Wrapping Up Alternatives to DDG Flight III

May 16, 2013 Guest Author 2 Comments

Last month we challenged contributors to take their best shot (or really any shot, so long as it was interesting) at articulating alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class DDG Flight III. We originally intended the series to run a week, but never ones to reject late-but-coherent thoughts, we kept it going as long as the submissions kept coming in. The results were quite interesting, challenging force structure/projection assumptions, as well as following the assumptions in the chain of reasoning leading to the Flight III as currently conceived:

The U.S. needs to conduct ballistic missile defense (BMD)
U.S. BMD needs a sea-based component
The sea-based component needs to fit on a surface ship

Most of the hard looks questioned whether the (yet-to-be awarded) Air and Missile Defense Radar is the best way forward for the BMD mission and if so, whether the Flight III DDG is the best platform on which to base it.

Here are some parting shots that focus not on the BMD side of the house, but on ways to generate more of what a Flight III would accomplish with the rest of its mission set toolbox:

LT Patrick Kiefer, USN:

“One thing that we need more of on the destroyers is more helicopters… why we stop at 2 is a little baffling and then only a carrier has more…why not look to put 4 or 6 with simultaneous takeoff and landing? And when you look at everything the MH-60 brings, it is really a force multiplier that brings significant capabilities to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) missions, especially counter-swarm, and provides some limited support to anti-air warfare (AAW) and STRIKE.”

Sebastian Bruns, Germany:

The selection of the Flight III DDG or an alternative needs to be explained to the American people. Thoroughly. It is a grave irresponsibility to not lead a public discourse about the value of sea power in general, and the value and uses of certain platforms over others in particular.

More than a joke in need of a punchline: How many MH-60Rs can you fit on a DDG?

It follows from this that there must be a coherent policy – means selected to accomplish aims with due respect to timing and costs (“strategy”). This would serve as national security contract underpinning the use of the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) for the better of the nation. What do you want from a (probably Aegis-equipped?) ship? FIghting pirates off Somalia or intercepting ICBMs in the Mediterranean? Counter-narco ops in Mexico or deterrence of regional rouge states? This approach is easier said than done, but one needs bold characters and ideas to really make a strategy deserving of its name (as opposed to yet another doctrine, white paper, document, etc. that’s more platitudes than substance). Vague “AirSea Battle” concepts don’t buy public support, and they rarely serve as a 10- or 20-year outlook. 30-year shipbuilding plans, on the other hand, don’t mean much to many people (in fact, as a Hill staffer, I attended a hearing where the value of a three-decade plan was questioned and IMHO misleading arguments were made for a 10- or 20-year shipbuilding plan).

U.S. shipbuilding must get its act together, along with a trimmed procurement bureaucracy at the Pentagon and a coherent Congress that sets its priorities straight. This last item might, above all, be the most “wishful” of all my thinking, as politics will always be politics. But consider for a moment the extensive list of design failures, cost-overruns, ideas scuttled at the drawing board, and procurement problems vs. the “successes” of the past 25 years. There’s quite a negative imbalance, from the perspective of an outside observer. Competitiveness must be improved. Perhaps the U.S. needs to finally look abroad for designs that could be adapted for the U.S. Navy. A joint design, perhaps, with a trusted allied partner nation from Asia or Europe?

I am under the impression that the current pace of events (and, quite frankly, developments not really in favour of a strong defense budget) might well quickly overtake the discussions that naval specialists lead among themselves, rendering these conversations irrelevant. The end state? Pooling and sharing, leading from behind by default and necessity, without the negative political connotations.

LT H.Vic Allen, USN:

The ability to base 2 helos is non-negotiable. Helos expand a great deal – from situational awareness (SA) to the weapons systems envelope to flexibility; you name it. The capabilities of the MH-60R brings a ridiculous amount of SA to the CO/warfare commander.

Rethink the bridge watch team, a la LCS. For the vast majority of the time, there’s no reason why fly-by-wire and autopilots can’t do the work of a bridge team that is probably 200% too big.

