Notes to the New CNO Series

By Anthony Cowden

My recommendations to the next Chief of Naval Operations are based on the difference between the kind of navy we have today and the kind of navy our nation needs. Today we have a forward-based navy, not an expeditionary navy. This distinction is important for remaining competitive against modern threats and guiding force design.

Due to the unique geographical position of the U.S., the Navy has the luxury of defending the nation’s interests “over there.” Since World War II, it developed and maintained a navy that was able to project power overseas; to reconstitute its combat power while still at sea or at least far from national shores; and continuously maintain proximity to competitors. This expeditionary character minimized the dependence of the fleet on shore-based and homeland-based infrastructure to sustain operations, allowing the fleet to be more logistically self-sufficient at sea.

However, late in the Cold War, the U.S. Navy started to diminish its expeditionary capability, and became more reliant on allied and friendly bases. A key development was subtle but consequential – the vertical launch system (VLS) for the surface fleet’s primary anti-air, anti-submarine, and land-attack weapons. While a very capable system, reloading VLS at sea was problematic and soon abandoned. While an aircraft carrier can be rearmed at sea, surface warships cannot, which constrains the ability of carrier strike groups to sustain forward operations without taking frequent trips back to fixed infrastructure. The Navy is revisiting the issue of reloading VLS at sea, and those efforts should be reinforced.

The next step the Navy took away from an expeditionary capability was in the 1990s, when it decommissioned most of the submarine tenders (AS), all of the repair ships (AR), and destroyer tenders (AD), and moved away from Sailor-manned Shore Intermediate Maintenance Centers (SIMA). Not only did this eliminate the ability to conduct intermediate maintenance “over there,” but it destroyed the progression of apprentice-to-journeyman-to-master technician that made the U.S. Navy Sailor one of the premier maintenance resources in the military world. Combat search and rescue, salvage, and battle damage repair are other areas in which the U.S. Navy no longer has sufficient capability for sustaining expeditionary operations.

The Navy needs a new strategy that highlights the kind of fleet the nation needs. This strategy would argue the Navy needs to be able to use the sea when needed, to deny it to the nation’s enemies, and to project force ashore when required. To accomplish this, the Navy would maintain a tempo of operations using the necessary multi-domain forces, wherever in the world they are required. The Navy’s operations and force posture should always be based on the logic that naval operations will principally be conducted “over there,” far from the nation’s borders, and with a minimum of dependence on shore-based infrastructure.

The Navy also needs a different overall force structure to return to a more balanced and expeditionary force. The modern fleet is top-heavy in large surface combatants, light in smaller combatants, and insufficient in auxiliary ships. In summary, a new force structure calls for:

• • 11 Aircraft carriers
  • 10 LHA/LHDs
  • 21 Amphibious warfare ships
  • 71 Large surface combatants
  • 78 Small surface combatants
  • 66 Attack submarines
  • 12 Ballistic missile submarines
  • 34 Combat logistics forces
  • 48 Support vessels

This overall battle force of 351 ships is a more balanced and affordable force structure than what is currently under consideration.

The top thing the next CNO can do to affordably improve the U.S. Navy as a fighting force is to reduce operational tempo. Returning to predictable six-month-long deployments would improve force material readiness, morale, and retention. The tempo necessarily increased after 9/11 and the war in Iraq, but those efforts are largely over and the Navy needs to return to a rational and sustainable level of effort. The Navy will be able to make numerous and far-reaching changes to its warfighting readiness and expeditionary capability if it can manage to create a stable foundation of predictable deployment cycles.

Anthony Cowden is the Managing Director of Stari Consulting Services, co-author of Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat,  author of The Naval Institute Almanac of the U.S. Navy,  and was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy for 37 years.

Featured Image: INDIAN OCEAN (July 11, 2023) Sailors aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Rafael Peralta (DDG 115) prepare to conduct a replenishment-at-sea with the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Colby A. Mothershead)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Gonzalo Vazquez

With an increasingly complex strategic environment, and a fleet struggling to meet its many operational requirements, the next CNO must strive to find new ways to capitalize on allied naval capabilities to succeed at sea. Prominent options include strengthening naval cooperation with partners to ensure a permanent presence in all strategically relevant theaters, and bolstering the sharing of naval knowledge among allied naval war colleges.

Although significantly smaller in size and capabilities, European navies remain valuable assets that help Washington avoid a thinly-stretched force posture. Current NATO standing naval forces provide relatively low-cost means of sending high-value political signals of unity and forward deployments of warfighting capability. These standing naval forces could help strengthen Allied presence in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, or the Baltic Sea regions.

