Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Jessica K. Simonds

Seafarers engage in various security practices while transiting the Straits of Hormuz, Bab Al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the broader Indian Ocean. How have these practices developed to identify and communicate emerging maritime threats based on how seafarer feedback has been incorporated within strategies that counter piracy? These developments will be understood by drawing on original interview material from the author’s PhD thesis, which featured interactions with seafarers from all ranks of the merchant navy bridge team as well as senior representatives from the protection and indemnity and traditional maritime insurance world.

Maritime governance is a fluid and dynamic process and is open to active development when responding to threats, new and old,  that are prominent hinderances to merchant shipping. The reorientation of this process, from a regime that was constructed to deter Somali-based piracy, is evident in the mechanisms of information sharing and the related dissemination platforms. New threats such as the Houthi rebel insurgency as well as the shift toward identifying unidentified attackers are embedded within literature that  has been developed by the conglomerate of industry actors (such as the Best Management Practice series), as well as the experiences of seafarers who have transited the aptly named High Risk Area (HRA) within the last two years.

Attempting to define an approach to the topic of ocean governance is as broad as addressing the web of interactions that underpin terrestrial global governance. The seas are providing a dynamic and volumetric geography featuring many layers, such as the liquidity of the sea with its own natural resources and politics. The ocean landscape also hosts micro-societies, constituting communities of seafarers aboard vessels that represent mobile beacons of sovereignty. Although this seemingly leaves nothing more than tracks in the sea, through the translation of laws and norms ships are where politics happens as global maritime regimes are legitimized through practice.

The shore-based construction of maritime governance encompasses the formal and informal, structured and temporary, state, non-state, industrial, research, and military interactions. International political regimes have been constructed to preserve these layers. Drawing on the seas as a resource that furthers the goals of land-based civilizations, regimes such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) divides maritime territory as corresponsive to these layers. These include access to the seabed, exclusive rights to marine resources such as fishing stocks and oil, and the implementation of structures such as wind turbines, to name a few.

Normative approaches to ocean governance are important because it sets a frame of reference for shore-based entities to consolidate maritime crimes into a recognizable and translatable legal and policy framework. Yet, it also informs daily practice onboard merchant vessels through structures of routine as set out by frameworks such as the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code and the International Safety Management (ISM) Code. In the effort to counter Somali-based piracy and armed robbery from 2009 to the present day, the Head of Marine Underwriting at Lloyd’s Market Association – Neil Roberts – asserts that it involves the construction of a three-legged stool consistent of “naval missions, communication structures …and vessel-based security strategies.”

This framework has been credited with the successful decline in successful hijackings. Naval missions such as the EU’s Naval Force’s (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atlanta  and the  U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) have patrolled the area since late 2008 (NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield was terminated in December 2016) and have contributed to the deterrence and disruption of piracy, forming one of these legs. Yet the Nautical Institute asserts that it would require “83 helicopter-equipped vessels to provide an effective one-hour response, when most vessels are only able to request help with a 10-minute warning,” reflecting the interdependence of the three-legged approach. Therefore, the practical performance of working with the sea and making critical decisions at the frontline of deterring piracy becomes the responsibility of the seafarers and sailors themselves, who must transform their vessels into a site of defense. This is embedded into practice through implementing practices into the Ship’s Security Plan (SSP) and resonate through seafarer experiences of crossing the “imagined line in the sea” where danger may lie ahead.

Transforming the vessel into a counter-piracy asset is based on the master’s engagement and translation of best management practices (BMP) as well as vessel-specific guidance; working with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASPS) as well as engaging with live information through mechanisms such as email, VHF radio, and MARSAT. Both traditional and mutual P&I insurers consider engagement with BMP as the “very minimum” (Kendall-Marsden, Personal Correspondence, 2018) that they expect seafarers and shipowners to exercise in demonstrating that they have acted with due diligence and prudence in the event of a successful hijacking. Therefore, reflection of how practices have been undertaken is an important element of a claim investigation that can then be used to revise prescribed advice and is one method of feeding back from land to sea.

