Sea Control 483 – The Transformation of Maritime Professions with Dr. Karel Davids

By Nathan Miller

Dr. Karel Davids joins the program to discuss his edited volume, The Transformation of Maritime Professions: Old and New Jobs in European Shipping Industries, 1850-2000. Karel Davids is Full Professor Emeritus of Economic and Social History in the Faculty of Humanities and the School of Business and Economics.


Links

1. The Transformation of Maritime Professions: Old and New Jobs in European Shipping Industries, 1850-2000, edited by Karel Davids and Joost Schokkenbroek, Palgrave MacMillan, 2023.

Nathan Miller is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast and edited and produced this episode. Contact the Sea Control team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Changing Surface Warfare Qualifications: Better Incentives Make Deadlier Officers

By LTJG Chris Rielage and LCDR JR Dinglasan

“The young officer deals in tactics. That is what he cares about most. While he chafes against other duties, his first focus is meant to be the development of skills to bring combat power to bear on an enemy in circumstances of mortal danger.”–Vice Admiral Cebrowski1

“The disconcerting truth, however, is that the modern naval officer is buried in reports… that deal with everything but how to fight.”–Captain Wayne Hughes2

These quotes from classic naval thinkers underline what has been glaringly obvious for years – every American Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) knows that the community spends less time on tactics than it should. SWOs mainly conceive of their professional identities in terms of their administrative function, such as “I’m the Auxiliaries Officer” or “I’m the 1st Lieutenant,” instead of their tactical or operational roles. The CASREP instruction is more familiar to Ensigns than the classic work Fleet Tactics. These administrative duties take up a massive amount of time and energy, and with the surface fleet’s emphasis on program management and material readiness, tactics consistently fall by the wayside. To state it more bluntly, warships are more ready for inspection than they are for war.3

What if it could be different? Other services and communities fulfill the same duties to man, train, and equip without losing their warfighting ethos. Naval aviators identify themselves by what combat aircraft they fly, focusing on their ability to fight over the administrative role they serve within a squadron. Marines conceive of themselves as riflemen even in the heart of the Pentagon.

The Surface Navy needs to cut itself free of its extraneous entanglements and make concrete changes to how it improves warfighting skill. Our most urgent target for reform should not be improving individual tactics on a piecemeal level. Rather, we should be focusing on systematic changes to the personnel and training systems throughout the Surface Warfare community that will cultivate more tacticians.

The lowest-hanging fruit is in the junior officer detailing process. The fleet is missing a major opportunity to incentivize junior officers to be more lethal, but reform would be relatively simple. When assigning officers in the SWO community, detailers at the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) reward extra points for attaining certain advanced qualifications. Officers who quickly qualify as Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW), the top tactical and engineering watches on a ship, often receive first choice of their next assignment due to the number of “extra points” they receive when slating for their next tour. This is a great way to incentivize hard work, but the limited scope of this program is a missed opportunity. The detailing process should also assign point increments to more junior tactical qualifications.

The obvious candidates are Warfare Coordinator (WC) positions – the watchstations subordinate to the TAO that actually employ weapons in combat. It is not feasible for most junior officers to become a TAO – a position normally filled by Department Heads ten years their senior – in the few extra months between earning their SWO pin and transferring to a new command. It is feasible, however, for a hard-charging division officer to learn how to fight a single domain under the TAO’s direction. Giving JOs a point incentive by qualifying these watches would motivate them to go after these qualifications earlier. Detailers could begin rewarding the watchstations listed above right away – and include even more, like Anti-Submarine Warfare Evaluator (ASWE) or Tomahawk Engagement Control Officer (ECO), after changes to the school requirements.

Detailers should also reward qualified Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officers (ATTWOs) with a small point bonus. While not required on most ships, the ATTWO position requires officers to demonstrate calm under fire in a way more academic qualifications fail to achieve. Officers need to confidently know their tactics – but they also need to be mentally prepared to make decisions with limited information, preserve order in chaotic situations, and if needed, order the use of lethal force. Only the ATTWO qualification, with its focus on real-world drills, regularly trains JOs in these skills.

