Battle of Litani River: Maritime Challenges in the Levant

October 18, 2013 Guest Author 2 Comments

As the Syrian conflict drags on well into its third year, military planners continue weighing the differing contingency options and courses of action. How do Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Israel protect themselves from a pre-emptive strike from the Baathist regime? Is Russia providing advanced weaponry to the regime? Will one or some of the various terrorist groups residing within Syria gain control of chemical weapons? What exactly is the Russian navy doing in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea? Who is the “opposition”?

The difficult limited choices (boots on the ground, non-fly zone, etc.) and the projection of future scenarios must be a heavy burden for military leadership that claim areas of responsibility for operations in Syria and around the Levant region. Yet, the common military (and political) dialogue fails to discuss a very real sequel to any military campaign in Syria – What will happen in Lebanon?

This “Switzerland of the Middle East” is a dynamic and aggravated area, susceptible to flare up and strife. Does it matter? To the Israelis: of course it does, just look at the recent history of operations in Lebanon. To the US: they have been involved in Lebanon (continually) since the early 1980s. The recognized border between Lebanon and Israel is a memorial to the frozen conflict of which is just pending Hizbollah and/or Syria’s next move.

In June 1941, the Allies conducted a Syria-Lebanon campaign (known as Operation Exporter) of which little is written. British, Palestinians, Jordanians, Indians, Australians, and the “Free French” conducted an invasion of Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon, ultimately resulting in a victory, with the Free French General Catroux being placed in charge of Syria-Lebanon. Shortly after, Catroux named both Syria and Lebanon free nations. Lebanon declared its independence in November 1943 with Syria claiming independence two months later.

In this campaign, Australian commandos as part of the British Layforce – an ad hoc assortment of special forces – conducted an amphibious raid into Lebanon through the southern Litani River area in an effort to seize key nodes (bridges and high terrain) in advance of the main force, driving north from Palestine towards Beirut. The amphibious force was to coordinate with the 21^st Brigade’s attack on the Litani River position, through an amphibious assault from sea near the mouth of the river. They were to secure the north and south banks of the river and prevent an enemy demolition of the Qasmiye bridge, allowing the 21^st brigade to advance towards Beirut. The landing force met unforeseen challenges posed both from their adversary as well as their own command and control. These likewise hold lessons for naval planners contemplating operations in the region today.

Limited Intelligence

The overall campaign commander, Field Marshal Henry Wilson, was unable to detail the force structure up to 10 days prior to the assault. There were limited amount of intel handbooks to provide information on Lebanese and Syrian roads, towns, people, and enemy forces. The allied forces only had broad maps (1:200,000) of the area of operations and no prior intelligence on beach landing sites. In response to this intel gap, action officers conducted a reconnaissance trip to Haifa to inquire on weather. Finding that the landing area had heavy surf at 300yds from the beach, and given the dates of the pending assault, a landing was not assessed as favorable.

While the information available to naval planners has grown in the last 70 years, given ISR limitations and a robust Syrian air-defense posture, limited actionable intelligence will most likely still present a challenge. Despite a recent Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) of Lebanon, the increased conflict in Syria and multi-national interest in the region pose a much more complicated environment and larger quantity of unknowns.

Conflicting Command Relationships

The senior officer of the amphibious force, consisting of the landing ship HMS Glengyle and destroyers HMS Hotspur, HMS Iris, and HMS Coventry, serving as escorts, delegated responsibility of landing boats to the commanding officer of the amphibious ship CAPT Petrie, RN. Upon conversing with the other ship captains (who all recommended against a landing) CAPT Petrie decided to recover the boats and return to Port Said. This decision was not concurred by Col Pedder, the Amphibious Landing Force commander, who argued that the risk was worth taking to maintain surprise (moonlight had showed their presence), but the decision was made to reverse course nonetheless. The ships returned to Port Said on the afternoon of 09 June, and after a brief meeting decided to get underway and attempt the landing again – early the next morning. The force returned at 0300 to the same spot (four miles west of the coast) and launched the operation under a full moon in calm weather. Various landing parties came under immediate fire upon arriving at the beach and many felt that the previous night’s loitering tipped off the enemy to their intentions. Additionally, when the main force (X) arrived south of the Litani River they observed that the enemy had already demolished the Qasmiye bridge.

