Tag Archives: featured

Capability Analysis

Land Force Integration: The Army’s Contribution to Deterring China

1 Comment

By Major General James B. Bartholomees III 

Chinese Coast Guard vessels are ramming Philippine Coast Guard ships at an alarming rate in the South China Sea. Chinese military planes are increasing dangerous intercepts with U.S., Allied and partner planes over the international waters of East Asia. While the high-profile use of military ships and planes is concerning, China is building and training a joint military force designed with one overarching objective in mind—to seize land areas from its neighbors. 

U.S. naval and air forces have been contesting China’s maritime and air threats for years. But they alone cannot deny China the ends of its military strategy either through gray zone tactics or use of force. With significant U.S. Army investments in long range fires systems, and lessons of harsh ground combat in the war in Ukraine, the role of land forces in the Indo-Pacific is becoming more apparent. To deter China from seizing terrain as part of the long-term strategic competition, while assuring our regional allies, U.S. Army Pacific is complementing maritime and air forces by improving the ability to defend key terrain, including the sovereign territory of the United States and its Allies. This can be accomplished by increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities forward in the region involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and capitalizing on favorable policy developments.

U.S. Army Pacific is strengthening its multi-domain capabilities to support joint operations in the Indo-Pacific region. By increasing the scale and frequency of campaigning activities, namely regional exercises that involve long-range fires systems, the Army aims to bolster Allies’ and the joint force’s abilities to counter maritime and air threats. This approach, developed through the U.S. Army’s multi-domain operations doctrine and implemented by newly formed Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), integrates land-based offensive and defensive capabilities with space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information operations.

Recently a Multi-Domain Task Force deployed its new Typhon Mid-Range Capability to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. Typhon is a mobile land-based anti-ship missile system capable of launching the Navy’s SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. Typhon offers complementary capability to the Philippines’ BrahMos antiship missile batteries coming online. The deployment demonstrated U.S. commitment to a mutual defense treaty ally faced with escalating threats. This is particularly important as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts its focus from counterinsurgency operations in Mindanao to a new strategy of comprehensive archipelagic defense. MDTFs are also employing terrestrial sensors, high-altitude balloons, and deep-sensing platforms in the Indo-Pacific.

A Mid-Range Capability (MRC) Launcher from Charlie Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Long Range Fires Battalion, 1st Multi-Domain Task Force arrives as part of the capability’s first deployment into theater on Northern Luzon, Philippines, April 7, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Ryan DeBooy)

This new formation is applying lessons from recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to drive experimentation with advanced technologies. This strategy enhances U.S. military effectiveness and empowers Allied nations with capacity to develop their own land-based long-range fires capabilities—critical for defending their sovereign areas—contributing to a more robust regional defense posture against potential adversaries like China.

U.S. Army Pacific is positioning critical sustainment equipment and supplies in Allied nations so that the U.S. is ready to meet its mutual defense treaty obligations and support U.S. joint forces. The tyranny of distance from the Continental United States to the “First Island Chain” of Japan – Taiwan – Philippines requires positioning essential equipment and supplies before any fast-moving crisis. For contingency purposes, the Army has pre-prepositioned stocks across the globe in locations such as the Middle East, Poland, Japan and Korea. These pre-positioned stocks provide a unique set of sustainment capabilities to the joint force to include Common User Land Transport (CULT), ship-to-shore fueling capability, bulk water purification and storage, vertical and horizontal engineering, field feeding, maintenance services, contracting and large-scale medical capabilities across a host of disciplines.

The Army also provides watercraft and causeways that the joint force relies upon for intra-theater sealift as well as ship-to-shore movements. U.S. Army Pacific is equipped with purpose-designed, theater-enabling commands to run these functions in support of the joint force, Allies and partners. For exercises and deployments, pre-positioned equipment and supplies in critical locations reduce commercial vessel movement costs and support the economies of vital U.S. Allies. Pre-positioning equipment and supply in the Philippines and Australia, for example, rather than on ships at sea, also enables the U.S. joint force to respond faster and more effectively to their international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs during natural events such as cyclones, typhoons, floods and landslides. Investment in pre-positioned equipment and supplies on our Allies’ soil allows the U.S. military to provide a range of options to protect and safeguard our friends in the region.

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have matured existing policy agreements with many countries allowing the Army to tangibly improve the joint force’s ability to meet Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. The new reality of China’s land seizure capability combined with their increasing ties with Russia have informed our diplomatic and military support to allies and partners. Current agreements provide sufficient authority to increase exercise scope and duration as well as storage of military equipment and supplies, but often nations choose to support agreements based on their political will. 