Methods in which seafarers are given awareness of BMP and the practices it prescribes is through their translation by the master. This reflects the space of transformation for the social as well as physical preparation of a vessel in transit of the HRA. Enhanced watch schedules, re-purposing sub-deck enclaves into citadels, locking doors to ensure single points of entry ,as well as behavioural advice in several stages of a hijacking are just a small representation of the practices that seafarers engage with in complying with BMP. These guidelines have become more specific in both their operational requirements as each edition is released.

Two cadets (who wish to remain anonymous) who trained with Maersk, experienced transit through the HRA in late 2018 and reflected on their experiences of performing BMP. Through participating in multiple drills with the private security team that was deployed on their vessel,  as well as through being tasked with the dressing of the deck with razor wire – each cadet was offered the opportunity to reflect on their performance to officers of a higher rank. These opportunities to engage arise from formal platforms such as meetings as well as informal interactions such as passing comments on shifts and small talk. These opportunities also included platforms for suggesting additional measures they have identified while carrying out the drill that may enhance the vessels robustness against a piratical boarding. One cadet explains that a fellow cadet “suggested greasing poles around the deck” which was then included in their task schedule for the following day. The second cadet explains that he “overheard a naval vessel request information from another vessel as to whether they were carrying private security on VHF Channel 16.” VHF Channel 16 is accessible for anyone with the equipment to pick up a VHF signal, including pirates who could render a vessel vulnerable once they are aware of its security detail. The cadet mentioned this to the master of the vessel who then made contact with MSCHOA to request that naval missions do not request such information via such a public forum.

Drawing expertise from crews is not a process that happens exclusively at sea and confined to the sociology of the vessel, nor is it a formally structured process. The experiences of both master mariners and P&I representatives reflects the dynamism of formal and informal structures of communication from sea to land. As one example of how seafarer knowledge is incorporated in developing best practices and developing the emergence of a broader security regime. This again characterizes ocean governance as a dynamic and rhythmic process that is in a constant state of development open to reorientation and new directions.

Captain Joshi, an experienced master mariner, states that there is enormous value in holding meetings with the crew prior to entering the HRA. Explaining that the rationale for this is not only based on educating them on their roles and responsibilities in transforming the vessel, but in “gathering ideas to feed back to the shipping company – of which his previous company [that he wishes not to be mentioned] offered incentives and competitions for innovative ideas.” The next stage in this chain of communication is supported by Timothy Howse, Vice President for Industry Liaison at Gard P&I Club. Howse explains that best practices as well as accidents are fed back to shipping companies and then to P&I Clubs based on their relevance to diminishing the liability of the shipowner in a particular event. He uses the example of a chef cutting their finger on a knife, where methods pertaining to safety of knife handling or storage may be sought through circulars that can then be fed back to other shipowners and safety can therefore develop based on collective knowledge and sharing of best practices. The same method of communication can be said for developing P&I expertise on the effectiveness of counter-piracy practices, whilst also considering how they relate to how safe they are for  crew to implement.

The value of gathering seafarer expertise pertaining to the operational aspect of maritime governance, especially in security governance, is evident in both the release of the latest edition of the Best Management Practices (BMP5) and the experiences of the two cadets and a second officer in late 2018. BMP5 was released in 2018, seven years following the release of BMP4, and where BMP4 is credited as the most successful version of the series due to the large decline in successful piratical hijackings in the period it covered. The release of BMP5 reflects a turning point in how the seafarer is reimagined in a post-piratical reconfiguration of governance. Firstly, the change in title to generally “Enhance Maritime Security” alongside  the deterrence of piracy signals a broader security remit. Secondly, the content of BMP5 includes a multitude of interwoven additional security measures to address additional risks such as that from “water borne improvised explosive devices (WBEID’s), sea mines and anti-ship missiles,” and within the practices that were developed for the purposes of counterpiracy.

