding the difference between the EU’s inward-focused posture and the US’s forward-leaning one undermines US attempts to reset transatlantic relations. While US commentators correctly ask Europeans to contribute more, they overlook their counterparts’ perspective. From the US point of view, fighting the Houthis means not only preventing attacks on the seas but also bombing their positions on land. For Europeans, this is excessive, rendering US complaints about their conduct dangerously pointless.

In no other domain has this mistaken approach had more consequences than in the naval domain. The US viewpoint is forward-leaning – hence, offensive – towards protecting SLOCs, involving heavy military force. On the other hand, the European perspective is reactive, building convoy-like defenses around commercial ships. In short, Americans prefer to charge ahead, whereas Europeans tend to build trenches. The Red Sea Crisis exemplifies this dynamic.

The Euro-American split has resulted in two overlapping operations acting from different perspectives without a common end goal. While the EU-led Operation Aspides focuses solely on protecting commerce, US-led efforts have multilayered strategic goals: protecting SLOCs, demonstrating maritime strength on the global seas, and eroding Iran’s influence in the Middle East by striking its proxies. From the US viewpoint, these goals are not isolated but interconnected ends on a dynamic maritime chessboard, where the ultimate objective is to checkmate China. From the European perspective, China is not even on the board.

Indeed, contrary to popular US belief, the Red Sea Crisis is not about European trade; rather, it is about US sea power. The United States is not fighting the Houthis to bail out freeloading Europeans. This view is contrary to US interests and damaging to US strategy. The United States is taking charge of a maritime crisis because it can still be the premier global maritime power. This demonstration of maritime strength sends two messages. First, the United States still dominates the seas. Second, the United States is not a dead sea power to China. Underestimating the value of these messages in the context of strategic competition with China is a fatal mistake for the US.

To be fair, concerns about straining US naval forces are valid and must be addressed. However, once again, these concerns must be addressed in accordance with US naval strategy, not against it. Indeed, an increased European commitment should not continue on the premise of split naval strength. This is an open subversion of all the basic principles of US naval strategy: overwhelming naval power, control of the sea lines of communications, and maritime dominance. If the United States concedes any of these to either friend or foe, the sea power that has supported US freedom and prosperity will crumble.

The United States must leverage NATO to align transatlantic allies. This will require two key steps. First, the United States must tone down its anger towards its transatlantic allies. Autonomy-seeking Europeans might be more incentivized to maintain their defensive posture if they view the United States as an adversary. So far, this trend has been evident, and there is no reason for the United States to make Europeans even less inclined to contribute to transatlantic efforts.

The second step could involve a more structured division of labor in the Red Sea. Throughout history, very few maritime crises involving land-based attacks on commercial shipping have ended without a major deployment of strength. While the United States has a strong interest in striking the Houthis to keep Iran in check, the Europeans have an interest in keeping SLOCs open. The current approach – the United States striking the Houthis from the sea while the Europeans continue their convoy-like missions – is a good starting point. However, the split command and lack of matching European resources must cease. To make this work, the Europeans should reduce their commitments in the Indo-Pacific until the Red Sea Crisis is resolved. This would allow the United States to allocate resources effectively between the two connected theaters. Likewise, the United States should clarify that a unified command is crucial to bring this crisis to a halt.

A better understanding of expectations and goals in the Red Sea could generate premises to mend transatlantic fences. Presently, no one has the perfect recipe to bring this crisis to a halt, and a split approach has likely extended the crisis. Not only have the Houthis taken the lead in messaging victory, but the first true victim of this crisis – the Israeli port of Eilat – has fallen under financial pressure. Time has run out for the United States to complain about Europe without a plan. Likewise, time has proven that the European Union is still not a reliable security actor. An integrated NATO strategy that accounts for both US and European perspectives is the only choice for victory. The alternative option spells defeat.

Anna Matilde Bassoli holds a M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a MLitt in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews. She also earned a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy. She currently works in the think tank industry, focusing on tech policy and security.

Featured Image: The UK Royal Navy (RN) Type 23 frigate HMS Richmond (foreground) and Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond hand over on station as the RN vessel contributing to Operation Prosperity Guardian. (Photo by UK Ministry of Defence)