Mediterranean countries´ navies field strong assets and are capable of providing a sustained presence throughout the region, as do the navies of Canada, Denmark, Norway and the U.K. in the North Atlantic and the High North. The CNO must look for new ways to maximize the help they can offer, such as by improving their interoperability under the framework of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs). This interoperability can be enhanced by linking centers of excellence that focus on tactical and training development, so that navies can share warfighting lessons across allied fleets.  

The U.S. should also capitalize on the growing capabilities of the Japanese and South Korean navies to face China in the Indo-Pacific region. Their commercial shipbuilding industrial bases have made them the second and third largest in the world by numbers, only behind Beijing. These capabilities could be leveraged to improve logistics and repair capacity. As such, they bring promising opportunities in a contested region and can help offset the relative lack of shipbuilding capacity in the United States.

With them, Australia and the Philippines will also be important assets to drive a credible deterrent posture against China´s growing assertiveness. Hybrid tactics in the vicinity of the South China Sea, like the water cannon incident in August 2023, could be handled better by using something similar to a Standing Maritime Group framework but applied in the Indo-Pacific. The partnership announced by Washington and Manila to enhance their surveillance around the region is a good starting point, but the CNO must aspire to include other regional partners as well.

Additionally, for stronger support to Allied efforts at sea, cooperation and sharing of expertise among partner nations at the academic level is highly desirable. Options worth considering include bringing qualified allied observers to sea to witness combat exercises at higher levels of classification, and establishing a formal network of the different naval war colleges to share knowledge, wargames, and curriculum.

The conference of PLAN admirals in 2022 highlighted China’s aspirations to expand their research on military affairs and study their adversaries in detail. Beijing is aware of the vital role that academic research plays in improving chances of warfighting success at sea, and so should allied navies. The new CNO will be in an excellent position to advocate for new joint initiatives among allied naval war colleges.

Admiral J.C. Wylie spoke of the need for naval presence, that a “man on the scene with a gun [may be needed] to exercise the durable and continuing control that can rarely be had in any other way.” Allied navies are poised to be on the scene and provide tangible presence. The new CNO must drive the U.S. Navy into a new chapter of Allied naval cooperation.

Gonzalo Vázquez is a junior analyst with the Center for Naval Thought at the Spanish Naval War College, and is currently working as an Intern at the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Center of Excellence in Sofia, Bulgaria.

Featured Image: Naval review of the Spanish Navy held on June 2, 2017 in the Pontevedra Estuary on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Royal Company of Guardiamarinas, origin of the current Naval Military Academy of Marín. In the picture, BAM Tornado P-44, frigate Almirnate Juan de Borbón F-102 and Juan Carlos I aircarrier. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Victor Sussman

The U.S. Navy faces myriad challenges in a dynamic multipolar world, yet risks a sclerotic response to threats. This is most apparent in the surface force where a predilection for high-end multi-mission platforms risks an unbalanced fleet unable to meet threats across the spectrum of conflict. To rectify this, the Navy must recommit to the vital role of small ships in meeting its obligations.

A commitment to smaller combatants offers benefits for naval operations, the supporting industrial base, and for leadership development. Small ships enable the consistent presence that can deter escalation. As J.C. Wylie states in Military Strategy, “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun.” High-end combatants cannot be omnipresent and effective, and they are not risk-worthy enough to be forward postured in tense crises. A numerically larger low-end force plays a critical role in durable presence, developing relationships with regional partners, and deterrence of adversaries.

Construction of less exquisite platforms in greater numbers would reinvigorate an industrial base that has pursued consolidation to survive in the face of inconsistent demand. A reliable need for smaller ships will encourage the growth of smaller yards and suppliers, foster competition, and revive interest in the skilled trades and expertise needed to design and build ships.

A focus on smaller ships facilitates the development of command skills and judgement. Smaller ships increase opportunities for taking command earlier in career paths. Developing capable leaders before the O-5 level furnishes them with the skills and judgement needed to succeed in larger complex billets and provides the Navy with a deeper bench of talent. Benefits also propagate down the chain by creating more opportunities for junior officers to gain proficiency and have meaningful shipboard roles, reducing the problem of too many JOs on one ship.

To begin this transformation, two courses of action are suggested. First, split the Program Executive Office for Unmanned and Small Combatants (PEO USC) into two PEOs: one focused on small surface combatants (PEO SSC) and one focused on unmanned vessels (PEO USV). Unmanned systems offer immense potential, but lower technical readiness than small ships. Separate PEOs will have the focus to deliver better solutions for their areas of responsibility.