Persistent engagement, collaboration, and routine communication are critical to earning and maintaining our allied and partner militaries’ trust. From information sharing with the Philippines on maritime threats to their economic exclusion zones, to network development with the Japanese in command post exercises and missile defense, the U.S. Army is building trusting relationships. In stark contrast to China’s bullying tactics, the U.S. Army works with local populations and governments to gain and retain freedom of action in the competitive space, giving joint and combined forces an edge should they have to transition to crisis or conflict.

Members of the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) conduct operations. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Philip Velez)

Critics will question why allies and partners would be willing to grant access and basing short of a crisis. Because they will seek support when we least expect it – and we must be strategically vigilant in positioning forces and equipment ahead of a crisis. In competition short of war, land forces translate political legitimacy into military advantage through campaigning: the logical and sequential arrangement of operations, activities, and investments. These recommendations position U.S. Army forces to support Allies in anticipation of their requests for assistance, and at the invitation of the host nation under existing agreements. These simple actions strengthen our critical alliances – a value that China fails to bring into any of its transactional relationships.

Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (retired) Mark Milley believed that “preparing for war is expensive,” but “there is nothing more expensive than fighting a war.” The forementioned costs would be far less than U.S. blood and treasure spilled in conflict with China. General Flynn, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific, often reiterates that “our goal is no war.” To protect our allies and prevent another future conflict, U.S. land forces must complement maritime and air forces by increasing the scale and frequency of exercises involving long-range fires systems, pre-positioning equipment, and capitalizing on policy developments. U.S. air and sea power alone will not deter. Controlling physical land areas and nonphysical areas (e.g., human and information dimensions) directly supports freedom of the seas, in times of competition, or command of the sea in wartime. Alongside Marine Corps stand-in forces and U.S. special operations forces, Army forces can help secure key terrain in maritime Asia. Land force integration is essential to preventing war and winning the long-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

Major General James B. Bartholomees III currently serves as the Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Pacific. He previously served as the Operations Officer of U.S. Army Pacific and his previous commands include the 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) and 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. MG Bartholomees holds a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering from the United States Military Academy and a Masters in National Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

References

ADM Samuel J. Paparo, USN, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command speech, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, (May 3, 2024). 

Josh Luckenbaugh, “Army Has Role to Play in Air Force’s Agile Combat Concept,” National Defense Magazine (September 12, 2024).

General Charles Flynn and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Devine, “Mobilize Land Power to Contain China’s Maritime Ambitions” USNI Proceedings (September 2024). 

“2022 National Defense Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense. 

Doll, A., et al., The Backbone of U.S. Joint Operations: Army Roles in the Indo-Pacific, Rand (May 5, 2023).

Frederick, B. et al. Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, Rand (February 4, 2020).

Chris Panella, “The US Army put on a sudden show of force out on the far edge of Alaska to send the message it can as Russia and China partner in the Pacific,” Business Insider, (September 14, 2024).

Watts, S., et al., Assessing the Value of Overseas Military Campaigning in Strategic Competition, Rand (December 13, 2022).

Wong, J. P., et al., New Directions for Projecting Land Power in the Indo-Pacific: Contexts, Constraints, and Concepts, Rand (December 20, 2022).

Featured Image: Soldiers observe a live fire during Rim of the Pacific 2018 at Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking Sands. (Sgt. 1st Class Claudio Tejada/Army)

Capability Analysis

The Caspian Challenge: A Fleet in Being for Kazakhstan’s Sea Lines of Communication

1 Comment

By Bakhtiyar Askaruly

Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country, relying heavily on a resource-exporting economy, with the main route to international markets going through Russian territory.1 For many years, Kazakhstan did not experience any interruptions while exporting its resources, but the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s economic and security stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station in the Black Sea port to draw Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring different routes for its resource exports. The Caspian Sea offers a promising option but will require sea lines of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being” to protect its lines of communication, guaranteeing access to the Caspian Sea.2

80 percent of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gas exports.3 90 percent of those oil exports go to European markets through Russian territory via pipelines.4 Kazakhstan’s reliance on energy exports places the country in a vulnerable position that is now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation several times in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen foreign policy. On March 20, 2022, high seas in the Black Sea allegedly damaged the oil pumping station, but under nefarious circumstances. During the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan lost up to 300 million dollars in revenues.5 Before this event, reports surfaced that Kazakhstan chose not to send troops to Ukraine to fight alongside Russian forces.6 On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station in the Black Sea a second time due to discovered malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.7 The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian local court halted exports under the guise of an oil spill.8