Our proposed model is shown below. BUPERS currently gives 0.25-point bonuses for TAO and EOOW, which are then added to a value calculated off of Fitness Report (FITREP) scores. To minimize confusion – that calculation is fairly complex, and unnecessary for this discussion – our proposal describes fractions of the TAO/EOOW bonuses. When ultimately implemented, the exact scores will also need to be tailored to match those FITREP scores.

A proposed model for adjusting point values for specific SWO qualifications. (Author graphic)

This new model has three main advantages – it will make junior officers more lethal, it will create a deeper bench of experience among more senior officers, and it will incentivize retention.

Today’s SWO qualification process only touches on tactics in the Combat Information Center Watch Officer (CICWO) and Maritime Warfare qualifications. These are cursory quals that provide only the barebones foundation of modern warfare. They cover U.S. Navy capabilities and limitations, but leave major gaps when it comes to other great powers and their tactics and doctrine. Despite earning the qualification, a qualified CICWO has not yet been taught how to track and assess threats, launch missiles, or maneuver the ship in combat. In contrast, the warfare coordinator qualifications, with their emphasis on exact weapon employment, countering specific threat tactics, and coordinating with other tactical watchstanders and units, represent a more serious professional achievement in becoming a skilled warfighter. Incentivizing junior officers to go after these specific quals earlier will make them much deadlier and increase lethality on a fleet-wide scale.

These changes will also benefit more senior officers. Today, most officers in the surface fleet formally learn tactics for the first time when going through the TAO curriculum in Department Head school, after seven to nine years of experience. That is much too late for the complexity of today’s weapons and tactics. Incentivizing early tactical qualifications would give Department Heads a stronger foundation, setting them up for success when they assume the TAO role. A stronger foundation will also allow for more advanced tactical education and training to be administered at later career milestones, further elevating the lethality of the force. Given enough years, it will eventually create more lethal captains and admirals.

Finally, these point incentives would boost retention among junior officers. When interviewed, junior SWOs consistently say that they are not well-trained for combat.5 The current point system feeds that problem by only rewarding the qualifications – TAO and EOOW – that are prerequisites for command. Shifting to the new model would improve combat skills across the fleet, and would send a powerful signal that the SWO community values tacticians at all levels. Bonus points for tactical qualifications are not a silver bullet – but they are a step in the right direction, showing junior officers that the Navy sees their achievements as worthwhile in their own right, and not simply as stepping stones to command. By providing tangible professional incentives that directly strengthen the Navy’s core function – warfighting – the Navy will boost warfighter retention and morale.

The SWO community should keep its big point incentives to create high-quality captains – but recognize that the best ships are ones where top captains are backed by lethal, combat-ready O-2s and O-3s. Today’s JOs are starving for a foundation in tactics. Incentivizing them to pursue tactical qualifications early may be the first step in convincing them that the SWO community prioritizes warfighting, and in turn, convince them to stay and grow into more deadly department heads and captains.

LTJG Chris Rielage is a Surface Warfare Officer onboard USS BENFOLD (DDG 65) in the Western Pacific. His publications have previously appeared in USNI’s Proceedings and CIMSEC.

LCDR JR Dinglasan currently serves as the IAMD WTI course of instruction (COI) lead at the Surface Advanced Warfighting School (SAWS), Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC). He recently completed his second department head tour as the Combat Systems Officer aboard USS BENFOLD (DDG 65). He is a graduate of the surface warfare community’s IAMD WTI COI and previously served at SMWDC as an advanced tactical training planner and as the lead instructor/tactics developer for Standard Missile-6 surface warfare (SUW) tactical employment.

References

1. Captain Wayne P. Hughs Jr. and RADM Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, Third Edition, U.S. Naval Institute Press, xxi, 2019.

2. Ibid, xxxi.

3. Senior Chief Gunner’s Mate Norman Mingo, U.S. Navy, “The Navy Is Prepared for Inspections, Not War,” Proceedings, March 2021, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/navy-prepared-inspections-not-war.