Second, N96 should establish an office to promote small combatants on the OPNAV staff and to Congress, as they often lack the advocates common to higher-end ships. As such, the SSC N96 office would focus on key but underserved areas including constabulary operations, gray zone competition, irregular warfare, and mine warfare. Additionally, such an office should work closely with the Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC) to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for these warfare areas, and the numbered fleet commands to familiarize the value of small combatants in achieving objectives in their areas of operation. Finally, such an office should partner closely with both the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard to define requirements and identify opportunities for savings through joint development or multi-service partnerships to procure the force the Navy needs to meet tomorrow’s threats without delay.

Victor Sussman is a senior research scientist specializing in catalyst R&D at a Fortune 500 chemical company, and holds a Ph.D. in chemistry from the University of Minnesota. He is interested in the technology and tactics that will enable the sea services to succeed in the 21st century. He has previously written for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and is glad to make his first contribution to CIMSEC.

Featured Image: The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Uhlmann (DD-687) underway at sea, in the 1960s. (U.S. Navy photo)

Notes to the New CNO Series

By Commanders Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch and Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine

Given how 20 to 30 percent of the fleet’s platforms could be replaced by 2045, a thoughtful and imaginative force design process must go beyond measuring the relative importance of existing and planned platforms and capabilities. The Navy needs to divorce itself from its affinity of conceiving capability as a function of traditional naval platforms, such as surface combatants or range-hobbled carrier air wings, and pursue a more holistic concept.

The Navy’s force design should be oriented on the strategic intelligence estimate of the future joint operating environment, the naval enduring functions (missions), and the overlapping required capabilities espoused by the Joint Warfighting Concept. Focusing on the platforms, people (through recruiting, training, and education), and doctrine required to effect operational concepts will allow the Navy to cover its enduring missions and provide needed capabilities. Additionally, the Navy can meaningfully contribute to the Joint Warfighting Concept and effectively defend its budget requests by clearly articulating an integration pathway through the joint force.

The Navy should design its force utilizing hierarchical tiers of sea control. For example, the Navy shall ensure supremacy in the U.S. near seas with the ability to protect the homeland’s approaches to ports and coastline. For the next tier, it shall provide naval superiority in the vital sea lanes that are the economic lifelines to the homeland and her allies. It should also be able to contest the seas where superiority is not possible, but where necessary logistics must transit. Lastly, as the final tier, it can provide sea denial in the areas where an adversary is strongest. These differentiated tiers, overlayed with the future joint operating environment, will demand discrete capabilities that drive a bespoke high-low force mixture. Furthermore, lower-end capabilities provide greater integration opportunities with regional allies and partners, the true strategic center of gravity.

The adage is a ship is a fool to fight a fort. The Navy should avoid the temptation to believe that more ships or traditional platform-centric models of force design will effectively compete with pacing threats, especially when competitors have fielded holistic, land-based networks of capability (forts) oriented toward the maritime domain. Furthermore, the Navy must not repeat the experience of using expensive, high-end systems designed for peer combat in low-level engagements persisting below the level of conflict. To do so, the Navy’s force structure should incorporate more economical platforms for cooperation and competition, preserving the lifespan and readiness of higher-end vessels.

Historically, the Navy pursued a force design independent of the other services, and a force posture the Navy felt was required to win a war within the maritime domain on its own. The practice led to duplications of capability, but the modern defense industrial base does not afford the luxury of excess. Today offers an opportunity for the Navy to change course on force design, which will require strong leadership to redirect the accumulated inertia.

Commander Andrew “Kramer” Tenbusch is a U.S. naval flight officer and prospective executive officer of Strike Fighter Squadron TWO TWO. He recently completed a fellowship with the Halsey Alfa advanced research program at the U.S. Naval War College and is a graduate of the Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN). CDR Tenbusch is Space Policy and Nuclear Public Policy fellow at Nonproliferation Education Center, and is pursuing a Master’s in Space Systems at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Commander Trevor “Mrs.” Phillips-Levine is a U.S. naval aviator and a special operations joint terminal attack controller instructor. He currently serves as the Joint Close Air Support division officer at the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center where he follows unmanned systems employment and tactics. CDR Phillips-Levine is a Nonproliferation Education Center Space and Nuclear Public Policy Fellow, and is pursuing a Master’s in Systems Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Featured Image: An aerial view of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Bremerton, Washington (USA), on 24 November 2012. (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)