In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the development of alternative routes for oil export. He directed a study to examine the construction of an underwater pipeline and the use of an oil tanker fleet in the Caspian Sea.9 Similar proposals for an underwater pipeline took place in the 1990s but remained blueprints and mockups. In the 1990’s U.S. companies undertook the Transcaspian gas pipeline project, which was aimed to transport gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a new position in the State Department for Caspian gas and oil projects. In turn, Russia appointed two high-level government representatives to address the Caspian issues. Moscow also agreed with Iran for strategic energy cooperation in the region, meant to block any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not under Russia’s control or influence.10 Both countries used the unresolved status of the Caspian Sea to impede any further development of energy transfer options.

A map depicting energy infrastructure and deposits in the Caspian Sea. (Graphic via U.S. Energy Information Administration)

In 2018, the Caspian Convention regional countries signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.11 This new legal status for the Caspian Sea allows Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit options. This project’s completion remains uncertain due to Russia’s opposition. Another option for Kazakhstan is to build a tanker fleet and expand port capabilities. In the future, a Caspian oil tanker fleet could move up to 30 percent of oil exports through the Caspian Sea.12 However, oil tankers in the Caspian remain vulnerable to adversaries’ provocations without appropriate protection offered by the Corbettian concept of a “Fleet in Being,” providing security to a friendly fleet, and defending against unwarranted attacks.

The military balance of power in the Caspian Sea is shared between five countries: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “local command” of the Caspian Sea with its relatively significant fleet for this isolated body of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, including two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, four patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six landing craft, and a gunboat.13 Iran’s fleet comprises one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, four submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet comprises two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.

Kazakhstan’s present naval fleet remains inferior compared to the top threat. Russian and Iranian cooperation further compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious position. Kazakhstan’s fleet only patrols the littorals and provides security for offshore oil extraction.

In the face of new challenges, namely developing new export routes through the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in Being” to ensure the denial of adversaries. The main task of Kazakhstan’s fleet should be focused on quick reaction to any provocation on its SLOCs, which are approximately 300 kilometers in length. This could be resolved by three to five corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with effective firepower, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. More significantly however, a naval buildup might stimulate further militarization and an arms race in the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these risks surface ships numbers should be enough to present a credible threat, but appear defensive.

The missile boat Mangystau of Kazakhstan’s Naval Forces arrives in Baku, Azerbaijan. (Photo by Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan)

To ensure that any adversary’s action in the sea would be defeated, Kazakhstan might acquire ISR systems and loitering munitions. This capability combination proved effective in the second Nagorno-Karabakh War.14 ISR systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would be able to provide locations of ships and targeting information, while loitering munitions could deliver precision strikes, similar to current operations in Ukraine. The main requirements for such platforms can include UAVs that are able to operate beyond an adversary’s effective range while being able to relay the target’s location. Loitering munitions should feature enough explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. For instance, the Harop drone could be used as a loitering munition designed to locate and strike with 23 kg of high explosive. It also can be safely landed and relaunched.15

The combination of UAVs and loitering munitions can avoid an unnecessary arms race in the Caspian Sea. It is also cheaper to acquire and maintain them. Another advantage of this combination is that they can be used in other tasks in different locations. Loitering munitions can be operated in low altitudes above the sea surface, making them highly survivable. They can an effective range of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.16 Units that operate this system could train in any location in the vast steppe of Kazakhstan. In concert with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they can also provide a credible deterrent.

Conclusion

In the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports through the Caspian Sea. However, the country’s naval power might not be able to provide secure lines of communication since it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil production, more like the functions of a coast guard. To ensure SLOC security, Kazakhstan should build a “Fleet in being.” That capability could consist of additional corvettes armed with cruise missiles, as well as ISR systems and loitering munitions. This combination promises to be an effective deterrent while not provoking an arms race in the Caspian Sea.

Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a military officer of a Central Asian nation.

References

1. https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-transport-and-logistics (accessed 4-30-2023)/

2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is meant by this term, a force than can “dispute” command of the sea.

3. https://oec.world/en/profile/country/kaz#:~:text=Yearly%20Trade,-%23permalink%20to%20section&text=The%20most%20recent%20exports%20are,and%20Germany%20(%243.82B) (accessed 4-30-2023)…

4. https://russianstudiesromania.eu/2022/07/23/russia-could-stop-the-transit-of-kazakh-oil-to-europe/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

5. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/uscherb-ot-avarii-na-ktk-nazval-ministr-finansov-466764/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

6. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1289976/ncrd1289985#liveBlogCards (accessed 4-30-2023.

7. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-russia-frictions-over-ukraine-war-go-public (accessed 4-30-2023).

8. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-court-suspends-oil-flows-through-caspian-pipeline-2022-07-06/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

9. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstan-needs-diversify-oil-supply-routes-tokayev-says-2022-07-07/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines in the Caspian: Catalyst or Cure-all?” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.

11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Commission, Energy Security Program Policy Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO association of Canada).

12. https://astanatimes.com/2023/03/kazakhstan-on-its-way-to-oil-supply-diversification/ (accessed 4-30-2023).

13. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/august/caspian-flotilla-russias-offensive-reinvention

14. John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die, (Oxford, UK: Casemate Publisher, 2022).

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

Featured Image: A Russian Navy Caspian Flotilla warship fires a Kalibr-NK cruise missile during naval drills. (Photo via Russian Ministry of Defense)

2027 War Readiness Week

Readiness for Pacific War Week Concludes on CIMSEC

Leave a comment

By Dmitry Filipoff

This past week CIMSEC featured writing submitted in response to our Call for Articles on readiness for Pacific war in 2027.

Authors covered a wide variety of topics, including force design, operational concepts, and strategic deterrence. Each of these efforts offers some possibility for improving advantage in the near-term. But with 2027 being only a few years away, it remains unclear whether defense institutions will act with the appropriate sense of urgency and clarity of purpose.

Below are the articles and authors that featured during the topic week. We thank them for their excellent contributions.

“Weaponized Containers: A Warship-in-a-Box for Warfighting Advantage,” by Steve Wills

“Any conflict with a peer opponent would be global, and historically navies find that they never have enough ships to cover all tasks that surface in the course of a major conflict. Using the shipping container, the building block of the maritime world, represents a relatively quick and easy method of creating additional naval capacity to improve warfighting advantage.”

“Considering Global War: A Strategy for Countering Revisionist Powers,” by Justin Cobb

“A denial strategy focused exclusively on Taiwan is not a true strategy but rather a subsidiary campaign objective. Zoom out and assess the broader implications of countering destructive revisionist powers. Western aligned nations must begin expanding military power and cooperation immediately and address the dilemmas that define effective force design and deterrence posturing globally.”

“The Maritime Convoys of 2027: Supporting Taiwan in Contested Seas,” by Nathan Sicheri

“Unknown factors of American public support, Taiwanese political will, and Taiwan’s ability to sustain resistance may mean that decisive sea control may come too late to supply and support Taiwan within the shrinking window of opportunity. The U.S. must carefully consider how to provide logistical support to a besieged island deep within an adversary’s weapon engagement zone and with little enabling sea control.”

“The Four-Block Littoral Force Revisited: Force Design and Marine Littoral Regiment Boarding Teams,” by Clay Robinson

“Force Design should be modified to embrace this mission by adding Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission sets of MLRs. The MIO mission is currently assigned only to Marine Expeditionary Units, but the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver elements with organic operational mobility, combined with a “mothership” such as an Expeditionary Mobile Base (ESB) and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), could make the MLR ideally suited for large-scale MIO.”

“To Prepare for Pacific War by 2027, the United States Must Harden its Southern Flank,” by Henry Ziemer

“While it remains improbable that China would seek to contest the Western Hemisphere theater with the United States by 2027, the combination of these hybrid tactics could severely undermine the United States’ position in the very region most critical for U.S. physical security.”

“Deterrence 2027: Keeping the Threat at Bay,” by James Wirtz

“If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?”

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at Content@cimsec.org.

Featured Image: PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Xianyang (Hull 108) attached to a naval destroyer flotilla under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command steams to a designated sea area during a multi-subject maritime drill on October 20, 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zhou Tianyu)

2027 War Readiness Week

Deterrence 2027: Keeping the Threat at Bay

Leave a comment

By James Wirtz

The year 2027 has been designated as a “year of maximum danger,” especially for the inhabitants of the island of Taiwan. This is not the first time, however, that a critical benchmark has emerged for American strategists and planners. Amid the shocks of the early Cold War, National Security Council Report-68 (NSC-68), drafted in April 1950 by a committee led by Paul H. Nitze, also identified a year of maximum danger, 1954.1 Nitze, who was the Director of Dean Acheson’s State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, estimated that this was the year that the Soviet Union would possess the capability to launch a disarming nuclear strike against U.S. forces, tempting the Kremlin “to strike swiftly and with stealth.” “In time,” noted Nitze, “the atomic capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more effective opposition than we have now programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack cannot be excluded.”2 History does not repeat itself, but the reader might be forgiven for thinking that it does seem to rhyme.