Keep VLS. Even a 32-cell install is very useful.

Hybrid power plants that support kinetic and directed energy weapons. GTGs won’t cut it anymore.

Incorporate a wide array of UAVs. Undersea unmanned vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) don’t provide enough bang for the buck – a DDG is very visible, so stealthy insertion of UUVs isn’t going to help, and USVs just don’t have the range/speed necessary to make them competitive with UAVs. I foresee close-in (<10nm), local (10-100nm) and long-range (>100 nm) UAVs as assisting DDGs with their missions.

Note: The views expressed above are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their governments, militaries, or the Center for International Maritime Security.

Uncategorized

X-47B Sea Trials – A BFD

May 14, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

My twitter feed was abuzz today with statements lauding this morning’s launch of the U.S. Navy’s X-47B unmanned carrier air system from USS George H. W. Bush (CVN 77):

“…another great first for naval aviation…History has just been made…Momento histórico…History has just been made…the Next Era of Naval Aviation…Launch Catapults Naval Aviation into the Future…New era in warfare…MOMENTOUS…Watershed…a pivotal milestone in naval aviation…game-changing technology,” etc.

There is a bit of truth in all of these. Though perhaps the event is best summarized in the words of Vice President Biden.

This article was re-posted by permission from, and appeared in its original form at NavalDrones.com.

Capability Analysis

Patos, Logos, Etos and the LCS Design Trap

May 13, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

Not the Prince of Survivability — *Prince of Wales*: Victim of survibability or the changing operational environment?

Bloomberg News recently again raised the issue of LCS survivability. Survivability is justifiably important as it is one of the key characteristics that differentiates warships from commercial vessels. Yet there is something wrong with the debate about LCS survivability. In general, the arguments fall into one of three broad categories — patos, logos, or etos. These Greek words refer to our emotions, rational mind, and values. In discussing LCS survivability patos dominates over logos. When there is strong disagreement on a specific issue, it is sometimes useful to state the reasoning carried to its extreme in order to mark the boundaries of common sense. This lets us reconsider the validity of the initial assumptions and is a loose variation of the reductio ad absurdum method. We can say also that this is an emotional way of applying logic, justified in cases when pure logic is viewed does not satisfy emotional positions.

Consider whether the following statement is TRUE or FALSE:

“Level 3 ships are NOT survivable.”

It is always the possible to offer examples to support a TRUE assertion. An aircraft carrier will hardly survive the explosion of a nuclear torpedo under her keel. A more realistic and historical case is discussed in D. K. Brown’s “Nelson to Vanguard“, in which the battleship Prince of Wales – designed to withstand 1,000 lb. explosives – was sunk by aerial, light torpedoes with 330 lb. warheads. Nonetheless we consider ships designed according to the best contemporary practices as “survivable.” This simply demonstrates that survivability cannot be determined without defining the predicted level of threat. It is stated both in OPNAVINST 9070.1A and its predecessor. I find especially useful the threat- and conflict-level classification proposed by Rear Admiral Richard Hill (RN) in his paper Medium Power Strategy Revisited. Normal conditions with operations like constabulary work, disaster relief, and presence

Low intensity operations when “escort by surface combatants may be required.” “Cover by high-capability forces may be required, to deter or if necessary counter escalation.” These operations “are subject to the international law of self-defense, often include sporadic acts of violence by both sides, and have objectives that are predominantly political in nature”.
Higher level operations with combat at the far end of the continuum. “The definition of ‘higher level’ includes ‘use of major weapon systems’, that is to say combat aircraft, major surface units, submarines, and extensive mining; missiles from air, surface and subsurface can be employed.”

Sail frigates and later cruisers were designed to be a scouts and to operate on commerce shipping lines, but were never intended to survive a clash with an enemy’s battle fleet. Royal Navy WWII destroyers were surely designed according to naval rules, but in the 1st year of the war they were exposed to a threat level unimaginable a few years earlier and suffered a loss of 124 ships sunk or damaged out of the 136 in service at the outbreak of war.