While the decision to delay the landing had been delegated to CAPT Petrie, he also had a responsibility to report to his senior officer that landing force commander did not concur with the decision. Communication limitations may have hindered such a correspondence, but this hotly contested command relationship is another reminder of the inherent risks that are always involved in amphibious operations.

Naval history books are filled with command and control mistakes during amphibious operations and Allied forces in World War II learned hard lessons in their gradual development of effective amphibious task force/landing force relationships. Given the uniqueness of the Levant region and the Eastern Mediterranean there are multiple commands who may be involved. Recent western-coalition amphibious exercises (i.e. Bold Alligator) found persistent errors in command relationships and no common understanding of an appropriate chain of command. U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command, and NATO all have operational area boundaries that meet in the Levant Region. Given the complexity of the area and environment, unless lessons of the past are understood, accepted, and acted upon the same issues may continue to haunt future amphibious operations in an around the Litani.

Faulty Navigation Skills

Two of the three landing parties (X and Z) had difficulties finding the correct landing site, resulting in the main effort (X party) landing one mile south of the intended objective and south of the Litani River, whereas the supporting effort (Z party) landed on the unintended side of the enemy forces. This is not the first early morning amphibious operation (see Gallipoli) in which the leading guide used an incorrect navigational aid (small house vice a bridge). Despite advances in GPS technology, the lack of updated environmental information and infrequent operations in this area should cause amphibious force planners to expect a comparable level of complexity.

Six minutes after landing, a battery of field guns including 75mm guns, 81mm mortars and heavy machine guns opened fire on X party’s beach. This may be viewed as irrelevant in light of today’s advanced equipment, but a friendly reminder that the 11 Scottish Commando’s arrival on the hillcrest overlooking the Litani river met with immediate friendly artillery fire should strike note of caution in maritime planners.

Lack of Air Support and Coastal Shore Bombardment

Vichy French recon planes made repeated flights over the landing forces, while their destroyers moved down the Lebanese coast, firing into landing parties positions. Despite ineffective shore bombardment on Z party, the X party sustained direct hits on troops and artillery with no effective friendly ship counter-fire. It is unfathomable to think that two enemy French destroyers were able to freely maneuver on the coast, disrupting landing force operations, while three allied destroyers and one cruiser were assigned as escorts.

This scenario easily translates to today’s operations and high-priority Ballistic Missile Defense platforms. In the Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD) environment (easily framed in the Eastern Mediterranean) planners should be asking more than just strategic imperatives and instead should be asking commanders for operational priorities. Who is the main effort? Who is supporting? In response to the Syrian conflict, will a Lebanon amphibious operation ever be the top priority or will naval forces be asked to conduct multi-functional missions that overlap C2 relationships, confuse capabilities and responsibilities, and fail to achieve mission success?

From a Naval perspective the Levant region is ripe with challenges: small maneuver space in the Eastern Mediterranean, only 3 choke-point entries (Gibraltar, Suez, Bosphorus), and a concave coastline that presents decreased distance from coastal-defense cruise missiles and coastal batteries, as well as, various territorial water space considerations. The amateur maritime planner may quickly consider these challenges as important for the status quo mission of maritime strike and ballistic missile defense, but with a bit more time invested a planner would quickly surmise that the Levant’s maritime domain is much more of a challenge for potential amphibious operations.

References: McHarg, Ian “Litani River.” United Kingdom, 2011. www.litaniriver.com

@NavalPlanner is an experienced strategic and operational military planner. He strives to share his perspective on operational art and planning with fellow maritime enthusiasts on his blog.

Current Operations

Has an Unsolved Mystery Almost (But Not Quite) Been Solved?