Nitze’s time horizon was a bit longer than ours today and the nuclear threat he foresaw was more extreme than the circumstances generally associated with a People’s Liberation Army assault on Taiwan. His response to the looming threat of the 1950s, however, also was significantly different than today’s call to better prepare to engage in hostilities about three years hence. Nitze suggested that the United States should not focus on prevailing in a coming war; instead, he called for preventing the outbreak of war in the first place by making a significant effort to bolster the West’s deterrent posture.3 This raises two relevant questions. If there is little enthusiasm today about engaging in a naval showdown in the Taiwan Strait, why not concentrate on altering Beijing’s perception of the military and political setting so that the prospect of hostilities appears unattractive? Why do we not do everything in our power to bolster our maritime deterrent to spare the world a potentially catastrophic conflict in the western Pacific?

Wanted: A Maritime Deterrent Strategy

Several ideas come to mind when explaining why talk of “warfighting” and prevailing in a possible conflict has crowded out planning for deterring, thereby preventing, the outbreak of a clash over Taiwan. One is that the Biden administration’s ambitious quest to “integrate deterrence,” creating a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance, program to synchronize deterrent activities among multiple warfare domains and across the conflict spectrum remains largely aspirational.4 Another is that an overstretched U.S. Navy has yet to devise a maritime deterrent strategy for the western Pacific, although commentators have identified the need and even the outlines of what such a strategy might look like.5 As a result, it is hard for naval officers to suggest logistical, tactical, and operational ways to strengthen deterrence, without at least a rough, agreed upon outline, of what the Navy is trying to deter and the type of deterrence strategy (deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment/coercion, deterrence by retaliation, the role of pre-emption) that will be adopted to deter war. Implementing a deterrent strategy in the western Pacific requires changes in daily maritime operations and a fundamental shift in the mindset of operators and planners.

From a deterrence perspective, the outbreak of war in the Pacific highlighted by the notion of a “year of maximum danger” constitutes a catastrophic strategic failure produced by the inability of the joint and maritime force to prevent conflict. Planning for war implies that we are already back on our heels, so to speak: the Chinese have shifted the onus of escalation onto us, leaving the Navy to engage in an attritional battle (against the People’s Republic, no less) to restore the pre-war status quo. If war breaks out, and the fleet manages to dodge the opponent’s opening salvo, it remains unclear how the Navy and the rest of the joint force would turn back the clock and “free” Taiwan.

Now some observers might object to this line of reasoning about the Navy’s failure to take deterrence seriously. Navy policy proclamations at least pay lip service to “deterrence” and reference the Navy’s contribution to deterring the outbreak of war. It also would be wrong not to acknowledge the decades of human and material resources the Navy has devoted to maintaining nuclear powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles as a leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.6 By supplying this secure second-strike capability, the Navy is the centerpiece of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It is the service that supplies America’s ultima ratio regum. The Navy is no stranger to deterrence; the idea is a classic tenet of naval strategy.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the Navy has been preoccupied not with deterring war, but with fighting major wars and other engagements at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Humanitarian operations, freedom of navigation operations, anti-piracy patrols, counter-proliferation intercepts, escort duties, policing “no-fly zones,” executing small precision strikes, mounting missile defenses, and delivering massive air and missile assaults, have been a fixture of the Navy’s day-to-day activities. It might not be an exaggeration to say that most of the Navy is not involved in deterring anything but is instead fully and continuously engaged in actual hostilities, e.g., ongoing operations in the Red Sea. As a result, deterrence is a concept that does not seem to correspond to maritime realities for officers today. To them, deterrence is an idea that appears if not incredible, then somewhat farfetched – a figment of academic imagination.

Deterrence is not just an alien concept to today’s officers; however, it also appears disturbing or ill advised. Although the Navy has been continuously engaged in warfighting for decades, its operations usually appear to be circumspect, measured, and precise. Efforts are made to minimize collateral damage, to avoid harm to third parties, to not place personnel or assets in harm’s way unnecessarily, and to minimize the risks of escalation by friend and foe alike.7 By contrast, deterrence is all about risk, or as Thomas Schelling put it, deterrence is a competition in risk taking.8 Deterring an attack on Taiwan is not just about engaging an amphibious assault before it can establish some beachhead. It also is about undertaking operations that create a perceptible risk of a wider regional, global, and even nuclear war. Indeed, it would be prudent to treat a high-intensity conventional battle between two nuclear-armed competitors as a nuclear war, even though few Americans think much about the potential nuclear dimensions involved in the defense of Taiwan and no one has suggested that nuclear weapons should be introduced in the tactical or operational defense of the Island. 

