Update: U.S. officials say SEALs were involved in the strike against Barawe but have not released details on casualties or the success/target of the mission. Elsewhere, US forces have reportedly captured Anas al-Libi, a involved in the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and are holding him aboard a U.S. naval vessel.
A developing story today: reports coming out of Somalia of a pre-dawn, seaborne raid at the al-Shabaab-held coastal town of Barawe. Al Shabaab at first stated U.S. forces may have been involved, then said the raid consisted of British SAS and Turkish forces.
“The commander of the British force, it said, was killed during the attack and four other SAS operatives were critically wounded. One Turkish soldier was also wounded, according to a statement by Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, al Shabaab’s military operation spokesman.”
British and Turkish officials are publicly denying any involvement. France has similarly denied involvement despite one Somali official’s statement that the raid was carried about by French forces targeting a Chechen or Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane, aka Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, believed behind the attack on Nairobi’s Westgate mall.
Other accounts say with some troops also landed by helicopter, and that the focus of the raid was a two-story beach-side house used as a headquarters.
The only non-conflicting report at this point seems to be that residents awoke to the sounds of gunfire around 3am.
This article is a part of The Hunt for Strategic September, a week of analysis on the relevance of strategic guidance to today’s maritime strategy(ies). As part of the week we have encouraged our friendly international contributors to provide some perspective on their national and alliance strategic guidance issues.
As the United States undertakes a rigorous review of its strategic guidance, Canadian defence planners should take note. An update is expected for an important element of American maritime strategy, Cooperative Seapower for the 21st Century, which calls for operations to be carried out ‘ideally’ in concert with allies. The Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), to be issued next year, will assess the threats and challenges faced by the United States and set out long-term plans on how to develop American capabilities accordingly.
In contrast, Canada lacks an equivalent to the QDR, with any strategic review conducted on an ad hoc basis. In 2001, a weighty tome was published by Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND), entitled Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020. As this was developed and released prior to the September 11th attacks and such operations as Active Endeavour, an update came in 2005, entitled Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers: Charting the Course from Leadmark. Since then, no further updates to Canada’s maritime strategy have been released. In 2008, DND released the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), but this is primarily concerned with funding and procurement issues for the Canadian Forces as a whole. The CFDS is already badly dated; where it does briefly outline the Canadian Forces’ strategic objectives, it identifies security for the 2010 Winter Olympics as a top priority.
Canada could benefit greatly from an equivalent process to the QDR. One of the objectives of such a review should be to determine whether the Royal Canadian Navy is still in strategic lockstep with its allies. If a significant gap in capabilities and/or priorities is found, an update on the scale of Leadmark 2.0 may be necessary in order to ensure Canada is capable of upholding its commitments to its allies. There is some cause for concern as to whether Canada is already falling behind, making the need for a defence review all the more urgent.
In 2011, as a follow-up to the CFDS, the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was released. While some of the particulars are hazy, the NSPS is intended to modernize the Royal Canadian Navy, replacing many vessels that have been operating well past their intended date of retirement. For example, the Joint Support Ship Project will see Canada’s two Protecteur-class auxiliary vessels replaced with three Berlin-class replenishment ships. However, perhaps the most ambitious aspect of the NSPS is the Single Class Surface Combatant Project, which calls for the replacement of Canada’s 12 Halifax-class frigates and three Iroquois-class destroyers with 15 vessels of as yet unknown capabilities or classification. However, there are strong indications that these new vessels will be similar in many respects to the current Halifax-class frigate.
As some observers have noted, the United States Navy has placed greater attention in recent years on the littoral zone. Meanwhile, Canada remains focused on a traditional naval task force role, lacking sealift capabilities or any means of reliably deploying in littoral waters. If the Littoral Combat Ship is the shape of things to come, Canada’s expected frigates (or at least frigate-like vessels) may not be fully compatible. Though the Royal Canadian Navy will remain useful for maritime interdiction and generally supporting the United States in ensuring continental defence, Canada may find itself largely ignored by American strategists in favour of other, more compatible allies. Had DND undertaken reviews similar to the QDR, some course correction could have been made to Leadmark, its successor, and the subsequent NSPS. One can only hope that the Single Class Surface Combatant once unveiled will prove to be something capable of participating actively alongside US and NATO maritime forces.