October 17, 2013 Guest Author 1 Comment

Alleged U.S. Navy Involvement in the 1973 Chile Coup

Costa-Gavras' film "Missing" portrayed the execution of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi — Costa-Gavras’ film “Missing” portrayed the execution of Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi

An old mystery has come back into the limelight following the recent revelation that a retired U.S. Navy officer, accused of being complicit in the murder of two U.S. citizens in the immediate aftermath of Augusto Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile, had died in Chile months ago, ironically at the same time as Chilean authorities were seeking his extradition from the U.S.

Retired Captain Ray Davis had been the Commander of the U.S. Military Group in Chile at the time of the coup. He “was thought to be living in Florida and Chile’s Supreme Court had approved his extradition request last October,” however, he apparently had actually been living in Santiago until his death in April.

Davis had long been accused of being involved in the execution of Americans Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi by the forces of Pinochet’s junta. The story of Horman’s death and the quest of his wife and father for justice was chronicled first in a book by Thomas Hauser and the 1982 film Missing, directed by Greek filmaker Costa-Gavras and starring Jack Lemmon. The film implies that Horman and Teruggi had stumbled onto a substantial U.S. military presence in Chile on the eve of and during the revolt, with a fictional portrayal of a Davis-like character as the main American who stood by while they were killed by Chilean authorities, presumably because they knew too much about U.S. involvement in the coup.

Horman’s wife claims that during a ride that Davis had given to Horman in the days after the coup, Davis determined Horman possessed information that “would have risked derailing the recognition of Chile’s junta by the US government,” transforming him “from an American citizen who was entitled to protection, to a vulnerable and disposable threat to powerful forces.”

The Chilean judge seeking Davis’ extradition claimed that Horman had been identified as a “subversive” by “U.S. agents,” directly leading to his execution. John Dinges, whose book The Condor Years detailed how Chile organized South American-wide repression in the 1970s, argues that it was likely that the U.S. did not just “tacitly tolerate” Horman’s killing, but rather that Ray Davis “produced the information that led to his death and when Chileans consulted about it, he decided not to oppose it.” Davis’ supporters and family members have claimed instead that he was simply “a liaison between the U.S. and Chilean militaries” who had nothing to hide.

The National Security Archive has collected several declassified documents related to the Horman/Teruggi murders. In possibly the most damning piece of correspondence, State Department officials in 1976 admitted that there was “some circumstantial evidence to suggest” that

“U.S. intelligence may have played an unfortunate part in Horman’s death. At best, it was limited to providing or confirming information that helped motivate his murder by the GOC. At worst, U.S. intelligence was aware the GOC saw Horman in a rather serious light and U.S. officials did nothing to discourage the logical outcome of GOC paranoia.”

Perhaps the most bizarre twist to this story is that while authorities in Chile were attempting to bring Davis back there in order to face trial after his 2011 indictment, he was apparently “right under their noses all along, living in a nursing home in an upscale part of the Chilean capital.” The U.S. embassy there claims that they “were unaware that Mr. Davis was living in Santiago until early this past May, when they were informed of his death a few days before.” No press reports about Davis’ death so far have identified why he was living in Chile while simultaneously trying to avoid trial there. Horman’s wife is asking for proof of Davis’ death, not yet convinced that the Ray Davis who died in Chile earlier this year was the one she believes caused the death of her husband.

Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson is a Naval Intelligence officer currently serving on the OPNAV staff. He has previously served at Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2). The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

Events

By-Election for Secretary

October 16, 2013 Guest Author 1 Comment

Secretary2 — “And this ship is going to have lasers on it, see, and all of these robots will fly and swim off it, see, and it will fight pirates and…You getting all this?”
“Sure boss, sure…”

As part of our onslaught towards 501(c)(3) status here in the States we have learned we need an official secretary. Two gentlemen have graciously thrown their hats in the ring. If you are a member (click here if unsure), please vote at bottom. Voting ends Thursday, midnight EST.

Mike Carroll:

Experience As with most compulsive volunteers, I have been affiliated with a number of non-profits over the span of my adult life. This has occasionally included duties as a governing board member. However, some of those affiliations have included financial and organizational management teams I found less than ideal. Those periods prompted me to me to dive into the minutia of 501(c)(3) corporate organization and their financial reporting requirements.