These measures draw on the seafarer as a surveillance agent in capturing information of new measures that are emerging. In their consideration of new measures was the Houthi rebel threat off the coast of Yemen and the Bab al-Mandeb. This is evidenced through including explicit instruction in the reporting of suspicious behaviours to the UKMTO in annexes C&D. These annexes draw on the seafarers’ expertise in recognizing behaviors that are not necessarily normal seafaring practice and therefore allows shore-based actors to learn and respond to new threats that they may have not yet have identified based on a communication structure that has evolved beyond piracy. Thirdly, the language in BMP5 has purposely moved beyond piracy and focuses more on “attackers” and “potential attackers.” Supported by a senior executive at the International Group of P&I (IGP&I) Clubs, the vision for BMP5 is to develop to include broader threats and may evolve to include “cyber threats and migration,” amongst anything else that may become relevant. The purpose for seeking new areas to address is to seek a new purpose for the actors who have constructed the practices, many of which “have built livelihoods around the business of counter piracy,” and is evident in the experiences of seafarers who have performed BMP5.

Officer Wolckzo is a second officer who works onboard tramp vessels, and her role primarily surrounds the planning of the vessel’s passage. This involves deep engagement with navigational instruments and technologies. With little warning as to the determination of her route, engagement with BMP and the HRA can often come last minute. Whilst in transit in late 2018, she was navigating east from the south coast of Sri Lanka and had to rely on a “luckily” solid internet connection to download charts such as the Q6099 Maritime Security Chart depicting the HRA as well as engage with MARSAT to learn of the security environment they would be transiting. At the last minute her vessel took on a security team of four Greek PCASPs and underwent drills and training in performing BMP. Yet – in her experience, the performance of BMP was to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, to meet company and insurance requirements pertaining to protecting the vessel against piracy, but secondly, and practically, to protect the vessel against the use of “Houthi drone vessels in the Bab-Al-Mandeb.” This experience is mirrored by one of the two cadets previously discussed, who claimed that the performance of BMP for piracy seemed very monotonous and rehearsed, whereas the  threat of the “rebels and rockets” was perceived as far more of a threat based on the “sporadic and  indiscriminate nature” and is what motivated adherence to BMP on board his vessel.

Conclusion

In summary, the role of the seafarer in contributing to counter-piracy practice is evident in the gathering of specialized and technical expertise from the merchant vessel. The production of new documents, practices, and procedures that encompass a broader and open direction for managing security reflects that this aspect of maritime governance is rhythmic and dynamic, and where vessel-based knowledge is translated to shore and then translated back again in the form of prescribed best practices. The result of which is an evolution in the role of the seafarer based on the recognized value of their experience in the development of counter-piracy resources such as BMP. The seafarer is now considered both a surveillance agent in the identification of new practices whilst simultaneously retaining the role as an agent in the performance and transformation of a vessel in countering piracy. Based on this argument, the release of BMP6, whenever that may be, promises the inclusion of information and expertise gathered from seafarers. Drawing on the formal and informal platforms seafarers have encountered in the author’s research, this may be through engagement with the annexes C&D in BMP5, as well as informal and momentary engagements with shore-based actors to identify not only new threats, but novel methods of deterrence that will enhance ocean governance.

Jessica Simonds is a third-year International Studies PhD candidate at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland. She holds an M.A. in Violence, Terrorism and Security and a B.A. in International Politics and Conflict Studies. This work draws on original fieldwork for her PhD thesis as well as part of the concluding arguments regarding the reorientation of maritime security in the Indian Ocean and going beyond piracy. Previously accepted opportunities to present this fieldwork have included conferences with the British International Studies Association (BISA) workshop on the sea (2018), the European International Studies Association workshops and annual conference (2019) and the annual conference of the International Studies Association (2020 – cancelled).

Resources and References

Anon A (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (11 December 2018)

Anon B (2019) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (8 January 2019)

Anon C (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (28 September 2018)

BMP5. (2018). BMP5 – Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. (5th ed.). Edinburgh: Witherby Publishing Group.https://doi.org/https://safety4sea.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Intercargo-Best-Management-Practices-to-Deter-Piracy-and-Enhance-Maritime-Security-in-the-Red-Sea-Gulf-of-Aden-Indian-Ocean-and-Arabian-Sea-2018_06.pdf

Benton, L. (2014). A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900 (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press

Elden, S. (2013). The Birth of Territory (1st ed.). London: The University of Chicago Press.