I also offer this statement for consideration:

“It is possible to design and construct 300-ton Fast Attack Craft with Level 3 survivability.”

Theoretically the statement is TRUE, but it is enough to recall the transformation of HMMWVs into MRAPs, which could be described as improving Level 1 survivability to Level 2, to understand the technical and economic limitations to such an endeavor. There was an interesting paper presented last year to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects – Balancing Survivability, Operability and Cost for a Corvette Design. It offers interesting insights into unavoidable compromises, and a not-so-surprising conclusion that the best way to increase survivability is to increase the length of the ship. From this point of view both LCS are of good design, but LCS also falls into a design trap. Longer and bigger ships lead to criticism of being underarmed. Up-arming the ship would lead to higher costs and reduced affordability. This in turn means a smaller fleet and an increased gap between force-structure requirements and reality. Such a gap leads to questions of whether it can be filled by smaller ships. But these are in turn “not survivable”. Vicious circle closed.

Ship survivability is a complex issue, including such things as the probability of being hit, tolerance to damage, and recoverability. I cannot judge whether LCS is survivable or not. The better question to ask is if it is survivable enough – taking into account its size, mission, and the projected threat level in its intended operating environment. Such a discussion is vital to every class of ships and calls for carefully balanced patos and logos.

Przemek Krajewski alias Viribus Unitis is a blogger In Poland. His area of interest is broad context of purpose and structure of Navy and promoting discussions on these subjects In his country

Current Operations, Uncategorized

Death of a Fisherman

May 12, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

The rough location of the shooting incident.

Taiwan on Sunday sent a task force of three Coast Guard Administration vessels and one Lafayette-class navy frigate to waters near the northern Philippines, joining a Knox-class frigate already in the area. The move follows the death of a Taiwanese fisherman last Thursday that has strained ties between the neighbors.

The 65-year-old fisherman was aboard the fishing vessel Kuang Ta Hsin No 28 when he was killed in a confrontation with Philippine coastguardsmen aboard the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel MCS 3001, an incident now under investigation by the Philippines government.

On Friday, the Philippines confirmed that it had confronted two fishing vessels and fired at one, but only after it says a vessel tried to ram the 30-meter MCS 3001. Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Commander Armand Balilo said that the BFAR ship fired to disable the ship’s engines, and before the coastguardsmen were aware of the injury, they saw “a big white ship“ that apparently scared them off. “Our people felt threatened so they left the area,” he said, according to AFP News.

It is important to note that although the Philippines insists the incident took place in its undisputed waters, so far Taiwan has not acknowledged that assertion, backing the Kuang Ta Hsin‘s claims that they were in an area of overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Despite an increase in Filipino spending, Taiwan has more naval forces to call upon as a result of decades of inter-strait tension. — Despite an increase in Filipino naval spending, Taiwan has more naval forces to call upon as a result of decades of inter-strait tension.

Two additional Taiwanese fishing vessels reportedly rescued the Kuang Ta Hsin after it called for help and “towed the boat back to a port in southern Taiwan.”

Taiwan responded on Friday by demanding compensation from the Philippine Coast Guard, prosecution for those responsible, and an apology within 72 hours. Failure to comply would lead to a freeze on the hiring of Filipino nationals in Taiwan, said the spokeswoman for Taiwan’s presidential office, Lee Chia-fei.

The Philippines, however, are waiting for the result of their official investigation, with no word on its expected duration and in the mean time sticking by claims of justifiable self-defense. “If somebody died, they deserve our sympathy but not an apology,” said Balilo. Nonetheless, the personnel involved have been suspended as a matter of routine pending the investigation’s outcome. Interestingly, another Filipino news site says video exists of the incident and will be used in the investigation but is not available for public viewing.

Meanwhile hackers from both nations have targeted each others’ government websites.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.