4. This proposal is designed around an AEGIS cruiser or destroyer, as the US Navy’s most common surface combatant. Other watchstations, like a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Planner on an LCS or Air Defense Warfare Coordinator (ADWC) on an LPD, could also be excellent candidates.

5. Lieutenant Judith Hee Rooney, U.S. Navy, “The State of the Warfighter Mentality in the SWO Community,” CIMSEC, August 22, 2022, https://cimsec.org/the-state-of-the-warfighter-mentality-in-the-swo-community/

Featured Image: NAVAL STATION ROTA, Spain (Dec. 6, 2021) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) departs Naval Station Rota, Spain, Dec. 6, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Andrea Rumple/Released)

Grand Admiral Thrawn and the Operational Level of Conflict in Star Wars

By Steve Wills

The “Star Wars” franchise continues to build and expand into its 46th year of impact on American and global culture, science fiction and, in some cases, scientific fact. The “wars” side of the story, however, has not always been as accurate as perhaps possible. Hero and villain commanders alike, including General Obi wan Kenobi, Darth Vader, and others are more tactical warriors fighting with lightsabers, lasers, and individual strike fighter spacecraft. Tactical planning for space combat such as the briefing scene for the attack on the first Death Star in Episode IV, A New Hope (the original movie), has a World War II movie fleet of pilots in a ready room, and the space fighter combat that follows of a similar vintage. The great star fleets of Star Destroyers, Rebellion ships, Republic and Separatist ships, and the latest series of films with First Order and New republic warships, is mostly backdrop for character dialogue and decision rather than decisive military planning and action.

The “admirals” of these formations (Ackbar, Holdo, and Piett) are mostly tactical fighters, although the unfortunate Admiral Ozzel from The Empire Strikes Back receives the ultimate punishment from Darth Vader for a low-level poor operational decision (dropping out of light speed too early and alerting the Rebels to a system-wide Imperial attack). Grand Moff Tarkin is the originator of the so-called “Tarkin Doctrine” that advocates a counter-insurgency plan based on terror and retribution using the first Death Star and the Imperial fleet, but that seems more the province of a Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy rather than distinct military operation.

One Star Wars leader, however, stands out as an operational-level war planner and strategist. Grand Admiral Thrawn, the blue-skin humanoid leader of Imperial forces in the wake of the death of Emperor Palpatine, Darth Vader, and thousands of Imperial soldiers and naval personnel in the battle of the Endor moon, seems the one Star Wars character with War College training and mastery of all levels of war. Created by author Timothy Zahn as a composite of historical military leaders, Thrawn is a multi-dimensional character closer to the modern senior military leader than the rest of the one-dimensional, cartoon-like heroes and villains of the Star Wars saga. Zahn described Thrawn as a quite different kind of villain, stating in 2017 that

“Most of the Imperial leaders we see in the movies rule through a combination of fear and manipulation. I wanted to create something different: a commander who could lead through loyalty. The result was Thrawn, a tactical genius whose troops follow him willingly, and who will fight for him whether or not he’s watching over their shoulders.”

A Star Wars Character with a Career Record

Timothy Zahn’s books on the blue-skinned, red-eyed humanoid admiral detail his discovery by an imperial patrol, and his career as essentially an Imperial surface warfare officer, and then a Joint Force commander. Thrawn attends the premier Imperial Naval Academy, and commands increasingly larger and more capable warships across his career up to Star Destroyer size. Along the way, he confronts bigotry, as the Empire is described as somewhat racist and biased in favor of humans over the aliens that make up a large part of the Galactic realm.

Thrawn is an admirable junior officer who speaks the truth to his superiors. He takes risks but involves his subordinates as a team to get results. He successfully fights pirates as a senior Lieutenant and is promoted to the position of executive officer of a light cruiser (a medium-sized imperial warship.) Thrawn performs well in tactical combat. His ship is damaged in a sophisticated drone attack, but he analyzes the attack pattern and destroys the drones. He is again promoted and given command of the cruiser. After more success in fighting rebels and pirates, he is promoted to command a larger Star Destroyer, and after more success, the equivalent of a carrier strike group command (built around a Star Destroyer and its escorts) and later a Fleet Command with multiple capital ships. While his career progression is considered rapid in the books, it is definable and in line with what one would expect for a senior naval leader.