Howse, T (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (24 September 2018)

Jones, S. (2013). Maritime Security Handbook: Coping With Piracy (1st ed.). London: The Nautical Institute.

Joshi, R (2019) Interviewed by Simonds J.K (4 February 2019)

Kendall-Marsden, S (2018) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (24 September 2018)

Lefebvre, H. (2017). Rhythmanalysis : space, time, and everyday life. London ; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, An Imprint Of Bloomsbury Publishing Pic.

Lefebvre, H. and Nicholson-Smith, D. (2009). The production of space. Malden, Ma ; Oxford: Blackwell.

Roberts, N (2020) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (2 April 2020)

Ryan, B.J. (2015). Security spheres: A phenomenology of maritime spatial practices. Security Dialogue, 46(6), pp.568–584.

Steinberg, P., & Peters, K. (2015). Wet ontologies, fluid spaces: Giving depth to volume through oceanic thinking. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(2), 247–264.

Wolckzo, M (2019) Interviewed by Simonds, J.K (9 March 2019)

Featured Image: Maersk Londrina container ship (Wikimedia commons)

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Michael van Ginkel

Introduction

Sprawling archipelagos and limited government resources make comprehensive maritime domain awareness (MDA) challenging in the Sulu and Celebes Seas. To improve their information gathering capabilities, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have invested in advanced geospatial data acquisition technologies like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and satellites. Integrating the resulting datasets into existing databases for an aggregate analysis greatly enhances regional MDA. Incorporating geospatial information provides authorities with a deeper understanding of the Sulu and Celebes Seas’ physical environment and how maleficent actors like insurgent groups, human smugglers, and arms traffickers threaten security. These information assets assist law enforcement agencies in prioritizing the deployment of their limited maritime assets and are some of the more critical capabilities in the regional toolkit for ocean governance.

The Sulu and Celebes Seas

The Sulu and Celebes seas are an important geographical area within Southeast Asia. From an international perspective, a significant amount of all commerce traded between Australia and East Asia is shipped through the area. Locally, the seas form a tri-border area heavily used by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia for littoral trade. The biodiverse marine environment, combined with a significant reliance on fisheries production by littoral countries, also elevates the area’s importance. As pointed out in the Stable Seas: Sulu and Celebes Seas maritime security report, however, the complex political and geographic environment creates substantial difficulties for law enforcement agencies attempting to monitor the Sulu and Celebes Seas for maritime crime. Faced with kidnapping operations of armed militant groups like Abu Sayaff and illegal, unreported, and unregistered fishing violations by both local fishermen and foreign fishing companies, the three littoral countries have begun relying more on advanced geospatial technologies to enhance their maritime domain awareness. The multi-pronged approach to intelligence gathering allows for more informed responses to the wide range of maritime threats present in the region.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

UAVs offer a flexible and cost-effective method of gathering geospatial data. Flying at an altitude of around 400 feet creates high-resolution orthophotography and aerial mapping. Law enforcement agencies also find the UAVs’ ability to provide real-time information and track moving objects highly useful in dealing with dynamic security environments. The countries in this region began developing early versions of UAVs for maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in the early 2000s. Indonesia, for instance, began a government-funded program for UAV development in 2004 in order to monitor nontraditional threats like illegal, unregistered, and unreported fishing, as well as trafficking and smuggling.

As technological advances made it easier to access high-quality UAVs, demand rose accordingly. Most recently, the United States Department of Defense provided Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia with a total of 34 Insitu ScanEagle drones to improve their MDA. Their growing popularity is reflected in the global market for UAVs, which Acumen Research and Consulting estimates will achieve a worth of roughly $48.8 billion by 2026. Collecting geospatial data through UAVs has created the opportunity for agencies to expand surveillance coverage of specific areas of interest indicated in intelligence reporting. Increased geospatial surveillance of the Sulu archipelago, for instance, could corroborate reports of Abu Sayyaf insurgent activity on the islands before troops are mobilized for a ground search. 

Satellites 

Satellites provide comprehensive coverage of extensive areas on a consistent basis. Satellites have proven to be an asset through their ability to pierce cloud cover and provide regular region-wide updates across the complex terrain of the Sulu and Celebes Seas. The tropical climate and atmospheric conditions of the tri-border area make satellites all the more useful for regional geospatial data collection.