Even so, calls for an update to Canadian strategic guidance have been limited. In analyzing Canadian public opinion, the original Leadmark laments, “some Canadians are unaware of their navy, and do not understand where ‘naval’ fits into a ‘national’ strategy.” 12 years later, one may wonder whether parliamentarians have also forgotten their navy, hoping that haphazard fleet-replacement will be a sufficient remedy.
Paul Pryce is a Junior Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council of Canada. With degrees in political science from universities in both Canada and Estonia, he has previously worked in conflict resolution as a Research Fellow with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. His research interests include African security issues and NATO-Russia relations.
“Nothing is as real as a dream. The world can change around you, but your dream will not. Your life may change, but your dream doesn’t have to. Responsibilities need not erase it. Duties need not obscure it. Your spouse and children need not get in its way, because the dream is within you. No one can take your dream away.”
Bestselling author and popular commentator, Thomas Leo Clancy Jr., recently passed away at the age of 66.
Mr. Clancy’s prolific career began rather unexpectedly. The former insurance agent originally began writing Patriot Games in the early 1970s, but after learning of the mutiny aboard the USSR vessel “Storozhevoy,” he authored The Hunt for the Red October. After several publishers turned down the manuscript, Mr. Clancy approached the United States Naval Institute (USNI) and struck a deal with them resulting in the publication of their first fictional novel. His sole goal during this process was simply just publication because “If your name is in the Library of Congress, you’re immortal.” Yet, The Hunt for the Red October reached higher levels of success, and once President Reagan mentioned that it had been keeping him up all night, it immediately became a bestseller and remains to this day USNI’s most successful publication.
Mr. Clancy’s ability to bring out his environment with technical details clearly translated to the reader set high, new standards for fictional authors. Unlike many authors that “data-dump” readers with incomprehensible numbers and statistics, Mr. Clancy took the time to explain the mechanics of the real and “imagined” items in his universe. The ability for an author like Mr. Clancy to describe how a magnetohydrodynamic drive (The Hunt for the Red October) functioned to a diverse audience (who mostly had no experience with submarines and did not have “Google” to help them) is arguably unprecedented in fiction. Ranging from describing the classic “Crazy Ivan” submarine maneuver used by Soviet submarines (The Hunt for the Red October) to the more technical AQS-13 dipping sonar on an SH-60 (Red Storm Rising), Mr. Clancy’s descriptions of these advanced, and often secret, topics are so well done that he once admitted that “I’ve made up stuff that’s turned out to be real, that’s the spooky part.”
Yet, Mr. Clancy supplemented his war-gamed scenarios and weapons with some of the best characters. Jack Ryan serves for some as a cooler alternative than James Bond, and even Jason Bourne. His background, demeanor, and successes kept readers enthralled—watching Ryan connect the dots to foil America’s adversaries (and the occasional political ones), and eventually somehow get caught up in a gunfight, is not only awesome, but it never gets old. Sure, Ryan does not drink the famous Vesper cocktail or drive an Aston Martin, readers feel like they actually have something in common with him. Watching him achieve heroic feats while displaying the qualities shared with readers is a rewarding experience. How can you not like a man that stockbroker, to CIA historian, to President?
For many, Mr. Clancy was more than a literary powerhouse–he was an inspiring figure. When he put the pen to the paper, he created not only a page turner, but also created an educational and motivating experience that siphoned the abundance of energy of teenagers and men of all ages. From the submarine bridge in The Hunt for the Red October to the fields of the Fulda Gap in Red Storm Rising and the Olympics in Rainbow Six, Mr. Clancy always provided his readers with as realistic picture as possible, inspiring my personal current academic and professional pursuits, and many others. His characters, and the ideas that they fought for, truly embody the American spirit.