Tactical Prowess

Thrawn is a tactical expert, proficient in the tactical tools of both the Galactic Empire and the Rebellion. He combines these tactical skills in the maneuvering and combat of starships with operational intelligence on his opponents that includes everything from the ship types and weapons to cultural strengths and weaknesses. Legendary naval tactics expert Captain Wayne Hughes said, “To know tactics, know technology.” Thrawn knows the technological capabilities of his force and combines these with cultural knowledge, what the Naval War College calls “intangible” factors, to achieve tactical overmatch like Air Force tactics expert Colonel John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop process.

While Boyd’s scheme was purely based on technologically driven air combat, Thrawn’ s use of intangible knowledge further expands his use of the OODA loop to get even further ahead of his opponents. For example, in an engagement with New Republic forces after returning to take command of the post-Battle of Endor imperial remnant, Thrawn conducts an unorthodox maneuver of his flagship against attacking New Republic ships that his fleet captain predicts will be easily understood and countered. What the Captain does not understand is that Thrawn has made a study of the planetary home world of the Republic commander and knows that that species fears radical change to the point where they are unable to effectively react in a timely matter. Thrawn’ s tactical maneuver confounds the Republic ships and allows him to gain advantage in the decision cycle which results in their defeat. Had Thrawn maneuvered as if he were facing an imperial opponent with the same knowledge base, and mirror-imaged his opponent, he might not have been successful. The combination of Hughes tactical knowledge, Boyd OODA Loop framework, and avoidance of assuming that opponents would act as he would empower Thrawn as a superb tactical operator.

Operational and Strategic Commander

U.S. Naval War College Graphic Showing a Military Center of Gravity.

At the end of the first Thrawn book, one sees the newly minted Flag Officer Thrawn conduct a system-wide campaign against the nascent forces of the rebellion with the Imperial equivalent of a U.S. Navy carrier strike group. Thrawn quickly identifies the “military center of gravity” of the operation as a group of planetary defense weapons protected by an impenetrable shield. He gathers intelligence on the defenses to determine that the weapons are fully effective. Thrawn first employs deception and maneuver, using his Star Destroyer’s escorts as a decoy to distract his opponent and gain knowledge of his opponents’ weapons and weaknesses, while his flagship remains out of range of planetary weapons. Then Thrawn uses what War College curriculum would call “enabling fires” onto the rebel planet’s oceans, with resulting tidal waves that cause electrical casualties to his opponent’s weapon systems and shields. With their force protection measures neutralized, the rebel garrison is forced to surrender or face direct fire from Thrawn’ s battle group. This is just the beginning of a sector-wide operation by Thrawn to eliminate the rebel threat in the sector and restore safe passage for imperial trade. The Imperial Admiral also employs intangibles aspects of center of gravity analysis through decisive leadership of his own forces and estimating his opponent’s culminating point being the destruction of the energy shield by the tidal waves.

Thrawn finally comes into his own as a strategic commander with his return from the so-called “unknown regions” in the wake of the Imperial collapse following the defeat at the Battle of Endor and the deaths of Emperor Palpatine, Darth Vader, Admiral Piett, and many other senior imperial leaders in the disastrous engagement. Thrawn re-organized the Imperial remnant as a striking force, sought disruptive technologies that would limit Jedi communication powers, and identified the center of gravity of New Republic forces as a strategic shipyard and warships it produced still waiting to be delivered. The Republic victory at this engagement (Battle of Sluis Van) only comes from a lack of Imperial jamming that the Republic exploits to turn imperial uncrewed platforms against the ships they were trying to capture. Mass takeover of combat platforms through essentially hacking them is a common science fiction element, appearing more recently in the opening episode of the Battlestar Galactic reboot of the 2000s. While Thrawn’ s planning displayed sound operational art, the knowledge of technology and networks is essential for both attack and defense. The U.S. military’s own desire to manage mass uncrewed system operations could benefit from a review of science fiction.