In September 2018, the Philippines signed an agreement for access to data from the NovaSAR-1 satellite. Equipped with a synthetic-aperture radar (SAR), the NovaSAR-1 can systematically identify vessels and aquaculture systems in Philippine waters. SAR datasets have increasingly been used to identify the location of ships based on their outline, which has proven advantageous in tracking vessels that have turned off their Automatic Identification System transponders. Similarly, Indonesia built its indigenous satellite capabilities through the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN). After collaboratively launching the LAPAN-A1 microsatellite with India, Indonesia created and launched the LAPAN-A2 and LAPAN-A3. The earth observation satellites expand the country’s MDA by incorporating AIS and providing video surveillance. The successful use of microsatellites in Indonesia convinced the government to invest in creating an orbital rocket with the capacity to launch a satellite into low Earth orbit by 2040.

Dataset Integration

Systems designed to integrate geospatial datasets into existing databanks allow experts to conduct a holistic analysis. Overlapping means of ship identification through a combination of AIS and low Earth orbit satellites like SAR provides a system of checks and balances. Merging geospatial data with non-sensor data like human and open-source intelligence means all available information can be comprehensively analyzed for threats. Algorithms tapping into artificial intelligence can then predict imminent illegal or illicit maritime activity by observing real-time data trends.

Algorithm parameters and situational context provided by human experts ensure the analysis is issue-specific and generates actionable results. Within the Sulu and Celebes region, for example, traditional migration patterns between Mindanao in the Philippines and Sabah in Malaysia can confound AI attempts to reliably identify human trafficking and drug smuggling without human guidance.

Conclusion

Innovative means of collecting geospatial datasets allow maritime law enforcement agencies to more comprehensively monitor the maritime domain. When integrated with non-sensor forms of intelligence, geospatial information obtained by UAVs and radar can greatly expand regional coverage. The resulting data analysis conducted through artificial intelligence and system experts then informs governments on illicit and illegal activity. Within the Sulu and Celebes seas, geospatial coverage has reduced the strain placed on limited maritime resources. The bird’s-eye view of open waters, archipelagos, and coastlines means Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines can appropriately allocate law enforcement assets to best counter illicit activity. Given the complex security environment of the Sulu and Celebes seas, the ability to make decisions based on reliable intelligence will significantly impact the success rate of law enforcement operations. 

Ocean Governance Topic Week

By Bem Ibrahim Garba 

Introduction

The world’s oceans occupy over 70 percent of the earth’s surface, playing a significant role in the support of the socio-economic growth and development of nations. These oceans provide a source of livelihood for many people through fishing, shipping and logistics, exploration of hydrocarbons and petroleum resources, exploitation of mineral resources, as well as leisure.

For some time now, these repositories of valuable natural resources have endured great degradation due to man’s activities.  In order to continuously utilize and benefit from them now and in the future, the oceans need to be efficiently managed and sustained with guidelines and policies for effective governance.

This implies that ocean governance is not only obligatory but also compulsory on nations that are contiguous to the oceans and other major water bodies around the world. 

Ocean Governance

Ocean governance refers to actionable policies, strategies and activities embarked upon by governments and non-governmental agencies for influencing and managing the affairs of the world’s oceans. The world’s ocean systems are complex, as such matters concerning ocean governance are multi-pronged and multi-faceted. The challenges associated with climate change, green-house pollution, biodiversity loss, offshore extraction, and overfishing also continue to be a burden, posing various kinds of threat to marine life and humankind as well.  

These challenges are too complex to be tackled by a single group, region, or nation-state, hence keeping the world’s oceans healthy and safe requires a broad coalition of actors coming together under international guidelines and protocols. This becomes even more imperative as the global population is estimated to hit 10 billion by 2050 and 11 billion by the year 2100.

Governance in general involves interactions between formal institutions, civil society groups and organizations within areas of interest (sometimes geographic) aimed at exercising authority and influence, which leads to the enactment of policies and decisions, in the management of the economic and social resources of an area.