Get Serious about Deterrence – Today

The Prussian theoretician and historian of war Carl Von Clausewitz offers a bit of advice for those contemplating 2027 as a year of maximum danger: “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish… the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”9 Following Clausewitz’s writ is no small matter; nevertheless, maritime strategy is what supplies us with a description of future war, how to deter it, and how to prevail in the event of deterrence failure. It remains unclear, however, how a Navy that still appears captured by capabilities-based planning and the dreary routines of budget preparation will devise this maritime strategy. 

The starting point for this new strategy is establish its initial objective: to deter an “all domain” amphibious assault on Taiwan that could well escalate into a pan-Asia war. Additional objectives should be added as the strategy is fined tuned. The Navy’s nascent “hellscape” initiative could provide a sea denial capability that would form the basis of a deterrence by denial strategy in the waters around Taiwan, while the Navy’s sea control forces could undertake assurance of allies, prevent the isolation of friends and allies in the event of hostilities, and prepare to engage in deterrence by punishment/coercion in the event of deterrence failure.

This bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is in keeping with the general thrust of the Navy’s ongoing force development efforts and would provide a way for the Navy to synchronize modernization efforts that are already underway.10 What is especially attractive about adapting a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy is that it can have an immediate impact on the strategic situation in the western Pacific. If Beijing is paying attention, actions taken now can quickly bolster deterrence. Ship movements, exercises, especially with friends and allies, force deployments, war games, and experiments could send opponents back to the drawing board for weeks, months, or maybe even years. A bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy will not be perfect at the outset; effectiveness depends on continuous change and evolving capabilities. By contrast, procurement programs require at least a decade to field a new capability – if war breaks out in 2027 it really will be a “come as you are” affair.

Conclusion

It remains unclear how the Navy might shift its corporate attention toward devising a maritime deterrent and how such a strategy might be promulgated across the service. Today, ideas that depart from routine are sometimes acknowledged and pushed aside, not out of malice but out of an inability to direct them to “the right office.” Without a senior advocate to sponsor change, it is difficult to discern a pathway forward to gain broad acceptance for a new emphasis on deterrence, or the acceptance of a bi-modal maritime deterrent strategy. Nevertheless, we need to put capabilities and operations in place so that Beijing decides that the game is not worth the candle. Maybe the greatest advantage offered by a bi-modal maritime deterrent is that we can begin to put it into practice quickly, before Beijing’s 2027 countdown to a showdown.

James J. Wirtz is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Endnotes

1 Samuel F. Wells Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security Vol. 4, No.2, (Fall 1979) pp. 116-158.

2 A Report to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC68), April 15, 1950, p. 37. https://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSC-68.pdf 

3 NSC-68 was intended to influence positively the Truman administration’s decision to develop thermonuclear weapons to bolster quickly the U.S. deterrent posture.

4 James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Wanted: A Strategy to Integrate Deterrence,” Defense and Security Analysis, pp. 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2024.2352943

5 James J. Wirtz, “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy: The Key to an Overarching Navy Warfighting Concept,” CIMSEC, 2 October 2024. https://cimsec.org/a-maritime-deterrence-strategy-the-key-to-an-overarching-navy-warfighting-concept/

6 “Big Navy” has always maintained a rather nuanced relationship with its nuclear deterrence mission see James J. Wirtz, “The SSBN and US Nuclear Strategy: The Future of the Maritime Deterrent,” in Rory Medcalf, Katherine Mansted, Stephen Fruhling and James Goldrick (eds.) The Future of the Undersea Deterrent: A Global Survey (Acton: The Australian National University, 2020), pp. 16-18.

7 Alan Cummings, “Reinvigorate Risk: The United States need to focus on manipulating adversary risk,” USNI Proceedings Vol. 148/3/1, 429, March 2022. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/march/reinvigorate-risk

8 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92-125.

9 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 88.

10 “A Maritime Deterrence Strategy.”

Featured Image: A J-10 fighter jet attached to an aviation brigade with the PLA air force under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command taxis on the flightline during a flight exercise on October 31, 2024. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Guoyun)