Thrawn Lessons Learned

Grand Admiral Thrawn eventually goes down to defeat, stabbed in the back by his own bodyguard, a sad fate for such a talented strategist, operational planner, and tactician. He remains, however, the most believable, senior military commander in the Star Wars universe and a cut above other officers such as the hapless Admiral Ozzel, Darth Vader’s subordinate Admiral Piett, and the rebel/New Republic commanders like Admirals Ackbar and Holdo who act primarily as tactical commanders. The character of Thrawn offers some useful examples of exceptional operational planning and tactical execution for military planners and wargamers to follow. One can hope that the forthcoming TV appearance of the blue-skinned imperial commander will be as inspiring as the literary versions of his persona.

Popular culture does not always offer significant military lessons, but the Grand Admiral Thrawn character possesses tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war skills worth emulation by the U.S. armed forces. Thrawn’ s command of technology enables his tactical success. His meticulous planning and execution of complex operations echo Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke’s statement that there is genius in diligence. Finally, Thrawn’ s ability to see multiple operations in progress through to conclusion reflects his skill in grand strategy. Thrawn does not raise his voice, use expletives, or “force choke” his subordinates, but mentors them and freely shares his own thoughts and wisdom. Thrawn seeks to understand his opponents’ goals and methodology through their art and culture, and often uses this understanding to gain operational and tactical advantage.

Yes, Thrawn is a villain, and his objectives are often cruel, but that said, his fictional campaigns are worthy of study. As further proof of this applicability, see Strategy Strikes Back, a collection of essays that examines real warfare through a Star Wars lens. While focused on tactics, the book by the same name from legendary fleet tactics expert Captain Wayne Hughes is another useful tool through which to understand what Thrawn attempts to do in the books. Hughes suggests that operational doctrine is the “glue of tactics,” and Thrawn’s own doctrine emerges across the book series as one that uses a mix of technology, maneuver, and application of fires from unlikely locations to achieve tactical and campaign-level success in the books. The Thrawn Trilogy series itself details the admiral’s full career, and readers can explore in depth Thrawn’s operational planning skills across multiple campaigns. In a world where many may not know the great strategists of history, Thrawn may be a good start in getting more young people interested in strategy, operations, and tactical thinking.

Dr. Steven Wills currently serves as a Navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States. He is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy and U.S. Navy surface warfare programs and platforms. After retiring from the Navy in 2010, he completed a master’s and a Ph.D. in History with a concentration on Military History at Ohio University, graduating in 2017. He is the author of Strategy Shelved: The Collapse of Cold War Naval Strategic Planning, published by Naval Institute Press in July 2021 and, with former Navy Secretary John Lehman, Where are the Carriers? U.S. National Strategy and the Choices Ahead, published by Foreign Policy Research Institute in August 2021. Wills also holds a master’s in National Security Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a bachelor’s in History from Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.

Featured Image: Grand Admiral Thrawn as he Appears in the New Disney “Ahsoka” series played by actor Lars Mikkelsen (credit: Disney+).

Sea Control 482 – “An Honorable Place in American Air Power”: Civil Air Patrol Operations, 1942-1943 with Dr. Frank Blazich

By Walker Mills

Dr. Frank Blazich, a curator of modern military history at the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of American History and a Colonel in the Civil Air Patrol, joins the program to discuss his book “An Honorable Place in American Air Power:” Civil Air Patrol Operations, 1942-1943. In his book, Dr. Blazich covers the founding of the Civil Air Patrol and its maritime missions. Dr. Blazich also shares observations about how this history provides lessons for the present and how the Civil Air Patrol might be better employed today.

Sea Control 482 – “An Honorable Place in American Air Power”: Civil Air Patrol Operations, 1942-1943 with Dr. Frank Blazich


Links

1. An Honorable Place in American Air Power:” Civil Air Patrol Operations, 1942-1943 by Frank Blazich, Air University Press, 2020.

2. Civil Air Patrol Air Force Auxiliary website.

Walker Mills is Co-Host of the Sea Control podcast. Contact the podcast team at Seacontrol@cimsec.org.

Brendan Costello edited and produced this episode.

Fostering the Discussion on Securing the Seas.