Ocean governance involves making sure that those who operate and trade on the oceans do so with safe and reasonable caution. They need to be guided by the requisite laws and order. As an example, in line with its Global Strategy and specific regional policies for the Gulf of Guinea, the European Union plays a key role as a global maritime security provider. It has mobilized resources to protect the region against maritime threats like piracy and human trafficking, reduced maritime accidents, and prevented environmental disasters. Satellite data from its Copernicus programme have been used by the European Maritime Safety Agency for international search-and-rescue operations at the request of the UN.

Since the inception of seaborne trade, ocean coastlines have been valuable gateways for global trade, however today, with ongoing pollution, human degradation, piracy, armed banditry, kidnapping of seafarers and illegal bunkering on the seas on the rise, there is a noteworthy decline in the economic value derived from seaborne trade within areas that border oceans notorious for criminality at sea.

Some of the threats to life and assets at sea include terrorism, vandalization, robberies, piracy, gun running, bunkering, and other acts of economic sabotage, stealing, pollution (from oil spillage), war and civil unrest, etc. These acts of criminality are especially common on the African coastline known as the Gulf of Guinea. 

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG)

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) represents the continental coastline that borders the Atlantic Ocean and is more than 6,000 kilometers in length. This coastline spans the border of Africa from Central and West Africa, and borders more than a dozen countries.

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) provides an economic theater to both coastal and landlocked African countries and is of strategic importance to the global business community and international shipping. The safe passage of goods and services to ports in this region, plus the required security within its waters is a critical factor to global energy production and transportation. This is more so as Nigeria and Angola, two countries within this zone, are amongst the world’s top ten crude oil exporters.

The Gulf of Guinea is also important to West Africa’s fishing industry, as it provides employment and a means of sustenance for a large percentage of the indigenous population. It offers vast mineral resources and commercially valuable marine life, as well as providing strategic maritime transport routes for international shipping. Its natural resources are integral to global trade networks. This justifies the need for maritime security and safety at all times.

The socio-economic and political environment within this area has changed over the years. Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has taken a different dimension. Piracy and other criminal activities have been on the rise, and constitutes a serious threat to life and commercial activity within the area.

Within Nigeria’s Niger Delta, there has been a spike in maritime piracy, armed robbery, and youth militancy. In 2007, over 100 attacks against shipping vessels were recorded. A study by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2013 identified the threats in the Gulf as acts of violence at sea, organized transnational crime, trafficking in drugs and illegal substances, illegal and unrecorded fishing, and other ecological risks. The report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) records the Gulf of Guinea as the most dangerous sea in 2016.

The IMB also reported that in 2017 the Gulf of Guinea had the highest number of reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the world. It was noted in the same report that 102 crew members were kidnapped in 2018, compared to 63 kidnap incidents in 2017.

However, it is worthy to note that piracy is not the only cause of maritime instability and insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Other challenges related to weak governance include organized crime such as illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, and corruption. The region is known as a major transit corridor for drug trafficking from South America to Europe and other parts of the world.

Close analysis suggests that weak ocean governance is the major factor enabling insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Other factors would include poverty within coastal communities, corruption of government officials, growing unemployment, youth militancy, terrorism, and the lure of quick money provided by criminal enterprise.

Healthy global trade demands a concerted global effort to combat criminal activities and the racketeering that have become synonymous with this region. To create a safer more secure economic region, there must be adequate information, human capacity development, the development and transfer of technical knowledge, sound and practical institutional policies and technological resources to manage the adverse human impact and natural hazards inherent within this marine environment and its ecosystem. This is impossible without integrated governance and a trans-regional ocean policy that will balance the use of this coastline with the sustainable development of its abundant resources.

Rising up to this challenge, many maritime organizations, especially the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have followed the security issues in the Gulf of Guinea for many years with a strong commitment to understanding and resolving the underlying challenges. This started after an appeal was made to the United Nations by the then-President of Benin Republic Thomas Boni Yayi for assistance in combating crimes in the region. In response to this, amongst many other pleas from other stakeholders, the UN Security Council in February 2012 came up with Resolution 2039 which urged states within the region to develop counter-piracy policies at regional and national levels.

Bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) also convened joint meetings and strategic sessions to draft regional strategies. Documents drafted at the above meetings were endorsed at a summit of heads of states and governments of Central and West Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in June 2013.

2015 saw the creation of the Inter-regional Coordination Center (ICC) under the auspices of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). Many other bodies have also been created to deal with the issue of insecurity and facilitate development in the area. These bodies include CRESMAO in 2014 and CRESMAC in 2015, under ECOWAS.

On the global scene, the UN Security Council Resolution 2039 invited international partners to provide support for regional efforts and bilateral relations and partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea. Developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Spain are to be part of the bilateral partnerships. The EU has also released its strategy for the Gulf of Guinea, and INTERPOL and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have included Gulf of Guinea piracy in their analyses and reports concerning organized crime in West and Central Africa.

This international attention acknowledges that maritime insecurity in West Africa, like Somali piracy, exists as a component of transnational crime and can have an impact far beyond the immediate region.

The IMO Council, in its Resolution 1069 of 2003, resolved to monitor the situation in relation to acts and attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, illicit maritime activity, and threats to ships sailing in the Gulf of Guinea. The council resolved to initiate any actions which it may deem necessary, including coordinating the work of competent committees of the organization to ensure the protection of seafarers and ships sailing in those waters and to ensure appropriate cooperation with other organizations and entities tasked with relevant activities.

Notwithstanding the efforts listed above, piracy and armed banditry still remain a critical challenge in the Gulf of Guinea, and this challenge continues to rise. Many factors have been adduced for the inability of these regional bodies to eliminate the incessant insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. One of the key factors listed include the structure of the regional bodies responsible for this work. Most of them have duplicated functions and are poorly coordinated.

Another factor is the competition for scarce resources (mostly financial) by regional heads, organizations, committees, and donor bodies. This implies that most of these organizations are unable to operate efficiently, making them ineffective in tackling and combating criminal activity within the region.

There is no verifiable record of any criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within this region, hence the absence of any legal deterrents. This has, in turn, further led to an international outcry among the littoral states and maritime operators for increased surveillance, better restructuring, and greater funding for the management of the Gulf of Guinea.

To develop a workable blueprint for the sustainable development of renewable and non-renewable resources within the region, the conservation and protection of this marine domain, and to address the interrelated problems of the ocean space as a whole, there are key questions and challenges that are likely to confront the policymakers responsible for ocean governance.

When viewed holistically, there are four major areas or perspectives that ocean governance needs to be addressed from. They include environmental problems and population pressures; institutional responses to these problems and pressures; modern technology; and the adoption of the principles of responsible governance. A combination of these environmental, institutional, technological, and societal perspectives will have a significant bearing on ocean governance and, by extension, on the security and development of the Gulf of Guinea. 

Major Environmental Problems

Perhaps the most significant pressures on the marine environment over the coming decades will be exerted by the ever-increasing human population. This is currently at around 7.5 billion and is estimated to reach 11 billion by 2100.

Significant reforms and adjustments are needed if humanity will be guided away from the present yet obsolete socio-economic systems, while entering into a future blue economy that is directed and guided by sustainable ecological principles.

As millions of people live in and around coastal cities and islands, the ability to recognize the threats and benefits of the ocean in relation to economic and public health issues will become a major imperative for marine environmental protection. In order to achieve this, studies in nautical sciences, oceanography, ocean technology, navigation, and fishery technology (all interrelated), will be needed for the effective practice of ocean governance of the Gulf of Guinea and its coastal communities. 

Institutional Arrangements and Principles

In order to achieve the far-reaching security for people and cargo within the Gulf of Guinea and along its coasts, the governments of stakeholder states need to develop and adopt a grand security architecture in their approach to ocean governance. This will require inter-sectoral cooperation amongst the governing bodies.

Modern management principles and an integrated governance framework will be needed to improve enforcement and compliance in this ecological belt. Responsible ocean governance goes beyond legal and institutional arrangements and policies, even though these remain fundamental and key determinants. Other key factors worthy of consideration would include ethics and shared values; the use of the best scientific knowledge, shared information from indigenous knowledge systems; human capacity development; enhanced public awareness systems; technological advancements and innovation. All these are essential to enhancing cooperation amongst the stakeholders in order to strengthen institutional arrangements for ocean governance and to broaden participation amongst governing institutions at all levels in the Gulf region. 