Although Mr. Clancy is in a different place, Jack Ryan, John Clark, Admiral Greer and Ding Chavez will always live in our libraries.
With the focus on Syria calming over the past couple of weeks due to the advent of a deal between the U.S. and Russia to allow Syria to give up their chemical weapons, contemplation on other issues related to the Syrian civil war is in order.
The Washington Post a few weeks ago reported on a very interesting maritime security element related to the Syria story – the shipping of arms from Russian and Russian controlled ports in Ukraine to Syria. Commenting on a report published by C4ADS, the Post provides an intriguing story on how the Russians have been supplying Assad with shipments of arms – such as tanks, helicopters, and rocket launchers. Also, if you haven’t already, please read the excellent commentary on this issue written by LCDR Mark Munson. Notwithstanding any deal regarding chemical weapons, the arms shipments that help sustain the Assad regime will continue to obstruct a sustainable peace in the conflict and in the region. This maritime security issue provides an opportunity for decision makers to explore creative solutions. Any discussion on how to dismantle the arms trade, however, would be lacking imagination if it did not include the classic naval blockade.
Toulon: the scene of our BLOCKADE!
From the Royal Navy’s blockade of Cadiz in 1797 to Israel’s blockade of Gaza in 2009, a blockade is a time-tested method. An important consideration if the U.S. were to blockade Syria, however, is that a blockade is generally considered an act of war. Because President Obama and most of the U.S. population have an unfavorable view of war with Syria, history may be able to provide an alternative.
In July 2013, the Department of Justice released a cache of old Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos from 1933-1937. As a brief introduction, OLC provides the President and others in the Executive authoritative legal opinions, many of constitutional relevance. This office is most famous recently for producing the torture memos of the Bush administration. One of the little gems hidden in the stack of memorandum opinions titled “Authority of the President to Blockade Cuba.” Interestingly, this opinion was dated January 25, 1961, almost 22 months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nevertheless, the OLC memorandum opinion provides an interpretation of international law that would apply even today if the U.S. Navy was to blockade Syria. The memorandum opinion states:
“At the outset it should be noted that both courts and commentators are agreed that a blockade involves a state of war; i.e., it is the right of a belligerent alone…The United States is not in a state of war with Cuba in the traditional sense….Accordingly, the principles of international law, as presently developed and followed by the United States, would seem to furnish no legal justification for the imposition by this government of a blockade of Cuba.”
Simply exchanging “Cuba” with “Syria” would suggest that a blockade to stop the arms flowing in from Russia would be illegal under international law – unless the U.S. is willing to go to war with Syria. However, the memorandum provides a potential alternative to justifying a blockade:
“In this posture, we turn to the question whether it is, nevertheless, possible to argue that a blockade of Cuba is justifiable. That the United States is engaged in a “cold war” with major communist nations and with Cuba is plain. To keep communist imperialism from engulfing the United States is a matter of vital national interest.”
The memorandum further explains by quoting Doris Graber:
“Interventions undertaken to further these interests were lawful if those who authorized them believed that intervention was a last re-sort to safeguard the nation from extreme peril and proper means of intervention were used. . . .”
Doris A. Graber, Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Intervention Policies and Practices 211–12 (1959).”
So, put another way, it seems as if the existence of the “cold war” was sufficient to allow the U.S. to intervene and blockade Cuba.
What does this mean in the Syria context? If decision makers were to seriously consider legally blockading Syria to prevent support to the Assad regime, they would be required to meet the following:
a. Analogize the “cold war” with the “war on terror” (which commentators have done in the past), b. Fit the civil war in Syria into the global war on terror, and c. Strengthen the connection between intervention in Syria with “safeguarding [this nation or our allies] from extreme peril.
If decision-makers can successfully meet these three requirements, then the U.S. could potentially be legally justified in unilaterally blockading Syria. This, however, doesn’t mean that it would be prudent or feasible to do so.
LT Dennis Harbin is a surface warfare officer and is enrolled at Penn State Law in the Navy’s Law Education Program. The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy. This article is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice.