The basic mechanics of successful 501(c)(3)s are many of the same items expected of a successful DIVO: a good report tickler, attention to detail, and the fore-handedness to gather the required data in a timely manner. It’s not rocket science. Schedule the required meetings, publish the results, and assemble the annual IRS-990 for the May filing deadline or request the optional six month extension.

Qualifications Traditionally, the position was primarily a administrative function associated with record keeping and record certification to include the duties of a notary. In the 21st Century it has evolved to include ethics and compliance/due diligence duties.

As a retired CDR and former industrial safety officer I’m well acquainted with both record keeping, program compliance, and ethics. I’m willing to move forward with acquiring a notary seal, if required.

Goals CIMSEC’s future requires a transition from the realm of the founders’ enthusiasm (and responsibility) to the admittedly bureaucratic structures of management boards and committees. While publishing new ideas lies at its core, CIMSEC’s architecture will need to broaden to provide a foundational infrastructure.

As a 501(c)(3), CIMSEC becomes a corporate entity. Corporate entities are not clubs, They are enduring organizations committed to long span goals. I would like to provide the service necessary for that future.

Conclusion: CIMSEC is a remarkable place. As a Stavridis (and Galrahn) fanboy, it focuses on something missing from my JO experience, “Read, Think, Write, Publish.” The fleet and force of the future will need leaders who have already thought about where they are before they arrive.

I’m not an accountant or a lawyer or a master strategist. I’m a guy who believes in recruiting the smartest people in the room to solve our problems. This was a place where I could step up.

Dennis Harbin:

I am a qualified surface warfare officer and am currently enrolled at Penn State Law in the Navy’s Law Education Program. My relevant background includes leadership and project management experience as a division officer in USS BAINBRIDGE (DDG-96) and as Operations Officer with PC CREW KILO deployed in USS FIREBOLT (PC-10). As a law student in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, I have begun developing skills necessary for complex administrative problem-solving and regulatory compliance.

I see the role of Secretary as two-fold. First, it is the duty of every organization’s secretary to ensure that the Board complies with specific formality and regulatory requirements, in this case under 501(c)(3) and our own by-laws. My very minimal legal background should be useful in this role. Second, it is the duty of every officer to ensure that the mission of the organization is fulfilled, but also continues to expand and grow.

Even though I’m new to CIMSEC, I’ve been enthusiastic from the beginning about what this group does and how it serves our various professions and institutions through the discussion of ideas. CIMSEC has great potential and I want to do what I can to ensure its efficient administration and its effectiveness as an indispensable forum on maritime and security affairs.

Thanks to both for stepping up to help out!

Current Operations

Catch and Release

October 16, 2013 Guest Author Leave a comment

On Thursday Venezuelan officers boarded the U.S.-operated, Malaysia-owned survey vessel Teknik Perdana for “carrying out illegal activities.” The Venezuelan navy escorted the vessel into port on Margarita Island, where the ship and crew were told they would remain detained pending an investigation. The ship ran afoul of a dispute between Venezuela it’s smaller neighbor Guyana over waters off the coast of an area known as Esequiba. According to the BBC, Venezuela has claimed the Esequiba region (and about 2/3rds of the whole of Guyana) since Guyana was a British colony in the 19th Century. UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the U.S. is not a signatory but follows due to its force as accepted customary law, formalizes Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) that regulates most economic activity, typically drawn out 200nm from the coastal baseline of a nation’s territory, as well as the rights to resources further out in the continental shelf’s seabed. Thus as far as the law is usually* concerned, who owns the land owns the sea, and therefore much of the interest over otherwise marginal islands elsewhere. Fortunately for the owners and crew of the Teknik Perdana, Venezuela released vessel on Tuesday.

If this story has a happy ending it is that Venezuela and Guyana said in August that they would seek help from the UN to solve their squabble, and this incident may act as further impetus. This doesn’t mean claimants always abide by the rulings (see neighboring Colombia’s reaction over its dispute with Nicaragua), but they at least tend to keep things peaceful.

*History can also play a large role.

LT Scott Cheney-Peters is a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and the former editor of Surface Warfare magazine. He is the founding director of the Center for International Maritime Security and holds a master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are his alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.