Technological Challenges and Opportunities

The use of science and technology is increasing within many maritime domains. Some of the areas that have seen these developments include improved internet connectivity, marine information forecasts, transport efficiency, navigation, ocean floor profiling, and marine resource exploitation capabilities.

These developments in technology offer great opportunities for capacity development and wealth creation in the sector. In the future, access to cost-effective, timely data will be critical to enhancing ocean governance within the Gulf of Guinea. Information gathering and sharing via geospatial data systems and infrastructures will be essential for maritime domain awareness, observation, reporting, and more detailed exploration of the ocean’s floor. This will ensure the safety and security of marine operators while at the same time improving the management of commercial fishing practices.

Institutional Framework for Ocean Governance and Maritime Safety in the Gulf of Guinea

To achieve the above, institutional frameworks built on a multi-layered approach are required.

African nations within the littoral and landlocked zones of the Gulf of Guinea need to be more committed to formulating strategic maritime policies that engage with key ocean players to build bilateral partnerships. There is a need for an integrated fisheries management policy at the regional level through Regional Conventions and Fisheries Management Boards (RFMBs). This will improve regional ocean fishery regulation.

Finally, there is a need to build the capacity of partner states and organizations to monitor the oceans, conserve marine biodiversity and eliminate illegal, underreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. 

National governments can, through determined political will, take up the mantle of leadership needed to formulate national policies and regulations for their respective states. The regional bodies, on their part, can integrate the policies developed by individual states and fashion them into actionable goals to be achieved within specific time periods. At the global level, international agreements and protocols can be strengthened and implemented with support and advocacy from the diverse coastal communities.

All the above, if well-coordinated, will draw support from the coastal communities. Through social networking, capacity-building, and effective communication, coastal communities will lead the effort and support participatory governance. This will promote shared values and enhance the rule of law.

The Future of the Gulf of Guinea 

Looking into the future, the European Commission, in 2019, established the International Ocean Governance Stakeholders Forum which brought together maritime experts, civil society representatives, academics, and policymakers dedicated to ocean and maritime issues worldwide.

Their terms of reference were to establish new protocols, discuss current challenges that hinder international ocean governance, and recommend future actions to resolve them. African nations dotting the Gulf of Guinea need to borrow from this effort. They need to become more proactive, transcending from being ordinary policy formulators, to implementors of agreed-upon goals for the development of oceans and coastlines in Africa.

Addressing the Gulf of Guinea’s challenges is a significant task, while ocean governance is a daunting issue which demands an interdisciplinary approach and innovative solutions. It remains a known fact that this maritime domain has a community of likeminded peoples with the passion and commitment to tackle these challenges. Their reasons are very simple. The economic and historic importance of the area is beyond reproach.

Much can be achieved through the collective efforts of these coastal communities when they come together as progressive stakeholders for the governance of the Gulf of Guinea. Effective ocean governance within the Gulf of Guinea will require their collective identification of common goals and the implementation of collectively agreed upon effective strategies for managing the region. These must all be built on enduring institutional structures.

It is by doing this, and by carrying out the shared recommendations, that the laudable objective of ocean governance and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea will be achieved.

Bem is the Chief Executive Officer of GOG Marine Limited, a shipowner and management company established to provide high quality product shipping services to end users doing business within the West African sub-region. From 2011 to 2017, Bem through his company BNTI Limited, was actively involved in defense equipment manufacturing projects (through strategic relationships) in India, South America, Europe and the U.S. For many years, he provided technical support and services to Nigerian law enforcement and military end users, supplying them with various hardware requirements. Bem is currently a Certified Management Consultant (CMC), and a Fellow of the Institute of Management Consultants (FIMC).

Featured Image: LIBREVILLE, Gabon (March 21, 2018) Participating African forces and international partners attend the exercise Obangame Express 2018 opening ceremony in Libreville, Gabon, March 21, 2018. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Justin Stumberg)